No More Learning

Yet he at the same time, by the introduction of courts composed of merchants, surrendered the provincials with their hands fettered to the party of material interests, and thereby to a despotism still more unscrupulous than that of the aristocracy had been ; and he introduced into Asia a taxation, compared with which even the form of taxation current after the Carthaginian model in Sicily might be called mild and humane — just because on the one hand he needed the party of moneyed men, and on the other hand required new and comprehensive resources to meet his distributions of grain and the other burdens imposed on the finances. Gracchus beyond doubt desired a firm administration and a well-regulated dispensing of justice, as numerous thoroughly judicious ordinances testify; yet his new system of administration rested on a continuous series of individual usurpations only formally legalized, and he intentionally drew the judicial system — which every well-ordered state will endeavour as far as possible to place, if not above political parties, at any rate aloof from them — into the midst of the whirlpool of revolution. Certainly the blame of these conflicting tendencies in Gaius Gracchus is chargeable to a very great extent on his position rather than on himself personally. On the very threshold of the tyrannis he was confronted by the fatal dilemma, moral and political, that the same man had at one and the same time to maintain his ground,
newly
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THE REVOLUTION AND book it
we may say, as a robber-chieftain and to lead the state as its first citizen — a dilemma to which Pericles, Caesar, and Napoleon had also to make dangerous sacrifices. But the conduct of Gaius Gracchus cannot be wholly explained from this necessity ; along with it there worked in him the consuming passion, the glowing revenge, which foreseeing its own destruction hurls the firebrand into the house of the foe. He has himself expressed what he thought of his ordinance as to the jurymen and similar measures intended to divide the aristocracy ; he called them daggers which he had thrown into the Forum that the burgesses—the men of rank, obviously —might lacerate each other with them. He was a political incendiary. Not only was the hundred years' revolution which dates from him, so far as it was one man's work, the work of Gaius Gracchus, but he was above all the true founder of that terrible urban proletariate flattered and paid by the classes above which through its aggregation in the capital—the natural consequence of the largesses of corn — became at once utterly demoralized and aware of its power, and which —with its demands, sometimes stupid, sometimes knavish, and its talk of the sovereignty of the people — lay like an incubus for five hundred y«ars upon the Roman commonwealth and only perished along with And yet—this greatest of political transgressors was in turn the regenerator of his country. There scarce structural idea in Roman monarchy, which not traceable to Gaius Gracchus. From him
the maxim — founded doubtless in certain sense in the nature of the old traditional laws of war, but yet, the extension and practical application now given to
foreign to the older state-law —that all the land of the subject communities was to be regarded as the private property of the state; maxim, which was primarily employed to vindicate the right of the state to tax that land at pleasure, as was the case in Asia, or to apply for
proceeded
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the institution of colonies, as was done in Africa, and which became afterwards a fundamental principle of law under the empire. From him proceeded the tactics, whereby demagogues and tyrants, leaning for support on material interests, break down the governing iristocracy, but subsequently legitimize the change of constitution by sub stituting a strict and efficient administration for the previous misgovern ment. To him, in particular, are traceable the first steps towards such a reconciliation between Rome and the provinces as the establishment of monarchy could not but bring in its train; the attempt to rebuild Carthage destroyed by Italian rivalry and generally to open the way for Italian emigration towards the provinces, formed the first link in the long chain of that momentous and beneficial course of action. Right and wrong, fortune and misfortune were so inextricably blended in this singular man and in this marvellous political constellation, that it may well beseem history in this case—though it beseems her but seldom —to reserve her judgment.
When Gracchus had substantially completed the new The constitution projected by him for the state, he applied ^the"11
himself to a second and more difficult work
as to the Italian allies was still undecided.
views of the democratic leaders regarding
rendered sufficiently apparent 340). They naturally desired the utmost possible extension of the Roman franchise, not merely that they might bring in the domains occupied the Latins for distribution, but above all that they might strengthen their body of adherents the enormous mass of the new burgesses, might bring the comitial machine still more fully under their power widening the body of privileged electors, and generally might abolish distinction which ha now with the fall of the republican constitution lost all serious importance. But here they encountered resistance from their own party,
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THE REVOLUTION AND BOOK IT
and especially from that band which otherwise readily give its sovereign assent to all which it did or did not under stand. For the simple reason that Roman citizenship seemed to these people, so to speak, like a partnership which gave them a claim to share in sundry very tangible profits, direct and indirect, they were not at all disposed to enlarge the number of the partners. The rejection of
126. the Fulvian law in 629, and the insurrection of the Fregel- lans arising out of were significant indications both of the obstinate perseverance of the fraction of the burgesses that ruled the comitia, and of the impatient urgency of
122. the allies. Towards the end of his second tribunate (632) Gracchus, probably urged by obligations which he had undertaken towards the allies, ventured on second attempt. In concert with Marcus Flaccus—who, although
consular, had again taken the tribuneship of the people, in order now to carry the law which he had formerly pro posed without success —he made proposal to grant to the Latins the full franchise, and to the other Italian allies the former rights of the Latins. But the proposal encountered the united opposition of the senate and the mob of the capital. The nature of this coalition and its mode of conflict are clearly and distinctly seen from an accidentally preserved fragment of the speech which the consul Gaius Fannius made to the burgesses in opposition to the proposal. "Do you then think," said the Optimate, "that, you confer the franchise on the Latins, you will be able to find
place in future — just as you are now standing there in front of me—in the burgess-assembly, or at the games and popular amusements Do you not believe, on the contrary, that those people will occupy every spot? " Among the burgesses of the fifth century, who on one day conferred the franchise on all the Sabines, such an orator might perhaps have been hissed those of the seventh found his reasoning uncommonly clear and the price of the assignation
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of the Latin domains, which was offered to it by Gracchus, far too low. The very circumstance, that the senate carried a permission to eject from the city all non-burgesses before the day for the decisive vote, showed the fate in store foi the proposal. And when before the voting Livius Drusus, a colleague of Gracchus, interposed his veto against the law, the people received the veto in such a way that Gracchus could not venture to proceed further or even to prepare for Drusus the fate of Marcus Octavius.
It was, apparently, this success which emboldened the Overthrow senate to attempt the overthrow of the victorious dema- ^^
gogue. The weapons of attack were substantially the same with which Gracchus himself had formerly operated. The power of Gracchus rested on the mercantile class and the proletariate ; primarily on the latter, which in this conflict, wherein neither side had any military reserve, acted as it were the part of an army. It was clear that the senate was not powerful enough to wrest either from the merchants or from the proletariate their new privileges ; any attempt to assail the corn-laws or the new jury-arrangement would have led, under a somewhat grosser or somewhat more civilized form, to a street-riot in presence of which the senate was utterly defenceless. But it was no less clear, that Gracchus himself and these merchants and proletarians were only kept together by mutual advantage, and that the men of material interests were ready to accept their posts, and the populace strictly so called its bread, quite as well from any other as from Gaius Gracchus. The institutions of Gracchus stood, for the moment at least, immoveably firm witli the exception of a single one—his own supremacy. The weakness of the latter lay in the fact, that in the constitu tion of Gracchus there was no relation of allegiance subsist ing at all between the chief and the army ; and, while the new constitution possessed all other elements of vitality, it lacked one — the moral tie between ruler and ruled, without
Rtral dema- gogism of the senate. The Livian
which every state rests on a pedestal of clay. In the rejection of the proposal to admit the Latins to the franchise it had been demonstrated with decisive clearness that the multitude in fact never voted for Gracchus, but always simply for itself. The aristocracy conceived the plan of offering battle to the author of the corn-largesses and land- assignations on his own ground.
