No More Learning

420, &c. 425, &c. ). The Platonic letters
doctrine of as, till he did so through his travels, were compose at different periods ; the oldest of
--for these assumptions all that can be made out is, them, the seventh and eighth, probably by disciples
that in a number of the dialogues the peculiar fea- of Plato (Hermann, p. 420, &c. ). The dialogues
tures of the Platonic dialectic and doctrine of ideas Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, Axiochus, and those
do not as yet make their appearance in a decided on justice and virtue, were with good reason re-
form. But on the one hand Hermann ranks in garded by ancient critics as spurious, and with
that class dialogues such as the Euthydemus, Menon, them may be associated the Hipparchus, Theages,
and Gorgias, in which references to dialectic and and the Definitions. The genuineness of the first
the doctrine of ideas can scarcely fail to be recog- Alcibiades seems doubtful, though Hermann defends
nised; on the other it is not easy to see why Plato, it (p. 439, &c. ). The smaller Hippias, the lon, and
even after he had laid down in his own mind the the Menexenus, on the other hand, which are
outlines of his dialectic and doctrine of ideas, should allowed by Aristotle, but assailed by Schleiermacher
not now and then, according to the separate re- i. 2, p. 295, ii. 3, p. 367, &c. ) and Ast (p. 303,
quirements of the subject in hand, as in the Pro- &c. 448), might very well maintain their ground
tagoras and the smaller dialogues which connect as occasional compositions of Plato. As regards the
themselves with it, have looked away from them, thorough criticism of these dialogues in more recent
and transported himself back again completely to times, Stallbaum in particular, in the prefaces to
the Socratic point of view. Then again, in Her- his editions, and Hermann (p. 366, &c. 400, &c. ),
mann's mode of treating the subject, dialogues have rendered important services.
which stand in the closest relation to each other, as However groundless may be the Neo-platonic
the Gorgias and Theaetetus, the Euthydemus and assumption of a secret doctrine, of which not even
Theaetetus, are severed from each other, and the passages brought forward out of the insititious
assigned to different periods ; while the Phaedon, Platonic letters (vii
. p. 341, e. ii. p. 314, c. ) contain


