10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you.
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you.
Summa Theologica
infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be
traced. " Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above ([2386]FS, Q[71], A[6]; [2387]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the
more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than
ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach
Him, but is severed from Him.
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the
sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
further on ([2388]Q[20], A[3];[2389] Q[34], A[2], ad 2;[2390] Q[39],
A[2], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its
genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not
sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave
generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the
sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect
it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has
a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from
malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his
sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we
consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e. g.
adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer,
other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both
on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which
he insults by committing sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says:
"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin. " Now the life of unbelievers
consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.
Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
I answer that, As stated above ([2391]FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either
that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no
sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin.
Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously. "
Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct
the intention in respect of a connatural good.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural
reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in
them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth
of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to
give him fuller instruction in the faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not
on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several
species of unbelief, according to the various points which the
unbeliever disbelieves.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith
in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our
consideration.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different
species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a
diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species
of unbelief.
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith
is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
I answer that, As stated above ([2392]FS, Q[55], A[4]; [2393]FS, Q[64],
A[1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed
to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to
their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are
determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral
virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by
falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed
to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the
various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite
number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e. g. temperance or
fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the
various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the
rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held
evil to be infinite.
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number.
For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this
may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in
two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which
case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his
sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may
be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken
is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to
the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to
charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various
temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to
God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First
Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers
follow many false opinions.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of
unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many
things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many
things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet
nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief,
even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according
as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so
does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which
holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most
important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the
heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is
the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those
which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more
numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they
do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.
Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some
good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known
it, to turn back. " Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some
way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2394](A[5]), two things may be
considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from
this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins
more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins
more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the
unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of
the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however,
they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they
corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the
Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above [2395](A[1]) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere
absence of faith, for the latter as was stated [2396](A[1]) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely,
the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not
in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers. " But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone
ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once
been judged and disposed of. " Now all matters of faith have been
decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.
Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas
things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter
of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of
faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul increased
much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . .
. to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks. "
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the
faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though
he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as
being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is
praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or
for practice.
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence.
But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because
either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance,
Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or
else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those
countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is
necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those
who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in
this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers
are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to
withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would
tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as
a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed. " On the other
hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the
faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very
reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from
what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what
unbelievers have to say against the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid
disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious
words rather than of sound speeches.
Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about
the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not
as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending
the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy
everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in
you [*Vulg. : 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is
apparently taken from Bede]. " Sometimes again, it is necessary, in
order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That
he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the
gainsayers. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mat. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked
him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up? " and that he answered:
"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also
together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in
Matth. ): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it
is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily
slay many innocent persons. " Therefore it seems that for the same
reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can. , De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for
the future, none are to be compelled to believe. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing. " Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]):
"I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg. : 'of him that dieth']. "
Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
([2397]FS, Q[19], AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in. " Now men enter into the house
of God, i. e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because
to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled
by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder
the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even
by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's
faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of
forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and
take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if
they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of
Christ.
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil
what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to
forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears
from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent.
xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be
compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight
with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was
so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our
chains asunder. " Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer
both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which
precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also
together with it. " For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
"these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say,
when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he
has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of
discipline should not slacken. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith,
ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they
have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated
in the same chapter.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and
keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a
matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has
received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be
compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface
(Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel? '
They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards
taught Him. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to
have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he
had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers
together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her
maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb. ): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any
reservation. " Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with
him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to
do to judge them that are without? " Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate
with unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages
with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of
the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we
should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have
any dealings with them. "
I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be
gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? " and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within? "
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i. e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. "
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them. " Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward. " Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.
Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i. e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints? " Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no
means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply
with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall
away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an
unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to
acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any
capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve
to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into
children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i. e. born in slavery;
and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his
service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in
this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church,
she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have
enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of
liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to
those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in
temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in
order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He
could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are
free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving
scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their
masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be
blasphemed. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction
of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that
they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while,
remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their
whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything:
whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special
works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be
allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits
Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail
their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre
to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6.
Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by
such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them. " Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry. " But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret. , dist. xlv,
can. , Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed
to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers
have for ages observed them. "
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the
universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods
might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain
evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with
harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust. " Hence, though
unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on
account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which,
of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there
follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith,
and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this
reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e. g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over
children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease,
when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be
severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " And yet the marriage bond is broken
on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the
unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under
servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and
Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling
to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the
other partner is not bound to cohabitation. " Much more, therefore, does
unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over
their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against
their parents' will.
Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in
danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal
death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal
death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews
and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.
Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves
bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently
kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them
against their parents' wishes.
Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their
parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through
not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to
the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and
sounds not the trumpet. " Much more therefore, if Jewish children are
lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
could have baptized them and did not.
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not
be baptized against their parents' will.
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we
ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an
Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the
custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the
will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very
powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom
most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with
Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have
failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable.
It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the
children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in
contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from
its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like
a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse
belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when
he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a
son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.
Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before
coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents'
custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon,
however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to
belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters
concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be
induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it
can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its
parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it
is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it
is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children,
especially before they come to the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have
the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to
the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death
against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned
by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of everlasting death.
Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage,
which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he
can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of
the child in all matters relating to God.
Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of
preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of
preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made
thee a watchman to the children [Vulg. : 'house'] of Israel. " On the
other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals
xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is
derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of
that school which he deems best. " But choice is an act of the
appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end;
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. " Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong
to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util.
Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or follows false
and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that
he may lord and be honored above others. " Therefore heresy is a species
of pride rather than of unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies.
