No More Learning

237
248
264
II. A CRITICISM OF MORALITY-
1. The Origin of Moral Valuations
2. The Herd
3. General Observations concerning Morality
4. How Virtue is made to Dominate
5. The Moral Ideal-
A. A Criticism of Ideals -
B. A Criticism of the “Good Man," of the
Saint, etc.
C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil
Qualities
D. A Criticism of the Words : Improving, Per-
fecting, Elevating
6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism
of Morality
.
282
.
291
312
320
III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
1. General Remarks
2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy
3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers
4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philo-
sophy -
327
345
369
.
378


## p. v (#13) ###############################################

EDITOR'S FOREWORD
THE two volumes of The Will to Power have
been revised afresh by their translator. He, the
most gifted and conscientious of my collaborators,
would have added his corrections to the second
edition of these books, had it not been that five
years of war and war-service prevented him from
accomplishing a task which he always judged
necessary. The changes made are numerous and
well able to throw light upon many a dark passage,
but the actual faults of translation were few in
number, so that the first and second editions are
by no means invalidated by this third one.
OSCAR LEVY.
PARIS, ist March 1924.


## p. vi (#14) ##############################################



## p. vii (#15) #############################################

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
In the volume before us we have the first two books
of what was to be Nietzsche's greatest theoretical
and philosophical prose work. The reception
given to Thus Spake Zarathustra had been so
unsatisfactory, and misunderstandings relative to
its teaching had become so general, that, within a
year of the publication of the first part of that
famous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already
beginning to see the necessity of bringing his
doctrines before the public in a more definite and
unmistakable form. During the years that fol-
lowed—that is to say, between '1883 and 1886-
this plan was matured, and although we have no
warrant, save his sister's own 'word and the internal
evidence at our disposal, for classing Beyond Good
and Evil (published 1886) among the contributions
to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical scheme,
“The Will to Power,” it is nowimpossible to separate
it entirely from his chief work as we would naturally
separate The Birth of Tragedy, the Thoughts out
of Season, the volumes entitled Human, all-too-
Human, The Dawn of Day, and Joyful Wisdom.
Beyond Good and Evil, then, together with its
sequel, The Genealogy of Morals, and the two
little volumes, The Twilight of the Idols and the


## p. viii (#16) ############################################

viii
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE,
Antichrist (published in 1889 and 1894 respec-
tively), must be regarded as forming part of the
general plan of which The Will to Power was to
be the opus magnum.
Unfortunately, The Will to Power was never
completed by its author. The text from which
this translation was made is a posthumous publi-
cation, and it suffers from all the disadvantages
that a book must suffer from which has been ar-
ranged and ordered by foster hands. When those
who were responsible for its publication undertook
the task of preparing it for the press, it was very
little more than a vast collection of notes and rough
drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time to time,
as the material for his chief work; and, as any
liberty taken with the original manuscript, save
that of putting it in order, would probably have
resulted in adding or excluding what the author
would on no account have added or excluded him-
self, it follows that in some few cases the paragraphs
are no more than hasty memoranda of passing
thoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the in-
tention of elaborating at some future time. In
these cases the translation follows the German as
closely as possible, and the free use even of a con-
junction has in certain cases been avoided, for fear
lest the meaning might be in the slightest degree
modified It were well, therefore, if the reader
could bear these facts in mind whenever he is struck
by a certain clumsiness, either of expression or dis-
position, in the course of reading this translation,
It may be said that, from the day when
Nietzsche first recognised the necessity of making