## p. 399 (#415) ############################################

PLATO.
399
PLATO.
any evidence (comp. Hermann, i. pp. 544, 744, note to become like the Etemal. This impulse is the
755), the verbal lectures of Plato certainly did love which generates in Truth, and the develop
contain an extension and partial alteration of the ment of it is termed Dialectics. The hints re.
doctrines discussed in the dialogues, with an ap- specting the constitution of the soul, as independent
proach to the number-theory of the Pythagoreans ; of the body ; respecting its higher and lower na-
for to this we should probably refer the “ unwritten ture ; respecting the mode of apprehension of the
assumptions" (áypapa Góyuara), and perhaps also former, and its objects, the eternal and the self-
the divisions (daupérels), which Aristotle mentions existent ; respecting its corporisation, and its
(Phys. ir. 2, ib. Simpl. f. 127, de Generat. et Cor- longing by purification to raise itself again to
rupt
. ii
. 3 ; ib. Joh. Philop. f. 50 ; Diog. Laërt. its higher existence : these hints, clothed in the
ii. 80). His lectures on the doctrine of the good, form of mythus (Phuodr. p. 245, c. ), are followed
Aristotle, Heracleides Ponticus, and Hestiaeus, up in the Phaedrus by panegyrics on the love of
had noted down, and from the notes of Aristotle beauty, and discussions on dialectics (pp. 251–
some valuable fragments have come down to us 255), here understood more immediately as the
(Arist. de Anima, i. 2 ; ib. Simpl. et Joh. Philop. ; art of discoursing (pp. 265, d. 266, b. 269, c. ).
Aristox. Harmonica, ii. p. 30 ; comp. Brandis, de Out of the philosophical impulse which is developed
Perditis Aristotelis Libris, p. 3, &c. ; and Trende- by Dialectics not only correct knowledge, but also
lenburg, Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina). correct action springs forth. Socrates' doctrine re-
The Aristotelic monography on ideas was also at specting the unity of virtue, and that it consists in
least in part drawn from lectures of Plato, or con. true, vigorous, and practical knowledge ; that this
versations with him. (Aristot. Metaph. i. 9. p. knowledge, however, lying beyond sensuous per-
990, b. 11, &c. ; ib. Alex. Aphrod. in Schol. in ception and experience, is rooted in self-conscious-
Arist. p. 564, b. 14, &c. ; Brandis, l. C. p. 14, &c. ) ness and has perfect happiness (as the inward har-
mony of the soul) for its inevitable consequence :
III. The PHILOSOPHY OF Plato.
this doctrine is intended to be set forth in a pre-
The attempt to combine poetry and philosophy liminary manner in the Protagoras and the smaller
(the two fundamental tendencies of the Greek dialogues attached to it. They are designed, there-
mind), gives to the Platonic dialogues a charm, fore, to introduce a foundation for ethics, by the
which irresistibly attracts us, though we may have refutation of the common views that were enter-
but a deficient comprehension of their subject tained of morals and of virtue. For although not
matter. Even the greatest of the Grecian poets even the words ethics and physics occur in Plato
are censured by Plato, not without some degree of (to say nothing of any independent delineation of
passion and partiality, for their want of clear ideas, the one or the other of these sciences), and even dia-
and of true insight (de Rep. iii. p. 387, 8, ii. p. 377, lectics are not treated of as a distinct and separate
x pp. 597, c. , 605, a. , 608, a. , v. p. 476, b. , 479, province, yet he must rightly be regarded as the
472, d. , vi. p. 507, a. , de Leg. iv. p. 719, c. , Gorg. originator of the threefold division of philosophy
p. 501, b. ). “ Art is to be regarded as the capacity (Aristocles, ap. Euseb. Praep. Ev. xi. 33 ; comp.
of creating a whole that is inspired by an invisible Aristot. Top. i 14, Anal. Post. i. 33), inasmuch as
order (Phileb. pp. 64, 67, Phaedr. p. 264, d. ); its he had before him the decided object to develop
aim, to guide the human soul (Phaedr. pp. 261, a. the Socratic method into a scientific system of dia-
277, c. 278, a. , de Rep. X. p. 605, c. ). The living, lectics, that should supply the grounds of our
unconsciously-creative impulse of the poet, when knowledge as well as of our moral action (physics
purified by science, should, on its part, bring this to and ethics), and therefore separates the general
a full development. Carrying the Socratic dialogue investigations on knowledge and understanding,
to greater perfection, Plato endeavours to draw his at least relatively, from those which refer to
hearers, by means of a dramatic intuition, into the physics and ethics. Accordingly, the Theaetetus,
circle of the investigation ; to bring them, by the Sophistes, Parmenides, and Cratylus, are principally
spur of irony, to a consciousness either of know- dialectical ; the Protagoras, Gorgias, Politicus, Phi-
ledge or of ignorance ; by means of myths, partly lebus, and the Politics, principally ethical ; while
to waken up the spirit of scientific inquiry, partly the Timaeus is exclusively physical. Plato's dia-
to express hopes and anticipations which science lectics and ethics, however, have been more success-
is not yet able to confirm. (See Alb. Jahn, Disser ful than his physics.
tatio Platonica qua tum de Causa et Natura Mytho- The question, “ What is knowledge,” had been
rum Platonicorum disputatur, tum Mythus de Amoris brought forward more and more definitely, in pro-
Ortu Sorte et Indole erplicatur. Beriae, 1839. ) portion as the development of philosophy generally
Plato, like Socrates, was penetrated with the advanced. Each of the three main branches of the
idea that wisdom is the attribute of the Godhead, ancient philosophy, when at their culminating point,
that philosophy, springing from the impulse to had made a trial at the solution of that question, and
know, is the necessity of the intellectual man, and considered themselves bound to penetrate beneath
toe greatest of the goods in which he participates the phenomenal surface of the affections and per-
(Phuedr. p. 278, d. , Lysis, p. 218, a. , Apolog. p. 23, ceptions. Heracleitus, for example, in order to
Theaet. p. 155, d. , Sympos. p. 204, a. , Tim. p. 47, a. ). gain a sufficient ground for the common (čuvóv),
When once we strive after Wisdom with the in- or, as we should say, for the universally admitted,
tensity of a lover, she becomes the true consecra- though in contradiction to his fundamental prin-
tion and purification of the soul (Phaedr. p. 60, e. , ciple of an eternal generation, postulates a world-
Symp. p. 218, b. ), adapted to lead us from the night consciousness ; Parmenides believed that he had
like to the true day (de Rep. vii. p. 521, d. vi. p. 485, discovered knowledge in the identity of simple,
b. ). An approach to wisdom, however, presupposes unchangeable Being, and thought; Philolaus, and
an original communion with Being, truly so called ; with him the flower of the Pythagoreans generally,
and this communion again presupposes the divine in the consciousness we have of the unchangeable
nature or immortality of the soul, and the impulse relations of number and measure. When, however,
a
.


