No More Learning

But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of winch is ajgure ^conceptipn , "while tin ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural conditions do not con cern the determination of the will itself, they relate to its effect alone, and the consequences of the effect in the world of phse nomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyondjtheir_p. o. 5tex- to. produce. . . They may produce a volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned -- a volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the ob ject what it may, purely sensuous --as pleasure, or presented by pure reason -- as good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect
? them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place, and which perhaps never will take place ; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For, in the
absence of thioupposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain effects in the world of experience.
Now, let us stop here, and admit it to be at least possible, that reason does stand in a really causal relation to phse- nomena. In this case it must -- pure reason as it is -- exhibit an empirical character. For every cause supposes a rule, ac cording to which certain phenomena follow as effects from th<< cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these effects ; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause -- as a faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason ; and this charac ter is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, iu conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms.
Thus the volition of every man has an empiricalIcharacter, 2
spontaneity, rearranges
? ? ? 840 TBAWflCENDKNTAI DIAlECTIC.
which is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in M far as its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the pre sence of a rule, according to which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees, the actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions, and in this way to decide upou the subjective principles of the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from phe nomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by experience ; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical cha racter, and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we
; could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognise to
be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be no freedom ; and it is only in the light of this character that we can consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple observation, and, as is the case in anthropology, insti tute a physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.
lation to speculative reason --but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these actions, we shall discover rule and an order very different from those of nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty may be, that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or be lieve that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand in causal relation to certain actions 01 roan and that these actions have taken place because they were determined, not empirical causes, but the act of the will upon grounds of reason.
Now, granting that reason stands in causal relation to phenomena can an action of reason he called free, when we know that, sensuously --in its empirical character, completely determined and absolutely necessary But this empirical character itself determined the intelligible cha racter. The latter we cannot cognize we can only indicat'
by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an imme
? --But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason not for the purpose of ezplaininpAheW origin, that in re
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diate cognition only of the empirical character. * An action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as n purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character Joes not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural law of phenomena, which determines them ac cording to time, and as a series of causes and effects in time ; it would consequently cease to be freedom, and become a part of nature. We are therefore justified in saying --If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects. For the condition, which resides in the reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or begin to be. And thus we find--what we could not discover in any empirical series -- a condition of a successive series of events itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the condition stands out of and beyond the series of pheno- mena -- it intelligible, and consequently cannot be subject to any sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by preceding cause.
But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series of phenomena. Man himself phenomenon. Hia will has an empirical character, which the empirical cause of all his actions. There no condition --determining man and his volition in conformity with this character --which does not itself form part of the series of effects in nature, and subject to their law -- the law according to which an empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For this reason no given actio* can have an absolute and spon taneous origination, all actions being phenomena, and belong-
The real morality of action! -- their merit or demerit, and even that of our own conduct, completely unknown to ua. Our estimates can relate only to their empirical character. How much the result of the net ion of free-will, how much to V ascribed to nature and to blameless CTror. or to happy constitution of temperament (merito fortune), no oca ntn dueuTcr, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice.
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? TBAN9CENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ing to the world of experience. But it cannot be said of rea>> >on, that the state in which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining it. For reason it not a phenomenon, and therefore uot subject to sensuous conditions ; and, consequently, even in relation to its causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it.
Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all ac tions of the human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of the man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible character, of which the former is but the sen suous schema, knows no before or after ; and every action, irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible charac ter of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of action, and is not dynamically determined either by internal or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be described, in a merely negative manner, as independence of empirical conditions, for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena ; but it must be re garded, positively, as a faculty which can spontaneously ori ginate a series of events. At the same time, it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place in reason ; on the contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of the will, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena -- a beginning which is not, however, absolutely primal.
