The great mass of opinion was
clear, that is, that while God was the ultimate source of all
authority, the immediate source was the Community itself,
and it should be remembered that this judgment was con-
firmed by the whole tradition of the Eoman Law and by the
medifeval and contemporary Civilians.
clear, that is, that while God was the ultimate source of all
authority, the immediate source was the Community itself,
and it should be remembered that this judgment was con-
firmed by the whole tradition of the Eoman Law and by the
medifeval and contemporary Civilians.
Thomas Carlyle
49: "Qua de causa
recte dicitur, magistratum non esse
legibus generalibus solutum . . . non
tantum naturalibus sed etiam civilibus.
. . . Dissentiunt plurime, per 1. 31.
De Legibus ('Dig. ,' i. 3, 31) quae
tamen non obstat, si eam intelligis de
legibus poenariis, quibus magistratus
est solutus, non respectu obligations,
sed exccutionis. Nam si deliquerit (at
non contra leges fundamentales et con-
ventionem propriam cum populo
initam), non punitur. Cujas. Lib. 36,
Obs. c. 35. "
2 Id. id. , xxiv. 50 (The prince
cannot do anything against the law
of the State): "Tum quia lex est
contractus, 1. 1, ibi. communis reipub-
licae sponsio, de legibus (i. e. , 'Dig. ,'
i. 3, 1) . . . ex quo contractu princepa
obligatur. . . . Ergo concessio imperii
a populo principi facta etiam verbis
generalissimis, ex materia, subjecta,
limitata, et restriota est ad meram
utilitatem civium. "
>> Cf. Part I. c. 2; Part II. o. 2.
* Id. id. , xxiv. 50: "Princeps
etiam solutus est legibus in oasibus, in
quibus jus ipsi dispensationem con-
cedit. "
* For the discussion of Bodin's
position, cf. Chap. III.
* Id. id. , ix. 15: "Ideo potesta*
impcrandi universalis dicitur, quae
aliam superiorem vel parem aut
sooiam non agnoscit. Atque hoc
supromum jurisdictionis universalis
jus, est forma et substantial essentia
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 361
said this, he begins to develop a sharply marked contradiction
of Bodin's theory. No single persons, he says, can receive
this complete authority (" plenitudo potestatis "); they must
recognise that it lies in the consent and agreement of the
associated body. 1
We must turn to a long passage in which Althusius draws
out his own conception in opposition to that of Bodin. Bodin,
he says, contradicted the principle that the supreme power
belonged to the whole community. He begins by pointing out
that even Bodin admits that the supreme power is subject to the
ISTatural and Divine law; and he urges that a really absolute
power would be a mere tyranny. He refuses dogmatically to
attribute the supreme power to the king or the "optimates,"
and maintains that it can belong only to the whole body of
the "universal" association--that is, to the commonwealth
or kingdom, for it is from this body that, after God, all legiti-
mate authority comes. The king, princes, or " optimates"
recognise that the commonwealth by which they are set up
or removed is superior to them, and that they are bound
by a contract to obey it. The king, therefore, has no supreme
and perpetual power which is free from the law, and does not
hold the "Jura Majestatis," but only, and that by the grant
of the society, the administration of these. The monarch
therefore must render an account of his administration and
may be deposed. 2
Majestatis, seu majoris illius status
quom diximus, quo sublato, vel ad-
empto Majestas ilia concidit. "
1 Id. id. , ix. 19: "Administ rat ores
potestatis hujus plures esse possunt, ita
ut singuli, impositae solicitudinis, non
in plenitudinem potostatis adsumantur.
. . . Et singuli bi non habent penes so
supremam potestatem, sod omnes simul
unam agnoscant in consociatorum cor-
porum consensu et concordia. "
* Id. id. , ix. 20: "Huic sententiae
nostrae, qua regno seu universali con-
sociationc summa potestas tribuitur,
contradicit Bodinus Lib. 1, e. 5, 'De
Repub. ' Ibi enim ille jus Majestatis,
quod regni jus appellavimus, dieit esse
summam et perpetuam potestatem,
nee lege, neque tempore definitam,
quam majestatis aftectionem late ex-
plicat Bonnet. Lib. 1, 'De Majestate
Politica. ' Ego in eo, quo Bodinus haec
sensu accipit, nullum horum requisitum
genuinum in jure hoc Majestatis ag-
nosco. Non enim est summa potestas,
non perpetua, neque lege soluta.
21. Summa non est, quia legem
divinam naturalemque agnoscat omnia
humana potestas, arg. Rom. e. 13.
