Both the Irish and LASA delega-
tions mention this as an electoral plus.
tions mention this as an electoral plus.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
This has no influence whatsoever on Time's treatment of State Department pronouncements as authentic truth-the standard from which other claims may be eval- uated.
Thus Time says that "Americas Watch, a controversial group
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS III
II2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
that is often accused of being too sympathetic to the left, called ~ Guatemala 'a nation of prisoners. ' " Time doesn't independently evalu-
ate the quality of sources-the State Department is unchallenged be-
cause it expounds the official and patriotic truth. Americas Watch is ~ denigrated (and only rarely cited, even with a dismissing put-down) because it challenges official propaganda. Pravda could hardly be more , subservient to state demands than Time in its coverage of demonstra-
tion elections. 78 _ The mass media's sourcing on the Guatemalan election was confined almost entirely to U. S. officials and official observers, the most promi-
nent Guatemalan political candidates, and generals. Spokespersons for
the insurgents-what in Nicaragua would be labeled the "main opposi- tion"-the smaller parties, spokespersons for popular organizations,
the churches, human-rights groups, and ordinary citizens, were essen-
tially ignored by the media. Time, Newsweek and CBS News almost
never talked to ordinary citizens or spokespersons for the insurgents. Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, had only one citation to a rebel source
in several dozen articles on Guatemala during the election periods, although on election day in 1984 he did speak with a number of ordinary citizens (who gave a much less optimistic view than Kinzer's usual
sources).
The restricted menu of media sources flows from and reinforces the
media's propensity to adopt a patriotic agenda. U. S. government offi- cials and observers are always optimistic and hopeful in their state- ments about sponsored elections. The leading contestant politicians are also moderately optimistic, as they have a good chance of acquiring at least nominal power. They do, however, express occasional doubts about whether the army will relinquish power. This allows the election drama to assume a slightly different character from that in EI Salvador, where it was the democratic army "protecting the election" versus the undemocratic rebels who refused to lay down their arms and partici- pate. In Guatemala, the frame was: Will the generals keep their promise to stay in the barracks? The triumph is that they do stay in the bar- racks-a civilian president takes office and now "rules. " The media then quickly drop the subject, so that whether the army really does relinquish power to the civilian leaders is never checked out (just as the "peace" sought by the populace in El Salvador was never considered in retrospect). In Poland, in January 1947, and Nicaragua, in 1984, and in enemy states generally, the focus was on the substance of power, and the extent to which that power shaped the electoral results in advance, as by limiting the ability of important constituencies to run for office and compete effectively. Not so for Guatemala.
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANlllOGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 1I3
If the mass media had enlarged their sources, fundamental condi- tions would have assumed greater prominence. For example, before both the July I, 1984, and December 1985 elections in Guatemala, the Guatemala Bishops' Conference issued pastoral statements that sug- gested in no uncertain terms and with detailed arguments that condi- tions in the country were incompatible with a free election. Its pastoral letter ofJune 8, 1984, focused on the civil-defense patrols as "suscepti- ble to manipulation," and it discussed the disappearances, "insatiable corruption," and the fact that sociopolitical structures are "not capable of promoting the welfare of the whole society. "79 Stephen Kinzer men- tioned this report in a Times news article of July 22, 1984, but his reference is made afler the election of JUly I, and Kinzer did not use it to frame the discussion of electoral conditions and to arrive at an assessment of the quality of the election. Furthermore, his summary of the twenty-seven-page report, that it "denounced torture, electoral
fraud, concentration of wealth and 'massacres of entire families,''' ignores the quite specific critique of the conditions bearing on an elec- tion. Time mentioned this pastoral letter briefly; Newsweek and CBS News never mentioned it.
In connection with the 1985 election, the bishops put forth another powerful statement, once again questioning whether an election can be meaningful in "a situation close to slavery and desperation. "80 They point out that the civil-defense patrols, the "ideology of national secu- rity," and hunger and impoverishment are not conducive to serious elections:
In order that the longed-for results be obtained, there must be not only the freedom at the moment of casting one's vote, but also a whole series of particular social, political and economic conditions which are, unfortunately, not happening in Guatemala. In effect there still persist in Guatemala harsh violence, lack of respect for human rights and the breaking of basic laws. It is a fact that any citizen pressured, terrorized or threatened is not fully able to exercise his/her right to vote or to be elected conscientiously.
This letter was not mentioned in the major media or anywhere else, to our knowledge, although the bishops are conservative, credible, and one of the few organized bodies in Guatemala not crushed by state terror.
There were other dissenting voices in Guatemala-politicians of the lesser parties, union officials, human-rights groups, lawyers, and ju- rists-who spoke out occasionally on the limits to free electoral condi-
II4 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
tions in Guatemala. And there were events of note that threw a power- fullight on the subject. Most of these were blacked out in the U. S. mass media. For example,81 on July 4. 1984, the Guatemalan Human, Rights Commission issued a statement in Mexico saying that the election's meaning should be viewed in the context of three important facts: namely, that the requirements for a meaningful election stipulated by the United Nations in a March 14 statement had not been met; that the left had been excluded from participation in the election; and that 115 persons had been murdered or disappeared in the thirty days prior to the election ofJuly I. This statement, and the facts cited by the commis- sion, were ignored in the U. S. press.
Consider also the following facts: On May 3, General Oscar Mejia Victores removed Ricardo Sagastume Vidaure from his position as president of the judiciary and the supreme court. On April II, the judiciary had issued writs of habeas corpus on behalf of 157 kidnapped individuals, and Sagastume had protested to Mejia Victores over the difficulty in proceeding against military abuses. On May 4, Acisco Valladares Molina, head of the Populist party, noted that Sagastume had been "fired like a simple subordinate. " On May 8, a communique from the Guatemalan bar association stated that in Guatemala there is no rule of law, as demonstrated by the constant violation of human rights and uncontrolled exercise of arbitrary power. By May 8, at least sixteen judicary officials, including supreme court and court of appeals magistrates, had resigned in protest at Sagustume's removal.
Stephen Kinzer never discussed any of these events, or their mean- ing, in the Times, nor did any of his colleagues elsewhere in the mass media. This is in accord with our hypothesis that in elections held in client states, fundamental electoral conditions, such as the presence or absence of the rule of law, are off the agenda. The point applies to other relevant structural conditions. Thus, while Kinzer occasionally men- tioned the civil-defense patrols, he never described them and their operations in any detail or tied them in with other institutional struc- tures of control, and he failed to relate them in a systematic way to army power. The numerous reports on these coercive institutions and their terrorist role by Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and the Brit- ish Parliamentary Human Rights Group were almost never cited by Kinzer in providing facts relevant to the Guatemalan elections. Al- though the constituent assembly elected in 1984 produced a new consti- tution, K. inzer never once discussed the nature of this instrument, which validated the special army role and structural constraints on freedom of the press.
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 115
Kinzer was reporting news in a way that fit the Times's editorial position and the U. S. government agenda. The Times editorial frame was that "The military, in power for most of 31 years, has honored its promise to permit the free election of a civilian president. "82 Kinzer's news articles of the same period convey the same message--one oft. hem is entitled "After 30 Years Democracy Gets a Chance in Guatemala" (Nov. 10, 1985)-whic. h accurately summarizes the contents, although they contain an undercurrent of reserved final judgment. That central message was false, however, if the basic conditions of a free election were not met, if the army's power remained unimpaired, and if these were confirmed in a written constitution that allows the army freedom from the rule of law and a license to kill without constraint from the nominal "democracy. "83 Kinzer could only convey this false message by ignoring the Sagastume case, the institutional arrangements of the counterinsurgency state, the ongoing murders, and the omnipresent fear-i. e. , the basic conditions of a free election-and by laying stress instead on expressions of hope, orderliness of the election processes, and army promises-i. e. , the government's propaganda agenda in a demonstration election.
