This
language
is alien.
Constructing a Replacement for the Soul - Bourbon
Heidegger answers we are things, and these things enact time as the functioning through which they emerge at any point as what they are.
But what kind of functional description, or semantic embodied series captures our functioning?
Things are units o f time, but these units are not stabilized relative to each other nor are they uniform
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except as semantic concepts. There are many times: only what counts as a thing stabilizes the concept o f time as what is. 21
Kant in On the Form andPrinciples o fthe Sensible and the Intelligible World, a precursor to the first Critique, proposes that time is not a concept, as Leibniz argues against Locke in the New Essays, but a fundamental, pure intuition: "you conceive all actual things in time, and not as contained under the general concept oftime, as under a common characteristic mark" (? 14)22 In the Critique o fPure Reason, this has become
Time is not discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts o f one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition. Moreover, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous is not to be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot have its origin in the concepts alone. It is immediately contained in the intuition and representation o f time. (A 32/ B 47)
The unity o f time is not established by God, being, or an Absolute clock, but rather by objects which constitute a world within the singularity o f an intuition.
Heidegger in "Das Ding" redescribes this being in time within the singularity o f an intuition by refiguring or turning inside out the world and things and mortals and divinities as 'weHen'. 'Weilen', to stay, linger, dwell, functions as an absolute clock-- that is, the pressure that translates the ontological into a semantic condensation is stabilized, as are all things, all temporal series, in the semantics of 'weilen' taken into the implicate totality of whatHeideggercallsthequadrature. Inthechainofimplicationconstitutingathing--
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each functor depends on. the categorical difference between its descriptive force and 'weilen'. Alloftheseotherfunctorsaswordsdescribethefunctioningofthejugwithin
thesemanticsofourordinarylanguage. Thereisametaphoricclaritytothisimplicate chain that is missing in Heidegger's use o f'weilen'. The sense of 'weilen' does not attach to the jug through its function, as do the other terms, but through the personification of the jug that allows it to 'take', 'gather', 'outpour', 'gather'-- and 'dwell': to claim these wordsasexpressiveofitself. 'Dwell'heremarkstheentrancesi'weilen'intothe dimension of function. The more obscure meaning of 'weilen' as 'staying' flattens the temporal order described by function into semantics, where the meaning o f this world requires the construction o f a world-organism, a form o f life, in which this semantics can have meaning. The object o f "Das Ding", therefore, is an attempt to construct this form of life through the elucidation of the semantics o f'weilen'.
The syntax o f function that describes the jug, however, cannot describe either the world or us. The relation between things, therefore, requires this further abstraction into stasis--or rather into the subjunctive. But it is exactly this subjunctive that needs to be described in order for 'weilen' to function as the categorical functor between the descriptive and functional temporal series and the world-constituting relations ofthe quadrature (Geveirt). Not only must Heidegger describe humans as things, but he must also describe the world, the quadrature, and in this redescribe how all three can describe a function, an identity, and an unfolding of time, a time series, as an implication that includes the others. Such an attempt would precipitate the skeptical dilemmas he is trying to avoid. The emergence ofthe opposition between making and given, where the given is emergent
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in our relation to things and in their functioning, must also include our species history. Heidegger's question about how the world emerges as a world must also include Thoreau's question 'why do these things make a world? '. Our self-reflective awe includes not just the philosophical question 'why is there anything instead o f nothing? ', but the questions'whythesethingsinsteadofothers? whymeinsteadofanother? ' Buildinga mind stabilizes this questioning by integrating how is this world mine with why is this world mine, not instead of another's but instead of simply 'not mine. ' I can make myself in order to make the world. Heidegger wants to forget this question in the givenness of things.
1Translating Geveirt as 'fourfold' as does Hofstadter, confuses the categorical distinction between the kind of coherence among earth and sky, divinities and mortals and that which is achieved in the abstraction o f the einfaltigen\ these domains are distinct and cannot be reduced one to the other, but complete each other while retaining the other category as a set o f relations or possibilities that enact the world in a particular way.
2 Der Krug steht als Gefass doch nur, insofem er zu einem Stehen gebracht wurde. 3Heidegger'spictureofscience: Scienceobscureswhat'thejug-characterofthejugconsist[s]',when science, as he believes it does, claims to "inform us about the reality of the actual jug" ("die Wissenschaft konneunsuberdieWirklichkeitdeswirklichenKrugeseinenAufschluflgeben"). Thisisaclaimfew scientistswouldmake,andattheveryleastisstrictlyspeakinglogicallyimpossible. Inductioncannot lead to certainty. The question science asks is 'How does this work? ' It collapses why-questions and what-questions into how-questions. Heidegger's claim, therefore, that science pays 'no heed to that in the vessel which does the containing. . . to how the containing itself goes on" is false. Science specifically provides an answer to "how the containing itself goes on". Its answer is embedded within a system of mathematical (broadly speaking) descriptions, simplified and idealized in order to answer this how. Heidegger's question 'how does the containing itself go on? ' asks not for a causal description but for a kind of transcendental deduction determined within phenomenological limits (and therefore exploring the semantics of 'containing') and describing a set of ontological possibilities. 4TheJournalsandMiscellaneousNotebooksofRalph WaldoEmerson.
5 If we can use Bohm's description o f quantum relations as a metaphor.
61say a noumenal boundary although Heidegger makes a distinction between the Ding an sich and Ding als Ding, because he asserts that from the thing qua thing we may reach thing in itself (DD168), but more importantlyrepresentationandmakingformthethingitselfasthenoumenal. Andthustheysetuptheir own failure.
7traut: cosy, secure, within, intimate, close.
trauen: trust, believe in, venture, dare, marry.
zutrauen: believe sombody is capable of doing something.
8 If the world always stays in this outpouring, beyond or forgonen by our representations, we can only discover it in following this outpouring in whatever world we find ourselves in. Losing the world might seem to suggest instead the possibility that 'this world', accompanied by a wave of an arm (my arm? ), is a
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true or false world. This can mean either that this might not count as a world, requiring some tests, an examination o f world-criteria, or that this might be a true-world or a false-world.
9 Aristotle's hylomorphism determines substance as matter determined by form, in a similar conceptual unity,inorderprimarilytoresistthePlatonicreductionofmattertoform. Realisminmodemphilosophy argues for the irreducibility o f category in order to resist what is often understood to be, but should not be, the scientific reduction to 'matter'.
10 See On the Way to Language; "Letter on Humanism"; "Dwelling Building Thinking".
11 ". . . Dasein's going-out-of-the-world in the sense of dying must be distinguished from the going-out-of- the-worldofthatwhichmerelyhaslife[desNur-leben-den\. Inourterminologytheendingofanything that is alive, is denoted as "perishing" [Verenden]. We can see the difference only if the kind of ending which Dasein can have is distinguished from the end of a life. Of course "(tying" may also be taken physiologicallyandbiologically. Butthemedicalconceptofthe'exitus'doesnotcoincidewiththatof "perishing". (BT 284-85; 240-41).
12 See Sein undZeit, 88.
u Averrois Cordubensis, lib. IV, comm. 88; cited in Duhem, 301.
14 Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 29/30.
15The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time.
16Basic Concepts, tr. Gary E. Aylesworthy, 21-22.
17 The following is a schematic translation o f this passage: Thinking: (Being, essence) embrace; Embrace (thing, person) = love =favor, Favor = bestow essence as gift: Favor = essence of enabling = unfold as letting it be; enabling= possible (essence of favor): Being enables thinking; enables = make possible; reintegrated into Being as enabling/ favoring2 possibility o f Being.