## p. ix (#17) ##############################################

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
ix
}
>
a more unequivocal appeal to his public than the
Zarathustra had been, that is to say, from the
spring of 1883, his work in respect of The Will
to Power suffered no interruption whatsoever, and
that it was his chief preoccupation from that
period until his breakdown in 1889.
That this span of six years was none too long
for the task he had undertaken, will be gathered
from the fact that, in the great work he had planned,
he actually set out to show that the life-principle, x
#Will to Power," was the prime motor of all living
organisms.
To do this he appeals both to the animal world
and to human society, with its subdivisions, religion,
art, morality, politics, etc. etc. , and in each of these
he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the prin-
ciple which he held to be the essential factor of
all existence.
Frau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion
that “ The Will to Power was the fundamental
principle of all life, first occurred to her brother in
the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was
serving as a volunteer in a German army ambul-
ance. On one occasion, at the close of a very
heavy day with the wounded, he happened to
enter a small town which lay on one of the chief
military roads. He was wandering through it in
a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned
the corner of a street that was protected on either
side by lofty stone walls, he heard a roaring noise,
as of thunder, which seemed to come from the
immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a
step or two, and what should he see, but a magni-
a


## p. x (#18) ###############################################

х
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
ficent cavalry regiment,gloriously expressive of
the courage and exuberant strength of a people-
ride past him like a luminous stormcloud. The
thundering din waxed louder and louder, and lo
and behold! his own beloved regiment of field
artillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the
mist of motes, and sped westward amid an uproar
of clattering chains and galloping steeds. A
minute or two elapsed, and then a column of in-
fantry appeared, advancing at the double—the
men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck the hard
road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their ac-
coutrements glistened through the haze. ' While
this procession passed before him, on its way to
war and perhaps to death,—so wonderful in its
vital strength and formidable courage, and so per-
fectly symbolic of a race that will conquer and
prevail, or perish in the attempt, Nietzsche was
struck with the thought that the Aighest will to
live could not find its expression in a miserable
struggle for existence," but in a will to war, a
Will to Power, a will to overpower!
This is said to be the history of his first con-
ception of that principle which is at the root of
all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in Thus
Spake Zarathustra, we find him expounding it
thus :
“Wherever I found a living thing, there found
I Will to Power; and even in the will of the
servant found I the will to be master.
"Only where there is life, is there also will:
not, however, Will to Life, but so teach I thee-
Will to Power!


## p. xi (#19) ##############################################

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
xi
“ Much is reckoned higher than life itself by
the living one; but out of the very reckoning
speaketh-the Will to Power ! ”
And three years later still, in Beyond Good and
Evil, we read the following passage :
. " Psychologists should bethink themselves be-
fore putting down the instinct of self-preservation
as the cardinal instinct of an organic being.
A living thing seeks above all to discharge its
strength-life itself is Will to Power; self-preser-
vation is only one of the indirect and most frequent
results thereof. "
But in this volume, and the one that is to
follow, we shall find Nietzsche more mature, more
sober, and perhaps more profound than in the
works above mentioned. All the loves and hates
by which we know him, we shall come across
again in this work; but here he seems to stand
more above them than he had done heretofore;
having once enunciated his ideals vehemently and
emphatically, he now discusses them with a certain
grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail,
and he gives even his enemies a quiet and respect-
ful hearing His tolerant attitude to Christianity
on pages 8-9, 107, 323, for instance, is a case in
point, and his definite description of what we are
to understand by his pity (p. 293) leaves us in no
doubt as to the calm determination of this work.
Book One will not seem so well arranged or so
well worked out as Book Two; the former being
more sketchy and more speculative than the latter,
Be this as it may, it contains deeply interesting
things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the ele-


## p. xii (#20) #############################################

xii
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
ments of Nihilism-as the outcome of Christian
values—in all the institutions of the present
day.
In the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in
for a number of telling blows, and not the least of
these is to be found on page 237, where, although
his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied.
Here Nietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an
individualistic morality, and carefully states that
his philosophy aims at a new order of rank.
It will seem to some that morality is dealt with
somewhat cavalierly throughout the two books;
but, in this respect, it should not be forgotten that
Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of
exceptional men, but that he also believed that
any morality is nothing more than a mere system
of valuations which are determined by the condi-
tions in which a given species lives. Hence his
words on page 107: "Beyond Good and Evil;—
certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional
and strict preservation of herd-morality"; and on
L
page 323: "Suppose the strong were masters in
all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think
what their attitude would be towards illness, suffer-
ing, and sacrifice! Self-contempt on the part of the
weak would be the result: they would do their
utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind.
And would this be desirable should we really
like a world in which the subtlety, the considera-
tion, the intellectuality, the plasticity—in fact, the
whole influence of the weak—was lacking? "
It is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche
only objected to the influence of herd-morality
"
»