As a matter of course, the senate offered to the prole tariate not merely the same advantages as Gracchus had already assured to it in corn and otherwise, but advantages still greater. Commissioned by the senate, the tribune of the people Marcus Livius Drusus proposed to relieve those who received land under the laws of Gracchus from the rent imposed on them 320), and to declare their allot ments to be free and alienable property and, further, to provide for the proletariate not in transmarine, but twelve Italian, colonies, each of 3000 colonists, for the planting of which the people might nominate suitable men only, Drusus himself declined —in contrast with the family- complexion of the Gracchan commission —to take part in this honourable duty. Presumably the Latins were named
as those who would have to bear the costs of the plan, for there does not appear to have now existed in Italy other
domain-land of any extent save that which was enjoyed by them. We find isolated enactments of Drusus —such as the regulation that the punishment of scourging might only be inflicted on the Latin soldier by the Latin officer set over him, and not the Roman officer—which were to all appearance intended to indemnify the Latins for other losses. The plan was not the most refined. The attempt at rivalry was too clear the endeavour to draw the fair bond between the nobles and the proletariate still closer by their exercising jointly tyranny over the Latins
was too transparent the inquiry suggested itself too readily, In what part of the peninsula, now that the Italian domains
3«4
THE REVOLUTION AND BOOK IV
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had been mainly given away already — even granting that
the whole domains assigned to the Latins were confiscated —was the occupied domain-land requisite for the formation
of twelve new, numerous, and compact burgess-communities
to be discovered ? Lastly the declaration of Drusus, that
he would have nothing to do with the execution of his law,
was so dreadfully prudent as to border on sheer folly. But
the clumsy snare was quite suited for the stupid game which they wished to catch. There was the additional
and perhaps decisive consideration, that Gracchus, on whose personal influence everything depended, was just
then establishing the Carthaginian colony in Africa, and
that his lieutenant in the capital, Marcus Flaccus, played
into the hands of his opponents by his vehement and maladroit actings. The "people" accordingly ratified the Livian laws as readily as it had before ratified the Sempronian. It then, as usual, repaid its latest, by inflict
ing a gentle blow on its earlier, benefactor, declining to re-elect him when he stood for the third time as a candidate
for the tribunate for the year 633; on which occasion, 111. however, there are alleged to have been unjust proceedings
on the part of the tribune presiding at the election, who
had been formerly offended by Gracchus. Thus the foundation of his despotism gave way beneath him. A second blow was inflicted on him by the consular elections, which not only proved in a general sense adverse to the democracy, but which placed at the head of the state Lucius Opimius, who as praetor in 629 had conquered 188b Fregellae, one of the most decided and least scrupulous chiefs of the strict aristocratic party, and a man
firmly resolved to get rid of their dangerous antagonist at the
earliest opportunity.
Such an opportunity soon occurred. On the 10th of De
cember, 632, Gracchus ceased to be tribune of the people ; 122. on the 1st of January, 633, Opimius entered on his office. 121.
the trans marine coloniza tion. Downfall of Gracchus.
useful and the most unpopular measure of Gracchus, the re- establishment of Carthage. While the transmarine colonies had hitherto been only indirectly assailed through the greater allurements of the Italian, African hyaenas, it was now alleged, dug up the newly-placed boundary-stones of Carthage, and the Roman priests, when requested, certified that such signs and portents ought to form an express warn ing against rebuilding on a site accursed by the gods. The senate thereby found itself in its conscience compelled to have a law proposed, which prohibited the planting of the colony of Junonia. Gracchus, who with the other men nominated to establish it was just then selecting the colonists, appeared on the day of voting at the Capitol whither the burgesses were convoked, with a view to procure by means of his adherents the rejection of the law. He wished to shun acts of violence, that he might not himself supply his opponents with the pretext which they sought; but he had not been able to prevent a great portion of his faithful partisans, who remembered the catastrophe of Tiberius and were well acquainted with the designs of the aristocracy, from appearing in arms, and amidst the immense excite ment on both sides quarrels could hardly be avoided. The consul Lucius Opimius offered the usual sacrifice in the porch of the Capitoline temple; one of the attendants assisting at the ceremony, Quintus Antullius, with the holy entrails in his hand, haughtily ordered the " bad citizens " to quit the porch, and seemed as though he would lay hands on Gaius himself; whereupon a zealous Gracchan drew his sword and cut the man down. A fearful tumult arose. Gracchus vainly sought to address the people and to dis claim the responsibility for the sacrilegious murder; he
only furnished his antagonists with a further formal ground of accusation, as, without being aware of it in the confusion, he interrupted a tribune in the act of speaking
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THE REVOLUTION AND BOOK IV
Attack on The first attack, as was fair, was directed against the most
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to the people—an offence, for which an obsolete statute, originating at the time of the old dissensions between the orders 353), had prescribed the severest penalty. The consul Lucius Opimius took his measures to put down force of arms the insurrection for the overthrow of the republican constitution, as they were fond of designating the events of this day. He himself passed the night in the temple of Castor in the Forum at early dawn the Capitol was filled with Cretan archers, the senate-house and Forum with the men of the government party — the senators and the section of the equites adhering to them—who by order of the consul had all appeared in arms and each attended
two armed slaves. None of the aristocracy were absent even the aged and venerable Quintus Metellus, well disposed to reform, had appeared with shield and sword. An officer of ability and experience acquired in the Spanish wars, Decimus Brutus, was entrusted with the command of the armed force; the senate assembled in the senate-house. The bier with the corpse of Antullius was deposited in front of the senate, as surprised, appeared en masse at the door in order to view the dead body, and then retired to determine what should be done. The leaders of the demo
cracy had gone from the Capitol to their houses; Marcus Flaccus had spent the night in preparing for the war in the streets, while Gracchus apparently disdained to strive with
Next morning, when they learned the preparations made by their opponents at the Capitol and the Forum, both proceeded to the Aventine, the old stronghold of the popular party in the struggles between the patricians and the plebeians. Gracchus went thither silent and unarmed Flaccus called the slaves to arms and entrenched himself in the temple of Diana, while he at the same time sent his younger son Quintus to the enemy's camp in order pos sible to arrange a compromise. The latter returned with the announcement that the aristocracy demanded unconditional
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surrender ; at the same time he brought a summons from the senate to Gracchus and Flaccus to appear before it and to answer for their violation of the majesty of the tribunes. Gracchus wished to comply with the summons, but Flaccus prevented him [from doing so, and repeated the equally weak and mistaken attempt to move such antagonists to a compromise. When instead of the two cited leaders the young Quintus Flaccus once more presented himself alone, the consul treated their refusal to appear as the beginning of open insurrection against the government ; he ordered the messenger to be arrested and gave the signal for attack on the Aventine, while at the same time he caused proclama tion to be made in the streets that the government would give to whosoever should bring the head of Gracchus or of Flaccus its literal weight in gold, and that they would gua rantee complete indemnity to every one who should leave the Aventine before the beginning of the conflict. The ranks on the Aventine speedily thinned ; the valiant nobility in union with the Cretans and the slaves stormed the almost undefended mount, and killed all whom they found, about 350 persons, mostly of humble rank. Marcus Flaccus fled with his eldest son to a place of concealment, where they were soon afterwards hunted out and put to Gracchus had at the beginning of the conflict retired into the temple of Minerva, and was there about to pierce him self with his sword, when his friend Publius Laetorius seized his arm and besought him to preserve himself if possible for better times. Gracchus was induced to make an attempt
