No More Learning

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the first moment of Consciousness is the sense-Certainty. it tries to grasp reality as one that is immediately sensorially given. evidently, the greek world, as historical, is sensorially given too. But, in so far as the sense-Certainty cannot grasp its reality as a unity, forcing Consciousness to make the transition into Perception and Understanding, the unity of the polis escapes the multitude of ethical relations in which it appears so that, consequently, Perception and Understanding must be understood as moments of the polis. Perception's "[t]hing with many properties" can be found again twice: as the unity of the family appearing in the multitude of family members and as the unity of the state appearing in the multi- tude of citizens. Understanding appears in the laws underlying the unity of the family and that of the state: the law of the family (or the divine law) and the law of the state (or the human law). the distinction hegel makes at the level of Understanding between the first and the second law of Understanding (PhSp, 96) returns in the polis. from out of the objec- tifying perspective of Consciousness, the law of the state appears as the "eternal" law, remaining the same (the first law of Understanding). from out of this objectifying perspective, the law of the family (whose further development we will see later) appears as the second law of Understand- ing: "like becomes unlike and unlike becomes like" (PhSp, 96). As the sup- plier of citizens, the family is the presupposition of the law of the state. to fulfill this position, it must make the unlike (the natural individuals) like: it must educate the natural individuals to citizens. in this way, the like becomes unlike: the natural individual is split up into the natural indi- vidual and the citizen.
from the perspective of the Consciousness, there is no question of deed in pregnant sense, indeed. the content of the law of the state and the goal of education are fixed. this changes, however, if the polis is consid- ered from the perspective of Self-consciousness. from this perspective, the law is not something given in reality, but is grounded in a pure self. in the second chapter of the Phenomenology, hegel develops the conditions under which the pure self can really exist. it exists not in relation to the natural reality that is immediately given (s. Desire), but only within the framework of society. he expresses this societal order in the metaphor of the master/servant relation. 12 the pure self can only be real as servant, i. e. , as the servant of the societal order, which is the master.
12 translated as: "lordship and Bondage. "
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in this context, it is not necessary to develop elaborately the transition from the pure self into the master/servant relation (lordship and Bond- age). We need only to understand that the basic thought underlying the master/slave relation is an Aristotelian one. man is a free being because he is able to produce a second nature. the state is the reality in which not the laws of nature are valid but the laws posed by the people themselves. therefore, the submission to the state (the serving of the master) is not a submission to a foreign power, but an act of freedom: it is self-submission to free human essence.
it is important not to understand the master/servant relation as a his- torical relation, as an act of recognition that leads to the constitution of a societal order. Rather, the relation is an explicitation of the being of the pure self. the reality of the pure self can only be understood in relation to an objective reality that can be considered as self-expression of the pure self: it is a state order recognized by the self as the expression of the self's pure essence. moreover, it is of importance that hegel shows that this recognition presupposes that the servant has experienced the fear of death. this experience must also not be understood as factual in time (i. e. , as if there is first the experience of the fear of death and, con- sequently, the decision to submit as servant). here, again, the experience is an explicitation of logical presuppositions. Without body the pure self cannot be real. this, however, does not imply that the self is determined by its body--this would destroy its purity. therefore, the pure self must not only experience that it is explicitly distinguished from its body, but also that it can express itself in its body. hegel combines the experience of the distinction between the pure self and the body with the fear of death. in the fear of death, the self experiences its body in the power of an abso- lute master (death), so that it is no longer in the power of the pure self. Precisely because the body is caught in a foreign power, the pure self can experience it as distinguished from itself. therefore, the fear of death is not an experience that shows what it means to die. Rather, it is a kind of victory over death. in the fear of death, the pure self experiences itself to be with itself because it distinguishes itself from its body as such. the pure self learns to understand itself as the body that is brought into the unity of the concept. As this pure concept, the pure self is not mortal itself.