## p. 400 (#416) ############################################

400
PLATO.
PLATO.
a
the conflict of these principles, each of them unte- up the assertion, that knowledge consists in right
nable in its own one-sidedness, had called forth the conception, united with discourse or explanation ;
Bophists, and these had either denied knowledge for even thus an absolutely certain knowledge will
altogether, or resolved it into the mere opinion of be presupposed as the rule or criterion of the ex-
momentary affection, Socrates was obliged above planation, whatever may be its more accurate
all things to show, that there was a knowledge in- definition (p. 200, c. &c. ). Although, therefore,
dependent of the changes of our sensuous affections, Plato concludes the dialogue with the declara-
und that this knowledge is actually found in our tion that he has not succeeded in bringing the idea
inalienable consciousness respecting moral require- of knowledge into perfect clearness (p. 210, a. ), but
ments, and respecting the divinity, in conscientious that it must be something which excludes all change-
Belf-intellection. To develope this by induction from ableness, something which is its own guarantee,
particular manifeslations of the moral and religious simple, uniform, indivisible (p. 205, c. , comp. 202,
sense, and to establish it, by means of definition, in d. ), and not to be reached in the science of num.
a comprehensible form,--that is, in its generality, - bers (p. 195, d. ): of this the reader, as he sponta-
such was the point to which his attention had mainly neously reproduces the investigation, was intended
to be directed. Plato, on the contrary, was con-
to convince himself (comp. Charmid. p. 166, c. 169,
strained to view the question relating to the essence C. , Sophist. p. 220, c. ). That knowledge, however,
and the material of our knowledge, as well of that grounded on and sustained by logical inference
which develops itself for its own sake, as of that (airias doyoua, Meno, p. 98, a. , de Rep. iv. p.
which breaks out into action,—of the theoretical as 431, c. ), should verify itself through the medium of
well as of the practical, more generally, and to direct true ideas (Tim. p. 51, c. , de Rep. vi. p. 54, d. ), can
his efforts, therefore, to the investigation of its va- only be considered as the more perfect determina-
rious forms. In so doing he became the originatortion of the conclusion to which he had come in the
of the science of knowledge,- of dialectics. No Theaetetus.
one before him had gained an equally clear percep- But before Plato could pass on to his investiga-
tion of the subjective and objective elements of our tions respecting the modes of development and the
knowledge ; no one of the theoretical and the prac- forms of knowledge, he was obliged to undertake
tical side of it; and no one before him had attempted to determine the objects of knowledge, and to
to discover its forms and its laws.
grasp that knowledge in its objective phase. To
The doctrine of Heracleitus, if we set aside the pos- accomplish this was the purpose of the Sophistes,
tulate of a universal world-consciousness, had been which immediately attaches itself to the Theaetetus,
weakened down to the idea that knowledge is con- and obviously presupposes its conclusions. In the
fined to the consciousness of the momentary affec- latter dialogue it had already been intimated that
tion which proceeds from the meeting of the motion knowledge can only take place in reference to real
of the subject with that of the object ; that each of existence (Theaet. p. 206, e. and 201, a). This was
these affections is equally true, but that each, on also the doctrine of the Eleatics, who nevertheless
account of the incessant change of the motions, must had deduced the unconditional unity and unchange-
be a different one. With this idea that of the ableness of the existent, from the inconceivableness
atomistic theory coincided, inasmuch as it was only of the non-existent. If, however, non-existence is
by means of arbitrary hypotheses that the latter absolutely inconceivable, then also must error, false
could get over the consciousness of ever-changing conception, be so likewise. First of all, therefore,
sensuous affections. In order to refute this idea the non-existent was to be discussed, and shown to
from its very foundation, once for all, Plato's have, in some sort, an existence, while to this end
Theaetetus sets forth with great acuteness the doc- existence itself had to be defined.
trine of eternal generation, and the results which In the primal substance, perpetually undergoing
Protagoras had drawn from it (p. 153, &c. ); he a process of transformation, which was assumed by
renounces the apparent, but by no means decisive the Ionian physiologists, the existent, whether
grounds, which lie against it (p. 157, e. &c. ) ; but understood as duality, trinity, or plurality, cannot
then demonstrates that Protagoras must regard his find place (p. 242, d. ); but as little can it (with the
own assertion as at once true and false ; that he Eleatics) be even so much as conceived in thought
must renounce and give up all determinations re- as something absolutely single and one, without any
specting futurity, and consequently respecting uti- multiplicity (p. 244, b. &c. ). Such a thing would
lity ; that continuity of motion being presupposed, rather again coincide with Non-existence. For a
no perception whatever could be attained ; and that multiplicity even in appearance only to be ad-
the comparison and combination of the emotions mitted, a multiformity of the existent must be
or perceptions presupposes a thinking faculty pe acknowledged (p. 245, c. d. ). Manifold existence,
culiar to the soul (reflection), distinct from mere however, cannot be a bare multiformity of the
feeling (pp. 171, &c. 179, 182—184). The man tangible and corporeal (p. 246, a. f. ), nor yet
who acknowledges this, if he still will not renounce a plurality of intelligible incorporeal Essences
sensualism, yet will be inclined from his sense-per- (Ideas), which have no share either in Action or in
ceptions to deduce recollection ; from it, concep- Passion, as Euclid and his school probably taught ;
tion ; from conception, when it acquires firmness, since so conceived they would be destitute of any
knowledge (Phaedo, p. 96, c. ); and to designate influence on the world of the changeable, and would
the latter as correct conception ; although he will indeed themselves entirely elude our cognizance
not be in a condition to render any account of the (p. 248, a f. ).
rise of incorrect conceptions, or of the difference But as in the Theaetetus, the inconceivableness of
between those and correct ones, unless he presup- an eternal generation, without anything stable, had
poses a knowledge that lies, not merely beyond been the result arrived at (comp. Sophist
. p. 249,
conception generally, but even beyond correct con- b. ), so in the Sophistes the opposite idea is disposed
ception, and that carries with it its own evidence of, namely, that the absolutely unchangeable ex-
(Theaet. p. 187). He will also be obliged to give istence alone really is, and that all change is mere
:


