,
yet the performers were rewarded magnificently.
yet the performers were rewarded magnificently.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
?
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl.
handle.
net/2027/nyp.
33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.
hathitrust.
org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would
not think himself secure in Macedon. He is then
sensible that he entertains designs against you, and
that you perceive them; and as he thinks highly of
your wisdom, he judges that you hold him m the ab-
horrence he deserves. To these things (and these
of such importance) add, that he is perfectly con-
vinced that although he were master of all other
places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure while
your popular government subsists: but that, if any
pscident should happen to him (and every man is
' abject to many), all those who now submit to force
would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for pro-
tection ; for you are not naturally disposed to grasp
at power, or to usurp dominion; but to prevent
usurpation, to wrest their unjust acquisitions from
the hands of otheis, to curb the violence of ambition,
and to preserve the liberty of mankind, is your pecu-
liar excellence. And, therefore, it is with regret he
sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy on the incidents
of his fortune: nor is this his reasoning weak or
trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be re-
garded, as the implacable enemy of our free and
popular constitution. In the next place, we should
be fully persuaded that all those things which now
employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is pro-
jecting against this city. There can be none among
you weak enough to imagine that the desires of
Philip are centred in those paltry villages1 of Thrace;
(for what name else can we give to Drongilus, and
Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said
to be in his possession ? ) that he endures the severity
of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the
utmost dangers for these; and has no designs on the
ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver
mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the
glory of Athens, (which never may the conquest of
I Those paltry villages, &c. l--See the notes of theoration on the State
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 170 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
this city give to him or any other! ) but will suffei
us to enjoy these; while, for those trifling hoards of
grain he finds in the cells of Thrace he takes up his
winter-quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It
cannot be ! Even in his inarch thither he had these
in view: these are the chief objects of all his enter-
prises.
Thus must we all think of him. And let us not
oblige th-it man who hath ever been our most faith-
ful counsellor to propose the war in form: that
would be to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue
the interest of our country. To yourselves I appeal:
if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's
infractions of his treaty (for there was a long suc-
cession of them), any man had moved you to declare
hostilities against him, and he had given the same
assistance to the Cardians as now, when no such
motion came from any Athenian, would not that man
have been torn to pieces ? Would you not have cried
out with one voice that it was this which made him
ally to the Cardians ? Do not then seek for some
person whom you may hate for Philip's faults; whom
you may expose to the fury of his hirelings. >>When
your decree for war hath once passed, let there be
no dispute whether it ought or ought not to have
been undertaken. Observe his manner of attacking
you: imitate it in your opposition: supply those who
are now opposing him with money, and whatever
else they want: raise your supplies: prepare yout
forces, galleys, horse, transports, and all other neces-
saries of a war. At present, your conduct must
expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to
witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes
were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your
treasures are wasted; you shift the weight of public
business on others; break into passion; criminate
each other. I shall now show whence these disor-
ders have proceeded, and point out the remedy.
You have never, Athenians, made the necessary
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 171
dispositions in your affairs, nor armed yourselves in
time; but have been ever led by events. Then,
when it proves too late to act, you lay down your
arms. If another incident alarms you, your prepara-
tions are resumed, and all is tumult and confusion.
But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to
secure the least success by occasional detachments.
No: you must raise a regular army, provide for its
subsistence, appoint state treasurers, and guard the
public money with the strictest attention; oblige
those treasurers to answer for the sums expended,
and your general for his conduct in the field; and let
this general have no pretence1 to sail to any other
place, or engage in any other enterprise but those
prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your
resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the
real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine
himself to his own territory; or you will engage him
on equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps,
as you now ask, "What is Philip doing? whither is
he marching? " so there may come a time when he
will be solicitous to know whither our forces have
directed their march, and where they are to appear.
If it be objected that these measures will be
attended with great expense, and many toils and per
plexities, I confess it. (It is necessary, absolutely
necessary that a war should be attended with many
disagreeable circumstances. ) But let us consider
what consequences must attend the state if we refuse
to take this course, and it will appear that we shall
really be gainers by a seasonable performance of our
duty. Suppose some god should be our surety (for
no mortal could be depended on in an affair of such,
moment); for, although you are quite inactive and
insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies
hither; still it would be ignominious, it would (I call
every power of heaven to witness! ) be beneath you,
1 Have no pretence *o i--See note 1, p. 47.
Vol. I--O
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 172 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory
of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest. of, Greece
to slavery for the sake of private ease. I for my
part would rather die than propose such a conduct:
if, however, there be any other person to recommend
rt to you, be it so; make no opposition; abandon all
affairs: but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on
the contrary, we all foresee that the farther this man
is suffered to extend his conquests the more dan-
gerous and powerful enemy we must find in him,
why is our duty evaded 1 why do we delay 1 or when
will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians ?
Must some necessity press us 1 What one may call
the necessity of freemen not only presseth us now,
but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to-
be wished, may never approach us. How do these
differ? To freemen, the most urgent necessity is
dishonour; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned;
to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us ?
It ought not to be mentioned I
And now the neglect of those things to which your
lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be con
fessed, is by no means justifiable:--far from it J some
pretence, however, may be alleged in its excuse.
But to refuse even to listen to those things which
demand your utmost attention, which are of the
greatest moment to be fully considered, this deserves
the most severe censure. And yet you never attend
but on occasions like this, when the danger is ac-
tually present; nor in time of disengagement do
you ever think of consulting; but, while he is pre-
paring to distress you, instead of making like prepa-
rations and providing for your defence, you are
sunk in inactivity; and if any one attempts to rouse
you, he feels your resentment. But when advice is
received that some place is lost or invested, then you
attend, then you prepare. The proper season for
attending and consulting was then, when you refused:
now, when you are prevailed on to hear, vou should
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
173
be acting', and applying your preparations. And by
this supineness is your conduct distinguished from
that of all other nations: they usually deliberate
before events; your consultations follow them. --
There is but one course left, which should long since
have been pursued, but still may be of service. --This
I shall lay before you.