181 am not finished with perishing and dying, as i f anyone could be! , but I don't want to recapitulate
existential descriptions- but to work out the relation between grammar and ontology--you could read that here as possibility and necessity as stances toward oneselfand the world- and thus not as logical (modal) possibilities.
19"Moira (Parmenides VIE, 34-41)" in Early Greek Thinking, tr. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi.
20 Although Heidegger never articulated it as such, this construction o f things as functions responds to Putnam's twin-earth argument and its consequences for functionalism narrowly conceived as a model for the mind.
z,How does form emerge as the kind of thing I should be or am, if I do not already understand form, at least of others, as who they are?
22 In Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, tr. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992) 373-416.
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9. 1 Thunder-talk
9
'Weilen' in The Waste Land
Howdowedwellinandstaytheworldaslanguage? Science,Heidegger imagines, stays the world into quantity, while he stays it into semantics, into the quality of being a thing and a world. Eliot asks in The Waste Land, I imagine, 'How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? ' Heidegger's transformation of ontology into semantics mutates, in the poem, into a translation ofthe semantic into the subjunctive under the aspect o f a more restrictive aesthetics o f identity. Eliot's questioning does not undo Heidegger's work, but it shows how the giveness ofthe thing is also made against the fantasy o f the subjunctive. Thus, The Waste Land highlights our language into a subjunctive mode through which we constitute ourselves in language (at the very least investigating the way in which pronouns and names and voices have a claim on us, or 'we' on them). How do we approach the inanimate through the subjunctive?
How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? I find this question in another kind of semantic play on 'weilen' in a fragment Eliot quotes from the opening scene ofWagner's opera Tristan undIsolde:
Frisch weht der Wind Der Heimat zu
Mein Irisch Kind,
Wo weilest du?
Notes for this chapter are on page 398
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A sailor sings these verses. Isolde, mistakenly or not, interprets them to be about her: "Who dares to mock me? " She is th e 'you'. Asking "where you dwell? " to a woman figured as nothing but a pronoun can be understood as another way of asking 'How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? ' A provisional answer, that will prove not to be an answer at all, but a restatement o f the question is the invocation o f memory and desire withwhichthepoembegins. Theenvironmentandtime(figuredasApril)arestayedinto poetry through the Coincidentia Oppositorum, "mixing/ Memory and desire" (2-3). I find thismixinginTheWasteLandoperatic. Howisthisenactmentofstaying(notreallya stasis) or lingering or dwelling through the fragments different from the astonishment of soul Kierkegaard describes as an effect of Opera? Certainly the power of The Waste Land is not the "exuberant gaiety" that is the power o f Don Giovanni. This gaiety is the expression of"his voice, the voice ofthe sensuous" (96). How would we describe the
voices in The Waste Land?
Heidegger leaves us in a world of things, with neither people nor the scientific
logic with which to build these things into people. This is something like the world in which Tristan finds himself in The Waste Land. Heidegger wants to get to the organic coherence of the world as a form of life that can speak 'weilen' with the ontological force that he needs to reconstitute a particular thing into staying, dwelling, being the world, avoiding the traditional attempts to link particulars and universals (examples, exemplars, forms, versions, reflections, and so on). Heidegger's romanticism remains akin to Schlegel's in his attempt to reconstruct a semantics with ontological force. His attempt, however, blocks offany questioning ofthe giveness ofthe world (like Wittgenstein, he
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wants to disconnect 'how the world is' form "what is higher. God does not reveal himself intheworld'(TLP6. 432);Heideggerbothbeforeandafterhisturn("dieKehre") rejects this kind o f transcendence: Wittgenstein and Heidegger always had alien views concerning logic. What is common between them, however, is not just their appeal to the ordinary and to the grammar of language (albeit in different ways) but their failure to understand the depth of questions about how the world is). For Eliot some possible world speaks 'verwielen' and from this speaking he must construct its semantics, in this case the semantics o f thunder.
What is created in an by The Waste Lcmdl
The attempt to justify the poetry results in an appeal to and requires the constructionofakindoftheoryofmind. Whythisisremainsamystery. Ifmindsfunction within an ontological universe described by science, by strict laws describing a totality of possibilities, then these constructions have force only in so far as they articulate themselves in relation to such an ontology. When Eliot deciphers "What The Thunder Said" as "The spoke the thunder/ DA," the etymological force o f DA, and its inclusion in
Datta (give), Dayadhvam (sympathize) and Damyata (control) does not get taken up into mythological or theological promises or stories separate from the physics of thunderstorms and the indifference of these natural processes to our concerns, understanding, and meanings. Howdoesitgettakenup? Orhowarewetakenupbyit?
Is this thunder the voice of our beginning as human beings, or our end? Vico and, through him, Joyce settled thunder at the beginning of humanity, driving our ancestors
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into caves and into society. From our havens listening toward heaven, our "forebears" (FW572. 06) mimicked onomatpoetically thunder into language:
The first men, who spoke by signs, naturally believed that lightening bolts and thunderclaps were signs make to them by Jove; whence from m o , to make a sign, can numen, the divine will, by an idea more than sublime and worthy to express the divine majesty. They believed that Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words, and that nature was the language of ove. The science o f language the gentiles universally believed to be divination, which by the Greeks was called theology, meaning the science o f the language o f the gods. (NS379)
The world requires divination, and thus "Sibyls and oracles are the most ancient institutions of the gentile world [721, 925]" (NS381). Divination, as the form of what Vico calls "poetic metaphysics," "seeks its proofs not in the external world but within the modificationsofthemindofhimwhomediatesit"(NS364). Themythicconsciousnessis
gripped by a kind o f idealism that resists the conscious articulation o f the question "Are the signs I see in the world actually in the world or a function o f my interpretations? "
"Because o f the indefinite nature o f the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance man makes himselfthe measure of all things" (NS120). What is the nature of this ignorance? In this case it is the ignorance attending finding ourselves fragments (represented or acted out in our ignorance of the meaning of The Waste Land). Eliot's ignorance is not directed at the world and its workings but toward God and the
justificationoftheworld. ThisisagainakintoVico'sdescriptionofpoeticmetaphysics:
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So that, as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them (homo intelligendof i t omnia), this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them (homo non intelligendofit omnia). . . . . . . . . for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them. (NS405)
How do we extend our mind into our mind? The Waste Land requires us to remark our ignorance of the significance or nature of our own believing and of our visions as self- reflexive ignorance: our ignorance of our ignorance.
Vico explicitly grounds the poetic and the mythic in the same logic, or poetic wisdom. Eliot's project in The Waste Land is ostensibly the same (or similar). What is the poetic logic Eliot uses to expose the mutual relation between poetry and myth? (This is another way o f asking what does the poem create? ). I do not want to explore this question byexaminingEliot'suseofmythorhisuseanddistortionsofquotations. Vicooffersa way into a more interesting question about how we enter into the correlation (an origin) between language and consciousness. If Vico's history is too obscure, then, at least, his argument that human consciousness derived from mythical consciousness and that this mythical stance toward the world articulates a poetic metaphysics places the logic of origins within the logic of coherence determining language as a language, a consciousness as a consciousness, or a mind as a mind. These logics of origin and coherence are akin to
Heidegger's configuration of the thing as the staying of the quadrature. The logic of origin and coherence in The Waste Land function as the aesthetics (or justification) of
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fragmentation within the poem. Eliot's aesthetics o f fragmentation is the poetic enactment of the Sibyl's condition described in the poem's epigraph. Such an aesthetics attempts to organize language, consciousness, and the world within and around the inhabitation o f the concept o f identity represented (or enacted) by the Sibyl.