I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example, from its employment in the world of experience ; proved it cannot be by any amount of experience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions. Let us take a voluntary action --for example, a falsehood --by means of which a man has in troduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of hu manity, which is judged according to the motives from which it originated, and the blame of which and of the evil conse quences arising from imputed to the offender. We at hr>>t proceed to examine the empirical character of the ofTence,
mi. lor this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the loured of that character, Mich as defective education, bad company
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343'
a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of reflection --not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances, we do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for Ilia unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which in fluenced him, nay, not even for his former course of life ; for we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside,
conditions may be regarded at having never existed, and that the action may he considered
as completely unconditioned in relation to any state preced ing, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely nev series of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason, whichjeq<<iresjia to regard this faculty as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise deter mined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all em pirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard as a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It mat ters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this causality, the offence is estimated according to its intelligible character --the offender is decidedly worthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we regard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and therefore, as in the present case, culpable.
The above judgment is complete evidence that we are ac customed to think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no change takes place -- although ita pluenomena, in other words, the mode in which it appears in its effects, are subject to change -- that in it no preceding state determines the following, and, consequently, that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws. Reason is present and the same in all human actions, and at all times ; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It relatively to new states or conditions, determining, bnt uot determinable. Hence we cannot ask Why did uol
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? 844 THANSCEITOTnTAI, DTAUOTTC.
reason determine itself in a different manuer ? The question ought to be thus stated : Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a dif ferent manner? But this is a question which admits of no auswer. For a different intelligible character would have ex hibited a different empirical character ; and, when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refraiued from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority -- permissive or prohibitive -- of reason. Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time ; and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each oilier -- for these are not things, and therefore not causes in themselves, --but it cannot produce any difference in the re lation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.
Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go ; although we can recognize that it is free, that independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phsenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phseno mena, and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances, beyoad the power of out reason to decide. The question as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be Whj does the transcendental object of our external sensuous in tuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely this--whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition in the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient answer for we hare shown that, as the former stands relation to dif ferent kind of conditions from those of the latter, the law the one does not affect the law of the other, and that, coi. se- quently, both can exist together in independence of and with out interference with each other.
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Tlie reader must be careful to remark that my intention iu the above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence if freedom, as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain ? i-nsuous phsenomena. For, Dot to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental character, nor have been limited to the discussion of pure conceptions, --all at tempts at inferring from experience what cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful.
more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom ; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a causal power, by the aid of mere a priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in the foregoing remarks only ns a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of phsenomena with the help of that which is sen suously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an anti nomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least not opposed --this was the only tiling in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to solve.
IV.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.
In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of sense as constituting a dynamical scries, in which each member is subordinated to another --as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an existence which may be the high est condition of all changeable phsenomena, that to ne- oessary being. Our endeavour to reach, not the uncondi tioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of substance. The series before us therefore series of conceptions, and not ot intuitions, (in which the one intuition
of the other). that, But evident
as all phsenomena
are
cb>>Hr,t, and conditioned in their existence, the series of dc
subject tc
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? 346 rKAKSCENDKNTAL DIALECTIC.
pendent existences cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phsenomena were things in themselves, and-- as an immediate consequence from this supposition -- condi tion and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of sensuous phsenomena, would be perfectly im possible.
An important distinction, however, exists between the dy namical and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely witli the combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts ; and therefore are the con ditions of its series parts of the series, and to be consequently
regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phsenomena. In the former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the pos sibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to demon strate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the con dition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.
In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present dealing, there exists a way of escape from the diffi culty ; for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in different relations. All sensuous
phsenomena may be contingent, and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member -- not even the highest member --of the series ; the whole world of sense
would be left in its empirically determined existence uninter- fered with and uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in the consider
ation of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself--
? the cause (substantia phitnomenon) was regarded as belonging to the scries of conditions, and only its causality to the in
telligible world, -- we are obliged in the present case to cogi
? ? ? 01 THE COSMOLO01CAL IDEA Or DEVENDENOB 347
tate this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramun- danum) ; for otherwise it would be subject to the phenomena! law of contingency and dependence.
In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically conditioned existence, --that no pro- perty of the sensuous world possesses unconditioned necessity, --that we are bound to expect, and, so far as is possible, to
seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of conditions, --and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any ex istence as independent and self-subsistent ; although this Bhould not prevent us from recognising the possibility of the whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible,
and for this reason free from all empirical conditions.