There is nothing which the state is more con-
cerned to procure on this occasion than money; and
gome very favourable opportunities present them-
selves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly
supply our demands. In the first place, they whom
the king regards1 as his faithful and strenuous adhe-
rents are the implacable enemies of Philip, and ac-
tually in arms against him. Then, the man who
was2 Philip's assistant and counsellor in all his
designs against the king hath been lately seized; so
that the king will be informed of his practices, not
by our accusations, to which he might suppose our
private interest prompted us, but by the very agent
and conductor of them. This will give weight to
your assertions; and there will be nothing left for
your ministers to urge but what the king will gladly
attend to: "That we should unite to chastise the
man who hath injured us equally: that Philip will
be much more formidable to the king if his. first
ittack be made on us; for that, if he should be
t They whom the king regards, Ac. l--He probably means the Thebans,
who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium; and
who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which
he had taken from them. --Tovrreii.
a The man who was, Sec. ]--As Philip seems to have already projected
an expedition into Asia, he received with open arms all the malecontenta
of Persia, and held secret intelligence with the rebel satraps. Hermies,
the tyrant of Artanea, a city of Mysia, was of this number, and had
been m confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the
Persian army, drew him to an interview by feigned promises, where he
seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. Instead of avapnaoros,
some copies have avatriiatiios, brought back: in which case it must be
understood of Memnon or Artanazus, two rebellious satraps, who had
taken refuge in Philip's court, but, by the jnediation of Mentor, were
reconciled to the King of Persia. --Ulpian and Tourreil.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 174 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
permitted to gain any advantage here, he will then
march against him, free from all apprehensions. "
For all these reasons, I think you should send am-
bassadors to treat with the king, and lay aside those
idle prejudices which have so often been injurious to
your interests--" that he is a Barbarian, our common
enemy," and the like. For my own part, when [
find a man apprehending danger from a prince whose
residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing
him the enemy of our state, who formerly re-estab-
lished its power,1 and but now made us2 such con-
siderable offers (if you rejected them, that was no
fault of his), and yet speaking in another strain of
one who is at our gates, who is extending his con-
quests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of
the Greeks, I am astonished; and regard that man,
whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger
in Philip. 1
There is another affair wherein the public hath
been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly
and indecently; which is the constant pretence of
those who refuse to perform their duty to the state ;
to which you will find the'blame of every omission
which every man is guilty of constantly transferred.
I cannot speak of it without great apprehensions.
Yet I will speak: for I think I can serve my country
by advancing some things, both in behalf of the
poor3 against the rich, and of the rich against the
t Who formerly re-established its power. ]--That is, when Conon, by
the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedaemonian fleet at
Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendour of his country.
2 And but how made us, &c. ]--Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce
Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited succours from the princi-
pal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented : but from Athens
and Lacedffimon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He
had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would
concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the
imprudence of Athens in rejecting these offers. --Tourreit.
3 Some things, both in behalf of the poor, &c. ]--The theatrical dis-
tributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the
several orders of the state. The poor were, ever dissatisfied that the
richer citizens shared the largesses, which they considered aa their own
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
175
necessitous ; if we first banish those invectives un-
justly thrown out against the theatrical funds, and
those fears that such an appointment cannot subsist
without some dismal consequences; an appointment
which, above all others, may be most conducive to
our interests, and give the greatest strength to the
whole community-
Attend, then, while I first plead for those who are
thought necessitous. There was a time, not long
since, when the state could not raise more than one
hundred and thirty talents ;t and yet none of those
peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the dissipation of
the public fund? , which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them.
But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the
state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expenses of
feasts and entertainments; and in this case, some factious leader, who
was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich; or, per-
haps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which
would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined,
were alarmed at such proceedings : they inveighed loudly against the
authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and
bring them to trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly
exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting
such flagrant injustice. Their clamours were loud against the person
accused: but, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by ballot,
they then had an opportunity of saving their friend.
All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical appointments
is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to Ins usual open-
ness and freedom, and which plainly betray a consciousness of bin
being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be ex-
cused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions
of the people, and giving up a favourite point, I cannot pretend to deter-
mine. But it is certainly not very honourable to Demosthenes to sup
pose (with ULpian) that his former opposition was merely personal, and
that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.
I The state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents. ]
--We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only;
for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides,
amounted to four hundred and sixty talents annually. And Pericles
jaised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their reve
nues, we should consider the prices of things. In the time nf Solon an
ox was sold at Athens for five drachmas; as we learn from Plutarch, in
the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three
drachmae; as appears from one of his comedies called " The Peace. "--
Olivet.
A drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to 7&f. of our money
A hundred drachma e made a mina, or 31. 4. w Id. We may also, from the
same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of
Bolon com was reckoned at a drachma the medimuus, or 4s. W pel
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 176 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
who were to command or to contribute to the equip-
ment of a galley ever had recourse to the pretence
of poverty to be exempted from their duty; but ves-
sels were sent out, money was supplied, and none
of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to for-
tune! ) our revenues were considerably improved;
and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred
talents; and this without any loss to the wealthy
citizens, but rather with advantage; for they share
the public affluence, and justly share it. Why, then,
do we reproach each other? why have we recourse
to_ such pretences to be exempted from our duty 1
unless we envy the poor that supply with which for-
tune hath favoured them. I do not, and I think no
one should, blame them ; for in private families I do
not find the young so devoid of respect to years, or
indeed any one so unreasonable and absurd as to
refuse to do his duty unless all others do quite as
much: such perveiseness would render a man ob-
noxious to the laws against undutiful children ; for
to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a
just and cheerful discharge of that debt in which
both nature and the laws engage us to our parents.
And as we each of us have our particular parents,
so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common
parents of the state; and therefore, instead of de-
priving them of what the state bestows, we ought,
if there were not this provision, to find out some
other means of supplying their necessities. If the
rich proceed on these principles, they will act
quarter. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five
drachma e the medimnus, which makes it 11. 2s. 7Jrf. per quarter. In
Solon's time the price of a sheep was 73d. A soldier's daily pay was a
drachma. The yearly salary of a common schoolmaster at Athens was
a mina. In the early times of the republic, -five hundred drachmae, 161
2s. lid. , were thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman. To
Aristides's two daughters the Athenians gave three thousand drachmae,
967. 17s. 2rf. The arts and sciences were rated very high; and though
the price of a seal in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2? d.
