Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the
physical
map
of India, I fail to see why there is this hue and cry.
of India, I fail to see why there is this hue and cry.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Jinnah.
On 1 July, 1940,
while Mr. Jinnah was at Simla, he forwarded the following sug-
gestions marked as “Tentative Proposals” to the Viceroy:
“That no pronouncement or statement should be made by His
Majesty's Government which would in any way militate against
the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore
Resolution of division of India and creating Muslim States in the
north-west and eastern zones; and it may be stated that that ideal
now has become the universal faith of Muslim India.
“That His Majesty's Government must give a definite and cate-
gorical assurance to the Musalmans of India that no interim or
final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Gov-
trnment without the previous approval of Muslim India. In view
of the rapid developments in Europe and the grave danger that is
facing India it is fully realised that everything should be done that
is possible to intensify war efforts and mobilise all the resources of
India for her defence, for the purpose of maintaining internal
security, peace and tranquillity, and to ward off external aggression.
But this can only be achieved provided the British Government are
ready and willing to associate the Muslim leadership as equal part-
ners in the Government both at the Centre and in all the Provinces.
In other words, Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as
equals and have equal share in the authority and control of the
Governments, Central and Provincial.
“Provisionally and during the period of the war, the following
steps should be taken to comply with the formula, namely, co-
operation with the Government with equal share in the authority
of the Government:
“(a) That the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be
enlarged, within the framework of the present constitutional exist-
ing law, the additional number to be settled after further discussion
but it being understood that the Muslim representation must be
equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in; otherwise they
should have the majority of the additional members as it is obvious
that the main burden and the responsibility will be borne by the
## p. 826 (#868) ############################################
826
PAKISTAN
Musalmans in that case.
“(b) That in the provinces where Section 93 of the Act has to
operate, non-official Advisers should be appointed, the number to
be fixed after further discussion, and the majority of the non-official
Advisers should be the representatives of Musalmans; and where
the provinces can be run by a combination of parties or ‘coalition,'
naturally it would be for the parties concerned to adjust matters
by agreement among themselves.
"(c) That there should be a War Council consisting of not less
than fifteen members, including the President, to be presided over
by His Excellency the Viceroy. I do not like the expression ‘War
Consultative Committee'. This Council should regularly meet to
deal with, and review the general situation as it may develop from
time to time, and advise the Government with regard to matters in
connection with the prosecution of the war generally, and in parti-
cular, the fullest development of defence possible and of finance and
to make a thorough economic and industrial drive. On this body it
will not be difficult to secure the representation and full co-operation
of the Indian Princes, and as far as I can judge they would have
no difficulty in joining it. It is through this body that the associa-
tion of the Princes can be secured. Here again the representation
of the Muslim India must be equal to that of Hindus if the Con-
gress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority.
“Finally, the representatives of the Musalmans on the proposed
War Council and the Executive Council of the Governor-General
and the additional non-official Advisers of the Governors, should
be chosen by the Muslim League. ”
The Viceroy wrote back to Jinnah on 6 July, 1940, as follows:
“I am much obliged for the private and personal memorandum
headed “Tentative Proposals' which you were kind enough to send
me in your letter to my Private Secretary on July 1. I note the
points taken in Paragraph 1 of that memorandum, and in the first
sentence of Paragraph 2, both of which you emphasised in our
recent conversation. I welcome also the amplification, as putting
me in fuller possession of your mind, of that conversation represent-
ed by the balance of your letter. But certain of the points taken
suggest there may be same slight misapprehension, which you will
I think, agree that it would be desirable that I should clear without
delay.
“As regards my expansion of the Executive Council, this would,
as you rightly observe in your memorandum, be within the existing
constitutional scheme. In other words, any council so expanded
would co-operate as a whole and as a single Government of India.
It is not a case of striking a balance between the different interests
## p. 827 (#869) ############################################
TENTATIVE PROPOSALS OF JINNAH
827
Gov
or of preserving the proportions between the important parties. As
you yourself indicated in the course of our conversation, there are
parties other than either Congress or the Muslim League who may
fairly claim to be considered for inclusion, and there is a very defi-
nite limit of numbers to any possible expansion. At the same time
I readily accept the importance, in the event of any expansion, of
securing adequate representation of Muslim interests and that is a
point which I would bear in mind.
“There is, however, as you will see from my explanation, no
question of responsibility falling in greater or less degree on any
particular section. Responsibility will be that of the Governor-
General-in-Council as a whole. Again, it will be clear that under
existing law and practice it must remain with the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Governor-General, to decide upon such
names as we may submit to His Majesty the King for inclusion in
the Governor-General's Executive Council, and such persons can-
not be the nominees of political parties, however important, though
it may, of course, be assumed that both the Secretary of State and
the Governor-General would, in all cases, do their utmost to select
persons from the various sections of the community.
“I need not remind you that under law the whole responsibility
of Government in Section 93 provinces vests exclusively in the
or, although a Governor can, of course, take advantage of
the assistance of any advisers he may appoint. Whether, and if
so at what point and in what strength, non-official Advisers from
political parties should be appointed in provinces under Section 93
administration, in the event of an expansion of the Governor-
General's Council would clearly call for consideration in the light
of circumstances of each province. You will, I think, agree with
me also that the importance of the community from which Advisers
are drawn in a particular province has a direct bearing.
“Your idea for a War Council is, in my view, well worth-while
considering, though details would have to be worked out Here
again there are, of course, many parties to be considered other than
the Muslim League or the Congress.
“As regards Section III of your memorandum, I ought, I think,
to make it clear that it would be constitutionally impossible for the
choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to any expanded Ex-
ecutive Council or as non-official Advisers to rest with the Muslim
League. But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that
any suggestions you may put forward would not receive full con-
sideration.
“Let me, in conclusion, thank you again for your very clear and
valuable memorandum. I realise, of course, fully that it is not
## p. 828 (#870) ############################################
828
PAKISTAN
merely private and personal, but that, in your own words, it em-
bodies a tentative proposal. I am sure that you will agree with me
that it is well that there should be no misunderstanding on the im-
portant points on which I have touched above. "
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION (1940)
At this stage, it seems desirable to refer to the circumstances
which led to the passing of the Pakistan Resolution at Lahore on
23 March, 1940. It was in October, 1938, that a resolution was
passed by the Sind Muslim League Conference held at Karachi.
The resolution was in these words: “This Conference considers
it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the
vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural
development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-
determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims,
to recommend to All-India Muslim League to review and revise
the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for
India which will secure honourable and legitimate status due to
them, and that this conference therefore recommends to the All-
India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under
which Muslims may attain full independence. ” The resolution
also disapproved of the scheme of the All-India federation as em-
bodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 and urged the
British Government not to enforce it as it was detrimental to the
interests of the Muslims.
When the annual session of the All-India Muslim League was
held at Patna in December 1938, a resolution was passed by which
the President of the Muslim League was given the authority to
adopt such course as might be necessary with a view to exploring
a suitable alternative to the Government of India Act, 1935 which
could safeguard the interests of the Muslims of India. When the
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met at Meerut
on 26 March, 1939, a Committee was appointed to examine and
report on the various draft schemes “already propounded by those
who are fully versed in the constitutional developments of India
and other countries and those that may be submitted hereafter to
the President and report to the Working Committee their con-
clusions at an early date". Some of the important members of
this Committee were President Jinnah, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan,
Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Sayyed Abdul Aziz, Liaquat
Ali Khan, Sir Nazimuddin, etc. The above resolution of the Work-
ing Committee was placed before the Council of the All-India
Muslim League for ratification in April 1939. On that occasion,
## p. 829 (#871) ############################################
SCHEMES OF PAKISTAN
829
Mr. Jinnah observed: “In regard to Federation, there were several
schemes in the field including that of dividing the country into
Muslim and Hindu India. These schemes were before the Com-
mittee which had been set up by the Working Committee of the
League. The Committee was not pledged to any particular
scheme. It would examine the whole question and produce a
scheme which according to the Committee, would be in the best
interests of the Muslims of India. ”
The Committee appointed by the Muslim League examined a
number of schemes. The schemes of Dr. Iqbal and Choudhry
Rahmat Ali have already been discussed above. Dr. Syed Abdul
Latif of Hyderabad, Deccan published his scheme in 1939. The
Indian Federation was to consist of four Muslim cultural zones and
eleven Hindu cultural zones. The four Muslim cultural zones
were the North-West bloc embracing Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab,
North-West Frontier Province and the Indian States of Khairpur
and Bahawalpur, the North-East bloc of Eastern Bengal and
Assam, the Delhi-Lucknow bloc extending from the Eastern border
of Patiala to Lucknow and the Deccari bloc embracing the state
of Hyderabad and including a strip of territory in the South with
an opening to the sea. It is interesting to know that although the
Muslims were in a hopeless minority in the state of Hyderabad,
Dr. Latif still wanted a Muslim zone for that area as he belonged
to Hyderabad. As he himself was an Urdu speaking Muslim, he
advocated the creation of the Delhi-Lucknow bloc.
bloc. Dr. Latif's
view was that such a zone could be created by the exchange
of population. His scheme provided for a weak centre having con-
trol over Defence, Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Communi-
cations. The residuary powers were to be with the provinces.