But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to
the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to evidence the possibility of a purely intelli gible condition of the existence of all sensuous phsenomena. As bounds were set to reason, to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions, and losing itself in transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete pre sentation ; so, it was my purpose, ou the other hand, to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding, and to protest against any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility qf things, or declaring the' existence of the in telligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the a>>bitrary hypothesis of a neces sary, although purely intelligible condition, that no real con tradiction exists between them, and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an absolutely necessary
being may be impossible ; but this can never be demon strated from the universal contingency and dependence of sen suous phsenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue the series at some member of or to seek Sir its cause in some sphere of existence beyond the world
? prove
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nature. Reason goes its way ia the empirical world, ani follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of the transcend ental.
The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere representations, and always sensuously con ditioned ; things in themselves are not, and cannot be, ob jects to us. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some member of an empirical ? cries beyond the world of sense, as if empirical representa tions were things in themselves, existing apart from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would certainly be the case with contingent things ; but it cannot be with mere representations of things, the contin gency of which is itself merely a phenomenon, and can relate to no other regress than that which determines phenomena, that the empirical. But to cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover, from the contingency ot the latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the
empirical regress, nor with the complete contingency of phe nomena. And the demonstration of this was the only thing
necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For the condition of every conditioned -- as regards its existence --
sensuous, and for this reason part of the same series, must be itself conditioned, aa was shewn in the Antithesis of the fourth Antinomy. The embarrassments into which reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to exist or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its
? necessity does not require, nor does ience of an empirical condition and
conditionally necessary.
The empirical employment of reason
assumption of purely intelligible being
operations on the principle of the contingency of all phe nomena, proceeding from empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves empirical. Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards merely the pure tmployment of reason --in relation to ends or aims. For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcen
even permit, the pre- consequently, un
not affected the continues its
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? CONCLUDING BEMABKS ON T11E ANTINOMIES.
349
dental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensu- oua phenomena, and its existence necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the con tingency of phenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical conditions.
Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy ofPure Reason.
So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the to tality of conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satis faction, from this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas transcendental and eosmological. But when we set the unconditioned -- which is
inquiries -- in a sphere which lies out of the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas become transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never executed, but always to be pursued) ; they detach themselves completely from experience, and construct for themselves objects, the
material of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective reality of which is not based upon the comple tion of the empirical series, but upon pure & priori conceptions. T'. ie intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain distinct predicates re lating to its internal nature, for it has no connection with em pirical conceptions ; nor are we justified in affirming the existence of any such object. It consequently, mere product of the mind alone. Of all the eosmological ideas, however, that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this step. For the existence of phenomena, always conditioned and never self-snbsistenl, requires us to look for an object different from phenomena --an intelligible object, with which all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to assume the ex istence of self-sub8istent reality out of the field of experience, and are tfierefore obliged to regard phsenomena as merely contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by beings which are themselves intelligences, --no other course remains for us than to follow analogy, and employ 'he same mode in forming some conception of intelligible things, of which we have not the 'east knov'edge, which
? the aim of all our
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? 350 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical con ceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we are at present engaged in the discussion of thiuga which are not objects of experience ; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of it, all our conceptions of intelligible things. This we pro pose to attempt in the following chapter.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK H.
Chap. III. -- The Ideal of Pube Reason. <5ectio>> Fibst.
Of the Ideal in General.
We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects
to the mind, except under sensuous conditions ;
the conditions of objective reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact, nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied to phenomena, be presented in eonereto ; for it is phenomena that present to them the materials for the formation ot empirical conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further removed from objective reality than categories ; for no phsenomenon can ever present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attain able by no possible empirical cognition ; and they give to
reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.
But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in indhriduo -- as an individual thing, deter minable or determined by the idea alone.
The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not only the
? because
? ? ? OF THE IDEAL IN GENERAL. 351
advancement of nll the powers and faculties, which constitute our conception of liuman nature, to a complete attainment of their final aims, but also every thing which is requisite for the complete determination of the idea ; for of all contradictory predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What I have termed an ideal, was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind -- an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences.
Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power --as regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actiont. Moral con ceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of reason, because an empirical element --of pleasure or pain -- lies at the foun dation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and consequently when we attend merely to
their form, they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a human being existing only in thought, and in com plete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea pro vides a rule, bo the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it de mands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as chimeras ; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by comparison,
'. lie degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it. But to aim at realising the ideal in an example in the world of experience --to describe, for instance, the character of the perfectly wise man in a romance is impracticable. Nay more, there is something absurd in the attempt ; and the result must be little edifying, as the natural limitations which are continually breaking in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the illusion in the story, and throw an air
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DIALECTIC.
of suspicion even on what is good in thu idea, which hence appears fictitious and unreal.
Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which 11 always based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as n rule and a model for imitation or for criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception ; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture--the production of many diverse experiences --than a determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists {profess to have in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as they are de clared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for expla nation or examination.
In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determi nation according to a priori rules ; and hence it cogitates an object, which must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object is on this account trans cendent.
CHAPTER THIRD. Section Second.
Of the Transcendental Ideal.
(Prolotypon Transcendentale. )
? in relation to that which
in undetermined and subject to the principle of determin-
ability. This principle that of every two contradictorily op posed predicates, only one can belong to conception.
purely logical principle, itself based upon the principle of contradiction inasmuch as makes complete abstraction
the coutent, and attends merely to the logical form of the cognition.
But again, everything, as regards its possibility, also sub ject to the principle* of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible contradictory predicates things must belong to it. This principle not'based merely
Princiitium determmaiionh onmtmodet. -- r.
Erery conception
not contained
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? OF THE THA1T8CENBENTAI. IDEAL. 353
upon that cf contradiction ; for, in addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates, it regards everything as
standing in a relation to the sum of possibilities, as the sura- total of all predicates of things, and, while presupposing this sum as an a priori condition, presents to the mind every thing as receiving the possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in the aforesaid sum of possibilities. * The principle of com plete determination relates therefore to the content and not to the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the complete conception of a thing, and not a mere principle of analytical representation, which anounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a conception. It contains, more over, a transcendental presupposition -- that, namely, of the material for all possibility, which must contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility.
The proposition, everything which exists is completely deter mined, means not only that one of every pair of given contradic tory attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always predicable of the thing ; in it the predicates are not merely compared logically with each other, but the thing itself is tran- scendentally compared with the sum-tolal of all possible pre dicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying : --to attain to a complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it thereby, in a positive or negative manner. The conception of complete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality in eoncreto, and is therefore based upon an idea, which has its seat in the reason -- the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the haws of its harmonious and perfect exercise.
Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far as it forms the condition of the complete determina-
* Thus thii principle declares ever> thing to possess a relation to a common correlate -- the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the ground of their complete determination. The determinabitity of every conception is subordinate to the unkertatity (AUgemeinheit unit* latitat) of the principle of excluded middle ; the determination of a thing to the totali'y (Allheit. umKerriiat' of all possible predicates.
? A
? ? ? ? ? ,:a
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
tion of every thing, is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may constitute this sum-total, and we cogi tate in it merely the sum-total of all possible predicates --we nevertheless find, upon closer examination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the mind, excludes a large number of predicates --those deduced and those irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception completely de termined & priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an individual object, which is completely determined by and through the mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.
When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logi cally, but transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which may be cogitated as existing in them <J priori, we shall find that some indicate a bring, others merely a non-being. The logical negation expressed in the word not, does not properly belong to a conception, but only to the re lation of one conception to another in a judgment, and is consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the con tent of a conception. The expression not mor. al, does not in dicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object ; it does not concern the content at all. A transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates non-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the conception of which of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality, because in and through it objects are considered to be some thing -- to be things ; while the opposite negntion, on the other hand, indicates a mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone are attached to a representa tion, the non-existence of anything corresptnding to the repre sentation.
Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at the same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the least notion of darkness, because he has none of light ; the vagabond knows nothing of po verty, because he has never known what it is to be in com fort ;* the ignorant man ha9 no conception of his ignorance,
* The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught ui much that is wonderful ; hut the most important lesson we have received from them is the discovery of the ahyss of our ignorance in relation to the universe -- an ignorance the magnitude of which reason, without th*
? ? ? ? OF THE TRANSCSXDeNTAL IDEAL.