Minister Dei est tibi in bonum. Si
minister Dei est, ergo contra Domini
sui mandantis prescripta nihil facero
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? 362
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
We have dealt with this aspect of political theory in the
sixteenth century at some length, for, as it seems to us, the
conception of the nature and authority of law was still, as in
the Middle Ages, the most important element of political
potest. . . . Absoluta vero summa, ot
legibus omnibus soluta potestas tyrannis
dicitur. . . . Remota, ait (Augustinus)
justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna
latrocinia. In quo quidem, neo
Bodinus a nobis dissentit . . . Quaes-
tio igitur nobis est, de civili lege et
jure, an huic etiam imperium et fasces
subijiciat, qui summam dicitur habere
potestatem. Negat Bodinus, et plur-
imi alii cum eodem. Erit igitur ex
horum sententia summa potestas quae
civili lege non est definita; quod ego
non dixerim. Nam lege civili potesta-
tem solvere, est etiam aliquatenus
naturalis et divinae legis vinculis
eandem exuere. Nulla enim est, neo
esse potest, lex civilis quae non aliquid
naturalis et divinae aequitatis im-
mutabile habeat admixtum. . . . Quod
si igitur lex civilis generalis a principe
lata est aequa et justa, quis eundem
ab obligatione istius legis solvere
potest? . . . Quatenus vero lex ilia
civilis in quibusdam disoedit a naturali
aequitate . . . fatebor, eum qui sum-
mam habet potestatem, neo superiorem
nisi Deum et naturalem equitatem et
justitiam agnoscit, ilia lege non
teneri. . . .
22. Atque in hoo sensu accepta
lege, soluta summa potestate, concedo
in sententiam Bodini . . . Cujacii . . .
et aliorum jurisconsultorum. Sed
hano summam potentiam nequaquam
possum tribuere regi aut optimatibus,
quam sententiam tamen Bodinus acer-
rime propugnare conatur, sed jure, ilia
tantum corpori universalis consocia-
tionis nimirum reipublicae vel regno,
tanquam propria est adscribenda. Ab
hoc corpora, post Deum, profluit omnia
potestas legitima, in hos, quos reges,
optima tesve vocamus, 1. 1. De
Const. Prin. ('Dig. ,' i. 4, 1). . . .
Corpus igitur hoc consociatum, rex,
princeps, optimatesve superius ag-
noscunt, a quo iidem constituntur,
removontur, dejiciuntur, et exauctor-
antur, sicuti latius probaverim in
dictis locis.
Quis vero summam dicit potestatem,
quae superiorem agnoscit aliam? Quod
et Bodinus probat. Quis lege solvet
eum, in quam ipsemet consensit, ct
ad cujus obedientiam se per modum
contractus obligavit. . . .
23. Quantacunque enim est potestas,
quae alii conceditur, semper tamen
minus est ejus potestate, qui eandem
concessit, et in ea praeeminentia et
superioritas concedentis reservata in-
telligitur. . . . Unde efficitur, regem
? ? summam, perpetuam, legeque solutam
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
363
theory, and it will, we hope, be clear that the mediaeval
principle of the supremacy of law was still asserted and
understood.
We shall in a later chapter inquire how far there had also
developed in the sixteenth century a conception that the
king was absolute and above law.
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? 364
CHAPTER II.
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
We have, in the last chapter, considered some aspects of the
conceptions of the source and authority of law, that is, of
those who were clear that the law was greater than the ruler.
We shall, in a later chapter, discuss the position of those who
took the. opposite view. But, before we do this, we must
deal with the conception of the source and nature of the
authority of the prince.
We think it will be found to make for greater clearness if
we treat this subject under the following heads: (1) The
Source of the Authority of the Euler; (2) The Conception
of a Sovereign Power behind the Euler; (3) The Eelation
of the Euler to the Courts of Law; (4) The Theory of the
Contract between the Euler and the People; (5) The Eight
to resist, and even to depose the Euler; (6) The Magistrates
or Ephors.
(1) The Source of the Authority of the Euler. --There is
no need to discuss this at any great length, for while there were
a few, with whom we shall deal in a later chapter, who trace
the authority of the king to the direct appointment of God,
these were quite exceptional.
The great mass of opinion was
clear, that is, that while God was the ultimate source of all
authority, the immediate source was the Community itself,
and it should be remembered that this judgment was con-
firmed by the whole tradition of the Eoman Law and by the
medifeval and contemporary Civilians.
