No More Learning

How shall we do this? By possessing those dogmas which are the principles of impulses and of action. Which dogmas? Those which pertain to the distinction ofwhat is
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 3 7
good om what is bad: there is no good r mankind but that which renders him just, temperate, courageous and ee, and there is no evil r mankind, except that which brings about in him the con­ trary vices.
Marcus also employs the word theorema to designate the "dogmas," inasmuch as every art entails principles, and consequently so too does that art of living called philosophy (XI , 5 ) :
What art do you practice? That of being good. How can you practice this except by starting out om theorems, some ofwhich concern the Nature of the , and others of which deal with the constitution proper to mankind?
Dogmas, as Marcus says (VII, 2), run the risk ofdying out, ifone does not constantly reignite those inner images, or phantasiai, which make them present to us.
Thus, we can say that the Meditations-with the exception of Book I-are wholly made up of the repeated, ever-renewed rmulation of the three rules of action which we have just seen, and of the various dogmas which are their undation.
Do as and their rmulation
These dogmas, or undational and ndamental rules, were the subject ofdemonstrations within the Stoic schools. Marcus learned such demon­ strations om his Stoic teachers Junius Rusticus, Apollonius, and Sextus, to whom he renders homage in the rst book ofthe Meditations. Above , he read about them in the Discourses of Epictetus as collected by Arrian. In his Meditations, Marcus mentions "the large number ofproofs by which it is demonstrated that the world is like a City," or else the teachings he has received on the subject of pleasure and pain, and to which he has given his assent (IV, 3 , 5, 6) .
With the aid ofthese demonstrations, the dogmas imposed themselves upon Marcus with absolute certainty, and he usually restricts himself to rmulating them in the rm of a simple proposition, as he does in Book II, r , 3 . The nature of the good, he says there, is moral good (to kalon); while that of evil is moral evil (to aischron). This condensed rm is su cient to evoke the theoretical demonstration ofwhich they were the subject, and it allows the inner disposition which was a result ofhis clear
THE INNER CITADEL
view o f these principles-that is, the resolution to do good-to b e re­ awakened within his soul. To repeat the dogmas to onesel or write them down r onesel is "to retreat," as Marcus says (IV, 3, 1), "not to the countryside, the seashore, or the mountains, " but within oneself It is there that one can nd the rmulas "which shall renew us. " "Let them be concise and essential," Marcus continues, in order that their e cacy be complete. This is why, in order to be ready to apply the three rules of action, Marcus sometimes gathers together a series of chapter-heads ephalaia), extremely briefin rm, which constitute an enumeration of points which, by their very accumulation, can increase their psychic e cacy (II, 1; IV, 3; IV, 26; VII, 22, 2; VIII, 21, 2; XI, 18; XII, 7; XII, 8; XII, 26). I cannot quote these lists in their entirety, but I shall take one example (XII, 26) in which eight kephalaia, or ndamental points, pro­ vide a group ofresources with a view to the practice ofthat rule ofaction which prescribes that we must serenely accept that which happens to us, but does not depend on our will:
Ifyou are annoyed at something, it is because you have rgotten: (1) that everything happens in accordance with universal Nature; (2) that whatever ult was committed is not your concern;
(3) and, moreover, that everything that happens has always hap­
pened thus and will always happen thus, and is, at this very mo­ ment, happening thus everywhere;
(4)how close is the relationship between man and the whole human race: r this is no community ofblood or ofseed, but ofthe intellect.
You have also rgotten:
(s)that the intellect of each person is God, and that it has owed down here om above;
(6) and that nothing belongs to any of us in the strict sense, but that our child, our body and our soul come om above;
(7)and that everything is ajudgment-value;
(8) and the only thing each ofus lives and loses is the present.
the points presented here in the rm of a laconic aide-memoire, which does nothing but evoke demonstrations with which Marcus is miliar om elsewhere, can be und separated om one another throughout the Meditations: they are repeated, ruminated upon; but also explained and sometimes demonstrated. If we assemble these series of kephalaia (II, 1; IV, 3; IV, 26; VII, 22, 2; VIII, 21, 2; XI, 18; XII, 7; XII,
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 39
8; XII, 26) we can thus discover almost all the themes announced or developed in the Meditations. By connecting them to the most nda­ mental dogmas of Stoicism, we can present, in a structured rm, the whole ensemble of doctrines which constitute the essential core of the Meditations.
From the absolutely primary principle according to which the only good is moral good and the only evil is moral evil (II, 1, 3), it llows that neither pleasure nor pain are evils (IV, 3, 6; XII, 8); that the only thing shame l is moral evil (II, 1, 3); that ults committed against us cannot touch us (II, 1, 3; XII, 26); that he who commits a ult hurts only himself (IV, 26, 3); and that the ult cannot be und elsewhere than within oneself(VII, 29, 7; XII, 26). It rther llows that I can su er no harm whatsoever om the actions ofanyone else (II, 1, 3; VII, 22, 2).
From the general principles
1 . only that which depends on us can be either good or evil; and
2. ourjudgment and our assent depend on us (XII, 22),
it llows that the only evil or trouble there can be r us resides in our own judgment; that is to say, in the way we represent things to ourselves (IV, 3, 10; XI, 18, I I); and that people are the authors of their own problems (IV, 26, 2; XII, 8). Everything, there re, is a matter ofjudg­ ment (XII, 8; XII, 22; XII, 26). The intellect is independent ofthe body (IV, 3 , 6) , and things do not come inside us in order to trouble us (IV, 3 , 10). If everything is a matter ofjudgment, every ult is in ct a false
judgment, and proceeds om ignorance (II, 1, 2; IV, 3, 4; XI, 18, 4-5).
I n the enumeration of kephalaia in Book XI (XI , 1 8 , 2) , Marcus tells
himsel
Go higher up still, starting om the principle that if we reject atoms, it must be Nature which governs the All.
In the list in Book IV, he says:
Remember the disjunction: either providence or atoms.
These brief mentions of a principle, which it is assumed is known, allow us to glimpse that Marcus is here again alluding to teachings he has received, which placed ce to ce the Epicurean position (atoms) and the Stoic position (Nature and providence) , to conclude in vor of the
40 THE INNER CITADEL
latter. I shall return to this point. For the moment, suf ce it to say that om the dogma that a rms a unity and rationality of the world, many consequences may be drawn, to which Marcus alludes in his series of kephalaia. Everything comes om universal Nature and in con rmity with the will of universal Nature (XII, 26)-even the malevolence of mankind (XI, 18, 24), which is a necessa consequence of the gi of liberty. Everything occurs in con rmity with Destiny (IV, 26, 4) : thus, it is in con rmity with the order of the universe that all things undergo continuous metamorphosis (IV, 3 , I I ; XII, 21), but are also ceaselessly repeated (XII, 26), and that we must die (IV, 3, 4; XI, 18, rn). Universal Reason gives rm and energy to matter that is docile, but without strength; this is why we must always and everywhere distinguish the causal (reason) and the material (XII, 8; XII, 18). It is om universal Reason that comes that reason which is common to all mankind and assures its relatedness, which is not a community of blood or of seed (II, 1, 3; XII, 26). This is why people are made r one another (II, 1, 4; IV, 3, 4; XI, 18, 1-2).