In what must be one of the low points of his journalistic career, in an article of December 27, 1985 ("Guatemala Vote Heartens Nicaragua Parties"), Kinzer even implies that the Guatemala election establishes an electoral model for Nicaragua. He describes a Cerezo visit to Nicara- gua, in which Kinzer features the encouragement Cerezo gives to the dissident parties that perhaps the power of the Sandinistas can be broken by patience (implying that Cerezo had broken the power of the army in Guatemala and was in full command). The article closes with a quote from an opposition figure: "Ortega is now the last President in Central America who wears a military uniform, and the contrast is going to be evident. " Nowhere in the article does Kinzer point out that army power can not be read from whether the head of state wears a uniform, or that the rule of the army in Guatemala has not yet been overcome. He does not refer to the fact that the Guatemalan army has killed tens of thousands of ordinary civilians. Nor does he show any recognition of the fact that the election held in Nicaragua was much
more open than that held in Guatemala. On the contrary, this is a fact that the media, including the New York Times, explicitly and consis- tently deny, in accordance with state imperatives.
As in the case of El Salvador, the U. S. mass media never suggested that the exclusion of the Guatemalan insurgent groups rendered the Guatemalan election meaningless. Kinzer several times mentioned with
u6 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
extreme brevity that the left was off the ballot, but he never asked anybody to discuss the meaning of this in terms of the options available to the various segments of society. As coauthor of an important book on this topic, Kinzer is well aware of the facts. 84 The vast majority of Guatemalans are very poor, and they have been entirely excluded from political participation or representation since 1954. The insurgency grew out of the parlous condition and exploitation of that mass, and the absence of any possibility of a democratic process to alleviate injustice and misery. The ruling army had allowed only parties to run and civilians to hold office who agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to keep off the policy agenda all maners of central concern to the impoverished major- ity. There is no way to measure the strength of popular support for the insurgents, but in light of the fact that they espouse programs well oriented to the interests of the general population and have been able to maintain an insurgency without significant external aid, and that the army response has been a war against virtually the entire rural popula-
tion, the rebel claim to be a "main opposition" would appear to be stronger than that of Arturo Cruz and his upper-class Nicaraguan associates. And if the rebels---or any candidates who would threaten the army and oligarchy in ways appealing to the majority---eannot qualify in a Guatemalan election, is it not essentially fraudulent? This was strongly suggested in both 1984 and 1985 by the Guatemalan Bishops' Conference, but this respectable source, in contrast with Arturo Cruz and Robert Leiken, is blacked out. As with EI Salvador, the election was not evaluated, either in advance or in retrospect, on the basis of whether or not the fundamental requirements of a free election were met. For the U. S. government, the insurgents were not a main opposition, Guatemalan state terror was merely a public-relations inconvenience, and the elections were fair. The mass media's treatment of the Guatemalan election reflected well this government propaganda agenda.
3. 6. NICARAGUA: MEDIA SERVICE IN THE DELEGITIMIZING PROCESS
In contrast with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases, the Reagan administration was intent on discrediting the Nicaraguan election, which threatened to legitimize the Sandinista government and thus
. l
LEGITIMIZING VERSeS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIOSS II7
weaken the case for U. S. funding of a terrorist army. The administra- tion had been berating the Sandinistas for failing to hold an election, but the actual holding of one was inconvenient. From the inception of Nicaraguan planning for the election, therefore, the administration began to express doubts about its quality. And just as it devoted itself to creating a positive image of the two client-state elections, so it expended substantial resources to depict the Nicaraguan election in the worst possible light. The media dutifully followed course, as a propa- ganda model predicts.
The mass media failed to call attention to the cynicism of first assailing Nicaragua for failing to hold an election, and then striving to have the election either postponed or discredited. 85 Time even cites the absence of "official delegations [of observers] from the major western democracies" (Nov. 19, 1984), as if this were evidence of something discreditable in the election, rather than as a reflection of U. S. power. There were 450-odd foreign observers in attendance at the Nicaraguan election, some with superb credentials, observing more freely and at greater length than the official U. S. observers in El Salvador and Guatemala. Time and the rest of the mass media paid no attention to them. 86
Stephen Kinzer's use of observers is noteworthy. In the case of Nicaragua, he completely ignored the unofficial observers-many ex- ceedingly well qualified to observe, as we have noted-and he even ignored the official Dutch government team, drawn from the center- right and highly apologetic about atrocities in El Salvador, which observed both the Salvadoran and the Nicaraguan elections and con- cluded that the elections in Nicaragua "were more open than in El Salvador, in the sense that more people were able to take part; that the opposition did not fear for their lives"; and that "the legitimation ofthe regime is thus confirmed. "87 In Guatemala, by contrast, he cited the official observer report in both the 1984 and 1985 elections, despite their great bias and superficiality (see the report discussed in appendix I). In the 1984 Guatemala election, Kinzer did refer to the report of the unofficial Human Rights Law Group that we cited earlier, quoting their statement that the voting process was "procedurally correct," but neg- lecting to note here and elsewhere their numerous statements to the
effect that "the greater part of the population lives in permanent fear" (p. 4), so that "procedural correctness" has little meaning.
With no U. s. -government-designated official observers available in Nicaragua, the media relied even more heavily than usual on U. S. government handouts. It is enlightening to compare this conduited propaganda of the mass media with the findings of foreign-observer
lIS MANUFACTURING CONSENT
teams on the scene in Nicaragua. For the purpose of this comparison, which follows, we will use two such reports. One, that of the Irish Inter-Party Parliamentary Delegation, is The Elections in Nicaragua, November I984. The delegation was composed offOUT individuals, three from right-wing or moderate-right political parties, who spent seven- teen days in Nicaragua at the time of the election. We will also use as a basis of comparison of media coverage the previously cited report of the Is-member delegation sent by the Latin American Studies Associa- tion (LASA), half of whom had had "substantial field experience" in Nicaragua itself. This delegation spent eight days in Nicaragua before the election, traveled in a rented bus, determined their own itinerary, and "spoke with anyone who we chose to approach (as well as numer-
ous people who spontaneously approached US). "88
3. 6. 1. Tone of negativism and apathy
Time magazine hardly attempts to hide the fact that it takes its cues from Washington. It quotes John Hughes, then a public-relations man for the State Department (and previously, and subsequently, a colum- nist for the Christian Science Monitor): "It was not a very good election. . . . It was just a piece of theatre for the Sandinistas. "89 Time follows this cue with a series of denigrating strokes: "The Sandinistas win, as expected. . . . The Nicaraguan election mood was one of indifference. . . . The outcome was never in doubt. . . . Something of an anticlimax" (all in the issue of November 19, 1984). In an earlier article (October 29), Time indulged in the same negative refrain: "A campaign without suspense," voters "too apathetic to go to the polls at all" (this was a forecast dredged up well before the election). In both articles, "fear" was also featured heavily. In the Salvadoran election, Time's tone was different: "There was no denying the remarkable sense of occasion" (Le. , the Reagan administration had a big public-relations investment in the election); "hundreds of thousands . . . braved the threats, and sometimes the bullets, of the Marxist-led [FMLN] to join long serpen- tine polling lines for the country's much awaited presidential elections" (Apr. 9, 1984). 90 In Guatemala too, "Some 1. 8 million voters braved four-hour polling lines, tropical rainstorms and a bewildering array of
political choices to cast ballots in their country's most open and fraud- free elections in more than a decade" ouly 16, 1984). There is never apathy or fear of government force in Time's renditions of demonstra- tion elections.
-
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEAN1NGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 1I9
Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, also took a far less kindly view of the election in Nicaragua than of those in Guatemala, giving enormous attention to election opponents like the U. S. candidate Arturo Cruz (whereas in Guatemala he almost completely ignored the small parties, union protesters, rebels, and human-rights groups), and finding more people voting out of fear than he did in Guatemala, a remarkable discovery given the circumstances in the two countries. 91 He focuses steadily on the Sandinistas' efforts to get out the vote, the fact that the election result is a foregone conclusion, claims of the breaking up of election rallies, and allegations of unfairness and withdrawals by the opposition. As with Time, the voters are "philosophical," "enthusiasm for the election was not universal," and "there was little visible enthusi- asm. " Kinzer did not compare the electoral modalities, range of op- tions, or other basic conditions in Nicaragua and Guatemala (or El Salvador). In short, he discussed different questions in his news report- ing on the elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala, adhering closely to the propaganda frame. n
On the alleged negativism and apathy, both the Irish and LASA delegations noted that voting was not required in Nicaragua and was entirely secret. Therefore, as the Irish delegation pointed out, the low rate of abstention is more meaningful and "invalidates predictions that large sectors of the population were opposed to the election. Further- more, the percentage ofspoiled votes (7. 4 percent) is comparable to any European election in a country with a highly literate population" (p. 7). They also note that
Speaking with one old man, awaiting his turn to vote in a rural polling station, one member of the delegation inquired: "What difference do you see between this and any other election in which you voted? " He replied: "Everything. " "In what way? " He simply shrugged: "Everything is different. "
The U. S. media never located anybody like this old man. The Irish delegation also pointed out that
Some observers from other countries suggested that the people did not appear eI. 1thusiastic as they went to the polls. This is not surprising as people stood in long queues waiting patiently their turn to go behind the curtain to mark their ballot paper. One member of the delegation who had the opportunity to observe voters in the American election just two days later, noted no greater enthusiasm for standing in queues there!