Unlike Vico and Joyce, Eliot does not ground the speaking o f the thunder in the "first men, stupid, insensate, and horrible beasts" (NS374). Eliot does not give us a complete thunder language, nor the integrated language or form o f life evolved, evolving and expressing the infrarational mind of someone, but rather the grammatical (the linguistic forms, examples, usages, bits) limits between thunder language(s) and the minds and times and societies in which they made sense, between the theology of God's language
and the insensate forms o f nature's indifference to make our kind o f sense. offers different kinds o f education: an incarnation versus T&ks(h*,xxj:
Then spoke the thunder DA
Datta: what have we given?
DA
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key
DA
Damyata: The boat responded
The thunder
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"DA/Dattat" if heardfrom the beginning of time or humanity pretends to describe the transformation of a sound into a phoneme and then into a ritual language. If heard as a beginning, "D A . . D A . . DA" decomposes our language back into phonemes and then into exclamation and then noise. Even if someone spoke Sanskrit fluently "Datta," "Dayadhvam," and "Damyata" sound outside o f any ordinary language game, not with philosophical weight but with religious mass.
This language is alien. It must mean, but no one can understand it like they might 'this is my house. ' It might mean, however, 'this is my house. ' The order of sounds that makes a language is the same order of sounds that makes thunder. This is true even if all we can understand by thunder is its physical causes. Science speaks the order of the universe.
What can this language mean against physics?
Thunder disturbs the universe.
It disturbs us with a question: "Datta: what have we given? " To whom? we ask
back. Who is this 'we'? The thunder speaks to me not because it is a language but because it threatens me into a 'we'. What have I given to you? The thunder can turn 'you' into an 'us'. If we mimicked thunder to create language, this means we formed mirrors through which we could see ourselves as both individuals and as human beings. Thunder-reflection is self-reflection.
The demands of this 'we' can be taken up in friendship as it is in the line following "Datta . "My friend, blood shaking my heart. " At night or when we turn our ears toward ourselves the blood sounds our own thunder, shaking us into life as much as the thunder into fear: 'My friend, my heart in my chest, and in our language as I write myself
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into concepts, and into the world, my friend, as passions circulate amongst us. ' What kind o f language is this?
We reach the foundation of who 'we' are:
By this, and this alone, we have existed
Which is not to be found in our obituaries
Or in memories draped by the beneficent spider Or under seals broken by the lean solicitor
In our empty rooms
By what alone have we existed? By giving or not giving? By friendship or blood or daring and surrender? This "By this" cannot be found in descriptions after the fact, or in memories, in further representations edited even in our own minds, or in our own giving of things and money within the law, under the auspices of order and definition, or in the places and spaces we possessed. Either we do not know what 'exist' means here, or we do not know giving, friendship, blood, daring, or surrender.
Do we mistake the unrepresentable for the inexpressible? or for our privacy? The demand to sympathize (Dayadhvam) is ironically answered by a picture of solipsism, "each in his prison. " The pain I feel is my pain and not yours, but 'my pain' and your response to my pain is not determined by either my knowledge o f it (I experience it, or in other words, I pain: pain! ) or your knowledge ofthe truth ofmy pain. You respond to my expressionorthemanifestationsofmypain. Wittgensteinremarks,
What makes it so plausible to say that it [the pain] is not the body? --Well, something like this: if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say
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so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one
looks into his face. (PI? 286)
I can, however, fall into absurdity and find it not plausible to acknowledge the other as human. Peoplehavebeenknowntofallintoparts,bothinPetrarchianpoeticloveblazons andinAliceinWonderlanddistortionsandeverynight,asleep. Asleeponeloses ontologicalaccesstoone'sface. Inpartialanswertooneofmyinitialquestions,'whatis being created? ', I can answer "Faces are not being created, nor even found. ' The language of The Waste Land is attached to human beings through a collection of names: Marie, Madame Sosostris, Phoenician Sailor, Belladonna, The Hanged Man, Mrs. Equitone, Saint Mary Woolnoth, Philomel, Stetson, Lil, Albert, Bill, Lou, May, Sweeney, Mrs. Porter, Mr. Eugenides, Tiresias, Elizabeth I, Leicester, Phlebas, and Hieronymo. Not all of these names are names o f human beings who had once lived. Is there any significance in
replacing the face with a name? It in effect turns all names into pronouns.
These words do not speak in the context o f god: the voices are extracted from
everydaylife. Itistheordinarywhichbordersonhysteria. ThisisEliot'stransformation of a feminine voice into a parody ofMozart's Queen ofthe Night:
"My nerves are bad to-night. Yes, bad. Stay with me. "Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak.
"What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? "I never know what you are thinking. Think. " (Ins. l 11-114)
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Hysteria attaches one's nerves to oneself. These "nerves" are a physical synecdoche for a mental condition, a hysteria played out against human indifference and uncaring and alienation within a marriage. The same hysteria can stay a person in a disintegrating relationship: "my nerves are bad . . . stay with me. " (This is one way o f 'staying' the world inalanguageoflove. ItisoneoftheconclusionsofEliotthatsuch'staying'isdamning). The husband here has lost or renounced his voice (a sibyl-like diminishment); he functions in these lines as a metaphysical 'I', a limit determining the scope of but not included within the world, dominated by the women's speaking. But the absent husband's implicit authorial position (maybe as bricoleur) means he ventriloquizes her speaking, and she
ventriloquizes his soul (the negative outlines o f his face sketched in his absence). Catherine Clement, in her book on Opera, asks about what she understands as patriarchal fear: "What haste, what hatred drives them to reduce woman to her image? " (28). The image of women in The Waste Land is described by speaking. Is the image of the diva, her body,herface,hersinging,orhervoice? InTheWasteLandoneoftheimagesdescribing thelimitbetween silenceandsong(whichisitselfthelimitbetweensilenceandspeech) and between desire and possession is female hair:
Under the firelight, under the brush, her hair Spread our in fiery points
Glowed into words, then would be savagely still. (Ins. 108-110)
Do we imagine this scene parodies lightening and thunder? Parody requires judgment, enacting mimicry within a structure ofvalues. To suggest that parody is the origin of
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language is to mock the question o f origin when it is understood as answerable by something like parody. Joyce's use o f Vico's stages o f history (including the theory that speech imitates thunder) suggests exactly this kind o f parody, transforming putative origins into limits. (What motivates parody? a tool in what game? A chimpanzee will mimic other chimps and humans, but why not parody them? )
Is Eliot pursuing a similar project of transforming origins into limits? Maybe. There is at least a confusion between parodies and rumors:
Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus
What are "aethereal rumours"? They are night-words, but aethereal words can be from Godandtherumorspromises. Buttheserumorsre-animate(revive)ifonlyforamoment, the fragmented body o f Coriolanus. By what does Coriolanus exist? At night we lose our body. We might find ourselves in any body. We can find ourselves as a we-body, as "the They" .
