But danger is more
arduous and difficult when present.
arduous and difficult when present.
Summa Theologica
But a certain fear "drives away all
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to
avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear
is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained.
Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes
men of counsel. "
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men
of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves. " Now
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ([1400]Q[42], A[2]).
Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good
counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of
counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to
him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he
loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more
dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every
passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good
counsel.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the
hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear
is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are
so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be
slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely
disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good
counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because,
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters
he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii,
3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of
good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil
things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty,
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.
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Whether fear makes one tremble?
Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear.
Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold
person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to
cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are
thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of
those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause
trembling.
Objection 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence
laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often
caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently
does not cause trembling.
Objection 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to
the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1401](A[1]), in fear there takes place
a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body,
the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as
stated in De Anima ii, 4.
Reply to Objection 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the
inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or
nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst
ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and
urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are
due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher
says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles,
as also those members which are connected with the breast where the
heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech,
on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip,
too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the
heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason
the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are
more mobile. For which reason the knees tremble in those who are
afraid, according to Is. 35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and
confirm the trembling [Vulg. : 'weak'] knees. "
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Whether fear hinders action?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is
hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action.
But fear disturbs reason, as stated above [1402](A[2]). Therefore fear
hinders action.
Objection 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt
to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls
through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below,
he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders
action.
Objection 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and
trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear
were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good
action.
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the
principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear,
considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on
account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their
heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without
much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far
as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and
work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to
disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But
of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers
a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is
pictured to his imagination.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and
therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome,
it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other
things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that
whereby a man escapes from what he fears.
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OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
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Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice. " Now vice is
contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a
passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is
contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear
excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes
forethought for safety. " Therefore safety is contrary to fear.
Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is
contrary to fear. "
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions
can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of
the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus
they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this
movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names
of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we
are speaking of it in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not
several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one
thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above
([1403]Q[23], A[2];[1404] Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions
admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of
good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according
to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is
contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to
fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who
fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while
daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies
privation, so daring implies safety.
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Whether daring ensues from hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.
Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ([1405]Q[40],
A[1]). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same
order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,
despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore
daring does not result from hope.
Objection 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.
But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.
Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result
from it.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are
hopeful are full of daring. " Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
hope.
I answer that, As we have often stated ([1406]Q[22], A[2];[1407] Q[35],
A[1];[1408] Q[41], A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive
power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one
either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of
something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By
reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object
of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object
of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the
object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which
is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of
itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things
belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope,
avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to
daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore,
that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming
the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair
results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he
fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were
not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to
good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit;
consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues
good.
Reply to Objection 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to
evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the
pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope
precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not
always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not
always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to
which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is
conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined
good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns
away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly
speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair
is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot
be a principal passion.
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Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For
the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are
strong and daring. " But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness.
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
who have no experience of danger are bold. " But want of experience is a
defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be
daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But
the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused
by a defect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means
of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either
non-existent or far off. " But anything pertaining to defect implies
either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of
something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a
cause of daring.
I answer that, As stated above ([1409]AA[1],2) daring results from hope
and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause
hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and
hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the
appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be
considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope,
or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive
movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is
well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes
of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through
having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger;
since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have
harmed others.
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are
more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the
natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a
large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house
as well as it does a small house. " He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4),
that "those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through
the heat in the heart that results therefrom. " He says also in the same
passage that "lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of
the wine": hence it has been said above ([1410]Q[40], A[6]) that
drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear
and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the
heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a
defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man
think greatly of himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more
daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i. e. in so far as
through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor
the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of
fear gives rise to daring.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who
have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to
the assistance of those who suffer unjustly. "
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,
i. e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary,
either in oneself or in another.
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Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first
than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which
is contrary to daring, as stated above [1411](A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But
the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De
Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in
the midst of danger.
Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its
object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more
lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the
greater the difficulty, the greater the daring.
But danger is more
arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is
greatest.
Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds.
But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"anger makes man bold. " Therefore when man is in the midst of danger
and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst
of dangers they stand aloof. "
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances;
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to
face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he
feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a
situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to
the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the
danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in
the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes
the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore
they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the
danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of
their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring
face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and
banishing fear, as stated above [1412](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account
of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the
body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the
heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it
withdraws to the inferior parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if
it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is
a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement
of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to
be.
Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be
some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ([1413]Q[46], A[1]).
Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of
victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does
ensue, there will be greater daring.
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OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
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Whether anger is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one
special passion.
Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary
passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion
is contrary to anger, as stated above ([1414]Q[23], A[3]). Therefore
anger is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But
anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure,
and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is
not a special passion.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because
just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a
likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects
according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is
produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause
remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an
effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain
generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually
existing therein.
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above ([1415]Q[23],
A[4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not
a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a
general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because
love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above
([1416]Q[27], A[4] ). But, in a third way, anger may be called a
general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several
passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account
of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge:
for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to
punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible. " Consequently if
the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not
ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira"
[anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but
because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these
movements, anger is the most patent.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by
contrary passions, i. e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which
is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has
no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a
genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion
of cause and effect.
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Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For
Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] that anger is "the
sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever
obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character
of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since
each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its
object, as stated above ([1417]Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.
Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow. " But
evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge. " But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is
good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing
in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these
ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a
simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and
adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire,
hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as
when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or
being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This
is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so
far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when
a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement
of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it
desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something
contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects
of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes
evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger
regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat
made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
"desire. " But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows
into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger. " But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire. " Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and
in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about
both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught
or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is
therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the
irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of
craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though
the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its
causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the
concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
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Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but
of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they
are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat. "
I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to
be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. " Now
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow
an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason
in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,
wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it
follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that
"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
result of reason's denouncing the injury. " Because the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to
them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens
somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
"but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of
reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an
act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk,
so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those
who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though
hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
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Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire.
Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
"gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to
be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those
things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to
nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is
a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,
viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these
things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more
natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire. "
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If
then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the
object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of
sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these
pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i. e. the nature of this man considered as an animal;
thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very
generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend
to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual.
If, however, we consider the specific nature, i. e. the nature of this
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire,
in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger
"is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything
to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the
nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,
thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is
prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or
any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire.
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to
avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear
is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained.
Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes
men of counsel. "
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men
of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves. " Now
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ([1400]Q[42], A[2]).
Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good
counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of
counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to
him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he
loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more
dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every
passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good
counsel.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the
hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear
is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are
so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be
slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely
disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good
counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because,
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters
he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii,
3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of
good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil
things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty,
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.
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Whether fear makes one tremble?
Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear.
Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold
person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to
cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are
thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of
those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause
trembling.
Objection 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence
laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often
caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently
does not cause trembling.
Objection 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to
the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth. "
I answer that, As stated above [1401](A[1]), in fear there takes place
a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body,
the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as
stated in De Anima ii, 4.
Reply to Objection 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the
inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or
nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst
ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and
urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are
due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher
says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles,
as also those members which are connected with the breast where the
heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech,
on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip,
too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the
heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason
the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are
more mobile. For which reason the knees tremble in those who are
afraid, according to Is. 35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and
confirm the trembling [Vulg. : 'weak'] knees. "
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Whether fear hinders action?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is
hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action.
But fear disturbs reason, as stated above [1402](A[2]). Therefore fear
hinders action.
Objection 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt
to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls
through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below,
he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders
action.
Objection 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and
trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear
were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good
action.
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the
principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear,
considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on
account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their
heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without
much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far
as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and
work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to
disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But
of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers
a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is
pictured to his imagination.
Reply to Objection 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and
therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome,
it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other
things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that
whereby a man escapes from what he fears.
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OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
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Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice. " Now vice is
contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a
passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is
contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Objection 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear
excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes
forethought for safety. " Therefore safety is contrary to fear.
Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is
contrary to fear. "
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions
can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of
the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus
they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this
movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names
of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we
are speaking of it in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not
several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one
thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above
([1403]Q[23], A[2];[1404] Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions
admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of
good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according
to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is
contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to
fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who
fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while
daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies
privation, so daring implies safety.
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Whether daring ensues from hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.
Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ([1405]Q[40],
A[1]). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same
order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,
despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore
daring does not result from hope.
Objection 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.
But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.
Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result
from it.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are
hopeful are full of daring. " Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
hope.