I20 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
It is our belief that the invariable enthusiasm and optimism found by the U. S. mass media in client-state elections, and the apathy and nega- tivism found in elections in states disfavored by the U. S. administra- tion, has nothing to do with electoral realities and must be explained entirely by an imposed propaganda agenda and the filtering out of contrary opinion and information.
3. 6. 2. Ignoring the superior quality of the Nicaraguan election
In the propaganda format, a great deal of attention is paid to the mechanical properties of elections in client states, but not in states
whose elections are being denigrated. This was true in the cases under discussion. Time (Apr. 9, 1984) described in detail the elaborate elec-
toral preparations in El Salvador, the "tamper-proof' procedures, the
use of transparent Lucite ballot boxes, and the indelible-ink marking
and stamping of ID cards. It turned out, however, that the high-tech, computerized voting procedures weren't understood by the population,
more than half of whom were illiterate. At no point did Time, or its
media colleagues, raise any question about the importance ofimproving literacy as a necessary prelude to an election; nor did they suggest that
the Lucite boxes might compromise the secrecy of the vote, or that the stamped ID card might be a coercive instrument helping to explain turnout. I
Nicaragua went to great pains to provide for election secrecy, and ~ for an easy and intelligible system of voting. For one thing, they had
a massive literacy campaign before the election, making electoral
printed matter generally accessible.
Both the Irish and LASA delega-
tions mention this as an electoral plus. Nicaragua also put a high
priority on getting a complete registration list and getting the voters registered. The Irish delegation noted that "Recent elections in other
Central American countries such as EI Salvador and Guatemala did not introduce such measures, and there was considerable debate concern-
ing the validity of their registers, which were based on out-of-date
census figures, incomplete official registers of population changes, and
other sources" (p. 5). Nicaragua also deliberately avoided transparent
ballot boxes, ID stamping, and any other mechanism that would allow
the authorities to identify whether or how somebody had voted. LASA
points out that . .
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 121
I
The ballots were also printed on heavy opaque white paper. The contrast with Somoza-era elections is striking. The Somozas used translucent ballots, so virtually everyone assumed that their ballot was not secret. The same problem occurred in the 1984 elections in E1 Salvador, where thin-paper ballots were deposited in trans- parent ballot boxes. The vote in Nicaragua in 1984 was truly a secret ballot (p. 4).
In Nicaragua, also, there was proportional voting, which made it possi- ble for the smaller parties to obtain legislative representation. Parties could also qualify quite easily to participate in the election. In Guatemala, 4,000 signatures were needed to qualify in 1984, a large number and not easy for dissident parties to collect in a society with daily political murders.
Stephen Kinzer and his associates never mentioned these differ- ences. More generally, the substantial merits of the Nicaraguan elec- tions were never contrasted with the procedures in the U. S. client states, a comparison that would have been most revealing and that would have thoroughly undermined the Reagan agenda to which the media were committed in their reporting of the election. Time, as noted, mentions the compromised Salvadoran procedures as if they were meri- torious. The Times mentioned the transparent voting boxes in EI Salva- dor only once (Richard Meislin, on March 25, 1984), repeating without question the official line that the purpose of the translucent boxes was to prevent fraud. Any other possibility is unmentioned. Newsweek and CBS News ignored these matters.
3. 6. 3. Rebel disruption into the black hole; turnout no longer an index of triumph of democracy
In the Salvadoran election, rebel disruption was a central feature of the government's propaganda frame. Because the rebels opposed the elec- tion, voting by the people proved their rejection of the rebels and approval of the army. Turnout was the index of democratic triumph and rebel defeat. As we saw, the mass media followed this frame with- out question. In the case of Nicaragua, the propaganda format was reversed-the rebels were the good guys, and the election held by the bad guys was condemned in advance. Rebel opposition to the
election-and efforts at disruption-did not make voting and a large
122 MAlI;UFACTURING CONSENT
turnout a repudiation of the rebels and approval of the Sandinistas. The U. S. mass media once again followed the government agenda, even though it meant an exact reversal of the standards they had applied in the Salvadoran election. The contras and their supporters urged the public not to vote, and interfered with the election process with at least as much vigor as (and with more killings than) the rebels in El Salvador. Furthermore, voting was more assuredly secret and the citizens were not required to vote, or to have ID cards stamped indicating that they had. And the Sandinistas did not kill ordinary citizens on a daily basis, as was true in the "death-squad democracies. " Thus turnout was far more meaningful in the Nicaraguan election than in the ones held in El Salvador and Guatemala-the public was free to abstain as well as
to vote for opposition parties.
The U. S. mass media disposed of this problem mainly by massive
suppression. They simply ignored the contra-U. S. campaign for absten- tion, waged with threats and attacks on polling places and election workers; and they buried the fact of an effectively secret vote and the right not to vote,93 just as, in parallel, they had inflated rebel disruption efforts in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and buried the voting requirement and other pressures to vote.
Although the New York Times had gone out of its way to focus on the "challenge" of rebel opposition and alleged disruption as giving turnout special meaning in the Salvadoran election of 1982,94 Stephen Kinzer never once mentioned that the cantras attacked a number of polling stations and had issued radio appeals for abstention. 95 For Kinzer, neither these facts nor the U. S. campaign to discredit were seen as posing a "challenge" that made turnout meaningful in Nicaragua.
The Irish delegation pointed out that "The Parties of the Demo- cratic Coordinating Committee [based in the business communityl op- posed the voter registration, and called for a boycott of this process" (p. 5), and it noted that eleven polling stations were closed down by counterrevolutionary activities (p. 7). The public voted in large num- bers "despite the possible dangers involved," which suggested to' the Irish delegation that turnout was significant and "showed how impor- tant the election was to the people" (p. 6). LASA pointed out the various ways in which the "main opposition" called for voter absten- tion, and cited the radio warnings broadcast into the country from Costa Rica threatening that voters would be killed by the contras (pp. 16, 28). LASA also pointed out that "voter turnout was heavy," with "more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more affluent neighborhoods. " 9 6 Like Time, LASA notes that the turnout did not quite realize the expectations of FSL~ officials, but unlike Time,
LEGIT1MIZISG VERSUS MEANllIiGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 123
LASA points out that the rate of participation achieved "compares very favorably with the rates achieved in II other recent Latin American elections, as well as the 1984 U. S. presidential election . . . " (p. 16). 97
In sum, the two observer reports discuss rebel disruption in Nicara- gua, turnout, and the meaning of that turnout. The U. S. mass media, which had featured these matters heavily in reference to the Salvadoran election-where they fitted the government's propaganda agenda- found them entirely unnewsworthy as regards Nicaragua.
3. 6. 4. The revived sensitivity to coercion
As we described earlier, the "coercion package" was off the agenda for the U. S. government and mass media in addressing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections. So was the element of fear engendered by mass murder and the absence of any rule of law in these U. S. client states. Coercion and fear were back on the agenda, however, for Nicaragua. This revival was illustrated with amazing dishonesty and hypocrisy in Time~ which had never mentioned fear and pressures from the govern- ment as factors possibly explaining turnout in the U. S. -sponsored elec- tions, even after the murder of 50,000 civilians. In Nicaragua, however, the "pugnacious" Sandinistas had "an awesome monopoly of force," and getting them to "relax their grip," which was "essential for free electoral competition," was extremely dubious. Time's Central Ameri- can correspondent George Russell even located a "Latin American diplomat" who says, "You can't have democracy where there is no personal liberty at all" (Oct. 8 and May 14, 1984). Russell and Time had never found the Salvadoran government "pugnacious," with any "awe- some monopoly of force," or as having a "grip" that needed relaxing for electoral competition, and personal liberty was never mentioned as lacking or even pertinent to Salvadoran ejections. For the Nicaraguan
election, however, Time found that "The pressure to participate was high: many citizens feared they would lose precious rationing cards. " Further, "the government had made it clear that it considered failure to vote a counterrevolutionary stance. " Later, quoting Daniel Ortega, "All Nicaraguans who are Nicaraguans are going to vote. The only ones who are not going to vote are sellouts" (Nov. 19, 1984).
