No More Learning

A yet more remarkable illustration of the same policy was afforded
by the rendition of Mysore to Indian rule. For fifty years the state
1. Tupper, op. cit. p. 117. 2 Pai. "apers, 1891, no. 258, p. 3. : Op. cit. p. 113.


## p. 502 (#542) ############################################

502 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
>
had been managed by British officials under the direct control of the
governor-general. The deposed raja had been refused permission to
adopt a son. At one time it was very generally assumed that the state
had passed permanently into British possession. Yet, when the old raja
died in 1868, it was resolved that his adopted son should succeed to
the government of the state if, when he came of age, he should be found
qualified for the position. Accordingly he was installed as raja in
1881. The Government of India seized this opportunity of determining
with precision what were the rights and duties of the state and of the
paramount power respectively, and the instrument of transfer, dated
i March, 1881, sums up what the government of the crown had come
to regard as the ideal relationship between it and the subordinate
Indian states. This modern document deserves comparison with the
1799 treaty which similarly sums up the views of policy held by
Wellesley, in this matter the most enlightened of all the Company's
governors-general. The present writer has discussed elsewhere the
change of outlook displayed by these documents. Financial stability
was the main object of the earlier, good government the main object
of the later. But in many ways the provisions 'touching the status of
the ruler of Mysore are perhaps the most interesting. The word
“sovereignty”, for instance, nowhere occurs in the instrument of trans-
fer except when referring to British sovereignty. The prince is to be
“placed in possession of the territories” which he is “to hold possession
of and administer". No succession is valid until recognised by the
governor-general in council. The prince must “remain faithful in
allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty". The separate Mysore
coinage, long discontinued, shall not be revived. The military forces
of the state "shall not exceed the strength which the governor-general
in council shall from time to time fix”. The laws and rules in force
ai the time of the transfer shall remain unchanged unless the governor-
general in council approves. It is noteworthy that these limitations
were imposed on one of the largest of the Indian states, covering
nearly 30,000 square miles, with a population of almost five million
persons, governed by a prince who was to be saluted with the maxi-
mum number of guns, and who therefore was reckoned, in spite of his
curtailed authority, on the same level of dignity as princes far less
restricted by treaty provisions. The rendition of Mysore is thus an
outstanding example of the manner in which the crown's disavowal
of any annexationist policy has been observed, even where territory
had been for nearly two generations under British control; but it also
affords the most strikirg instance on record of the contrast between
the views of the crown and those of the Company of what should be
the status of the Indian princes.
To this most important aspect of the present subject we must shortly
return. But it should be noted that other points of general policy are
1 Sketch of the History of India, 1858–1918, pp. 179 sqq.


## p. 503 (#543) ############################################

RENDITION OF MYSORE
503
well illustrated by the instrument of transfer. Of these telegraph and
railway development is one of the most important. Articles 14 and 15
provide for the free grant of all land needed by the Government of
India for these purposes, for the inclusion in the British telegraph
system of all telegraph lines that may be constructed, for their working
(in the absence of special agreement) by the British telegraph depart-
ment, for the exercise of plenary jurisdiction within all land made
over for railway construction. These provisions correspond with the
terms of special agreements made with a number of other states, and
represent the policy of developing these services throughout India as
a whole. In a like manner article 18 proscribes any action affecting
the salt and opium monopolies of the Government of India without its
assent. In the matter of salt Lytton concluded important agreements
with the Rajput states for the acquisition of the main sources of salt
in India, while the general policy of restricting exports of opium,
first accepted by the government of Lord Minto, has obviously affected
the revenues of the opium-producing states.
These points have a special interest of their own. They illustrate
the growth of a community of interests in India as a whole, reflected
in the field of policy by the appearance of that tendency which Lee-
Warner aptly described as “subordinate co-operation”. While com-
munications remained in their mediaeval condition, the resultant
limitation of trade and intercourse hindered the development of
common interests. It was possible still to regard the interests of in-
dividual states and of British India itself as little interdependent, and
consequently to adopt towards the states the former policy (again to
quote Lee-Warner) of “subordinate isolation". As time passed, and
the influence of developing communications became more evident,
this became more and more impracticable. A uniform railway and
telegraph system, for example, would manifestly be more beneficial,
not only to British India, but also to the states, than a variety of
gauges, rates, and regulations. Such ideas inevitably tended to carry
the conception of paramountcy beyond the political into the economic
sphere, and the uniformity achieved in the new economic relations
reacted upon the diversity of the old political relations.
Between 1858 and 1906 there were then numerous causes at work
tending (in defiance of all confirmations) to hasten the decay of the
Company's treaties. The establishment of personal relations with the
crown, the rising standards of administrative propriety, the growth of
common economic interests, multiplied points of contact, occasions
of influence, opportunities of interference, the scope of control; while
the guarantees against the old danger of annexation disposed the
princes to acquiesce in this development of policy and so to enlarge
the extra-diplomatic element in the paramountcy of the crown.
Hence arose the tendency (within limits which it is hardly possible at
1 Cf. Aitchison, op. cit. in, 189.