One last series ofkephalaia can be grouped around the grandiose vision of the immensity of universal Nature, and the in nity of space and of time (IV, 3, 7; XII, 7). From this perspective, the whole oflife seems to be ofminuscule duration (VIII, 21, 2; IV, 26, 5; XII, 7); the instant seems in nitesimal (II, 14, 3; XII, 26); the earth seems like a point (IV, 3, 8; VIII, 21, 2); current me and posthumous glory seem completely vain (IV, 3, 8; VIII, 21, 3; XII, 21; IV, 3, 7), all the more so since they can only be obtained om people who contradict themselves and each other (IV, 3, 8; VII, 21, 3), and whom one cannot respect, ifone sees them as they really are (XI, 18, 3).
All these "dogmas" can, then, be deduced om more ndamental dogmas. Yet they all become crystallized around the three rules or disci­ plines ofli , which we have distinguished. The discipline ofthought, r example, obviously presupposes the dogmas which concern eedom of
judgment; the discipline of action presupposes those which a rm the existence of a community of reasonable beings; and the discipline of consent to events presupposes the dogma ofthe providence and rational­ ity of the universe. We can glimpse a similar grouping in IV, 3 .
Lists of kephalaia or ndamental points: such is the rst mode of rmulation of dogmas in the Meditations. Yet these ndamental points are also taken up by themselves and equently repeated throughout the course of the work. Thus the invitation, rmulated in one of the series of kephalaia (XII, 8), to discern what is causal in each thing, is repeated
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 41
eight times in isolated rm, without any commentary or explanation, in the body ofthe Meditations (IV, 21, 5; VII, 29, 5; VIII, u ; IX, 25; IX, 37; XII, rn; XII, 18; XII, 29). Likewise, the a rmation " isjudgment," which gures in two lists of kephalaia (XII , 8 and XII , 26) is und twice by itself, either without commentary or accompanied by a very brief explanation (II, 15; XII, 22). Above , the dogma according to which our troubles come only om our judgments, and that things do not penetrate within us (IV, 3, 1o), recurs eighteen times in the course ofthe Meditations, sometimes repeated almost word r word, and sometimes in slightly di erent rm (V, 19; VI, 52; VII, 2; VIII, 47; IX, 13; IX, 15; XI, 11; XI, 16; XII, 22; XII, 25; IV, 7; IV, 39, 2; V, 2; VII, 14; VII, 16; VIII, 29; VIII, 40; VIII, 49).
Let us now consider another theme which we have encountered in the series ofkephalaia: that ofthe eternal repetition ofall things both in universal Nature and in human history (XII, 26, 3). This, too, is a point which is dear to Marcus, and which he goes over inde tigably. It does not matter, he writes, whether one attends the spectacle ofthe world r a short or a long time, since the totality ofbeing is present at each instant and in each thing. All things are thus homoeideis; that is, they have the same content, and there re repeat themselves in nitely.
From all eternity, all things have identical contents, and pass through the same cycles (II, 14, 1).
Everything is ofthe same kind, and ofidentical contents (VI, 37). From all eternity, all things are produced with identical contents,
and r in nity there will be other things of this kind (IX, 3 5) .
In a sense, a man of rty-if he is not devoid of intelligence-has seen all that has been and all that shall be, once he recognizes that all things have identical contents (XI, 1, 3).
It would be tedious to cite other examples ofthe many repetitions which one nds all throughout the work. It su ces to note that most of the Meditations take up again-o en in a highly elaborate and striking rm-these various kephalaia and dogmas, the list ofwhich Marcus gives us several times in the course ofhis work.
It is, however, not enough to "retreat, " returning equently to these dogmas to reorient one's actions; after all, in the art ofliving, we must do
42 THE INNER CITADEL
nothing which is not m con rmity "with the theorems of the art" (IV, 2). Rather, we must often return to their theoretical undations. Marcus clearly explains this need, in a passage which has been misunder­ stood by many interpreters (X, 9). Within it, we must distinguish two di erent lines of thought. The rst is a concentrated and brutal descrip­ tion ofthe unhappiness ofthe human condition, when it is not guided by
reason:
Bu oonery and bloody struggles; torpor and agitation; the slavery ofevery day! 4
Then there comes another thought, completely independent om the rst, which has to do with the importance oftheory:
All your ne sacred dogmas, which you think without unding them on a science ofNature, and then abandon: they will disappear rapidly. From now on, you must see and practice everything, so that that which is required by the present circumstances is accomplished, but, at the same time, the theoretical undation ofyour actions is always present in an e cacious way, and that you always maintain within yourself-latent, but not buried-that self-con dence which is procured by science, applied to each particular case.
We must, then, not only act in con rmity with the theorems of the art ofliving and the ndamental dogmas, but also keep present to our consciousness the theoretical undations which justi them. This is what Marcus means by the "science of Nature," because, in the nal analysis, all oflife's principles merge in the knowledge ofNature. 5 With­ out this, the rmulations of dogmas will become devoid of sense, no matter how often they are repeated.
This is why Marcus uses a third method of rmulating dogmas. Here the technique involves reconstructing the arguments used to justi them, or even re ecting upon the di culties to which they may give rise. For instance, Marcus alludes, without citing them, to all the proo which demonstrate that the world is like a City (IV, 3 , 5 ) ; and this rmula entailed a quite speci c attitude vis-a-vis events and other peo­ ple. Elsewhere, however, he bases this rmula on a complex series of rationalizations, and we can summarize the sorites he constructs as l­ lows: a city is a group ofbeings subject to the same laws. Now, the world is a group ofbeings subject to the same laws: the law ofReason. There-
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 43
re, the world is a City (IV, 4). This reasoning was traditional in Stoi­ cism; traces of it can be und, r example, in Cicero. 6 Yet elsewhere, Marcus remarks that we must imbibe our spirit with the help of reason­ ing-that is, the linkages between representations (V, 16, l)-and he proposes rther demonstrations, one of which also has the rm of a sorites.
This theoretical work does not, however, consist solely in reproducing a simple series ofreasonings. It may take on several rms: either that of literary or rhetorical-sounding developments, or ofmore technical dis­ cussions concerning aporiai. The dogma according to which "Everything happens in con rmity with universal Nature" (XII, 26, l), r instance, i s presented i n what one might call a highly orchestrated manner i n V, 8 , as well as in VII, 9:
things are linked together mutually, and their linkage is sacred. Nothing, so to speak, is reign to anything else, r everything is coordinated and everything contributes to the order of one single world. One single world is the result of all things, and one single God penetrates throughout them all; there is one single substance, and one sin e law which is the Reason common to all intelligent beings; there is one truth.