,
yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amosbaiu
sang in the theatre of Athens his pay per diera was a talent
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
177
agreeably not to justice only, but to good policy;
for to rob some men of their necessary subsistence
is to raise a number of enemies to the common-
wealth.
To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that
they should remove those grievances of which the
wealthier members complain so loudly and so justly
(for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and
shall not scruple to offer such truths as may be
favourable to the rich). Look out, not through
Athens only, but every other state, and, in my opin-
ion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman
a disposition, as to complain when he sees poor men,
men who even want the necessaries of life, receiv-
ing these appointments. Where then lies the diffi-
culty ? Whence this animosity ? When they behold
certain1 persons charging private fortunes with those
demands which were usually answered by the public;
when they behold the proposer of this immediately
rising in your esteem, and, as far as your protection
can make him, immortal; when they find your pri-
vate votes entirely different from your public clam-
ours; then it is that their indignation is raised;
for justice requires, Athenians, that the advantages
of society should be shared by all its members.
The rich should have their lives and fortunes well
secured; that so, when any danger threatens their
country, their opulence maybe applied to its defence.
Other citizens should regard the public treasure as
it really is, the property of all, and be content with
their just portion; but should esteem all private for-
tunes as the inviolable right of their possessors.
Thus a small state rises to greatness; a great one
preserves its power.
But it may be said that possibly these are the
duties of our several citizens: yet, that they may be
performed agreeably to the laws, some regulations
i When they behold certain, &c. ]--See note 3, p. 174
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 178 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
must first be made. --The causes of our present dis-
orders are many in number, and of long continuance.
Grant me your attention, and I shall trace them to
their origin.
You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of
government which your ancestors laid down. Yon
are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first
among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to
redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain ex-
pense. You are taught to think, that to lie down in
indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon
all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance
and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and
surprisingly happy. By these means the station
which you should have maintained is now seized by
another, and he is become the successful, the mighty
potentate. And what else could have been expected ?
for as the Lacedaemonians were unfortunate, the
Thebans engaged in the Phocian war, and we quite
insensible, he had no competitor for a prize so noble,
so great, so illustrious, which for a long time en-
gaged the most considerable states of Greece in the
severest contests. Thus is he become formidable,
strengthened by alliances and attended by his armies;
while all the Greeks are involved in so many and so
great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they
may find resources. But of all the dangers of the
several states, none are so dreadful as those which
threaten ours; not only because Philip's designs aim
principally at us, but because we, of all others, have
been most regardless of our interests.
If, then, from the variety1 of . merchandises and
plenty of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the
state is not in danger, you judge unworthily-and
falsely. Hence we might determine whether our
markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength
of that state which is regarded by all who aim at
1 If, then, from the variety, &c. ]--See note on the oration on the State
? f the Chersonesus, p. 133.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHllIPpiC THE FOURTH. 179
the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to
their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is
not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No:
we should inquire whether it be secure of the affec-
tions of its allies; whether it be powerful in arms.
These are the points to be considered; and in these,
instead of being well provided, you are totally
deficient. To be assured of this you need but attend
to the following consideration. At what time have
the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion ?
I believe it will not be affirmed that they have ever
been in greater than at present: for in former times
Greece was always divided into two parties, that of
the Lacedaemonians and ours. All the several states
adhered to one or the other of these. The king,
while he had no alliances here, was equally suspected
by all. By espousing the cause of the vanquished1
he gained some credit, until he restored them to the
same degree of power with their adversaries; after
that, he became no less hated2 by those whom he
had saved than by those whom he had constantly
opposed. But now, in the first place, the king lives
in amity with all the Greeks (indeed, without some
immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be
excepted). In the next place, there are several
1 By espousing the cause of the vanquished, &c. ]--Lacedssmon first
entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissa-
phernes; which enabled Lysander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained
from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succours necessary to revenge his country
and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia
attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states,
lest the prevailing power might turn its thoughts to Asia, and attempt
'an invasion there. --Tourreil.
2 He became no less hated, &c. ]--Laeedaemon had no sooner subjected
the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian prov-
inces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious satraps. And as
soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes' from the Spartan
yoke, they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from
Artaxerxes, and usurped a great partof the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits
could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements,
and interest dissolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct
Df the Greeks towards the kings of Persia is by no means flattering in
point of morals. But it is not in ancient times only that we find morals
must be silent whet pt litics epeak. --Tourreil
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 180 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cities which affect the, characters of guardians and
protectors. They are all possessed with a strong
passion for pre-eminence; and some of them (to
their shame! ) desert, and envy, and distrust each
other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthi-
ans, Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians have
ajl erected themselves mto so many distinct sove-
reignties. But among all these parties, all these
governing states, into which Greece is broken, there
is not one (if I may speak freely) to whose coun-
cils1 fewer Grecian affairs are submitted than to ours;
and no wonder, when neither love, nor confidence,
nor fear can induce any people to apply to you. It
is not one single cause that hath effected this (in
that case the remedy were easy), but many faults, of
various natures and of long continuance. Without
entering into a particular detail, I shall mention one
in which they all centre; but I must first entreat you
not to be offended if I speak some bold truths without
reserve.
Every opportunity which might have been im-
proved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease
and supineness in which you are indulged have dis-
armed your resentment against the traitors; and
thus others are suffered to possess your honours. --
But at present I shall take notice only of what
relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately
there is one ready to start up and cry, " We should
not act inconsiderately: we should not involve our-
selves in a war. " And then he is sure not to forget
the great happiness of living in peace, the misfor-
tune of being loaded with the maintenance of a
1 To whose councils. &c. ]--The ruling states of dreece accounted it
their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their
assemblies^ soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests
which Philip made in Thrace bad put an end to many Applications of
this sort, which had formerly oeen addressed to the Athenians ; and
their indolence- made people decline any engagements with them.
Foreigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their *
own interests were not likely to grant the due attention to those of
ethers
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
18
large array, the evil designs of some persons agains.
our treasures; with others of the like momentous
truths. >
But these exhortations to peace should not he
addressed to you; your conduct is but too pacific:
let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms.