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth.
traced. " Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above ([2386]FS, Q[71], A[6]; [2387]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the
more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than
ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach
Him, but is severed from Him.
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the
sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
further on ([2388]Q[20], A[3];[2389] Q[34], A[2], ad 2;[2390] Q[39],
A[2], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its
genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not
sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave
generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the
sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect
it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has
a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from
malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his
sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we
consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e. g.
adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer,
other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both
on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which
he insults by committing sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says:
"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin. " Now the life of unbelievers
consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.
Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
I answer that, As stated above ([2391]FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either
that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no
sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin.
Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously. "
Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct
the intention in respect of a connatural good.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural
reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in
them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth
of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to
give him fuller instruction in the faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not
on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several
species of unbelief, according to the various points which the
unbeliever disbelieves.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith
in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our
consideration.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different
species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a
diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species
of unbelief.
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith
is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
I answer that, As stated above ([2392]FS, Q[55], A[4]; [2393]FS, Q[64],
A[1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed
to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to
their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are
determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral
virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by
falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed
to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the
various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite
number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e. g. temperance or
fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the
various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the
rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held
evil to be infinite.
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number.
For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this
may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in
two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which
case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his
sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may
be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken
is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to
the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to
charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various
temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to
God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First
Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers
follow many false opinions.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of
unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many
things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many
things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet
nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief,
even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according
as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so
does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which
holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most
important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the
heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is
the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those
which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more
numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they
do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.
Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some
good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known
it, to turn back. " Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some
way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2394](A[5]), two things may be
considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from
this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins
more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins
more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the
unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of
the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however,
they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they
corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the
Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above [2395](A[1]) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere
absence of faith, for the latter as was stated [2396](A[1]) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely,
the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not
in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers. " But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone
ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once
been judged and disposed of. " Now all matters of faith have been
decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.
Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas
things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter
of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of
faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul increased
much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . .
. to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks. "
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the
faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though
he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as
being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is
praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or
for practice.
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence.
But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because
either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance,
Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or
else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those
countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is
necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those
who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in
this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers
are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to
withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would
tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as
a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed. " On the other
hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the
faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very
reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from
what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what
unbelievers have to say against the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid
disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious
words rather than of sound speeches.
Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about
the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not
as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending
the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy
everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in
you [*Vulg. : 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is
apparently taken from Bede]. " Sometimes again, it is necessary, in
order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That
he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the
gainsayers. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mat. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked
him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up? " and that he answered:
"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also
together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in
Matth. ): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it
is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily
slay many innocent persons. " Therefore it seems that for the same
reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can. , De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for
the future, none are to be compelled to believe. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing. " Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.
Objection 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]):
"I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg. : 'of him that dieth']. "
Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
([2397]FS, Q[19], AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in. " Now men enter into the house
of God, i. e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because
to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled
by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder
the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even
by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's
faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of
forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and
take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if
they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of
Christ.
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil
what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to
forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears
from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent.
xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be
compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight
with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was
so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our
chains asunder. " Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer
both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which
precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also
together with it. " For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
"these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say,
when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he
has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of
discipline should not slacken. "
Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith,
ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they
have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated
in the same chapter.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and
keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a
matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has
received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be
compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface
(Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel? '
They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards
taught Him. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to
have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he
had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers
together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her
maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb. ): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any
reservation. " Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with
him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to
do to judge them that are without? " Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate
with unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages
with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of
the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we
should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have
any dealings with them. "
I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be
gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? " and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within? "
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i. e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. "
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them. " Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward. " Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.
Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i. e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints? " Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no
means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply
with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall
away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an
unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to
acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any
capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve
to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into
children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i. e. born in slavery;
and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his
service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in
this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church,
she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have
enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of
liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to
those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in
temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in
order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He
could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are
free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving
scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their
masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be
blasphemed. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction
of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that
they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while,
remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their
whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything:
whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special
works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be
allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits
Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail
their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre
to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6.
Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by
such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them. " Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry. " But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret. , dist. xlv,
can. , Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed
to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers
have for ages observed them. "
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the
universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods
might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain
evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with
harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust. " Hence, though
unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on
account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which,
of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there
follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith,
and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this
reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e. g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over
children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease,
when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be
severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " And yet the marriage bond is broken
on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the
unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under
servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and
Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling
to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the
other partner is not bound to cohabitation. " Much more, therefore, does
unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over
their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against
their parents' will.
Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in
danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal
death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal
death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews
and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.
Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves
bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently
kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them
against their parents' wishes.
Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their
parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through
not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to
the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and
sounds not the trumpet. " Much more therefore, if Jewish children are
lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
could have baptized them and did not.
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not
be baptized against their parents' will.
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we
ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an
Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the
custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the
will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very
powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom
most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with
Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have
failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable.
It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the
children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in
contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from
its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like
a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse
belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when
he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a
son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.
Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before
coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents'
custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon,
however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to
belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters
concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be
induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it
can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its
parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it
is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it
is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children,
especially before they come to the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have
the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to
the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death
against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned
by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of everlasting death.
Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage,
which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he
can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of
the child in all matters relating to God.
Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of
preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of
preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made
thee a watchman to the children [Vulg. : 'house'] of Israel. " On the
other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals
xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is
derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of
that school which he deems best. " But choice is an act of the
appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end;
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. " Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong
to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util.
Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or follows false
and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that
he may lord and be honored above others. " Therefore heresy is a species
of pride rather than of unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies.
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth.
