Wherefore human law makes
precepts
only about acts of
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so
far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains
(Ethic.
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so
far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains
(Ethic.
Summa Theologica
vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are
"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
the life that is foreshadowed. " Now the precepts of the life we have to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is
foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from
Thy judgments," says, i. e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for
me. " But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the
judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according
to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment. " But acts of
justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and
consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral
precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts
besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the
Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these
belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which
dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to
be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known
principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters.
Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about
Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the
determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be
observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying
that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy,
and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with
regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word
"sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is consecrated to God);
and "good," i. e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at
the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised
under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts
of the life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an
application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.
Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral
precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both
judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the
ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial
precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall
observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while
"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the
moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act
belongs to the judicial precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the
ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is
worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz.
temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above
([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old
Law should comprise others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God,
and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and
commandments. " Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above
[2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial
precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments. "
[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this
article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the
ordinary acceptance of the word. ]
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of
the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have
[Vulg. : 'He hath'] commanded thee. " Therefore in addition to the above,
the Law comprises "testimonies. "
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications
(i. e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget. " Therefore
in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial
precepts, but also others, called "justifications. "
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. "
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all
the precepts of the Law are included under them.
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or
virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was
necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to
indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e. g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies. "
Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be
appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who
transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice
of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations," etc. : and these are called "justifications," according as God
punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a
law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of
the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts. "
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but
as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments";
because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an
example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in
other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc. )
says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments. "
Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards
human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those
things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those
things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as
the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in
so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part,
as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men
to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and
threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by
fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what
doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? " But the desire for temporal
goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity. " Therefore temporal
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a
lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher
declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law
employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of
guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But
as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the
just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if
you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour
you. "
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent
to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments
and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered
becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the
observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for
which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do
something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said
above ([2080]Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the
coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the
perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in
comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming:
and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still
under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in
his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is
clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13, 15): "Forgetting the
things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg. : 'and stretching'] forth
myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are
perfect, be thus minded. " Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal
goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their
end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should
conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect
have an affection.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in
temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal
goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the
imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise
Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him. "
Reply to Objection 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal
rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law
persuades men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from
God. In this respect it employs higher means.
Reply to Objection 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story
of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the
Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the
precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain
individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with
misfortunes---either because they had already become spiritual (so that
misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal
things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while
outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether
fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Is.
29:13 (Mat. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their
hearts is far from Me. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of
nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the
ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one
another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of
the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to
the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave
them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance. " But
instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law
of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore
not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law.
But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that
belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the
natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are
various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why
the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining
to good morals.
Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in
certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that
faith "worketh by charity. " But faith is not included in the law of
nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all
the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all
the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason,
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called
good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are
discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason
proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every
judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally,
as stated above ([2081]Q[94], AA[2],4): from which principles one may
proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters
connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little
consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by
means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be
the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various
circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only
those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the
particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed
in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot
judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles
of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done
or not to be done: e. g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou
shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of
nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more
careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law
of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching
the less wise: e. g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the
person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to
judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are
taught about the things of God: e. g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a
graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain. "
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not
about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old
Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy
justifications. " But justification is the execution of justice.
Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the
character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone
and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice
consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of
the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only
about the acts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the
common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral
precepts are only about the acts of justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
of heaven. " But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue.
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common
good, as stated above ([2082]Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must
needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence
the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in
a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a
state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the
state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the
Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the
civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men
are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in
communion with one another. This life in common of man with man
pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the
human community.
Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so
far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains
(Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is
united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore
the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human
reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the
virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of
the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the
acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior
actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes
precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain
matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of
reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while
other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come
under an admonition of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law,
even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the
character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey
God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man
should be subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of
one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the
lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the
Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about
the different kinds of community.
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten
precepts of the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old
Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first
and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mat. 22:37,39.
But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the
ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of
the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy
the Sabbath-day. " Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all
the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of
virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard
acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they
shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten
precepts, set them out in detail. " Therefore all the precepts of the
Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to
the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those
precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are
those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the
first general principles: and those also which become known to man
immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of
precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz.
first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after
being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are
self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and
other similar principles: and again those which the careful reflection
of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive
these principles from God, through being taught by wise men.
Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles
are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions;
while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely,
as conclusions in their principles.
Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general
principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason,
either through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of
the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in
one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the
things of God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am
God. " In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue:
but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a
ceremonial precept.
Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other
virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the
other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts
about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come
under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of
the Law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one
another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue
distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But
that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not
have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is
added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to
worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq.
in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct
from the negative precepts; e. g. "Honor thy father and thy mother,"
and, "Thou shalt not kill. " But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is
affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not,
as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): "I had not known
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet. '" Hence
it seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept;
and, therefore, should not be divided into two.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting
on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as
referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten
women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am
the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his
commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg. : "their"] "two iniquities");
the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord thy God in vain. " He states that there are six precepts pertaining
to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the
second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt
not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet. "
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,
if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two
statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept.
Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod. ) who also distinguishes four precepts
as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in
the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as
third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. " The other
six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg. : Cherubim] to
be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex.
25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven
thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the
purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh;
whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of
possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore
Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting
of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's
wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and
seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct
from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about
worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident
principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other
promulgation that the infusion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the
negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should
honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man;
nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept
is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two
distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
"Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there
are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not
believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and
therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as
though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of
covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of
the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 5).
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven. " But sins are distinguished according as man
sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations
to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to
the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept
about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others
also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury,
so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the
teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " Therefore there should
be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false
doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his
parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue
are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the
commandment is charity. " Therefore as there is a precept referring to
parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in
thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the
prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
wife. " Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins
of homicide and false witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the
irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when
it is said, "Thou shalt not covet. " Therefore the decalogue should have
included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone. "
I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the
precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community
or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he
behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave
well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is
therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first
place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second
place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who
are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first,
fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the
sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have
strange gods. " Reverence to his master requires that he should do
nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second
commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain. " Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the
creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying
his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about
honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done
to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i. e. as to his personal
existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of
offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the
aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not
steal. " Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is
forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet. "
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways.
First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the
precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept
about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of
loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its
vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of
God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing
oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had
written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. " Hence the
precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand
at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a
man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he
owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters
which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain
duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to
himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed
through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and,
consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of
past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the
sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine
favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the
reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord
made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and
final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life,
by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also
foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing
thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the
holy of the Lord glorious. " Because these favors first and chiefly are
borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the
past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to
the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by
one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of
all their controversy. " Hence, since oaths are common to all,
inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept
of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words,
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a
prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou
shalt not say that Christ is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an
immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts
that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an
immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in
return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a
son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it
by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and
being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue
does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone
except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be
indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the
reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and
"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue
contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the
same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of
wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful
good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they
needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it
is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired
only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins
of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of
thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the
concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it
were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of
the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than
God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom
he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? " But the first three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to
the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories
[*Lib. iv, cap.
"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
the life that is foreshadowed. " Now the precepts of the life we have to
lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is
foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from
Thy judgments," says, i. e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for
me. " But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the
judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according
to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment. " But acts of
justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and
consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral
precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts
besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the
Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these
belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which
dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to
be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known
principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters.
Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about
Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the
determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be
observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;
viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;
"ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship;
and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be
maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying
that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy,
and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with
regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word
"sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is consecrated to God);
and "good," i. e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at
the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised
under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts
of the life we have to lead.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an
application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.
Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral
precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common
with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both
judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the
ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial
precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall
observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while
"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the
moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act
belongs to the judicial precepts.
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Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and
ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the
ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is
worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz.
temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above
([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old
Law should comprise others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God,
and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and
commandments. " Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above
[2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial
precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments. "
[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this
article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the
ordinary acceptance of the word. ]
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of
the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have
[Vulg. : 'He hath'] commanded thee. " Therefore in addition to the above,
the Law comprises "testimonies. "
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications
(i. e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget. " Therefore
in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial
precepts, but also others, called "justifications. "
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and
ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you. "
And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all
the precepts of the Law are included under them.
I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept;
other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now
the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their
fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of
the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which
benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or
virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was
necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to
indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e. g. Dt. 6:4: "Hear, O
Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies. "
Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be
appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who
transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice
of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the
nations," etc. : and these are called "justifications," according as God
punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in
so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one
according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a
law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a
twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be
done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue
would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of
the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are
expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts. "
Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but
as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments";
because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an
example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a
garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in
other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc. )
says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments. "
Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards
human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and
rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the
Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled
"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the
commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those
things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those
things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as
the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either
moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the
character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the
precepts, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in
so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part,
as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be
anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
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Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its
precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men
to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and
threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by
fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): "And now, Israel, what
doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him? " But the desire for temporal
goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity. " Therefore temporal
promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a
lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher
declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.
Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law
employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of
guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But
as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the
just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to
the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): "If you be willing, and
will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if
you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour
you. "
I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent
to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments
and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences,
the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered
becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the
observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for
which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do
something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said
above ([2080]Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the
coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the
perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in
comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming:
and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still
under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in
his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is
clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13, 15): "Forgetting the
things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg. : 'and stretching'] forth
myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are
perfect, be thus minded. " Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal
goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their
end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should
conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect
have an affection.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in
temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal
goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the
imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise
Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him. "
Reply to Objection 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal
rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law
persuades men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from
God. In this respect it employs higher means.
Reply to Objection 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story
of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the
Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the
precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain
individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with
misfortunes---either because they had already become spiritual (so that
misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal
things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while
outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether
fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Is.
29:13 (Mat. 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their
hearts is far from Me. "
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OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the
moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of
nature?
(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues?
