)
according
to the character- istics of the agent, or 2.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
26c-d), are missing.
The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhatus.
7c. Avijnapti also exists in Rupadhatu.
"Also" that is to say: in Kamadhatu as well as in Rupadhatu; not in Arupyadhatu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the avijnapti is derived (iv. 6b). ] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the avijnapti which] is the discipline of the body and voice.
Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure avijnapti. Pwe avijnapti derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure avijnaptiln the. same way, when a person arisen in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu enters into an drupya absorption, he produces an avijnapti of
Karma 571
? Arupyadhatu deriving from the primary elements of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
The case is not the same, for the pure avijnapti transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an avijnapti of Arupyadhatu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
Further, turning away from all rupa--since any idea of rupa is absent in it--an drupya absorption is not capable of producing an avijnapti, which is rupa.
The Vaibha? ikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kamadhatu; morality, consisting of avijnapti, of the realm of Rupadhatu is opposed to it. But the arupyas are removed from Kamadhatu by the four estrangements of dsraya,
prakara, ddlambana, pratipaksa (ii. 67; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 495c23). 7d. Vijnapti exists in the two spheres where there is vicara.
There is vijnapti, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of
41
"Also," in the spheres where there is no vicara, and "also" in Kamadhatu. ]
Such vijnapti does not exist in Kamadhatu, [where all defiled vijnapti is bad, not neutral. ]
This means that vijnapti of the anivrtavydkrta class exists only in the world of Brahma. It is reported that Mahabrahma produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahabrahma boasted falsely, in order to
42 avoid the inquires of the venerable Asvajit.
***
But if vocal avijnapti is absent above the First Dhyana, how can sound (sabdayatana) exist in the Second Dhyana and above?
Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, where there'isvicara (i. 32c, viii 7). 8a. The vijnapti termed nivrta is also missing in Kamadhatu.
{Nivrta signifies nivrta-avyakrta (ii. 66), defiled but neutral.
? It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements:
43 sound caused by the wind, etc. (i. lOb).
Other masters say: Vijnapti exists in the Second Dhyana and in the
following Dhyanas; it is there in the anivrtdvydkrta class, undefiled-
neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in
these Dhyanas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere,
by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled
Brahma? Why is the vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kamadhatu?
8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.
i. It is the mind associated with vitarka and vicara which gives rise to the vijnapti: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyana and above. (iv. 7d).
ii. The nivrtavydkrta mind gives rise to a vijnapti of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class "to be abandoned through Mediation. " (See p. 575 and foil. )
[In Kamadhatu, only the nivrtavydkrta mind is the mind associated with satkdyadrsti and with antagrdhadrsti,'] Thus, it does not give rise to vijnapti (ii. 67, v. 12).
***
Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (samutthapaka) to them--good or bad nature--that the dharmas are good or bad?
The dharmas are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (param- arthatas), in and of themselves (svabhavatas), through association
46 (samprayOgatas), and through their original cause (samutthanatas).
8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good
Nirvana, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-
47
and-happy; hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of
vijnapti. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and 44
the defiled mind has been abandoned.
But [the Vaibhasikas] defend the first opinion.
Why is the vijnapti, whatever it may be, absent above the world of
45
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? Chapter Four ________ .
sickness (Majjhima, i. 510).
8c-d The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of them-
48 selves.
The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.
9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc,] is good through association.
The dharmas, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.
9b. Actions, etc are good by reason of their original cause. Having their origin in dharmas good in and of themselves or good
through association, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, [the laksanas,] praptis, 49
nirodhasamdpatti, asamjnisamdpatti (ii. 35 and foil. ), are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.
How can praptis be good when they have their origin in a mind
50
which is not good?
9c Evil is the contrary.
The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:
1. Samsdra--or existence--has for its nature the process of all
suffering: it is thus perfealy unhappy, and so absolute evil
2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d)
are bad in themselves.
3. The dharmas associated with these principles are bad in
themselves.
4. Having their origin in the roots, etc, and in the dharmas
associated with these roots, etc, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, their charaaeristics (arising, etc. ) and the praptis of the bad dharmas, are bad by reason of their original cause.
? Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.
But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to samsdra: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?
From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure dharma which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii. 54), and the impure dharma which produces an agreeable retribu- tion, is called good
What is absolutely neutral?
9d. Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.
The two unconditioned things (asamskrta, i. 5), namely space and apratisamkhydnirodha, are, without ambiguity, neutral.
A difficulty. The Vaibhasikas teach that aaion, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition. ]The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal aaion (iv. 2b, 3d).
No, answer the Vaibhasikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the aaion, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain aaion, not any primary elements. ]
But, we should say, how will the avijnapti produced by absorption (iv. 6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the avijnapti and so does not think, "Let us create an avijnaptiV We cannot admit that the avijnapti produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the avijnapti produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhasikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii. 72a, trans, p. 315, vii. 45).
There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhasikas should resolve.
It has been said above (iv. 8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandonedthroughSeeingdoesnotgiverisetovijnaptiYettheBlessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad aaion, bad livelihood. " Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v. 4).
This Sutra does not contradia this theory. In faa
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10a-b. That which gives rise (samutthana) is of two types, which 1
are known as hetusamutthana and tatksanasamutthana^
Samutthana is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (hetu) and samutthana is hetusamutthana. What is samutthana at the very moment of the action is tatksanasamutthana.
lOc-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.