As we pointed out earlier, both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran army warned the public that voting was required by law and that nonvoting was treasonous. These statements were more precisely warn-
I24 MA/I;UFACTURING CONSENT
ingsj whereas Ortega's was an insult but not a clear threat. Ortega's was the only such statement of its kind reported, and Time's statement that the government "made it clear" that nonvoting was "counterrevolu- tionary" is doubly dishonest-the statement was not clearly a warning, and "counterrevolutionary" is an invidious word concocted by Time. The official government position as expressed in the law was that Nica- raguans did not have to vote. Time suppresses this fact. It suppresses the secrecy of the ballot and absence of a checkable ID card, so that there would have been no way to implement a threat even if one had been made. It suppresses the fact that the Nicaraguan army did not regularly murder even "counterrevolutionaries," whereas the Salvado- ran and Guatemalan armies murdered numerous people who weren't "revolutionaries" but were somehow in the way. In short, propaganda
could hardly be more brazen.
Time's alleged "fact," that "many" people feared the removal of the
rationing card, is contested by LASA, which states that "in our inter- views in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn . . . for any reason. " They note that there were five reports filed with the supreme electoral council alleging intimidation by threat of withdrawal of ration cards, "but none of these allegations were sustained upon investiga- tion" (p. 27). Time does not indicate the source of its evidence and fails to provide a single illustration of the "many" cases.
We noted earlier that Stephen Kinzer cited more claims of coercion in the Nicaraguan than the Guatemalan elections, a remarkable jour- nalistic achievement, given the unchallenged facts about the actual scale and character of repression in the two states. His playing down of state terror in Guatemala as a basic factor affecting the quality of the election in all its dimensions-the ability of candidates to run, freedom of speech and press, the existence of intermediate groups, endemic fear, and the meaning of turnout-amounts to massive deceit. His Nicarag- uan coverage also involved large-scale misrepresentation. He did not point out the absence of mass killings, and he failed to mention the absence of a coercion package-no transparent boxes, no requirement that an ID card be stamped, and no legal obligation to vote. Kinzer's one notice of the voting requirement in his fourteen articles on the election amounts to serious deception-he quotes a voter as follows: " 'I've always voted because it is always required,' he said. 'Of course, the law says one thing, but after a while one realizes that voting is part of patriotism, and patriotism leads to long life. ' "98 Kinzer's source implies but doesn't say directly that voting is not legally required in Nicaragua, and this murky statement-the closest Kinzer ever comes
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:-JINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOr-:S 125
to acknowledging the absence of a voting requirement-is counter- balanced by his respondent's suggestion that voting may be based on some kind of threat.
Both the Irish and LASA delegations stressed the superior protection of secrecy in the balloting, which, in LASA's words, was "meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses" (p. 15). They also em- phasized the fact that voting was not required by law, and that, contrary to the U. S. government propaganda expounded by Time and other media entities, the coercive elements in getting out the vote were small. Human-rights abuses by the government that contribute to an environ- ment of fear, LASA pointed out, were "on a very small scale" when "compared to other nations in the region . . . " (p. 28). In fact, they note that fear in Nicaragua is directed more to the United States and the contras than to the government in Managua.
3. 6. 5. The "main opposition" to the fore
As we saw, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the fact that the insurgents were off the ballot did not faze the U. S. media one bit. Neither did Duarte's acknowledgment in 1981 that "the masses were with the guer- rillas" when he joined the junta a year earlier (which would clearly make them a "main opposition"). 99 Nor were the media affected by the army's murder of the opposition leadership in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In ? 1 Salvador, the exclusion of the rebels was part of the U. S. government's electoral plan; they were, therefore, not a "main opposition," and the debarment and even murder of their leaders did not compromise election quality. In the Nicaraguan case, in sharp contrast, the U. S. government worked with a different frame-the exclusion of its sponsored rebels and any other candidates was a serious matter that threatened the quality of the election. The media followed like good little doggies (lap- rather than watch-).
The central dramatic propaganda line for the Nicaraguan election pressed by U. S. officials was the alleged struggle of Arturo Cruz to induce the Sandinistas to create an open system in which he would be able to compete fairly, the failure of the "Marxists-Leninists" to make adequate concessions, Cruz's refusal to compete, and the subsequent "exclusion" of the "main opposition. " Cruz, however, was a "main opposition" only in the propaganda construct of the U. S. government and mass media. A longtime expatriate (who now concedes that he was
126 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
on the CIA payroll), with no mass base in Nicaragua, Cruz would
almost certainly have done poorly in a free election. lOo There is good
reason to believe that Cruz never intended to run, but that he and his
sponsors had held out this possibility precisely to allow the propaganda 1 frame to be used effectively. IOI
The mass media focused on the Cruz drama heavily and uncritically. ' Cruz was given enormous play: he was continually referred to as the . . . "main opposition" or "leading opponent" of the ruling party (without
any supporting evidence), and his candidacy was made "an acid test of
the Sandinistas' democratic intentions" (Time, Oct. 29, 1984). For the Times, the election would be a "sham" without Cruz (editorial, Oct. 7, 1984), and its news columns placed "main opposition" Cruz on center stage, from which vantage point he could regularly denounce the pro- ceedings as a "farce" or sham. l02 The Times did have one good back- page article that provided evidence that Cruz had not intended to run or would not have been allowed to run by his closest Nicaraguan allies and U. S. officials, and that his function was, as we stated, to discredit
the election by pretending to be interested, thus capturing press atten- tion. 103 But this low-keyed article stood alone and did not alter the unremitting focus on the alleged exclusion of this alleged main opposi- tion as the centerpiece of the Nicaraguan election drama.
In focusing on an alleged "main opposition" in Nicaragua, which voluntarily chose not to run, while ignoring a real main opposition in El Salvador, excluded by force and plan, the mass media simply adopted without question the government's propaganda framework. Sources that would speak to the condition of the "main opposition" in El Salvador and the significance ofits exclusion-both Salvadorans and foreign observers-were simply ignored. I04 In the case of the Nicara- guan election, in contrast, Cruz and U. S. government officials were given the floor to present their themes, which were transmitted on a daily basis with no accompanying notice of their possible falsity and manipulative intent, in perfect accord with the expectations of a propa-
ganda model.
The Reagan administration not only dangled Cruz before the media,
it tried hard to induce or bribe other candidates in the Nicaraguan election to withdraw in order to fulfil the prophecy of a meaningless election. The brazenness of this intervention by a great power was remarkable, but the U. S. media gave it minimal attention. They never denounced it as antidemocratic, they failed to link it to Cruz's campaign (with its suggestion of a larger effort to discredit by boycott), and they never suggested that voter "turnout" was more meaningful given the active U. S. campaign to discredit the election. On October 31, 1984,
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:>IIl<iGLESS THIRD WORLD ELI! CTIOl<iS 127
Stephen Kinzer noted that senior U. S. officials confirmed accouncs of "regular contacts" with the Nicaraguan parties. Kinzer's article is head- lined "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista and U. S. Pressure," the headline and article itself equating the government's aid to, and agree- ments with, its own political parties with U. S. intervention to get the Nicaraguan parties to boycott the election! CBS, Newsweek, and Time ignored the U. S. bribe program entirely. Time gave great emphasis to the number of candidates and the withdrawal of several, but it never once mentioned that this was helped along by V. S. connivance, bribes, and pressure. It even quotes without comment the State Department fabrication that "it did not try to influence the outcome of the election" (Nov. 19, 1984). All substantive evidence is placed in the black hole. In the same article, Time asserts that "the V. 5. had pushed hard for elections in which all parties felt free to participate," a fabrication of considerable audacity.
As regards the scope of electoral options in Nicaragua, the Irish delegation noted that "The [political parties] law guarantees participa- tion to political parties of all ideologies," an interesting point validated by a range of political opinion in the contesting parties far wider than that found in ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala (or the United States).
LASA states that "No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984" (p. 18). This, of course, could not be said of ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala. These important features of the Nicaraguan law and practice were not mentioned in the U. S.