This theme of the unity of the world, based on the unity of its origin, is often repeated in analogous terms (VI, 38; XII, 29); but it is also discussed critically, sometimes in schematic shion, but at other times in a more diluted way, particularly in the numerous passages in which we nd what Marcus calls the "disjunction": either atoms (that is, Epicurean dispersion), or one Nature (Stoic unity; c£ IV, 27; VI, 10; VI, 44; VII, 75; VIII, 18; IX, 28; IX, 39; X, 6-7).
Many other major points are discussed in comparatively long develop­ ments: r instance, the mutual attraction that reasonable beings feel r one another, which explains that people are made r one another (IX, 9); or the dogma that nothing can constitute an obstacle r intellect or reason (X, 33).
The three rules oflife or disciplines
As we have seen, practical conduct obeys three rules ofli which deter­ mine the individual's relationship to the necessa course of Nature, to other people, and to his own thought. As in the case ofhis exposition of
44 THE INNER CITADEL
the dogmas, Marcus' exposition ofthese rules is highly structured. The three rules oflife or discipline correspond to the three activities ofthe soul: judgment, desire, and impulse; and to the three domains of reality: our individual culty ofjudgment, universal Nature, and human nature. This can be seen in the llowing diagram:
activi
(1) judgment
(2) desire
(3) impulse toward action
domain efreality
culty ofjudgment universal Nature human Nature
inner attitude
objectivity consent to Destiny
justice and altruism We encounter this ternary model very equently throughout the
Meditations. I shall cite a few important passages:
Always and everywhere, it depends on you
-piously to rejoice in the present conjunction ofevents (2);
-to conduct yourself with justice toward whatever people are present (3);
-to apply the rules of discernment to your present representation ( 1 ) , s o t h a t n o t h i n g n o n o bj e c t i v e m a y i n l t r a t e i t s w a y i n ( V I I , 5 4 ) .
The llowing are enough r you:
-your present value-judgment (1), as long as it is objective; -your present action (3) , as long as it is accomplished in the service ofthe human community;
-your present inner disposition (2), as long as it nds its joy in every conjunction of events brought about by the external cause (IX, 6).
Reasonable nature is indeed llowing its proper path
-i with regard to its representations (1), it gives its assent neither to what is false, nor to what is obscure;
-if it directs its impu es (3) only toward those actions which serve the human community;
-ifit has desire (2) and aversion only r that which depends on us; while it joyfully greets all that which is granted to it by universal Nature (VIII, 7).
Again,
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises
45
Erase your representation hantasia) (I);
Stop your impulse toward action orme) (3)
Extinguish your desire (orexis) (2) ;
Have your guiding principle (hegemonikon) within your power (IX, 7).
What must you practice?
One thing only:
-thought devoted to justice and actions accomplished in the service ofthe community (3);
-speech which can never deceive (I);
-an inner disposition (2) which lovingly greets each conjunction of events, recognizing it as necessary, miliar, and owing rth om so great a principle, and so great a source (IV, 33, 3).
I n addition t o these explicit mmlations, w e nd numerous allusions to the three disciplines, in various rms. Thus, Marcus lists as a triad of virtues: "truth," "justice," and "temperance" (XII, 15); or "unhurried­ ness injudgment," "love ofpeople," and "the disposition to place one­ selfin the cortege ofthe gods" (III, 9, 2)-which correspond to the three rules ofli . It sometimes happens that only two or even only one ofthe disciplines appears, as r instance in IV, 22:
To accomplish justice on the occasion of each impulse toward action, and, on the occasion of each representation, retain only that part ofit which exactly corresponds to reality (here we can recog­ nize the disciplines ofaction and ofjudgment).
In X, I I , 3 :
He is content with two things: to accomplish the present action with justice, and to love the te which has, here and now, been allotted to him.
And again, in VIII, 23 :
Am I accomplishing some action? I accomplish it, relating it to the well-being of mankind. Is something happening to me? I greet it, relating what happens to me to the gods and to the source of all
things, whence is rmed the amework of events (here we recog­ nize the disciplines ofaction and ofdesire).
O en, only one theme is evoked, as r instance the discipline of desire (VII, 57):
Love only the event which comes upon us, and which is linked to us by Destiny.
or the discipline ofjudgment (IV, 7) :
Suppress the value-judgment (which you add), and the "I've been hurt" is also suppressed. Suppress the "I've been hurt," and the harm is suppressed.
or, nally, the discipline ofimpulses (XII, 20):
In the rst place: nothing at random, and nothing unrelated to some goal or end. Second, don't relate your actions to anything except an end or goal which serves the human community.
The Meditations, then, take up the various dogmas one by one, either brie y or in more developed rm, and di erent chapters give longer lists ofthem than others. Likewise, they tirelessly repeat, either concisely or in more extended rm, the rmulation of the three rules of l e, which can be und gathered together in their entirety in certain chapters. As we shall see, Book III attempts to give a detailed, ideal portrait of the good man, and the three rules ofli , which correspond precisely to the good man's behavior, are set rth in great detail. On the other hand, we can also nd the three rules oflife-mixed together with other related exhortations-presented in a rm so concise that it makes them almost enigmatic :
Erase this representation [discipline ofjudgment].
Stop dancing around like a puppet [discipline ofaction]. Circumscribe the precise moment oftime.
Recognize what is happening to you or to someone else [disci­
pline ofthe consent to Destiny].
Divide the object and analyze it into "causal" and "material. " Think about your last hour.
THE INNER CITADEL
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises
As r the wrong committed by so-and-so: leave it right where
the ult was committed (VII, 29).
These three disciplines of li are the true key to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, r the various dogmas I have discussed crystallize around them. The dogmas a rming our eedom ofjudgment, and the possibility r mankind to criticize and modi his own thought, are linked to the discipline ofjudgment, while the theorems on the causality of universal Nature are grouped around that discipline which directs our attitude toward external events. Finally, the discipline of action is fed by a the theoretical propositions concerning the mutual attraction which unites rational beings.
In the last analysis, we realize that behind their apparent disorder, we can discern a highly rigorous conceptual system in Marcus' Meditations. I shall now turn to a detailed description ofits structure.
Imaginative exercises
The Meditations do notjust rmulate the rules oflife and the dogmas by which they are nourished; r it is not only reason which is exercised in them, but the imagination as well. For example, Marcus does not restrict himselfto saying that life is short and that we all must soon die, by virtue of the laws of metamorphosis imposed by Nature. Instead, he brings to l i fe b e r e h i s e y e s ( V I I I , 3 1 )
the court of Augustus; his wi , his daughter, his descendants, his progeny, his sister, Agrippa, his relatives, his acquaintances, his iends Arius and Maecenas, his doctors, his sacri cers, the death of an entire Court . . .