## p. 401 (#417) ############################################

PLATO.
401
PLATO.
appearance. Plato vas obliged, therefore, to un- | thinking souls (Philcb. p. 15, a. , de Rep. vii. p. 532,
dertake this tnsk,—to find a Being instead of a 2, Tim. p. 5), Phaedo, p. 100, b. p. 102. c. &c).
Becoming, and vice versi, and then to show how To that only which can be conceived as an entirely
the manifold existences stand in relation to each formless and undetermined mass, or as a part of a
other, and to the changeable, i. e. to phenomena whole, or as an arbitrary relation, do no ideas
Existence, Plato concludes, can of itself consist whatever correspond (Parm. p. 130, c. ).
neither in Rest nor in Motion, yet still can share But how are we to understand the existence
in both, and stand in reciprocal community (p. 250, of ideas in things ? Neither the whole concep-
a &c. ).
tion, nor merely a part of it, can reside in the
But certain ideas absolutely exclude one an- things ; neither is it enough to understand the ideas
other, as rest, for example, excludes motion, and to be conceptions, which the soul beholds together
sameness difference. What ideas, then, are capable with the things (that is, as we should call them,
of being united with each other, and what are subjectively valid conceptions or categories), or as
not so, it is the part of science (dialectics) to decide bare thoughts without reality. Even when viewed
(p. 252, e. ). By the discussion of the relation as the archetypes of the changeable, they need some
which the ideas of rest and inotion, of samencos more distinct definition, and some security against
and difference, hold to each other, it is explained obvious objections. This question and the difficul-
how motion can be the same, and not the same, ties which lie against its solution, are developed in
how it can be thought of as being and yet not the Parmenides, at the beginning of the dialogue,
being ; consequently, how the non-existent denotes with great acuteness. To introduce the solution
only the variations of existence, not the bare nega- to that question, and the refutation of these diffi-
tion of it (p. 256, d. &c. ). That existence is not culties, is the evident intention of the succeeding
at variance with becoming, and that the latter is dialectical antinomical* discussion of the idea of
not conceivable apart from the former, Plato shows anity, as a thing being and not being, according as
in the case of the two principal parts of speech, and it is viewed in relation to itself and to what is
their reciprocal relation (p. 258. C. , &c. 262). From different. How far Plato succeeded in separating
this it becomes evident in what sense dialectics can ideas from mere abstract conceptions, and making
be characterised at once as the science of under their reality distinct from the natural causality of
standing, and as the science of the self-existent, as motion, we cannot here inquire. Neither can we
the science of sciences. In the Phaedrus (p. 261 ; enter into any discussions respecting the Platonic
comp. pp. 266, b. 270, d. ) it is presented to us in the methods of division, and of the antinomical defini-
first instance as the art of discoursing, and there- tions of ideas, respecting the leading principles of
with of the true education of the soul and of intel- these methods, and his attempt in the Cratylus to
lection. In the Sophistes (p. 261, e. &c. ) it appears represent words as the immediate copy of ideas,
as the science of the true connection of ideas ; in that is, of the essential in things, by means of the
the Pbilebus (p. 16, c. ) as the highest gift of the fundamental parts of speech, and to point out the
gods, as the true Promethean fire; while in the part which dialectics must take in the development
Books on the Republic (vi. p. 511, b. ) pure of language. While the foundation which Plato
ideas, freed from all form and presupposition, are lays for the doctrine of ideas or dialectics must be
shown to be grasped and developed by it. regarded as something finished and complete in
In the Theaetetus simple ideas, reached only by itself, yet the mode in which he carries it out is