## p. 504 (#544) ############################################

504 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
present to define) to ignore treaty stipulations where important con-
siderations were deemed to be at stake. This operated, seldom by way
of any formal breach of treaty rights, but by assuming authority
nowhere granted by treaty, or by extending authority admitted by
treaty in one state to others which had not accepted such conditions.
A series of rules began to appear by which the Foreign Department
invariably determined certain questions. The absence of princes from
their states offers an illustration of this tendency. A custom had
sprung up for Indian princes, desirous of travelling beyond the limits
of their states, especially to Europe, to seek the approval of the govern-
inent. This had originated naturally enough in the clauses precluding
them from entering into any relations with another state save through
the agency of the Government of India. Some, however, began to form
a habit of residing for long periods of time in London and other
European capitals, where their occupations, if free from political
taint, were liable to criticism on other grounds. To Curzon, “who took
to government as other men take to pleasure”, this neglect of their
duty seemed an intolerable offence. He therefore issued a circular,
which found its way into the newspapers, laying down the views of
government.
“Repeated absences from India of Native Chiefs”, he observed, "should be
regarded as a dereliction and not as a discharge of public duty. . . the visits of
such princes and chiefs to Europe should only meet with encouragement in cases
where. . . benefit will result from the trip both to the chief and to his people. . .
where such permission is. . . granted,. . . it should be understood that so far from
constituting a ground for the early renewal of the request, it is a reason against
it; and. . . a suitable interval should elapse between the return from travel and
a fresh application for leave. ”
There had, in fact, been imported into the relations with the Indian
states a moral factor alongside of the old political considerations.
Curzon's speech at Gwalior in 1899 voices this in no uncertain manner.
"The native chief”, he said, "has become by our policy an integral factor in
the imperial organisation of India. He is concerned not less than the viceroy
or the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as
my colleague and partner. He cannot remain vis d vis of the empire a loyal subject
of Her Majesty the Queen Empress, and vis à vis of his own people a frivolous
or irresponsible despot. He must justify and not abuse the authority committed
to him; he must be the servant as well as the master of his people. ”
It is significant that this declaration of administrative morality
should have coincided with a marked inclination to tighten the reins
of control. Much as seventy years earlier the Company's aversion to
annexation yielded before the reflection that the extension of British
rule would mean also the extension of educational and missionary
influences, so in 1899 the duty of securing an improved administra-
i The Times, 31 January, 1921.
2 Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, 11, 91.
3 Raleigh, Curzon in India, p. 217.
"2


## p. 505 (#545) ############################################

CURZON'S POLICY
505
tion in the Indian states had come to outweigh the duty of observing
the letter of treaties framed in earlier days. A new attitude had indeed
come into vogue. The Foreign Department came to stress certain
provisions of certain treaties, to lay emphasis upon the conditions
imposed on certain states, to regard what had been done in one state
as a good precedent for what in like circumstances might be done in
any of the others. Nor did the practice invariably work to the dis-
advantage of the states. Down to the close of the nineteenth century,
for instance, there had lingered on queer survivals of oriental diplo-
matic custom. An agent sent publicly by one state to another had
cver been housed and clothed, fed and paid, at the expense of the state
which received him. The practice, perhaps, originated partly in the
oriental traditions of unlimited hospitality, partly in the universal
claims of Eastern kings who never willingly acknowledged any other
temporal dominion than their own and little liked the sight of those
whom they could not regard as their own servants. This tradition
been accepted by the Company's government when it first entered
into close relations with Indian princes; it had maintained the vakils
whom the Bonsla, or the nawab wazir, kept at Calcutta, and had
suffered the princes to pay allowances to the residents whom it sent
to them. This no doubt explains the immense popularity enjoyed by
the political service among the Company's servants of the period. The
revolution in the Company's position transformed this primitive
system of relations. Gradually the princes' vakils ceased to be received
at the headquarters of the government, and the Company's residents
depended on the salaries of the government that employed them. But
a number of advantages of various kinds and varying amounts—known
technically as “casements”-had continued; and just as Curzon laid
down rules regarding visits to Europe, so also in this matter of political
perquisites. In fact the relations with the princes were being regu-
larised, while the principle of “reading all Indian treaties together”,
1
so as to produce something like a coherent body of rules, strengthened
the process. This was definitely laid down by Curzon in his speech at
Bahawalpur in 1903. The ties between the Indian princes and the
British crown, he then said,
have no parallel in any other country of the world. The political system of India
is neither feudalism nor federation; it is embodied in no constitution; it does not
always rest upon a treaty; it bears no resemblance to a league. It represents a
series of relationships that have grown up between the crown and the Indian
princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time
have gradually conformed to a single type. ?
This certainly represents the practice of the Forcign Department
under Curzon's vigorous, if unwise, control. The objections on the
part of the Indian states are evident enough, for the policy casts doubt
upon the validity of individual treaties. Yet in the circumstances of
1 Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 256.
? Raleigh, op. cil. p. 226.