Yet it is not only the disappearance ofa court that he tries to represent to himself, but that of a whole generation (IV, 3 2) :
For instance, imagine the time of Vespasian. You'll see all o f that: people getting married, raising a mily, lling ill, dying, going to war, celebrating festivals, doing business, working the elds; there'll be atterers, arrogant or suspicious people, conspirators; there'll be people who desire the death of others; others who grumble about present events; there'll be lovers, misers, others who lust after con-
47
THE INNER CITADEL
sulate or kingship. That life oftheirs: is it not true that it is nowhere now?
At other times, Marcus thinks of the great men of the past: Hip­ pocrates, Alexander, Pompey, Caesar, Augustus, Hadrian, Heraclitus, Democritus, Socrates, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, and Archimedes. " of them long dead! " he writes (VI, 47); "No more and nowhere! " (VIII, 5). By so doing, Marcus takes his place in the great literary tradition which, om Lucretius to Fran ois Villon,7 has evoked the famous dead: "Where are the snows of yesteryear? " "Where are they? " Marcus had already asked (X, 31, 2); "Nowhere; no matter where! "
Such imaginative exercises recur rather o en in the Meditations (IV, 50; VI, 24; VII, 19, 2; VII, 48; VIII, 25; VIII, 37; IX, 30; XII, 27). It is by this means that Marcus attempts vigorously to place the dogma of universal metamorphosis be re his eyes.
Life itsel however, is a kind of death, when it is not illuminated by virtue, by the practice ofthe rules oflife, and by the knowledge ofthose dogmas which provide knowledge of things human and divine. This is what explains those descriptions of the vanity of human life-worthy of a Cynic-which we sometimes nd in the Meditations, as in the llow­ ing extraordinary passage (VII, 3):
The vain solemnity o fa procession; dramas played out o n the stage; troops ofsheep or goats; ghts with spears; a little bone thrown to dogs; a chunk of bread thrown into a sh-pond; the exhausting labor and heavy burdens under which ants must bear up; crazed mice running r shelter; puppets pulled by strings. . . .
And we have already encountered the llowing briefbut striking note (X, 9):
Bu oonery and bloody struggles; to or and agitation; the slavery of every day.
Writing as a spiritual exercise
As we have seen throughout these analyses, the Meditations appear to be variations on a small number of themes. The result of this is the large number of repetitions they contain, which are sometimes almost verba-
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 49 tim. We have already encountered several examples of this, and the
llowing ones can be added:
How could that which does not make a man worse, make li
worse? (II, I I , 4)
That which does not make a man worse than he is, does not make
his life worse, either. . . . (IV, 8) .
is ephemeral: that which remembers, and that which it remem­ bers (IV, 35).
Ephemeral . . . is he who remembers and that which he remembers (VIII, 21, 2).
Nothing is so capable ofproducing greatness ofsoul (III, I I , 2).
Nothing is so capable of producing greatness of soul (X, I I , I ) .
Many more examples could be cited, including long developments such as VIII, 34 and XI, 8, both of which are structurally parallel, and are devoted to the power which man has received om God to reunite himselfwith the All om which he has separated himsel
The advice on distinguishing within each thing "that which is causal" om "that which is material" is repeated almost ten times, with only very slight variations. Here we can recognize one of the ndamental struc­ tures of Stoic physics,8 and there re-once again-the technical nature of the rmulas Marcus uses. But Marcus does not merely repeat this distinction as ifhe were reproducing something he had learned in a Stoic school; r him, it has an existential meaning. To distinguish the causal element is to recognize the presence within oneself of the hegemonikon, that is, the principle which directs all being. This is that principle of thought andjudgn1ent which makes us independent ofthe body, and the principle ofliberty which delimits the sphere of"that which depends on us," as opposed to "that which does not depend on us. "
Marcus does not say this; however, we can deduce it om the overall structure ofhis system. He is content merely to recommend to himselfto apply this distinction, without ever giving an example which ght help us to understand what this exercise might mean. The reason is that Marcus has no need of examples; he knows per ctly well what he's
50 THE INNER CITADEL
talking about. These rmulas, which are repeated throughout the Medi­ tations, never set rth a doctrine. Rather, they serve only as a catalyst which, by means of the association of ideas, reactivates a series of repre­ sentations and practices, about which Marcus-since he is writing only
r himself-has no need to go into detail.
Marcus writes only in order to have the dogmas and rules ofli always
present to his mind. He is thus llowing the advice ofEpictetus, who, after having set rth the distinction between what does and does not depend on us-the ndamental do a of Stoicism-adds:
It is about this that philosophers ought to meditate; this is what they should write down every day, and it should be the subject of their exercises (I, I, 25).
You must have these principles at hand rocheira) both night and day; you must w te them down; you must read them (III, 24, 103).
The Stoic philosophical life consists essentially in mastering one's in­ ner discourse. Everything in an individual's life depends on how he represents things to himself-in other words, how he tells them to him­ self in inner dialogue. " It is not things that trouble us, " as Epictetus said (Manual, §5), "but our judgments about things," in other words, our inner discourse about things. I will have a great deal to say later on about the Discourses ofEpictetus, which were collected by his disciple Arrian. They depict Epictetus speaking with his students during his philosophy classes, and, as Arrian says in his brief pre ce, "When he spoke, he certainly had no other desire than to set the thoughts of his listeners in motion toward what is best . . . when Epictetus spoke these words, his audience could not help elingjust what this man wanted them to feel. "
Epictetus' speech, then, was intended to modi his audience's inner discourse. We are thus in the presence oftwo therapies: one was that of the word, practiced in a variety of rms, by means ofstriking or moving rmulas and with the help oflogical and technical rational processes, but also with the help of seductive and persuasive imagery. Another was the therapy ofwriting r onesel which, r Marcus, consisted in taking up the dogmas and rules of action as they were stated by Epictetus-all the while addressing himself-and assimilating them, so that they might be­ come the principles of his inner discourse. There re, one must con­ stantly rekindle the "representations" hantasiai) within onesel in other words, those discourses which rmulate dogmas (VII, 2).
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 5 1
Such writing exercises thus lead necessarily to incessant repetitions, and this is what radically di erentiates the Meditations om every other work. Do as are not mathematical rules, learned once and r all and then mechanically applied. Rather, they must somehow become achievements of awareness, intuitions, emotions, and moral experiences which have the intensity of a mystical experience or a vision. This spiritual and a ective spirituality is, however, quick to dissipate. In order to reawaken it, it is not enough to reread what has already been written. Written pages are already dead, and the Meditations were not made to be reread. What counts is the re rmulation: the act ofwriting or talking to onesel right now, in the very moment when one needs to write. It is also the act of composing with the greatest care possible: to search r that version which, at a given moment, will produce the greatest e ect, in the moment be re it des away, almost instantaneously, almost as soon as it is written. Characters traced onto some medium do not x anything: everything is in the act ofwriting. Thus, we witness a succes­ sion of new attempts at composition, repetitions of the same rmulas, and endless variations on the same themes: the themes ofEpictetus.