Dr. Latif was not in favour of a Parliamentary form of Govern-
ment in India as that would have meant the rule by the Hindus.
Therefore, he suggested the creation of a composite executive drawn
from all parties or groups. Dr. Latif was in favour of giving the
ports of Calcutta and Madras to the Muslims.
The Aligarh scheme was prepared by Professor Syed Zafar-ul-
Hasan and Dr. Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri of the Aligarh
Muslim University. According to it, British India was to be divided
into three independent, sovereign states. There were to be two
Muslim states of North-West India and Bengal and the Hindu state
known as Hindustan was to cover the rest of British India. The
Muslim state of North-West India was to be known as the Pakistan
Federation and Bengal was to be known as the Muslim Federation.
Hyderabad with its old dominions of Merar and Carnatic was to be
created a sovereign state. Delhi and Malabar were to be raised to
## p. 830 (#872) ############################################
830
PAKISTAN
the status of Provinces in Hindustan so that they may be able to
protect the interests of the Muslims. All the towns of Hindustan
with a population of 50,000 or more were to have the status of a
borough with a large measure of autonoiny. After the partition of
British India, the Muslims in Hindustan were to be recognized as
a separate nation and allowed to have their separate organization.
In the summer of 1939, Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz
Khan of Mamdot was the President of the Punjab Provincial
Muslim League. He published his scheme in a book entitled “The
Confederacy of India". According to his scheme, India was to be
divided into five "countries”, viz. , the Indus Regions, Rajistan
,
comprising the states of Rajputana and Central India, the Deccan
states built around the states of Hyderabad and Myscre, Bengal
(excluding the Hindu districts in it but including parts of Assam
and other states) and Hindu India lying in the Central Region
and including all the territory not covered by the other four ‘coun-
tries'. There was to be no transfer of population as the same was
inconvenient and expensive. The author was not in favour of a
separate Muslim Federation. To quote him, “The foreign element
amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil
as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and
not out of it”. The scheme was silent with regard to the subjects
to be assigned to the Confederacy of India. The cost of Defence
was to be shared equally by the five members of the Confederacy.
Fiscal policy was to be controlled by the Centre. The scheme said
nothing about the constitutions of the five countries in which India
was to be divided.
Sir Abdoola Haroon put forward his own scheme. According
to him, India was to be divided into two separate federations, each
drawing its support from one of the major communities in India.
The Muslim Federation was to comprise the North-Western part
of India and Kashmir. However, nothing was said about Bengal
and Hyderabad. Sir Abdoola Haroon tells us that the Muslim
League circles had begun drifting in the direction of "a separate
federation of Muslim states and Provinces so that we are free, once
and for all, from the Hindu molestation".
Sir Sikander Hyat Khan published his scheme in July 1939.
It provided for a two-tier federation, a regional and an All-India
Federation. India was to be divided into seven zones, viz. , zone 1 con-
sisting of Assam, Bengal, Bengal states and Sikkim, zone 2 consisting
of Bihar and Orissa, zone 3 consisting of the United Provinces and
U. P. States, zone 4 consisting of Madras, Travancore, Madras
States and Coorg, zone 5 consisting of Bombay, Hyderabad, Western
India States, Bombay States, Mysore and C. P. States, zone 6 con:
## p. 831 (#873) ############################################
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION
831
zones.
sisting of Rajputana States (excluding Bikaner and Jaisalmer),
Gwalior, Central India States, Bihar, Orissa States, C. P. and Berar
and zone 7 consisting of the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier
Province, Kashmir, Punjab States, Baluchistan, Bikaner and
Jaisalmer. Each zone was to have its own legislature consisting of
representatives of British India and Indian States within these
The Central Federal Assembly was to consist of 375 mem-
bers, 250 from British India and 125 from the Indian states. The
Muslims were to be at least one-third of the total number of re-
presentatives in the Federal Assembly. The Viceroy was to be
the Head of the Federal executive. The Federal executive was to
have at least one representative from each zone. At least one-
third of the ministers were to be Muslims. The Federal Govern-
ment was given subjects like Defence, External Affairs, Communi-
cations, Customs, Coinage, Currency, etc. The residuary powers
were to be with units.
It is true that the Committee of the Muslim League examined
the various schemes before the Lahore Session of the All-India
Muslim League held in March 1940, but the Committee was not
able to recommend any particular scheme it preferred. In his
Presidential address, Mr. Jinnah pointed out that no final scheme
had emerged from the Committee. As to what happened in the
Working Committee of the Muslim League before the Lahore Re-
solution of 23 March, 1940, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan observes: “I
have no hesitation in admitting that I was responsible for drafting
the original resolution. But let me make it clear that the resolu-
tion which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Com-
mittee, and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted
and the one that was finally passed. The main difference between
the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which
related to the centre and co-ordination of the activities of the var-
ious units, was eliminated. ”
While presiding over the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim
League, Mr. Jinnah declared on 22 March, 1940 that the Mussal-
mans were not a minority and they were a nation by any definition.
To quote him, “If the British Government are really in earnest and
sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-
continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations
separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national
States. There is no reason why the States should be antagonistic
to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural
desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order
and establish political supremacy over the other in the govern-
ment of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards
## p. 832 (#874) ############################################
832
PAKISTAN
natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they
can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will
lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard
to minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between
Muslim India and Hindu India which will far more adequately and
effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and var-
ious other minorities.
“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends
fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are
not religious in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, quite
different distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus
and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality and this
misconception of the Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits
and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to
destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus
and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social
customs, literatures. They neithher inter-marry, nor inter-dine and,
indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based
mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life
and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussal-
mans derive their inspiration from different sources of history.
They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different
episodes. Very often the hero of one is foe of the other and, like-
wise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two
such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and
the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final
destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the govern-
ment of such a State. "
On 23 March, 1940 was passed a resolution by the All-India
Muslim League. It is known as the Lahore Resolution or the
Pakistan Resolution. The resolution was in these terms: "Resolved
that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim
League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this coun-
try or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following
basic principle, namely, the geographically continuous units are
demarcated in regions which should be so constituted, with such
territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in
which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-
Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to con-
stitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.
"That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units
## p. 833 (#875) ############################################
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION
833
and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in
consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the
Mussalmans are in a majority, adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them
and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in
consultation with them.
“This session further authorises the Working Committee to
frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic prin-
ciples providing for the assumption finally by the respeciive regions
of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications,
customs and such other matters as may be necessary. "
It is to be observed that in the Lahore resolution, there is no
mention of the word Pakistan. This name was given to this re-
solution later on. In his Presidential address in the Delhi session
of the Muslim League held in 1943, Mr. Jinnah made it clear that
the word Pakistan was coined neither by him nor by the Muslim
League. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “You know perfectly well that
Pakistan is a word which is really foisted upon us and fathered
on us by some section of the Hindu press and also by the British
press. Now our resolution was known for a long time as the
Lahore resolution, popularly known as Pakistan. But how long
are we to have this long phrase? Now I say to my Hindu and
British friends: We thank you for giving us one word. ”
The Lahore resolution was vague in many ways. It did not
clearly demarcate the areas in the North-Western and Eastern
Zones of India which were to be grouped to constitute independent
Muslim states. Probably, the language used was deliberately kept
vague in order to give room to the leaders of the Muslim League
for bargaining and manoeuvring. It was rightly pointed out by
Lord Mountbatten to the leaders of the Muslim League that the
areas of Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution did not in-
clude the entire Provinces of the Punjab, Bengal and Assim because
the resolution specifically used the phrase "areas in which
the
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and
Eastern Zones of India".