If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty
on your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfor-
tune to provide for our security at the expense of
some part of our possessions: the consequences that
must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather
deserve that name. And as to the plundering of
your treasury, this must be prevented by finding
some effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting
your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost
indignation, when I find some of you complaining
that your treasures are plundered, though it be in
your power to secure them, and to punish the guilty ;
and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip is
plundering every part of Greece successively; and
this, that he may at last destroy you.
And what can be the reason, Athenians, that when
Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice,
when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of
these men will acknowledge that he acts unjustly,
or commits hostilities; but assert that they who
rouse you from your insensibility, and urge you to
oppose these outrages, are involving you in war?
This is the reason; that whatever accidents may
happen in the course of the war (and there is a
necessity, a melancholy necessity that war should
be attended with many accidents), they may lay the
whole blame on your best and most faithful coun-
sellors. They know, that if with a steady and
unanimous resolution you oppose the insolent in-
vader, he must be conquered, and they deprived of a
master whose pay was ever ready. But if the first
unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and
prosecutions, they need but appear as accusers.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 182 OKaTIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and two great points are secured--your favour, and
Philip's gold; while you discharge the vengeance
due to their perfidy against your faithful speakers.
These are their hopes; these the grounds of thpir
complaints that certain persons are involving you
in war. For my own part, this 1 know perfectly,
that although it hath never been proposed by any
Athenian to declare war, yet Philip hath, seized
many of our territories, and but just now sent suc-
cours to the Cardians. But if we will persuade
ourselves that he is not committing hostilities, he
would be the most senseless of mortals should he
attempt to undeceive us: for, when they who have
received the injury deny it, must the offender prove
his guilt? But when he marches directly hither,
what shall we then say? He will still deny that he
is at war with us (as he did to the people of Oreum,
until his forces were in the heart of their dominions;
as he did to those of Pherae, until he was on the
point of storming their walls; as he did to the
Olynthians, until he appeared in their territories at
the head of an army). Shall we then say that they
who urge lis to defend our country are involving us
in a wai ? If so, we must be slaves. There is no
medium. Nor is your danger the same with that
of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave,
but to extirpate Athens. He knows that a state like
yours, accustomed to command, will not, or, if it
were inclined, cannot submit to slavery: he knows,
that if you have an opportunity you can give him
more disturbance than any other people; and, there-
fore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of find-
ing no degree of mercy.
Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that
is dear to you, apply to the great work with an atten-
tion equal to the importance of it: let the wretches
who have openly sold themselves to this mar. be the
objects of your abhorrence: let them meet with the
utmost severity of public justice: for you will not.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
183
you cannot conquer your foreign enemies until you
have punished those that lurk within your walls
No: they will ever prove so many obstacles to
impede our progress, and to give our enemies the
superiority.
And what can be the reason that he treats you
with insolence (for I cannot call his present conduct
by another name); that he utters menaces against
' you; while he, at least, condescends to dissemble
with other people, and to gain their confidence by
good offices? Thus, by heaping favours on the
Thessalians, he led them insensibly into their present
slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the
various artifices he practised against the wretched
Olynthians (such, among others, was the putting
them in possession of Potidaea). In his late trans-
actions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his
party by yielding Breotia to them, and by freeing
them from a tedious and distressing war. And
thus, after receiving their several insidious favours,
some of these people have suffered calamities but
too well known to all; others must submit to what-
ever may befall them. What you yourselves have
formerly lost I shall not mention; but, in the very
treaty of peace, in how many instances have we
f been deceived ? how have we been despoiled 1 Did
we not givp up Phocis and the straits ? Did we not
lose our Thracian dominions--Doriscum, Serrium,
and even our ally Cersobleptes ? Is he not in pos-
session of Cardia ? and doth he not avow his usurpa-
tion ? Whence is it, then, that his behaviour towards
you is so different from that towards others? Be-
cause, of all the Grecian states, ours is the only one
in which harangues in favour of enemies are pro-
nounced with impunity; and the venal wretch may
utter his falsehoods with security, even while yon
are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak
* for Philip at Olynthus until the people had been
gained bv Potidaea. In Thessaly it was not safe to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 184 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
speak for Philip until that people had been _
by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being rein-
stated in the council of amphictyons. Nor could it
have been safely attempted at Thebes until he had
given them up Bceotia, and exterminated the Pho-
cians. But at Athens without the least danger may
Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of
Amphipolis and the territory of Cardia; although
he threatens our city by his fortifications in Eubcea;
although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence
some of his advocates have arisen from penury to
affluence; from obscurity and contempt to honour
and eminence; while, on the other hand, you have
sunk from glory to disgrace; from wealth to poverty:
for the riches of a state I take to be the number,
fidelity, and affection of its allies; in all which you
are notoriously deficient. And by your total insen-
sibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin,
he is become successful, great, and formidable to all
the Greeks, to all the Barbarians; and you deserted
and inconsiderable; sumptuous, indeed, in your
markets; but in every thing relating to military
power, ridiculous.
There are some orators, I find, who view your
interests and their own in a quite different light.
To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet,
whatever injuries you are exposed to; they them-
selves find this impossible, though no one offers them
the least injury. To you I speak, Aristodemus! '
Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you
this question: " How is it that you, who are sensible
(for it is a well-known truth) that the life of private
men is serene and easy, and free from danger--that
of statesmen invidious and insecure, subject to daily
contests and disquiets--should yet prefer the life
1 To you I speak, Aristodemus! ]--He was by profession a player, and
was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athenians had sent to the
court of Macedon to treat about the peace. At his return Demosthenes
proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good services,
whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 1S5
encompassed with dangers to that of peace and dis-
engagement? " What could you say ? Suppose we
admit the truth of the very best answer you could
make, " that you were prompted by a desire of
honour and renown;" is it possible that you, who
engaged in such painful undertakings, who despised
all toils and dangers for the sake of these, should
advise the state to give them up for ease and indul-
gence ? You cannot, surely, say that it was in-
cumbent on you to maintain a degree of eminence
in the city; and that the city was not concerned to
maintain her eminence in Greece!