This was the current opinion, apart entirely from the politi-
cal controversies of the time. We may begin by observing
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? chap, n. ]
365
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
again the words of the Spanish Dominican, Soto, the Con-
fessor of Charles V. and Professor at Salamanca. The public
civil authority is the ordinance of God, the commonwealth
creates the prince, but it was God who taught men to do this. 1
We find the same principle stated by his Dominican con-
temporary and colleague in Salamanca, Franciscus Victoria,
in the terms of a careful distinction between "Potestas"
and "Authoritas. " The Eoyal "Potestas" is not derived
from the commonwealth, but from God Himself, for though
he is established by the commonwealth, for the common-
wealth creates the king, it transfers not "Potestas " but its
own "Authoritas " to him. 2
The same judgment is expressed by such a careful and
experienced politician as Sir Thomas Smith. In a passage
already cited, he contrasts the king and the tyrant, not only
with reference to their relation to the law, but also to the
source of his authority. The king is one who has attained
the royal power by hereditary succession or by election, with
the consent of the people, while the tyrant is one who has
obtained power by force, and without the consent of the
people. 3
We have cited these opinions, not as being in themselves
very important, but merely as illustrations of what we think
was the normal opinion, apart from the controversies of the
later part of the century. When we pass to those who wrote
under these later conditions, we naturally find all this much
more sharply asserted. George Buchanan, for instance, in
his work, 'De Jure Eegni apud Scotos,' which is in the form
1 Soto,' De Justitia et Jure,' iv. 4, 1
(p. 309): "Ecco quemadmodum
publics civilia potestas ordinatio Dei
est; non quod respublica non creaverit
ptincipos, sed quod id feccrit divinitus
erudita. "
* Franciscus Victoria, 'Relationes
de Potestate Civili,' viii. : "Videtur
ergo quod regia potestas sit non a
republica, sed ab ipso Deo, ut Catholici
doc tores sentiunt. Quamvis enim a
republica constituatur (creat namque
respublica regem), non potestatom, sed
propriam authoritatem in regem trans-
fer^"
>> T. Smith, 'De Republica Anglo-
rum,' I. 7: "Re rum sum mam ad
unum aliquem dolatam potestatem,
regiam esse perhibent, qui vel natalium
splendore, vel suffragiorum prerogativa,
per consentientem populi voluntatem,
eam adeptus. . . . Tyrannum appel-
lant, qui per vim absque consensu
populi nactus principatum. "
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? 366
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
of a dialogue between himself and "Metellanus" (Maitland),
in asserting the subordination of the King of Scotland to the
laws, maintains that though the kings of Scotland received
the throne by hereditary succession, they were created by
the laws and the will of the people just as much as those
kings who were elected. 1
The Huguenot writers of the period between 1573 and 1580
set out this conception in different ways. Hotman does this,
with reference primarily to history, in his work 'Franco
Gallia,' originally published in Latin in 1573. 2 We are not
here conoerned with the historical value of his contentions
about the nature of the Merovingian and Carolingian mon-
archies, but only with the conclusions which he drew from
his study of history. He contended that the supreme
authority in the time of these monarchies belonged to the
general assembly of the whole people, which he relates to the
States General of later times,3 and that it was this assembly
which elected and deposed kings. * He gives a number of
examples of the authority of the States General, including a
statement that it was the States General which decided
between the claims to the French crown of Edward III. and
Philip of Valois. 5 In one place he says roundly that the
"Concile des Etats" (the States General) had the power to
elect and to depose kings, and to entrust the administration
of the kingdom during a minority to such a person as it thought
best. 4
The treatise entitled 'La Politique, Dialogue d'Archon et
de Politie,' published in 1576,7 has a very high conception of
monarchy, and speaks of the Prince as the Image and Vicar
of God; but if he has this character, he must also represent
the goodness and justice of God. 8 Hereditary succession or
1 George Buchanan,' De Jure Regni' electos. "
(p. 26): "B. Equibus omnibus facile * Cf. Allen, op. cit. (p. 309).
intelligi potest, qualem a majoribus * Hotman, 'Franco Gallia,' x. (page
acceperunt potestatem: non aliam 647).
videlicet, quarr. qui suffragiis electi in 4 Id. id. , xi. (p. 661).
leges jorant. . . . lllud autem, opinor, * Id. id. , xvii. (p. 701).
vides qui nascuntur nobis reges, eos et 4 Id. id. , xx. (p. 712).
legibus et populi suffragio creari, non 'Cf. Allen, op. cit. (p. 314).
minus quam quos ab initio diximus ? 'La Politique,' <fcc. (p. 90).
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? CHAP. II. ]
367
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
election are both tolerable: the best is to combine the two,
but even in the case of those who hold by hereditary succession
the peoples who have the right to place magistrates over them-
selves have also the right to depose them. 1 The best known
of these works, the ' Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' published in
1577, also speaks of kings as the Vicars of God,2 and says
that it is God Who has "instituted" kings, but it is the
people who constitute them, who bestow kingdoms and
approve their election. Kings must remember that they
reign " a Deo sed per populum et propter populum. " There-
fore if in some countries kingship has become hereditary, it is
still the custom that the children do not succeed their fathers
till they have been constituted anew by the people, and are
only held to be kings when they have received the investiture
of sceptre and crown from those who represent the " Majestas"
of the people. 3
George Buchanan and the Huguenot writers express this
judgment in strong and unqualified terms, but we find the
same opinions expressed in as thorough-going a fashion by
some of the Eoman Catholic writers of the last years of the
sixteenth century. Among the most important tracts written
in defence of the deposition of Henry III. of France is that
of Boucher, 'De justa Abdicatione Henrici Tertii,' published
1 Id. (p. 96): "Politie. II me
semble que et Pun et l'autre no sont
si louables que ceux qui sont par elec
tion et succession tout ensemble. . . .
Politie. J'avoue bien que par cous-
tume la chose est tellement reolue
qu'elle (hereditary succession) est re-
pute? pour droit, mais puis que les
peuples ont le droit de mettre les
magistrats sur eux . . . il faut con-
done qu'ils les peuvent demettre, et
par la sont electeurs de leurs princes. "
* 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. ' Qu.