At the moment the body dies, it seems to be disproved that the pure self is the essence of its body (and other nature). the certainty that the pure self was thought to have was only a subjective, internal certainty that, in the end, is refuted by the facts when it comes to the point where the pure self is not able to express itself as the essence of its body. this changes,
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however, when the pure self knows its essence to be represented by the master. in the master, the pure self is recognized as the absolute ground of society. this recognition is practically expressed if all serve the master as servant, i. e. , if all express the law of society in their actions. then, the pure self gets an institutional, immortal body in the organism of society.
the master/slave relation is transformed in the relationship of stoicism when the servant can identify himself with the master. the cultivation the servant has undergone in his serving has resulted in a reality that no lon- ger seems to have secrets for the servant. the distinctions in the servant's thinking seem to coincide immediately with the distinctions of reality. in his thoughts, the servant supposes to have become immediately the master of reality. it is exactly this form of stoicism that characterizes the consciousness of the citizens in the polis, as long as "no deed has been committed. " At this stage, actions have not been developed into deeds in the pregnant sense: "the action is the transition from thought to actuality merely as the movement of an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have no particular, distinctive content and no essentiality of their own" (PhSp, 281). in this acting, the pure self disappears behind its historical expression in the specific historic law of the polis.
7. Return of the Suppressed: the Divine law as expression of the Pure Self
Although the actions of the citizens according the human law of the polis are free (the law is a product of human freedom), this freedom is not yet expressed as such in human law. the purity of the free self, the free- dom that makes it possible to realize oneself in many ways, remains hid- den behind the factual realization in the ruling human law. this means that the citizen only appears as an instrument of the state. Ultimately, the state can ask the citizen to sacrifice his life for the salvation of the state. this does not do justice to the inward freedom of the citizen, to his pure self that makes him a member of an absolute, supra-temporal order, which is distinct from the worldly order of the state. this is a blessing for the state because it does not need to fear the subversion of its authority by the pure self.
if the pure self is not expressed at all in the polis, the pure self would be no more than a void illusion. maintaining that the human law is an expression of human freedom would cease to have any meaning. As a result, the law would only exist and could have a natural as well as a
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divine origin. the human origin of the human law can only be under- stood if this freedom belongs to the reality of the polis. According to hegel, in the greek world, it is not the state but the family that does jus- tice to the pure self.
the family is not dealing with citizens but with real individuals, which it keeps alive and educates to become citizens. Also, these activities seem to have nothing to do with the individual's participation in the pure self. this changes, however, with the death of the individual. for the state, the death of the individual is a relative loss, the loss of one of its many citi- zens. Conversely, for the family, the death of the individual is an absolute loss. Because the family has to educate its members to their ethical role, it principally does justice to them as free individuals, i. e. , as individuals who participate in the pure self. the submission to the ethical role is essen- tially self-submission.
the absolute loss of the family leads to a process of experience, which is structured like the Unhappy Consciousness. the absolute essence of the deceased individual can only be held in the memory of the family and is thus separated from the objective world. this separation denies the abso- luteness of its essence. therefore, the family searches for the dead one in the real world. however, it can only find the body of the lost individual. in its "work," i. e. , in the burying of the body, the family tries to reunite the dead body, by sacrificing its corporeality (the body is given back to "the bosom of the earth" (PhSp, 271)), with its absolute essence. this re-union, however, is the result of the family's actions. in its entombing of the dead family member, the family does justice to the pure self of the deceased. this justice, however, gets no place in the real world. the deceased, who is honored by the family, has taken a place in the underworld. individual and community, the right of the pure self and the right of the citizens of the state, do not need to be opposed. hegel formulates the deceased's right of entombing as the family's duty, i. e. , as the Divine law that is valid alongside the human law.
8. the Abstract Work of Art: the Representation of the Pure Self in the Public Domain
the definite banishment of the pure self to the underworld will fail. the pure and real self are internally united. this internal bond will inevi- tably lead to the penetration by the pure self of the public conscious- ness and, consequently, to the undermining of the state's stability. the moments of the pure self, the coming to self-consciousness at the level
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of family in a process of experience that was structured in the form of Unhappy Consciousness, cannot remain hidden from the public con- sciousness. the decline of the polis, however, can, for the time being, be postponed because these moments are not expressed in the form of self- consciousness but in the form of representation, i. e. , as the works of the abstract art. the moments are represented as absolute works of art that have their own existence beside the statue and the temple that originally represent the harmonic unity of the polis. the pure self that exists for the family beside the objective world (as the subjective memory of the deceased) returns in the public consciousness in the form of the abstract works of art.
the penetration by the pure self of the public consciousness is done justice by hegel when he says that the sculptor does not recognize the activity of his actions in the statue. 13 the sculptor objectifies his pathos in the statue, like the citizen objectifies his pathos in the human law. the pathos of the artist, however, is not identical with its expression in the work of art but also encompasses the moment of freedom. the self of the artist has dissociated itself from its being immediately determined by the substance. the work of art is, as we have seen earlier, the result of the struggle between the pure activity of the artist and his pathos. insofar as the sculptor does not recognize his activity in the work, the work as well as the polis it represents loses its absolute status.