The Lahore Resolution was a personal triumph for Mr. Jinnah
and it established his dictatorial leadership beyond all possibility
of overthrow. On account of the Second World War, the British
Government also began to rely more and more on the support of
the Muslims, the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah.
About the Lahore Resolution, Dr. Rajendra Prasad observed:
“When insisted to elaborate the scheme and furnish details as re-
## p. 834 (#876) ############################################
834
PAKISTAN
gards the territories to be included in the regions and other matters,
he has refused to do so, insisting that the principle should be first
accepted and then and only then wiil he be prepared to work out
or disclose details. ” Dr. Rajendra Prasad pointed out the ambiguities
in the Lahore Resolution in these words: “The questions that arise
are: (a) Who is to frame the constitution? (b) What is to be the
nature of the constitution contemplated—theocratic, oligarchic,
totalitarian, or any other? (c) What is the relation of these inde-
pendent States going to be with the British Empire and the non-
Muslim Zones? (d) In case of breach of any of the mandatory
safeguards for the protection of the minorities, how, by whom and
under what sanction are these safeguards to be enforced? (e) What
are the territories to be included in the Muslim State or States? (f)
What will be their resources and position? (g) What is the authority
that will be in charge of defence, external affairs, etc. ? ”
Regarding the importance of the Lahore Resolution, Dr. Lal
Bahadur says: “The Lahore Resolution was the highest culmination
of Muslim aspirations roused by leaders from Syed Ahmed's times.
But it was never put so boldly as in 1940. It was vehemently cri-
ticised by organisations and individuals on several grounds and
some believed it to be a practical impossibility but its authors knew
that it would, one day, be a reality and those who had statesman-
ship and political imagination understood the danger lurking behind
a demand of this character. It gave the League a new ambition
and new programme. A renewed stress was laid on the two-nation
theory and communal differences were exaggerated with re-doubled
energy. It was, therefore, natural that the relations between the
Congress and the League be marred in their highest degree. "
A Muslim writer contends that the Lahore Resolution was a
landmark in the history of India and that of the Mussalmans.
Before the passing of that resolution, Muslim India had no goal
in view and Muslim politics remained in the hands of individuals
who had conflicting interests and inclinations. Very often, the col-
lective good of the Muslims suffered either at their hands or at the
hands of their agents and wire-pullers. Dr. Iqbal and his followers
had tried to place a goal before the Muslims but they were not
able to achieve it. It was left to Jinnah to fulfil the aspirations
of the Muslims. It was under his leadership that the Muslims of
India were organised and learned the lesson that their organisation
was more important than the individuals. By and by, the British
Government came to realise that nothing could be done in India
without the consent and approval of the Muslims, the Muslim
League and Mr. Jinnah.
It looked strange to Mr. Jinnah that “men like Mr. Gandhi and
## p. 835 (#877) ############################################
AUGUST OFFER AND LEAGUE
835
Mr. Rajagopalachari should talk about the Lahore resolution in
such terms as 'vivisection of India' and 'cutting the baby into two
halves'. Surely, today India is divided and partitioned by Nature.
Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map
of India, I fail to see why there is this hue and cry. Where is the
nation which is denationalised? India is composed of nationalities,
to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes. Where is the cen-
tral national Government whose authority is being violated? India
is held by the British power and that is the hand that holds and
gives the impression of a United India and a unitary Government.
Indian nation and Central Government do not exist. It is only
the convenient imagination of the Congress High Command. It
is pure intellectual and mental luxury, in which some of the Hindu
leaders have been indulging so recklessly. "
On 8 August, 1940 Lord Linlithgow made a statement on behalf
of the British Government. This is known as the August Offer.
It was clearly stated by the Viceroy that in view of the doubts as to
whether the position of the minorities would be sufficiently safe-
guarded in any future constitutional change, the British Govern-
ment reaffirmed its desire that full weight should be given to minority
opinion. “It goes without saying that they could not contemplate
transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare
of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly
denied by large and powerfui elements in India's national life.
Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into sub-
mission to such a Government. "
The Working Committee of the Muslim League welcomed that
part of the August Offer which was condemned by the Congress.
It was resolved that the August Offer met the demand of the
League "for a clear assurance to the effect that no future constitu-
tion, interim or final, should be adopted by the British Govern-
ment without their approval and consent. ” It was also declared
that "the partition of India was the only solution of the most diffi-
cult problem of India's future constitution. ” In spite of this the
Muslim League neither accepted nor rejected the August Offer.
While addressing the Central Assembly in November, 1940, Mr.
Jinnah emphatically declared: “And although I am pressed for
time, I think I must tell the House the correct position. And I
tell you and my Congress friends that they have still at the back
of their mind the idea that the Congress and Congress alone
re-
present the country, the people of India, the Indian nation, and
so on; that they alone are the spokesmen, and that the Muslims
and others are minorities. I say this on the floor of this House
that the reason why there has not been a settlement between the
>
## p. 836 (#878) ############################################
836
PAKISTAN
Hindus and Musalmans is that the Congress is a Hindu organi-
sation, whatever they may say—that the Hindu leaders and Con-
gres leaders have had always at the back of their minds the basis
that the Musalmans have to come within the ken of the Congress
and the Hindu Raj, that they are a minority, and all that they
can justly press for is merely safeguards as a minority, whereas let
me tell gentlemen of the Congress and the Nationalist Congress
Party members that the Musalmans always had at their back the
basis—and it has never been different during the last twenty-five
years—that they are a separate entity. "
While speaking at the Madras session of the Muslim League in
1941, Mr. Jinnah gave a warning to the British Government in
these words: "I think I have taken much more time of yours than
I thought I would, but it seems to me that I can only wind up
on a note-a note which is really of warning to the British Govern-
ment; because, after all, they are in possession of this land and the
Government of this sub-continent. Please stop your policy of ap-
peasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating the war
effort, doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the
defence of India at this critical moment. Do you want at this
moment to place them in a superior and dominant position now
and after the war? Change the corner-stone of the British policy
in this country. You are not loyal to those who are willing to
stand by you and who sincerely desire to support you.
desire to placate those who have the greatest nuisance-value in
political and economic fields. Give up the dominant feature of
this policy and the character of this policy. It is that you are try-
ing to get on with those who do not want to get on with you. If
you want honestly the support and the co-operation of Muslim
India, place your cards on the table and take action. "
But you
CRIPPS MISSION (1942)
In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India by the
British Government with certain proposals for ending the dead-
lock prevailing in India. Soon after his arrival in India, he com-
municated the contents of the Draft declaration of the British Gov-
ernment brought by him to India, to Indian leaders on 25 March,
1942. It was provided in the draft declaration that imme-
diately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps would be taken to
set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing
a new constitution for India. His Majesty's Government under-
took to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed
subject only to the right of any Province of British India that was
## p. 837 (#879) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
837
not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present
constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent ac-
cession if it so decided. " With such non-acceding provinces, if they
so desire, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree
upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the
Indian union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that
here laid down.
The Cripps proposals were rejected by the Indian National Con-
gress. The Muslim League was opposed to the creation of a single
Indian Union. It was feared that if one single union was crea-
ted, the creation of another may become impossible. The system
of election by a single electoral college by proportional represen-
tation was opposed. That was not in accordance with the system
of communal representation which enabled the Muslims to send
their own representatives. The League also objected to the me-
thod and procedure for non-accession of Indian Provinces. It was
contended on behalf of the Muslim League that the Provinces of
India were created for administrative convenience and not on any
logical basis. The League demanded the re-distribution of the
Provinces. It opposed the plebiscite by the whole of the adult
population of India. It demanded the inherent right of self-deter-
mination for the Muslims alone. The scheme was not acceptable
to the League because Pakistan was not conceded unequivocally
and the right of Muslim self-determination was denied although
the recognition given to the principle of partition was very much
appreciated. The view of Mr. Jinnah was that "the Draft Dec-
laration, in fact, went some way to meet the Muslim case, but not
far enough. "
After the failure of Cripps' Mission in March 1942, the Con-
gress passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8 August 1942.
