No More Learning

The Passion Of Love; Jealousie-- Love of one singularly, with desire to
be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the
love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse-- Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn
some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity-- Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no
living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom
the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable
generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall
Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion-- Feare of power invisible, feigned
by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not
allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we
imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour-- Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what,
PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of
them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first,
some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example;
every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion
happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration-- Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to
man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory-- Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power
and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING:
which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is
the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or
onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,
is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection-- Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection
of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of
abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and
is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory Laughter-- Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those
Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of
their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud
themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the
fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in
their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men.
And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of
Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help
and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most
able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping-- On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the
passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and
they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall,
such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of
Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made
to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away.
For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame Blushing-- Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability
is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and
consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young
men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in
old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not
commendable.

Impudence-- The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty-- Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth
from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and
therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present
time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from
great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same
Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious
to the same.

Cruelty-- Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that
which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation Envy-- Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth,
honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own
abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with
Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Deliberation-- When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes
and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and
divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to
be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole
sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or
thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But
of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not
knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a
putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to
our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is
no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or
Aversion.




The Will

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the
WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have
Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the
Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite,
is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act
against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the
Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall
say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the
Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The
Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a
man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to
do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action
Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last
Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any
action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions
should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action
should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning
from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion,
or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary
Actions.




Formes Of Speech, In Passion

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts.
And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I
Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them
have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not
affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences,
besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed
Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with
their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and
differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in
generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars.
The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This,
Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is
Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory,
of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to
know, there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is
It, When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of the
Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do
not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because
they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such
Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the
countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we
otherwise know the man to have.




Good And Evill Apparent

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good
in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that
which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the
evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so
that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest
prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he
will, to give the best counsel unto others.




Felicity

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing
as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life
itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without
Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath
ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know,
than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of
School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.




Praise Magnification

The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and
greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie
the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is
sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.



CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE


Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last
an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of
Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.




Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans
Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will
Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that
which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil,
the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and
Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so
the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called
the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth.
And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good
or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate,
in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or
to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and
ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No
man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will
be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if
This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which
is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.




Science Opinion Conscience

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with
the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into
general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or
last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it
signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence
of words, which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of
such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly
joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again
OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in
absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.
When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said
to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it
together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one
another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill
act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force
another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always
hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use
of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret
facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that
the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently
in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and
obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that
reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful,
to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true,
when they know at most but that they think so.




Beliefe Faith

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called
Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to
know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth
not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the
Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the
man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So
then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the
other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man,
signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man:
But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth
of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In;
as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used
but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are
put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin,
Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this
singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many
disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not
onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold
all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not;
which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person
whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever
it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or
from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and
good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of
our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And
consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith,
and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.
And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the
name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him
trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he
be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History.
For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the
glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of
Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body
else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and
we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is
evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is
drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be
sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.



CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;

AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS




Intellectuall Vertue Defined

Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued
for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things
were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues
INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men
praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under
the name of a Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to
distinguish one certain ability from the rest.




Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I
mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else
but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute
Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that
Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method,
Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally
in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one
thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the
Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind,
which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other
names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.




Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and
therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to,
and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.
And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to
observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One
Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They
Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case
they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a
Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they
that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called
Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement:
and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein,
times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called
DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement,
is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and
Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy.
Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a
good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts
to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done;
he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that
will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it
with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention.
But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one
kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse,
are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their
thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that
they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular
name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby
that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others:
sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore
thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended
way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets,
Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required:
But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the
Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse
consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but
onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is
done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest
what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be
opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy.
But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing
they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning,
were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be
apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse
will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane,
clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball
discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the
Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or
write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please,
but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant
fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt,
should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want
of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse
of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and
aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters
of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before
persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of
words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in
the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy
that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is
Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.




Prudence

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what
designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not
easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on
much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is
in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall
in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different
occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a
family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but
different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little,
or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A
plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a
Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.




Craft

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such
as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked
Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For
Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which
the Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is
a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into
a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter
sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking
mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.




Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there
is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and
produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken
in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and
the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different
Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if
the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of
Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference
of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies,
and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are
different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also
from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are
principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge,
and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.




Giddinesse Madnesse

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good
man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have
either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the
Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the
things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse
of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to
be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions
indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have
stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily
seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the
evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the
vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the
Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either
great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt;
or great Dejection of mind.




Rage

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire
of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes
Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive
opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome,
learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse:
the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any
thing, contradicted by others, Rage.