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would
not think himself secure in Macedon. He is then
sensible that he entertains designs against you, and
that you perceive them; and as he thinks highly of
your wisdom, he judges that you hold him m the ab-
horrence he deserves. To these things (and these
of such importance) add, that he is perfectly con-
vinced that although he were master of all other
places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure while
your popular government subsists: but that, if any
pscident should happen to him (and every man is
' abject to many), all those who now submit to force
would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for pro-
tection ; for you are not naturally disposed to grasp
at power, or to usurp dominion; but to prevent
usurpation, to wrest their unjust acquisitions from
the hands of otheis, to curb the violence of ambition,
and to preserve the liberty of mankind, is your pecu-
liar excellence. And, therefore, it is with regret he
sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy on the incidents
of his fortune: nor is this his reasoning weak or
trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be re-
garded, as the implacable enemy of our free and
popular constitution. In the next place, we should
be fully persuaded that all those things which now
employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is pro-
jecting against this city. There can be none among
you weak enough to imagine that the desires of
Philip are centred in those paltry villages1 of Thrace;
(for what name else can we give to Drongilus, and
Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said
to be in his possession ? ) that he endures the severity
of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the
utmost dangers for these; and has no designs on the
ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver
mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the
glory of Athens, (which never may the conquest of
I Those paltry villages, &c. l--See the notes of theoration on the State
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 170 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
this city give to him or any other! ) but will suffei
us to enjoy these; while, for those trifling hoards of
grain he finds in the cells of Thrace he takes up his
winter-quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It
cannot be ! Even in his inarch thither he had these
in view: these are the chief objects of all his enter-
prises.
Thus must we all think of him. And let us not
oblige th-it man who hath ever been our most faith-
ful counsellor to propose the war in form: that
would be to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue
the interest of our country. To yourselves I appeal:
if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's
infractions of his treaty (for there was a long suc-
cession of them), any man had moved you to declare
hostilities against him, and he had given the same
assistance to the Cardians as now, when no such
motion came from any Athenian, would not that man
have been torn to pieces ? Would you not have cried
out with one voice that it was this which made him
ally to the Cardians ? Do not then seek for some
person whom you may hate for Philip's faults; whom
you may expose to the fury of his hirelings. >>When
your decree for war hath once passed, let there be
no dispute whether it ought or ought not to have
been undertaken. Observe his manner of attacking
you: imitate it in your opposition: supply those who
are now opposing him with money, and whatever
else they want: raise your supplies: prepare yout
forces, galleys, horse, transports, and all other neces-
saries of a war. At present, your conduct must
expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to
witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes
were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your
treasures are wasted; you shift the weight of public
business on others; break into passion; criminate
each other. I shall now show whence these disor-
ders have proceeded, and point out the remedy.
You have never, Athenians, made the necessary
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 171
dispositions in your affairs, nor armed yourselves in
time; but have been ever led by events. Then,
when it proves too late to act, you lay down your
arms. If another incident alarms you, your prepara-
tions are resumed, and all is tumult and confusion.
But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to
secure the least success by occasional detachments.
No: you must raise a regular army, provide for its
subsistence, appoint state treasurers, and guard the
public money with the strictest attention; oblige
those treasurers to answer for the sums expended,
and your general for his conduct in the field; and let
this general have no pretence1 to sail to any other
place, or engage in any other enterprise but those
prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your
resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the
real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine
himself to his own territory; or you will engage him
on equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps,
as you now ask, "What is Philip doing? whither is
he marching? " so there may come a time when he
will be solicitous to know whither our forces have
directed their march, and where they are to appear.
If it be objected that these measures will be
attended with great expense, and many toils and per
plexities, I confess it. (It is necessary, absolutely
necessary that a war should be attended with many
disagreeable circumstances. ) But let us consider
what consequences must attend the state if we refuse
to take this course, and it will appear that we shall
really be gainers by a seasonable performance of our
duty. Suppose some god should be our surety (for
no mortal could be depended on in an affair of such,
moment); for, although you are quite inactive and
insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies
hither; still it would be ignominious, it would (I call
every power of heaven to witness! ) be beneath you,
1 Have no pretence *o i--See note 1, p. 47.
Vol. I--O
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 172 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory
of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest. of, Greece
to slavery for the sake of private ease. I for my
part would rather die than propose such a conduct:
if, however, there be any other person to recommend
rt to you, be it so; make no opposition; abandon all
affairs: but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on
the contrary, we all foresee that the farther this man
is suffered to extend his conquests the more dan-
gerous and powerful enemy we must find in him,
why is our duty evaded 1 why do we delay 1 or when
will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians ?
Must some necessity press us 1 What one may call
the necessity of freemen not only presseth us now,
but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to-
be wished, may never approach us. How do these
differ? To freemen, the most urgent necessity is
dishonour; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned;
to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us ?
It ought not to be mentioned I
And now the neglect of those things to which your
lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be con
fessed, is by no means justifiable:--far from it J some
pretence, however, may be alleged in its excuse.
But to refuse even to listen to those things which
demand your utmost attention, which are of the
greatest moment to be fully considered, this deserves
the most severe censure. And yet you never attend
but on occasions like this, when the danger is ac-
tually present; nor in time of disengagement do
you ever think of consulting; but, while he is pre-
paring to distress you, instead of making like prepa-
rations and providing for your defence, you are
sunk in inactivity; and if any one attempts to rouse
you, he feels your resentment. But when advice is
received that some place is lost or invested, then you
attend, then you prepare. The proper season for
attending and consulting was then, when you refused:
now, when you are prevailed on to hear, vou should
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
173
be acting', and applying your preparations. And by
this supineness is your conduct distinguished from
that of all other nations: they usually deliberate
before events; your consultations follow them. --
There is but one course left, which should long since
have been pursued, but still may be of service. --This
I shall lay before you.