The result was that all the Congress leaders in the country, whe-
ther big or small, were arrested and they remained in jail for
about 3 years. The Muslim League took full advantage of this
.
opportunity as there was practically no rival in the field and was
able to strengthen its position in the country. There was none to
question or contradict the statements made and the false propa-
ganda carried on by the leaders of the Muslim League and their
agents. The Government was also favourably inclined toward
the Muslim League as it was not standing in the way of its war-
effort. No wonder, the Muslim League was able to achieve a lot
during this period.
MUSLIM LEAGUE AND QUIT INDIA RESOLUTION
The Working Committee of the Muslim League which held its
## p. 838 (#880) ############################################
838
PAKISTAN
. . . . . .
sittings from 16 to 20 August, 1942 passed a resolution criticising
the Quit India movement of the Congress in these words: “The
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. . . . . . dep-
lores the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee
on August 8, 1942, to launch an open rebellion. . . . . . in pursuance
of their objective of establishing Congress Hindu domination in
India. . . . . It is the considered opinion of the Working Com-
mittee that this movement is directed not only to coerce the British
Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy. . . . .
but also to force the Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the
Congress terms and dictation. ” On 7 September 1942, Mr.
Jinnah congratulated the Muslims "for completely keeping them-
selves aloof from the Mass Civil Disobedience Movement launched
by the Congress. ” He attacked the Congress attempt to establish
democracy in India as a conspiracy to set up a Hindu Raj in the
country. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “When you talk of democracy, you
mean Hindu Raj to dominate over the Muslims, a totally different
nation, different in culture, different in everything. You yourself are
working for Hindu nationalism and Hindu Raj. ” In the course of his
Presidential address at the Karachi session of the Musiim League
held on 24 December, 1943, Mr. Jinnah asked, “Can we Mussal-
mans of India accept Akhand Hindustan, Hindu Raj over the
entire sub-continent? " Speaking at a meeting of the Muslim fede-
”
ration at Bombay on 24 January 1943, Mr. Jinnah described the
Mahasabha as "a counter-part of the Congress. "
Mr. Jinnah also asserted that the Congress could not attain its
objective of independence without the concurrence of the Muslim
League. He asked, “Do the Congress or Mr. Gandhi or other
Hindu leaders think that they can achieve the independence of
India without an agreement with the Muslim League? ” In his
speech at the Muslim Federation of Bombay, Mr. Jinnah. observed,
"The policy adopted—as has been stated by Mr. Gandhi—is a suici-
dal policy. May be that the Mussalmans are numerically one-
fourth. But you cannot always go by counting heads. The Mus-
lims are a very powerful nation in this sub-continent” and “the
hundred million Muslims would undoubtedly revolt and would
never submit to be at the mercy of a Hindu Raj. "
a
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
An interesting plea was put forward by the Muslim League in
favour of Pakistan. It was contended that while Pakistan meant
freedom both for the Hindus and Muslims, the Hindu demand
for a united India meant Hindu Rule and Muslim subiection. It
## p. 839 (#881) ############################################
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
839
was further contended that the Muslim League aimed at “sovereign
states for Hindus and Muslims in their homelands, guaranteeing
to each the power and opportunity to work out his destiny in his
own way according to his genius, tradition and culture. ” Mr.
Jinnah was prepared to come to terms with Mahatma Gandhi if
the latter accepted the Muslim demand of Pakistan. To quote
Mr. Jinnah, “Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr.
Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the
Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it
will be the greatest day both for the Hindus and Mussalmans. ”
Mr. Jinnah emphasised the differences between the Hindus and
Muslims and criticised his Hindu friends for their failure to
understand the fundamental differences between the two religions.
To quote Mr. Jinnah, “The Hindus and Muslims belong to two
different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They
neither intermarry nor interdine. . . . Their aspects of life and
own life
are different. . . . They have different epics, different
heroes and different episodes. . . . . . To yoke together two such
nations under a single state. . . . . . must lead to growing discontent
and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for
the Government of such a state. "
Hindu-Muslim differences were also emphasised by other Mus-
lim writers. Mr. Z. A. Suleri pointed out that “Hindu-Muslim
differences are not born of dress or language; they are fundamen-
tally due to the clash between Hindu and Muslim ideologies. . . . .
Hindus worshipped idols, Mussalmans owe allegiance to one God;
Hindus believed in castes, Muslims repudiate them; Hindus
flourished on interest, Muslims want to abolish it. ” The view
of El Hamza was that National Unity was the product of homo-
geneity and where the population was comprised of "widely differ-
ent elements which owing to complete absence of blood intermixture
and in the presence of great cultural differences are reconcilable
on a national basis, then a common administration instead of
effecting a fusion brings about the opposite result of accentuating
the antagonism between different interests. "
In order to carry on propaganda in favour of Pakistan, a Com-
mittee of writers was set up by the Muslim League with Jamil-ud-
Din as its convener. Pakistan Literature Series were issued in
furtherance of the cause of a separate homeland for the Mussal-
Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf of Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore
served the cause of Pakistan by publishing most of the propaganda
literature. About the Hindu-Muslim differences, Professor Said-
ud-Din Ahmad of the Muslim University, Aligarh observed, “They
possess different faiths. . . . . . While idol-worship is prohibited in
mans.
## p. 840 (#882) ############################################
840
PAKISTAN
the one, it is the basis of prayer in the other. While the Mussalmans
worship only one God, Hindus have many of them. With the
division of divinity, the whole social and moral structure is clearly
demarcated. The forms of prayer and rituals and the places of
pilgrimage are different. ” Professor Said-ud-Din Ahmad went to
the extent of saying that "there is no such thing as an Indian
Nation. ” He described the unity of India as a false notion from
.
the geographical point of view and pointed out four clearly demar-
cated geographical areas in India. It was in this way that he used
his knowledge of geography to support the Muslim demand for
Pakistan.
Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad was in favour of the creation of Pakistan
even before the attainment of independence by India. He employ-
ed militant and diplomatic language to support the cause of Pakis-
tan. He wrote, “Talk of independence before Pakistan is a camou-
flage intended to hoodwink the Muslims and other minorities.
Pakistan presupposes the independence of India. ” He contended
that free Pakistan and free Hindustan would live in amity and
brotherhood. He put emphasis on the fact that the so-called unity
of India was a myth.
Mr. Jinnah justified the demand for Pakistan on spiritual, cul-
tural and religious grounds. His contention was that the progress
of the Muslims in various spheres of life was not possible without
Pakistan. Only a Muslim independent and sovereign state could
promote the interests of the Muslims. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “We
wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, eco-
nomic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in
consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our
own people. ” The propaganda carried on by Mr. Jinnah was that
it was impossible to live under Congress Raj on account of the
acts of injustices. Moreover, it was absolutely essential for all-
round development of Mussalmans to reside in a separate Muslim
homeland.
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar published in 1941 a book entitled “Thoughts
on Pakistan" and in that he supported the cause of Pakistan. The
book was divided into three parts. The first part was confined
to a statement of the Muslim case for Pakistan. The second part
dealt with the Hindu case against Pakistan and the third part des-
cribed the alternative to Pakistan. Dr. Ambedkar pointed out
that the Muslims asked for administrative areas ethnically homo-
geneous so that they might be constituted into a separate state on
the ground that the Muslims were a separate nation and also be-
cause the Hindus desired to use their majority to treat the Muslims
as second class citizens. The view of Dr. Ambedkar was that there
## p. 841 (#883) ############################################
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
841
9
was no substance in the Hindu opposition to Pakistan. The Hindus
feared the break-up of Indian Unity, the weakness of defences and
the inability of Pakistan demand to solve the communal problem.
while Mr. Jinnah was at Simla, he forwarded the following sug-
gestions marked as “Tentative Proposals” to the Viceroy:
“That no pronouncement or statement should be made by His
Majesty's Government which would in any way militate against
the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore
Resolution of division of India and creating Muslim States in the
north-west and eastern zones; and it may be stated that that ideal
now has become the universal faith of Muslim India.