The hetusamutthana projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The tatksanasamutthana is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).
But what is [with regard to the action {vijnapti)] the efficacy done by the tatksanasamutthana which makes it the second mover?
If the tatksanasamutthana is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies. ]
[But if the vijnapti does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there vijnapti for a person free from a mind which
53
undertakes the discipline? (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 586a8).
[One will then have recourse to another explanation. ] The vijnapti is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the vijnapti, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.
lla-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.
The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the vijnapti, because it is the cause of the mental process {vitarka and vicara) which gives rise to the vijnapti It is not the second mover 1. ) because it no longer exists at the moment when the vijnapti takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2. ) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the rupa (that is, the vijnapti) created by it would also be abandoned by
? this Seeing; [in the same way that the vijnapti created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation. ] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i. 40c-d).
In fact, rupa (-vijnapti) is not contradicted either by vidya (correct knowledge), or by avidya (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be
54 abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.
[The Sautrantikas would answer that this affirmation, "Rupa is not contradiaed by vidya,"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of rtipa through Seeing would not admit that rupa is not contradiaed by vidya.
[The Vaibhasikas say: If the rupa (-vijnapti) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (dsraya) to this rupa, to this vijnapti, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral dharmas, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (klista, ii. 40c-d). ]
We deny this consequence. In faa, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the vijnapti (iv. 9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.
[The Vaibhasikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled dharma is not contradiaed either by vidya or by avidya.
[In faa, the undefiled dharma, either of the anivrtdvyakrta, undefiled-neutral class, or of the kuScdasdsrava, good-impure class, is not contradiaed by vidya, that is to say through the pure (andsrava) Path, as is the case for the defiled dharma which perishes by the faa that its prdpti is cut off by this said Path. . .
Hence the Sutra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing
ff
does not give rise to vijnapti, for this Sutra refers to false views
Karma yjl
? considered as agent. (Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 610c22)
llb-c The manas susceptible of being abandoned through
Meditation is twofold
The mental consciousness of the bhavanaheya category is at one and 55
the same time both agent and mover. lid. The five are solely mover.
The five vijndnakdyas, [visual consciousness, etc. ,] are solely mover,
56
[being free from reflexion (vikdpa, i. 33)]
There are thus four cases:
i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is
exclusively agent.
ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.
iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned
through Meditation is both promoter and mover.
iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.
***
Is the "mover" of the same [nature--good, bad, neutral--] as the agent?
There is no rule on this subject:
12a-b. From a good agent, etc. , a mover of three types.
A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.
58 12c With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.
With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.
12c Or good
Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral
agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the
59 teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminutioa
(Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 6l0a6)
57
? 60
According to other Schools, the mind of the Buddhas is never
neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sutra says, "The Naga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated"
The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks. ]But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral dharmas: dharmas of retribution (vipdkaja), dharmas related to attitudes (irydpatha), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nir- mdnacitta) (ii. 66).
We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral
61 12d That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.
The mind that has arisen from retribution (vipdkaja, i. 36, ii. 60, iv. 85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover. ]
Is the vijnapti good, bad, or neutral, 1.
) according to the character- istics of the agent, or 2. ) according to the characteristic of its mover?
To what does this question lead?
i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,--personalism, and past- and-future-of-the-personality--are the agent (iv. lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the vijnapti to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kamadhatu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv. 8b). ]If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv. Ua-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas satkayadrsti and the antdgrdhadrsti are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.
Second hypothesis. The vijnapti through which a person under- takes theJPratimoksa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind
ii. The Vaibhasikas answer. The vijnapti is of the same nature as its
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agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (vijnapti), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by victim and by vitarka, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (vijriapti) of the same nature.
iii. But if the action (vijnapti) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv. lOa-b) of the Sutra does not hold You have said in effect that the Sutra considers a "wrong view" (drsti) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of vijnapti, the Sutra contradias neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender vijnapti, nor its corollary that, in Kamadhatu, there is no vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sutra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (vijnapti), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.
This is enough on this point which has been defined above ( i l l , iv. 3d).
13a-b. Avijnapti is threefold, discipline {samvara), un-discipline (asamvara), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.
It is of three types, 1. ) samvara, discipline, so called because it constrains thefluxof immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2. ) asamvara, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv. 24c-d), and 3. ) naivasamvaranasamvara, [an avijnapti which has neither the characteristic of samvara nor asamvara. ]
13c-d Pratimoksa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from dhytina.
There are three types of discipline: 1. ) the discipline called
? Pratimoksa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kamadhatu, the morality of beings of this world; 2. ) the discipline produced through dhyana is morality of the sphere of Rupadhatu; and 3. ) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.
[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines? ]
14a. The Pratimoksa is of eight types.
It includes the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Bhiksuni, the Sik-
62
samana, the Sramanera (novice), the Sramanerika, the Upasaka
(pious layman, iv. 30), the Upasika, and the Upavasastha ("faster," iv. 28). These eight disciplines are the Pratimoksa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Pratimoksa is of eight types.
14b. In substance however, the Pratimoksa is of four types.
Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Sramanera, the Upasaka and the Upavasastha.