## p. xiii (#21) ############################################

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
xiii
outside the herd—that is to say, among excep-
tional and higher men who may be wrecked by it.
Whereas most other philosophers before him had
been the" Altruists" ofthe lower strata of humanity,
Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the
exceptions, of the particular lucky cases among
men. For such varieties," he thought, the
morality of Christianity had done all it could do,
and though he in no way wished to underrate the
value it had sometimes been to them in the past,
he saw that at present, in any case, it might prove
a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he
believed that "Hypotheses are only the pieces of
scaffolding which are erected rounda building during
the course of its construction, and which are taken
away as soon as the edifice is completed. To the
workman, they are indispensable; but he must be
careful not to confound the scaffolding with the
building. " *
It is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was
never able to complete his life-work.
The frag-
ments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of
The Will to Power are sufficiently remarkable to
convey some idea of what the whole work would
have been if only its author had been able to
arrange and complete it according to his original
design.
It is to be hoped that we are too sensible now-
adays to allow our sensibilities to be shocked by
serious and well-meditated criticism, even of the
* Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen (Weimar Edition,
i. 11, p. 132).


## p. xiv (#22) #############################################

xiv
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE,
most cherished among our institutions, and an
honest and sincere reformer ought no longer to
find us prejudiced-to the extent of deafness-
against him, more particularly when he comes
forward with a gospel" The Will to Power"-
which is, above all, a test of our power to will.
ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.


## p. 1 (#23) ###############################################

PREFACE.
I.
CONCERNING great things one should either be
silent or one should speak loftily :-loftily—that
is to say, cynically and innocently.
2.
What I am now going to relate is the history
of the next two centuries. I shall describe what
will happen, what must necessarily happen: the
triumph of Nihilism. This history can be written
already; for necessity itself is at work in bringing
it about. This future is already proclaimed by a
hundred different omens; as a destiny it announces
its advent everywhere; for this music of to-morrow
all ears are already pricked. The whole of our
culture in Europe has long been writhing in an
agony of suspense which increases from decade
to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe:
restless, violent, helter-skelter, like a torrent that
will reach its bourne, and refuses to reflect-yea,
that even dreads reflection.
3.
On the other hand, the present writer has done
little else, hitherto, than reflect and meditate, like
А
VOL. I.


## p. 2 (#24) ###############################################

2
PREFACE.
an instinctive philosopher and anchorite, who found
his advantage in isolation in remaining outside, in
patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like
a weighing and testing spirit who has already lost
his way in every labyrinth of the future; like a
prophetic bird-spirit that looks backwards when it
would announce what is to come; like the first
perfect European Nihilist, who, however, has already
outlived Nihilism in his own soul—who has out-
grown, overcome, and dismissed it.
4.
For the reader must not misunderstand the
meaning of the title which has been given to this
Evangel of the Future. “ The Will to Power :
An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values"-
with this formula a counter-movement finds ex-
pression, in regard to both a principle and a
mission; a movement which in some remote
future will supersede this perfect Nihilism; but
which nevertheless regards it as a necessary step,
both logically and psychologically, towards its own
advent, and which positively cannot come, except
on top of and out of it. For, why is the triumph
of Nihilism inevitable now?
Because the very
values current amongst us to-day will arrive at
their logical conclusion in Nihilism,-because
Nihilism is the only possible outcome of our
greatest values and ideals, because we must first
experience Nihilism before we can realise what the
actual worth of these "values" was. . . . Sooner
or later we shall be in need of new values.