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS III
II2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
that is often accused of being too sympathetic to the left, called ~ Guatemala 'a nation of prisoners. ' " Time doesn't independently evalu-
ate the quality of sources-the State Department is unchallenged be-
cause it expounds the official and patriotic truth. Americas Watch is ~ denigrated (and only rarely cited, even with a dismissing put-down) because it challenges official propaganda. Pravda could hardly be more , subservient to state demands than Time in its coverage of demonstra-
tion elections. 78 _ The mass media's sourcing on the Guatemalan election was confined almost entirely to U. S. officials and official observers, the most promi-
nent Guatemalan political candidates, and generals. Spokespersons for
the insurgents-what in Nicaragua would be labeled the "main opposi- tion"-the smaller parties, spokespersons for popular organizations,
the churches, human-rights groups, and ordinary citizens, were essen-
tially ignored by the media. Time, Newsweek and CBS News almost
never talked to ordinary citizens or spokespersons for the insurgents. Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, had only one citation to a rebel source
in several dozen articles on Guatemala during the election periods, although on election day in 1984 he did speak with a number of ordinary citizens (who gave a much less optimistic view than Kinzer's usual
sources).
The restricted menu of media sources flows from and reinforces the
media's propensity to adopt a patriotic agenda. U. S. government offi- cials and observers are always optimistic and hopeful in their state- ments about sponsored elections. The leading contestant politicians are also moderately optimistic, as they have a good chance of acquiring at least nominal power. They do, however, express occasional doubts about whether the army will relinquish power. This allows the election drama to assume a slightly different character from that in EI Salvador, where it was the democratic army "protecting the election" versus the undemocratic rebels who refused to lay down their arms and partici- pate. In Guatemala, the frame was: Will the generals keep their promise to stay in the barracks? The triumph is that they do stay in the bar- racks-a civilian president takes office and now "rules. " The media then quickly drop the subject, so that whether the army really does relinquish power to the civilian leaders is never checked out (just as the "peace" sought by the populace in El Salvador was never considered in retrospect). In Poland, in January 1947, and Nicaragua, in 1984, and in enemy states generally, the focus was on the substance of power, and the extent to which that power shaped the electoral results in advance, as by limiting the ability of important constituencies to run for office and compete effectively. Not so for Guatemala.
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANlllOGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 1I3
If the mass media had enlarged their sources, fundamental condi- tions would have assumed greater prominence. For example, before both the July I, 1984, and December 1985 elections in Guatemala, the Guatemala Bishops' Conference issued pastoral statements that sug- gested in no uncertain terms and with detailed arguments that condi- tions in the country were incompatible with a free election. Its pastoral letter ofJune 8, 1984, focused on the civil-defense patrols as "suscepti- ble to manipulation," and it discussed the disappearances, "insatiable corruption," and the fact that sociopolitical structures are "not capable of promoting the welfare of the whole society. "79 Stephen Kinzer men- tioned this report in a Times news article of July 22, 1984, but his reference is made afler the election of JUly I, and Kinzer did not use it to frame the discussion of electoral conditions and to arrive at an assessment of the quality of the election. Furthermore, his summary of the twenty-seven-page report, that it "denounced torture, electoral
fraud, concentration of wealth and 'massacres of entire families,''' ignores the quite specific critique of the conditions bearing on an elec- tion. Time mentioned this pastoral letter briefly; Newsweek and CBS News never mentioned it.
In connection with the 1985 election, the bishops put forth another powerful statement, once again questioning whether an election can be meaningful in "a situation close to slavery and desperation. "80 They point out that the civil-defense patrols, the "ideology of national secu- rity," and hunger and impoverishment are not conducive to serious elections:
In order that the longed-for results be obtained, there must be not only the freedom at the moment of casting one's vote, but also a whole series of particular social, political and economic conditions which are, unfortunately, not happening in Guatemala. In effect there still persist in Guatemala harsh violence, lack of respect for human rights and the breaking of basic laws. It is a fact that any citizen pressured, terrorized or threatened is not fully able to exercise his/her right to vote or to be elected conscientiously.
This letter was not mentioned in the major media or anywhere else, to our knowledge, although the bishops are conservative, credible, and one of the few organized bodies in Guatemala not crushed by state terror.
There were other dissenting voices in Guatemala-politicians of the lesser parties, union officials, human-rights groups, lawyers, and ju- rists-who spoke out occasionally on the limits to free electoral condi-
II4 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
tions in Guatemala. And there were events of note that threw a power- fullight on the subject. Most of these were blacked out in the U. S. mass media. For example,81 on July 4. 1984, the Guatemalan Human, Rights Commission issued a statement in Mexico saying that the election's meaning should be viewed in the context of three important facts: namely, that the requirements for a meaningful election stipulated by the United Nations in a March 14 statement had not been met; that the left had been excluded from participation in the election; and that 115 persons had been murdered or disappeared in the thirty days prior to the election ofJuly I. This statement, and the facts cited by the commis- sion, were ignored in the U. S. press.
Consider also the following facts: On May 3, General Oscar Mejia Victores removed Ricardo Sagastume Vidaure from his position as president of the judiciary and the supreme court. On April II, the judiciary had issued writs of habeas corpus on behalf of 157 kidnapped individuals, and Sagastume had protested to Mejia Victores over the difficulty in proceeding against military abuses. On May 4, Acisco Valladares Molina, head of the Populist party, noted that Sagastume had been "fired like a simple subordinate. " On May 8, a communique from the Guatemalan bar association stated that in Guatemala there is no rule of law, as demonstrated by the constant violation of human rights and uncontrolled exercise of arbitrary power. By May 8, at least sixteen judicary officials, including supreme court and court of appeals magistrates, had resigned in protest at Sagustume's removal.
Stephen Kinzer never discussed any of these events, or their mean- ing, in the Times, nor did any of his colleagues elsewhere in the mass media. This is in accord with our hypothesis that in elections held in client states, fundamental electoral conditions, such as the presence or absence of the rule of law, are off the agenda. The point applies to other relevant structural conditions. Thus, while Kinzer occasionally men- tioned the civil-defense patrols, he never described them and their operations in any detail or tied them in with other institutional struc- tures of control, and he failed to relate them in a systematic way to army power. The numerous reports on these coercive institutions and their terrorist role by Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and the Brit- ish Parliamentary Human Rights Group were almost never cited by Kinzer in providing facts relevant to the Guatemalan elections. Al- though the constituent assembly elected in 1984 produced a new consti- tution, K. inzer never once discussed the nature of this instrument, which validated the special army role and structural constraints on freedom of the press.
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 115
Kinzer was reporting news in a way that fit the Times's editorial position and the U. S. government agenda. The Times editorial frame was that "The military, in power for most of 31 years, has honored its promise to permit the free election of a civilian president. "82 Kinzer's news articles of the same period convey the same message--one oft. hem is entitled "After 30 Years Democracy Gets a Chance in Guatemala" (Nov. 10, 1985)-whic. h accurately summarizes the contents, although they contain an undercurrent of reserved final judgment. That central message was false, however, if the basic conditions of a free election were not met, if the army's power remained unimpaired, and if these were confirmed in a written constitution that allows the army freedom from the rule of law and a license to kill without constraint from the nominal "democracy. "83 Kinzer could only convey this false message by ignoring the Sagastume case, the institutional arrangements of the counterinsurgency state, the ongoing murders, and the omnipresent fear-i. e. , the basic conditions of a free election-and by laying stress instead on expressions of hope, orderliness of the election processes, and army promises-i. e. , the government's propaganda agenda in a demonstration election.
In what must be one of the low points of his journalistic career, in an article of December 27, 1985 ("Guatemala Vote Heartens Nicaragua Parties"), Kinzer even implies that the Guatemala election establishes an electoral model for Nicaragua. He describes a Cerezo visit to Nicara- gua, in which Kinzer features the encouragement Cerezo gives to the dissident parties that perhaps the power of the Sandinistas can be broken by patience (implying that Cerezo had broken the power of the army in Guatemala and was in full command). The article closes with a quote from an opposition figure: "Ortega is now the last President in Central America who wears a military uniform, and the contrast is going to be evident. " Nowhere in the article does Kinzer point out that army power can not be read from whether the head of state wears a uniform, or that the rule of the army in Guatemala has not yet been overcome. He does not refer to the fact that the Guatemalan army has killed tens of thousands of ordinary civilians. Nor does he show any recognition of the fact that the election held in Nicaragua was much
more open than that held in Guatemala. On the contrary, this is a fact that the media, including the New York Times, explicitly and consis- tently deny, in accordance with state imperatives.