(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the
ten precepts of the decalogue?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one
another?
(5) Their number;
(6) Their order;
(7) The manner in which they were given;
(8) Whether they are dispensable?
(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of
the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to
the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave
them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance. " But
instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law
of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore
not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law.
But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that
belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the
natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are
various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why
the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining
to good morals.
Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in
certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that
faith "worketh by charity. " But faith is not included in the law of
nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all
the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who
have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which
must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all
the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason,
which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called
good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are
discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason
proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every
judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally,
as stated above ([2081]Q[94], AA[2],4): from which principles one may
proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters
connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little
consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by
means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be
the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various
circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only
those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the
particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed
in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot
judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles
of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural
reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done
or not to be done: e. g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou
shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of
nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more
careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law
of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching
the less wise: e. g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the
person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to
judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are
taught about the things of God: e. g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a
graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the
name of the Lord thy God in vain. "
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not
about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old
Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy
justifications. " But justification is the execution of justice.
Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the
character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone
and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice
consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of
the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only
about the acts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the
common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral
precepts are only about the acts of justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
of heaven. " But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue.
Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common
good, as stated above ([2082]Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must
needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence
the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in
a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a
state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the
state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the
Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the
civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men
are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in
communion with one another. This life in common of man with man
pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the
human community.
Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so
far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains
(Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men
in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And
therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is
united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore
the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human
reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the
virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of
the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the
acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior
actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes
precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain
matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of
reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while
other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come
under an admonition of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law,
even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the
character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey
God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man
should be subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of
one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the
lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the
Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about
the different kinds of community.
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Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten
precepts of the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old
Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first
and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mat. 22:37,39.
But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the
ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of
the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy
the Sabbath-day. " Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all
the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of
virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard
acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they
shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten
precepts, set them out in detail. " Therefore all the precepts of the
Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other
precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to
the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those
precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are
those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the
first general principles: and those also which become known to man
immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of
precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz.
first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after
being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are
self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and
other similar principles: and again those which the careful reflection
of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive
these principles from God, through being taught by wise men.
Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of
the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles
are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions;
while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely,
as conclusions in their principles.
Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general
principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason,
either through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of
the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in
one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the
things of God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am
God. " In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue:
but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a
ceremonial precept.
Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other
virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the
other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts
about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come
under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of
the Law.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one
another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue
distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But
that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not
have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is
added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to
worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq.
in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct
from the negative precepts; e. g. "Honor thy father and thy mother,"
and, "Thou shalt not kill. " But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is
affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not,
as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): "I had not known
concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet. '" Hence
it seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept;
and, therefore, should not be divided into two.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting
on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as
referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by
different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, "Ten
women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am
the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his
commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg. : "their"] "two iniquities");
the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord thy God in vain. " He states that there are six precepts pertaining
to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the
second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt
not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet. "
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,
if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two
statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept.
Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod. ) who also distinguishes four precepts
as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in
the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as
third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. " The other
six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg. : Cherubim] to
be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex.
25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven
thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the
purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh;
whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of
possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore
Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting
of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's
wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and
seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct
from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about
worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident
principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other
promulgation that the infusion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the
negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should
honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man;
nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept
is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two
distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
"Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there
are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not
believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and
therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as
though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of
covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of
the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 5).
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven. " But sins are distinguished according as man
sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations
to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to
the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept
about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others
also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury,
so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the
teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " Therefore there should
be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false
doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his
parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue
are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the
commandment is charity. " Therefore as there is a precept referring to
parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in
thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the
prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
wife. " Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins
of homicide and false witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the
irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when
it is said, "Thou shalt not covet. " Therefore the decalogue should have
included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone. "
I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the
precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community
or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he
behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave
well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is
therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first
place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second
place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who
are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first,
fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the
sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have
strange gods. " Reverence to his master requires that he should do
nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second
commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain. " Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the
creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying
his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about
honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done
to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i. e. as to his personal
existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of
offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the
aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not
steal. " Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is
forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet. "
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways.
First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the
precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept
about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of
loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its
vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of
God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing
oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had
written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. " Hence the
precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand
at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a
man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he
owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters
which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain
duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to
himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed
through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and,
consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of
past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the
sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine
favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the
reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord
made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and
final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life,
by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also
foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing
thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the
holy of the Lord glorious. " Because these favors first and chiefly are
borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the
past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to
the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by
one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of
all their controversy. " Hence, since oaths are common to all,
inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept
of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words,
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a
prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou
shalt not say that Christ is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an
immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts
that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an
immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in
return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a
son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it
by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and
being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue
does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone
except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be
indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the
reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and
"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue
contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the
same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of
wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful
good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they
needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it
is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired
only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins
of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of
thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the
concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it
were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of
the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than
God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom
he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? " But the first three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to
the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories
[*Lib. iv, cap.