to escape to the other bank of the Tiber; but when hasten ing down the hill he fell and sprained his foot. To gain time for him to escape, his two attendants turned to face his pursuers and allowed themselves to be cut down, Marcus Pomponius at the Porta Trigemina under the Aventine, Publius Laetorius at the bridge over the Tiber where Hora- tius Codes was said to have once singly withstood the
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Etruscan army ; so Gracchus, attended only by his slave Euporus, reached the suburb on the right bank of the Tiber. There, in the grove of Furrina, were afterwards found the two dead bodies ; it seemed as if the slave had put to death first his master and then himself. The heads of the two fallen leaders were handed over to the government as required ; the stipulated price and more was paid to Lucius Septumuleius, a man of quality, the bearer of the head of Gracchus, while the murderers of Flaccus, persons of humble rank, were sent away with empty hands. The bodies of the dead were thrown into the river ; the houses of
the leaders were abandoned to the pillage of the multitude. The warfare of prosecution against the partisans of Gracchus began on the grandest scale ; as many as 3000 of them are said to have been strangled in prison, amongst whom was Quintus Flaccus, eighteen years of age, who had taken no part in the conflict and was universally lamented on account of his youth and his amiable disposition. On the open space beneath the Capitol where the altar consecrated by Camillus after the restoration of internal peace 382) and other shrines erected on similar occasions to Concord were situated, these small chapels were pulled down and out of the property of the killed or condemned traitors, which was confiscated even to the portions of their wives, new and splendid temple of Concord with the basilica belonging to
was erected in accordance with decree of the senate by the consul Lucius Opimius. Certainly was an act in accordance with the spirit of the age to remove the memo rials of the old, and to inaugurate new, concord over the remains of the three grandsons of the conqueror of Zama, all of whom — first Tiberius Gracchus, then Scipio Aemilianus, and lastly the youngest and the mightiest, Gaius Gracchus —had now been engulfed by the revolution. The memory of the Gracchi remained officially proscribed Cornelia was not allowed even to put on mourning for the death of her
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THE REVOLUTION AND GAIUS GRACCHUS book iv
last son ; but the passionate attachment, which very many had felt towards the two noble brothers and especially towards Gaius during their life, was touchingly displayed also after their death in the almost religious veneration which the multitude, in spite of all precautions of police, continued to pay to their memory and to the spots where they had fallen.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
The new structure, which Gaius Gracchus had reared, be- Vacancy came on his death a ruin. His death indeed,' like that of govern* his brother, was primarily a mere act of vengeance ; but it
was at the same time a very material step towards the restoration of the old constitution, when the person of the monarch was taken away from the monarchy, just as it was
on the point of being established. It was all the more so in the present instance, because after the fall of Gaius and the sweeping and bloody prosecutions of Opimius there existed at the moment absolutely no one, who, either by blood-relationship to the fallen chief of the state or by pre eminent ability, might feel himself warranted in even attempting to occupy the vacant place. Gaius had
from the world childless, and the son whom Tiberius had left behind him died before reaching man hood; the whole popular party, as it was called, was literally without any one who could be named as leader. The Gracchan constitution resembled a fortress without a commander ; the walls and garrison were uninjured, but the general was wanting, and there was no one to take posses sion of the vacant place save the very government which had been overthrown.
So it accordingly happened. After the decease of Gaius Gracchus without heirs, the government of the senate as it
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THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
The were spontaneously resumed its place ; and this was the JJJJJJSwr. mo,,e natural, that it had not been, in the strict sense, formally abolished by the tribune, but had merely been reduced to a practical nullity by his exceptional proceedings. Yet we should greatly err, if we should discern in this restoration nothing further than a relapse of the state-
Phweco-
machine into the old track which had been trodden and worn for centuries. Restoration is always revolution ; but in this case it was not so much the old government as the old governor that was restored. The oligarchy made its appearance newly equipped in the armour of the tyrannis which had been overthrown. As the senate had beaten Gracchus from the field with his own weapons, so it continued in the most essential points to govern with the constitution of the Gracchi ; though certainly with the ulterior idea, if not of setting it aside entirely, at any rate of thoroughly purging it in due time from the elements
really hostile to the ruling aristocracy.
At first the reaction was mainly directed against persons.
democrats. 6
Publius Popillius was recalled from banishment after the 121. enactments relating to him had been cancelled (633), and a warfare of prosecution was waged against the adherents of Gracchus ; whereas the attempt of the popular party to
have Lucius Opimius after his resignation of office con
demned for high treason was frustrated by the partisans of 120. the government (634). The character of this government
of the restoration is significantly indicated by the progress of the aristocracy in soundness of sentiment. Gaius Carbo, once the ally of the Gracchi, had for long been a convert
340), and had but recently shown his zeal and his use fulness as defender of Opimius. But he remained the renegade when the same accusation was raised against him by the democrats as against Opimius, the government were not unwilling to let him fall, and Carbo, seeing himself lost between the two parties, died his own hand. Thus the
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men of the reaction showed themselves in personal questions pure aristocrats. But the reaction did not immediately attack the distributions of grain, the taxation of the pro vince of Asia, or the Gracchan arrangement as to the jurymen and courts; on the contrary, it not only spared the mercantile class and the proletariate of the capital, but continued to render homage, as it had already done in the introduction of the Livian laws, to these powers and especially to the proletariate far more decidedly than had been done by the Gracchi. This course was not adopted merely because the Gracchan revolution still thrilled for long the minds of its contemporaries and protected its creations; the fostering and cherishing at least of the interests of the populace was in fact perfectly compatible with the personal advantage of the aristocracy, and thereby
further was sacrificed than merely the public
All those measures which were devised by Gaius The Gracchus for the promotion of the public welfare —the best Jjj^jjjl, but, as may readily be conceived, also the most unpopular under the part of his legislation —were allowed by the aristocracy to restorat 00. drop. Nothing was so speedily and so successfully assailed
as the noblest of his projects, the scheme of introducing a
legal equality first between the Roman burgesses and Italy,
and thereafter between Italy and the provinces, and—inas
much as the distinction between the merely ruling and consuming and the merely serving and working members of
the state was thus done away —at the same time solving the
social question by the most comprehensive and systematic emigration known in history. With all the determination
and all the peevish obstinacy of dotage the restored
oligarchy obtruded the principle of deceased generations —
that Italy must remain the ruling land and Rome the ruling
city in Italy — afresh on the present. Even in the lifetime
of Gracchus the claims of the Italian allies had been
nothing weal.
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THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
decidedly rejected, and the great idea of transmarine colonization had been subjected to a very serious attack, which became the immediate cause of Gracchus' fall. After his death the scheme of restoring Carthage was set aside with little difficulty by the government party, although the individual allotments already distributed there were left to the recipients. It is true that they could not prevent a similar foundation by the democratic party from succeeding at another point : in the course of the conquests beyond the Alps which Marcus Flaccus had begun, the colony of Narbo
118. (Narbonne) was founded there in 636, the oldest trans marine burgess-city in the Roman empire, which, in spite of manifold attacks by the government party and in spite of a proposal directly made by the senate to abolish per manently held its ground, protected, as probably was, by the mercantile interests that were concerned. But, apart from this exception — in its isolation not very important — the government was uniformly successful in preventing the
assignation of land out of Italy.