There is nothing which the state is more con-
cerned to procure on this occasion than money; and
gome very favourable opportunities present them-
selves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly
supply our demands. In the first place, they whom
the king regards1 as his faithful and strenuous adhe-
rents are the implacable enemies of Philip, and ac-
tually in arms against him. Then, the man who
was2 Philip's assistant and counsellor in all his
designs against the king hath been lately seized; so
that the king will be informed of his practices, not
by our accusations, to which he might suppose our
private interest prompted us, but by the very agent
and conductor of them. This will give weight to
your assertions; and there will be nothing left for
your ministers to urge but what the king will gladly
attend to: "That we should unite to chastise the
man who hath injured us equally: that Philip will
be much more formidable to the king if his. first
ittack be made on us; for that, if he should be
t They whom the king regards, Ac. l--He probably means the Thebans,
who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium; and
who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which
he had taken from them. --Tovrreii.
a The man who was, Sec. ]--As Philip seems to have already projected
an expedition into Asia, he received with open arms all the malecontenta
of Persia, and held secret intelligence with the rebel satraps. Hermies,
the tyrant of Artanea, a city of Mysia, was of this number, and had
been m confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the
Persian army, drew him to an interview by feigned promises, where he
seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. Instead of avapnaoros,
some copies have avatriiatiios, brought back: in which case it must be
understood of Memnon or Artanazus, two rebellious satraps, who had
taken refuge in Philip's court, but, by the jnediation of Mentor, were
reconciled to the King of Persia. --Ulpian and Tourreil.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 174 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
permitted to gain any advantage here, he will then
march against him, free from all apprehensions. "
For all these reasons, I think you should send am-
bassadors to treat with the king, and lay aside those
idle prejudices which have so often been injurious to
your interests--" that he is a Barbarian, our common
enemy," and the like. For my own part, when [
find a man apprehending danger from a prince whose
residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing
him the enemy of our state, who formerly re-estab-
lished its power,1 and but now made us2 such con-
siderable offers (if you rejected them, that was no
fault of his), and yet speaking in another strain of
one who is at our gates, who is extending his con-
quests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of
the Greeks, I am astonished; and regard that man,
whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger
in Philip. 1
There is another affair wherein the public hath
been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly
and indecently; which is the constant pretence of
those who refuse to perform their duty to the state ;
to which you will find the'blame of every omission
which every man is guilty of constantly transferred.
I cannot speak of it without great apprehensions.
Yet I will speak: for I think I can serve my country
by advancing some things, both in behalf of the
poor3 against the rich, and of the rich against the
t Who formerly re-established its power. ]--That is, when Conon, by
the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedaemonian fleet at
Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendour of his country.
2 And but how made us, &c. ]--Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce
Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited succours from the princi-
pal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented : but from Athens
and Lacedffimon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He
had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would
concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the
imprudence of Athens in rejecting these offers. --Tourreit.
3 Some things, both in behalf of the poor, &c. ]--The theatrical dis-
tributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the
several orders of the state. The poor were, ever dissatisfied that the
richer citizens shared the largesses, which they considered aa their own
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
175
necessitous ; if we first banish those invectives un-
justly thrown out against the theatrical funds, and
those fears that such an appointment cannot subsist
without some dismal consequences; an appointment
which, above all others, may be most conducive to
our interests, and give the greatest strength to the
whole community-
Attend, then, while I first plead for those who are
thought necessitous. There was a time, not long
since, when the state could not raise more than one
hundred and thirty talents ;t and yet none of those
peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the dissipation of
the public fund? , which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them.
But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the
state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expenses of
feasts and entertainments; and in this case, some factious leader, who
was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich; or, per-
haps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which
would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined,
were alarmed at such proceedings : they inveighed loudly against the
authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and
bring them to trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly
exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting
such flagrant injustice. Their clamours were loud against the person
accused: but, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by ballot,
they then had an opportunity of saving their friend.
All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical appointments
is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to Ins usual open-
ness and freedom, and which plainly betray a consciousness of bin
being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be ex-
cused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions
of the people, and giving up a favourite point, I cannot pretend to deter-
mine. But it is certainly not very honourable to Demosthenes to sup
pose (with ULpian) that his former opposition was merely personal, and
that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.
I The state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents. ]
--We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only;
for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides,
amounted to four hundred and sixty talents annually. And Pericles
jaised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their reve
nues, we should consider the prices of things. In the time nf Solon an
ox was sold at Athens for five drachmas; as we learn from Plutarch, in
the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three
drachmae; as appears from one of his comedies called " The Peace. "--
Olivet.
A drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to 7&f. of our money
A hundred drachma e made a mina, or 31. 4. w Id. We may also, from the
same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of
Bolon com was reckoned at a drachma the medimuus, or 4s. W pel
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 176 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
who were to command or to contribute to the equip-
ment of a galley ever had recourse to the pretence
of poverty to be exempted from their duty; but ves-
sels were sent out, money was supplied, and none
of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to for-
tune! ) our revenues were considerably improved;
and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred
talents; and this without any loss to the wealthy
citizens, but rather with advantage; for they share
the public affluence, and justly share it. Why, then,
do we reproach each other? why have we recourse
to_ such pretences to be exempted from our duty 1
unless we envy the poor that supply with which for-
tune hath favoured them. I do not, and I think no
one should, blame them ; for in private families I do
not find the young so devoid of respect to years, or
indeed any one so unreasonable and absurd as to
refuse to do his duty unless all others do quite as
much: such perveiseness would render a man ob-
noxious to the laws against undutiful children ; for
to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a
just and cheerful discharge of that debt in which
both nature and the laws engage us to our parents.
And as we each of us have our particular parents,
so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common
parents of the state; and therefore, instead of de-
priving them of what the state bestows, we ought,
if there were not this provision, to find out some
other means of supplying their necessities. If the
rich proceed on these principles, they will act
quarter. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five
drachma e the medimnus, which makes it 11. 2s. 7Jrf. per quarter. In
Solon's time the price of a sheep was 73d. A soldier's daily pay was a
drachma. The yearly salary of a common schoolmaster at Athens was
a mina. In the early times of the republic, -five hundred drachmae, 161
2s. lid. , were thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman. To
Aristides's two daughters the Athenians gave three thousand drachmae,
967. 17s. 2rf. The arts and sciences were rated very high; and though
the price of a seal in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2? d.