I answer that, As we have often stated ([1406]Q[22], A[2];[1407] Q[35],
A[1];[1408] Q[41], A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive
power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one
either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of
something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By
reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object
of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object
of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the
object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which
is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of
itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things
belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope,
avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to
daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore,
that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming
the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair
results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he
fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were
not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to
good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit;
consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues
good.
Reply to Objection 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to
evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the
pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope
precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not
always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not
always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to
which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is
conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined
good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns
away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly
speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair
is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot
be a principal passion.
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Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For
the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are
strong and daring. " But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness.
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
who have no experience of danger are bold. " But want of experience is a
defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Objection 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be
daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But
the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused
by a defect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means
of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either
non-existent or far off. " But anything pertaining to defect implies
either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of
something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a
cause of daring.
I answer that, As stated above ([1409]AA[1],2) daring results from hope
and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause
hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and
hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the
appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be
considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope,
or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive
movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is
well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes
of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through
having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger;
since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have
harmed others.
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are
more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the
natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a
large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house
as well as it does a small house. " He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4),
that "those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through
the heat in the heart that results therefrom. " He says also in the same
passage that "lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of
the wine": hence it has been said above ([1410]Q[40], A[6]) that
drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear
and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the
heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a
defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man
think greatly of himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more
daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i. e. in so far as
through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor
the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of
fear gives rise to daring.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who
have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to
the assistance of those who suffer unjustly. "
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,
i. e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary,
either in oneself or in another.
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Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first
than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which
is contrary to daring, as stated above [1411](A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But
the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De
Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in
the midst of danger.
Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its
object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more
lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the
greater the difficulty, the greater the daring.
But danger is more
arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is
greatest.
Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds.
But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"anger makes man bold. " Therefore when man is in the midst of danger
and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst
of dangers they stand aloof. "
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances;
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to
face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he
feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a
situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to
the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the
danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in
the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes
the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore
they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the
danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of
their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring
face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and
banishing fear, as stated above [1412](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account
of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the
body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the
heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it
withdraws to the inferior parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if
it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is
a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement
of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to
be.
Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be
some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ([1413]Q[46], A[1]).
Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of
victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does
ensue, there will be greater daring.
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OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
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Whether anger is a special passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one
special passion.
Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary
passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion
is contrary to anger, as stated above ([1414]Q[23], A[3]). Therefore
anger is not a special passion.
Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But
anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure,
and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is
not a special passion.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because
just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a
likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects
according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is
produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause
remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an
effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain
generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually
existing therein.
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above ([1415]Q[23],
A[4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not
a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a
general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because
love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above
([1416]Q[27], A[4] ). But, in a third way, anger may be called a
general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several
passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account
of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge:
for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to
punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible. " Consequently if
the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not
ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira"
[anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but
because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these
movements, anger is the most patent.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by
contrary passions, i. e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which
is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has
no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a
genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion
of cause and effect.
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Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For
Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] that anger is "the
sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever
obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character
of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since
each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its
object, as stated above ([1417]Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.
Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow. " But
evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge. " But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is
good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing
in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we
understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when
we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these
ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a
simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and
adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire,
hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as
when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or
being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This
is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so
far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far
as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when
a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement
of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it
desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something
contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects
of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes
evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger
regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person,
on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat
made up of contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of
"desire. " But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows
into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger. " But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. ] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire. " Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the
vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and
in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about
both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught
or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is
therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the
irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of
craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though
the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its
causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the
concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
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Whether anger requires an act of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but
of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they
are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat. "
I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to
be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to
quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. " Now
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore
anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow
an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason
in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,
wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it
follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger
follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that
"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a
result of reason's denouncing the injury. " Because the sensitive
appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to
them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as
stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens
somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
"but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of
reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an
act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk,
so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those
who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though
hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
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Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire.
Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But
"gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to
be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those
things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to
nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is
a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,
viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these
things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more
natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire. "
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If
then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the
object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of
sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these
pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i. e. the nature of this man considered as an animal;
thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very
generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend
to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual.
If, however, we consider the specific nature, i. e. the nature of this
man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire,
in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger
"is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything
to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the
nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,
thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is
prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or
any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire.