Thisisagainpartoftheinstabilityofpronouns. TheserumorsinFinnegansWake (a "foull subustioned mullmud"; Sebastian Melmoth, one o f Wilde's masks and, therefore, an expression of and a disguise against rumor or exposure [228. 32]) are "Allwhile,. . . , preying in his mind, son o f Everallin, within himself, he swure" (228. 03-04). Some 'he' swore and was sure that he was who he was (which could be anyone). Recalling Stephen inPortrait ofthe Artist as a YoungMan, or Joyce, himself) a young man, the dreamer (maybe here thinking through HCE) reincorporates himself in the possibility o f leaving
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himselfbehind by leaving the (or a) world behind, remembering or traveling or writing or sleeping:
He would split. He do big squeal like holy Trichepatte. . . He take skiff come first dagrene day overwide tumbler, rough and dark, till when bow of the shower show of the bower with three shirts and a wind, pogoda permettant, crookolevante, the bruce, the coriolano and the ignacio. (FW228. 05-11)
In 'his' splitting and flight, weather permitting (R. pogoda, 'weather'), in a search for wisdom or escape from the world (permanent pagoda), God willing (Deo volente), fleeing debt (crook and levant), 'he' becomes Robert Bruce, Coriolanus, and St. Ignatius Loyola; or rather he is the qualities these names describe if they become adjectives (or as if the adjectives become a single name or description o f his being in this flight, while reading maybe): Robert Bruce, silence; Coriolanus, exile; and St. Ignatius, cunning.
This flight or movement away and towards marks subjective historical time, fragmentingtheworldandconstitutingatransportable'I'betweenthefragments. This 'he' is "recorporated, (prunty! ) by meteoromancy and linguified heissrohgin" (FW228. 20-
1). This mysterious "meteoromancy" suggests a divination through reading meteors, a reading of chance streaks, instead of stable stars (although there is some regularity in meteor showers, there is no regularity in any particular meteor which bums away in the atmosphere). Byreadingthechancefireworksoftheskyweallegorizeourselvesasboth unstable and unique. Reincorporating, in this case, proceeds not only through meteoromancy, but through "linguified heissrohgin," on first reading another description of the Wake as a linguified language of rogue/roving names (G. heifieri). The collapse of
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Roh (G. raw) and heifi^G. hot), the raw and the cooked, as one kind of human limit between kinds o f societies, between humans and animals, in the confusion o f names (heissrohgin; and one's personal investment o f oneself in identities, language games, relationships, and so on) describes the action o f recorporation as a self-interpretation. To be "recorporated, (prunty! ) by meteoromancy and linguified heissrohgin" means to gain formasanegativespace, orratherasthesubjunctivenexusofthesetofpossibilities describing our stances toward the future and within language. Meteoromancy, therefore, is the divination o f the ephemeral, the generation o f predictive interpretations, through and as the instability o f identity (names and faces) enacted through the possibilities o f language which constitutes, in effect, any pronoun.
Two of the related figures for this kind of self-interpretation in The Waste Land is a dismemberment into parts (a human hand or God's hand) and navigation:
DA
Damyata: The boat responded
Gaily, to the hand expert with sail and oar
"Damyata" means 'control,' but whose over what or whom? The instability of the 'ground' o f the undrinkable sea replaces the stasis o f the drought and desert. And land has become a boat over which some expert hand has control, a dismembered hand controlling a dismembered land (a boat). The mind separated into a prison but answered by sympathy. This is a hand not attached to a person. It could be anyone's. The boat, a floating jug, "responded/ Gaily," as if alive, with quickness, as if not dead, animated by the
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controlling expert hand. But whose hand? This boat scene is allegorized into a scene of love? lust? caring? power?
The sea was calm, your heart would have responded Gaily, when invited, beating obedient
To controlling hands
Someone's heart could respond like a boat, and in this it could describe human love in the daring of surrender or the exaltation of control or love of God, the 'your' becoming a hypothetical 'thou' to God's 'I'. The hand like those attacking the blindfolded Christ can be anyone's. The skill to control a boat, should one find water, can become someone's through education. This skill is a quality, but ofwhose hands? The 'we' includes "your heart" and some "hands. " "Your heart" is mock essence and love of what is always subjectively vorhanden, marking something as human, but without that which is to be marked. This 'we' cannot attach itself to persons.
The body is remade into an 'I' casting between the logic of aridity and stones and a further remaking of these fragments into order (this logic of aridity will generate four subjunctive worlds):
I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me Shall I at least set my hands in order?
How would this ordering change the world? What kind of question is this? Some 'I' asks himself or herself'if I should act or enact an order (determined how? ) on the lands that form my world? ' Should I refit exactly these words into a world? Why exactly do these
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things not make a world for me? ' A science ofthe mind bom our ofwhat Vico called ignorance, but Freud called the unconscious, and what we respond to at time as intentionality, what Brentano called the essentially mental, or which Wittgenstein called the grammatical (as the limit organizing our negotiations between the psychological and the physical) understands the form o f this not as an analogue for the identity o f things, the position Heidegger attacks, but as the analogue for the structures o f the mind:
The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means o f reflection.
This axiom gives us the universal principle o f etymology in all languages: words are carried over from bodies and the properties of bodies to signify the institutions o f the mind and spirit.
(NS236-37)
Bishop argues that Joyce develops this insight into the practice of "an extended 'abnihilization ofthe eytm' throughout the Wake (353. 22 [I. ab nihilo, 'from nothing'])" in which he "shows the body lying everywhere under the surface of language (L. lingua, 'tongue'])" (198).
Finnegans Wake and The Waste Land enact different kinds of crucifixion. Finnegans Wake crucifies God through his embodiment or incarnation as human: this is the crucifixion ofsleep, the realization ofthe limits ofthe body, that allows for or opens up the possibilities of mind or spirit that we interpret as dreams or as soul. The Waste Land crucifies human beings, as if we were already asleep: a crucifixion of vision, or
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dreams themselves. Crucifixion can seem like standing in air. Air is the only element missing (or diminished) in The Waste Land: we are buried in earth, burning burning in fire, drowning in water. What Karl Barth takes as "the positive relation between God and man", Eliot takes as the demand the world makes on us, to ask, what Barth asserts: "The righteousness of God is our standing-place in the air--that is to say, where there is no human possibility of standing- whose foundations are laid by God Himselfand supported by Him only" (The Epistle to the Romans, iii. 21). How do we stand "before an irresistible and all-embracing dissolution of the world to time and things and me, before a penetrating and ultimate KRISIS, before the supremacy o f a negation by which all existence is rolled up"? (iii. 21). Where do we stand when we ask "Mein Irisch Kind,/ Wo weilest du? " In a subjunctiveAfterAfterAfter. PhlebasthePhoenicianhasdrowned,daringtosurrenderto despair and falling from his ship, a mock Fisher King and Christ. . He has performed the
final act of dissolution, which the Sibyl desires but cannot consummate.
The first stanza o f "What The Thunder Said" describes Jesus' imprisonment and
his death from the perspective o f those watching it, those remaining in the physical, material world, where death is not transformation but loss:
After the torchlight red on sweaty faces After the frosty silence in the gardens After the agony in stony places
The shouting and the crying
Prison and palace and reverberation Ofthunder of spring over distant mountains
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He who was living is now dead.
This succession o f "after" clauses, although sounding paratactic, grammatically invoke and then fail to complete a logically conditioned temporal succession of"after this, then that. " "After" combines the force o f the conditional "i f with a claim not simply o f logical inevitability, but o f temporal order: o f intention ("after this, I will") or historical fact (after this, that happened") or rather awkwardly a kind of modal present ("after that, I do this"). What is done or will be done or was done after the torchlight is repressed until after the frostysilencewhoseafterisrepresseduntilaftertheagony. Eachoftheseantecedentsas part of a temporal sequence are markers in time, taking the place of a subject, an T (thus in the preceding sentence the ease by which I can say "the frosty silence whose 'after"'). The consequent to the "after X" grammatically requires a temporal marker, for example,
"After the torchlight, the shouting and the crying began. " (This would not be required if the consequent included a human subject, as in "after the frosty silence, Joe spoke. " Time markers act as subjects, and subjects organize and mark the present, and thus determine what counts as after and what before. ) A temporal marker could be replaced by a preposition chaining this event (the shouting and crying) to another.