I. (P- 9).
>> Id. , Q. III. (p. 76): "Ortendi-
riius antea Deum Reges instituere,
rogna regibus dare, reges eligere. Dici-
mus jam, populum reges constituere,
regna tradere, olectionem suo sum-agio
comprobare. . . . " (P. 79): Quo sem-
per recordantes reges ae a Deo quidem,
sed por populum et propter populum
regnare. . . . " (P. 82): Etai vero, ex
quo virtutem pat rum imitati fiiii,
nepotesve, regna sibi quasi haeredi-
taria fecisse videntur, in quibusdam
regionibus electionis libera facultas
desiisso quodammodo videatur; man-
sit tamen perpetuo in omnibus regnis
bene constitutis ea consuetudo, ut de
mortuia non prius succederent liberi,
quam a populo quasi de novo conatitu-
erentur, nec tanquam suia haeredes
patribus agnoscerentur, sed tum demuni
reges censerentur, cum ab iis qui populi
mnjestatem representant, regni in-
vestituram, quasi per sceptrum et
diadema accepissent. "
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? 368 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PAST IV.
in 1589. Boucher was a theologian of some eminence, and
his work is largely concerned with the question of the power
of the Pope to depose kings. We are not, however, here
concerned with this question, but with his conception of the
relation of the authority of the king to that of the community.
With regard to this, he expressed himself as clearly and dog-
matically as the Huguenot writers.
It is the people or commonwealth which establishes the
king, but while it bestows this authority upon him, the final
authority and "Majestas" remains with the people. It
resided with them before there were any kings, and even
kings must render their account for any offence against it. 1
This " Majestas " is embodied in the Estates. 2
It is the people, then, from whom the king derives his
authority, and not from God only, and he repudiates the
interpretation of St Paul's words in Eomans xiii. 1 as imply-
ing the latter. We recognise, he says, that kings, like all
good things, come from God, but in accordance with the Jus
Gentium, it is through the people. 3
It would be difficult to find a more explicit repudiation of
what we call the "Divine Eight," and a more thorough-
going affirmation of the principle that the royal authority
'J. Boucher, 'De Justa Henrici
Tertii Abdicatione,' I. 9: "Jus sutem
illud cum in duobus positum sit, ut et
a populo seu republics constituuntur
reges, et regibus constitutis, sic penes
eos Kummam potestatem esse conatet,
ut surnma in eos tamen populi seu
reipublicae jus ac majestas romaneat,
huiusque adeo laesae vel imminutao, ei
res ita ferrat, rex teneri possit. "
Id. , III. 7: "Maiestas reipublicae ac
populi quae sit, diotum antea est.
Quae ut prima per se ac regibus anti-
quior est, ita authenticum quid penes
se, vel teste scriptura habot, quod
deponere, quodque abiicere a se nec
possit nec debeat. Cujusque legibus
omnes omnis generis homines ac reges
ipsi teneantur. Quippe, cum penes
eos non aliunde majestas sit, quam
quia publica ab iis potestas referatur.
Quae Caesar ab iis semel, ut sceptro
reos amonneat, lege Julia constat, quae
poenam majestatis, non dignitatis
tantum, sed et animae amissionem esse
jubet. "
* Id. id. , III. 8: "Porro majesta-
tem illam cum penes ordines seu
comitia esse constet, id quoque sequi-
tur, qui ordines laeserit, publicae
majestatis supra omnes teneri atque
reum esse. Nam pones comitia ut
regni majostas sit, cum uni versa
regnorum consuetudo docet, tum quia
perpetua in Gallia aacrosanota eorum
auctoritas esse consuevit. "
* Id. id. , I. 13: "Et nos, quidem,
ut reges a Deo, ut et bonum omne,
esso agnoscimus, ita intermedio iure
gentium, et per populum, ut sunt, ita
esse, sane fateamur. "
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? CHAP. II. ]
369
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
was inferior to the sovereign authority, or " Majestas," of the
community; it was derived from it, and was answerable to
it. Boucher adds, dogmatically, that no one is born a king;
there is no Christian kingdom where hereditary succession has
such a force that the right of establishing the king does not
remain with the people. 1
Boucher does not, however, state these principles as merely
abstract, but maintains that they were embodied in the actual
constitutional systems of the European countries, and he
refers specially to the Empire, to Aragon, and to the authority
of Parliament in England, and he attributes the comparative
absence in France of the constitutional forms of this supreme
authority of the community to the recent tyrannical
innovations of Louis XI. 2 He cites the deposition of
Merovingian and Carolingian kings in France, of Eichard
II. in England, and the recent deposition of the King of
Denmark. 3
With these writers we may place Mariana, the Spanish
Jesuit of the late sixteenth century. He also considers the
monarchy to be the best form of government, and he oare-
fully discusses the advantages and disadvantages of succession
by inheritance or by election. He finally concludes that
hereditary succession is best, but the succession should be
determined by law, not by the will of the king, for the common-
wealth gave him an authority restrained by laws, and any
change therefore must be made with the consent of the
"Ordines" (the Estates or Cortes). 4 In another place,
discussing the relation of the commonwealth to a king who
becomes a tyrant, he argues that the commonwealth, from
which the royal authority arises, may call the king to account,
and may deprive him of his authority.
recte dicitur, magistratum non esse
legibus generalibus solutum . . . non
tantum naturalibus sed etiam civilibus.