the spontaneous activity of thought, bad presented not by any means beyond the reach of objections ;
themselves as the necessary conditions of krow- and we can hardly assume that it had attained
ledge ; in the Sophistes, the objects of knowledge any remarkably higher development either in the
come before us as a manifold existence, containing mind of Plato himself
, or in his lectures, although
in itself the principles of all changes. The existence he appears to have been continually endeavouring
of things, cognisable only by means of conception, is to grasp and to represent the fundamental outlines
their true essence, their idea. Hence the asser- of his doctrine from different points of view, as
tion (Parmen. p. 135, b. ) that to deny the reality is manifest especially from the argumentations
of ideas is to destroy all scientific research. Plato, which are preserved to us in Aristotle's work on
it is true, departed from the original meaning of the Plato's ideas. (Brandis, de perditis Aristotelis
word idea (namely, that of form or figure) in which Libris de Ideis et de Bono, p. 14, &c. ; also Hand-
it had been employed by Anaxagoras, Diogenes of buch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philo-
Apollonia, and probably also by Democritus ; inas- sophie, vol. ii. p. 227, &c. )
much as he understood by it the unities (evades, That Plato, however, while he distinctly sepa-
uováðes) which lie at the basis of the visible, rated the region of pure thinking or of ideas from
the changeable, and which can only be reached by that of sensuous perception and the world of phe-
pure thinking (einikpurris oiávova) (Phaedr. p. 247, nomena, did not overlook the necessity of the com-
de Rep. ii. p. 380, ix. p. 585, b. vi. p. 507, b. , munion between the intelligible and the sensible
Phileb. p. 15, Tim. p. 51, b. ); but he retained the world, is abundantly manifest from the gradations
characteristic of the intuitive and real, in opposi- which he assumes for the development of our cog.
tion to the mere abstractness of ideas which be- nition. In the region of sense perception, or con-
long simply to the thinking which interposes itself. ception, again, he distinguishes the comprehension
He included under the expression idea every thing of images, and that of objects (eixaola and plotis),
stable amidst the changes of mere phenomena, all while in the region of thinking he separates the
really existing and unchangeable definitudes, by knowledge of those relations which belong indeed
which the changes of things and our knowledge
of them are conditioned, such as the ideas of The meaning of the somewhat novel, though
genus and species, the laws and ends of nature, convenient, word, antinomical (antinomisch) will be
as also the principles of cognition, and of moral evident to any one who examines the Greek word
action, and the essences of individual, concrete, dutivopisós, to which it is equivalent. [Transl. )
VOL UL.
DD


## p. 402 (#418) ############################################

402
PLATO.
PLATO.
to thinking, but which require intuition in the case aside the doubt that arises from the existence of
of sensuous objects, from the immediate grasp by evil and suffering in the world. (Braudis, Ibid.
thought of intelligible objects or ideas themselves, p. 331, &c. )
that is, of ultimate principles, devoid of all pre-
But then, how does the sensuous world, the
supposition (giávora, vous). To the first gradation world of phenomena, come into existence ? To
of science, that is, of the higher department of suppose that in his view it was nothing else than
thinking, belong principally, though not exclu: the mere subjective appearance which springs from
sively, mathematics ; and that Plato regarded the commingling of the ideas, or the confused con-
them (though he did not fully realise this notion)ception of the ideas (Ritter, Geschichte der Philo
as a necessary means for elevating experience into sophie, vol. ii. pp. 295, &c. 339, &c. ), not only
scientific knowledge, is evident from hints that contradicts the declarations of Plato in the Philebus
occur elsewhere. (Comp. Brandis, Handbuch, &c.