“That His Majesty's Government must give a definite and cate-
gorical assurance to the Musalmans of India that no interim or
final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Gov-
trnment without the previous approval of Muslim India. In view
of the rapid developments in Europe and the grave danger that is
facing India it is fully realised that everything should be done that
is possible to intensify war efforts and mobilise all the resources of
India for her defence, for the purpose of maintaining internal
security, peace and tranquillity, and to ward off external aggression.
But this can only be achieved provided the British Government are
ready and willing to associate the Muslim leadership as equal part-
ners in the Government both at the Centre and in all the Provinces.
In other words, Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as
equals and have equal share in the authority and control of the
Governments, Central and Provincial.
“Provisionally and during the period of the war, the following
steps should be taken to comply with the formula, namely, co-
operation with the Government with equal share in the authority
of the Government:
“(a) That the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be
enlarged, within the framework of the present constitutional exist-
ing law, the additional number to be settled after further discussion
but it being understood that the Muslim representation must be
equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in; otherwise they
should have the majority of the additional members as it is obvious
that the main burden and the responsibility will be borne by the
## p. 826 (#868) ############################################
826
PAKISTAN
Musalmans in that case.
“(b) That in the provinces where Section 93 of the Act has to
operate, non-official Advisers should be appointed, the number to
be fixed after further discussion, and the majority of the non-official
Advisers should be the representatives of Musalmans; and where
the provinces can be run by a combination of parties or ‘coalition,'
naturally it would be for the parties concerned to adjust matters
by agreement among themselves.
"(c) That there should be a War Council consisting of not less
than fifteen members, including the President, to be presided over
by His Excellency the Viceroy. I do not like the expression ‘War
Consultative Committee'. This Council should regularly meet to
deal with, and review the general situation as it may develop from
time to time, and advise the Government with regard to matters in
connection with the prosecution of the war generally, and in parti-
cular, the fullest development of defence possible and of finance and
to make a thorough economic and industrial drive. On this body it
will not be difficult to secure the representation and full co-operation
of the Indian Princes, and as far as I can judge they would have
no difficulty in joining it. It is through this body that the associa-
tion of the Princes can be secured. Here again the representation
of the Muslim India must be equal to that of Hindus if the Con-
gress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority.
“Finally, the representatives of the Musalmans on the proposed
War Council and the Executive Council of the Governor-General
and the additional non-official Advisers of the Governors, should
be chosen by the Muslim League. ”
The Viceroy wrote back to Jinnah on 6 July, 1940, as follows:
“I am much obliged for the private and personal memorandum
headed “Tentative Proposals' which you were kind enough to send
me in your letter to my Private Secretary on July 1. I note the
points taken in Paragraph 1 of that memorandum, and in the first
sentence of Paragraph 2, both of which you emphasised in our
recent conversation. I welcome also the amplification, as putting
me in fuller possession of your mind, of that conversation represent-
ed by the balance of your letter. But certain of the points taken
suggest there may be same slight misapprehension, which you will
I think, agree that it would be desirable that I should clear without
delay.
“As regards my expansion of the Executive Council, this would,
as you rightly observe in your memorandum, be within the existing
constitutional scheme. In other words, any council so expanded
would co-operate as a whole and as a single Government of India.
It is not a case of striking a balance between the different interests
## p. 827 (#869) ############################################
TENTATIVE PROPOSALS OF JINNAH
827
Gov
or of preserving the proportions between the important parties. As
you yourself indicated in the course of our conversation, there are
parties other than either Congress or the Muslim League who may
fairly claim to be considered for inclusion, and there is a very defi-
nite limit of numbers to any possible expansion. At the same time
I readily accept the importance, in the event of any expansion, of
securing adequate representation of Muslim interests and that is a
point which I would bear in mind.
“There is, however, as you will see from my explanation, no
question of responsibility falling in greater or less degree on any
particular section. Responsibility will be that of the Governor-
General-in-Council as a whole. Again, it will be clear that under
existing law and practice it must remain with the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Governor-General, to decide upon such
names as we may submit to His Majesty the King for inclusion in
the Governor-General's Executive Council, and such persons can-
not be the nominees of political parties, however important, though
it may, of course, be assumed that both the Secretary of State and
the Governor-General would, in all cases, do their utmost to select
persons from the various sections of the community.
“I need not remind you that under law the whole responsibility
of Government in Section 93 provinces vests exclusively in the
or, although a Governor can, of course, take advantage of
the assistance of any advisers he may appoint. Whether, and if
so at what point and in what strength, non-official Advisers from
political parties should be appointed in provinces under Section 93
administration, in the event of an expansion of the Governor-
General's Council would clearly call for consideration in the light
of circumstances of each province. You will, I think, agree with
me also that the importance of the community from which Advisers
are drawn in a particular province has a direct bearing.
“Your idea for a War Council is, in my view, well worth-while
considering, though details would have to be worked out Here
again there are, of course, many parties to be considered other than
the Muslim League or the Congress.
“As regards Section III of your memorandum, I ought, I think,
to make it clear that it would be constitutionally impossible for the
choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to any expanded Ex-
ecutive Council or as non-official Advisers to rest with the Muslim
League. But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that
any suggestions you may put forward would not receive full con-
sideration.
“Let me, in conclusion, thank you again for your very clear and
valuable memorandum. I realise, of course, fully that it is not
## p. 828 (#870) ############################################
828
PAKISTAN
merely private and personal, but that, in your own words, it em-
bodies a tentative proposal. I am sure that you will agree with me
that it is well that there should be no misunderstanding on the im-
portant points on which I have touched above. "
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION (1940)
At this stage, it seems desirable to refer to the circumstances
which led to the passing of the Pakistan Resolution at Lahore on
23 March, 1940. It was in October, 1938, that a resolution was
passed by the Sind Muslim League Conference held at Karachi.
The resolution was in these words: “This Conference considers
it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the
vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural
development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-
determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims,
to recommend to All-India Muslim League to review and revise
the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for
India which will secure honourable and legitimate status due to
them, and that this conference therefore recommends to the All-
India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under
which Muslims may attain full independence. ” The resolution
also disapproved of the scheme of the All-India federation as em-
bodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 and urged the
British Government not to enforce it as it was detrimental to the
interests of the Muslims.
When the annual session of the All-India Muslim League was
held at Patna in December 1938, a resolution was passed by which
the President of the Muslim League was given the authority to
adopt such course as might be necessary with a view to exploring
a suitable alternative to the Government of India Act, 1935 which
could safeguard the interests of the Muslims of India. When the
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met at Meerut
on 26 March, 1939, a Committee was appointed to examine and
report on the various draft schemes “already propounded by those
who are fully versed in the constitutional developments of India
and other countries and those that may be submitted hereafter to
the President and report to the Working Committee their con-
clusions at an early date". Some of the important members of
this Committee were President Jinnah, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan,
Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Sayyed Abdul Aziz, Liaquat
Ali Khan, Sir Nazimuddin, etc. The above resolution of the Work-
ing Committee was placed before the Council of the All-India
Muslim League for ratification in April 1939. On that occasion,
## p. 829 (#871) ############################################
SCHEMES OF PAKISTAN
829
Mr. Jinnah observed: “In regard to Federation, there were several
schemes in the field including that of dividing the country into
Muslim and Hindu India. These schemes were before the Com-
mittee which had been set up by the Working Committee of the
League. The Committee was not pledged to any particular
scheme. It would examine the whole question and produce a
scheme which according to the Committee, would be in the best
interests of the Muslims of India. ”
The Committee appointed by the Muslim League examined a
number of schemes. The schemes of Dr. Iqbal and Choudhry
Rahmat Ali have already been discussed above. Dr. Syed Abdul
Latif of Hyderabad, Deccan published his scheme in 1939. The
Indian Federation was to consist of four Muslim cultural zones and
eleven Hindu cultural zones. The four Muslim cultural zones
were the North-West bloc embracing Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab,
North-West Frontier Province and the Indian States of Khairpur
and Bahawalpur, the North-East bloc of Eastern Bengal and
Assam, the Delhi-Lucknow bloc extending from the Eastern border
of Patiala to Lucknow and the Deccari bloc embracing the state
of Hyderabad and including a strip of territory in the South with
an opening to the sea. It is interesting to know that although the
Muslims were in a hopeless minority in the state of Hyderabad,
Dr. Latif still wanted a Muslim zone for that area as he belonged
to Hyderabad. As he himself was an Urdu speaking Muslim, he
advocated the creation of the Delhi-Lucknow bloc.
bloc. Dr. Latif's
view was that such a zone could be created by the exchange
of population. His scheme provided for a weak centre having con-
trol over Defence, Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Communi-
cations. The residuary powers were to be with the provinces.