## p. 3 (#25) ###############################################

d
n
ce
st
a
it
st.
-y
t.
FIRST BOOK.
ne
nis
EUROPEAN NIHILISM.
X-
a
ete
=ut
20
vn
spt
ph
ery
at
75C
our
rst
he
aer


## p. 4 (#26) ###############################################



## p. 5 (#27) ###############################################

EUROPEAN NIHILISM.
I.
A PLAN
1. NIHILISM is at our door: whence comes this
most gruesome of all guests to us ? To begin
with, it is a mistake to point to “social evils,"
“physiological degeneration," or even to corrup-
tion as a cause of Nihilism. This is the most
straightforward and most sympathetic age that
ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or
intellectual, is, in itself, quite unable to introduce
Nihilism, i. e. , the absolute repudiation of worth,
purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet
other and quite different explanations. But there
is one very definite explanation of the phenomena:
Nihilism harbours in the heart of Christian
morals.
2. The downfall of Christianity,—through its
morality (which is insuperable), which finally turns
against the Christian God Himself (the sense of
truth, highly developed through Christianity,
ultimately revolts against the falsehood and ficti-
tiousness of all Christian interpretations of the
world and its history. The recoil-stroke of "God
li


## p. 6 (#28) ###############################################

6
THE WILL TO POWER.
is Truth” in the fanatical Belief, is: “All is
false. " Buddhism of action. . .
. ).
3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor.
The downfall of the moral interpretation of the
universe, which loses its raison d'être once it has
tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its end
in Nihilism. “Nothing has any purpose” (the
inconsistency of one explanation of the world, to
which men have devoted untold energy,-gives
rise to the suspicion that all explanations may
perhaps be false). The Buddhistic feature : a
yearning for nonentity (Indian Buddhism has
no fundamentally moral development at the back
of it; that is why Nihilism in its case means only
morality not overcome; existence is regarded as
a punishment and conceived as an error; error is
thus held to be punishment—a moral valuation).
Philosophical attempts to overcome the “moral
God” (Hegel, Pantheism). The vanquishing of
popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard.
Antagonism of "true" and “ beautiful” and
“good. ”
4. Against "purposelessness” on the one hand,
against moral valuations on the other : how far has
all science and philosophy been cultivated hereto-
fore under the influence of moral judgments? And
have we not got the additional factor—the enmity
of science, into the bargain? Or the prejudice
against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian
valuations everywhere present as remnants in
socialistic and positivistic systems. A criticism of
Christian morality is altogether lacking.
5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural


## p. 7 (#29) ###############################################

EUROPEAN NIHILISM.
7
5
S
1
e
0
"S
у
a
science (along with its attempts to escape into a
Beyond). Out of its practice there finally arises a
"certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude
towards itself—a sort of anti-scientificality. Since
Copernicus man has been rolling away from the
centre towards x.
6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political
and politico-economical way of thinking, where all
principles at length become tainted with the atmo-
sphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, in-
significance, dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy,
etc. Punishment. Everywhere the deliverer is
missing, either as a class or as a single man-the
justifier.
7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the
“practical historian," i. e. , the romanticist. The
attitude of art is quite unoriginal in modern life.
Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.
8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Roman-
ticism (the conclusion of Wagner's Ring of the
Nibelung).
LS
ik
ly
as
is
1)
al
of
d.
and
ad
nas
co
nd
ity
cice
an
in
0
ral


## p. 8 (#30) ###############################################

I.
NIHILISM.
1. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE
VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED
HERETOFORE.
2.
What does Nihilism mean? —That the highest
values are losing their value. There is no bourne.
There is no answer to the question : “to what
purpose ? "
3.
Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life
is absurd, in the light of the highest values
already discovered; it also includes the view that
we have not the smallest right to assume the
existence of transcendental objects or things in
themselves, which would be either divine or
morality incarnate.
This view is a result of fully developed "truth-
fulness”: therefore a consequence of the belief in
morality.
4.
What advantages did the Christian hypothesis
of morality offer?
1