The Italian domain -question was settled in a similar
spirit. The Italian colonies of Gaius, especially Capua, were cancelled, and such of them as had already been planted were again broken up only the unimportant one of Tarentum was allowed to subsist in the form of the new town Neptunia placed alongside of the former Greek community. So much of the domains as had already been distributed by non- colonial assignation remained in the hands of the recipients the restrictions imposed on them by Gracchus in the interest of the commonwealth — the ground-rent and the prohibition of alienation —had already been abolished by Marcus Drusus. With reference on the
other hand to the domains still possessed by right of occupation —which, over and above the domain -land enjoyed by the Latins, must have mostly consisted of the estates left with their holders in accordance with the
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Gracchan maximum 320) — was resolved definitively to secure them to those who had hitherto been occupants and
to preclude the possibility of future distribution. It was primarily from these lands, no doubt, that the 36,000 new farm-allotments promised by Drusus were to have been formed but they saved themselves the trouble of inquiring where those hundreds of thousands of acres of Italian domain-land were to be found, and tacitly shelved the Livian colonial law, which had served its purpose —only perhaps the small colony of Scolacium (Squillace) may be referred to the colonial law of Drusus. On the other hand
by law, which the tribune of the people Spurius Thorius carried under the instructions of the senate, the allotment- commission was abolished in 635, and there was imposed lit. on the occupants of the domain-land fixed rent, the pro ceeds of which went to the benefit of the populace of the capital —apparently by forming part of the fund for the dis tribution of corn proposals going still further, including perhaps an increase of the largesses of grain, were averted
by the judicious tribune of the people Gaius Marius. The
final step was taken eight years afterwards (643), when by 111.
new decree of the people the occupied domain-land was directly converted into the rent-free private property of the former occupants. was added, that in future domain- land was not to be occupied at all, but was either to be leased or to lie open as public pasture in the latter case provision was made the fixing of very low maximum of ten head of large and fifty head of small cattle, that the large herd-owner should not practically exclude the small. In these judicious regulations the injurious character of the occupation-system, which moreover was long ago given up (ii. 21), was at length officially recognized, but unhappily
in great part still extant and known under the erroneous name, which has now been handed down for three hundred years, of the Thorian agrarian law.
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THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book it
they were only adopted when it had already deprived the state in substance of its domanial possessions. While the Roman aristocracy thus took care of itself and got whatever occupied land was still in its hands converted into its own property, it at the same time pacified the Italian allies, net indeed by conferring on them the property of the Latin domain-land which they and more especially their municipal aristocracy enjoyed, but by preserving unimpaired the rights in relation to it guaranteed to them by their charters. The opposite party was in the unfortunate position, that in the most important material questions the interests of the Italians ran diametrically counter to those of the opposition in the capital ; in fact the Italians entered into a species of league with the Roman government, and sought and found protection from the senate against the extravagant designs of various Roman demagogues.
While the restored government was thuscareful thoroughly and eques- t0 eradicate the germs of improvement which existed in trian order the Gracchan constitution, it remained completely power- restoration. less in presence of the hostile powers that had been, not
for the general weal, aroused by Gracchus. The prole tariate of the capital continued to have a recognized title to aliment ; the senate likewise acquiesced in the taking of the jurymen from the mercantile order, repugnant though this yoke was to the better and prouder portion of the aristocracy. The fetters which the aristocracy wore did not beseem its dignity ; but we do not find that it seriously set itself to get rid of them. The law of Marcus Aemilius
I22. Scaurus in 632, which at least enforced the constitutional restrictions on the suffrage of freedmen, was for long the only attempt — and that a very tame one — on the part of the senatorial government once more to restrain their mob- tyrants. The proposal, which the consul Quintus Caepio seventeen years after the introduction of the equestrian
1M. tribunals (648) brought in for again entrusting the trials to
The pro-
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
377
senatorial jurymen, showed what the government wished; but showed also how little it could do, when the question was one not of squandering domains but of carrying a measure in the face of an influential order. It broke down. 1 The government was not emancipated from the inconvenient associates who shared its power; but these measures probably contributed still further to disturb the never sincere agreement of the ruling aristocracy with the merchant -class and the proletariate. Both were very well aware, that the senate granted all its concessions only from fear and with reluctance ; permanently attached to the rule of the senate by considerations neither of gratitude nor of interest, both were very ready to render similar services to any other master who offered them more or even as much, and had no objection, if an opportunity occurred, to cheat or to thwart the senate. Thus the restoration continued to govern with the desires and sentiments of a legitimate aristocracy, and with the constitution and means ofgovern ment of a tyrannis. Its rule not only rested on the same bases as that of Gracchus, but it was equally ill, and in fact still worse, consolidated ; it was strong, when in league with the populace it overthrew serviceable institutions, but it was utterly powerless, when it had to face the bands of the streets or the interests of the merchants. It sat on the vacated throne with an evil conscience and divided hopes, indignant at the institutions of the state which it ruled and yet incapable of even systematically assailing them, vacillat ing in all its conduct except where its own material advan tage prompted a decision, a picture of faithlessness towards its own as well as the opposite party, of inward inconsistency,
1 This is apparent, as is well known, from the further course of emits.
In opposition to this view stress has been laid on the fact that in Valerius Maximus, vi. 9, 13, Quintus Caepio is called patron of the senate ; but on
the one hand this does not prove enough, and on the other hand what is
there narrated does not at all suit the consul of 64S, to that there mat be 106. an error either in the name or in the facts reported.
The men restoration
of the most pitiful impotence, of the meanest selfishness — an unsurpassed ideal of misrule.
It could not be otherwise ; the whole nation was in a state of intellectual and moral decline, but especially the upper classes. The aristocracy before the period of the Gracchi was truly not over-rich in talent, and the benches of the senate were crowded by a pack of cowardly and disso lute nobles; nevertheless there sat in it Scipio Aemilianus, Gaius Laelius, Quintus Metellus, Publius Crassus, Publius Scaevola and numerous other respectable and able men, and an observer favourably predisposed might be of opinion that the senate maintained a certain moderation in injustice
and a certain decorum in misgovernment. This aristocracy had been overthrown and then reinstated ; henceforth there rested on it the curse of restoration. While the aristocracy had formerly governed for good or ill, and for more than a century without any sensible opposition, the crisis which it had now passed through revealed to like flash of lightning in dark night, the abyss which yawned before its feet Was any wonder that henceforward rancour always, and terror wherever they durst, characterized the government of the lords of the old nobility? that those who governed confronted as an united and compact party, with far more sternness and violence than hitherto, the non- governing multitude that family-policy now prevailed once more, just as in the worst times of the patriciate, so that e. g. the four sons and (probably) the two nephews of Quintus Metellus — with single exception persons utterly insignificant and some of them called to office on account of their very simplicity —attained within fifteen years
378
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
128-109. (631-645) all of them to the consulship, and all with one exception also to triumphs —to say nothing of sons-in-law and so forth that the more violent and cruel the bearing of any of their partisans towards the opposite party, he received the more signal honour, and every outrage and
?
a it
? a
it, a
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
379
every infamy were pardoned in the genuine aristocrat? that the rulers and the ruled resembled two parties at war in every respect, save in the fact that in their warfare no international law was recognized? It was unhappily only too palpable that, if the old aristocracy beat the people with rods, this restored aristocracy chastised it with
It returned to power; but it returned neither wiser nor better. Never hitherto had the Roman aristocracy been so utterly deficient in men of statesmanly and military capacity, as it was during this epoch of restoration between the Gracchan and the Cinnan revolutions.
A significant illustration of this is afforded by the chief of Marcus the senatorial party at this time, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus. g^Jj^ The son of highly aristocratic but not wealthy parents, and
thus compelled to make use of his far from mean talents,
he raised himself to the consulship (639) and censorship 115. (645), was long the chief of the senate and the political 109. oracle of his order, and immortalized his name not only as
an orator and author, but also as the originator of some of
the principal public buildings executed in this century.
But, if we look at him more closely, his greatly praised achievements amount merely to this much, that, as a
general, he gained some cheap village triumphs in the
Alps, and, as a statesman, won by his laws about voting
and luxury some victories nearly as serious over the revolu
tionary spirit of the times. His real talent consisted in
this, that, while he was quite as accessible and bribable as
any other upright senator, he discerned with some cunning
the moment when the matter began to be hazardous, and
above all by virtue of his superior and venerable appear
ance acted the part of Fabricius before the public. In a
military point of view, no doubt, we find some honourable exceptions of able officers belonging to the highest circles
of the aristocracy ; but the rule was, that the lords of
quality, when they were to assume the command of armies,
scorpions.