## p. 506 (#546) ############################################

506 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
the case it would have been singularly difficult to avoid. Almost all
the treaties belonged to a world which had completely passed away,
and in which the Company's predominance had been new, uncertain,
questioned. They no longer corresponded with the political facts, and
some general rules of conduct towards the Indian states were indis-
pensable. Even Sir Leslie Scott found himself unable to avoid general
formulas for which assuredly no universal treaty obligations can be
found. “The rights and duties arising from paramountcy”, he says,
“are uniform throughout India. "1 He elsewhere defines paramountcy
as arising “out of the agreed cession of. . . attributes of sovereignty”. 2
Yet there are numerous small states that have never formally made
any such cession. They are, it seems, bound by the cessions that other
states have made. And yet, if for instance the little state of Janjira is
bound by the cessions made by Hyderabad, why is Hyderabad not
bound by the cessions made by Mysore? The fact seems to be that
constructive interpretations and practice based on use and sufferance
could not be excluded from a consideration of the princes' rights and
duties, nor could any real limit be set to their application beyond the
line drawn at any moment by political expediency, failing that general
revision of the treaties which is still awaited.
Certainly no one considering the general course of events within
the period covered by this chapter can deny that political expediency
has materially affected the attitude of both parties, of the Government
of India on the one side and of the states on the other, towards the
question of treaty rights. In general down to 1906 the governors-
general were steadily inclining more and more towards basing their
policy on the maxims of general philanthropy, while their unquestioned
power disposed them in the name of duty constantly to raise the limits
of the expedient. At the same time through most of the period the
princes were equally inclined to acquiesce. They had gained too much
by the abandonment of annexation to oppose the accompanying
growth of paramountcy. It was not until the close of the century that
regulations such as Curzon's rules about visits to Europe excited their
active opposition. Then, indeed, they began to question the validity of
much that had been done, and to consider how much of it might be
reversed. At almost the same moment the attitude of the Government
of India began to change. The explanation lies less in any belated
recognition of the princes' rights than in the fact that political move-
ments within British India itself were beginning to dispute the right
and authority by which India was governed. Assailed by the intelli-
gentsia, the government looked round naturally for allies and helpers.
In 1857 the princes had in general aided to resist the tide of the Mutiny.
In 1907 they might aid to slacken the onslaught of political unrest.
They were therefore to be cultivated rather than coerced. Seeing
their rising value, the princes raised their demands, but not too much,
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 79.
· Idem, p. 64.