In fact, the discipline of the Bhiksuni does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhiksu; the discipline of the Siksamana and the Sramanerika do not differ from the discipline of the Sramanera; and the discipline of the Upasika does not differ from that of the Upasaka.
14c. The name changes with the gender.
Unga is vyanjana, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhiksu, Bhiksuni, etc. , differ.
When their gender is modified, the Bhiksu becomes a Bhiksuni; the Bhiksuni, a Bhiksu; the Sramanera, a Sramanerika; the Sramanerika, like the Siksamana, becomes a Sramanera; the Upasaka, an Upasika; and the Upasika, an Upasaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new
63
one; the change of gender cannot have this influence. Thus the four
female disciplines are indentical with the three male disciplines.
***
Karma 581
? When the disciplines are undertaken successively,--Le. , the dis- cipline of the Upasaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Sramanera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhiksu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,--do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (virati, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?
I4d [The disciplines exist] separately.
They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all--Upasakas, Sramaneras and Bhiksus all renounce (virati) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors--the three dis- ciplines have some distinct characteristics.
Their differencs lie in the difference of the occasions (nidana) of
transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a
greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of
occasions of intoxication-pride (mada, ii. 33c-d) and of non-diligence
(pramadasthana, ii. 26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of
64
occasions of transgression, killing, etc
of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upasaka and Sramanera were integral to the discipline of a Bhiksu, then the Bhiksu who renounces the discipline of a Bhiksu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.
I4d. But they do not contradict one another.
They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does
65
not abandon the preceeding ones. Thus the fact that a Bhiksu who
renounces his quality of Bhiksu remains in possession of the discipline of Upasaka and Sramanera is explained. **
***
How does one become an Upasaka, an Upavasastha, a Sramanera, or a Bhiksu?
Consequently the three series
? 15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of
the eight, the ten, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the
67 quality of Upasaka, Upavasastha, Sramanera, and Bhiksu.
1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upasaka.
2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2.
stealing, 3. unchastity,4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents,garlands,
68
and unguents; dances, songs, music; 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8.
meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavasastha.
3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Sramanera. These make ten items, for one counts "scents, garlands, and unguents"separately from "dances, songs, and music"
4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhiksu.
***
The Pratimoksa discipline is
I6a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.
69
1. It is morality (Ma), because it redresses that which is "unjust,"
for transgressors condua themselves in an unjust manner with regard to beings. Etymologically, because it cools (ft), as it says in the stanza, "Happy is the undertaking of morality, because morality does not burn. "
2. Good condua, because it is praised by the wise.
3. Aaion (karma), because it is aaion (ktiya) by nature. Objection. Does not the Sutra say that avijnapti is "not doing"
(akarana) (see above p. 560, 562)? How can avijnapti be aaion? Without doubt, the avijnapti makes the disciple, endowed with shame, to abstain from transgression; it is thus "not doing. " But it is
aaion, according to the etymology kriyata iti kriya: it is doing (kriyate) 70
either by a bodily-vocal aaion (vijnapti), or by the mind (citta). According to others, avijnapti is aaion because it is the cause and the
Karma 583
? 71 effect of an action.
4. Discipline (samvara), because it disciplines or constrains the body and the voice.
***
The expression "Pratimoksa discipline" designates all Pratimoksa discipline since its origin.
I6c-d The Pratimoksa is the first vijnapti and the first avijnapti; these are courses of action (karmapatha).
1. The expression "Pratimoksa" designates the first vijnapti and the first avijnapti of the undertaking of the discipline.
The Pratimoksa is called prdtimokfa, for through it there takes 72
placepratimoksana, that is, the abandoning of transgression: such is the efficacy of the first moment (vijnapti and avijnapti) of the undertaking of discipline.
2. This vijnapti and avijnapti are also "Pratimoksa discipline" because they discipline the body and the voice.
3. They are courses of action, that is "courses of action properly so called" (maula, iv. 66).
There is no longer any Pratimoksa in the moment which follows
the first moment and in the moments which follow, for the
transgression is not rejected (pratimokfyate) by the second moment,
having been rejected (pratimoksita) by the first; there is prati- 75
moksasamvara, that is, discipline "of the Pratimoksa type" or discipline "arisen from Pratimoksa;" there are no longer courses of action properly so-called, but solely "consecutive action" (iv. 68).
***
Who possesses each of the three disciplines? 17a. Eight persons possess the Pratimoksa.
Eight persons, the Bhiksu, Bhiksuni. . . the Upavasatha, possess the Pratimoksa discipline.
Does this mean that non-Buddhists cannot possess a morality that
74 they have undertaken?
? They can possess a morality, but they cannot possess the Prati- moksa discipline. In fact, the morality that they undertake ("I shall abstain from killing," etc), rests on an idea of existence; even when they have in view, not a heavenly existence, but that which they call "deliverance" (moksa), they conceive of deliverance as a certain type of existence. Hence transgression is not absolutely "rejected" by them, nor can they be "released" through the discipline they have undertaken.
#**
17b. He who possesses dhyana possesses the discipline which arises from dhyana.
"Which arises from dhyana" (dhydnaja), that is, which arises from dhyana (ablative) or by means of dhyana (instrumental).