. . . Dissentiunt plurime, per 1. 31.
De Legibus ('Dig. ,' i. 3, 31) quae
tamen non obstat, si eam intelligis de
legibus poenariis, quibus magistratus
est solutus, non respectu obligations,
sed exccutionis. Nam si deliquerit (at
non contra leges fundamentales et con-
ventionem propriam cum populo
initam), non punitur. Cujas. Lib. 36,
Obs. c. 35. "
2 Id. id. , xxiv. 50 (The prince
cannot do anything against the law
of the State): "Tum quia lex est
contractus, 1. 1, ibi. communis reipub-
licae sponsio, de legibus (i. e. , 'Dig. ,'
i. 3, 1) . . . ex quo contractu princepa
obligatur. . . . Ergo concessio imperii
a populo principi facta etiam verbis
generalissimis, ex materia, subjecta,
limitata, et restriota est ad meram
utilitatem civium. "
>> Cf. Part I. c. 2; Part II. o. 2.
* Id. id. , xxiv. 50: "Princeps
etiam solutus est legibus in oasibus, in
quibus jus ipsi dispensationem con-
cedit. "
* For the discussion of Bodin's
position, cf. Chap. III.
* Id. id. , ix. 15: "Ideo potesta*
impcrandi universalis dicitur, quae
aliam superiorem vel parem aut
sooiam non agnoscit. Atque hoc
supromum jurisdictionis universalis
jus, est forma et substantial essentia
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 361
said this, he begins to develop a sharply marked contradiction
of Bodin's theory. No single persons, he says, can receive
this complete authority (" plenitudo potestatis "); they must
recognise that it lies in the consent and agreement of the
associated body. 1
We must turn to a long passage in which Althusius draws
out his own conception in opposition to that of Bodin. Bodin,
he says, contradicted the principle that the supreme power
belonged to the whole community. He begins by pointing out
that even Bodin admits that the supreme power is subject to the
ISTatural and Divine law; and he urges that a really absolute
power would be a mere tyranny. He refuses dogmatically to
attribute the supreme power to the king or the "optimates,"
and maintains that it can belong only to the whole body of
the "universal" association--that is, to the commonwealth
or kingdom, for it is from this body that, after God, all legiti-
mate authority comes. The king, princes, or " optimates"
recognise that the commonwealth by which they are set up
or removed is superior to them, and that they are bound
by a contract to obey it. The king, therefore, has no supreme
and perpetual power which is free from the law, and does not
hold the "Jura Majestatis," but only, and that by the grant
of the society, the administration of these. The monarch
therefore must render an account of his administration and
may be deposed. 2
Majestatis, seu majoris illius status
quom diximus, quo sublato, vel ad-
empto Majestas ilia concidit. "
1 Id. id. , ix. 19: "Administ rat ores
potestatis hujus plures esse possunt, ita
ut singuli, impositae solicitudinis, non
in plenitudinem potostatis adsumantur.
. . . Et singuli bi non habent penes so
supremam potestatem, sod omnes simul
unam agnoscant in consociatorum cor-
porum consensu et concordia. "
* Id. id. , ix. 20: "Huic sententiae
nostrae, qua regno seu universali con-
sociationc summa potestas tribuitur,
contradicit Bodinus Lib. 1, e. 5, 'De
Repub. ' Ibi enim ille jus Majestatis,
quod regni jus appellavimus, dieit esse
summam et perpetuam potestatem,
nee lege, neque tempore definitam,
quam majestatis aftectionem late ex-
plicat Bonnet. Lib. 1, 'De Majestate
Politica. ' Ego in eo, quo Bodinus haec
sensu accipit, nullum horum requisitum
genuinum in jure hoc Majestatis ag-
nosco. Non enim est summa potestas,
non perpetua, neque lege soluta.
21. Summa non est, quia legem
divinam naturalemque agnoscat omnia
humana potestas, arg. Rom. e. 13.
Minister Dei est tibi in bonum. Si
minister Dei est, ergo contra Domini
sui mandantis prescripta nihil facero
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? 362
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
We have dealt with this aspect of political theory in the
sixteenth century at some length, for, as it seems to us, the
conception of the nature and authority of law was still, as in
the Middle Ages, the most important element of political
potest. . . . Absoluta vero summa, ot
legibus omnibus soluta potestas tyrannis
dicitur. . . . Remota, ait (Augustinus)
justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna
latrocinia. In quo quidem, neo
Bodinus a nobis dissentit . . . Quaes-
tio igitur nobis est, de civili lege et
jure, an huic etiam imperium et fasces
subijiciat, qui summam dicitur habere
potestatem. Negat Bodinus, et plur-
imi alii cum eodem. Erit igitur ex
horum sententia summa potestas quae
civili lege non est definita; quod ego
non dixerim. Nam lege civili potesta-
tem solvere, est etiam aliquatenus
naturalis et divinae legis vinculis
eandem exuere. Nulla enim est, neo
esse potest, lex civilis quae non aliquid
naturalis et divinae aequitatis im-
mutabile habeat admixtum. . . . Quod
si igitur lex civilis generalis a principe
lata est aequa et justa, quis eundem
ab obligatione istius legis solvere
potest? . . . Quatenus vero lex ilia
civilis in quibusdam disoedit a naturali
aequitate . . . fatebor, eum qui sum-
mam habet potestatem, neo superiorem
nisi Deum et naturalem equitatem et
justitiam agnoscit, ilia lege non
teneri. . . .