## p. 507 (#547) ############################################

IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS
507
for they also were threatened by the same forces that the Government
of India was seeking to dam back into constitutional channels. A new
tendency had come into operation.
It is illustrated by two very remarkable developments, both of which
may be traced back into the pre-Curzonian period. One is represented
by the imperial service troops, the other by the abandonment of the
century-old policy of the isolation of individual states. The distrust or
dislike with which the state forces had been regarded has already been
pointed out. Save for a brief period during the Mutiny, few governors-
general had regarded the states, in their military aspect, save as
potential, if unlikely, enemies. Even at the beginning of the twentieth
century Kitchener's internal defence scheme took them into account
as a source of possible danger. " This, however, was more the survival
of tradition than the policy advocated by the Foreign Department.
The Panjdeh war scare in 1885 had elicited a number of offers from
the Indian states, especially from those near the North-West Frontier,
of troops for service against Russia if need should arise. General
military opinion was averse to anything of the kind. But the secretary
of the Foreign Department, Mortimer Durand, strongly favoured the
idea of utilising the state forces. He discussed it with the lieutenant-
governor of the Panjab, with the governor-general, Lord Dufferin,
with the commander-in-chief, Lord (then Sir Frederick) Roberts. 2
The upshot was the formation of the imperial service troops. These
were bodics of men entirely under the control of the states which
maintained them, trained under British officers specially lent for the
purpose, and never under the orders of the commander-in-chief except
when on active service. The first occasion of their employment was
the Hunza campaign of 1893. They were differentiated from the
contingents of earlier days by the voluntary nature of their main-
tenance, by their being entirely under Indian control and commanded
by Indian officers, and by their recognition depending on their
being kept up to an effective standard, always ready for service
whenever called for. In 1914 they were 22,000 strong, maintained by
twenty-nine of the states. In 1923 they had risen to 27,000. 3 This
represents, as Lee-Warner points out, the complete antithesis of
Wellesley's policy of holding the Indian states in check by the bit and
bridle of subsidiary forces. It even affords a notable contrast with
the policy which had warned Sindhia in 1867 to disperse his favourite
"toy”.
The other development was at least equally significant. The com-
monest clause in the treaties had been that which forbade the states
to enter into relations with each other or with any external power save
i Irthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, 11, 135.
* Sykes, Lifi of Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 172.
3 The Army in India and its evolution, pp. 156–7.
• Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 185.


## p. 508 (#548) ############################################

508 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
through the medium of the Company's government. The constant
repetition of the clause had marked the importance which was attached
to it. It had been the corner-stone of the Company's policy, and for
many years it remained equally important in the eyes of the repre-
sentatives of the crown. It was deemed essential to keep the states
isolated one from another. Lytton was the first governor-general to
propose the abandonment of these views. It is noteworthy that he was
also the first governor-general to attempt to regulate the vernacular
press. In one of those moments of true insight which from time to
time visited him, he wrote to Lord Salisbury,
I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced
Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good
government. . . .
Look at the mistake which Austria made in the government of
her Italian provinces. They were the best governed portions of Italy; she studied
and protected the interests of the native peasantry; but, fcaring the native noblesse,
she snubbed and repressed it. . . . !
He was exceedingly anxious, therefore, to transform the relations
between the states and the Government of India. With this end in view
he pressed for leave to announce, at the durbar in which the queen
was to be proclaimed the Queen Empress, the establishment of an
Indian privy council. This was to be limited, at first at all events, to
the great chiefs, who were to consult with and advise the governor-
general on matters of common interest. But the opposition of the
home authorities proved too strong, and the proposal was cut down
to the bestowal of an empty title, “Councillors of the Empress”, on
some of the leading princes. The effect of Lytton's proposals, had
they been carried into effect, would have been the establishment of
co-operation, not only between the Government of India and the
states individually, but also between the states collectively. This novel
idea, as yet unsupported by the evident development of danger from
within, would, it was still feared, give rise to common understandings
and united pressure such as mightembarrass the Government of India.
In fact it was regarded with the same doleful apprehension as that
with which forty years later distinguished publicists regarded the
creation of the chamber of princes. *
No further step in this direction was taken till the government of
Lord Minto. By then the Indian situation was much more favourable
to a move, for political unrest had reached the point at which it could
not be mistaken. The governor-general consulted the leading states
concerning the spread of anarchist conspiracies; and his reform pro-
posals included the revival of something like Lytton's earlier scheme.
But again the project fell through, largely because in Morley's doc-
trinaire view the only effective remedy for the situation lay in political
concessions.
Lady Betty Balfour, Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 109.
2 Idem, p. 111.
3 Sir Valentine Chirol, ap. The Times, 10 February, 1921.