Bodal
holders, and in its new arrogance allowed itself with growing frequency to drive them out, the farms disappeared like raindrops in the sea. That the economic oligarchy at least kept pace with the political, is shown by the opinion
3&>
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book IV
hastily read up from the Greek military manuals and the Roman annals as much as was required for holding a mili tary conversation, and then, when in the field, acted most wisely by entrusting the real command to an officer of humble lineage but of tried capacity and tried discretion. In fact, if a couple of centuries earlier the senate resembled an assembly of kings, these their successors played not ill the part of princes. But the incapacity of these restored aristocrats was fully equalled by their political and moral worthlessness. If the state of religion, to which we shall revert, did not present a faithful reflection of the wild dissoluteness of this epoch, and if the external history of the period did not exhibit the utter depravity of the Roman nobles as one of its most essential elements, the horrible crimes, which came to light in rapid succession among the highest circles of Rome, would alone suffice to indicate their character.
The administration, internal and external, was what was to ^e expecte^ under such a government. The social ruin restoration, of Italy spread with alarming rapidity ; since the aristocracy had given itself legal permission to buy out the small
Attaints- uDdertiie
^J'0'
100. expressed about 650 by Lucius Marcius Philippus, a man
of moderate democratic views, that there were among the whole burgesses hardly 2000 families of substantial means. A practical commentary on this state of things was once more furnished by the servile insurrections, which during the first years of the Cimbrian war broke out annually in Italy, eg. at Nuceria, at Capua, and in the territory of Thurii. This last conspiracy was so important that the urban praetor had to march with a legion against it and yet overcame the insurrection not by force of arms, but only by
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
381
insidious treachery. It was moreover a suspicious circum stance, that the insurrection was headed not by a slave, but
by the Roman knight Titus Vettius, whom his debts had driven to the insane step of manumitting his slaves and declaring himself their king (650). The apprehensions of 104. the government with reference to the accumulation of masses of slaves in Italy are shown by the measures of precaution respecting the gold-washings of Victumulae, which were carried on after 6 1 1 on account of the Roman 148. government : the lessees were at first bound not to employ more than 5000 labourers, and subsequently the workings were totally stopped by decree of the senate. Under such
a government as the present there was every reason in fact for fear, as was very possible, Transalpine host should penetrate into Italy and summon the slaves, who were in great part of kindred lineage, to arms.
The provinces suffered still more in comparison. We The shall have an idea of the condition of Sicily and Asia, we Pr0Ttoc,fc endeavour to realize what would be the aspect of matters in
the East Indies provided the English aristocracy were
similar to the Roman aristocracy of that day. The legisla
tion, which entrusted the mercantile class with control over
the magistrates, compelled the latter to make common cause
to certain extent with the former, and to purchase for themselves unlimited liberty of plundering and protection
from impeachment by unconditional indulgence towards
the capitalists in the provinces. In addition to these Piracy, official and semi-official robbers, freebooters and pirates
pillaged all the countries of the Mediterranean. In the
Asiatic waters more especially the buccaneers carried their outrages so far that even the Roman government found
itself under the necessity in 652 of despatching to Cilicia 102. fleet, mainly composed of the vessels of the dependent mercantile cities, under the praetor Marcus Antonius, who
was invested with proconsular powers. This fleet captured
a
a
if
if,
a
Occupation 0 ' lcla-
a number of corsair-vessels and destroyed some rock-strong holds ; and not only so, but the Romans even settled them selves permanently there, and in order to the suppression of piracy in its chief seat, the Rugged or western Cilicia, occupied strong military positions—the first step towards the establishment of the province of Cilicia, which thence- forth appears among the Roman magistracies. 1 The design was commendable, and the scheme in itself was suitable for its purpose ; only, the continuance and the increase of the evil of piracy in the Asiatic waters, and especially in Cilicia, unhappily showed with how inadequate means the pirates were combated from the newly-acquired position.
But nowhere did the impotence and perversity of the
38a
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
Revolts of
"• Roman provincial administration come to light so con
spicuously as in the insurrections of the slave proletariate, which seemed to have revived on their former footing simultaneously with the restoration of the aristocracy. These insurrections of the slaves swelling from revolts into
184. wars —which had emerged just about 620 as one, and that
1 It is assumed in many quarters that the establishment of the province of Cilicia only took place after the Cilician expedition of Publius Servilius 92. in 676 tl seq. , but erroneously ; for as early as 662 we find Sulla (Appian,
78.
80. 79. Mithr. 57 ; B. C. i. 77; Victor, 75), and in 674, 67s, Gnaeus Dolabella
102.
(Cic. Verr. i. i, 16, 44) as governors of Cilicia—which leaves no alter- native but to place the establishment of the province in 653. This view is further supported by the fact that at this time the expeditions of the Romans against the corsairs—e. g. the Balearic, Ligurian, and Dalmatian expeditions —appear to have been regularly directed to the occupation of the points of the coast whence piracy issued ; and this was natural, for, as the Romans had no standing fleet, the only means of effectually checking piracy was the occupation of the coasts. It is to be remembered, more over, that the idea of a provincia did not absolutely involve possession of the country, but in itself implied no more than an independent military command ; it is very possible, that the Romans in the first instance occupied nothing in this rugged country save stations for their vessels and troops.
The plain of eastern Cilicia remained down to the war against Tigranes attached to the Syrian empire (Appian, Syr. 48) ; the districts to the north of the Taurus formerly reckoned as belonging to Cilicia — Cappa- docian Cilicia, as it was called, and Cataonia —belonged to Cappadocia, the former from the time of the breaking up of the kingdom of Attalus (Justin, xxxvii. 1 ; see above, p. 378), the latter probably even from the time of the peace with Antiochus.
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
383
perhaps the proximate, cause of the Gracchan revolution — were renewed and repeated with dreary uniformity. Again, as thirty years before, a ferment pervaded the body of slaves throughout the Roman empire. We have already men tioned the Italian conspiracies. The miners in the Attic silver-mines rose in revolt, occupied the promontory of Sunium, and issuing thence pillaged for a length of time the surrounding country. Similar movements appeared at other places.
But the chief seat of these fearful commotions was once
more Sicily with its plantations and its hordes of slaves ^aian brought thither from Asia Minor. It is significant of the greatness of the evil, that an attempt of the government to
check the worst iniquities of the slaveholders was the immediate cause of the new insurrection. That the free proletarians in Sicily were little better than the slaves, had
been shown by their attitude in the first insurrection
(p. 310) ; after it was subdued, the Roman speculators took
their revenge and reduced numbers of the free provincials
into slavery. In consequence of a sharp enactment issued against this by the senate in 650, Publius Licinius Nerva, 104 the governor of Sicily at the time, appointed a court for deciding on claims of freedom to sit in Syracuse. The
court went earnestly to work ; in a short time decision was
given in eight hundred processes against the slave-owners,
and the number of causes in dependence was daily on the
increase. The terrified planters hastened to Syracuse, to compel the Roman governor to suspend such unparalleled administration of justice; Nerva was weak enough to let himself be terrified, and in harsh language informed the non-free persons requesting trial that they should forgo their troublesome demand for right and justice and should instantly return to those who called themselves their masters. Those who were thus dismissed, instead of doing as he bade them, formed a conspiracy and went to the mountains.