Dr. Latif was not in favour of a Parliamentary form of Govern-
ment in India as that would have meant the rule by the Hindus.
Therefore, he suggested the creation of a composite executive drawn
from all parties or groups. Dr. Latif was in favour of giving the
ports of Calcutta and Madras to the Muslims.
The Aligarh scheme was prepared by Professor Syed Zafar-ul-
Hasan and Dr. Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri of the Aligarh
Muslim University. According to it, British India was to be divided
into three independent, sovereign states. There were to be two
Muslim states of North-West India and Bengal and the Hindu state
known as Hindustan was to cover the rest of British India. The
Muslim state of North-West India was to be known as the Pakistan
Federation and Bengal was to be known as the Muslim Federation.
Hyderabad with its old dominions of Merar and Carnatic was to be
created a sovereign state. Delhi and Malabar were to be raised to
## p. 830 (#872) ############################################
830
PAKISTAN
the status of Provinces in Hindustan so that they may be able to
protect the interests of the Muslims. All the towns of Hindustan
with a population of 50,000 or more were to have the status of a
borough with a large measure of autonoiny. After the partition of
British India, the Muslims in Hindustan were to be recognized as
a separate nation and allowed to have their separate organization.
In the summer of 1939, Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz
Khan of Mamdot was the President of the Punjab Provincial
Muslim League. He published his scheme in a book entitled “The
Confederacy of India". According to his scheme, India was to be
divided into five "countries”, viz. , the Indus Regions, Rajistan
,
comprising the states of Rajputana and Central India, the Deccan
states built around the states of Hyderabad and Myscre, Bengal
(excluding the Hindu districts in it but including parts of Assam
and other states) and Hindu India lying in the Central Region
and including all the territory not covered by the other four ‘coun-
tries'. There was to be no transfer of population as the same was
inconvenient and expensive. The author was not in favour of a
separate Muslim Federation. To quote him, “The foreign element
amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil
as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and
not out of it”. The scheme was silent with regard to the subjects
to be assigned to the Confederacy of India. The cost of Defence
was to be shared equally by the five members of the Confederacy.
Fiscal policy was to be controlled by the Centre. The scheme said
nothing about the constitutions of the five countries in which India
was to be divided.
Sir Abdoola Haroon put forward his own scheme. According
to him, India was to be divided into two separate federations, each
drawing its support from one of the major communities in India.
The Muslim Federation was to comprise the North-Western part
of India and Kashmir. However, nothing was said about Bengal
and Hyderabad. Sir Abdoola Haroon tells us that the Muslim
League circles had begun drifting in the direction of "a separate
federation of Muslim states and Provinces so that we are free, once
and for all, from the Hindu molestation".
Sir Sikander Hyat Khan published his scheme in July 1939.
It provided for a two-tier federation, a regional and an All-India
Federation. India was to be divided into seven zones, viz. , zone 1 con-
sisting of Assam, Bengal, Bengal states and Sikkim, zone 2 consisting
of Bihar and Orissa, zone 3 consisting of the United Provinces and
U. P. States, zone 4 consisting of Madras, Travancore, Madras
States and Coorg, zone 5 consisting of Bombay, Hyderabad, Western
India States, Bombay States, Mysore and C. P. States, zone 6 con:
## p. 831 (#873) ############################################
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION
831
zones.
sisting of Rajputana States (excluding Bikaner and Jaisalmer),
Gwalior, Central India States, Bihar, Orissa States, C. P. and Berar
and zone 7 consisting of the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier
Province, Kashmir, Punjab States, Baluchistan, Bikaner and
Jaisalmer. Each zone was to have its own legislature consisting of
representatives of British India and Indian States within these
The Central Federal Assembly was to consist of 375 mem-
bers, 250 from British India and 125 from the Indian states. The
Muslims were to be at least one-third of the total number of re-
presentatives in the Federal Assembly. The Viceroy was to be
the Head of the Federal executive. The Federal executive was to
have at least one representative from each zone. At least one-
third of the ministers were to be Muslims. The Federal Govern-
ment was given subjects like Defence, External Affairs, Communi-
cations, Customs, Coinage, Currency, etc. The residuary powers
were to be with units.
It is true that the Committee of the Muslim League examined
the various schemes before the Lahore Session of the All-India
Muslim League held in March 1940, but the Committee was not
able to recommend any particular scheme it preferred. In his
Presidential address, Mr. Jinnah pointed out that no final scheme
had emerged from the Committee. As to what happened in the
Working Committee of the Muslim League before the Lahore Re-
solution of 23 March, 1940, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan observes: “I
have no hesitation in admitting that I was responsible for drafting
the original resolution. But let me make it clear that the resolu-
tion which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Com-
mittee, and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted
and the one that was finally passed. The main difference between
the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which
related to the centre and co-ordination of the activities of the var-
ious units, was eliminated. ”
While presiding over the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim
League, Mr. Jinnah declared on 22 March, 1940 that the Mussal-
mans were not a minority and they were a nation by any definition.
To quote him, “If the British Government are really in earnest and
sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-
continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations
separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national
States. There is no reason why the States should be antagonistic
to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural
desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order
and establish political supremacy over the other in the govern-
ment of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards
## p. 832 (#874) ############################################
832
PAKISTAN
natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they
can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will
lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard
to minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between
Muslim India and Hindu India which will far more adequately and
effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and var-
ious other minorities.
“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends
fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are
not religious in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, quite
different distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus
and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality and this
misconception of the Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits
and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to
destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus
and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social
customs, literatures. They neithher inter-marry, nor inter-dine and,
indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based
mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life
and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussal-
mans derive their inspiration from different sources of history.
They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different
episodes. Very often the hero of one is foe of the other and, like-
wise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two
such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and
the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final
destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the govern-
ment of such a State. "
On 23 March, 1940 was passed a resolution by the All-India
Muslim League. It is known as the Lahore Resolution or the
Pakistan Resolution. The resolution was in these terms: "Resolved
that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim
League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this coun-
try or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following
basic principle, namely, the geographically continuous units are
demarcated in regions which should be so constituted, with such
territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in
which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-
Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to con-
stitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.
"That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units
## p. 833 (#875) ############################################
PAKISTAN RESOLUTION
833
and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in
consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the
Mussalmans are in a majority, adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them
and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in
consultation with them.
“This session further authorises the Working Committee to
frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic prin-
ciples providing for the assumption finally by the respeciive regions
of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications,
customs and such other matters as may be necessary. "
It is to be observed that in the Lahore resolution, there is no
mention of the word Pakistan. This name was given to this re-
solution later on. In his Presidential address in the Delhi session
of the Muslim League held in 1943, Mr. Jinnah made it clear that
the word Pakistan was coined neither by him nor by the Muslim
League. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “You know perfectly well that
Pakistan is a word which is really foisted upon us and fathered
on us by some section of the Hindu press and also by the British
press. Now our resolution was known for a long time as the
Lahore resolution, popularly known as Pakistan. But how long
are we to have this long phrase? Now I say to my Hindu and
British friends: We thank you for giving us one word. ”
The Lahore resolution was vague in many ways. It did not
clearly demarcate the areas in the North-Western and Eastern
Zones of India which were to be grouped to constitute independent
Muslim states. Probably, the language used was deliberately kept
vague in order to give room to the leaders of the Muslim League
for bargaining and manoeuvring. It was rightly pointed out by
Lord Mountbatten to the leaders of the Muslim League that the
areas of Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution did not in-
clude the entire Provinces of the Punjab, Bengal and Assim because
the resolution specifically used the phrase "areas in which
the
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and
Eastern Zones of India".