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except as semantic concepts. There are many times: only what counts as a thing stabilizes the concept o f time as what is. 21
Kant in On the Form andPrinciples o fthe Sensible and the Intelligible World, a precursor to the first Critique, proposes that time is not a concept, as Leibniz argues against Locke in the New Essays, but a fundamental, pure intuition: "you conceive all actual things in time, and not as contained under the general concept oftime, as under a common characteristic mark" (? 14)22 In the Critique o fPure Reason, this has become
Time is not discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts o f one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition. Moreover, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous is not to be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot have its origin in the concepts alone. It is immediately contained in the intuition and representation o f time. (A 32/ B 47)
The unity o f time is not established by God, being, or an Absolute clock, but rather by objects which constitute a world within the singularity o f an intuition.
Heidegger in "Das Ding" redescribes this being in time within the singularity o f an intuition by refiguring or turning inside out the world and things and mortals and divinities as 'weHen'. 'Weilen', to stay, linger, dwell, functions as an absolute clock-- that is, the pressure that translates the ontological into a semantic condensation is stabilized, as are all things, all temporal series, in the semantics of 'weilen' taken into the implicate totality of whatHeideggercallsthequadrature. Inthechainofimplicationconstitutingathing--
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each functor depends on. the categorical difference between its descriptive force and 'weilen'. Alloftheseotherfunctorsaswordsdescribethefunctioningofthejugwithin
thesemanticsofourordinarylanguage. Thereisametaphoricclaritytothisimplicate chain that is missing in Heidegger's use o f'weilen'. The sense of 'weilen' does not attach to the jug through its function, as do the other terms, but through the personification of the jug that allows it to 'take', 'gather', 'outpour', 'gather'-- and 'dwell': to claim these wordsasexpressiveofitself. 'Dwell'heremarkstheentrancesi'weilen'intothe dimension of function. The more obscure meaning of 'weilen' as 'staying' flattens the temporal order described by function into semantics, where the meaning o f this world requires the construction o f a world-organism, a form o f life, in which this semantics can have meaning. The object o f "Das Ding", therefore, is an attempt to construct this form of life through the elucidation of the semantics o f'weilen'.
The syntax o f function that describes the jug, however, cannot describe either the world or us. The relation between things, therefore, requires this further abstraction into stasis--or rather into the subjunctive. But it is exactly this subjunctive that needs to be described in order for 'weilen' to function as the categorical functor between the descriptive and functional temporal series and the world-constituting relations ofthe quadrature (Geveirt). Not only must Heidegger describe humans as things, but he must also describe the world, the quadrature, and in this redescribe how all three can describe a function, an identity, and an unfolding of time, a time series, as an implication that includes the others. Such an attempt would precipitate the skeptical dilemmas he is trying to avoid. The emergence ofthe opposition between making and given, where the given is emergent
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in our relation to things and in their functioning, must also include our species history. Heidegger's question about how the world emerges as a world must also include Thoreau's question 'why do these things make a world? '. Our self-reflective awe includes not just the philosophical question 'why is there anything instead o f nothing? ', but the questions'whythesethingsinsteadofothers? whymeinsteadofanother? ' Buildinga mind stabilizes this questioning by integrating how is this world mine with why is this world mine, not instead of another's but instead of simply 'not mine. ' I can make myself in order to make the world. Heidegger wants to forget this question in the givenness of things.
1Translating Geveirt as 'fourfold' as does Hofstadter, confuses the categorical distinction between the kind of coherence among earth and sky, divinities and mortals and that which is achieved in the abstraction o f the einfaltigen\ these domains are distinct and cannot be reduced one to the other, but complete each other while retaining the other category as a set o f relations or possibilities that enact the world in a particular way.
2 Der Krug steht als Gefass doch nur, insofem er zu einem Stehen gebracht wurde. 3Heidegger'spictureofscience: Scienceobscureswhat'thejug-characterofthejugconsist[s]',when science, as he believes it does, claims to "inform us about the reality of the actual jug" ("die Wissenschaft konneunsuberdieWirklichkeitdeswirklichenKrugeseinenAufschluflgeben"). Thisisaclaimfew scientistswouldmake,andattheveryleastisstrictlyspeakinglogicallyimpossible. Inductioncannot lead to certainty. The question science asks is 'How does this work? ' It collapses why-questions and what-questions into how-questions. Heidegger's claim, therefore, that science pays 'no heed to that in the vessel which does the containing. . . to how the containing itself goes on" is false. Science specifically provides an answer to "how the containing itself goes on". Its answer is embedded within a system of mathematical (broadly speaking) descriptions, simplified and idealized in order to answer this how. Heidegger's question 'how does the containing itself go on? ' asks not for a causal description but for a kind of transcendental deduction determined within phenomenological limits (and therefore exploring the semantics of 'containing') and describing a set of ontological possibilities. 4TheJournalsandMiscellaneousNotebooksofRalph WaldoEmerson.
5 If we can use Bohm's description o f quantum relations as a metaphor.
61say a noumenal boundary although Heidegger makes a distinction between the Ding an sich and Ding als Ding, because he asserts that from the thing qua thing we may reach thing in itself (DD168), but more importantlyrepresentationandmakingformthethingitselfasthenoumenal. Andthustheysetuptheir own failure.
7traut: cosy, secure, within, intimate, close.
trauen: trust, believe in, venture, dare, marry.
zutrauen: believe sombody is capable of doing something.
8 If the world always stays in this outpouring, beyond or forgonen by our representations, we can only discover it in following this outpouring in whatever world we find ourselves in. Losing the world might seem to suggest instead the possibility that 'this world', accompanied by a wave of an arm (my arm? ), is a
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true or false world. This can mean either that this might not count as a world, requiring some tests, an examination o f world-criteria, or that this might be a true-world or a false-world.
9 Aristotle's hylomorphism determines substance as matter determined by form, in a similar conceptual unity,inorderprimarilytoresistthePlatonicreductionofmattertoform. Realisminmodemphilosophy argues for the irreducibility o f category in order to resist what is often understood to be, but should not be, the scientific reduction to 'matter'.
10 See On the Way to Language; "Letter on Humanism"; "Dwelling Building Thinking".
11 ". . . Dasein's going-out-of-the-world in the sense of dying must be distinguished from the going-out-of- the-worldofthatwhichmerelyhaslife[desNur-leben-den\. Inourterminologytheendingofanything that is alive, is denoted as "perishing" [Verenden]. We can see the difference only if the kind of ending which Dasein can have is distinguished from the end of a life. Of course "(tying" may also be taken physiologicallyandbiologically. Butthemedicalconceptofthe'exitus'doesnotcoincidewiththatof "perishing". (BT 284-85; 240-41).
12 See Sein undZeit, 88.
u Averrois Cordubensis, lib. IV, comm. 88; cited in Duhem, 301.
14 Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 29/30.
15The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time.
16Basic Concepts, tr. Gary E. Aylesworthy, 21-22.
17 The following is a schematic translation o f this passage: Thinking: (Being, essence) embrace; Embrace (thing, person) = love =favor, Favor = bestow essence as gift: Favor = essence of enabling = unfold as letting it be; enabling= possible (essence of favor): Being enables thinking; enables = make possible; reintegrated into Being as enabling/ favoring2 possibility o f Being.
181 am not finished with perishing and dying, as i f anyone could be! , but I don't want to recapitulate
existential descriptions- but to work out the relation between grammar and ontology--you could read that here as possibility and necessity as stances toward oneselfand the world- and thus not as logical (modal) possibilities.