,
yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amosbaiu
sang in the theatre of Athens his pay per diera was a talent
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
177
agreeably not to justice only, but to good policy;
for to rob some men of their necessary subsistence
is to raise a number of enemies to the common-
wealth.
To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that
they should remove those grievances of which the
wealthier members complain so loudly and so justly
(for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and
shall not scruple to offer such truths as may be
favourable to the rich). Look out, not through
Athens only, but every other state, and, in my opin-
ion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman
a disposition, as to complain when he sees poor men,
men who even want the necessaries of life, receiv-
ing these appointments. Where then lies the diffi-
culty ? Whence this animosity ? When they behold
certain1 persons charging private fortunes with those
demands which were usually answered by the public;
when they behold the proposer of this immediately
rising in your esteem, and, as far as your protection
can make him, immortal; when they find your pri-
vate votes entirely different from your public clam-
ours; then it is that their indignation is raised;
for justice requires, Athenians, that the advantages
of society should be shared by all its members.
The rich should have their lives and fortunes well
secured; that so, when any danger threatens their
country, their opulence maybe applied to its defence.
Other citizens should regard the public treasure as
it really is, the property of all, and be content with
their just portion; but should esteem all private for-
tunes as the inviolable right of their possessors.
Thus a small state rises to greatness; a great one
preserves its power.
But it may be said that possibly these are the
duties of our several citizens: yet, that they may be
performed agreeably to the laws, some regulations
i When they behold certain, &c. ]--See note 3, p. 174
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 178 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
must first be made. --The causes of our present dis-
orders are many in number, and of long continuance.
Grant me your attention, and I shall trace them to
their origin.
You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of
government which your ancestors laid down. Yon
are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first
among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to
redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain ex-
pense. You are taught to think, that to lie down in
indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon
all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance
and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and
surprisingly happy. By these means the station
which you should have maintained is now seized by
another, and he is become the successful, the mighty
potentate. And what else could have been expected ?
for as the Lacedaemonians were unfortunate, the
Thebans engaged in the Phocian war, and we quite
insensible, he had no competitor for a prize so noble,
so great, so illustrious, which for a long time en-
gaged the most considerable states of Greece in the
severest contests. Thus is he become formidable,
strengthened by alliances and attended by his armies;
while all the Greeks are involved in so many and so
great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they
may find resources. But of all the dangers of the
several states, none are so dreadful as those which
threaten ours; not only because Philip's designs aim
principally at us, but because we, of all others, have
been most regardless of our interests.
If, then, from the variety1 of . merchandises and
plenty of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the
state is not in danger, you judge unworthily-and
falsely. Hence we might determine whether our
markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength
of that state which is regarded by all who aim at
1 If, then, from the variety, &c. ]--See note on the oration on the State
? f the Chersonesus, p. 133.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHllIPpiC THE FOURTH. 179
the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to
their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is
not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No:
we should inquire whether it be secure of the affec-
tions of its allies; whether it be powerful in arms.
These are the points to be considered; and in these,
instead of being well provided, you are totally
deficient. To be assured of this you need but attend
to the following consideration. At what time have
the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion ?
I believe it will not be affirmed that they have ever
been in greater than at present: for in former times
Greece was always divided into two parties, that of
the Lacedaemonians and ours. All the several states
adhered to one or the other of these. The king,
while he had no alliances here, was equally suspected
by all. By espousing the cause of the vanquished1
he gained some credit, until he restored them to the
same degree of power with their adversaries; after
that, he became no less hated2 by those whom he
had saved than by those whom he had constantly
opposed. But now, in the first place, the king lives
in amity with all the Greeks (indeed, without some
immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be
excepted). In the next place, there are several
1 By espousing the cause of the vanquished, &c. ]--Lacedssmon first
entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissa-
phernes; which enabled Lysander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained
from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succours necessary to revenge his country
and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia
attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states,
lest the prevailing power might turn its thoughts to Asia, and attempt
'an invasion there. --Tourreil.
2 He became no less hated, &c. ]--Laeedaemon had no sooner subjected
the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian prov-
inces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious satraps. And as
soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes' from the Spartan
yoke, they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from
Artaxerxes, and usurped a great partof the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits
could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements,
and interest dissolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct
Df the Greeks towards the kings of Persia is by no means flattering in
point of morals. But it is not in ancient times only that we find morals
must be silent whet pt litics epeak. --Tourreil
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 180 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cities which affect the, characters of guardians and
protectors. They are all possessed with a strong
passion for pre-eminence; and some of them (to
their shame! ) desert, and envy, and distrust each
other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthi-
ans, Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians have
ajl erected themselves mto so many distinct sove-
reignties. But among all these parties, all these
governing states, into which Greece is broken, there
is not one (if I may speak freely) to whose coun-
cils1 fewer Grecian affairs are submitted than to ours;
and no wonder, when neither love, nor confidence,
nor fear can induce any people to apply to you. It
is not one single cause that hath effected this (in
that case the remedy were easy), but many faults, of
various natures and of long continuance. Without
entering into a particular detail, I shall mention one
in which they all centre; but I must first entreat you
not to be offended if I speak some bold truths without
reserve.
Every opportunity which might have been im-
proved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease
and supineness in which you are indulged have dis-
armed your resentment against the traitors; and
thus others are suffered to possess your honours. --
But at present I shall take notice only of what
relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately
there is one ready to start up and cry, " We should
not act inconsiderately: we should not involve our-
selves in a war. " And then he is sure not to forget
the great happiness of living in peace, the misfor-
tune of being loaded with the maintenance of a
1 To whose councils. &c. ]--The ruling states of dreece accounted it
their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their
assemblies^ soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests
which Philip made in Thrace bad put an end to many Applications of
this sort, which had formerly oeen addressed to the Athenians ; and
their indolence- made people decline any engagements with them.
Foreigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their *
own interests were not likely to grant the due attention to those of
ethers
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
18
large array, the evil designs of some persons agains.
our treasures; with others of the like momentous
truths. >
But these exhortations to peace should not he
addressed to you; your conduct is but too pacific:
let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms.