the substance of the polis can regain an absolute representation if the activity of the artist is also represented in the work. According to hegel, this happens in the hymn, the second form of the abstract work of art he discusses. At this level, the god is represented in the medium of the expressed language. in this medium, the work of art remains, in its objectivation, bound to the self. therefore, the separation between the self and the substance has been avoided. the hymn is not a thing like a statue or a temple which, once produced, keeps the activity of the self out- side itself. the hymn only exists in and by the performance of the people. here, the religious self-consciousness is "pure thought, or the devotion whose inwardness in the hymn has at the same time an outer existence" (PhSp, 430).
the reverse side of this alliance between the existence of the work of art and the activity of the self is that the existence of the work of art
13 "Since his work comes back to him simply as joyfulness, he does not find therein the painful labour of making himself into an artist, and of creation, nor the strain and effort of his work" (PhSp, 429).
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is fleeting. the hymn is, in hegel's terminology "a vanishing existence" (PhSp, 432). the work's objectivity is too much confined in the self and, therefore, "falls short of attaining a lasting shape and is, like time, no longer immediately present in the very moment of its being present" (PhSp, 432).
now it becomes clear what hegel implicitly already indicated by using the term "Devotion. " in the hymn, the theoretical moment of the Unhappy Consciousness is objectified. in the hymn, the god is represented as an unchanging but impalpable being. the unhappiness of the Unhappy Con- sciousness is due to the contradiction in which it is involved. Because its 'god' remains impalpable, i. e. , it does not appear in the real world, this 'god' is (negatively) determined by the real world and, therefore, is not absolute. to rescue the absoluteness of this 'god', the Unhappy Conscious- ness looks for its reality. hegel illustrates this search with the example of the medieval crusades that tried to find the reality of god in the holy land. the crusaders, however, only found a grave (no real self has an eternal life). Consequently, the Unhappy Consciousness makes a second attempt to reconcile the absolute self with the real world. By sacrificing its real self, it tries to become unified with the pure self. if, however, the Unhappy Consciousness succeeds in overcoming its real self, the Consciousness itself appears to be the absolute essence of the real self.
the development of the abstract work is structured in accordance with the Unhappy Consciousness: the pure self that is represented in the hymn must be reconciled with the real world. in the abstract Cult, the third form of the abstract work, the real self is raised "into being the pure divine element" (PhSp, 433) by ritual actions: "a soul that cleanses its exterior by washing it, and puts on white robes, while its inward being traverses the imaginatively conceived path of works, punishments, and rewards, the path of spiritual training in general, i. e. of ridding itself of its particularity, as a result of which it reaches the dwellings and the community of the blest" (PhSp, 433).
like the search for the real self that is divine, the attempts of the abstract Cult will fail. the ritual actions cannot really change the real self into a divine self. therefore, a second attempt has to be made in the actual Cult, the fourth form of the abstract work. the actual Cult is the action that can be understood as a spiritual movement, "because it is this twofold process, on the one hand, of superseding the abstraction of the divine Being (which is how devotion determines its object) and making it actual, and, on the other hand, of superseding the actual (which is how the doer determines the object and himself) and raising it into universality" (PhSp, 433/4). the
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central action of the actual Cult is an act of sacrifice. on the one hand, the divine Being is sacrificed: "the animal sacrificed is the symbol of a god; the fruits consumed are the living Ceres and Bacchus themselves" (PhSp, 434). on the other hand, the actual is sacrificed to divine Being: "with the pure surrender of a possession which the owner, apparently without any profit whatever to himself, pours away or lets rise up in smoke" (PhSp, 434). the result of these sacrifices is the transformation of the divine Being "into self-conscious existence, and the self has conscious- ness of its unity with the divine Being" (PhSp, 435).
in the unity of self and divine Being, the devotion is "robbed of its outer existence. " the Cult replaces this defect and "produces a dwelling and adornments for the glory of god" (PhSp, 435). once again, it appears that the labour in which the self sacrifices itself for the god ultimately shows that the real self is the essence of god: "the dwellings and halls of the god are for the use of man, the treasures preserved therein are his own in case of need; the honour and glory enjoyed by the god in his adornment are the honour and the glory of the nation, great in soul and in artistic achievement" (PhSp, 435).