## p. 9 (#31) ###############################################

NIHILISM.
9
(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men,
which contrasted with their apparent insignifi-
cance and subordination to chance in the eternal
flux of becoming and perishing.
(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates,
inasmuch as it granted the world a certain perfec-
tion despite its sorrow and evil—it also granted
the world that proverbial “freedom”: evil seemed
full of meaning:
(3) It assumed that man could have a know-
ledge of absolute values, and thus granted him
adequate perception for the most important things.
(4) It prevented man from despising himself as
man, from turning against life, and from being
driven to despair by knowledge: it was a self-
preservative measure.
In short: Morality was the great antidote
against practical and theoretical Nihilism.
5.
But among the forces reared by morality, there
was truthfulness: this in the end turns against
morality, exposes the teleology of the latter, its
interestedness, and now the recognition of this lie
so long incorporated, from which we despaired of
ever freeing ourselves, acts just like a stimulus.
We perceive certain needs in ourselves, implanted
during the long dynasty of the moral interpreta-
tion of life, which now seem to us to be needs
of untruth: on the other hand, those very needs
represent the highest values owing to which we
are able to endure life. We have ceased from
s


## p. 10 (#32) ##############################################

ΙΟ
THE WILL TO POWER.
attaching any worth to what we know, and we
dare not attach any more worth to that with
which we would fain deceive ourselves from this
antagonism there results a process of dissolution.
6.
This is the antinomy:
In so far as we believe in morality, we con-
demn existence.
7.
The highest values in the service of which
man ought to live, more particularly when they
oppressed and constrained him most-these social
values, owing to their tone-strengthening tenden-
cies, were built over men's heads as though they
were the will of God, or “reality," or the actual
world, or even a hope of a world to come, Now
that the lowly origin of these 'values has become
known, the whole universe seems to have been
transvalued and to have lost its significance—but
this is only an intermediate stage.
8.
The consequence of Nihilism (disbelief in all
values) as a result of a moral valuation :- We
have grown to dislike egotism (even though we have
realised the impossibility of altruism);-we have
grown to dislike what is most necessary (although
we have recognised the impossibility of a liberum


## p. 11 (#33) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
II
»
a
Azrbitrium and of an “intelligible freedom" *). We
고
​perceive that we do not reach the spheres in
s's which we have set our values—at the same time
those other spheres in which we live have not
thereby gained one iota in value.
On the contrary,
we are tired, because we have lost the main in-
centive to live. "All in vain hitherto ! "
9.
-
Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism.
IO.
h
у
]-
sy
al
W
he
en
ut
A. Pessimism viewed as strength-in what re-
spect ?
In the energy of its logic, as anarchy,
Nihilism, and analysis.
B. Pessimism regarded as collapse—in what
sense? In the sense of its being a softening
influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a
tout comprendre," and historical spirit.
Critical tension: extremes make their appear-
ance and become dominant.
II.
The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism :
what is the force at work ? —The notion that there
are no values, and no purpose : the recognition of
the part that moral valuations have played in all
other lofty values.
all
Ve
ve
Eve
gh
* This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of
Freedom-the practical and the transcendental kind. The
first belongs to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible
world. -TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
2111


## p. 12 (#34) ##############################################

12
THE WILL TO POWER.
Result: moral valuations are condemnations, ne-
gations; morality is the abdication of the will to
live. . .
I 2.
THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES.
A.
>
»
Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a psycho-
logical condition, first when we have sought in all
that has happened a purpose which is not there :
so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.
Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness
of the long waste of strength, the pain of “futility,"
uncertainty, the lack of an opportunity to recover
in some way, or to attain to a state of peace
concerning anything—shame in one's own pres-
ence, as if one had cheated oneself too long. .
The purpose above-mentioned might have been
achieved: in the form of a "realisation ” of a most
high canon of morality in all worldly phenomena,
the moral order of the universe ;- or in the form of
the increase of love and harmony in the traffic of
humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general
condition of happiness; or even in the march to-
wards general nonentity—any sort of goal always
constitutes a purpose.
The common factor to all
these appearances is that something will be at-
tained, through the process itself: and now
perceive that Becoming has been aiming at nothing,
and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusion-
ment in regard to a so-called purpose in existence,
as a cause of Nihilism ; whether this be in re-
we