The goal is to reactualize, rekindle, and ceaselessly reawaken an inner state which is in constant danger ofbeing numbed or extinguished.
The task-ever-renewe is to bring back to order an inner discourse which becomes dispersed and diluted in the tility ofroutine.
As he wrote the Meditations, Marcus was thus practicing Stoic spiritual exercises. He was using writing as a technique or procedure in order to in uence himsel and to trans rm his inner discourse by meditating on the Stoic dogmas and rules ofli . This was an exercise ofwriting day by day, ever-renewed, always taken up again and always needing to be taken up again, since the true philosopher is he who is conscious of not yet having attained wisdom.
"Greek" exercises
It is not su rising to the modern reader that the Meditations were written in Greek. One might, however, wonder why the Emperor, whose mother tongue was Latin, chose to use Greek to write personal notes intended only r himself
First of , we must note that Marcus was completely bilingual, having studied Greek rhetoric with Hera es Atticus and Latin rhetoric with Fronto. More generally, the population of Rome was made up of the most diverse elements, who had converged upon the Empire's metropo-
52 THE INNER CITADEL
lis r a wide variety of reasons, and the two languages were in constant use. In the streets of Rome, the Greek doctor Galen could rub elbows with the Christian apologist Justin, or else with some Gnostic. these gures taught in Rome and had students om the educated classes. 9
Even in Rome, Greek was the language ofphilosophy. The rhetori­ cian Quintillian, writing at the end of the rst century A. D. , notes that few Latin writers had ever dealt with philosophy: he cites only Cicero, Brutus, Seneca, and a few others. He could also have included the name of Lucretius. Be that as it may, in the rst century A. D. Cornutus, Musonius Ru s, and Epictetus all wrote in Greek, which allows us to infer that, om then on, educated Romans accepted that even in Rome, the o cial language ofphilosophy should be Greek.
One might have thought that Marcus would have preferred to talk to himself in Latin. As we have seen, however, the Meditations are not spontaneous e usions, but exercises carried out in accordance with a program which Marcus had received om the Stoic tradition, and in particular om Epictetus. Marcus was working with pre-existing materi­ als, and painting on a canvas given him by someone else. This ct entails several consequences.
In the rst place, this philosophical material was associated with a technical vocabulary, and the Stoics, in particular, were renowned r the technical nature of their terminology. Translators must, by the way, be aware ofthis peculiarity ofMarcus' vocabulary, and pay the closest possi­ ble attention when they encounter such words as hypolepsis ("value-judg­ ment"); kataleptikos ("objective"; "adequate"); phantasia ("repre­ sentation," not "imagination"), hegemonikon ("directing principle"); epakolouthesis ("necessary but nonessential consequence"); and hypexaire­ sis ("reserve clause"), to cite only a few examples. Such technicalities go to show that Marcus was no amateur, and that it was not the case that Stoicism wasjust "a religion" r him. 10
It was di cult to translate these terms into Latin. It could be said that Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca had done quite well when ced with the same kind of challenge. But the goal of these authors was popularization: they wanted to make Greek philosophy accessible to a Latin audience. Marcus' project was di erent: he was writing r himself To translate or to adapt terminology would distract him om his goal. What is more, if they were translated into Latin, the technical terms of Greek philosophy would lose a part of their meaning. In the same way, when Aulus Gel­ lius, 11 a contemporary of Marcus who had studied philosophy at Athens, translates a passage om the Discourses ofEpictetus as reported by Arrian,
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 53
he feels obliged to transcribe technical Greek words, in order to explain his choice of the Latin words which he has chosen to correspond to them. Modern translators ofHeidegger are often rced to do the same. In the nal analysis, philosophy, like poetry, is untranslatable.
In any case, Marcus had no time to indulge in the literary work of translation. In the urgency ofconversion and the imminence ofdeath, he searched r immediate e ects: words and phrases which would dissipate worry or anger immediately (IV, 3 , 3 ) . He lt the need to plunge back into the atmosphere of philosophical instruction, and to remember the exact phraseology of Epictetus, which supplied him with the themes upon which he developed his variations.
4
THE PHILOSOPHER-SLAVE AND THE EMPEROR-PHILOSOPHER
Memories ofphilosophical readings
Some quotations om philosophers appear occasionally in the Medita­ tions. 1 It is possible that Marcus may have read some ofthese authors, but he may also have come across them in the course ofhis Stoic readings.
The Stoics considered Heraclitus, r instance, as their great ancestor. 2 Several passages om the Ephesian philosopher appear in the Meditations, but it is di cult to distinguish the authentic passages om the paraphrases which the Emperor gives of them, perhaps because he is quoting them om memory. It is possible that Marcus' allusion to "people who speak and act while asleep," and thus live in a state ofunconsciousness (IV, 46, 4) , is only a development of the rst agment of Heraclitus, which also alluded to the unconsciousness ofthe majority ofmankind, analogous to sleep. 3
At any rate, the theme of the sleep of unconsciousness made a deep impression on Marcus. He makes a possible allusion to the Heraclitean agment4 which speaks ofa person so drunk he no longer knows where he is going: "he who rgets where the road leads," as Marcus puts it (IV, 46, 2). More signi cantly, Marcus a rms-still under the inspiration of Heraclitus5-that those who are asleep and unconscious also contribute, in their own way, to the brication ofthe world, and he draws om this the llowing conclusion (VI, 42, 1):
We are all working together in order to complete one work; some ofus knowingly and consciously, and the others unconsciously.
Thus, even when we oppose ourselves to the will of universal Reason, each of us collaborates with it, r the course of Nature also has need of those who re se to llow it. A er all, Nature has integrated eedom
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 5 5
into her plan, as well as all that it implies: including unconsciousness or resistance. In the drama which Nature makes us play, sleepers and oppo­ nents are precisely what she has to resee.
For these people, asleep or unconscious, who are "in discord with the logos"6 (IV, 46, 3), "what they encounter every day seems reign to them"7 (IV, 46, 3). It could be that this Heraclitean theme was all the more dear to Marcus because ofthe great importance he attached to the notion of" miliarity" with Nature, and there re with the logos. It is this miliarity which allows us to recognize as miliar or natural, and not reign, those events which occur by the will ofNature (III, 2, 6).
The death of the elements into one another-an eminently Her­ aclitean theme-could not il to attract the Emperor's attention (IV, 46, 1); a er all, Stoicism had accustomed him to meditate upon universal metamorphosis. 9
Together with Heraclitus we nd Empedocles, one of whose verses Marcus cites (XII, 3). The "pure-orbed" Sphairos which this poet­ philosopher had ima ned was the traditional model r the Sage. 10
Without naming its author, Marcus quotes and criticizes (IV, 24) a agment ofDemocritus which advises people not to get involved in too many things, if they want to keep their peace of mind. In ct, among those authors-especially Stoics-who dealt with this virtue, it was a tradition to re se the Democritean invitation to inaction. 11
In the collection entitled "The Sentences ofDemocratus," sometimes attributed to Democritus,12 Marcus und an aphorism which, one could say, sums up his own thought (IV, 3, r I):
The world is nothing but metamorphosis (alloiosis), and life is noth­ ing but an opinion (or a judgment: hypolepsis) .