The Lahore Resolution was a personal triumph for Mr. Jinnah
and it established his dictatorial leadership beyond all possibility
of overthrow. On account of the Second World War, the British
Government also began to rely more and more on the support of
the Muslims, the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah.
About the Lahore Resolution, Dr. Rajendra Prasad observed:
“When insisted to elaborate the scheme and furnish details as re-
## p. 834 (#876) ############################################
834
PAKISTAN
gards the territories to be included in the regions and other matters,
he has refused to do so, insisting that the principle should be first
accepted and then and only then wiil he be prepared to work out
or disclose details. ” Dr. Rajendra Prasad pointed out the ambiguities
in the Lahore Resolution in these words: “The questions that arise
are: (a) Who is to frame the constitution? (b) What is to be the
nature of the constitution contemplated—theocratic, oligarchic,
totalitarian, or any other? (c) What is the relation of these inde-
pendent States going to be with the British Empire and the non-
Muslim Zones? (d) In case of breach of any of the mandatory
safeguards for the protection of the minorities, how, by whom and
under what sanction are these safeguards to be enforced? (e) What
are the territories to be included in the Muslim State or States? (f)
What will be their resources and position? (g) What is the authority
that will be in charge of defence, external affairs, etc. ? ”
Regarding the importance of the Lahore Resolution, Dr. Lal
Bahadur says: “The Lahore Resolution was the highest culmination
of Muslim aspirations roused by leaders from Syed Ahmed's times.
But it was never put so boldly as in 1940. It was vehemently cri-
ticised by organisations and individuals on several grounds and
some believed it to be a practical impossibility but its authors knew
that it would, one day, be a reality and those who had statesman-
ship and political imagination understood the danger lurking behind
a demand of this character. It gave the League a new ambition
and new programme. A renewed stress was laid on the two-nation
theory and communal differences were exaggerated with re-doubled
energy. It was, therefore, natural that the relations between the
Congress and the League be marred in their highest degree. "
A Muslim writer contends that the Lahore Resolution was a
landmark in the history of India and that of the Mussalmans.
Before the passing of that resolution, Muslim India had no goal
in view and Muslim politics remained in the hands of individuals
who had conflicting interests and inclinations. Very often, the col-
lective good of the Muslims suffered either at their hands or at the
hands of their agents and wire-pullers. Dr. Iqbal and his followers
had tried to place a goal before the Muslims but they were not
able to achieve it. It was left to Jinnah to fulfil the aspirations
of the Muslims. It was under his leadership that the Muslims of
India were organised and learned the lesson that their organisation
was more important than the individuals. By and by, the British
Government came to realise that nothing could be done in India
without the consent and approval of the Muslims, the Muslim
League and Mr. Jinnah.
It looked strange to Mr. Jinnah that “men like Mr. Gandhi and
## p. 835 (#877) ############################################
AUGUST OFFER AND LEAGUE
835
Mr. Rajagopalachari should talk about the Lahore resolution in
such terms as 'vivisection of India' and 'cutting the baby into two
halves'. Surely, today India is divided and partitioned by Nature.
Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map
of India, I fail to see why there is this hue and cry. Where is the
nation which is denationalised? India is composed of nationalities,
to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes. Where is the cen-
tral national Government whose authority is being violated? India
is held by the British power and that is the hand that holds and
gives the impression of a United India and a unitary Government.
Indian nation and Central Government do not exist. It is only
the convenient imagination of the Congress High Command. It
is pure intellectual and mental luxury, in which some of the Hindu
leaders have been indulging so recklessly. "
On 8 August, 1940 Lord Linlithgow made a statement on behalf
of the British Government. This is known as the August Offer.
It was clearly stated by the Viceroy that in view of the doubts as to
whether the position of the minorities would be sufficiently safe-
guarded in any future constitutional change, the British Govern-
ment reaffirmed its desire that full weight should be given to minority
opinion. “It goes without saying that they could not contemplate
transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare
of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly
denied by large and powerfui elements in India's national life.
Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into sub-
mission to such a Government. "
The Working Committee of the Muslim League welcomed that
part of the August Offer which was condemned by the Congress.
It was resolved that the August Offer met the demand of the
League "for a clear assurance to the effect that no future constitu-
tion, interim or final, should be adopted by the British Govern-
ment without their approval and consent. ” It was also declared
that "the partition of India was the only solution of the most diffi-
cult problem of India's future constitution. ” In spite of this the
Muslim League neither accepted nor rejected the August Offer.
While addressing the Central Assembly in November, 1940, Mr.
Jinnah emphatically declared: “And although I am pressed for
time, I think I must tell the House the correct position. And I
tell you and my Congress friends that they have still at the back
of their mind the idea that the Congress and Congress alone
re-
present the country, the people of India, the Indian nation, and
so on; that they alone are the spokesmen, and that the Muslims
and others are minorities. I say this on the floor of this House
that the reason why there has not been a settlement between the
>
## p. 836 (#878) ############################################
836
PAKISTAN
Hindus and Musalmans is that the Congress is a Hindu organi-
sation, whatever they may say—that the Hindu leaders and Con-
gres leaders have had always at the back of their minds the basis
that the Musalmans have to come within the ken of the Congress
and the Hindu Raj, that they are a minority, and all that they
can justly press for is merely safeguards as a minority, whereas let
me tell gentlemen of the Congress and the Nationalist Congress
Party members that the Musalmans always had at their back the
basis—and it has never been different during the last twenty-five
years—that they are a separate entity. "
While speaking at the Madras session of the Muslim League in
1941, Mr. Jinnah gave a warning to the British Government in
these words: "I think I have taken much more time of yours than
I thought I would, but it seems to me that I can only wind up
on a note-a note which is really of warning to the British Govern-
ment; because, after all, they are in possession of this land and the
Government of this sub-continent. Please stop your policy of ap-
peasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating the war
effort, doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the
defence of India at this critical moment. Do you want at this
moment to place them in a superior and dominant position now
and after the war? Change the corner-stone of the British policy
in this country. You are not loyal to those who are willing to
stand by you and who sincerely desire to support you.
desire to placate those who have the greatest nuisance-value in
political and economic fields. Give up the dominant feature of
this policy and the character of this policy. It is that you are try-
ing to get on with those who do not want to get on with you. If
you want honestly the support and the co-operation of Muslim
India, place your cards on the table and take action. "
But you
CRIPPS MISSION (1942)
In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India by the
British Government with certain proposals for ending the dead-
lock prevailing in India. Soon after his arrival in India, he com-
municated the contents of the Draft declaration of the British Gov-
ernment brought by him to India, to Indian leaders on 25 March,
1942. It was provided in the draft declaration that imme-
diately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps would be taken to
set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing
a new constitution for India. His Majesty's Government under-
took to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed
subject only to the right of any Province of British India that was
## p. 837 (#879) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
837
not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present
constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent ac-
cession if it so decided. " With such non-acceding provinces, if they
so desire, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree
upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the
Indian union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that
here laid down.
The Cripps proposals were rejected by the Indian National Con-
gress. The Muslim League was opposed to the creation of a single
Indian Union. It was feared that if one single union was crea-
ted, the creation of another may become impossible. The system
of election by a single electoral college by proportional represen-
tation was opposed. That was not in accordance with the system
of communal representation which enabled the Muslims to send
their own representatives. The League also objected to the me-
thod and procedure for non-accession of Indian Provinces. It was
contended on behalf of the Muslim League that the Provinces of
India were created for administrative convenience and not on any
logical basis. The League demanded the re-distribution of the
Provinces. It opposed the plebiscite by the whole of the adult
population of India. It demanded the inherent right of self-deter-
mination for the Muslims alone. The scheme was not acceptable
to the League because Pakistan was not conceded unequivocally
and the right of Muslim self-determination was denied although
the recognition given to the principle of partition was very much
appreciated. The view of Mr. Jinnah was that "the Draft Dec-
laration, in fact, went some way to meet the Muslim case, but not
far enough. "
After the failure of Cripps' Mission in March 1942, the Con-
gress passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8 August 1942.