. . . ). . )
because he has no conception of knowledge. All conception! of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions ; anil realities contain the data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete de termination of all things.
If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foun dation of the complete determination of things --a sub stratum which is to form the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied, tbia substratum can not be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of reality (omnitudo realitatit). In this view, negations are nothing but limitations --a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our conception.
This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing in itself, regarded as completely determined ; and the conception of an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that predi cate of all possible contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is therefore a transcendental Meat which forms the basis of the complete determination of every thing that exists, and is the highest material condition of its possibility--a condition on which must rest the cogitation of all objects witli respect to their content. Nay, more, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable ; because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined, by and through itself, and cognized as the representation of an individuum.
The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical
division of the extent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion de
termines the conception by this part. The general conception of a reality cannot be divided d priori, because, without the aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate kinds of reality, standing under the former as the genus. The tran scendental principle of the eomplete detennination of all things is therefore merely the representation of the sum-total
information thus derived, could never have conceived. This discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the determination of the aims of human reason.
2'a 2
? ? ? ? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
of all reality ; it is not a conception which is Jie genua of all predicates under itself, but one which comprehends them all within itself. The complete determination of a thing is con sequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality, so much being predicated of the thing, while all that remains over is excluded --a procedure which is in exact agreement
with that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the object in the conclusion by one of the members of the division. It follows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact analogy with that which it pur- sues in disjunctive syllogisms--a proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by the human mind. *
It is self-evident that renson, in cogitating the necessary
determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal --for the purpose of deduciug from the un conditioned totality of complete determination, the condi tioned, that the totality of limited things. The ideal therefore the prototype of all things, which, as defective copies (eetypa), receive from the material of their possibility, and approximate to more or less, though impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.
The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as de rived -- except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be considered to be primitive and original. For all negations --and they are the only predicates means of which all other things can be distinguished from the ens realissimum -- are mere limitations of greater and higher -- nay, the highest reality and they consequently presuppose
this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from it. The manifold nature of tilings only an infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which
their common substratum just as all figures are possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The ob ject of the ideal of reason --an object existing only in reason ittelf--is nlso termed the primal being (ens originarmm)
? Set pasrs '225 am'. 2'lG.
? complete
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is
;
it
is
a
;
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? Or THE THAKBCEXDENTAL IDEAL
357
having no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens lummum) ; and as being the condition of all other beings, which rank under the being of all beings (ens entium). Bnt none of these terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions and all our investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to the ex istence of this being.
primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an existence which derivative, for the latter presuppose the former, and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. follows that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.
The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as limitation, or as kind of division of its reality for this
would be regarding the primal being as mere aggregate -- which has been shown to be impossible, although wrs so
represented in our first rough sketch. The highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phseno- menal reality, may lie with propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track,
and hypostatising this idea, we shall find ourselves authorised
to determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of
the mere conception of highest reality, as one, simple, all- sufficient, eternal, and so on -- in one word, to determine in
its unconditioned completeness the aid of every possible
? The conception of such being the conception of God in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason the object-matter of transcendental Theology.
But, such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be overstepping the limits of its validity and pur pose. For reason placed as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the complete determination of things, without
requiring that this conception be regarded as the conception an objective existence. Such an existence would be purely
predicate.
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by a
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A
? 358 TRANSCENDENTAL DIAXKCTIC.
fictitious, and the hypostatising of the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly un- authorised. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to as sume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the de ductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in general --for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary.
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of reason ; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For the ideal, of which we are at pre sent speaking, is based, not upon an arbit. rary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises : how happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being ?
The answer is ready ; it is at once presented by the pro cedure of transcendental analytic. The possibility of sen suous objects is a relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical form) may be cogitated & priori; while that which constitutes the matter -- the renlity of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to sen sation) --must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely deter mined, when it has been compared with all phsenomenal pre dicates, and represented by means of these either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself --the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which tlto real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing, -- the material of the possibility of nll sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of tins whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction from ench other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no other ob jects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and these can be given only in connection with a possible experience ; it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it pre supposes the whob> o<* sura-total of empirical renlity as tha
? ? ? ? OF THE EXISTENCE OF A BtJPItEME BKIWO. 359
condition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads i>> to consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous ob jects, as valid with regard to things in general. And thu. i we are induced to hold the empirical principle of our con ceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena, by leav ing out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental prin ciple of the possibility of things in general.