Dhyana, means not only the Four Principal (maula) Dhyanas, but also the absorptions which are close to them (samantaka, viii. 22a). In the same way, when one says, "There is a field of rice or a field of wheat in this village," one means the village and its environs.
***
75 17c. The Aryans possess pure discipline.
The Aryans,-^the Saiksas and Asaiksas,--possess pure discipline (iv. 26b-c).
**#
We have seen, in the definition of sahabhilhetu (ii. 51), that two disciplines "accompany the mind. " What are these two disciplines?
17d The last two disciplines are concomitants of the mind
The discipline that arises from dhyana and the pure discpline are concomitants of the mind; not of the Pratimoksa discipline, for this latter continues to exist in a person whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (anyacittacittaka, i. 11).
18a-b. Arising in the anantaryamargas, in anagamya, they are
76 called "abandoning. "
Karma 585
? In the nine dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya these two disciplines, the discipline of dhydna and pure discipline, are "abandoning disciplines" (prahdnasathvara^dbaLndomng and discipline), for through them one abandons immorality and the defilements which produce them (iv. l22a).
There are thus disciplines arisen from dhydna which are not abandoning-discipline. Four cases:
i. Discipline arising from dhydna, impure, with the exception of what arises from the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: discipline arisen from dhydna which is not abandoning;
ii. Pure discipline obtained in the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: abandoning, but not discipline arisen from dhydna;
iii. Impure discipline in the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: dis- cipline arisen from dhydna which is abandoning;
iv. Pure discipline arisen outside of the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: discipline not arisen from dhydna which is not abandoning.
According to the same principles, one would establish four cases relative to pure discipline which is not abandoning, to abandoning which is not pure discipline, etc (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 231al3)
***
The Blessed One said, "Good is discipline of the body, discipline of
77
the voice, discipline of the mind, discipline in all things;" and again,
78 "He lives disciplined through the discipline of the organ of sight. "
What is the nature of these two disciplines, discipline of the mind, and discipline of the organs?
Neither are, by their nature avijnapti of ? Ua. But on the contrary, 18c-d Discipline of the mind and discipline of the organs are,
each of them, two things: attentive consciousness and
79 mindfulness.
In order that the reader should not come to believe that the first
discipline is consciousness (samprajddna) and the second mindfulness 80
(smrti), the author says that each of them is two things. ***
? Let us examine who possesses vijnapti and avijnapti, and to what 81
period these belong in each case (iv. 19-22,23-24b).
19a-c He who is in Pratimoksa always possesses avijnapti of the present moment, as long as the does not rejea the avijnapti.
As we have said previously the person who dwells in the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. l4a), always possesses present avijnapti as long as he does not reject the avijnapti which constitutes this discipline (iv. 38).
19c-d. After the first moment, he also possesses avijnapti After the first moment, which is designated by the expression
Pratimoksa (iv. l6c-d), he also possesses earlier, past avijnapti: this of 82
course, as long as he does not rejea the discipline. As he who dwells in the Pratimoksa discipline,
20a. So too is he who dwells in undiscipline.
He who dwells in undiscipline (asamvarastha, iv. 24c-d), always possesses avijnapti of the present moment as long as he does not rejea it; [he also possesses avijnapti of the past, and from the second moment on, of undiscipline. ]
20b-c. He who possesses discipline arisen from dhyana always possesses past and future avijnapti.
He who possesses the discipline arisen from dhyana always possesses avijnapti of the past, and avijnapti of the future as long as he does not lose it, [for the avijnapti in question--namely the discipline arisen from dhyana--accompanies the mind (iv. l7d). ]
From the first moment when he acquires the discipline of dhyana, he takes possession of the discipline of former dhydnas, either of this existence, or of a previous existence, that he had lost.
20c-d The Aryan, at the first moment, does not posses past
avijnapti.
The Aryan possesses pure avijnapti, which constitutes his pure discipline, in the manner in which he who possesses the discipline arisen from dhyana possesses the avijnapti arisen from dhyana: he
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possesses his past and future avijnapti; but with the difference that, when in the first moment of the Way he takes possession of pure avijnapti for the first time, he cannot, evidently, possess pure avijnapti of the past.
21a-b. The person who is in a state of absorption, the person
who is placed in the Way, possesses avijnapti of the present 83
moment.
The person who is absorbed (samdbita), the person who is cultivating the Way (dryamdrgam samdpannah), possesses, at present, the avijnapti which is proper to him, arisen from dhyana, and pure. But when he leaves the absorption, he does not [possess this present avijnapti, for this avijnapti only accompanies an absorbed mind]
##*
As for the intermediary (madhyastha) [the person presently in neither-discipline-nor-undiscipline, who does not posses discipline like the Bhiksu, nor undiscipline like the transgressor:]
21b-c The intermediary, at the first moment, possesses, medially, avijnapti, when the avijnapti is produced.
Medially (madhya) means the present, situated between the past and the future.
Action {avijnapti) does not necessarily produce avijnaptiThe intermediary does not necessarily possess avijnapti: if there is avijnapti--either avijnapti created by an act of immorality (killing, etc), or avijnapti created by an act of morality (abstention from killing), or avijnapti is created by some other good or bad acts, the worship of a Stupa, hitting and wounding--he possesses this avijnapti, of the present, at the moment when it arises.
