2) and why he kept shifting its
position
in the different series of lectures.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
Hegel's criticism relates to the fact that the change occurs only in a being or a natural way: as becoming, or com- ing into being and perishing, not as a return of the one to itself: it is not a coming-to-self.
the spiritual is not just change, Hegel argues, but change through which the distinction is brought to reconciliation with the first moment and through which the duality is sublated.
(l2 27, 592/487)
6. Cultic aspects
How does a Hindu relate to his gods? that is the topic of cult, which Hegel pays attention to both in his lectures and in the Humboldt review. Cult is an essential part of religion that completes the concrete representations of the god or gods.
the "absolute or highest cult", Hegel affirms in the 1827 lectures, con- sists in a "complete emptying out of the human, the renunciation in which the Hindus relinquish all consciousness and willing, all passions and needs (nirvana), [or] this union with god in the mode of integral self- concentration (yoga)". (l2 27, 595/490) it presupposes a "growing lonely of the soul in emptiness" (Vereinsamen der Seele in die Leerheit) which might be compared to Christian or other forms of mysticism, but that Hegel, as far as Hinduism is concerned, radically rejects as being mere "numb- ing" (Verstumpfung) (H, 42; see also H, 34). the absence of any content, the emptiness of consciousness which the yogi is striving for, is not what Hegel recognizes in true mysticism, which has been "rich of spiritual, often highly pure, sublime and beautiful productions, because in the externally silent soul it is at once a going of it into itself and a development of the rich subject (Gegenstand) to which it relates and of its relationships to the latter" (ibid. ). this typical contrast between the Hindu cult, which is not just to be reduced to ritual sacrifices but encompasses a whole ethos, on the one hand, and a dimension of the Christian religion that is more or less akin to it, on the other, is symptomatic of Hegel's rejection of the excesses of the yogi ethos.
in the 1824 lectures, Hegel distinguishes three different forms depend- ing on the duration of the cult, being either momentaneous or more enduring.
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 47
1) in the first place, each Hindu is supposed to be Brahma himself, at least momentaneously, during the moments of prayer and meditation. the individual has to elevate itself to the level of abstract thought, to the level of the universal. insofar as it is capable of doing so, it is Brahma indeed. 23 (l2 24, 336/238) this "deification, or rather Brahmification" (H, 68) makes it understandable that there is, strictly speaking, no veneration of Brahma itself: Brahma has no temples dedicated to him or it, people do not pray to him. in fact, everyone capable of the higher forms of medita- tion can declare: "i am Brahm or the highest being" (l2 24, 337/239). 24
2) Whereas this first form of relationship of self-consciousness to the one is only momentaneous, the other ones are more enduring. one's whole existence should correspond to the universal represented by the god Brahm. therefore, a transition must be made from the moment of silent solitude and prayer into life. as a matter of fact this implies that the human individual should renounce all forms of vitality: "total indifference toward everything, and complete austerity" (l2 27, 595/491) appears to be the motto. the one shall penetrate the entire concrete life. therefore, the Hindus who are not Brahmans (see infra), have to make themselves into abstract egos: they must give up any movement, any interest, any incli- nation, any connection with their families. thus these saints, the yogis, venerated and fed by the other citizens, are making their lives into an enduring existence of Brahm.
23 this is the place where Hegel makes a reference to the modern religious belief that speaks in terms of immediate knowledge (Jacobi) (l2 24, 340/243-244): "Comparison with modern belief of reflection. immediate knowledge; god unknown. Jenseits. god is outside me: but as a negative for me. abstract being is the negative itself. Cf. the abstractum that Brahm is. existence only in my selfconsciousness. illusion to say something objective: god is only through my positing. the affirmative: only the i. modernity: i am the universal, master of all determinations; i am the one that posited them. But modern reflection is more developed, more free than Hinduism saying silently: i am Brahm. Hinduism: candid (unbefangene) stage of abstraction, beside of which the rest of the divine world remains objective. in modernity: everything is posited by me. Positing has volatilized all content of sensuous and supersensuous world. "
24 Cf. Hegel's quote from francis Wilford's Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West: "Wenn ich das gebet verrichte zu irgendeinem der go? tter, wenn ich mich auf den Boden setze, die Beine u? bereinander verschra? nke, die Ha? nde falte und gen Himmel blicke und meinen geist und meine gedanken sammle, ohne die Zunge zu bewegen, so sage ich mir selbst, ich bin Brahm oder das ho? chste Wesen" (l2 24, 337/239). ["When i perform the pu? ja? in honor of some of the gods, i seat myself on the ground, with my legs crossed in such a manner, that each foot rests upon the opposite thigh, (not under it, like a taylor, but) like those who perform tapasya. then with my eyes closed, and looking up to heaven, my hands moderately open, and close to each other, an a little elevated, i compose my mind and thoughts, and without moving the tongue, or using any of the organs of speech, i say inwardly i am Brahme, or the supreme Being. " (4b 720)]
? 48 paul cruysberghs
the yoga-doctrine, which Hegel also deals with extensively in the Humboldt review, is not considered by him as a real doctrine or science, as some philosophers had the tendency to do, but as a collection of asser- tions, which are primarily constructive and edifying (H, 30). their main aim is "a deepening without any content, a giving up of any attention of external objects, of the activity of the senses as well as the silencing of any inner sensation of a wish or a hope or a fear surging up, the silence of all inclinations and passions, as well as the absence of all images, represen- tations and of all determinate thoughts" (H, 34). Being oriented towards a complete absence of content (Inhaltslosigkeit) both of the subject and of the object, the yogi is trying to reach a state of complete unconscious- ness (H, 35). this state of abstraction is not to be understood as a transi- tional tension, but has to become a "habitual state of mind" (H, 35). 25 the highest form of perfection is a permanent state of abstraction--"a peren- nial solitude of the self-consciousness that has given up all sensations, all needs and representations of external things, thus no longer being consciousness,--even not a filled self-consciousness, which would have spirit as its content and would be insofar as it is still a consciousness;--an intuition, that does not intuit anything, that is not aware of anything--the pure emptiness of itself in itself " (H, 58). 26 ultimately, the transformation into Brahma will liberate the yogi even from metempsychosis (ibid. ).