9. the Polis as a harmonic Unity
in the previous paragraph, we saw that the loss of family members resulted in a dialectic movement structured according the Unhappy Conscious- ness. As a result of this movement, the family appeared as the essence of the pure self. the pathos of the family is expressed in the Divine law. the duty of the Divine law guarantees that the pure self of the deceased member remains preserved in the memory of the family. in this sense, the Divine law is, so to say, the institutional house of the pure self that is distinguished from the domain of the state.
the separation between human and Divine law seemed to protect the state from the undermining force of the pure self. the pure self, how- ever, is the presupposition of the freedom of the state's citizen. therefore, the penetration by the pure self of the public consciousness cannot be prevented; this penetration can only be postponed by representing the relation between citizen and polis in works of art, i. e. , as the fixed rela- tion between statue and temple. As a product of the artist, however, the work of art also presupposes the pure self and is, itself, undermined in its absoluteness. to repair the absoluteness of the work, the pure self is represented in its turn as an abstract work of art, structured according the
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moments of the Unhappy Consciousness. this time, the result of the dia- lectic movement shows the state as the appearance of the pure self. the pathos of the state (expressed in the human law) is no longer separated from the pathos of the family, but is explicitly understood as the realiza- tion of the pure self.
now the polis can be conceptualized as a harmonic unity in which all the moments of Reason are objectified. the pure self that is institutional- ized in the family relates to the objective world of the state in which it can recognize its own essence. if the relation is theoretically considered, it appears as the reality of the observing reason: "What observation knew as a given object in which the self had no part, is here a given custom, but a reality which is at the same time the deed and the work of the subject finding it. " (PhSp, 276) from a practical perspective, it is the reality of the practical reason:
the individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality, finds it in the family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation. or, again, it is in know- ing that the law of his own heart is the law of all hearts, in knowing the consciousness of the self as the acknowledged universal order; it is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sacrifice, what brings about what it sets out to do, viz. to bring forth the essence into the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life. (PhSp, 276/7)
from a totalizing perspective, it is the reality of the matter in hand:
finally, consciousness of the 'matter in hand' itself finds satisfaction in the real substance which contains and preserves in a positive manner the abstract moments of that empty category. that substance has in the ethical powers, a genuine content that takes the place of the insubstantial com- mandments which sound Reason wanted to give and to know; and thus it gets an intrinsically determinate standard for testing, not the laws, but what is done. (PhSp, 277)
10. Repression of the Deed: the living Work of Art
the harmonic unity of the polis is only guaranteed when the citizens com- mit no deeds in the pregnant sense: their actions have to be in accor- dance with the prevailing human law. this guarantee fails, however, at the moment that the human law is understood as an expression of the pure self. the pure self is basically a free self that is able to commit any action or, at least, actions that are not in accordance with the prevailing human law. therefore, the harmony of the polis is dependent on restric-
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tive conditions that must be imposed on possible actions. these condi- tions can be specified for the different relations that the free individual can take upon himself towards the polis, i. e. , they can be specified for the different moments of the objectified Reason that compose the polis. We will see that these conditions are represented in the living and the spiritual works of art.
in the living work of art, the first moment of the objectified Reason, i. e. , the observing Reason, is represented as an absolute, everlasting relation- ship. At this level, the statue is unified with its precondition, the pure self, and has developed into a "living statue" expressed by living individuals. the two forms of living art represent, respectively, the Divine and the human law as separated entities. in this separation, the external, theo- retical relationship between the laws is reflected, which characterizes the form of the observing Reason.
We have seen that the Divine law is the "house" of the pure self. By means of the Divine law, the pure self is given an institutional body. the pure self and its incorporation, mind and body, are represented in "the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus" (PhSp, 438). Ceres stands for the feminine principle of the body: the "simple essence as the movement, partly out of its dark night of concealment up into conscious- ness, there to be its silently nourishing substance; but no less, however, the movement of again losing itself in the nether darkness, and lingering above only with a silent maternal yearning.