As in the case of El Salvador, the U. S. mass media never suggested that the exclusion of the Guatemalan insurgent groups rendered the Guatemalan election meaningless. Kinzer several times mentioned with
u6 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
extreme brevity that the left was off the ballot, but he never asked anybody to discuss the meaning of this in terms of the options available to the various segments of society. As coauthor of an important book on this topic, Kinzer is well aware of the facts. 84 The vast majority of Guatemalans are very poor, and they have been entirely excluded from political participation or representation since 1954. The insurgency grew out of the parlous condition and exploitation of that mass, and the absence of any possibility of a democratic process to alleviate injustice and misery. The ruling army had allowed only parties to run and civilians to hold office who agreed, tacitly or explicitly, to keep off the policy agenda all maners of central concern to the impoverished major- ity. There is no way to measure the strength of popular support for the insurgents, but in light of the fact that they espouse programs well oriented to the interests of the general population and have been able to maintain an insurgency without significant external aid, and that the army response has been a war against virtually the entire rural popula-
tion, the rebel claim to be a "main opposition" would appear to be stronger than that of Arturo Cruz and his upper-class Nicaraguan associates. And if the rebels---or any candidates who would threaten the army and oligarchy in ways appealing to the majority---eannot qualify in a Guatemalan election, is it not essentially fraudulent? This was strongly suggested in both 1984 and 1985 by the Guatemalan Bishops' Conference, but this respectable source, in contrast with Arturo Cruz and Robert Leiken, is blacked out. As with EI Salvador, the election was not evaluated, either in advance or in retrospect, on the basis of whether or not the fundamental requirements of a free election were met. For the U. S. government, the insurgents were not a main opposition, Guatemalan state terror was merely a public-relations inconvenience, and the elections were fair. The mass media's treatment of the Guatemalan election reflected well this government propaganda agenda.
3. 6. NICARAGUA: MEDIA SERVICE IN THE DELEGITIMIZING PROCESS
In contrast with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases, the Reagan administration was intent on discrediting the Nicaraguan election, which threatened to legitimize the Sandinista government and thus
. l
LEGITIMIZING VERSeS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIOSS II7
weaken the case for U. S. funding of a terrorist army. The administra- tion had been berating the Sandinistas for failing to hold an election, but the actual holding of one was inconvenient. From the inception of Nicaraguan planning for the election, therefore, the administration began to express doubts about its quality. And just as it devoted itself to creating a positive image of the two client-state elections, so it expended substantial resources to depict the Nicaraguan election in the worst possible light. The media dutifully followed course, as a propa- ganda model predicts.
The mass media failed to call attention to the cynicism of first assailing Nicaragua for failing to hold an election, and then striving to have the election either postponed or discredited. 85 Time even cites the absence of "official delegations [of observers] from the major western democracies" (Nov. 19, 1984), as if this were evidence of something discreditable in the election, rather than as a reflection of U. S. power. There were 450-odd foreign observers in attendance at the Nicaraguan election, some with superb credentials, observing more freely and at greater length than the official U. S. observers in El Salvador and Guatemala. Time and the rest of the mass media paid no attention to them. 86
Stephen Kinzer's use of observers is noteworthy. In the case of Nicaragua, he completely ignored the unofficial observers-many ex- ceedingly well qualified to observe, as we have noted-and he even ignored the official Dutch government team, drawn from the center- right and highly apologetic about atrocities in El Salvador, which observed both the Salvadoran and the Nicaraguan elections and con- cluded that the elections in Nicaragua "were more open than in El Salvador, in the sense that more people were able to take part; that the opposition did not fear for their lives"; and that "the legitimation ofthe regime is thus confirmed. "87 In Guatemala, by contrast, he cited the official observer report in both the 1984 and 1985 elections, despite their great bias and superficiality (see the report discussed in appendix I). In the 1984 Guatemala election, Kinzer did refer to the report of the unofficial Human Rights Law Group that we cited earlier, quoting their statement that the voting process was "procedurally correct," but neg- lecting to note here and elsewhere their numerous statements to the
effect that "the greater part of the population lives in permanent fear" (p. 4), so that "procedural correctness" has little meaning.
With no U. s. -government-designated official observers available in Nicaragua, the media relied even more heavily than usual on U. S. government handouts. It is enlightening to compare this conduited propaganda of the mass media with the findings of foreign-observer
lIS MANUFACTURING CONSENT
teams on the scene in Nicaragua. For the purpose of this comparison, which follows, we will use two such reports. One, that of the Irish Inter-Party Parliamentary Delegation, is The Elections in Nicaragua, November I984. The delegation was composed offOUT individuals, three from right-wing or moderate-right political parties, who spent seven- teen days in Nicaragua at the time of the election. We will also use as a basis of comparison of media coverage the previously cited report of the Is-member delegation sent by the Latin American Studies Associa- tion (LASA), half of whom had had "substantial field experience" in Nicaragua itself. This delegation spent eight days in Nicaragua before the election, traveled in a rented bus, determined their own itinerary, and "spoke with anyone who we chose to approach (as well as numer-
ous people who spontaneously approached US). "88
3. 6. 1. Tone of negativism and apathy
Time magazine hardly attempts to hide the fact that it takes its cues from Washington. It quotes John Hughes, then a public-relations man for the State Department (and previously, and subsequently, a colum- nist for the Christian Science Monitor): "It was not a very good election. . . . It was just a piece of theatre for the Sandinistas. "89 Time follows this cue with a series of denigrating strokes: "The Sandinistas win, as expected. . . . The Nicaraguan election mood was one of indifference. . . . The outcome was never in doubt. . . . Something of an anticlimax" (all in the issue of November 19, 1984). In an earlier article (October 29), Time indulged in the same negative refrain: "A campaign without suspense," voters "too apathetic to go to the polls at all" (this was a forecast dredged up well before the election). In both articles, "fear" was also featured heavily. In the Salvadoran election, Time's tone was different: "There was no denying the remarkable sense of occasion" (Le. , the Reagan administration had a big public-relations investment in the election); "hundreds of thousands . . . braved the threats, and sometimes the bullets, of the Marxist-led [FMLN] to join long serpen- tine polling lines for the country's much awaited presidential elections" (Apr. 9, 1984). 90 In Guatemala too, "Some 1. 8 million voters braved four-hour polling lines, tropical rainstorms and a bewildering array of
political choices to cast ballots in their country's most open and fraud- free elections in more than a decade" ouly 16, 1984). There is never apathy or fear of government force in Time's renditions of demonstra- tion elections.
-
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEAN1NGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 1I9
Stephen Kinzer, in the Times, also took a far less kindly view of the election in Nicaragua than of those in Guatemala, giving enormous attention to election opponents like the U. S. candidate Arturo Cruz (whereas in Guatemala he almost completely ignored the small parties, union protesters, rebels, and human-rights groups), and finding more people voting out of fear than he did in Guatemala, a remarkable discovery given the circumstances in the two countries. 91 He focuses steadily on the Sandinistas' efforts to get out the vote, the fact that the election result is a foregone conclusion, claims of the breaking up of election rallies, and allegations of unfairness and withdrawals by the opposition. As with Time, the voters are "philosophical," "enthusiasm for the election was not universal," and "there was little visible enthusi- asm. " Kinzer did not compare the electoral modalities, range of op- tions, or other basic conditions in Nicaragua and Guatemala (or El Salvador). In short, he discussed different questions in his news report- ing on the elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala, adhering closely to the propaganda frame. n
On the alleged negativism and apathy, both the Irish and LASA delegations noted that voting was not required in Nicaragua and was entirely secret. Therefore, as the Irish delegation pointed out, the low rate of abstention is more meaningful and "invalidates predictions that large sectors of the population were opposed to the election. Further- more, the percentage ofspoiled votes (7. 4 percent) is comparable to any European election in a country with a highly literate population" (p. 7). They also note that
Speaking with one old man, awaiting his turn to vote in a rural polling station, one member of the delegation inquired: "What difference do you see between this and any other election in which you voted? " He replied: "Everything. " "In what way? " He simply shrugged: "Everything is different. "
The U. S. media never located anybody like this old man. The Irish delegation also pointed out that
Some observers from other countries suggested that the people did not appear eI. 1thusiastic as they went to the polls. This is not surprising as people stood in long queues waiting patiently their turn to go behind the curtain to mark their ballot paper. One member of the delegation who had the opportunity to observe voters in the American election just two days later, noted no greater enthusiasm for standing in queues there!