We proceed afterwards to hypostatise this idea of the sum- total of all reality, by chnnging the distributive unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole --a dialecticcl illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, con taining in itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete determination it presents. *
CHAPTER THIRD.
Section Thikd.
Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in proof oj the Existence of a Supreme Being.
Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for the complete determination of its con ceptions, the idealistic and factitious nature of such a presup position is too evident to allow reason for a moment to per suade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other considera tions which compel reason to seek out some resting-place in the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which
? This ideal of the ens reahtsimum --although merely a mental repre- ? entation --is first objeclhised, that is, has an objective existence attributed to then hypnttatited, and finally, by the natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, perionified, as we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience not based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the under- tttnding in eomeioutnett, and thus the unity of the supreme reality and
? the complete determinabiuty of all things, seem to Teside in understands, and consequently, in conscious intelligence.
supreme
? ? it, a
is a
a
? sen TBAWSCEUDEHTAL DIALECTIC.
is aot given as an actual existence from the mere conception of although alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first entered does not always continue to follow. It does not
begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and
basis actual existence. But this basis inse cure, unless rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely
requires
And this foundation itself unworthy of trust, leave under and above empty space, do not fill all, and leave no room for why or wherefore, be not, in
one word, infinite in its reality.
If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever
may be, we must also admit that there something which exists necessarily. For what contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which its cause and from this we must go On to conclude the existence of cause,
which not contingent, and which consequently exists neces sarily and unconditionally. Such the argument by whicii reason justifies its advances towards primal being.
necessary.
? Now reason looks round for the conception of
that may be admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the purpose of in ferring priori, from the conception of such being, its ob
existence, (for reason allowed itself to take this
course, would not require basis in given and actual exist
ence, but merely the support of pure conceptions), but for
the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of pos
sible things, that conception which possesses no element
consistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that there
must be some absolutely necessary existence, regards as truth already established. Now, can remove every exist ence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute neces sity, excepting one, -- this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity comprehensible us, that deducible from the conception of alone, or not.
Now that, the conception of which contains therefore to every wherefore, which not defective in any respect what ever, which all-sufficient as condition, seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity --for this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that pos
jective
beini
? ? is
a by is,
aa
;
is
is
is
if a
a
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it
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a
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it
if
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it
in
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? or THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING. 361
lible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this view, it is su perior to all other concept'ons, which, as deficient and incom plete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the condition of all other things, must possess only a conditioned existence ; but as little can we assert the con trary, for this supposed being does not possess the only cha racteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an (t priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its existence.
The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary
being. The former conception does not satisfy all the require ments of the latter ; but we have no choice, we are obliged
? for we find that we cannot do without the necessary being and even although we admit out of our power to discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims
to adhere to existence of
we find
to such distinction. The following
reason. begins
therefore, the natural course of human persuading itself of the existence of In this being recognises the charac
some necessary being.
teristics of unconditioned existence. then seeks the con
ception of that which independent of all conditions, and finds in that which itself the sufficient condition of all other things-- other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all an absolute unity, and conceived
the mind as being one and supreme and thus reason con cludes that the supreme being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which absolutely necessary.
This conception must be regarded as some degree satis factory, we admit the existence of necessary being, and consider that there exists necessity for definite and final answer to these questions. Iu such case, we cannot make
better choice, or rather we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility of things. But there exists no motive for coming to defiitiU
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a
in
a
a
it, a
a
if
it
It
it
a it,
ais; Itit a
a
in
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is
is is
is, by
by
;
? 362 TRANSCENDKMTAL DIALECTIC.
conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fiilly weighed both sides -- in other words, when we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know -- the above conclusion does not appear to so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective in the grounds upon which it is supported.
For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for ex ample,) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable ; that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely uncon ditioned -, and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without in consistency, absolute necessity -- it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in which the su preme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not dis cover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being --an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions, I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned ; just as I am Dot entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not exist, (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist either.