In this rmulation, Marcus no doubt recognized Epictetus' idea accord­
ing to which it is not things that trouble us, but the representations and judgments which we make about them (Manual, §5).
Elsewhere (VII, 3 r , 4), Marcus criticizes another Democritean text, which a rmed that true reality consists of atoms and the void, and that everything else was only "by convention" (nomisti). As Galen explains,13 this meant that "in itsel " there is nothing but atoms; but that "with regard to us," there is a whole world ofcolors, odors, and tastes, which we assume is real, but which in ct is only subjective. Marcus corrects the Democritean rmula, but inte rets it in a Stoic sense. He denies the in nite number of atoms which, on this theory, are the only real princi-
THE INNER CITADEL
ples, but h e admits the word nomisti, on the condition that it b e under­ stood not in the sense of "by convention, " but as ifit meant "by a law. " For Marcus, then, only halfofDemocritus' rmula is true: "Everything is nomisti. " Its meaning, however, is that "everything happens by the law," that is, the law ofuniversal Nature. The other part ofDemocritus' rmula, which asserted that the true reality is the multiplicity of atoms which constitute the principles, is lse; r if everything comes about by the laws of Nature, then the number of principles is quite restricted. In ct, it is reduced to one: the logos; or to two: the logos and matter. Such, at least, is one inte retation ofthis di cult and probably corrupt text. 14 One might also consider that Marcus understands "Everything is nomisti" in the same sense as the sentence ofDemocritus cited above: "Everything is subjective; that is, everything is judgment. " In other words, Marcus may have understood it in the light ofEpictetus' idea that everything is in our representations. 15 This does not mean that we do not know reality, but that we attribute to it values ofgood or ofevil which have no basis in reality.
Marcus also thinks he recognizes this doctrine in the rmula of a Cynic (II, 15):
"Everything is matter ofjudgment. " No doubt what people used to say in opposition to Monimus the Cynic is obvious; but the use l­ ness of what he said is obvious too, as long as we receive what is pro table in what he said, while remaining within the limits ofwhat is true.
According to the comic playwright Menander,16 Monimus the Cynic used to declare that all human opinion (to hypolephthen) is only vanity (tuphos). Marcus believed he was penetrating to the deepest truth ofthe rmula cited by Menander: in the nal analysis, everything is a matter of opinion; what troubles us are our value-judgments, and they are only vanity (tuphos).
As Monimus said, it is usually precisely our vanity- tuphos in the sense of "emptiness," "smoke," but also "pride"-which perverts our value­
judgments (VI, lJ):
Pride is a dreadful sophist, and it is just at the moment when you think you are devoting yourself to serious matters that it enchants you the most. Look, r instance, at what Crates says about a man like Xenocrates.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 57
In antiquity, Platonists like Xenocrates had the reputation of being vain, proud, and haughty, so it is not su rising that Crates-who, like Monimus, was a Cynic-should have reproached him r his tuphos, or pu ed-up vanity. 17
There is no doubt that, either directly or indirectly, Marcus was mil­ iar with other Cynic texts. There is nothing su rising about this: on the one hand, Cynicism and Stoicism were very close to each other with regard to their conceptions oflife; and on the other, as we have seen in the case ofDemocritus and Monimus, our philosopher-emperor had the gi of recognizing Stoic doctrines in the texts which retained his atten­ tion.
We also nd several Platonic texts in the Meditations, taken om the Apology (28b; 28d), the Gorgias (512d-e), the Republic (486a), and the Theaetetus (174d-e). Once again, this is not surprising, because the Plato whom Marcus quotes is, so to speak, a "pre-Stoic" Plato-that is, one who has Socrates speak in terms the Stoics would not have denied. For this Plato/Socrates, the important questions are not those dealing with life and death, but those that deal withjustice and injustice, or good and evil (VII, 44); we must remain at the post which has been assigned to us
(VII, 45); what matters is not to save one's life, but to spend it in the worthiest way possible (VII, 46); he who embraces in one ance the totality oftime and ofsubstance is not a aid ofdeath (VII, 35). Finally, Marcus nds in the Theaetetus ( 1 74d-e) a description of the di cult situation ofa king, bereft ofthe leisure he needs to think and to philoso­ phize, like a shepherd shut up with his ock "in a pasture in the midst of the mountains" (X, 23). What Marcus recognized in all these quotations was Stoicism, not Platonism. 18
Marcus also read a text by Theophrastus, the student of Aristotle, which he alone mentions of all the authors of antiquity. The passage probably interested the judge in Marcus, responsible r assessing guilt, since it raises the question of degrees of responsibility. According to Theophrastus, crimes committed with pleasure, and resulting om the attraction ofpleasure, are more serious than those one is rced to com­ mit because of the su ering caused by an injustice we have borne, which pushes us on to anger. Marcus approves ofthis theory (II, rn), and it has been maintained that he was thereby un ith l to Stoicism, since the Stoa held that ults are equal. 19 Now, it is true that the Stoics consid­ ered wisdom to be an absolute perfection. The slightest ult, there re, estranged a person om this perfection just as much as the most serious one did. One was either a sage or not, and there was no intermediate
58 THE INNER CITADEL
status. In theory, there re, there was no such thing as a more or less serious ult. Yet, r all that, the Stoics did allow r the possibility of moral progress in the case of the non-sage, and consequently they also admitted degrees of moral progress. Di erent degrees of the gravity of ults could there re also be allowed in the case of the non-sage. 20 Epictetus himsel r that matter, also appears to consider that certain ults are more easy to pardon than others (IV, l, 147): the passion of love, r example, is easier to pardon than that ofambition.
Marcus also mentions the "Pythagoreans," who ordained that we should raise our eyes toward the heavens at dawn, in order to remind ourselves of that model of order and purity represented by the stars (XI, 27). 21
Epicurean maxims and passages om Epicurus are also to be und in the Meditations. Marcus rewrites them into a Stoic vocabulary when he quotes them, and he retains om them advice which a Stoic could legitimately practice: be happy with the present, without regretting that which we do not possess and could not possess (VII, 27); pain cannot be simultaneously both unbearable and eternal (VII, 33; VII, 64); we should always keep the virtues ofthe ancients in mind (XI, 26); and nally, in every circumstance, we must remain on the level ofphilosophy, and not let ourselves be dragged down into sharing the anthropomorphic view­ points ofthose who do not practice philosophy (IX, 41). 22 The commen­ tary Marcus gives on this last-mentioned passage-a letter written by Epicurus while he was ill or on his deathbed-allows us to understand how Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus could nd, even in Epicurean­ ism, maxims capable of nourishing their own meditation. We must not assume that they were eclectics, rather than dyed-in-the-wool Stoics: they knew perfectly well that there was a radical opposition between Stoic and Epicurean doctrines, as well as between the practical attitude of the Stoics and the Epicureans. They were also aware, however, that Epicureanism, Stoicism, Platonism, and Aristotelianism were merely the di erent and opposing rms of a single phenomenon: the philosophical style oflife. Within the latter, there could be points held in common by several-or even all-of the schools, as Marcus states expressly with regard to the letter ofEpicurus (IX, 41):
I t i s common t o all the schools not t o depart om philosophy under any circumstances, and not to let oneselfbe dragged into the chatter of the vulgar, that is, of those who do not practice the science of Nature .