## p. 13 (#35) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
13
1
S
I
spect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into
the recognition that all the hypotheses are false
which have hitherto been offered as to the object
of life, and which relate to the whole of "Evolu-
tion" (man no longer an assistant in, let alone
the culmination of, the evolutionary process).
Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological
condition, in the second place, when man has fixed
a totality, a systematisation, even an organisation
in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul
thirsting for respect and admiration will wallow in
the general idea of a highest ruling and adminis-
trative power (if it be the soul of a logician,
the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning
will suffice to conciliate everything). A kind of
unity, some form of “monism”: and as a result
of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feel-
ing of profound relativity and dependence in the
presence of an All which is infinitely superior to
him, a sort of divinity. “The general good exacts
the surrender of the individual " but lo, there
is no such general good! At bottom, man loses
the belief in his own worth when no infinitely
precious entity manifests itself through him--that
is to say, he conceived such an All, in order to be
able to believe in his own worth.
Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a
third and last form. Admitting these two points
of view: that no purpose can be assigned to Be-
coming, and that no great entity rules behind all
Becoming, in which the individual may completely
lose himself as in an element of superior value;
there still remains the subterfuge which would con-
2
t
•
.
3
f
f
1
S
11
e
€,


## p. 14 (#36) ##############################################

14
THE WILL TO POWER.
hree C
world
ourse!
three
refuse
them
apple
for de
RE
is the
wort
C C
ried
sist in condemning this whole world of Becoming
as an illusion, and in discovering a world which
would lie beyond it, and would be a real world.
The moment, however, that man perceives that
this world has been devised only for the purpose
of meeting certain psychological needs, and that
he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form
of Nihilism comes into being, which comprises a
denial of a metaphysical world, and which forbids
itself all belief in a real world. From this stand-
point, the reality of Becoming is the only reality
that is admitted : all bypaths to back-worlds and
false godheads are abandoned—but this world is no
longer endured, although no one wishes to disown it.
What has actually happened? The feeling of
worthlessness was realised when it was understood
that neither the notion of " Purpose," nor that of
“ Unity," nor that of “Truth,” could be made to
interpret the general character of existence. Noth-
ing is achieved or obtained thereby; the unity
which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is
entirely lacking: the character of existence is not
true,” it is false; there is certainly no longer
any reason to believe in a real world.
In short,
the categories, “Purpose,” “Unity,” “Being," by
means of which we had lent some worth to life,
we have once more divorced from it—and the
world now appears worthless to us.
Our
Sore
been
are.
of
ing
L
thi
nes
ali
tH
B.
CE
Admitting that we have recognised the impos-
sibility of interpreting the world by means of these
DO
1


## p. 15 (#37) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
15
hree categories, and that from this standpoint the
world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask
ourselves whence we derived our belief in these
three categories. Let us see if it is possible to
refuse to believe in them. If we can deprive
them of their value, the proof that they cannot be
applied to the world, is no longer a sufficient reason
for depriving that world of its value.
Result: The belief in the categories of reason *
is the cause of Nihilism—we have measured the
worth of the world according to categories which
can only be applied to a purely fictitious world.
Conclusion: All values with which we have
tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from
our point of view, and with which we have there-
fore deprived it of all worth (once these values have
been shown to be inapplicable)—all these values,
are, psychologically, the results of certain views
of utility, established for the purpose of maintain-
ing and increasing the dominion of certain com-
munities: but falsely projected into the nature of
things. It is always man's exaggerated ingenuous-
ness to regard himself as the sense and measure of
all things.
1
Y
13.
Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological
condition (the vast generalisation, the conclusion
that there is no purpose in anything, is pathological) :
* This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of twelve
categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and
modality, are each provided with three categories. -TRANS-
LATOR'S NOTE.
S
S