" (PhSp, 437) Bacchus stands for the masculine principle of the mind. As the "moving impulse" he is:
[n]othing but the many-named divine light of the risen Sun and its undis- ciplined tumultuous life which, similarly let go from its [merely] abstract Being, at first enters into the objective existence of the fruit, and then, sur- rendering itself to self-consciousness, in it attains to genuine reality--and now roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the untamed revelry of nature in self-conscious form. (PhSp, 437/8)
the human law is the mediated "house" of the pure self, in which its medi- ated existence as citizen has been given a second nature in the objective institutional body of the state. this mediated unity of mind and body is represented in the athlete of the olympic games, the "inspired and living work of art that matches strength with its beauty; and on him is bestowed, as a reward for his strength, the decoration with which the statue was honoured, and the honour of being, in place of the god in stone, the high- est bodily representation among his people of their essence. " (PhSp, 438) in the representation of the athlete, it becomes clear how the religious
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consciousness regulates the actions of the free citizen (and postpones the decay of the polis). the freedom of the citizen remains encased in natural boundaries: mind and body appear as strength and beauty, i. e. , as culti- vated nature.
11. the Representation of the Deed: the Spiritual Work of Art
At the level of the practical reason, however, the citizen cannot accept boundaries that are set by an external, natural world. the practical rea- son wants to relate itself to an external world that it can recognize as the result of is own action. therefore, this world can only be a social world. this is illustrated by the moments of the practical reason as they appear in the harmonic unity of the polis.
the first moment of the practical reason, Pleasure and Necessity, con- sidered within the harmonic unity of the polis, is described by hegel as follows: "the individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individual- ity, finds it in the family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation. " (PhSp, 276) if, however, the individual becomes aware of his pure freedom, he will no longer accept the self-consciousness of the human law and will resist it as a strange necessity. once again, the stability of the polis is threatened. to ward off this threat, the moment of Pleasure and Necessity is represented as an absolute relation in the first form of the spiritual work of art, namely, the Epic.
in the spiritual work of art, the representation of the pure self is no longer separated from the representation of its objective expression like in the living work of art. 14 in the spiritual work, the self is represented as the self expressing itself. therefore, speech is its medium: "the perfect element in which inwardness is just as external as externality is inward is once again speech . . . " (PhSp, 439) At the level of the Epic, however, the self that expresses the speech, the minstrel, is still distinguished from the self that is expressed in the speech. What is expressed is "mnemosyne, recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of essence that formerly was directly present" (PhSp, 441). here, hegel is making reference to homer's iliad. in this work, the expression of the self is still the result of the synthetic representation of the minstrel: "it
14 "in the Bacchic enthusiasm it is the self that is beside itself, but in corporeal beauty it is spiritual essence" (PhSp, 439).
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is no longer the actual practice of the Cult, but a practice that is raised, not yet indeed into the notion, but at first into picture-thinking, into the synthetic linking-together of self-consciousness and external existence. " (PhSp, 440)
in the epic, Pleasure is represented by human action, i. e. , the actions of the heroes. the actions of the heroes, however, are managed by the gods:
the universal powers have the form of individuality and hence the principle of action in them; what they effect appears, therefore, to proceed entirely from them and to be as free an action as that of men. Consequently, both gods and men have done one and the same thing. the earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since they are in fact the powers or strength of the individuality performing the action; while the exertions and labour of the latter is an equally useless effort, since it is rather the gods who manage everything. (PhSp, 441/2)
however, over the many gods hovers the universal self, the might of neces- sity. "they are the universal, and the positive, over against the individual self of mortals which cannot hold out against their might; but the uni- versal self, for that reason, hovers over them and over this whole world of picture-thinking to which the entire content belongs, as the irrational void of necessity . . . " (PhSp, 443)
As long as the universal self of necessity remains undetermined, it remains unclear how the unity of society can be concretized. therefore, the empty self of necessity has to be transformed into the determined law of society. We have already seen how the polis can exist as the harmonic unity of two laws, the human and the Divine. this harmony is guaranteed insofar as the Divine laws restricts itself to the underworld so that its action does not interfere with the action of the human law, i. e. , when "no deed has been committed. " in this case, all can accept the human law so that there is no need for "the law of the heart" to be revealed as "the frenzy of self-conceit. " the law of the heart can be understood as a constituting moment of the harmonic totality of the polis: "or, again, it is in knowing that the law of his own heart is the law of all hearts, in know- ing the consciousness of the self as the acknowledged universal order. " (PhSp, 276)
Principally, however, the deed is unavoidable because the pure self of the family and the real self of the polis do not immediately coincide. (their reciprocal relation has to be developed). this is exemplarily illus- trated by Creon's ban to entomb Polynices, who sacrificed the interest of the state for his own interest. the clash between the two laws is post- poned because in the Tragedy their ultimate harmony is represented as an absolute one.