I20 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
It is our belief that the invariable enthusiasm and optimism found by the U. S. mass media in client-state elections, and the apathy and nega- tivism found in elections in states disfavored by the U. S. administra- tion, has nothing to do with electoral realities and must be explained entirely by an imposed propaganda agenda and the filtering out of contrary opinion and information.
3. 6. 2. Ignoring the superior quality of the Nicaraguan election
In the propaganda format, a great deal of attention is paid to the mechanical properties of elections in client states, but not in states
whose elections are being denigrated. This was true in the cases under discussion. Time (Apr. 9, 1984) described in detail the elaborate elec-
toral preparations in El Salvador, the "tamper-proof' procedures, the
use of transparent Lucite ballot boxes, and the indelible-ink marking
and stamping of ID cards. It turned out, however, that the high-tech, computerized voting procedures weren't understood by the population,
more than half of whom were illiterate. At no point did Time, or its
media colleagues, raise any question about the importance ofimproving literacy as a necessary prelude to an election; nor did they suggest that
the Lucite boxes might compromise the secrecy of the vote, or that the stamped ID card might be a coercive instrument helping to explain turnout. I
Nicaragua went to great pains to provide for election secrecy, and ~ for an easy and intelligible system of voting. For one thing, they had
a massive literacy campaign before the election, making electoral
printed matter generally accessible.
Both the Irish and LASA delega-
tions mention this as an electoral plus. Nicaragua also put a high
priority on getting a complete registration list and getting the voters registered. The Irish delegation noted that "Recent elections in other
Central American countries such as EI Salvador and Guatemala did not introduce such measures, and there was considerable debate concern-
ing the validity of their registers, which were based on out-of-date
census figures, incomplete official registers of population changes, and
other sources" (p. 5). Nicaragua also deliberately avoided transparent
ballot boxes, ID stamping, and any other mechanism that would allow
the authorities to identify whether or how somebody had voted. LASA
points out that . .
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 121
I
The ballots were also printed on heavy opaque white paper. The contrast with Somoza-era elections is striking. The Somozas used translucent ballots, so virtually everyone assumed that their ballot was not secret. The same problem occurred in the 1984 elections in E1 Salvador, where thin-paper ballots were deposited in trans- parent ballot boxes. The vote in Nicaragua in 1984 was truly a secret ballot (p. 4).
In Nicaragua, also, there was proportional voting, which made it possi- ble for the smaller parties to obtain legislative representation. Parties could also qualify quite easily to participate in the election. In Guatemala, 4,000 signatures were needed to qualify in 1984, a large number and not easy for dissident parties to collect in a society with daily political murders.
Stephen Kinzer and his associates never mentioned these differ- ences. More generally, the substantial merits of the Nicaraguan elec- tions were never contrasted with the procedures in the U. S. client states, a comparison that would have been most revealing and that would have thoroughly undermined the Reagan agenda to which the media were committed in their reporting of the election. Time, as noted, mentions the compromised Salvadoran procedures as if they were meri- torious. The Times mentioned the transparent voting boxes in EI Salva- dor only once (Richard Meislin, on March 25, 1984), repeating without question the official line that the purpose of the translucent boxes was to prevent fraud. Any other possibility is unmentioned. Newsweek and CBS News ignored these matters.
3. 6. 3. Rebel disruption into the black hole; turnout no longer an index of triumph of democracy
In the Salvadoran election, rebel disruption was a central feature of the government's propaganda frame. Because the rebels opposed the elec- tion, voting by the people proved their rejection of the rebels and approval of the army. Turnout was the index of democratic triumph and rebel defeat. As we saw, the mass media followed this frame with- out question. In the case of Nicaragua, the propaganda format was reversed-the rebels were the good guys, and the election held by the bad guys was condemned in advance. Rebel opposition to the
election-and efforts at disruption-did not make voting and a large
122 MAlI;UFACTURING CONSENT
turnout a repudiation of the rebels and approval of the Sandinistas. The U. S. mass media once again followed the government agenda, even though it meant an exact reversal of the standards they had applied in the Salvadoran election. The contras and their supporters urged the public not to vote, and interfered with the election process with at least as much vigor as (and with more killings than) the rebels in El Salvador. Furthermore, voting was more assuredly secret and the citizens were not required to vote, or to have ID cards stamped indicating that they had. And the Sandinistas did not kill ordinary citizens on a daily basis, as was true in the "death-squad democracies. " Thus turnout was far more meaningful in the Nicaraguan election than in the ones held in El Salvador and Guatemala-the public was free to abstain as well as
to vote for opposition parties.
The U. S. mass media disposed of this problem mainly by massive
suppression. They simply ignored the contra-U. S. campaign for absten- tion, waged with threats and attacks on polling places and election workers; and they buried the fact of an effectively secret vote and the right not to vote,93 just as, in parallel, they had inflated rebel disruption efforts in EI Salvador in 1982 and 1984 and buried the voting requirement and other pressures to vote.
Although the New York Times had gone out of its way to focus on the "challenge" of rebel opposition and alleged disruption as giving turnout special meaning in the Salvadoran election of 1982,94 Stephen Kinzer never once mentioned that the cantras attacked a number of polling stations and had issued radio appeals for abstention. 95 For Kinzer, neither these facts nor the U. S. campaign to discredit were seen as posing a "challenge" that made turnout meaningful in Nicaragua.
The Irish delegation pointed out that "The Parties of the Demo- cratic Coordinating Committee [based in the business communityl op- posed the voter registration, and called for a boycott of this process" (p. 5), and it noted that eleven polling stations were closed down by counterrevolutionary activities (p. 7). The public voted in large num- bers "despite the possible dangers involved," which suggested to' the Irish delegation that turnout was significant and "showed how impor- tant the election was to the people" (p. 6). LASA pointed out the various ways in which the "main opposition" called for voter absten- tion, and cited the radio warnings broadcast into the country from Costa Rica threatening that voters would be killed by the contras (pp. 16, 28). LASA also pointed out that "voter turnout was heavy," with "more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more affluent neighborhoods. " 9 6 Like Time, LASA notes that the turnout did not quite realize the expectations of FSL~ officials, but unlike Time,
LEGIT1MIZISG VERSUS MEANllIiGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 123
LASA points out that the rate of participation achieved "compares very favorably with the rates achieved in II other recent Latin American elections, as well as the 1984 U. S. presidential election . . . " (p. 16). 97
In sum, the two observer reports discuss rebel disruption in Nicara- gua, turnout, and the meaning of that turnout. The U. S. mass media, which had featured these matters heavily in reference to the Salvadoran election-where they fitted the government's propaganda agenda- found them entirely unnewsworthy as regards Nicaragua.
3. 6. 4. The revived sensitivity to coercion
As we described earlier, the "coercion package" was off the agenda for the U. S. government and mass media in addressing the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elections. So was the element of fear engendered by mass murder and the absence of any rule of law in these U. S. client states. Coercion and fear were back on the agenda, however, for Nicaragua. This revival was illustrated with amazing dishonesty and hypocrisy in Time~ which had never mentioned fear and pressures from the govern- ment as factors possibly explaining turnout in the U. S. -sponsored elec- tions, even after the murder of 50,000 civilians. In Nicaragua, however, the "pugnacious" Sandinistas had "an awesome monopoly of force," and getting them to "relax their grip," which was "essential for free electoral competition," was extremely dubious. Time's Central Ameri- can correspondent George Russell even located a "Latin American diplomat" who says, "You can't have democracy where there is no personal liberty at all" (Oct. 8 and May 14, 1984). Russell and Time had never found the Salvadoran government "pugnacious," with any "awe- some monopoly of force," or as having a "grip" that needed relaxing for electoral competition, and personal liberty was never mentioned as lacking or even pertinent to Salvadoran ejections. For the Nicaraguan
election, however, Time found that "The pressure to participate was high: many citizens feared they would lose precious rationing cards. " Further, "the government had made it clear that it considered failure to vote a counterrevolutionary stance. " Later, quoting Daniel Ortega, "All Nicaraguans who are Nicaraguans are going to vote. The only ones who are not going to vote are sellouts" (Nov. 19, 1984).