Melancholy

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in
haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in
fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions
that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall
name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that
would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be
madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend
to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when
many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is
visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than
to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is
somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour,
fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before,
they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be
Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For
as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of
that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part
contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of
the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse,
in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular
Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And
if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very
arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some
man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire
in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time
requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father;
I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his
Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins
very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by
others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason,
they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many
times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as
being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same
to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with
those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of
behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of
Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all
extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions:
For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from
them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the
most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the
mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts
at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that
Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning
the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the
Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which
they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs
is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former
sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them
sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes
Energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in
Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men
possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the
Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot
day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had
this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they
did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and
Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on
of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion
imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in
another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of
the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them,
might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not
contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip
such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the
story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same
Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the
Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods:
so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living
bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this,
held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they
calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits
good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and
Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and
mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and
Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them
termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by
Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to
have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham
pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of
God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law,
Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such
Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25. ) to
take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders,
the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided.
The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined
to Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3. ) "Whom I have filled
with the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a
spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their
own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of
man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean
spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the
vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the
other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God
spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen
Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes
fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that
which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search
naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the
grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately
conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or
defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may
probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall,
they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but
that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3. 21. ) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but
the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out
divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John
10. 20. ) some said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;" whereas others
holding him for a Prophet, sayd, "These are not the words of one that
hath a Divell.
" So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2
Kings 9. 11. ) was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, "What
came that mad-man for? " So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever
behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be
possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces,
who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at
all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby
perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather
than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they
were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other
kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture
in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The
Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to
prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the
world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the
exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion
make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men,
proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is
all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is
the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour
speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all
that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to
do, whether they speak to a Divel or not. ) For is not Christ also said
(Math. 8. 26. ) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4.
39. ) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel.
And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not
necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men
confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43. ) speaketh of an
unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry
places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same
man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a
Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his
lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times
worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that
requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.




Insignificant Speech

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also
be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words,
whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of
Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have
in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through
misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by
others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to
none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible,
as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common
sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those
other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words
are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would
need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man
into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning
any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ;
Transubstantiation; Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so
as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such
as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was
Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. "The first cause does not
necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential
subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke? "
They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez
first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When men write
whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others
so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where
after certain words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse,
Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c.
go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not
make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his
body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall,
are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind
of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse;
and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust,
they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus
much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.



CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE


There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact: the
other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another. The
former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge;
as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the
Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is
Conditionall; as when we know, that, If The Figure Showne Be A Circle,
Then Any Straight Line Through The Centre Shall Divide It Into Two
Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that
is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such
Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as
are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The
other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions
of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the
diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have
divided them in the following Table.

I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
also PHILOSOPHY

A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY

1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.

a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima

PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined

a) By Figure, By Number

1] Mathematiques,

GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE

2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
Speciall

a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,

1] Cosmography

ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,

1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight

Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION

2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities

a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish

METEOROLOGY

b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent

1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres

a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
Science of

SCIOGRAPHY

b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,

ASTROLOGY

2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
Ayre, or substance aetherial.


3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
without Sense,

1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
. 2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals

1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
Generall

a] Consequences from Vision,

OPTIQUES

b] Consequences from Sounds,

MUSIQUE

c] Consequences from the rest of the senses

2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall

a] Consequences from Passions of Men,

ETHIQUES

b] Consequences from Speech,

i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.

POETRY

ii) In Persuading,

RHETORIQUE

iii) In Reasoning,

LOGIQUE

iv) In Contracting,

The Science of
JUST and UNJUST


B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY

1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
the Subjects.



CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS




Power

The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means,
to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or
Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as
extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality,
Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or
by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches,
Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God, which men call
Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame,
increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the
further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers
of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill, that
has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the
Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;
such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued.
Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for
they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case
they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance
of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the
same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have
the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good
fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it
gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because
to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly
than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their
Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to
the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but
of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand
it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory,
are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the
Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand
of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar
for the Mother,) as his issue.




Worth

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power:
and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and
judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price
in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and
uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in
War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer
determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as
the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is
esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high
rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high,
and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate
that each man setteth on himselfe.




Dignity

The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value
of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command,
Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for
distinction of such Value.




To Honour and Dishonour

To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe
we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde
is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to
Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying
of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to
Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the
need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also
to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To
neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being
a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both
to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or
feare then he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but
goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is
to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend.
To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of
opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to
Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep,
or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or
which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving
the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving
his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding
of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate
ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour
him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a
signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in
the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as
without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that
have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand
for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or
Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of
his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be
conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the
Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. "
And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave
him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as
the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour;
such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and
Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many
signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for
they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality,
Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the
conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are
Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of
little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed
things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference
of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues
little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these
are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or
Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of
Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of
a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of
a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office,
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the
power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is
Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable;
as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the
contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great
and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or
unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore
the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly
Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing
Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much
as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor
in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne
of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had
invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of
Appollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths,
it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but
rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst
all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And
at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes
will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be
Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make
the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the
ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though
for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of
Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are
driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent
Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth
either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is
equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called
Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was
any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it
now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient
Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with
such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a
signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the
Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families:
but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst
the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever,
any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has
been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great
numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in
these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or
Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those
Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were
Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament,
both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture
of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible
mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament both of the
Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the
eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the
Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when
many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty
of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office
a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry;
which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and
rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and
other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.
Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers
manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned
from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which,
by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek
and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their
times.




Titles of Honour

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne
Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles
of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the
Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War:
Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship;
and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified:
Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds
of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the
Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of
the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules,
and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom
they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from
Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the
Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such
men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones.
But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of
Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent
Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government,
were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish
the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and
men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein
they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were
devised to the same end.




Worthinesse Fitnesse

WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and
also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power,
or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular
ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the
well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities
most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being
absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for
some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and
Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before
another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit,
praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of
which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.




CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS




What Is Here Meant By Manners

By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should
salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth
before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those
qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and
Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life,
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such
Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is
spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man
any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and
Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the
desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being
still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object
of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time;
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ
onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions,
in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or
opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.




A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that
ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or
that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot
assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power
is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes,
or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;
in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall
pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in
some art, or other ability of the mind.




Love Of Contention From Competition

Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the
other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of
Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these
ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.




Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common
Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might
be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.




From Feare Of Death Or Wounds

Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same
reason.