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this appeal to the tragedy seems to be strange because hegel also describes the "deed" and the decline of the harmonic unity of the polis in terms of the Tragedy, in particular, Sophocles' Antigone. in the tragedy, however, the clash between the two laws is accompanied by a process that hegel calls the "depopulation of heaven. " (PhSp, 449) it is this pro- cess that, for the time being, can retain the appearance of harmony.
first, the "Chorus of the elders" representing the people praises a mul- titude of gods: "lacking the power of the negative, it is unable to hold together and so subdue the riches and varied abundance of the divine life, but lets it all go its own separate ways, and in its reverential hymns it extols each individual moment as an independent god, first one and then another. " (PhSp, 444) the clash between the two laws, however, is reflected in the religious representation:
if, then, the ethical substance, in virtue of its notion, split itself as regards it content into powers which were defined as divine and human law, or law of the nether and of the upper world--the one of the family, the other the State power, the first being the feminine and the second the masculine character--similarly, now, the previously multiform circle of gods with its fluctuating characteristics confines itself to these powers which are thereby brought closer to genuine individuality. (PhSp, 445)
Both characters--the actor of the human law and the actor of the divine law--are one-sided: they only know the content of their own law. there- fore, their consciousness is intrinsically connected with the side of not- knowing.
therefore, the two sides of consciousness which have in actuality no sepa- rate individuality peculiar to each receive, when pictorially represented, each its own particular shape: the one, that of the revelatory god, the other, that of the furies who keep themselves concealed. in part, both enjoy equal honour, but again, the shape assumed by the substance, Zeus, is the neces- sity of the relation of the two to each other. (PhSp, 447/8)
in the "deed," the one-sidedness of the ethical powers becomes manifest, resulting in the decay of these powers:
the action, in being carried out, demonstrates their unity in the natural15 downfall of both powers and both self-conscious characters. the reconcilia- tion of the opposition with itself is the lethe of the underworld in death; or the lethe of the upper world as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness
15 'natural' is the translation of 'gegenseitig'. A better translation would have been 'reciprocal'.
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cannot deny its guilt, because it committed the act),16 but from the crime; and also the peace of mind following atonement for the crime. (PhSp, 448)
the downfall of the ethical powers is reflected in the completion of the depopulation of heaven.
the self-consciousness that is represented in the tragedy, knows and acknowledges, therefore, only one supreme power, and this Zeus only as the power of the state or of the heart, and in the antithesis belonging to knowing [of knower and known], only as the father of the particular that is taking shape in the knowing; and also as the Zeus of the oath and the furies, the Zeus of the universal, of the inner being dwelling in concealment. (PhSp, 449)
Self-consciousness, which has kept Zeus as its only god, has lost its spe- cific content. Zeus has become the representation of the pure form of self-consciousness. therefore, self-consciousness is no longer able to res- cue the ethical substance by sacrificing its self-conscious action. the pure self is explicitly separated from the contingent reality. the third moment of the practical reason, Virtue and the way of the world, ceases being a constituting moment of the reality of the polis. 17 Self-consciousness, "the simple certainty of self, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, of substantial being and of abstract necessity; it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. " (PhSp, 449/50) this negative power of self- consciousness is represented in the Comedy: "the self-consciousness of the hero must step forth from his mask and present itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as being no longer separated from the chorus, from the universal consciousness" (PhSp, 450).
in contrast to the self of the gods, the self of self-consciousness is not imagined. moreover, the self of self-consciousness is not dependent on a substantial being: it is only involved in a substantial power insofar as it acts its part by putting on its mask. But the self "quickly breaks out again from this illusory character and stands forth in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the genuine self, the actor, or from the spectator. " (PhSp, 450) this play between the self of the mask and the genuine self is the exhibition of "the ludicrous contrast
16 A better translation would have been 'deed'.
17 We have already seen how hegel characterized Virtue and the way of the world as a constituting moment of the polis: "it is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sacrifice, what brings about what it sets out to do, viz. to bring forth the essence into the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life" (PhSp, 276).