## p. 16 (#38) ##############################################

16
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
whether it be that the productive forces are no
yet strong enough-or that decadence still hesi-
tates and has not yet discovered its expedients.
The conditions of this hypothesis :—That there
is no truth; that there is no absolute state of
affairs no "thing-in-itself. ” This itself is only
Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It finds
that the value of things consists precisely in the
: fact that these values are not real and never have
been real, but that they are only a symptom of
strength on the part of the valuer, a simplification
serving the purposes of existence.
14.
Values and their modification are related to the
growth of power of the valuer.
The measure of disbelief and of the “ freedom
of spirit " which is tolerated, viewed as an expres.
sion of the growth of power.
“ Nihilism 'viewed as the ideal of the highest
spiritual power, of the over-rich life, partly destruc-
tive, partly ironical.
15.
What is belief? How is a belief born ? All
belief assumes that something is true.
The extremest form of Nihilism would mean
that all belief-all assumption of truth—is false :
because no real world is at hand. It were there.
fore: only an appearance seen in perspective, whose
origin must be found in us (seeing that we are
constantly in need of a narrower, a shortened, and
simplified world).


## p. 17 (#39) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
17
This should be realised, that the extent to
200
esi
which we can, in our heart of hearts, acknowledge
appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, with-
out going to rack and ruin, is the measure of
of strength.
nly In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the nega-
ndi tion of a real world and of Being, might be a
the divine view of the world.
ere
址​。
ave
16.
cio
th
If we are disillusioned, we have not become so
in regard to life, but owing to the fact that our
eyes have been opened to all kinds of " desiderata. "
With mocking anger we survey that which is
called “ Ideal”: we despise ourselves only because
we are unable at every moment of our lives to
quell that absurd emotion which is called “Ideal-
ism. " This pampering by means of ideals is
stronger than the anger of the disillusioned one.
lor
res
ches
ruc
17.
AI
near
Ise
To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism
continue to be the result of the same ideal as that
which gave rise to Christian Theism ? The
amount of certainty concerning the most exalted
desiderata, the highest values and the greatest
degree of perfection, was SO great, that the
philosophers started out from it as if it had been
an a priori and absolute fact: “God” at the head,
as the given quantity-Truth. “ To become like
God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being "-
B
ere
2056
art
anc
.
VOL. 1.


## p. 18 (#40) ##############################################

18
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
these were for centuries the most ingenuous and
most convincing desiderata (but that which con-
vinces is not necessarily true on that account:
it is nothing more nor less than convincing. An
observation for donkeys).
The granting of a personal-reality to this accre-
tion of ideals has been unlearned: people have
become atheistic. But has the ideal actually been
abandoned ? The latest metaphysicians, as
matter of fact, still seek their true “reality” in it
—the "thing-in-itself” beside which everything
else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that
because our world of appearance is so obviously
not the expression of that ideal, it therefore cannot
be “true”-and at bottom does not even lead
back to that metaphysical world as cause. The
unconditioned, in so far as it stands for that
highest degree of perfection, cannot possibly
be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopen-
hauer, who desired it otherwise, was obliged to
imagine this metaphysical basis as the antithesis
to the ideal, as “an evil, blind will ” : thus it could
be “that which appears," that which manifests
itself in the world of appearance. But even so, he
did not give up that ideal absolute—he circum-
vented it. . .
(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of
intelligible freedom," * in order to relieve the
ens perfectum of the responsibility of having con-
trived this world as it is, in short, in order to
explain evil: scandalous logic for a philosopher ! ).
(
* See Note on p. 11.


## p. 19 (#41) ##############################################

NIHILISM.
19
.
een
ia
ind
18.
on-
nt
The most general sign of modern times: in his
Ar
own estimation, man has lost an infinite amount of
dignity. For a long time he was the centre and
cre. tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured
ave to demonstrate at least his relationship to the
most essential and in itself most valuable side of
life—as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold
ini fast to the dignity of man, in their belief that
in moral values are cardinal values. He who has
itha let God go, clings all the more strongly to the
usl belief in morality.
inc
lea
19.
Th
Every purely moral valuation (as, for instance,
tha the Buddhistic) terminates in Nihilism: Europe
ibl must expect the same thing! It is supposed that
pen one can get along with a morality bereft of a
Ht
religious background; but in this direction the road
to Nihilism is opened. There is nothing in religion
noul which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing
fest creatures.
0,1
20.
cum
The question which Nihilism puts, namely," to
is c what purpose ? " is the outcome of a habit, hitherto,
th to regard the purpose as something fixed, given and
con exacted from outside that is to say, by some super-
rt natural authority. Once the belief in this has been
er! unlearned, the force of an old habit leads to the
search after another authority, which would know
how to speak unconditionally, and could point to