The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhatus.
7c. Avijnapti also exists in Rupadhatu.
"Also" that is to say: in Kamadhatu as well as in Rupadhatu; not in Arupyadhatu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the avijnapti is derived (iv. 6b). ] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the avijnapti which] is the discipline of the body and voice.
Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure avijnapti. Pwe avijnapti derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure avijnaptiln the. same way, when a person arisen in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu enters into an drupya absorption, he produces an avijnapti of
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? Arupyadhatu deriving from the primary elements of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
The case is not the same, for the pure avijnapti transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an avijnapti of Arupyadhatu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
Further, turning away from all rupa--since any idea of rupa is absent in it--an drupya absorption is not capable of producing an avijnapti, which is rupa.
The Vaibha? ikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kamadhatu; morality, consisting of avijnapti, of the realm of Rupadhatu is opposed to it. But the arupyas are removed from Kamadhatu by the four estrangements of dsraya,
prakara, ddlambana, pratipaksa (ii. 67; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 495c23). 7d. Vijnapti exists in the two spheres where there is vicara.
There is vijnapti, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of
41
"Also," in the spheres where there is no vicara, and "also" in Kamadhatu. ]
Such vijnapti does not exist in Kamadhatu, [where all defiled vijnapti is bad, not neutral. ]
This means that vijnapti of the anivrtavydkrta class exists only in the world of Brahma. It is reported that Mahabrahma produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahabrahma boasted falsely, in order to
42 avoid the inquires of the venerable Asvajit.
***
But if vocal avijnapti is absent above the First Dhyana, how can sound (sabdayatana) exist in the Second Dhyana and above?
Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, where there'isvicara (i. 32c, viii 7). 8a. The vijnapti termed nivrta is also missing in Kamadhatu.
{Nivrta signifies nivrta-avyakrta (ii. 66), defiled but neutral.
? It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements:
43 sound caused by the wind, etc. (i. lOb).
Other masters say: Vijnapti exists in the Second Dhyana and in the
following Dhyanas; it is there in the anivrtdvydkrta class, undefiled-
neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in
these Dhyanas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere,
by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled
Brahma? Why is the vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kamadhatu?
8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.
i. It is the mind associated with vitarka and vicara which gives rise to the vijnapti: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyana and above. (iv. 7d).
ii. The nivrtavydkrta mind gives rise to a vijnapti of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class "to be abandoned through Mediation. " (See p. 575 and foil. )
[In Kamadhatu, only the nivrtavydkrta mind is the mind associated with satkdyadrsti and with antagrdhadrsti,'] Thus, it does not give rise to vijnapti (ii. 67, v. 12).
***
Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (samutthapaka) to them--good or bad nature--that the dharmas are good or bad?
The dharmas are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (param- arthatas), in and of themselves (svabhavatas), through association
46 (samprayOgatas), and through their original cause (samutthanatas).
8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good
Nirvana, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-
47
and-happy; hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of
vijnapti. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and 44
the defiled mind has been abandoned.
But [the Vaibhasikas] defend the first opinion.
Why is the vijnapti, whatever it may be, absent above the world of
45
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? Chapter Four ________ .
sickness (Majjhima, i. 510).
8c-d The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of them-
48 selves.
The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.
9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc,] is good through association.
The dharmas, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.
9b. Actions, etc are good by reason of their original cause. Having their origin in dharmas good in and of themselves or good
through association, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, [the laksanas,] praptis, 49
nirodhasamdpatti, asamjnisamdpatti (ii. 35 and foil. ), are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.
How can praptis be good when they have their origin in a mind
50
which is not good?
9c Evil is the contrary.
The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:
1. Samsdra--or existence--has for its nature the process of all
suffering: it is thus perfealy unhappy, and so absolute evil
2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d)
are bad in themselves.
3. The dharmas associated with these principles are bad in
themselves.
4. Having their origin in the roots, etc, and in the dharmas
associated with these roots, etc, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, their charaaeristics (arising, etc. ) and the praptis of the bad dharmas, are bad by reason of their original cause.
? Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.
But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to samsdra: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?
From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure dharma which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii. 54), and the impure dharma which produces an agreeable retribu- tion, is called good
What is absolutely neutral?
9d. Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.
The two unconditioned things (asamskrta, i. 5), namely space and apratisamkhydnirodha, are, without ambiguity, neutral.
A difficulty. The Vaibhasikas teach that aaion, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition. ]The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal aaion (iv. 2b, 3d).
No, answer the Vaibhasikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the aaion, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain aaion, not any primary elements. ]
But, we should say, how will the avijnapti produced by absorption (iv. 6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the avijnapti and so does not think, "Let us create an avijnaptiV We cannot admit that the avijnapti produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the avijnapti produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhasikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii. 72a, trans, p. 315, vii. 45).
There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhasikas should resolve.
It has been said above (iv. 8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandonedthroughSeeingdoesnotgiverisetovijnaptiYettheBlessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad aaion, bad livelihood. " Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v. 4).
This Sutra does not contradia this theory. In faa
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10a-b. That which gives rise (samutthana) is of two types, which 1
are known as hetusamutthana and tatksanasamutthana^
Samutthana is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (hetu) and samutthana is hetusamutthana. What is samutthana at the very moment of the action is tatksanasamutthana.
lOc-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.