22. Atque in hoo sensu accepta
lege, soluta summa potestate, concedo
in sententiam Bodini . . . Cujacii . . .
et aliorum jurisconsultorum. Sed
hano summam potentiam nequaquam
possum tribuere regi aut optimatibus,
quam sententiam tamen Bodinus acer-
rime propugnare conatur, sed jure, ilia
tantum corpori universalis consocia-
tionis nimirum reipublicae vel regno,
tanquam propria est adscribenda. Ab
hoc corpora, post Deum, profluit omnia
potestas legitima, in hos, quos reges,
optima tesve vocamus, 1. 1. De
Const. Prin. ('Dig. ,' i. 4, 1). . . .
Corpus igitur hoc consociatum, rex,
princeps, optimatesve superius ag-
noscunt, a quo iidem constituntur,
removontur, dejiciuntur, et exauctor-
antur, sicuti latius probaverim in
dictis locis.
Quis vero summam dicit potestatem,
quae superiorem agnoscit aliam? Quod
et Bodinus probat. Quis lege solvet
eum, in quam ipsemet consensit, ct
ad cujus obedientiam se per modum
contractus obligavit. . . .
23. Quantacunque enim est potestas,
quae alii conceditur, semper tamen
minus est ejus potestate, qui eandem
concessit, et in ea praeeminentia et
superioritas concedentis reservata in-
telligitur. . . . Unde efficitur, regem
? ? summam, perpetuam, legeque solutam
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
363
theory, and it will, we hope, be clear that the mediaeval
principle of the supremacy of law was still asserted and
understood.
We shall in a later chapter inquire how far there had also
developed in the sixteenth century a conception that the
king was absolute and above law.
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? 364
CHAPTER II.
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
We have, in the last chapter, considered some aspects of the
conceptions of the source and authority of law, that is, of
those who were clear that the law was greater than the ruler.
We shall, in a later chapter, discuss the position of those who
took the. opposite view. But, before we do this, we must
deal with the conception of the source and nature of the
authority of the prince.
We think it will be found to make for greater clearness if
we treat this subject under the following heads: (1) The
Source of the Authority of the Euler; (2) The Conception
of a Sovereign Power behind the Euler; (3) The Eelation
of the Euler to the Courts of Law; (4) The Theory of the
Contract between the Euler and the People; (5) The Eight
to resist, and even to depose the Euler; (6) The Magistrates
or Ephors.
(1) The Source of the Authority of the Euler. --There is
no need to discuss this at any great length, for while there were
a few, with whom we shall deal in a later chapter, who trace
the authority of the king to the direct appointment of God,
these were quite exceptional.
The great mass of opinion was
clear, that is, that while God was the ultimate source of all
authority, the immediate source was the Community itself,
and it should be remembered that this judgment was con-
firmed by the whole tradition of the Eoman Law and by the
medifeval and contemporary Civilians.