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between [the self's] own opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its common- ness. " (PhSp, 451)
the self that has emancipated itself from the ethical substance is the free self with the capacity for reasonable thinking. 18 its gods are no longer coincidental individualities that reflect the divers powers in the ethical world. Reasonable thinking develops the individualities of the gods into the simple ideas of the Beautiful and the good in which return, at the highest level of abstraction, the divine and human laws. (in the Beautiful the individual gets a universal meaning and in the good the community encompasses the interests of the individuals). insofar as the gods have a natural side, "they are clouds,19 an evanescent mist, like those imaginative representations. " (PhSp, 451/2)
Because of their abstractness, the thoughts of the Beautiful and the good are empty so that any individual has the opportunity to give them his or her own meaning and make them the result of his or her coinciden- tal, contingent individuality.
therefore, the fate which up to this point has lacked consciousness and consists in an empty repose and oblivion, and is separated from self- consciousness, this fate is now united with self-consciousness. the individ- ual self is the negative power through which and in which the gods, as also their moments viz. existent nature and thoughts of their specific character vanish. At the same time, the individual self is not the emptiness of this disappearance but, on the contrary, preserves itself in this very nothingness, abides with itself and is the sole actuality. (PhSp, 452)
Conclusion
the religion of the work of art is the religion of freedom in its immediate form. it is the religion of the ancient greek people that has objectified the free self in the polis: the polis is the concrete totality of all moments of the free self. in the immediate form of the polis, however, freedom as such (i. e. , the free self in its pure form) is not objectified. the pure self is
18 J. heinrichs, Die Logik der 'Pha? nomenologie des Geistes', Bonn: Bouvier Verlag her- bert grundmann 1974. he thinks that the transition of the greek religion into reasonable thinking corresponds to the transition from Unhappy Consciousness to Reason, see p. 441. however, we have seen that reason is already represented by the living and the spiritual work of art.
19 here, of course, hegel is referring to Aristophanes' Comedy, The Clouds.
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the hidden presupposition of the polis. the reality of the polis is only a specific historical form of the polis that exists beside a multitude of other poleis. in the struggle between the poleis, each polis can become ruined. their decay appears as an external power, as the empty self of fate. in fact, the decay of the polis is caused by an internal power, i. e. , by the penetration of the ethical life of the polis by the pure self.
the development of the polis is the process in which the empty self of fate is recognized as the pure self of the real individual. the pure self will be understood as the fate of ethical life. in the end, the only reality is the reality of the contingent self that knows that in its part as persona, it is the master of this reality.
the development of the polis is an ongoing learning process that is performed by means of religious representations: all the constituting moments of the ethical life, the moments of the free self, are successively represented by a work of art. 20 this representation mediates a raising of the conscious, which results in the explication of the pure self as the pre- supposition of the polis. 21 At this point, the decay of the polis is over.
the religion of the work art first appears at the moment the pure self of the individual threatens to penetrate the public domain of the polis. the decay of the polis is warded off by representing the relation between individual and community as an absolute and harmonious relation: in the representation of the statue of the god and the temple. the statue and the temple, however, cannot repress the pure self because they only represent the objective appearance of individual and community, not the free activ- ity that is presupposed by them. therefore, the pure self is represented
20 Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion. he interprets the abstract, living and spiritual works of arts as historical stages of the religion of the work of art (see p. 208). Although within the development of the spiritual work of art there seems to be some chronological succession, the religious forms represent the moment of the polis which are real at the same time. therefore, it is not necessary that the logical development totally coincides with a chronological one.
21 R. Bubner, "Die ? Kunstreligion? als politisches Projekt der moderne" in A. Arndt e. a. (hg) Hegel Jahrbuch 2003, Glauben und Wissen. Erster Teil, p. 310: "Die generalformel einer entwicklung der Substanz zum Subjekt erzeugt in der spezifischen Anwendung auf das Religionskapitel, das wir diskutierten, die eigentu? mlichkeit, dass in der griechischen leb- ensform das Substantielle eingeu? bter, weitergereichter und durch tradition besta? tigter Sittlichkeit bereits durch a? sthetische transformation vom Ansichsein zum fu? rsichsein emporgehoben ist. " ("the general formula of the substance's development into Subject produces, as we discussed, in its specific use in the Religion Chapter the characteristic that in the greek form of life the substantial of the practiced, passed and by tradition affirmed ethical life is already sublated from being-in-itself into being-for-itself by aesthetic trans- formation. ")
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as an absolute being in the abstract work of art. the development of the abstract work of art results in the living work of art in which the represen- tation of the pure self is immediately united with its reality: in the athlete of the olympic games, the statue of god has become a living god.
in the athlete, however, the pure self remains embedded in natural relations. it is only at the level of the spiritual work of art that the self can be expressed as a spiritual one, i. e. , as a self that transcends the natural relations. in the Epic, Tragedy, and Comedy, the pure self is successively represented as the abstract self of fate, the self-conscious self of Zeus, who is the only one supreme power, and the pure self of the real indi- vidual that understands itself as the fate of the world.