The hetusamutthana projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The tatksanasamutthana is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).
But what is [with regard to the action {vijnapti)] the efficacy done by the tatksanasamutthana which makes it the second mover?
If the tatksanasamutthana is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies. ]
[But if the vijnapti does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there vijnapti for a person free from a mind which
53
undertakes the discipline? (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 586a8).
[One will then have recourse to another explanation. ] The vijnapti is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the vijnapti, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.
lla-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.
The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the vijnapti, because it is the cause of the mental process {vitarka and vicara) which gives rise to the vijnapti It is not the second mover 1. ) because it no longer exists at the moment when the vijnapti takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2. ) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the rupa (that is, the vijnapti) created by it would also be abandoned by
? this Seeing; [in the same way that the vijnapti created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation. ] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i. 40c-d).
In fact, rupa (-vijnapti) is not contradicted either by vidya (correct knowledge), or by avidya (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be
54 abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.
[The Sautrantikas would answer that this affirmation, "Rupa is not contradiaed by vidya,"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of rtipa through Seeing would not admit that rupa is not contradiaed by vidya.
[The Vaibhasikas say: If the rupa (-vijnapti) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (dsraya) to this rupa, to this vijnapti, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral dharmas, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (klista, ii. 40c-d). ]
We deny this consequence. In faa, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the vijnapti (iv. 9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.
[The Vaibhasikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled dharma is not contradiaed either by vidya or by avidya.
[In faa, the undefiled dharma, either of the anivrtdvyakrta, undefiled-neutral class, or of the kuScdasdsrava, good-impure class, is not contradiaed by vidya, that is to say through the pure (andsrava) Path, as is the case for the defiled dharma which perishes by the faa that its prdpti is cut off by this said Path. . .
Hence the Sutra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing
ff
does not give rise to vijnapti, for this Sutra refers to false views
Karma yjl
? considered as agent. (Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 610c22)
llb-c The manas susceptible of being abandoned through
Meditation is twofold
The mental consciousness of the bhavanaheya category is at one and 55
the same time both agent and mover. lid. The five are solely mover.
The five vijndnakdyas, [visual consciousness, etc. ,] are solely mover,
56
[being free from reflexion (vikdpa, i. 33)]
There are thus four cases:
i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is
exclusively agent.
ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.
iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned
through Meditation is both promoter and mover.
iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.
***
Is the "mover" of the same [nature--good, bad, neutral--] as the agent?
There is no rule on this subject:
12a-b. From a good agent, etc. , a mover of three types.
A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.
58 12c With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.
With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.
12c Or good
Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral
agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the
59 teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminutioa
(Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 6l0a6)
57
? 60
According to other Schools, the mind of the Buddhas is never
neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sutra says, "The Naga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated"
The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks. ]But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral dharmas: dharmas of retribution (vipdkaja), dharmas related to attitudes (irydpatha), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nir- mdnacitta) (ii. 66).
We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral
61 12d That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.
The mind that has arisen from retribution (vipdkaja, i. 36, ii. 60, iv. 85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover. ]
Is the vijnapti good, bad, or neutral, 1.
) according to the character- istics of the agent, or 2. ) according to the characteristic of its mover?
To what does this question lead?
i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,--personalism, and past- and-future-of-the-personality--are the agent (iv. lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the vijnapti to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kamadhatu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv. 8b). ]If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv. Ua-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas satkayadrsti and the antdgrdhadrsti are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.
Second hypothesis. The vijnapti through which a person under- takes theJPratimoksa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind
ii. The Vaibhasikas answer. The vijnapti is of the same nature as its
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agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (vijnapti), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by victim and by vitarka, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (vijriapti) of the same nature.
iii. But if the action (vijnapti) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv. lOa-b) of the Sutra does not hold You have said in effect that the Sutra considers a "wrong view" (drsti) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of vijnapti, the Sutra contradias neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender vijnapti, nor its corollary that, in Kamadhatu, there is no vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sutra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (vijnapti), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.
This is enough on this point which has been defined above ( i l l , iv. 3d).
13a-b. Avijnapti is threefold, discipline {samvara), un-discipline (asamvara), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.
It is of three types, 1. ) samvara, discipline, so called because it constrains thefluxof immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2. ) asamvara, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv. 24c-d), and 3. ) naivasamvaranasamvara, [an avijnapti which has neither the characteristic of samvara nor asamvara. ]
13c-d Pratimoksa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from dhytina.
There are three types of discipline: 1. ) the discipline called
? Pratimoksa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kamadhatu, the morality of beings of this world; 2. ) the discipline produced through dhyana is morality of the sphere of Rupadhatu; and 3. ) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.
[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines? ]
14a. The Pratimoksa is of eight types.
It includes the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Bhiksuni, the Sik-
62
samana, the Sramanera (novice), the Sramanerika, the Upasaka
(pious layman, iv. 30), the Upasika, and the Upavasastha ("faster," iv. 28). These eight disciplines are the Pratimoksa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Pratimoksa is of eight types.
14b. In substance however, the Pratimoksa is of four types.
Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Sramanera, the Upasaka and the Upavasastha.