19"Moira (Parmenides VIE, 34-41)" in Early Greek Thinking, tr. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi.
20 Although Heidegger never articulated it as such, this construction o f things as functions responds to Putnam's twin-earth argument and its consequences for functionalism narrowly conceived as a model for the mind.
z,How does form emerge as the kind of thing I should be or am, if I do not already understand form, at least of others, as who they are?
22 In Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, tr. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992) 373-416.
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9. 1 Thunder-talk
9
'Weilen' in The Waste Land
Howdowedwellinandstaytheworldaslanguage? Science,Heidegger imagines, stays the world into quantity, while he stays it into semantics, into the quality of being a thing and a world. Eliot asks in The Waste Land, I imagine, 'How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? ' Heidegger's transformation of ontology into semantics mutates, in the poem, into a translation ofthe semantic into the subjunctive under the aspect o f a more restrictive aesthetics o f identity. Eliot's questioning does not undo Heidegger's work, but it shows how the giveness ofthe thing is also made against the fantasy o f the subjunctive. Thus, The Waste Land highlights our language into a subjunctive mode through which we constitute ourselves in language (at the very least investigating the way in which pronouns and names and voices have a claim on us, or 'we' on them). How do we approach the inanimate through the subjunctive?
How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? I find this question in another kind of semantic play on 'weilen' in a fragment Eliot quotes from the opening scene ofWagner's opera Tristan undIsolde:
Frisch weht der Wind Der Heimat zu
Mein Irisch Kind,
Wo weilest du?
Notes for this chapter are on page 398
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A sailor sings these verses. Isolde, mistakenly or not, interprets them to be about her: "Who dares to mock me? " She is th e 'you'. Asking "where you dwell? " to a woman figured as nothing but a pronoun can be understood as another way of asking 'How do we dwell in and stay language as our world? ' A provisional answer, that will prove not to be an answer at all, but a restatement o f the question is the invocation o f memory and desire withwhichthepoembegins. Theenvironmentandtime(figuredasApril)arestayedinto poetry through the Coincidentia Oppositorum, "mixing/ Memory and desire" (2-3). I find thismixinginTheWasteLandoperatic. Howisthisenactmentofstaying(notreallya stasis) or lingering or dwelling through the fragments different from the astonishment of soul Kierkegaard describes as an effect of Opera? Certainly the power of The Waste Land is not the "exuberant gaiety" that is the power o f Don Giovanni. This gaiety is the expression of"his voice, the voice ofthe sensuous" (96). How would we describe the
voices in The Waste Land?
Heidegger leaves us in a world of things, with neither people nor the scientific
logic with which to build these things into people. This is something like the world in which Tristan finds himself in The Waste Land. Heidegger wants to get to the organic coherence of the world as a form of life that can speak 'weilen' with the ontological force that he needs to reconstitute a particular thing into staying, dwelling, being the world, avoiding the traditional attempts to link particulars and universals (examples, exemplars, forms, versions, reflections, and so on). Heidegger's romanticism remains akin to Schlegel's in his attempt to reconstruct a semantics with ontological force. His attempt, however, blocks offany questioning ofthe giveness ofthe world (like Wittgenstein, he
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wants to disconnect 'how the world is' form "what is higher. God does not reveal himself intheworld'(TLP6. 432);Heideggerbothbeforeandafterhisturn("dieKehre") rejects this kind o f transcendence: Wittgenstein and Heidegger always had alien views concerning logic. What is common between them, however, is not just their appeal to the ordinary and to the grammar of language (albeit in different ways) but their failure to understand the depth of questions about how the world is). For Eliot some possible world speaks 'verwielen' and from this speaking he must construct its semantics, in this case the semantics o f thunder.
What is created in an by The Waste Lcmdl
The attempt to justify the poetry results in an appeal to and requires the constructionofakindoftheoryofmind. Whythisisremainsamystery. Ifmindsfunction within an ontological universe described by science, by strict laws describing a totality of possibilities, then these constructions have force only in so far as they articulate themselves in relation to such an ontology. When Eliot deciphers "What The Thunder Said" as "The spoke the thunder/ DA," the etymological force o f DA, and its inclusion in
Datta (give), Dayadhvam (sympathize) and Damyata (control) does not get taken up into mythological or theological promises or stories separate from the physics of thunderstorms and the indifference of these natural processes to our concerns, understanding, and meanings. Howdoesitgettakenup? Orhowarewetakenupbyit?
Is this thunder the voice of our beginning as human beings, or our end? Vico and, through him, Joyce settled thunder at the beginning of humanity, driving our ancestors
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into caves and into society. From our havens listening toward heaven, our "forebears" (FW572. 06) mimicked onomatpoetically thunder into language:
The first men, who spoke by signs, naturally believed that lightening bolts and thunderclaps were signs make to them by Jove; whence from m o , to make a sign, can numen, the divine will, by an idea more than sublime and worthy to express the divine majesty. They believed that Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words, and that nature was the language of ove. The science o f language the gentiles universally believed to be divination, which by the Greeks was called theology, meaning the science o f the language o f the gods. (NS379)
The world requires divination, and thus "Sibyls and oracles are the most ancient institutions of the gentile world [721, 925]" (NS381). Divination, as the form of what Vico calls "poetic metaphysics," "seeks its proofs not in the external world but within the modificationsofthemindofhimwhomediatesit"(NS364). Themythicconsciousnessis
gripped by a kind o f idealism that resists the conscious articulation o f the question "Are the signs I see in the world actually in the world or a function o f my interpretations? "
"Because o f the indefinite nature o f the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance man makes himselfthe measure of all things" (NS120). What is the nature of this ignorance? In this case it is the ignorance attending finding ourselves fragments (represented or acted out in our ignorance of the meaning of The Waste Land). Eliot's ignorance is not directed at the world and its workings but toward God and the
justificationoftheworld. ThisisagainakintoVico'sdescriptionofpoeticmetaphysics:
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So that, as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them (homo intelligendof i t omnia), this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them (homo non intelligendofit omnia). . . . . . . . . for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them. (NS405)
How do we extend our mind into our mind? The Waste Land requires us to remark our ignorance of the significance or nature of our own believing and of our visions as self- reflexive ignorance: our ignorance of our ignorance.
Vico explicitly grounds the poetic and the mythic in the same logic, or poetic wisdom. Eliot's project in The Waste Land is ostensibly the same (or similar). What is the poetic logic Eliot uses to expose the mutual relation between poetry and myth? (This is another way o f asking what does the poem create? ). I do not want to explore this question byexaminingEliot'suseofmythorhisuseanddistortionsofquotations. Vicooffersa way into a more interesting question about how we enter into the correlation (an origin) between language and consciousness. If Vico's history is too obscure, then, at least, his argument that human consciousness derived from mythical consciousness and that this mythical stance toward the world articulates a poetic metaphysics places the logic of origins within the logic of coherence determining language as a language, a consciousness as a consciousness, or a mind as a mind. These logics of origin and coherence are akin to
Heidegger's configuration of the thing as the staying of the quadrature. The logic of origin and coherence in The Waste Land function as the aesthetics (or justification) of
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fragmentation within the poem. Eliot's aesthetics o f fragmentation is the poetic enactment of the Sibyl's condition described in the poem's epigraph. Such an aesthetics attempts to organize language, consciousness, and the world within and around the inhabitation o f the concept o f identity represented (or enacted) by the Sibyl.