## p. 509 (#549) ############################################

MINTO'S POLICY
509
The outbreak of war with Germany, however, displayed so strongly
the decision with which the princes held to their position in the British
Empire, that the adoption of the new policy was at last assured.
Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the ruling princes on
matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a
whole". 1 The joint report of Mr Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelms-
ford recommended the establishment of a Chamber of Princes, and
the formation of machinery for joint consultation between the governor-
general and the Indian states on matters of common interest. In 1921
the chamber was inaugurated, bringing to an end a prolonged and
most important phase of the relations between the states and the
Government of India.
The best exposition of the attitude of the governors-general within
the later and formative part of the period is contained in the speech
which Lord Minto delivered at Udaipur in 1909. He fully renounced
the tendency which the practice of the Foreign Department had
exhibited down to the government of Lord Curzon.
“I have. . . made it a rule", he declared, "to avoid as far as possible the issue
of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they
arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions,
antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and
constitutional, of individual principalities. "
This "more sympathetic and therefore more elastic policy" ad-
mitted the existence of more than one type of relationship. Yet Lord
Minto, too, recognised and declared the suzerainty of the crown as
existent quite apart from treaty obligation. “The imperial govern-
ment”, he said, "has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for
the general soundness of [the princes') administration and would not
consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of mis-
rule. ” He maintained the need of interpreting the treaties in the light
of actual fact, of established usage, and indeed of political expediency,
but he drew the line of political expediency far below the level to
which it had been forced by his predecessors. His attitude closely
agrees with that of Lord Reading in 1922. 3
Throughout the whole period, then, neither the claims of the crown
nor the claims of the princes have really depended on the exact
wording of the treaties. Both have fluctuated with the circumstances
of the time. The crown, in two most important points, has receded from
claims which it might have exercised. It has renounced annexation;
it has forgone its right to deal in no other way than individually with
the states. But, as against this, the states have become what they never
were by treaty, parts of an empire. The problem has become con-
stitutional rather than diplomatic. The suzerainty of the crown has
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 20.
* Buchan, Life of Lord Minto, p. 298.
• Parl. Papers, 1926, C. 2621, p. 19


## p. 510 (#550) ############################################

510 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
become by the weight of its power greater than the Company's para-
mountcy ever was. But this process has gone on unsupported by
any formal recognition. The contrast between the political facts and
any theory which both parties would agree to draw from the docu-
ments has become more pronounced. Under the pressure of this
suzerainty the administration of the states has been improved and the
position of the princes in a world of change been greatly strengthened.
But this has been achieved by an illogical expansion of political right
by that sense of moral duty which has been at once the strength and
weakness, the inspiration and obsession, of modern British rule in
India.


## p. 511 (#551) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVIII
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
The story of local self-government in British India reveals a long-
drawn-out effort to retain what was good in existing institutions and
to reinforce these wherever necessary by ideas which
had been proved
to be useful in England. As India was and is essentially a country of
villages, places where, thanks to the space and air available and the
cleansing power of the Indian sun and rains, disease in normal circum-
stances remained within reasonable bounds, the indigenous village
customs were left undisturbed, but for congested areas like towns it
was soon necessary to bring in the system of the West. Local self-
government was imported from England and bestowed as a gift, first
on the three presidency towns and later on the district towns, while
the villages were allowed to retain their ancient customs. Yet it is in
these villages, where the great mass of the people live, that there has
existed for centuries a simple system of local self-government on which
all real advance must be based. As the Decentralisation Commission
has said in its report:
The foundation of any stable edifice which shall associate the people with the
administration, must be the village, as being an area of much greater antiquity
than the administrative creations such as tahsils, and one in which people are
known to one another and have interests which converge on well-recognised
objects.
Unfortunately, owing to the general political unsettlement which
preceded the establishment of British rule in India, there had been
a great decay in the life of the village community so that often it was
hard to discern and call to life the various members of what had been
an organic whole. The following pages will show the efforts to utilise
what was left, for it was the business and policy of the government
“to leave as much as possible of the business of the country to be done
by the people themselves". 2
The conditions of life in the towns, however, called for the early
application of English methods of administration, and many attempts
were made to transplant English municipal life into India. But, since
this system was not an indigenous growth but a forced plant of foreign
importation, it developed in India not like the English local govern-
ment but somewhat like that in France, with local authorities looking
rather to the wishes of the central authority than to what was desired
by the local people and with the conduct of local affairs in the hands
a
i Report, p. 239.
2 Resolution of Lord Lawrence, 14 September, 1864.