In fact, the discipline of the Bhiksuni does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhiksu; the discipline of the Siksamana and the Sramanerika do not differ from the discipline of the Sramanera; and the discipline of the Upasika does not differ from that of the Upasaka.
14c. The name changes with the gender.
Unga is vyanjana, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhiksu, Bhiksuni, etc. , differ.
When their gender is modified, the Bhiksu becomes a Bhiksuni; the Bhiksuni, a Bhiksu; the Sramanera, a Sramanerika; the Sramanerika, like the Siksamana, becomes a Sramanera; the Upasaka, an Upasika; and the Upasika, an Upasaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new
63
one; the change of gender cannot have this influence. Thus the four
female disciplines are indentical with the three male disciplines.
***
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? When the disciplines are undertaken successively,--Le. , the dis- cipline of the Upasaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Sramanera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhiksu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,--do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (virati, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?
I4d [The disciplines exist] separately.
They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all--Upasakas, Sramaneras and Bhiksus all renounce (virati) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors--the three dis- ciplines have some distinct characteristics.
Their differencs lie in the difference of the occasions (nidana) of
transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a
greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of
occasions of intoxication-pride (mada, ii. 33c-d) and of non-diligence
(pramadasthana, ii. 26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of
64
occasions of transgression, killing, etc
of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upasaka and Sramanera were integral to the discipline of a Bhiksu, then the Bhiksu who renounces the discipline of a Bhiksu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.
I4d. But they do not contradict one another.
They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does
65
not abandon the preceeding ones. Thus the fact that a Bhiksu who
renounces his quality of Bhiksu remains in possession of the discipline of Upasaka and Sramanera is explained. **
***
How does one become an Upasaka, an Upavasastha, a Sramanera, or a Bhiksu?
Consequently the three series
? 15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of
the eight, the ten, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the
67 quality of Upasaka, Upavasastha, Sramanera, and Bhiksu.
1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upasaka.
2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2.
stealing, 3. unchastity,4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents,garlands,
68
and unguents; dances, songs, music; 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8.
meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavasastha.
3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Sramanera. These make ten items, for one counts "scents, garlands, and unguents"separately from "dances, songs, and music"
4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhiksu.
***
The Pratimoksa discipline is
I6a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.
69
1. It is morality (Ma), because it redresses that which is "unjust,"
for transgressors condua themselves in an unjust manner with regard to beings. Etymologically, because it cools (ft), as it says in the stanza, "Happy is the undertaking of morality, because morality does not burn. "
2. Good condua, because it is praised by the wise.
3. Aaion (karma), because it is aaion (ktiya) by nature. Objection. Does not the Sutra say that avijnapti is "not doing"
(akarana) (see above p. 560, 562)? How can avijnapti be aaion? Without doubt, the avijnapti makes the disciple, endowed with shame, to abstain from transgression; it is thus "not doing. " But it is
aaion, according to the etymology kriyata iti kriya: it is doing (kriyate) 70
either by a bodily-vocal aaion (vijnapti), or by the mind (citta). According to others, avijnapti is aaion because it is the cause and the
Karma 583
? 71 effect of an action.
4. Discipline (samvara), because it disciplines or constrains the body and the voice.
***
The expression "Pratimoksa discipline" designates all Pratimoksa discipline since its origin.
I6c-d The Pratimoksa is the first vijnapti and the first avijnapti; these are courses of action (karmapatha).
1. The expression "Pratimoksa" designates the first vijnapti and the first avijnapti of the undertaking of the discipline.
The Pratimoksa is called prdtimokfa, for through it there takes 72
placepratimoksana, that is, the abandoning of transgression: such is the efficacy of the first moment (vijnapti and avijnapti) of the undertaking of discipline.
2. This vijnapti and avijnapti are also "Pratimoksa discipline" because they discipline the body and the voice.
3. They are courses of action, that is "courses of action properly so called" (maula, iv. 66).
There is no longer any Pratimoksa in the moment which follows
the first moment and in the moments which follow, for the
transgression is not rejected (pratimokfyate) by the second moment,
having been rejected (pratimoksita) by the first; there is prati- 75
moksasamvara, that is, discipline "of the Pratimoksa type" or discipline "arisen from Pratimoksa;" there are no longer courses of action properly so-called, but solely "consecutive action" (iv. 68).
***
Who possesses each of the three disciplines? 17a. Eight persons possess the Pratimoksa.
Eight persons, the Bhiksu, Bhiksuni. . . the Upavasatha, possess the Pratimoksa discipline.
Does this mean that non-Buddhists cannot possess a morality that
74 they have undertaken?
? They can possess a morality, but they cannot possess the Prati- moksa discipline. In fact, the morality that they undertake ("I shall abstain from killing," etc), rests on an idea of existence; even when they have in view, not a heavenly existence, but that which they call "deliverance" (moksa), they conceive of deliverance as a certain type of existence. Hence transgression is not absolutely "rejected" by them, nor can they be "released" through the discipline they have undertaken.
#**
17b. He who possesses dhyana possesses the discipline which arises from dhyana.
"Which arises from dhyana" (dhydnaja), that is, which arises from dhyana (ablative) or by means of dhyana (instrumental).