Thetecond
384
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
The governor was not prepared for military measures, and even the wretched militia of the island was not immediately at hand ; so that he concluded an alliance with one of the best known captains of banditti in the island, and induced him by the promise of personal pardon to betray the revolted slaves into the hands of the Romans. He thus gained the mastery over this band. But another band of runaway slaves succeeded in defeating a division of the garrison of Enna (Castrogiovanni) ; and this first success procured for the insurgents —what they especially needed — arms and a conflux of associates. The armour of their fallen or fugitive opponents furnished the first basis of their military organization, and the number of the insurgents soon swelled to many thousands. These Syrians in a foreign land already, like their predecessors, seemed to themselves not unworthy to be governed by kings, as were their countrymen at home ; and—parodying the trumpery king
of their native land down to the very name — they placed the slave Salvius at their head as king Tryphon. In the district between Enna and Leontini (Lentini) where these bands had their head-quarters, the open country was wholly in the hands of the insurgents and Morgantia and other walled towns were already besieged by them, when the Roman governor with his hastily-collected Sicilian and Italian troops fell upon the slave-army in front of Morgantia. He occupied the undefended camp ; but the slaves, although surprised, made a stand. In the combat that ensued the levy of the island not only gave way at the first onset, but, as the slaves allowed every one who threw down his arms to escape unhindered, the militia almost without exception embraced the good opportunity of taking their departure, and the Roman army completely dispersed. Had the slaves in Morgantia been willing to make common cause with their comrades before the gates, the town was lost ; but they prsf**^ to accept the gift of freedom in
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
385
legal form from their masters, and by their valour helped them to save the town — whereupon the Roman governor declared the promise of liberty solemnly given to the slaves by the masters to be void in law, as having been illegally extorted.
While the revolt thus spread after an alarming manner Athenion. in the interior of the island, a second broke out on the west
coast. It was headed by Athenion. He had formerly
been, just like Cleon, a dreaded captain of banditti in his
native country of Cilicia, and had been carried thence as a slave to Sicily. He secured, just as his predecessors had done, the adherence of the Greeks and Syrians especially by prophesyings and other edifying impostures ; but skilled in war and sagacious as he was, he did not, like the other leaders, arm the whole mass that flocked to him, but formed out of the men able for warfare an organized army, while he assigned the remainder to peaceful employment In consequence of his strict discipline, which repressed all vacillation and all insubordinate movement in his troops, and his gentle treatment of the peaceful inhabitants of the country and even of the captives, he gained rapid and great successes. The Romans were on this occasion disappointed in the hope that the two leaders would fall out ; Athenion voluntarily submitted to the far less capable king Tryphon, and thus preserved unity among the insurgents. These soon ruled with virtually absolute power over the flat country, where the free proletarians again took part more or less openly with the slaves ; the Roman authorities were
not in a position to take the field against them, and had to rest content with protecting the towns, which were in the most lamentable plight, by means of the militia of Sicily and that of Africa brought over in all haste. The admini stration of justice was suspended over the whole island, and force was the only law. As no cultivator living in town ventured any longer beyond the gates, and no countryman
vol. in
90
386
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
ventured into tue towns, the most fearful famine set in, and the town-population of this island which formerly fed Italy
had to be supported by the Roman authorities
supplies of grain. Moreover, conspiracies of the town- slaves everywhere threatened to break out within, while the insurgent armies lay before, the walls ; even Messana was within a hair's breadth of being conquered by Athenion.
Difficult as it was for the government during the serious war with the Cimbri to place a second army in the field, 103. it could not avoid sending in 651 an army of 14,000
Romans and Italians, not including the transmarine militia, under the praetor Lucius Lucullus to the island. The united slave-army was stationed in the mountains above Sciacca, and accepted the battle which Lucullus offered. The better military organization of the Romans gave them the victory; Athenion was left for dead on the field, Tryphon had to throw himself into the mountain -fortress of Triocala; the insurgents deliberated earnestly whether it was possible to continue the struggle longer. But the party, which was resolved to hold out to the last man, retained the upper hand ; Athenion, who had been saved in a marvellous manner, reappeared among his troops and revived their sunken courage ; above all, Lucullus with incredible negligence took not the smallest step to follow up his victory ; in fact, he is said to have intentionally disorganized the army and to have burned his field baggage, with a view to screen the total inefficacy of his administration and not to be cast into the shade by his successor. Whether this
102. wao true or not, his successor Gaius Servilius (652) obtained no better results ; and both generals were afterwards crimi nally impeached and condemned for their conduct in office —which, however, was not at all a certain proof of their
102. guilt. Athenion, who after the death of Tryphon (652) was invested with the sole command, stood victorious at 101. the head of a considerable army, when in 653 Manius
sending
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
387
Aquillius, who had during the previous year distinguished Aquffltat. himself under Marius in the war with the Teutones, was as
consul and governor entrusted with the conduct of the war.
After two years of hard conflicts —Aquillius is said to have
fought in person with Athenion, and to have killed him in single combat—the Roman general at length put down the desperate resistance, and vanquished the insurgents in their last retreats by famine. The slaves on the island were pro hibited from bearing arms and peace was again restored to
or, in other words, its recent tormentors were relieved by those of former use and wont in fact, the victor himself occupied prominent place among the numerous and energetic robber-magistrates of this period. Any one who still required proof of the internal quality of the govern ment of the restored aristocracy might be referred to the origin and to the conduct of this second Sicilian slave-war, which lasted for five years.
But wherever the eye might turn throughout the wide The sphere of Roman administration, the same causes and the SS^ same effects appeared. If the Sicilian slave- war showed
how far the government was from being equal to even its simplest task of keeping in check the proletariate, contem
porary events in Africa displayed the skill with which the Romans now governed the client -states. About the very
time when the Sicilian slave-war broke out, there was exhibited before the eyes of the astonished world the spectacle of an unimportant client-prince able to carry out
fourteen years' usurpation and insurrection against the mighty republic which had shattered the kingdoms of Macedonia and Asia with one blow of its weighty arm— and that not by means of arms, but through the pitiful character of its rulers.
The kingdom of Numidia stretched from the river Numldfc. Molochath to the great Syrtis (ii. 381/), bordering on the
one side with the Maureianian kingdom of Tingis (the
a
it,
'
a a
;
jugurtha.
388
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book i>
modem Morocco) and on the other with Cyrene and Egypt, and surrounding on the west, south, and east the narrow district of coast which formed the Roman province of Africa. In addition to the old possessions of the Numidian chiefs, it embraced by far the greatest portion of the territory which Carthage had possessed in Africa during the times of its prosperity —including several important Old-Phoeni cian cities, such as Hippo Regius (Bona) and Great Leptis (Lebidah) —altogether the largest and best part of the rich seaboard of northern Africa. Numidia was beyond ques tion, next to Egypt, the most considerable of all the Roman
149. client-states. After the death of Massinissa (605), Scipio had divided the sovereign functions of that prince among his three sons, the kings Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal, in such a way that the firstborn obtained the residency and the state-chest, the second the charge of war, and the third the administration of justice 251). Now after the death of his two brothers Massinissa's eldest son, Micipsa,1 reigned alone, feeble peaceful old man, who was fond of occupy ing himself more with the study of Greek philosophy than with affairs of state. As his sons were not yet grown up, the reins of government were practically held an illegiti- mate nephew of the king, the prince Jugurtha. Jugurtha was no unworthy grandson of Massinissa. He was hand some man and skilled and courageous rider and hunter
The following table exhibits the genealogy of the Numidian princes :— Massinissa, 516-605 (338-149).
AdherbaL '64s
Micipsa (Diod. B. 607).
Massin, 643
Gauda before 666
(88). Hkmpaal IL
J«b»L JabalL
Jugurtha, {650 (104).
Oiyuiaa,
Micipsa, 636(118).
Hiempsal U- 637
(117).
Gulussa, before 636 (hB).
Mastanabal, before 636(11! )
(i"X
f
(
t
J
*
-\ I I.
a I
J
t
1
I
(p.