If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty
on your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfor-
tune to provide for our security at the expense of
some part of our possessions: the consequences that
must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather
deserve that name. And as to the plundering of
your treasury, this must be prevented by finding
some effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting
your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost
indignation, when I find some of you complaining
that your treasures are plundered, though it be in
your power to secure them, and to punish the guilty ;
and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip is
plundering every part of Greece successively; and
this, that he may at last destroy you.
And what can be the reason, Athenians, that when
Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice,
when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of
these men will acknowledge that he acts unjustly,
or commits hostilities; but assert that they who
rouse you from your insensibility, and urge you to
oppose these outrages, are involving you in war?
This is the reason; that whatever accidents may
happen in the course of the war (and there is a
necessity, a melancholy necessity that war should
be attended with many accidents), they may lay the
whole blame on your best and most faithful coun-
sellors. They know, that if with a steady and
unanimous resolution you oppose the insolent in-
vader, he must be conquered, and they deprived of a
master whose pay was ever ready. But if the first
unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and
prosecutions, they need but appear as accusers.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 182 OKaTIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and two great points are secured--your favour, and
Philip's gold; while you discharge the vengeance
due to their perfidy against your faithful speakers.
These are their hopes; these the grounds of thpir
complaints that certain persons are involving you
in war. For my own part, this 1 know perfectly,
that although it hath never been proposed by any
Athenian to declare war, yet Philip hath, seized
many of our territories, and but just now sent suc-
cours to the Cardians. But if we will persuade
ourselves that he is not committing hostilities, he
would be the most senseless of mortals should he
attempt to undeceive us: for, when they who have
received the injury deny it, must the offender prove
his guilt? But when he marches directly hither,
what shall we then say? He will still deny that he
is at war with us (as he did to the people of Oreum,
until his forces were in the heart of their dominions;
as he did to those of Pherae, until he was on the
point of storming their walls; as he did to the
Olynthians, until he appeared in their territories at
the head of an army). Shall we then say that they
who urge lis to defend our country are involving us
in a wai ? If so, we must be slaves. There is no
medium. Nor is your danger the same with that
of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave,
but to extirpate Athens. He knows that a state like
yours, accustomed to command, will not, or, if it
were inclined, cannot submit to slavery: he knows,
that if you have an opportunity you can give him
more disturbance than any other people; and, there-
fore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of find-
ing no degree of mercy.
Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that
is dear to you, apply to the great work with an atten-
tion equal to the importance of it: let the wretches
who have openly sold themselves to this mar. be the
objects of your abhorrence: let them meet with the
utmost severity of public justice: for you will not.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.
183
you cannot conquer your foreign enemies until you
have punished those that lurk within your walls
No: they will ever prove so many obstacles to
impede our progress, and to give our enemies the
superiority.
And what can be the reason that he treats you
with insolence (for I cannot call his present conduct
by another name); that he utters menaces against
' you; while he, at least, condescends to dissemble
with other people, and to gain their confidence by
good offices? Thus, by heaping favours on the
Thessalians, he led them insensibly into their present
slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the
various artifices he practised against the wretched
Olynthians (such, among others, was the putting
them in possession of Potidaea). In his late trans-
actions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his
party by yielding Breotia to them, and by freeing
them from a tedious and distressing war. And
thus, after receiving their several insidious favours,
some of these people have suffered calamities but
too well known to all; others must submit to what-
ever may befall them. What you yourselves have
formerly lost I shall not mention; but, in the very
treaty of peace, in how many instances have we
f been deceived ? how have we been despoiled 1 Did
we not givp up Phocis and the straits ? Did we not
lose our Thracian dominions--Doriscum, Serrium,
and even our ally Cersobleptes ? Is he not in pos-
session of Cardia ? and doth he not avow his usurpa-
tion ? Whence is it, then, that his behaviour towards
you is so different from that towards others? Be-
cause, of all the Grecian states, ours is the only one
in which harangues in favour of enemies are pro-
nounced with impunity; and the venal wretch may
utter his falsehoods with security, even while yon
are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak
* for Philip at Olynthus until the people had been
gained bv Potidaea. In Thessaly it was not safe to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 184 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
speak for Philip until that people had been _
by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being rein-
stated in the council of amphictyons. Nor could it
have been safely attempted at Thebes until he had
given them up Bceotia, and exterminated the Pho-
cians. But at Athens without the least danger may
Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of
Amphipolis and the territory of Cardia; although
he threatens our city by his fortifications in Eubcea;
although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence
some of his advocates have arisen from penury to
affluence; from obscurity and contempt to honour
and eminence; while, on the other hand, you have
sunk from glory to disgrace; from wealth to poverty:
for the riches of a state I take to be the number,
fidelity, and affection of its allies; in all which you
are notoriously deficient. And by your total insen-
sibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin,
he is become successful, great, and formidable to all
the Greeks, to all the Barbarians; and you deserted
and inconsiderable; sumptuous, indeed, in your
markets; but in every thing relating to military
power, ridiculous.
There are some orators, I find, who view your
interests and their own in a quite different light.
To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet,
whatever injuries you are exposed to; they them-
selves find this impossible, though no one offers them
the least injury. To you I speak, Aristodemus! '
Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you
this question: " How is it that you, who are sensible
(for it is a well-known truth) that the life of private
men is serene and easy, and free from danger--that
of statesmen invidious and insecure, subject to daily
contests and disquiets--should yet prefer the life
1 To you I speak, Aristodemus! ]--He was by profession a player, and
was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athenians had sent to the
court of Macedon to treat about the peace. At his return Demosthenes
proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good services,
whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/nyp. 33433082193412 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 1S5
encompassed with dangers to that of peace and dis-
engagement? " What could you say ? Suppose we
admit the truth of the very best answer you could
make, " that you were prompted by a desire of
honour and renown;" is it possible that you, who
engaged in such painful undertakings, who despised
all toils and dangers for the sake of these, should
advise the state to give them up for ease and indul-
gence ? You cannot, surely, say that it was in-
cumbent on you to maintain a degree of eminence
in the city; and that the city was not concerned to
maintain her eminence in Greece!