This was the current opinion, apart entirely from the politi-
cal controversies of the time. We may begin by observing
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? chap, n. ]
365
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
again the words of the Spanish Dominican, Soto, the Con-
fessor of Charles V. and Professor at Salamanca. The public
civil authority is the ordinance of God, the commonwealth
creates the prince, but it was God who taught men to do this. 1
We find the same principle stated by his Dominican con-
temporary and colleague in Salamanca, Franciscus Victoria,
in the terms of a careful distinction between "Potestas"
and "Authoritas. " The Eoyal "Potestas" is not derived
from the commonwealth, but from God Himself, for though
he is established by the commonwealth, for the common-
wealth creates the king, it transfers not "Potestas " but its
own "Authoritas " to him. 2
The same judgment is expressed by such a careful and
experienced politician as Sir Thomas Smith. In a passage
already cited, he contrasts the king and the tyrant, not only
with reference to their relation to the law, but also to the
source of his authority. The king is one who has attained
the royal power by hereditary succession or by election, with
the consent of the people, while the tyrant is one who has
obtained power by force, and without the consent of the
people. 3
We have cited these opinions, not as being in themselves
very important, but merely as illustrations of what we think
was the normal opinion, apart from the controversies of the
later part of the century. When we pass to those who wrote
under these later conditions, we naturally find all this much
more sharply asserted. George Buchanan, for instance, in
his work, 'De Jure Eegni apud Scotos,' which is in the form
1 Soto,' De Justitia et Jure,' iv. 4, 1
(p. 309): "Ecco quemadmodum
publics civilia potestas ordinatio Dei
est; non quod respublica non creaverit
ptincipos, sed quod id feccrit divinitus
erudita. "
* Franciscus Victoria, 'Relationes
de Potestate Civili,' viii. : "Videtur
ergo quod regia potestas sit non a
republica, sed ab ipso Deo, ut Catholici
doc tores sentiunt. Quamvis enim a
republica constituatur (creat namque
respublica regem), non potestatom, sed
propriam authoritatem in regem trans-
fer^"
>> T. Smith, 'De Republica Anglo-
rum,' I. 7: "Re rum sum mam ad
unum aliquem dolatam potestatem,
regiam esse perhibent, qui vel natalium
splendore, vel suffragiorum prerogativa,
per consentientem populi voluntatem,
eam adeptus. . . . Tyrannum appel-
lant, qui per vim absque consensu
populi nactus principatum. "
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? 366
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
of a dialogue between himself and "Metellanus" (Maitland),
in asserting the subordination of the King of Scotland to the
laws, maintains that though the kings of Scotland received
the throne by hereditary succession, they were created by
the laws and the will of the people just as much as those
kings who were elected. 1
The Huguenot writers of the period between 1573 and 1580
set out this conception in different ways. Hotman does this,
with reference primarily to history, in his work 'Franco
Gallia,' originally published in Latin in 1573. 2 We are not
here conoerned with the historical value of his contentions
about the nature of the Merovingian and Carolingian mon-
archies, but only with the conclusions which he drew from
his study of history. He contended that the supreme
authority in the time of these monarchies belonged to the
general assembly of the whole people, which he relates to the
States General of later times,3 and that it was this assembly
which elected and deposed kings. * He gives a number of
examples of the authority of the States General, including a
statement that it was the States General which decided
between the claims to the French crown of Edward III. and
Philip of Valois. 5 In one place he says roundly that the
"Concile des Etats" (the States General) had the power to
elect and to depose kings, and to entrust the administration
of the kingdom during a minority to such a person as it thought
best. 4
The treatise entitled 'La Politique, Dialogue d'Archon et
de Politie,' published in 1576,7 has a very high conception of
monarchy, and speaks of the Prince as the Image and Vicar
of God; but if he has this character, he must also represent
the goodness and justice of God. 8 Hereditary succession or
1 George Buchanan,' De Jure Regni' electos. "
(p. 26): "B. Equibus omnibus facile * Cf. Allen, op. cit. (p. 309).
intelligi potest, qualem a majoribus * Hotman, 'Franco Gallia,' x. (page
acceperunt potestatem: non aliam 647).
videlicet, quarr. qui suffragiis electi in 4 Id. id. , xi. (p. 661).
leges jorant. . . . lllud autem, opinor, * Id. id. , xvii. (p. 701).
vides qui nascuntur nobis reges, eos et 4 Id. id. , xx. (p. 712).
legibus et populi suffragio creari, non 'Cf. Allen, op. cit. (p. 314).
minus quam quos ab initio diximus ? 'La Politique,' <fcc. (p. 90).
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? CHAP. II. ]
367
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
election are both tolerable: the best is to combine the two,
but even in the case of those who hold by hereditary succession
the peoples who have the right to place magistrates over them-
selves have also the right to depose them. 1 The best known
of these works, the ' Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' published in
1577, also speaks of kings as the Vicars of God,2 and says
that it is God Who has "instituted" kings, but it is the
people who constitute them, who bestow kingdoms and
approve their election. Kings must remember that they
reign " a Deo sed per populum et propter populum. " There-
fore if in some countries kingship has become hereditary, it is
still the custom that the children do not succeed their fathers
till they have been constituted anew by the people, and are
only held to be kings when they have received the investiture
of sceptre and crown from those who represent the " Majestas"
of the people. 3
George Buchanan and the Huguenot writers express this
judgment in strong and unqualified terms, but we find the
same opinions expressed in as thorough-going a fashion by
some of the Eoman Catholic writers of the last years of the
sixteenth century. Among the most important tracts written
in defence of the deposition of Henry III. of France is that
of Boucher, 'De justa Abdicatione Henrici Tertii,' published
1 Id. (p. 96): "Politie. II me
semble que et Pun et l'autre no sont
si louables que ceux qui sont par elec
tion et succession tout ensemble. . . .
Politie. J'avoue bien que par cous-
tume la chose est tellement reolue
qu'elle (hereditary succession) est re-
pute? pour droit, mais puis que les
peuples ont le droit de mettre les
magistrats sur eux . . . il faut con-
done qu'ils les peuvent demettre, et
par la sont electeurs de leurs princes. "
* 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. ' Qu.