## p. 512 (#552) ############################################

512
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
of officials criticised and advised by local inhabitants rather than in
the hands of elected representatives of the locality advised and helped
by permanent officials who were their servants. Such a development
was naturally disliked by the British government in England and by
British officials in India, who often attempted to breed a munici-
pal system like that known in England. These did not meet with any
great success, partly because the English system was not suited to the
situation in the country and partly because officials in India did not
realise the real nature of government control in England.
The subject of local self-government in India naturally divides
itself into two main sections, rural and urban. Each section, again, has
two divisions which demand separate treatment. In the rural area
the administration of the villages with their indigenous local self-
government stands apart from that of the rural district, while among
the towns the presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
have a history quite distinct from that of the others.
VILLAGES
The following description of an Indian village taken from the
Imperial Gazetteer gives a picture which is true for large parts of India. 1
The typical Indian village has its central residential site, with an open space
for a pond or cattle stand. Stretching around this nucleus lie the village lands,
consisting of a cultivated area and (very often) grounds for grazing and wood
cutting. The arable lands have their several boundary marks and their little sub-
divisions of earth ridges made for retaining rain or irrigation water. The in-
habitants of such a village pass their life in the midst of these simple surroundings,
welded together in a little community with its own organisation and government,
which differ in character in the various types of villages, its body of customary
rules, and its little staff of functionaries, artisans and traders.
Such a description is not true of certain parts of India such as Bengal
and Assam, and, even where it may be generally true, there is such
an infinite variety of exceptions that the general application of a
statement must be made and received with the greatest caution.
The chief functionaries were the headman, the accountant, the
watchman, the priest and the schoolmaster, while the artisans included
among others the smith, the potter and the washerman. The final
word in the internal affairs of the village lay with the village council
or panchayat, which settled matters by discussion carried on until
general agreement was reached. The idea that the will of the majority
should prevail or that votes should be taken does not appear to have
existed. Formerly the village officers and artisans were paid by
grants of land or a share of the produce, but during Muhammadan
rule, especially in its later phases, the village community greatly
decayed and the remuneration of both officers and artisans, where
1 Imperial Gazetteer, IV, 279.
· Matthai, Village Government in British India, p. 30.


## p. 513 (#553) ############################################

VILLAGES
513
these remained, largely took the form of cash payments. Sometimes
the village council had disappeared, and in many places little trace of it
could be found. Not that the rulers interfered with village life directly,
for the relation between ruler and village was purely fiscal. So long
as the revenue was paid to the proper official the villages were left to
themselves. There was, however, in the exaction of all the revenue
and perquisites that could be taken from the country, a tremendous
pressure on the peasants which led to the decadence of village life. 1
Accordingly the British administrators had not to deal with a network
of flourishing villages each with a healthy local life, but only with the
remnants of the former system. Such as they were these remnants
were utilised as the foundation of the new rule. Under settled and
peaceful conditions, village life assumed a more normal course, and,
as knowledge was gained with experience, many efforts were made to
revive what was useful in the old village life with reference to educa-
tion, sanitation, watch and ward, administration of justice and poor
relief. In 1814 the court of directors of the East India Company
wrote:
We refer with particular satisfaction upon this occasion to that distinguished
feature of internal polity which prevails in some parts of India, and by which the
instruction of the people is provided for by a certain charge upon the produce
of the soil and by other endowments in favour of the village teachers, who are
thereby rendered public servants of the community.
They urged the government to protect and support these teachers. Sir
Thomas Munro, protesting in 1824 against the proposal to absorb the
village watch of Madras into the regular police, wrote: “No system
for any part of the municipal administration can ever answer that is
not drawn from the ancient institutions or assimilated with them" 3
In 1821 Elphinstone in the Bombay Presidency declared: "Our
principal instrument must continue to be the panchayat and that must
continue to be exempt from all new forms, interference and regula-
tions on our part". 4 Such was the policy laid down at the beginning
of the nineteenth century and followed by later administrators. The
procedure may be illustrated by describing the organisation of the
village watch and ward, an ever-present necessity, and the utilisation
of the village system for special poor relief necessitated every now and
then by the failure of proper rains.
The three original factors of village police organisation were the
headman, the village watchman and the general body of villagers,
all of whom are still utilised for the preservation of law and order. In
Madras the village headman "must maintain law and order in his
village, applying for assistance to higher authorities, if necessary, and
i Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India, chap. viii.
? Howell, Education in British India, p. 6.
: Matthai, op. cit. p. 141.
• Idem, p. 168.
CHI VI
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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
reporting to them the occurrence of crimes and the movement of
criminal gangs". 1 In Bombay the police patel or headman has
like duties to perform, while in the Panjab and the United Provinces
for the reporting of crime use is made of the lambardar or representative
of the landlords of the village. The administrative reports of Burma
commend the police work done not only by the village headmen but
also by their wives, one of whom arrested an armed robber in her
husband's absence. The watchman was in olden times practically a
servant of the headman, usually belonging to one of the menial castes,
who lived on the outskirts of the village, and performed general
service for the community. The importance of his services and position
has been continually recognised by British officials from Lord
Hastings who in 1815 described them as “the foundation of all possible
police in the country”,? right up to the present time. The Police
2
Commission of 1902-3 emphasised the necessity of maintaining the
village watch as part of the village system. 3
It is necessary also from the people's point of view; even if the expensive establish-
ment required could be maintained, it would be vexatious and intolerable to the
people. "Constant interference by the police, constant espionage of village life,'
constant visits of officials of the lowest grades constitute an intolerable burden
to the people.
In spite of frequent attempts on the part of the regular police to get
these watchmen entirely under their control, the policy of the govern-
ment has been, while making them work in harmony with the regular
police, to preserve their connection with the headmen by making
them responsible to the district magistrate through that functionary.
They are paid either by monthly salaries or by the old custom of
assignments of land and grain-fees, and in making new appointments
to this service hereditary claims are always respected. In Bengal
where village headmen did not exist and where the village watchman
was either a servant of the landlord or under the control of the regular
police, continual efforts have been made since 1870 to create a local
village council to collect the pay of the village watchmen and to
control them as village servants. The scheme at first met with little
success, as the council members objected to being responsible for the
pay, and the regular police found that they could get no help from
either council or watchman. Changes were made in the law to give
tl. , magistrate and police more control, but with little improvement
to the system, until finally in 1919 the Village Self-Government Act
gave the council a proper status and dignity and definitely placed the
village watchman in a position subordinate to that authority. Apart
from the headman and the village watchman, whose duties are pre-
scribed by statute, the general body of villagers at times show them-
selves ready for special organised efforts. This readiness has been
utilised by the regular police to form effective bodies to repel the
1 Imperial Gazetteer, iv, 281. 2 Matthai, op. cit. p. 141. • Commission Report, chap. iii.