Hegel's PHilosoPHy of Judaism Timo slootweg
1. introduction1
Hegel had a lifelong interest in Judaism. He wrote and lectured on the subject repeatedly and on many occasions. The early 'theological writings' (as they are called not quite correctly) are undeniably very critical about the Jewish faith. in the 1827 lectures, some 30 years later, the critique of Judaism is apparently almost muted. as Hodgson writes: "they carry further the favourable reassessment of Judaism begun in 1824. gone are all earlier references to 'the fear of the lord' that is 'the beginning of all wisdom' and to the 'execrations' of leviticus [. . . ]". 2 Careful analysis of the Jewish idea of god takes the place of the earlier critique, as well as a re-evaluation of the great contribution of israel to the history of religion: the spiritually subjective unity of god. Hodgson: "it [the subjective unity named 'god'] is in fact the highest philosophical concept; as such, god subsists without sensible shape, only for thought. "
in contrast to this somewhat apologetic reading of Hegel, i would like to insist here on not overestimating the differences in the development of Hegel's interpretations of the subject. Hodgson is certainly right that Hegel in his 1827 lectures mentions briefly 'certain limitations', only at the end of his overall quite 'sympathetic phenomenology of the Jewish repre- sentation of god'. However, as we shall see, the limitations that he notices in 1827 are broadly the same as the limitations he mentions and describes more extensively and critically in his early theological work. What then is it that indeed makes Hegel's later treatment of Judaism sound somewhat more sympathetic?
my explanation is quite simple and straightforward: it is mainly the dialectical structure of the lectures (which purpose is not to criticize but
1 i want to thank Rico sneller for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 P. C. Hodgson, ? editorial introduction? in: g. W. f. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, ed. P. C. Hodgson, oxford: oxford uP 2006, p. 55.
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strictly to develop logically the concept of religion) that indeed makes all the difference for the evaluation, not just of the determinate 'Religion of sublimity' (Judaism), but also for the other religious forms that precede the Consummate Religion of Christianity. in other words: it is primarily the progressively systematic and dialectical perspective of the mature Hegel that accounts for his notably sympathetic evaluation, in contrast to the relatively non dialectical, 'typological' and critical reflections of his early work on Judaism. it is in comparison to other determinate religions (especially the greek Religion, the Religion of Beauty), and in the context of the logical development Hegel perceives, that the Religion of sublimity is shown to be a necessary and rational stage and an indispensable pro- gression towards Christianity in which (eventually) the concept of religion becomes objective to itself.
in the following, i will demonstrate this reading by referring to other, later texts (taken from the Phenomenology en the Philosophy of Right) in which Judaism or one of its transformations (in Kant for instance, and in Pietism that share in the Jewish fate of Christianity) is at stake. The impor- tance of this simple explanation for the present elaboration of Hegel's view on Judaism is that it makes us aware of (first) the relatively strong continuity in his writings on the subject, and (second) of the unmitigated relevancy of the extensive and very explicit earlier analyses. in fact, they might show us, not just the 'limitations' of Jewish religion in respect to the Hegelian perspective, but also some of the limitations of Hegel's own Philosophy of Religion, and (finally) the inherent danger involved in the Geist of his idealism.
This is why i would like to start here by referring to the brilliant essay 'der geist des Christentums und sein schicksal' (1799) that Hegel wrote when he was only twenty-nine years old. according to Wilhelm dilthey,3 the essay is one of the finest texts Hegel ever wrote in his entire life. Jacques derrida has called this essay, quite rightly, la matrice conceptuelle, 'the conceptual womb',4 of Hegel's mature system. Hegel's later dialectic schema is an abstraction of his contemplation of the nature of love as the spirit of Christianity, which is why it can serve as a excellent introduction to his later thoughts.
3 Wilhelm dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, gs Bd. iV, stuttgart/go? ttingen: Van den Hoeck & Ruprecht 1974, p. 68.
4 J. derrida, Glas. Que reste-t-il du savoir absolu? , Vol. i, Paris: deno? el / gonthier 1974, p. 78. J.