As we pointed out earlier, both the Guatemalan and Salvadoran army warned the public that voting was required by law and that nonvoting was treasonous. These statements were more precisely warn-
I24 MA/I;UFACTURING CONSENT
ingsj whereas Ortega's was an insult but not a clear threat. Ortega's was the only such statement of its kind reported, and Time's statement that the government "made it clear" that nonvoting was "counterrevolu- tionary" is doubly dishonest-the statement was not clearly a warning, and "counterrevolutionary" is an invidious word concocted by Time. The official government position as expressed in the law was that Nica- raguans did not have to vote. Time suppresses this fact. It suppresses the secrecy of the ballot and absence of a checkable ID card, so that there would have been no way to implement a threat even if one had been made. It suppresses the fact that the Nicaraguan army did not regularly murder even "counterrevolutionaries," whereas the Salvado- ran and Guatemalan armies murdered numerous people who weren't "revolutionaries" but were somehow in the way. In short, propaganda
could hardly be more brazen.
Time's alleged "fact," that "many" people feared the removal of the
rationing card, is contested by LASA, which states that "in our inter- views in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn . . . for any reason. " They note that there were five reports filed with the supreme electoral council alleging intimidation by threat of withdrawal of ration cards, "but none of these allegations were sustained upon investiga- tion" (p. 27). Time does not indicate the source of its evidence and fails to provide a single illustration of the "many" cases.
We noted earlier that Stephen Kinzer cited more claims of coercion in the Nicaraguan than the Guatemalan elections, a remarkable jour- nalistic achievement, given the unchallenged facts about the actual scale and character of repression in the two states. His playing down of state terror in Guatemala as a basic factor affecting the quality of the election in all its dimensions-the ability of candidates to run, freedom of speech and press, the existence of intermediate groups, endemic fear, and the meaning of turnout-amounts to massive deceit. His Nicarag- uan coverage also involved large-scale misrepresentation. He did not point out the absence of mass killings, and he failed to mention the absence of a coercion package-no transparent boxes, no requirement that an ID card be stamped, and no legal obligation to vote. Kinzer's one notice of the voting requirement in his fourteen articles on the election amounts to serious deception-he quotes a voter as follows: " 'I've always voted because it is always required,' he said. 'Of course, the law says one thing, but after a while one realizes that voting is part of patriotism, and patriotism leads to long life. ' "98 Kinzer's source implies but doesn't say directly that voting is not legally required in Nicaragua, and this murky statement-the closest Kinzer ever comes
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:-JINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOr-:S 125
to acknowledging the absence of a voting requirement-is counter- balanced by his respondent's suggestion that voting may be based on some kind of threat.
Both the Irish and LASA delegations stressed the superior protection of secrecy in the balloting, which, in LASA's words, was "meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses" (p. 15). They also em- phasized the fact that voting was not required by law, and that, contrary to the U. S. government propaganda expounded by Time and other media entities, the coercive elements in getting out the vote were small. Human-rights abuses by the government that contribute to an environ- ment of fear, LASA pointed out, were "on a very small scale" when "compared to other nations in the region . . . " (p. 28). In fact, they note that fear in Nicaragua is directed more to the United States and the contras than to the government in Managua.
3. 6. 5. The "main opposition" to the fore
As we saw, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the fact that the insurgents were off the ballot did not faze the U. S. media one bit. Neither did Duarte's acknowledgment in 1981 that "the masses were with the guer- rillas" when he joined the junta a year earlier (which would clearly make them a "main opposition"). 99 Nor were the media affected by the army's murder of the opposition leadership in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In ? 1 Salvador, the exclusion of the rebels was part of the U. S. government's electoral plan; they were, therefore, not a "main opposition," and the debarment and even murder of their leaders did not compromise election quality. In the Nicaraguan case, in sharp contrast, the U. S. government worked with a different frame-the exclusion of its sponsored rebels and any other candidates was a serious matter that threatened the quality of the election. The media followed like good little doggies (lap- rather than watch-).
The central dramatic propaganda line for the Nicaraguan election pressed by U. S. officials was the alleged struggle of Arturo Cruz to induce the Sandinistas to create an open system in which he would be able to compete fairly, the failure of the "Marxists-Leninists" to make adequate concessions, Cruz's refusal to compete, and the subsequent "exclusion" of the "main opposition. " Cruz, however, was a "main opposition" only in the propaganda construct of the U. S. government and mass media. A longtime expatriate (who now concedes that he was
126 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
on the CIA payroll), with no mass base in Nicaragua, Cruz would
almost certainly have done poorly in a free election. lOo There is good
reason to believe that Cruz never intended to run, but that he and his
sponsors had held out this possibility precisely to allow the propaganda 1 frame to be used effectively. IOI
The mass media focused on the Cruz drama heavily and uncritically. ' Cruz was given enormous play: he was continually referred to as the . . . "main opposition" or "leading opponent" of the ruling party (without
any supporting evidence), and his candidacy was made "an acid test of
the Sandinistas' democratic intentions" (Time, Oct. 29, 1984). For the Times, the election would be a "sham" without Cruz (editorial, Oct. 7, 1984), and its news columns placed "main opposition" Cruz on center stage, from which vantage point he could regularly denounce the pro- ceedings as a "farce" or sham. l02 The Times did have one good back- page article that provided evidence that Cruz had not intended to run or would not have been allowed to run by his closest Nicaraguan allies and U. S. officials, and that his function was, as we stated, to discredit
the election by pretending to be interested, thus capturing press atten- tion. 103 But this low-keyed article stood alone and did not alter the unremitting focus on the alleged exclusion of this alleged main opposi- tion as the centerpiece of the Nicaraguan election drama.
In focusing on an alleged "main opposition" in Nicaragua, which voluntarily chose not to run, while ignoring a real main opposition in El Salvador, excluded by force and plan, the mass media simply adopted without question the government's propaganda framework. Sources that would speak to the condition of the "main opposition" in El Salvador and the significance ofits exclusion-both Salvadorans and foreign observers-were simply ignored. I04 In the case of the Nicara- guan election, in contrast, Cruz and U. S. government officials were given the floor to present their themes, which were transmitted on a daily basis with no accompanying notice of their possible falsity and manipulative intent, in perfect accord with the expectations of a propa-
ganda model.
The Reagan administration not only dangled Cruz before the media,
it tried hard to induce or bribe other candidates in the Nicaraguan election to withdraw in order to fulfil the prophecy of a meaningless election. The brazenness of this intervention by a great power was remarkable, but the U. S. media gave it minimal attention. They never denounced it as antidemocratic, they failed to link it to Cruz's campaign (with its suggestion of a larger effort to discredit by boycott), and they never suggested that voter "turnout" was more meaningful given the active U. S. campaign to discredit the election. On October 31, 1984,
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:>IIl<iGLESS THIRD WORLD ELI! CTIOl<iS 127
Stephen Kinzer noted that senior U. S. officials confirmed accouncs of "regular contacts" with the Nicaraguan parties. Kinzer's article is head- lined "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista and U. S. Pressure," the headline and article itself equating the government's aid to, and agree- ments with, its own political parties with U. S. intervention to get the Nicaraguan parties to boycott the election! CBS, Newsweek, and Time ignored the U. S. bribe program entirely. Time gave great emphasis to the number of candidates and the withdrawal of several, but it never once mentioned that this was helped along by V. S. connivance, bribes, and pressure. It even quotes without comment the State Department fabrication that "it did not try to influence the outcome of the election" (Nov. 19, 1984). All substantive evidence is placed in the black hole. In the same article, Time asserts that "the V. 5. had pushed hard for elections in which all parties felt free to participate," a fabrication of considerable audacity.
As regards the scope of electoral options in Nicaragua, the Irish delegation noted that "The [political parties] law guarantees participa- tion to political parties of all ideologies," an interesting point validated by a range of political opinion in the contesting parties far wider than that found in ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala (or the United States).
LASA states that "No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984" (p. 18). This, of course, could not be said of ? 1 Salvador and Guatemala. These important features of the Nicaraguan law and practice were not mentioned in the U. S.