Unlike Vico and Joyce, Eliot does not ground the speaking o f the thunder in the "first men, stupid, insensate, and horrible beasts" (NS374). Eliot does not give us a complete thunder language, nor the integrated language or form o f life evolved, evolving and expressing the infrarational mind of someone, but rather the grammatical (the linguistic forms, examples, usages, bits) limits between thunder language(s) and the minds and times and societies in which they made sense, between the theology of God's language
and the insensate forms o f nature's indifference to make our kind o f sense. offers different kinds o f education: an incarnation versus T&ks(h*,xxj:
Then spoke the thunder DA
Datta: what have we given?
DA
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key
DA
Damyata: The boat responded
The thunder
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"DA/Dattat" if heardfrom the beginning of time or humanity pretends to describe the transformation of a sound into a phoneme and then into a ritual language. If heard as a beginning, "D A . . D A . . DA" decomposes our language back into phonemes and then into exclamation and then noise. Even if someone spoke Sanskrit fluently "Datta," "Dayadhvam," and "Damyata" sound outside o f any ordinary language game, not with philosophical weight but with religious mass.
This language is alien. It must mean, but no one can understand it like they might 'this is my house. ' It might mean, however, 'this is my house. ' The order of sounds that makes a language is the same order of sounds that makes thunder. This is true even if all we can understand by thunder is its physical causes. Science speaks the order of the universe.
What can this language mean against physics?
Thunder disturbs the universe.
It disturbs us with a question: "Datta: what have we given? " To whom? we ask
back. Who is this 'we'? The thunder speaks to me not because it is a language but because it threatens me into a 'we'. What have I given to you? The thunder can turn 'you' into an 'us'. If we mimicked thunder to create language, this means we formed mirrors through which we could see ourselves as both individuals and as human beings. Thunder-reflection is self-reflection.
The demands of this 'we' can be taken up in friendship as it is in the line following "Datta . "My friend, blood shaking my heart. " At night or when we turn our ears toward ourselves the blood sounds our own thunder, shaking us into life as much as the thunder into fear: 'My friend, my heart in my chest, and in our language as I write myself
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into concepts, and into the world, my friend, as passions circulate amongst us. ' What kind o f language is this?
We reach the foundation of who 'we' are:
By this, and this alone, we have existed
Which is not to be found in our obituaries
Or in memories draped by the beneficent spider Or under seals broken by the lean solicitor
In our empty rooms
By what alone have we existed? By giving or not giving? By friendship or blood or daring and surrender? This "By this" cannot be found in descriptions after the fact, or in memories, in further representations edited even in our own minds, or in our own giving of things and money within the law, under the auspices of order and definition, or in the places and spaces we possessed. Either we do not know what 'exist' means here, or we do not know giving, friendship, blood, daring, or surrender.
Do we mistake the unrepresentable for the inexpressible? or for our privacy? The demand to sympathize (Dayadhvam) is ironically answered by a picture of solipsism, "each in his prison. " The pain I feel is my pain and not yours, but 'my pain' and your response to my pain is not determined by either my knowledge o f it (I experience it, or in other words, I pain: pain! ) or your knowledge ofthe truth ofmy pain. You respond to my expressionorthemanifestationsofmypain. Wittgensteinremarks,
What makes it so plausible to say that it [the pain] is not the body? --Well, something like this: if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say
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so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one
looks into his face. (PI? 286)
I can, however, fall into absurdity and find it not plausible to acknowledge the other as human. Peoplehavebeenknowntofallintoparts,bothinPetrarchianpoeticloveblazons andinAliceinWonderlanddistortionsandeverynight,asleep. Asleeponeloses ontologicalaccesstoone'sface. Inpartialanswertooneofmyinitialquestions,'whatis being created? ', I can answer "Faces are not being created, nor even found. ' The language of The Waste Land is attached to human beings through a collection of names: Marie, Madame Sosostris, Phoenician Sailor, Belladonna, The Hanged Man, Mrs. Equitone, Saint Mary Woolnoth, Philomel, Stetson, Lil, Albert, Bill, Lou, May, Sweeney, Mrs. Porter, Mr. Eugenides, Tiresias, Elizabeth I, Leicester, Phlebas, and Hieronymo. Not all of these names are names o f human beings who had once lived. Is there any significance in
replacing the face with a name? It in effect turns all names into pronouns.
These words do not speak in the context o f god: the voices are extracted from
everydaylife. Itistheordinarywhichbordersonhysteria. ThisisEliot'stransformation of a feminine voice into a parody ofMozart's Queen ofthe Night:
"My nerves are bad to-night. Yes, bad. Stay with me. "Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak.
"What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? "I never know what you are thinking. Think. " (Ins. l 11-114)
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Hysteria attaches one's nerves to oneself. These "nerves" are a physical synecdoche for a mental condition, a hysteria played out against human indifference and uncaring and alienation within a marriage. The same hysteria can stay a person in a disintegrating relationship: "my nerves are bad . . . stay with me. " (This is one way o f 'staying' the world inalanguageoflove. ItisoneoftheconclusionsofEliotthatsuch'staying'isdamning). The husband here has lost or renounced his voice (a sibyl-like diminishment); he functions in these lines as a metaphysical 'I', a limit determining the scope of but not included within the world, dominated by the women's speaking. But the absent husband's implicit authorial position (maybe as bricoleur) means he ventriloquizes her speaking, and she
ventriloquizes his soul (the negative outlines o f his face sketched in his absence). Catherine Clement, in her book on Opera, asks about what she understands as patriarchal fear: "What haste, what hatred drives them to reduce woman to her image? " (28). The image of women in The Waste Land is described by speaking. Is the image of the diva, her body,herface,hersinging,orhervoice? InTheWasteLandoneoftheimagesdescribing thelimitbetween silenceandsong(whichisitselfthelimitbetweensilenceandspeech) and between desire and possession is female hair:
Under the firelight, under the brush, her hair Spread our in fiery points
Glowed into words, then would be savagely still. (Ins. 108-110)
Do we imagine this scene parodies lightening and thunder? Parody requires judgment, enacting mimicry within a structure ofvalues. To suggest that parody is the origin of
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language is to mock the question o f origin when it is understood as answerable by something like parody. Joyce's use o f Vico's stages o f history (including the theory that speech imitates thunder) suggests exactly this kind o f parody, transforming putative origins into limits. (What motivates parody? a tool in what game? A chimpanzee will mimic other chimps and humans, but why not parody them? )
Is Eliot pursuing a similar project of transforming origins into limits? Maybe. There is at least a confusion between parodies and rumors:
Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus
What are "aethereal rumours"? They are night-words, but aethereal words can be from Godandtherumorspromises. Buttheserumorsre-animate(revive)ifonlyforamoment, the fragmented body o f Coriolanus. By what does Coriolanus exist? At night we lose our body. We might find ourselves in any body. We can find ourselves as a we-body, as "the They" .
Thisisagainpartoftheinstabilityofpronouns. TheserumorsinFinnegansWake (a "foull subustioned mullmud"; Sebastian Melmoth, one o f Wilde's masks and, therefore, an expression of and a disguise against rumor or exposure [228. 32]) are "Allwhile,. . . , preying in his mind, son o f Everallin, within himself, he swure" (228. 03-04). Some 'he' swore and was sure that he was who he was (which could be anyone). Recalling Stephen inPortrait ofthe Artist as a YoungMan, or Joyce, himself) a young man, the dreamer (maybe here thinking through HCE) reincorporates himself in the possibility o f leaving
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himselfbehind by leaving the (or a) world behind, remembering or traveling or writing or sleeping:
He would split. He do big squeal like holy Trichepatte. . . He take skiff come first dagrene day overwide tumbler, rough and dark, till when bow of the shower show of the bower with three shirts and a wind, pogoda permettant, crookolevante, the bruce, the coriolano and the ignacio. (FW228. 05-11)
In 'his' splitting and flight, weather permitting (R. pogoda, 'weather'), in a search for wisdom or escape from the world (permanent pagoda), God willing (Deo volente), fleeing debt (crook and levant), 'he' becomes Robert Bruce, Coriolanus, and St. Ignatius Loyola; or rather he is the qualities these names describe if they become adjectives (or as if the adjectives become a single name or description o f his being in this flight, while reading maybe): Robert Bruce, silence; Coriolanus, exile; and St. Ignatius, cunning.