I I
by a
♦
;
a
chap, IV THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
389
his countrymen held him in high honour as a clear and sagacious administrator, and he had displayed his military ability as leader of the Numidian contingent before Numantia under the eyes of Scipio. His position in the kingdom, and the influence which he possessed with the Roman government by means of his numerous friends and war-comrades, made it appear to king Micipsa advisable to adopt him (634), and to arrange in his testament that his 120. own two elder sons Adherbal and Hiempsal, and his adopted son Jugurtha along with them, should jointly inherit and govern the kingdom, just as he himself had done with his two brothers. For greater security this arrangement was placed under the guarantee of the Roman government
Soon afterwards, in 636, king Micipsa died. The testa- The [118. ment came into force : but the two sons of Micipsa—the JTmidiiui* vehement Hiempsal still more than his weak elder brother succession. —soon came into so violent collision with their cousin
whom they looked on as an intruder into the legitimate
line of succession, that the idea of a joint reign of the three
kings had to be abandoned. An attempt was made to
carry out a division of the heritage; but the quarrelling
kings could not agree as to their quotas of land and treasure,
and the protecting power, to which in this case the decisive
word by right belonged, gave itself, as usual, no concern
about this affair. A rupture took place ; Adherbal and
Hiempsal were disposed to characterize their father's testa
ment as surreptitious and altogether to dispute Jugurtha's
right of joint inheritance, while on the other hand Jugurtha
came forward as a pretender to the whole kingdom. While
the discussions as to the partition were still going on,
Hiempsal was made away with by hired assassins ; then a
civil war arose between Adherbal and Jugurtha, in which
all Numidia took part. With his less numerous but better disciplined and better led troops Jugurtha conquered, and
390
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book i»
seized the whole territory of the kingdom, subjecting the chiefs who adhered to his cousin to the most cruel perse cution. Adherbal escaped to the Roman province and proceeded to Rome to make his complaint there. Jugurtha had expected this, and had made his arrangements to meet the threatened intervention. In the camp before Numantia he had learned more from Rome than Roman tactics ; the Numidian prince, introduced to the circles of the Roman aristocracy, had at the same time been initiated into the intrigues of Roman coteries, and had studied at the fountain-head what might be expected from Roman nobles. Even then, sixteen years before Micipsa's death, he had entered into disloyal negotiations as to the Numidian suc cession with Roman comrades of rank, and Scipio had been under the necessity of gravely reminding him that it was becoming in foreign princes to be on terms of friend ship with the Roman state rather than with individual Roman citizens. The envoys of Jugurtha appeared in Rome, furnished with something more than words : that they had chosen the right means of diplomatic persuasion, was shown by the result The most zealous champions of Adherbal's just title were with incredible rapidity convinced that Hiempsal had been put to death by his subjects on account of his cruelty, and that the originator of the war as to the succession was not Jugurtha, but AdherbaL Even the leading men in the senate were shocked at the scandal ;
Marcus Scaurus sought to check but in vain. The senate passed over what had taken place in silence, and ordained that the two surviving testamentary heirs should have the kingdom equally divided between them, and that, for the prevention of fresh quarrels, the division should be undertaken by commission of the senate. This was done the consular Lucius Opimius, well known through his services in setting aside the revolution, had embraced the opportunity of gathering the reward of his patriotism,
:
a
it,
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
391
and had got himself placed at the head of the commission. The division turned out thoroughly in favour of Jugurtha, and not to the disadvantage of the commissioners; Cirta
the capital with its port of Rusicade (Philippeville) was no doubt given to Adherbal, but by that very arrangement the portion which fell to him was the
eastern part of the kingdom consisting almost wholly of sandy deserts, while Jugurtha obtained the fertile and
(Constantine)
western half (what was afterwards Mauretania Caesariensis and Sitifensis).
This was bad; but matters soon became worse. In order sieged to be able under the semblance of self-defence to defraud Adherbal of his portion, Jugurtha provoked him to war ; but
when the weak man, rendered wiser by experience, allowed Jugurtha's horsemen to ravage his territory unhindered and contented himself with lodging complaints at Rome, Ju
gurtha, impatient of these ceremonies, began the war even without pretext Adherbal was totally defeated in the region of the modern Philippeville, and threw himself into his capital of Cirta in the immediate vicinity. While the siege was in progress, and Jugurtha's troops were daily skirmishing with the numerous Italians who were settled in Cirta and who took a more vigorous part in the defence of the city than the Africans themselves, the commission despatched by the Roman senate on Adherbal's first complaint made its appearance ; composed, of course, of young inexperienced men, such as the government of those times regularly employed in the ordinary missions of the state. The envoys demanded that Jugurtha should allow them as deputed by the protecting power to Adherbal to enter the city, and generally that he should suspend hostilities and accept their mediation. Jugurtha summarily rejected both demands, and the envoys hastily returned home — like boys, as they were—to report to the fathers of the city. The fathers listened to the report, and allowed their countrymen in
populous
112.
Roman inter ven tion.
Cirta just to fight on as long as they pleased. It was not till, in the fifth month of the siege, a messenger of Adherbal stole through the entrenchments of the enemy and a letter of the king full of the most urgent entreaties reached the senate, that the latter roused itself and actually adopted a resolution —not to declare war as the minority demanded, but to send a new embassy —an embassy, however, headed by Marcus Scaurus, the great conqueror of the Taurisci and the freedmen, the imposing hero of the aristocracy, whose mere appearance would suffice to bring the refractory king to a different mind. In fact Jugurtha appeared, as he was bidden, at Utica to discuss the matter with Scaurus ; endless debates were held ; when at length the conference was con cluded, not the slightest result had been obtained. The embassy returned to Rome without having declared war, and the king went off again to the siege of Cirta. Adherbal found himself reduced to extremities and despaired of Roman support ; the Italians in Cirta moreover, weary of the siege and firmly relying for their own safety on the terror of the Roman name, urged a surrender. So the town capitulated. Jugurtha ordered his adopted brother to be executed amid cruel tortures, and all the adult male popula tion of the town, Africans as well as Italians, to be put to the
sword (642).
A cry of indignation rose throughout Italy. The mino
rity in the senate itself and every one out of the senate unanimously condemned the government, with whom the honour and interest of the country seemed mere commodi ties for sale ; loudest of all was the outcry of the mercan tile class, which was most directly affected by the sacrifice of the Roman and Italian merchants at Cirta. It is true that the majority of the senate still even now struggled ; they appealed to the class-interests of the aristocracy, and set in motion all the contrivances of collegiate procrastina tion, with a view to preserve still longer the peace which
39a
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
CHaP, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
393
they loved. But when Gaius Memmius, designated as
tribune of the people for next year, an active and eloquent
man, brought the matter publicly forward and threatened in
his capacity of tribune to call the worst offenders to judicial account, the senate permitted war to be declared against Jugurtha (642-3). The step seemed taken in earnest. The 113. 111. envoys of Jugurtha were dismissed from Italy without being admitted to an audience ; the new consul Lucius Calpurnius
Bestia, who was distinguished, among the members of his order at least, by judgment and activity, prosecuted the warlike preparations with energy ; Marcus Scaurus himself took the post of a commander in the African army. In a short time a Roman army was on African ground, and marching upward along the Bagradas (Mejerdah) advanced into the Numidian kingdom, where the towns most remote from the seat of the royal power, such as Great Leptis, already voluntarily sent in their submission, while Bocchus king of
Mauretania, although his daughter was married to Jugurtha, offered friendship and alliance to the Romans. Jugurtha himself lost courage, and sent envoys to the Roman head quarters to request an armistice. The end of the contest seemed near, and came still more rapidly than was expected. The treaty with Bocchus broke down, because the king, unacquainted with Roman customs, had conceived that he should be able to conclude a treaty so advantageous for the Romans without any gratuity, and therefore had neglected to furnish his envoys with the usual market price of Roman alliances. Jugurtha at all events knew Roman institutions better, and had not omitted to support his proposals for an armistice by a due accompaniment of money ; but he too was deceived. After the first negotiations it turned out that not an armistice merely but a peace was purchaseable at the Roman head-quarters. The royal treasury was still well filled with the savings of Massinissa ; the transaction was soon settled. The treaty was concluded, after it had
Treaty
been for the sake of form submitted to a council of war, whose consent was procured after an irregular and extremely summary discussion. Jugurtha submitted at discretion ; but the victor was merciful and gave him back his kingdom undiminished, in consideration of his paying a moderate fine and delivering up the Roman deserters and the war elephants
If***TM, Numidia,
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THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book it
111. (643) ; the greater part of the latter the king afterwards re purchased by bargaining with the individual Roman com mandants and officers.