## p. 20 (#42) ##############################################

20
THE WILL TO POWER,
N
B
fs
goals and missions. The authority of the conscience
now takes the first place (the more morality is
emancipated from theology, the more imperative
does it become) as a compensation for the personal
authority. Or the authority of reason. Or the
gregarious instinct (the herd). Or history with its
immanent spirit, which has its goal in itself, and to
which one can abandon oneself. One would like
to evade the will, as also the willing of a goal and
the risk of setting oneself a goal. One would like
to get rid of the responsibility (Fatalism would
be accepted). Finally: Happiness, and with a
dash of humbug, the happiness of the greatest
number.
It is said:
(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary.
(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen.
Precisely now, when will in its fullest strength
were necessary, it is in the weakest and most pusil-
lanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning
the organising power of the will.
ma
fem
:-
SU
ex
Si
CO
a
6
21.
The perfect Nihilist. —The Nihilist's eye idealises
—
in an ugly sense, and is inconstant to what it
remembers : it allows its recollections to go astray
and to fade, it does not protect them from that
cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all
that is distant and past. And what it does not do
for itself it fails to do for the whole of the past of
mankind as well—that is to say, it allows it to drop


## p. 21 (#43) ##############################################

232860
NIHILISM.
2I
22.
20
i
iv
20
ch
it
ti
Ekt
no
ik
ul
Nihilism. It may be two things :-
A. Nihilism as a sign of enhanced spiritual
strength : active Nihilism.
B. Nihilism as a sign of the collapse and decline
of spiritual strength: passive Nihilism.
23.
te
>
. .
8
151
Lin
"
Nihilism, a normal condition.
It may be a sign of strength; spiritual vigour
may have increased to such an extent that the
goals toward which man has marched hitherto
(the “convictions," articles of faith) are no longer
suited to it (for a faith generally expresses the
exigencies of the conditions of existence, a submis-
sion to the authority of an order of things which
conduces to the prosperity, the growth and power of
a living creature . . . ); on the other hand, a sign
of insufficient strength, to fix a goal, a "wherefore,”
and a faith for itself.
It reaches its maximum of relative strength, as
a powerful destructive force, in the form of active
Nihilism.
Its opposite would be weary Nihilism, which no
longer attacks: its most renowned form being
Buddhism : as passive Nihilism, a sign of weakness :
spiritual strength may be fatigued, exhausted, so
that the goals and values which have prevailed
hitherto are no longer suited to it and are no longer
believed in so that the synthesis of values and
goals (upon which every strong culturê stands)
lise
it :
tra
tha
sal
td
st
dro


## p. 22 (#44) ##############################################

22
THE WILL TO POWER.
decomposes, and the different values contend with
one another : Disintegration, then everything which
is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, steps
into the foreground under the cover of various dis-
guises, either religious, moral, political or æsthetic,
etc.
24.
Nihilism is not only a meditating over the “ in
vain ! ”-not only the belief that everything de-
serves to perish; but one actually puts one's
shoulder to the plough ; one destroys. This, if you
will, is illogical; but the Nihilist does not believe
in the necessity of being logical. . . . It is the
condition of strong minds and wills; and to these
it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of
judgment: the negation by deeds proceeds from
their nature. Annihilation by the reasoning
faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.
25.
Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist. The
courage of all one really knows comes but late
in life. It is only quite recently that I have ac-
knowledged to myself that heretofore I have been
a Nihilist from top to toe. The energy and
thoroughness with which I marched forward as a
Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental
fact. When one is progressing towards a goal
it seems impossible that.