This flight or movement away and towards marks subjective historical time, fragmentingtheworldandconstitutingatransportable'I'betweenthefragments. This 'he' is "recorporated, (prunty! ) by meteoromancy and linguified heissrohgin" (FW228. 20-
1). This mysterious "meteoromancy" suggests a divination through reading meteors, a reading of chance streaks, instead of stable stars (although there is some regularity in meteor showers, there is no regularity in any particular meteor which bums away in the atmosphere). Byreadingthechancefireworksoftheskyweallegorizeourselvesasboth unstable and unique. Reincorporating, in this case, proceeds not only through meteoromancy, but through "linguified heissrohgin," on first reading another description of the Wake as a linguified language of rogue/roving names (G. heifieri). The collapse of
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Roh (G. raw) and heifi^G. hot), the raw and the cooked, as one kind of human limit between kinds o f societies, between humans and animals, in the confusion o f names (heissrohgin; and one's personal investment o f oneself in identities, language games, relationships, and so on) describes the action o f recorporation as a self-interpretation. To be "recorporated, (prunty! ) by meteoromancy and linguified heissrohgin" means to gain formasanegativespace, orratherasthesubjunctivenexusofthesetofpossibilities describing our stances toward the future and within language. Meteoromancy, therefore, is the divination o f the ephemeral, the generation o f predictive interpretations, through and as the instability o f identity (names and faces) enacted through the possibilities o f language which constitutes, in effect, any pronoun.
Two of the related figures for this kind of self-interpretation in The Waste Land is a dismemberment into parts (a human hand or God's hand) and navigation:
DA
Damyata: The boat responded
Gaily, to the hand expert with sail and oar
"Damyata" means 'control,' but whose over what or whom? The instability of the 'ground' o f the undrinkable sea replaces the stasis o f the drought and desert. And land has become a boat over which some expert hand has control, a dismembered hand controlling a dismembered land (a boat). The mind separated into a prison but answered by sympathy. This is a hand not attached to a person. It could be anyone's. The boat, a floating jug, "responded/ Gaily," as if alive, with quickness, as if not dead, animated by the
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controlling expert hand. But whose hand? This boat scene is allegorized into a scene of love? lust? caring? power?
The sea was calm, your heart would have responded Gaily, when invited, beating obedient
To controlling hands
Someone's heart could respond like a boat, and in this it could describe human love in the daring of surrender or the exaltation of control or love of God, the 'your' becoming a hypothetical 'thou' to God's 'I'. The hand like those attacking the blindfolded Christ can be anyone's. The skill to control a boat, should one find water, can become someone's through education. This skill is a quality, but ofwhose hands? The 'we' includes "your heart" and some "hands. " "Your heart" is mock essence and love of what is always subjectively vorhanden, marking something as human, but without that which is to be marked. This 'we' cannot attach itself to persons.
The body is remade into an 'I' casting between the logic of aridity and stones and a further remaking of these fragments into order (this logic of aridity will generate four subjunctive worlds):
I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me Shall I at least set my hands in order?
How would this ordering change the world? What kind of question is this? Some 'I' asks himself or herself'if I should act or enact an order (determined how? ) on the lands that form my world? ' Should I refit exactly these words into a world? Why exactly do these
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things not make a world for me? ' A science ofthe mind bom our ofwhat Vico called ignorance, but Freud called the unconscious, and what we respond to at time as intentionality, what Brentano called the essentially mental, or which Wittgenstein called the grammatical (as the limit organizing our negotiations between the psychological and the physical) understands the form o f this not as an analogue for the identity o f things, the position Heidegger attacks, but as the analogue for the structures o f the mind:
The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means o f reflection.
This axiom gives us the universal principle o f etymology in all languages: words are carried over from bodies and the properties of bodies to signify the institutions o f the mind and spirit.
(NS236-37)
Bishop argues that Joyce develops this insight into the practice of "an extended 'abnihilization ofthe eytm' throughout the Wake (353. 22 [I. ab nihilo, 'from nothing'])" in which he "shows the body lying everywhere under the surface of language (L. lingua, 'tongue'])" (198).
Finnegans Wake and The Waste Land enact different kinds of crucifixion. Finnegans Wake crucifies God through his embodiment or incarnation as human: this is the crucifixion ofsleep, the realization ofthe limits ofthe body, that allows for or opens up the possibilities of mind or spirit that we interpret as dreams or as soul. The Waste Land crucifies human beings, as if we were already asleep: a crucifixion of vision, or
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dreams themselves. Crucifixion can seem like standing in air. Air is the only element missing (or diminished) in The Waste Land: we are buried in earth, burning burning in fire, drowning in water. What Karl Barth takes as "the positive relation between God and man", Eliot takes as the demand the world makes on us, to ask, what Barth asserts: "The righteousness of God is our standing-place in the air--that is to say, where there is no human possibility of standing- whose foundations are laid by God Himselfand supported by Him only" (The Epistle to the Romans, iii. 21). How do we stand "before an irresistible and all-embracing dissolution of the world to time and things and me, before a penetrating and ultimate KRISIS, before the supremacy o f a negation by which all existence is rolled up"? (iii. 21). Where do we stand when we ask "Mein Irisch Kind,/ Wo weilest du? " In a subjunctiveAfterAfterAfter. PhlebasthePhoenicianhasdrowned,daringtosurrenderto despair and falling from his ship, a mock Fisher King and Christ. . He has performed the
final act of dissolution, which the Sibyl desires but cannot consummate.
The first stanza o f "What The Thunder Said" describes Jesus' imprisonment and
his death from the perspective o f those watching it, those remaining in the physical, material world, where death is not transformation but loss:
After the torchlight red on sweaty faces After the frosty silence in the gardens After the agony in stony places
The shouting and the crying
Prison and palace and reverberation Ofthunder of spring over distant mountains
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He who was living is now dead.
This succession o f "after" clauses, although sounding paratactic, grammatically invoke and then fail to complete a logically conditioned temporal succession of"after this, then that. " "After" combines the force o f the conditional "i f with a claim not simply o f logical inevitability, but o f temporal order: o f intention ("after this, I will") or historical fact (after this, that happened") or rather awkwardly a kind of modal present ("after that, I do this"). What is done or will be done or was done after the torchlight is repressed until after the frostysilencewhoseafterisrepresseduntilaftertheagony. Eachoftheseantecedentsas part of a temporal sequence are markers in time, taking the place of a subject, an T (thus in the preceding sentence the ease by which I can say "the frosty silence whose 'after"'). The consequent to the "after X" grammatically requires a temporal marker, for example,
"After the torchlight, the shouting and the crying began. " (This would not be required if the consequent included a human subject, as in "after the frosty silence, Joe spoke. " Time markers act as subjects, and subjects organize and mark the present, and thus determine what counts as after and what before. ) A temporal marker could be replaced by a preposition chaining this event (the shouting and crying) to another.