I. (P- 9).
>> Id. , Q. III. (p. 76): "Ortendi-
riius antea Deum Reges instituere,
rogna regibus dare, reges eligere. Dici-
mus jam, populum reges constituere,
regna tradere, olectionem suo sum-agio
comprobare. . . . " (P. 79): Quo sem-
per recordantes reges ae a Deo quidem,
sed por populum et propter populum
regnare. . . . " (P. 82): Etai vero, ex
quo virtutem pat rum imitati fiiii,
nepotesve, regna sibi quasi haeredi-
taria fecisse videntur, in quibusdam
regionibus electionis libera facultas
desiisso quodammodo videatur; man-
sit tamen perpetuo in omnibus regnis
bene constitutis ea consuetudo, ut de
mortuia non prius succederent liberi,
quam a populo quasi de novo conatitu-
erentur, nec tanquam suia haeredes
patribus agnoscerentur, sed tum demuni
reges censerentur, cum ab iis qui populi
mnjestatem representant, regni in-
vestituram, quasi per sceptrum et
diadema accepissent. "
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? 368 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PAST IV.
in 1589. Boucher was a theologian of some eminence, and
his work is largely concerned with the question of the power
of the Pope to depose kings. We are not, however, here
concerned with this question, but with his conception of the
relation of the authority of the king to that of the community.
With regard to this, he expressed himself as clearly and dog-
matically as the Huguenot writers.
It is the people or commonwealth which establishes the
king, but while it bestows this authority upon him, the final
authority and "Majestas" remains with the people. It
resided with them before there were any kings, and even
kings must render their account for any offence against it. 1
This " Majestas " is embodied in the Estates. 2
It is the people, then, from whom the king derives his
authority, and not from God only, and he repudiates the
interpretation of St Paul's words in Eomans xiii. 1 as imply-
ing the latter. We recognise, he says, that kings, like all
good things, come from God, but in accordance with the Jus
Gentium, it is through the people. 3
It would be difficult to find a more explicit repudiation of
what we call the "Divine Eight," and a more thorough-
going affirmation of the principle that the royal authority
'J. Boucher, 'De Justa Henrici
Tertii Abdicatione,' I. 9: "Jus sutem
illud cum in duobus positum sit, ut et
a populo seu republics constituuntur
reges, et regibus constitutis, sic penes
eos Kummam potestatem esse conatet,
ut surnma in eos tamen populi seu
reipublicae jus ac majestas romaneat,
huiusque adeo laesae vel imminutao, ei
res ita ferrat, rex teneri possit. "
Id. , III. 7: "Maiestas reipublicae ac
populi quae sit, diotum antea est.
Quae ut prima per se ac regibus anti-
quior est, ita authenticum quid penes
se, vel teste scriptura habot, quod
deponere, quodque abiicere a se nec
possit nec debeat. Cujusque legibus
omnes omnis generis homines ac reges
ipsi teneantur. Quippe, cum penes
eos non aliunde majestas sit, quam
quia publica ab iis potestas referatur.
Quae Caesar ab iis semel, ut sceptro
reos amonneat, lege Julia constat, quae
poenam majestatis, non dignitatis
tantum, sed et animae amissionem esse
jubet. "
* Id. id. , III. 8: "Porro majesta-
tem illam cum penes ordines seu
comitia esse constet, id quoque sequi-
tur, qui ordines laeserit, publicae
majestatis supra omnes teneri atque
reum esse. Nam pones comitia ut
regni majostas sit, cum uni versa
regnorum consuetudo docet, tum quia
perpetua in Gallia aacrosanota eorum
auctoritas esse consuevit. "
* Id. id. , I. 13: "Et nos, quidem,
ut reges a Deo, ut et bonum omne,
esso agnoscimus, ita intermedio iure
gentium, et per populum, ut sunt, ita
esse, sane fateamur. "
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? CHAP. II. ]
369
THE PRINCE UNDER THE LAW.
was inferior to the sovereign authority, or " Majestas," of the
community; it was derived from it, and was answerable to
it. Boucher adds, dogmatically, that no one is born a king;
there is no Christian kingdom where hereditary succession has
such a force that the right of establishing the king does not
remain with the people. 1
Boucher does not, however, state these principles as merely
abstract, but maintains that they were embodied in the actual
constitutional systems of the European countries, and he
refers specially to the Empire, to Aragon, and to the authority
of Parliament in England, and he attributes the comparative
absence in France of the constitutional forms of this supreme
authority of the community to the recent tyrannical
innovations of Louis XI. 2 He cites the deposition of
Merovingian and Carolingian kings in France, of Eichard
II. in England, and the recent deposition of the King of
Denmark. 3
With these writers we may place Mariana, the Spanish
Jesuit of the late sixteenth century. He also considers the
monarchy to be the best form of government, and he oare-
fully discusses the advantages and disadvantages of succession
by inheritance or by election. He finally concludes that
hereditary succession is best, but the succession should be
determined by law, not by the will of the king, for the common-
wealth gave him an authority restrained by laws, and any
change therefore must be made with the consent of the
"Ordines" (the Estates or Cortes). 4 In another place,
discussing the relation of the commonwealth to a king who
becomes a tyrant, he argues that the commonwealth, from
which the royal authority arises, may call the king to account,
and may deprive him of his authority.