The result was that all the Congress leaders in the country, whe-
ther big or small, were arrested and they remained in jail for
about 3 years. The Muslim League took full advantage of this
.
opportunity as there was practically no rival in the field and was
able to strengthen its position in the country. There was none to
question or contradict the statements made and the false propa-
ganda carried on by the leaders of the Muslim League and their
agents. The Government was also favourably inclined toward
the Muslim League as it was not standing in the way of its war-
effort. No wonder, the Muslim League was able to achieve a lot
during this period.
MUSLIM LEAGUE AND QUIT INDIA RESOLUTION
The Working Committee of the Muslim League which held its
## p. 838 (#880) ############################################
838
PAKISTAN
. . . . . .
sittings from 16 to 20 August, 1942 passed a resolution criticising
the Quit India movement of the Congress in these words: “The
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. . . . . . dep-
lores the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee
on August 8, 1942, to launch an open rebellion. . . . . . in pursuance
of their objective of establishing Congress Hindu domination in
India. . . . . It is the considered opinion of the Working Com-
mittee that this movement is directed not only to coerce the British
Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy. . . . .
but also to force the Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the
Congress terms and dictation. ” On 7 September 1942, Mr.
Jinnah congratulated the Muslims "for completely keeping them-
selves aloof from the Mass Civil Disobedience Movement launched
by the Congress. ” He attacked the Congress attempt to establish
democracy in India as a conspiracy to set up a Hindu Raj in the
country. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “When you talk of democracy, you
mean Hindu Raj to dominate over the Muslims, a totally different
nation, different in culture, different in everything. You yourself are
working for Hindu nationalism and Hindu Raj. ” In the course of his
Presidential address at the Karachi session of the Musiim League
held on 24 December, 1943, Mr. Jinnah asked, “Can we Mussal-
mans of India accept Akhand Hindustan, Hindu Raj over the
entire sub-continent? " Speaking at a meeting of the Muslim fede-
”
ration at Bombay on 24 January 1943, Mr. Jinnah described the
Mahasabha as "a counter-part of the Congress. "
Mr. Jinnah also asserted that the Congress could not attain its
objective of independence without the concurrence of the Muslim
League. He asked, “Do the Congress or Mr. Gandhi or other
Hindu leaders think that they can achieve the independence of
India without an agreement with the Muslim League? ” In his
speech at the Muslim Federation of Bombay, Mr. Jinnah. observed,
"The policy adopted—as has been stated by Mr. Gandhi—is a suici-
dal policy. May be that the Mussalmans are numerically one-
fourth. But you cannot always go by counting heads. The Mus-
lims are a very powerful nation in this sub-continent” and “the
hundred million Muslims would undoubtedly revolt and would
never submit to be at the mercy of a Hindu Raj. "
a
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
An interesting plea was put forward by the Muslim League in
favour of Pakistan. It was contended that while Pakistan meant
freedom both for the Hindus and Muslims, the Hindu demand
for a united India meant Hindu Rule and Muslim subiection. It
## p. 839 (#881) ############################################
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
839
was further contended that the Muslim League aimed at “sovereign
states for Hindus and Muslims in their homelands, guaranteeing
to each the power and opportunity to work out his destiny in his
own way according to his genius, tradition and culture. ” Mr.
Jinnah was prepared to come to terms with Mahatma Gandhi if
the latter accepted the Muslim demand of Pakistan. To quote
Mr. Jinnah, “Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr.
Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the
Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it
will be the greatest day both for the Hindus and Mussalmans. ”
Mr. Jinnah emphasised the differences between the Hindus and
Muslims and criticised his Hindu friends for their failure to
understand the fundamental differences between the two religions.
To quote Mr. Jinnah, “The Hindus and Muslims belong to two
different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They
neither intermarry nor interdine. . . . Their aspects of life and
own life
are different. . . . They have different epics, different
heroes and different episodes. . . . . . To yoke together two such
nations under a single state. . . . . . must lead to growing discontent
and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for
the Government of such a state. "
Hindu-Muslim differences were also emphasised by other Mus-
lim writers. Mr. Z. A. Suleri pointed out that “Hindu-Muslim
differences are not born of dress or language; they are fundamen-
tally due to the clash between Hindu and Muslim ideologies. . . . .
Hindus worshipped idols, Mussalmans owe allegiance to one God;
Hindus believed in castes, Muslims repudiate them; Hindus
flourished on interest, Muslims want to abolish it. ” The view
of El Hamza was that National Unity was the product of homo-
geneity and where the population was comprised of "widely differ-
ent elements which owing to complete absence of blood intermixture
and in the presence of great cultural differences are reconcilable
on a national basis, then a common administration instead of
effecting a fusion brings about the opposite result of accentuating
the antagonism between different interests. "
In order to carry on propaganda in favour of Pakistan, a Com-
mittee of writers was set up by the Muslim League with Jamil-ud-
Din as its convener. Pakistan Literature Series were issued in
furtherance of the cause of a separate homeland for the Mussal-
Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf of Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore
served the cause of Pakistan by publishing most of the propaganda
literature. About the Hindu-Muslim differences, Professor Said-
ud-Din Ahmad of the Muslim University, Aligarh observed, “They
possess different faiths. . . . . . While idol-worship is prohibited in
mans.
## p. 840 (#882) ############################################
840
PAKISTAN
the one, it is the basis of prayer in the other. While the Mussalmans
worship only one God, Hindus have many of them. With the
division of divinity, the whole social and moral structure is clearly
demarcated. The forms of prayer and rituals and the places of
pilgrimage are different. ” Professor Said-ud-Din Ahmad went to
the extent of saying that "there is no such thing as an Indian
Nation. ” He described the unity of India as a false notion from
.
the geographical point of view and pointed out four clearly demar-
cated geographical areas in India. It was in this way that he used
his knowledge of geography to support the Muslim demand for
Pakistan.
Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad was in favour of the creation of Pakistan
even before the attainment of independence by India. He employ-
ed militant and diplomatic language to support the cause of Pakis-
tan. He wrote, “Talk of independence before Pakistan is a camou-
flage intended to hoodwink the Muslims and other minorities.
Pakistan presupposes the independence of India. ” He contended
that free Pakistan and free Hindustan would live in amity and
brotherhood. He put emphasis on the fact that the so-called unity
of India was a myth.
Mr. Jinnah justified the demand for Pakistan on spiritual, cul-
tural and religious grounds. His contention was that the progress
of the Muslims in various spheres of life was not possible without
Pakistan. Only a Muslim independent and sovereign state could
promote the interests of the Muslims. To quote Mr. Jinnah, “We
wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, eco-
nomic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in
consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our
own people. ” The propaganda carried on by Mr. Jinnah was that
it was impossible to live under Congress Raj on account of the
acts of injustices. Moreover, it was absolutely essential for all-
round development of Mussalmans to reside in a separate Muslim
homeland.
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar published in 1941 a book entitled “Thoughts
on Pakistan" and in that he supported the cause of Pakistan. The
book was divided into three parts. The first part was confined
to a statement of the Muslim case for Pakistan. The second part
dealt with the Hindu case against Pakistan and the third part des-
cribed the alternative to Pakistan. Dr. Ambedkar pointed out
that the Muslims asked for administrative areas ethnically homo-
geneous so that they might be constituted into a separate state on
the ground that the Muslims were a separate nation and also be-
cause the Hindus desired to use their majority to treat the Muslims
as second class citizens. The view of Dr. Ambedkar was that there
## p. 841 (#883) ############################################
PROPAGANDA FOR PAKISTAN
841
9
was no substance in the Hindu opposition to Pakistan. The Hindus
feared the break-up of Indian Unity, the weakness of defences and
the inability of Pakistan demand to solve the communal problem.