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VILLAGES
515
attacks of bands of robbers. Such village defence parties have func-
tioned in most provinces and proved especially useful in Bengal in
combating and capturing robbers, even when armed with firearms.
The relief of the poor has in normal circumstances been left mainly
to individual charity, which in India is accepted as one of the principal
duties of ordinary people. So universal is the acceptance of this duty
that ordinarily there has not arisen the necessity for state relief of the
poor which is so common a feature of Western countries. At times,
however, owing to the failure of the rains on which the harvests
depend, large masses of the population are faced with unemployment
and there is a sudden and great contraction of private charity. It is
now the accepted policy of the state to intervene to save the people
from starvation and at the same time to preserve in them to the fullest
possible extent the spirit of self-help. This policy has elaborated a
series of famine codes, the product of successive commissions of enquiry
to report on the results of previous famines and to formulate definite
suggestions for prevention and relief. “There are few things in the
history of Indian administration during the last thirty years in which
the growth of scientific knowledge and the power of organisation have
achieved a more conspicuous success than the prevention and relief
of famines. "i Such famines as do now occur are very different from
those mentioned in the chronicles of the seventeenth century which
were food famines in the strictest sense of the word, times when it was
not a question of obtaining the means to pay for food but of getting
food for all; famines accompanied by huge mortality and voluntary
enslavement of the people. 2 At the present day, thanks to the excellent
communications both within India and connecting her with the rest
of the world, the very idea of a food famine has been banished from
all but a few tracts still inaccessible to the merchant. It is necessary,
however, to help large masses of individuals in want, and the old
village organisation is employed to relieve distress throughout the area
affected by the failure of crops. Famine relief is given in villages by
distributing doles of grain, cooked food or money to poor persons
unable to work or by giving wages in payment of work done on village
relief works. For the administration of this relief a village council or
panchayat is appointed, while full use is made of the headman, ac-
countant, and watchman of the village. To these is added the village
g. ain-dealer who is all-important as the local purveyor. Although in
his capacity as money-lender this individual has been fiercely attacked
in all ages, yet as the local storer of grain and the middleman between
the producer and consumer, he is now recognised as one of the
principal combatants of famine whose services should be enlisted by
the state. The headman, aided by the village council, prepares the
list of those eligible for gratuitous relief, while usually some of them
1 Matthai, op. cit. p. 74.
Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, chap. vii.
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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
form the agency under which village relief works are carried out. The
accountant keeps systematic records of the persons relieved or em-
ployed, while the watchman informs the needy where food or work
may be had and helps to bring in cases too weak to walk. All through
the period they are supervised, corrected and encouraged by the
government official placed in charge of a circle of many villages, and
under his leadership they have made it possible to give wide and
economical distribution of state aid in times of famine
Similar methods have been adopted to utilise the old village
machinery for the extension of primary education and the dispensing
of justice, but the illustrations given above will suffice to show how
efforts have been made to utilise the self-government that was in-
digenous in the country. When the sphere of administration was
enlarged from the viilage to the district, a new departure had to be
made. Except in the collection of revenue there was nothing in the
old system by which the villages were linked up with the higher
authorities. New construction, not an adaptation of the old, was
necessary. For district self-government ideas were imported, ideas
with which the administrators had been familiar in their own country,
and it was hoped that cqual good would result from their planting in
an Indian soil.
RURAL BOARDS
The present system of rural boards throughout India is the result
of the resolution of Lord Ripon's government of 18 May, 1882, which
was worked out and applied in various ways by the different pro-
vincial governments in India. Such diversity, a natural consequence
of the great differences in the peoples and countries of India, was
accentuated by the necessity of utilising as far as possible the organisa-
tion that already existed for carrying on the various works of local
government, such as the construction and maintenance of roads,
village education, etc. Such work, as is usual in India, had been started
without legislation. In Bengal money was raised by regulations which
decreed that public ferries should be managed by the government for
the safety and convenience of travellers, and that surplus proceeds
should be used for the repair and construction of roads, bridges and
drains. Local committees were appointed, with the district magistrate
as secretary, to advise the government of the needs of each district and
to see that the money allotted was spent properly. Although these
committees had no legal power to raise funds, and their work was in
strict subordination to the local government, they were of considerable
use, not only in helping the local officials to realise what roads were
of prime importance, but also in persuading the local gentry to
subscribe for particular pieces of work. The funds available were so
small, less than £50,000 in 1886 for 200,000 square miles of country,
Regulation xix of 1816 and vi of 1819.


