Therefore
it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
Summa Theologica
Therefore it must be admitted that all the
transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain
natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can
alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of
these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents
or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot
in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance,
that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the
body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this
sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real
but a mere semblance of reality.
Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above
([933]Q[111], AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done
sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for
just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and
assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can
clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear
therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an
innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were
embodied in the semblance of some animal. " This not to be understood as
though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were
identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can
offer the same picture to another man's senses.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When
magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a
different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for
the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter
by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
subject. "
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Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from
making further assaults?
Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not
true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
Objection 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented
from further assaults.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him,"
i. e. Christ Who overcame.
I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can
no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin.
And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This
seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain
definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation
being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time. " There are two
reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as
Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among
his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as
long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows
him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our
weakness. " The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13: "The devil is afraid of
persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat. " That the devil
does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
Mat. 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out. "
From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
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OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate,
which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by
the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which
are subject to their influence?
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Whether a body can be active?
Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do
not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon;
this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these
are the spiritual substances. "
Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in
its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not
substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
no corporeal substance is active.
Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according
to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and
an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause
is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an
accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and
power on that of which it lays hold. "
I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments
mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all
the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of
some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to
him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates,
by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of
Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are
participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that
separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said
that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter.
Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is
determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held
that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the
principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to
any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone,
which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on
something else.
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the
participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to
make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such;
wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of
its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing
owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact
that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent
limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as
the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every
ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is
the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence
such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
considered to the "the rare" and "the dense. " Consequently both Plato
and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal
agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the
substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the
introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle.
And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of
which we have spoken above when treating of the creation ([934]Q[45],
A[8]).
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i,
8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
action; which things are manifestly untrue.
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a
body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of
the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no
nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to that which the other has in act.
From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be
observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to
be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal
form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as
is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight
retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its
movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because
action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by
something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from
God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
potentiality.
Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental
form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate
in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the
soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its
own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an
accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in
being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its
identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained
action by an issue of atoms.
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Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only
materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is.
Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons
produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can
be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say
that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no
active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things
which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world. "
I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living
things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and
the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the
word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing
in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive
principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which
living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the
name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and
movement.
These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas. "
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes. "
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are
produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
animal, as in "particular causes. " Fourthly, they are in the "seeds"
produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to
further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the
first effects produced.
Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural
things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their
being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of
their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas
[rationes ideales].
Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain
parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local
movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons
as employing seeds.
Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in
the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.
Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of
these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9)
that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the
world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things. " Nevertheless,
the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly
speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle;
and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal
virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the
passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be
used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be
wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the
passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and
this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the
scope of seminal virtues.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here
below?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are
not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
storms and atmospheric changes. "
Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and
matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for
the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
causality to the heavenly bodies.
Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is
more corporeal than sex. " But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser
and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
subtle and powerful nature. " And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that
"the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies,
moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection. "
I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all
bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as
to their cause.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and
corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the
heavenly bodies are gods.
Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are
only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the
like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of
which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But
to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial
forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act.
And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above
these material dispositions.
This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the
same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the
generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
and the sun generate man. "
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness
to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by
reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior
bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things
are like God.
Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously
received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of
matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception
is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this
as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
dispositions of matter.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above ([935]Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue
thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
superior to our souls.
Therefore it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform
principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it
seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly
bodies, as to their principles.
Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning
the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions. "
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act
on bodies, as stated above [936](A[3]). They can act directly indeed on
those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but
accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by
obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well.
Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal
organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from
sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the
cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led
by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which
there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal
organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of
heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man
has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like
other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to
human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and
accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the
intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will
receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain
force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of
following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of
the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be
changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause
of human actions, than on the intellect.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from
sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as
is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey
xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will
are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies
be the cause of human actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening
it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above
([937]Q[111], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements
is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its
cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and
the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which
are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these
passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in
the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in
particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by
his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium,
prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
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Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24
and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in
order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
subject to them.
Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely,
"herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and
figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11).
Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly
bodies.
On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the
heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the
first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held
that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art,
is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine
(De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely,
that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain
effects of the stars. " But this opinion is manifestly false. For we
know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the
power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a
man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite
poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that
necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that
demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said
man is subject thereto [938](A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be
false from what we have said above ([939]Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that
demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear
that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain
phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order
to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt. ) say. Secondly, because as they
are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as
stated above ([940]Q[114], A[4], ad 2) they take into account the
aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that
"the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of
the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is
precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the
demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain
constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man
into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the
stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain
constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for
which they are summoned.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the
"demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a
spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
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Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause
of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to
the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not
follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any
corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly
body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since
the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows
that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should
not be fulfilled. " Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies
take place of necessity.
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
[941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things
happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi,
Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not
to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has
not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that
a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as
to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this
cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it
is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing
cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some
terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to
the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on
the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some
heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this
matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is
accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result
of necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that
take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite.
Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to
local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its
effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of
another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause;
nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not
reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
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ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang. ): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real. "
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order. "
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher
cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by
their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in
regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who
had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115],
A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since
it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be
directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to
all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115],
A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being,
nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing.
Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can
therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a
grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts
after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this
world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of
a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure. " And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by
luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by
the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can
change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the
ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be
ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided
the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application
to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning
thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold
his tongue. " For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate:
wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck
or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
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Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate. " But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in
God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate,
as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God,
and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22],
A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of
the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as
being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by
certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by
the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some
of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged. " Of each of these
things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110],
A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is
in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production
of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the
nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i. e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as
the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this
order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus
fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to
the mediate causes, this fate is multiple.
transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain
natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can
alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of
these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents
or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot
in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance,
that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the
body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this
sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real
but a mere semblance of reality.
Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above
([933]Q[111], AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done
sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for
just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and
assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can
clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear
therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an
innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were
embodied in the semblance of some animal. " This not to be understood as
though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were
identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can
offer the same picture to another man's senses.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When
magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a
different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for
the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter
by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
subject. "
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Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from
making further assaults?
Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not
true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
Objection 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented
from further assaults.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him,"
i. e. Christ Who overcame.
I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can
no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin.
And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This
seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain
definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation
being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time. " There are two
reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as
Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among
his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as
long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows
him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our
weakness. " The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13: "The devil is afraid of
persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat. " That the devil
does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
Mat. 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out. "
From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
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OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate,
which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by
the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which
are subject to their influence?
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Whether a body can be active?
Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do
not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon;
this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these
are the spiritual substances. "
Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in
its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not
substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
no corporeal substance is active.
Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according
to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and
an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause
is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an
accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and
power on that of which it lays hold. "
I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments
mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all
the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of
some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to
him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates,
by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of
Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are
participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that
separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said
that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter.
Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is
determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held
that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the
principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to
any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone,
which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on
something else.
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the
participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to
make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such;
wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of
its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing
owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact
that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent
limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as
the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every
ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is
the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence
such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
considered to the "the rare" and "the dense. " Consequently both Plato
and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal
agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the
substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the
introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle.
And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of
which we have spoken above when treating of the creation ([934]Q[45],
A[8]).
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i,
8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
action; which things are manifestly untrue.
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a
body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of
the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no
nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to that which the other has in act.
From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be
observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to
be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal
form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as
is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight
retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its
movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because
action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by
something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from
God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
potentiality.
Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental
form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate
in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the
soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its
own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an
accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in
being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its
identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained
action by an issue of atoms.
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Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only
materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is.
Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons
produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can
be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say
that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no
active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things
which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world. "
I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living
things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and
the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the
word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing
in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive
principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which
living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the
name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and
movement.
These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas. "
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes. "
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are
produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
animal, as in "particular causes. " Fourthly, they are in the "seeds"
produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to
further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the
first effects produced.
Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural
things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their
being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of
their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas
[rationes ideales].
Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain
parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local
movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons
as employing seeds.
Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in
the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.
Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of
these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9)
that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the
world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things. " Nevertheless,
the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly
speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle;
and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal
virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the
passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be
used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be
wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the
passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and
this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the
scope of seminal virtues.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here
below?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are
not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
storms and atmospheric changes. "
Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and
matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for
the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
causality to the heavenly bodies.
Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is
more corporeal than sex. " But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser
and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
subtle and powerful nature. " And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that
"the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies,
moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection. "
I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all
bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as
to their cause.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and
corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the
heavenly bodies are gods.
Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are
only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the
like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of
which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But
to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial
forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act.
And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above
these material dispositions.
This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the
same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the
generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
and the sun generate man. "
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness
to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by
reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior
bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things
are like God.
Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously
received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of
matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception
is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this
as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
dispositions of matter.
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Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above ([935]Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue
thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
superior to our souls.
Therefore it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform
principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it
seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly
bodies, as to their principles.
Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning
the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions. "
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act
on bodies, as stated above [936](A[3]). They can act directly indeed on
those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but
accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by
obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well.
Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal
organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from
sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the
cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led
by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which
there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal
organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of
heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man
has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like
other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to
human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and
accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the
intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will
receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain
force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of
following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of
the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be
changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause
of human actions, than on the intellect.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from
sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as
is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey
xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will
are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies
be the cause of human actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening
it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above
([937]Q[111], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements
is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its
cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and
the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which
are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these
passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in
the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in
particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by
his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium,
prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
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Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24
and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in
order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
subject to them.
Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely,
"herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and
figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11).
Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly
bodies.
On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the
heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the
first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held
that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art,
is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine
(De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely,
that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain
effects of the stars. " But this opinion is manifestly false. For we
know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the
power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a
man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite
poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that
necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that
demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said
man is subject thereto [938](A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be
false from what we have said above ([939]Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that
demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear
that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain
phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order
to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt. ) say. Secondly, because as they
are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as
stated above ([940]Q[114], A[4], ad 2) they take into account the
aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that
"the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of
the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is
precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the
demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain
constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man
into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the
stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain
constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for
which they are summoned.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the
"demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a
spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
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Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause
of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to
the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not
follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any
corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly
body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since
the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows
that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should
not be fulfilled. " Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies
take place of necessity.
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
[941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things
happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi,
Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not
to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has
not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that
a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as
to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this
cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it
is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing
cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some
terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to
the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on
the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some
heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this
matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is
accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result
of necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that
take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite.
Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to
local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its
effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of
another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause;
nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not
reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
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ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang. ): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real. "
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order. "
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher
cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by
their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in
regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who
had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115],
A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since
it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be
directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to
all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115],
A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being,
nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing.
Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can
therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a
grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts
after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this
world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of
a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure. " And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by
luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by
the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can
change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the
ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be
ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided
the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application
to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning
thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold
his tongue. " For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate:
wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck
or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
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Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate. " But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in
God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate,
as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God,
and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22],
A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of
the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as
being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by
certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by
the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some
of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged. " Of each of these
things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110],
A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is
in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production
of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the
nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i. e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as
the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this
order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus
fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to
the mediate causes, this fate is multiple.