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 59
In particular, the Stoics and the Epicureans shared a speci c attitude with regard to time. They insisted on concentration on the present moment,23 which allows us both to grasp the incomparable value of the present instant, and to diminish the intensity of pain, as we become conscious ofthe ct that we onlyfeel and live this pain within the present moment.
When all is said and done, it was as a Stoic, and as a disciple of Epictetus, that Marcus read the texts of the philosophers whom he quotes. For it is above all the reading ofEpictetus, and the knowledge of his teachings, which explain the Meditations.
The teachings ofEpictetus
In the course of the preceding pages, we have encountered the name of Epictetus more than once. Nor is this surprising, given that he is men­ tioned many times in the Meditations. For instance, Marcus expresses his gratitude to his Stoic teacher Rusticus r having passed along to him notes taken at Epictetus' classes. Marcus o en quotes texts explicitly om Epictetus, and places him on the same level as those whom the Stoics considered the greatest ofmasters II, 19, 2):
How many men-like Chrysippus, like Socrates, like Epictetus­ has Eternity swallowed up!
Epictetus was, at the time, considered to be the great philosopher. His image and teachings were mentioned throughout the literature of the second century A. D. , and he was to remain a model r philosophers down to the end ofantiquity. The Latin author Aulus Gellius, who had studied at Athens, mentions a conversation he had witnessed there in which the rhetorician Herodes Atticus quoted a passage om the Dis­ courses of Epictetus, as collected by Arrian. He also in rms us that, in another conversation, the philosopher Favorinus had reported several of the Master's sayings. In the course ofa sea voyage, Aulus Gellius himself had met another philosopher, who pulled the Discourses out ofhis travel­ bag and read him a passage om them. Elsewhere in Gellius' Attic Nights, we nd allusions to details about Epictetus' life: his initial condition as a slave; his expulsion om Rome by the emperor Domitian; and his even­ tual settling down in Nicopolis. 24 The satirist Lucian, who also lived under the reign ofMarcus, tells how an admirer once bought "the clay lamp ofthe Stoic Epictetus" r 3,000 drachmas. "No doubt he hoped,"
60 THE INNER CITADEL
remarks Lucian,25 " that if he read at night by the light of this lamp, the wisdom of Epictetus would come upon him all of a sudden during his sleep, and he would bejust like that admirable old man. " Marcus' doctor, Galen, alludes to a dialogue which Favorinus of Ades had directed against Epictetus, and which Galen himself re ted. 26 Even Christians such as Origen, who wrote in the third century, speak of Epictetus in terms ofrespect. 27
Epictetus was born in the rst century A. D. , in Phrygian Hierapolis (Pammukale in modern Turkey) . Sometime during the second half of the century, he was brought to Rome as the slave ofEpaphroditus, one of Nero's eedmen. Epictetus mentions his master Epaphroditus several times in the Discourses; he allowed his slave to attend the classes of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Ru s. Musonius had a tremendous in uence on Epictetus; the latter equently reproduces his teacher's sayings in the Discourses, and describes his teaching as llows (III, 23, 29): "When we sat be re him, each of us felt as though someone had de­ nounced our ults to him. Such was the exactitude with which he hit upon our current state, and placed everyone's ults be re his eyes. "
After having been set ee by Epaphroditus, Epictetus opened his own philosophy school in Rome, but was expelled om the city, together with all other philosophers, by the emperor Domitian in 93-94· He then set himselfup at Nicopolis, in Epirus on the Greek coast, a town which served as a jumping-o point r the sea voyage across the Adriatic to Italy. There he opened a new philosophy school. The Neoplatonist Simplicius relates that Epictetus was so poor that the house he lived in at Rome had no need r a lock, since it contained nothing other than the mattress and the mat on which he used to sleep. The same author reports that Epictetus had adopted an o han, and had taken in a woman in order to bring him up,28 but he never married. 29 The precise date of his death is not known.
Epictetus wrote nothing. If we can still get some idea of his teachings, it is thanks to Arrian of Nicomedia, a politician who, as a young man about rn8 A. D. , had attended Epictetus' classes in Nicopolis, and later published the " notes " he had taken at these classes. Arrian of Nicomedia is an attractive character. 30 It should be pointed out right away that his contemporaries considered him a philosopher: inscriptions dedicated to him during his lifetime at Athens and Corinth designate him by this title. 31 The historian Cassius Dio had apparently written a "Life ofArrian the Philosopher. "32 Arrian did, indeed, leave philosophical works behind him. In addition to his notes which report the Sayings or Discourses of Epictetus, one must add a little work which was ofmuch greater impor-
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 6 1
tance in the history ofwestern thought: the so-called Manual ofEpictetus (in Greek, Encheiridion). The word Encheiridion ("that which one has at hand") alludes to a requirement of the Stoic philosophical life-a re­ quirement to which Marcus, too, had tried to respond by composing his Meditations. In every one oflife's circumstances, it was necessary to have "at hand" the principles, "dogmas," rules of life, or rmulas which would allow a person to place himself in that inner disposition most conducive to correct action, or to accept his te. The Manual is a selection ofpassages taken om the Sayings ofEpictetus. 33 It is a kind of anthology of striking maxims aimed at illuminating the philosopher in the course of his actions. Arrian also seems to have written a book on celestial phenomena, or what was called meteorology in antiquity. 34 As we have seen, however, a philosopher in antiquity was not someone who wrote philosophical books, but someone who led a philosophical life, and we have every reason to believe that Arrian, although he remained a
politician like Marcus' teacher Rusticus, tried to live like a philosopher. We can surmise this om the end ofhis pre ce to Epictetus' Discourses; by publishing them, Arrian wanted to produce in his readers the same e ect that Epictetus had on his auditors: to raise them up toward the Good. His model, moreover, was Socrates' mous disciple Xenophon, who had also had a military and political career at the same time as a literary one. Arrian wanted to be known as the "new Xenophon"; he imitates the latter both in style and in the subject matter ofhis works, and, like Xenophon, he too wrote a treatise on hunting. Above all, however, Arrian wrote the Discourses, which are as it were the Memora­ bilia ofEpictetus, the new Socrates. 35 He certainly did not have in mind a mere literary model, but a model r li : that of the philosopher in action. Two centuries later, the philosopher Themistius36 would praise Junius Rusticus and Arrian r having abandoned their books and placed themselves at the service ofthe common good, not only like Cato and other Romans, but especially like Xenophon and Socrates himsel For Rusticus and Arrian, Themistius goes on, philosophy did not stop with pen and ink: they were not content merely to write about courage, and they did not shrink om their duty ofserving the interests ofthe State.