Dhyana, means not only the Four Principal (maula) Dhyanas, but also the absorptions which are close to them (samantaka, viii. 22a). In the same way, when one says, "There is a field of rice or a field of wheat in this village," one means the village and its environs.
***
75 17c. The Aryans possess pure discipline.
The Aryans,-^the Saiksas and Asaiksas,--possess pure discipline (iv. 26b-c).
**#
We have seen, in the definition of sahabhilhetu (ii. 51), that two disciplines "accompany the mind. " What are these two disciplines?
17d The last two disciplines are concomitants of the mind
The discipline that arises from dhyana and the pure discpline are concomitants of the mind; not of the Pratimoksa discipline, for this latter continues to exist in a person whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (anyacittacittaka, i. 11).
18a-b. Arising in the anantaryamargas, in anagamya, they are
76 called "abandoning. "
Karma 585
? In the nine dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya these two disciplines, the discipline of dhydna and pure discipline, are "abandoning disciplines" (prahdnasathvara^dbaLndomng and discipline), for through them one abandons immorality and the defilements which produce them (iv. l22a).
There are thus disciplines arisen from dhydna which are not abandoning-discipline. Four cases:
i. Discipline arising from dhydna, impure, with the exception of what arises from the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: discipline arisen from dhydna which is not abandoning;
ii. Pure discipline obtained in the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: abandoning, but not discipline arisen from dhydna;
iii. Impure discipline in the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: dis- cipline arisen from dhydna which is abandoning;
iv. Pure discipline arisen outside of the dnantafyamdrgas of andgamya: discipline not arisen from dhydna which is not abandoning.
According to the same principles, one would establish four cases relative to pure discipline which is not abandoning, to abandoning which is not pure discipline, etc (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 231al3)
***
The Blessed One said, "Good is discipline of the body, discipline of
77
the voice, discipline of the mind, discipline in all things;" and again,
78 "He lives disciplined through the discipline of the organ of sight. "
What is the nature of these two disciplines, discipline of the mind, and discipline of the organs?
Neither are, by their nature avijnapti of ? Ua. But on the contrary, 18c-d Discipline of the mind and discipline of the organs are,
each of them, two things: attentive consciousness and
79 mindfulness.
In order that the reader should not come to believe that the first
discipline is consciousness (samprajddna) and the second mindfulness 80
(smrti), the author says that each of them is two things. ***
? Let us examine who possesses vijnapti and avijnapti, and to what 81
period these belong in each case (iv. 19-22,23-24b).
19a-c He who is in Pratimoksa always possesses avijnapti of the present moment, as long as the does not rejea the avijnapti.
As we have said previously the person who dwells in the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. l4a), always possesses present avijnapti as long as he does not reject the avijnapti which constitutes this discipline (iv. 38).
19c-d. After the first moment, he also possesses avijnapti After the first moment, which is designated by the expression
Pratimoksa (iv. l6c-d), he also possesses earlier, past avijnapti: this of 82
course, as long as he does not rejea the discipline. As he who dwells in the Pratimoksa discipline,
20a. So too is he who dwells in undiscipline.
He who dwells in undiscipline (asamvarastha, iv. 24c-d), always possesses avijnapti of the present moment as long as he does not rejea it; [he also possesses avijnapti of the past, and from the second moment on, of undiscipline. ]
20b-c. He who possesses discipline arisen from dhyana always possesses past and future avijnapti.
He who possesses the discipline arisen from dhyana always possesses avijnapti of the past, and avijnapti of the future as long as he does not lose it, [for the avijnapti in question--namely the discipline arisen from dhyana--accompanies the mind (iv. l7d). ]
From the first moment when he acquires the discipline of dhyana, he takes possession of the discipline of former dhydnas, either of this existence, or of a previous existence, that he had lost.
20c-d The Aryan, at the first moment, does not posses past
avijnapti.
The Aryan possesses pure avijnapti, which constitutes his pure discipline, in the manner in which he who possesses the discipline arisen from dhyana possesses the avijnapti arisen from dhyana: he
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? 588 Chapter Four
possesses his past and future avijnapti; but with the difference that, when in the first moment of the Way he takes possession of pure avijnapti for the first time, he cannot, evidently, possess pure avijnapti of the past.
21a-b. The person who is in a state of absorption, the person
who is placed in the Way, possesses avijnapti of the present 83
moment.
The person who is absorbed (samdbita), the person who is cultivating the Way (dryamdrgam samdpannah), possesses, at present, the avijnapti which is proper to him, arisen from dhyana, and pure. But when he leaves the absorption, he does not [possess this present avijnapti, for this avijnapti only accompanies an absorbed mind]
##*
As for the intermediary (madhyastha) [the person presently in neither-discipline-nor-undiscipline, who does not posses discipline like the Bhiksu, nor undiscipline like the transgressor:]
21b-c The intermediary, at the first moment, possesses, medially, avijnapti, when the avijnapti is produced.
Medially (madhya) means the present, situated between the past and the future.
Action {avijnapti) does not necessarily produce avijnaptiThe intermediary does not necessarily possess avijnapti: if there is avijnapti--either avijnapti created by an act of immorality (killing, etc), or avijnapti created by an act of morality (abstention from killing), or avijnapti is created by some other good or bad acts, the worship of a Stupa, hitting and wounding--he possesses this avijnapti, of the present, at the moment when it arises.