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RURAL BOARDS
517
that we find the government urging the committees to encourage local
subscriptions in aid of the work. 1 In other parts of India money was
raised usually by a cess, a small percentage of the land-revenue levied
or paid voluntarily for expenditure on roads and education, this being
the easiest and traditional way of getting any extra money required.
The amounts to be paid were fixed when an assessment of land-
revenue was settled, and, so long as they were used for obvious local
improvements, these levies met with little opposition. In nearly all
cases local committees were appointed, consisting of both officials and
private persons, English and Indian, to help the district officer in
distributing expenditure throughout the area. The needs of various
parts were discussed and the money allotted. It was a type of local
government suited to the conditions of the time that responsibility
should rest on the district magistrate, who got others, interested in the
needs of the district, to help him in the work.
In Madras and Sind proceedings were soon taken to legalise these
cesses and later in 1869 the Bombay Government was armed with a
comprehensive enactment to provide for expenditure on objects of
local public utility and to constitute committees for the proper ad-
ministration of such funds. These bodies were formed not only for the
district as a whole, but also for the taluks or subdivisions of the district,
considerable sums being placed at the disposal of all these bodies. By
the formation of local committees it was hoped that the people might
become accustomed to take an interest in the administration of their
own affairs and give that assistance of which the government stood so
much in need in regulating and providing for local requirements and
improvements. The director of public instruction had reported that
the educational inspectors continued to make the most encouraging
reports of the working of the local cess, and thought he saw his way
to give primary education to the children of the cultivators. All the
members of the committees were nominated, with the local officials
at their head while their proceedings were subject to review and
control by the government. Local self-government had been put on a
definite footing, not like that in England, but rather akin to that on
the continent of Europe in its strict control by officials.
The next phase was inaugurated by the financial reforms of Lord
Mayo in 1870, whereby each province was to bear a part of the growing
state expenditure, and the need for organising local self-government
was clearly laid down in the resolution of 14 September, 1870.
The operation of this resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford
opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal
institutions, and for the association of natives and Europeans to a greater extent
than heretofore in the administration of affairs.
1 Ferry Fund Resolution, 12 September, 1856.
: Act VI of 1863 (Madras Council), VIII of 1865 (Bombay Council).
: Act III of 1865 (Bombay Council). .
• Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 5 February, 1869.


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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Within the next year there was great activity in the various provinces
to place local government on a proper local footing, acts being
passed which legalised existing cesses, adding to them in some cases
and in Bengal even bringing them into existence. As Bengal had so
far escaped all cesses, it raised a cry of indignation at the proposal thus
to raise funds for roads and education.