Arrian did, indeed, enjoy a brilliant career as a statesman: he was proconsul of the province ofBeltica around 123 A. D. , consul su ectus37 in l29 or l3o, and governor of Cappadocia om l3o (or l3 l) to l37 (or l 3 8) . In this last capacity, he repulsed an invasion of the Alani in l 3 5 , made an inspection ofthe coasts ofthe Black Sea, and presented a report
on his trip to the emperor Hadrian.
In the pre ce he addressed to his friend Lucius Gellius, Arrian explains
THE INNER CITADEL
the way h e had gathered together his notes taken at the classes ven by Epictetus: "I did not compose them in a literary style, as could have been done in the case of sayings of this kind, and I did not publish them mysel precisely because I did not compose them. " In antiquity, it was in principle only works care lly composed according to the rules of style and composition that were made public, either by means of a public reading, or by giving the text over to booksellers.
Yet I tried to write down everything I heard while he was speaking, in the same words that he used, in order to preserve r myself, in the ture, "notes to help me remember" ypomnemata) his thought and his eedom of speech. It is there re natural that these notes should have the appearance of a spontaneous, man-to-man conver­ sation, and not at all that ofa composition intended to be read later.
What Arrian means is that he has reproduced, inso r as was possible, the spontaneity of an exhortation or a dialogue, and this is how he explains his use of popular language (koine) throughout the work, instead of the literary style he had used in his other books. He continues: "I do not know how notes which were in such a state have managed to nd their way into the public domain, unbeknownst to me and against my wishes. " The same thing probably happened to Arrian as had happened to Galen: class notes, initially con ded to iends, were gradually copied in a wide variety of circumstances and were thus, r all intents and purposes, "published. " "I don't particularly care ifpeople think me inca­ pable of properly composing a work. " Here, by despising literary glory, Arrian shows himselfto be a good student ofEpictetus.
As r Epictetus: it is not important in his case either, ifit is true that he held discourses in contempt. When he spoke, the only thing he wanted was to set the thoughts of his listeners in motion toward better things. If that is indeed the result of these discourses, then they will certainly not il to produce the e ect that the discourse of philosophers should produce. Ifthe contrary should occur, then at least may those who read them know that when they were spoken by Epictetus himsel the person listening to them necessarily felt what that man wanted him to feel. If these discourses il to produce this e ect, perhaps I am to blame; perhaps, however, thingsjust had to be that way.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
I shall not go into detail about the discussions to which this passage has given rise among historians. Some are of the opinion that Arrian has preserved r us in his work the very words ofEpictetus, taken down by stenography. For others, on the contrary, Arrian, in his desire to imitate Xenophon's Memorabilia, carried out a much more extensive editorial activity than he gives us to understand in his letter to Gellius: he often reconstituted Epictetus' sayings, since their literary rm is much more re ned than Arrian was willing to admit. In any case, unless we suppose that Arrian was capable ofdeveloping an original philosophical discourse himself and attributing it to Epictetus, we have no alternative but to concede that, as r as the main points are concerned, Arrian's work is closely connected with the living teaching ofEpictetus. 38
We must not conclude om this, however-as has been done by the majority ofhistorians and commentators-that all ofEpictetus' teachings are contained in the Discourses as reported by Arrian. As we read them, we nd allusions to parts of the course which were not included by Arrian. In ct, as has been shown by Souilhe,39 the greatest part of Epictetus' course, as was the case r all philosophy courses om at least the rst century A. D. on, was devoted to the explanation oftexts by the unders of the school-that is, in the case of the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. The master would explain these texts, but this was also sometimes the task ofthe auditors. Now, although Arrian did not repro­ duce one single bit of this technical aspect of Epictetus' pedagogical activity, he does sometimes allude to it. For instance, he relates a scene in which one of Epictetus' students is explaining, under the guidance of a more advanced student, a Stoic text concerning the logical problem of syllogisms (I, 26, 13); similarly, he speaks ofEpictetus getting up in the morning and thinking about how he will direct the exercise of textual explanation in his class later that day (I, IO, 8).
This part of the class, then, which consisted of "reading"40 would become the lectio ofthe Middle Ages, and nally our "lesson. " It made up the most essential part of Epictetus' teachings, but is completely absent om the Discourses of Epictetus. What they do preserve r us, however, is what could be termed the nontechnical part of the course. philosophy courses-at least since the beginning of the rst century A. D. -contained as an essential element the explanation oftexts; yet they could also end in a moment of ee discussion between the philosopher and his auditors. Aulus Gellius, writing a few decades after Arrian, tells how his Platonic teacher had the habit, a er the lectio or textual explana­ tion, of suggesting that his auditors question him on a topic of their
THE INNER CITADEL
choice. The Discourses narrated by Arrian thus correspond to those more relaxed moments in which the Master entered into a dialogue with his students, or developed remarks which he considered use l r the prac­ tice of the philosophical li . 41
It is most important to emphasize this point, r it means that we cannot expect to nd technical and systematic expositions of the whole of Stoic doctrine in Epictetus' Discourses as reported by Arrian. This does not mean, however, that Epictetus did not, in that part of course devoted to theoretical instruction, tackle the Stoic system as a whole by means of the explanation of texts. In other words, we should not say that, of the three parts of Stoic philosophy-physics, ethics, and logic-Epictetus ignores physics, or that part of this discipline which described physical phenomena; r we have no idea which Stoic texts Epictetus read during his classes, nor of the explanation he gave of them. we can say is that he does not mention physical problems in those discourses with his disciples which have come down to us. It does appear that Arrian himself wrote a book on comets, which is un rtunately now lost to us. Ifthis is true, we can presume that Arrian had been initiated by Epictetus into the philosophical treatment of this kind of question. The way Photius de­ scribes the contents of the work even allows us to see what Arrian had retained om the lessons ofEpictetus-that is, the moral signi cance that was to be attributed to physical investigations:42 "Arrian, who wrote a little work on the nature, rmation, and apparitions of comets, tries to show in a number of discussions that appearances such as this do not retell anything, either good or evil. "
We shall have occasion to return to Epictetus' conception of the tripartite division of philosophy. For the moment, it is su cient to say that it would be utte y false to conclude, on the basis of the content of the Discourses as they have come down to us, that Late Stoicism under­ went an impoverishment in its theoretical teaching. 43 In the rst place, as we have seen, the Discourses only reproduce-certainly in a highly ag­ mentary way-that part of the course which was, by de nition, neither theoretical nor technical.