On the news of this peace the storm once more broke forth in Rome. Everybody knew how the peace had been brought about ; even Scaurus was evidently open to bribery, only at a price higher than the ordinary senatorial average. The legal validity of the peace was seriously assailed in the senate ; Gaius Memmius declared that the king, if he had really submitted unconditionally, could not refuse to appear in Rome, and that he should accordingly be summoned before them, with the view of ascertaining how the matter actually stood as to the thoroughly irregular negotiations for peace by hearing both the contracting parties. They yielded to the inconvenient demand : but at the same time granted a safe-conduct to the king inconsistently with the law, for he came not as an enemy, but as one who had made his submission. Thereupon the king actually appeared at Rome and presented himself to be heard before the assembled people, which was with difficulty induced to respect the safe-conduct and to refrain from tearing in pieces on the spot the murderer of the Italians at Cirta. But scarcely had Gaius Memmius addressed his first question to the king, when one of his colleagues interfered in virtue of his veto and enjoined the king to be silent Here too African gold was more powerful than the will of the sovereign people and of its supreme magistrates. Mean while the discussions respecting the validity of the peace so concluded went on in the senate, and the new consul
chap, it THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
39S
Spurius Postumius Albinus zealously supported the proposal to cancel in the expectation that that case the chief command in Africa would devolve on him. This induced Massiva, grandson of Massinissa living in Rome, to assert before the senate his claims to the vacant Numidian king dom upon which Bomilcar, one of the confidants of king Jugurtha, doubtless under his instructions made away with the rival of his master assassination, and, when he was prosecuted on account of escaped with Jugurtha's aid from Rome.
This new outrage perpetrated under the eyes of the
Roman government was at least so far effectual, that the
senate now cancelled the peace and dismissed the king Declaration from the city (winter of 643-644). The war was accord- 111-110. ingly resumed, and the consul Spurius Albinus was invested
with the command (644). But the African army down to lim
its lowest ranks was in state of disorganization corre
sponding to such political and military superintendence.
Not only had discipline ceased and the spoliation of Numidian townships and even of the Roman provincial
territory become during the suspension of hostilities the
chief business of the Roman soldiery, but not few officers
and soldiers had as well as their generals entered into
secret understanding with the enemy. easy to see
that such an army could do nothing in the field and
Jugurtha on this occasion bribed the Roman general into
inaction, as was afterwards judicially asserted against the
latter, he did truth what was superfluous. Spurius
Albinus therefore contented himself with doing nothing.
On the other hand his brother who after his departure
assumed the interim command —the equally foolhardy and
incapable Aulus Postumius —in the middle of winter fell on
the idea of seizing by bold coup de main the treasures of
the king, which were kept in the town of Suthul (afterwards
Calama, now Guelma) difficult of access and still more
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difficult of conquest The army set out thither and reached the town ; but the siege was unsuccessful and without prospect of result, and, when the king who had remained for a time with his troops in front of the town went into the desert, the Roman general preferred to pursue him. This was precisely what Jugurtha intended ; in a nocturnal assault, which was favoured by the difficulties of the ground and the secret understanding which Jugurtha had with some in the Roman army, the Numidians captured the Roman camp, and drove the Romans, many of whom were unarmed, before them in the most complete and disgraceful rout The consequence was a capitulation,
396
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
tion of the the terms of which —the marching off of the Roman army Romans.
Second under the yoke, the immediate evacuation of the whole
peace.
Dissatis This was too much to be borne. While the Africans faction in were exulting and the prospect—thus suddenly opened up the capital. —of such an overthrow of the alien domination as had
been reckoned scarcely possible was bringing numerous tribes of the free and half-free inhabitants of the desert to the standards of the victorious king, public opinion in Italy was vehemently aroused against the equally corrupt and pernicious governing aristocracy, and broke out in a storm of prosecutions which, fostered by the exasperation of the mercantile class, swept away a succession of victims from the highest circles of the nobility. On the proposal of the tribune of the people Gaius Mamilius Limetanus, in spite of the timid attempts of the senate to avert the threatened punishment, an extraordinary jury-commission was appointed to investigate the high treason that had occurred in connec tion with the question of the Numidian succession ; and its sentences sent the two former commanders-in-chief Gaius Bestia and Spurius Albinus as well as Lucius Opimius, the
Numidian territory, and the renewal of the treaty cancelled
by the senate —were dictated by Jugurtha and accepted by 109. the Romans (in the beginning of 645).
chap, iv THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION
397
head of the first African commission and the executioner withal of Gaius Gracchus, along with numerous other less notable men of the government party, guilty and innocent, into exile. That these prosecutions, however, were only intended to appease the excitement of public opinion, in the capitalist circles more especially, by the sacrifice of some of the persons most compromised, and that there was in them not the slightest trace of a rising of popular indignation against the government itself, void as it was of right and honour, is shown very clearly by the fact that no one ventured to attack the guiltiest of the guilty, the prudent and powerful Scaurus ; on the contrary he was about this very time elected censor and also, incredible as it may seem, chosen as one of the presidents of the extra ordinary commission of treason. Still less was any attempt even made to interfere with the functions of the govern ment, and it was left solely to the senate to put an end to the Numidian scandal in a manner as gentle as possible for the aristocracy ; for that it was time to do so, even the most aristocratic aristocrat probably began to perceive.
The senate in the first place cancelled the second treaty OnmBag of peace —to surrender to the enemy the commander who JLzSi had concluded as was done some thirty years before, treaty, seemed according to the new ideas of the sanctity of
treaties no longer necessary —and determined, this time in
all earnest, to renew the war. The supreme command in
Africa was entrusted, as was natural, to an aristocrat, but
yet to one of the few men of quality who in military and
moral point of view were equal to the task. The choice Metdlus fell on Quintus Metellus. He was, like the whole powerful {*^e family to which he belonged, in principle rigid and un scrupulous aristocrat; as magistrate, he, no doubt,
reckoned honourable to hire assassins for the good of the
state and would presumably have ridiculed the act of Fabricius towards Pyrrhus as unpractical knight errantry,
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107.
105. 106.
108. 106.
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THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION book iv
but he was an inflexible administrator accessible neither to fear nor to corruption, and a judicious and experienced warrior. In this respect he was so far free from the prejudices of his order that he selected as his lieutenants not men of rank, but the excellent officer Publius Rutilius Rufus, who was esteemed in military circles for his ex emplary discipline and as the author of an altered and improved system of drill, and the brave Latin farmer's son Gaius Marius, who had risen from the pike. Attended by these and other able officers, Metellus presented himself in
109. the course of 645 as consul and commander-in-chief to the African army, which he found in such disorder that the generals had not hitherto ventured to lead it into the enemy's territory and it was formidable to none save the unhappy inhabitants of the Roman province. It was
108. sternly and speedily reorganized, and in the spring of 646 *
* In the exciting and clever description of this war by Sallust the chronology has been unduly neglected. The war terminated in the 106. summer of 649 114); therefore Marius began his management of the
107. war as consul in 647, he held the command there in three campaigns.