Objection
2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]).
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]).
Summa Theologica
.
.
Counsel is worthless, when the
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another. " Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another. " We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations. " Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy
mountain. " Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are
impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for
Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the
truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . .
fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with
the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the
contemplative life, e. g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the
active life, e. g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with
this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in
those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly
virtue. "
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to
their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for
this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in
heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely
subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the
matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life
they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they
will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the
case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according
as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of
glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something
that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with
the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes,
and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates
the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,"
of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every
man . . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous,"
which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the
mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of
fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in
the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of
confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to
knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void
of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he
adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the
fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he
says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy. " These
words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward
regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also
to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but
fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it
pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and
that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which
also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer
to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope
are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their
matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active
life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things
pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly
bliss.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in
their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that
which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of
man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12):
"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a
master, where is My fear? " Therefore it seems that fear, which is
mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is
profitable to all things. " Now a common good is preferable to
particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but
one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it
is set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than
the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than
fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the
gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz.
in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
with the lower gifts. "
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to
their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they
follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with
another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's
powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as
the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and
among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the
active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet
so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before
science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the
gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels
fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and
fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and
counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are
concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard
ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds
with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and
understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence
is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are
preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation,
so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as
though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of
generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16),
before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is
not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of
which he had said it "is profitable to little. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by
reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its
matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty
(Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all
matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason
are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in
relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason
transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on
the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive
power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because
counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while
knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel
together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
preference to knowledge and piety.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the
gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity:
"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but,
without charity, they avail nothing. " But charity is a virtue.
Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the
mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,
temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom;
against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of
heart, piety; against piety, fear. " Therefore the virtues are more
excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the
virtues cannot be used to evil purpose. " But it is possible to make
evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up
the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding,
while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it
multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives
confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and
yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from
the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly
alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair. " Therefore the virtues
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62],
A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some
intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby
man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby
reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other
hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to
be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,
by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as
the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i. e. the seven gifts, "never
attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in
faith, hope, and charity. "
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
than the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq. ) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq. , ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq. ).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.
Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e. g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope. " Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.
Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep. " Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth. " Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.
Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear. " Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God,
and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn.
3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we
shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him,
because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore these rewards refer to
the future life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These
promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete
change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us
after this life. "
I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of
these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom
in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and
some to the present life.
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future
happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having
a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by
way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future
happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope
that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and
another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the
beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness,
either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards,
may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or
some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have
attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life.
Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues
and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as
a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end:
yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to
that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I
have been helped. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo
temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so,
Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment. " The
Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is
divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that";
and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so
miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice. " In like manner,
although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material
rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in
this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a
hundred times as much" even "in this time. "
Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in
the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in
this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning
of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men.
The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the
soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
inheritance, signified by "the land. " They are "comforted" in this
life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i. e.
the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food
of which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him
that sent Me. " Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy. " Again,
the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to
speak, "see God. " Likewise, in this life, those who are the
"peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and
are called "the children of God. " Nevertheless these things will be
more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably
enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and
understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters
connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e. g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.
Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom. " Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.
Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek. " From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. [1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn. "
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice. " With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e. g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc. ; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful. "
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart. " But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e. g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e. g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]. " The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. " It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.
Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor. " The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger. " The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now. " The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you. " And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude. "
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Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.
Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good.
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another. " Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another. " We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations. " Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy
mountain. " Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are
impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for
Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the
truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . .
fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with
the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the
contemplative life, e. g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the
active life, e. g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with
this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in
those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly
virtue. "
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to
their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for
this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in
heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely
subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the
matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life
they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they
will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the
case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according
as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of
glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something
that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with
the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes,
and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates
the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,"
of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every
man . . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous,"
which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the
mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of
fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in
the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of
confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to
knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void
of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he
adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the
fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he
says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy. " These
words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward
regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also
to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but
fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it
pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and
that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which
also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer
to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope
are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their
matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active
life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things
pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly
bliss.
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Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in
their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that
which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of
man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12):
"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a
master, where is My fear? " Therefore it seems that fear, which is
mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is
profitable to all things. " Now a common good is preferable to
particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but
one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it
is set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than
the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than
fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the
gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz.
in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
with the lower gifts. "
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to
their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they
follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with
another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's
powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as
the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and
among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the
active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet
so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before
science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the
gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels
fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and
fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and
counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are
concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard
ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds
with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and
understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence
is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are
preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation,
so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as
though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of
generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16),
before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is
not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of
which he had said it "is profitable to little. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by
reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its
matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty
(Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all
matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason
are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in
relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason
transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on
the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive
power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because
counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while
knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel
together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
preference to knowledge and piety.
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Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the
gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity:
"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but,
without charity, they avail nothing. " But charity is a virtue.
Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the
mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,
temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom;
against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of
heart, piety; against piety, fear. " Therefore the virtues are more
excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the
virtues cannot be used to evil purpose. " But it is possible to make
evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up
the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding,
while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it
multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives
confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and
yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from
the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly
alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair. " Therefore the virtues
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62],
A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some
intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby
man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby
reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other
hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to
be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,
by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as
the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i. e. the seven gifts, "never
attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in
faith, hope, and charity. "
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
than the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
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OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
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Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq. ) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq. , ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq. ).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.
Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e. g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope. " Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
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Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.
Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep. " Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth. " Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.
Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear. " Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God,
and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn.
3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we
shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him,
because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore these rewards refer to
the future life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These
promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete
change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us
after this life. "
I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of
these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom
in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and
some to the present life.
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future
happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having
a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by
way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future
happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope
that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and
another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the
beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness,
either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards,
may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or
some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have
attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life.
Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues
and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as
a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end:
yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to
that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I
have been helped. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo
temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so,
Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment. " The
Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is
divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that";
and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so
miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice. " In like manner,
although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material
rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in
this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a
hundred times as much" even "in this time. "
Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in
the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in
this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning
of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men.
The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the
soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
inheritance, signified by "the land. " They are "comforted" in this
life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i. e.
the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food
of which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him
that sent Me. " Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy. " Again,
the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to
speak, "see God. " Likewise, in this life, those who are the
"peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and
are called "the children of God. " Nevertheless these things will be
more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
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Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably
enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and
understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters
connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e. g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.
Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom. " Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.
Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek. " From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. [1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn. "
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice. " With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e. g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc. ; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful. "
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart. " But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e. g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e. g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]. " The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. " It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.
Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor. " The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger. " The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now. " The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you. " And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude. "
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Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.
Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good.