3. the third moment is particular to the members of one particular caste, that of the Brahmans. each Brahman, each member of the caste is considered as Brahm. thus the Brahman is the god for every other Hindu who does not belong to the caste. typical of the Brahman is that his relationship to god no longer takes the negative form of renounce- ment. this is not so by accident: according to the logic of negation itself, we might say, the necessity of an affirmative relationship is confirmed. However, since the unity of Brahm remains "solitary, by itself " (einsam, fu? r sich), the concrete fulfilment of this affirmative relationship is "a wild and unruly one" (eine wilde, ausgelassene) (l2 27, 600/495).
this is the source of the fanciful polytheism (phantastische Vielgo? tterei) (l2 27, 601/496) of Hinduism, to which we have already referred. ignoring the independency of natural things, they endow them with the shape of
25 Comparing the yogi's practice to the Christian meditation (Andacht), Hegel, after hav- ing stressed the fact that both are essentially different because the Christian Andacht is not empty (cf. mysticism supra), sees an analogy between both, insofar as the Christian Andacht has to turn into a habitual state of mind as well in the form of piety (Fro? mmigkeit).
26 Hegel compares his interpretation with the modern (i. e. Jacobi's) conception of 'immedi- ate knowing'.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 49
the only independent being they know, the human being. thus the imagi- nation (Phantasie) deifies everything in an anthropomorphic way. at the same time, however, the human being itself, not yet being able to distin- guish its freedom from its natural side, is thought of in natural terms. as a consequence its life has no higher value than that of the natural objects upon which it depends. "for the Hindus" indeed, Hegel suggests, "human life is something contemptible and despicable--it has no more value than a sip of water" (l2 27, 602/497). life gains worth only through its negation. this explains, according to Hegel, the cult of human beings sacrificing themselves, their wives, or their children. 27 the dependency on natural objects on the other hand, explains the many forms of superstition, which Hegel interprets as an indication of the fact that a true concept of freedom and of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is absent. "and just as the superstition aris- ing from this lack of freedom is unbounded, so it also follows that there is no ethics to be found, no determinate form of rational freedom, no right, no duty. the Hindu people are utterly sunk in the depths of an unethical life (in die tiefste Unsittlichkeit)" (l2 27, 603/498). 28 not just in the lectures, but in the Humboldt review as well, Hegel argues that ethical life and true education (Bildung) are "eternally" impossible amongst Hindus. He con- nects this with the fact that Hindu religiosity and the doctrine of duties connected with it, are determined exclusively by the law of the castes (H, 37). Hence Hegel's conclusion: "instead of the work of wisdom, of good- ness and justice, which is known as the work of the divine world govern- ment in a higher religion, the work that is fulfilled perpetually by Krishna, is just the maintaining of the caste difference" (H, 38). 29 in the caste of the Brahmans the inner relationship to the one has taken the form of something external and natural: that of being born as a Brahman (l2 24, 345/248). those who belong to the caste of Brahmans are conscious of
27 Hegel praises Humboldt paying attention to the fact that Krishna suggests the prin- ciple that when acting, we should renounce the fruits of our acts, somehow in the line of the modern Kantian principle that the good be done for its own case, duty for the case of duty. But just as for the Kantian morality, Hegel complains that there is no transition in the mahabharata episode to the question of the goals of our actions and the content of our duty (H, 23; 35).
28 in the Humboldt review Hegel quotes the general governor of india, Warren Hast- ings, who in his foreword to the english translation of the Bhagavad-gita, warns the readers that he has to admit "zum voraus die eigenschaften von Dunkelheit, Absurdita? t, barbarischen Gebra? uchen und einer verdorbenen Moralita? t" (H, 22).
29 Here again Hegel compares the Hindu religion to the Christian religion, in which, he assumes, all distinctions of social position disappear and the human beings relate equally to god as human beings (gW 16, 38).
? 50 paul cruysberghs
their essence as thinking beings. as such they are the reincarnated ones, those who are born twice: once in a natural way, and a second time via the abstraction of spirit.
as a matter of fact the caste system reveals the fundamental contra- diction which is present at the very heart of Hinduism: that between the (ethical) order of acting, on the one hand, and the order of merely inactive (handlungslosen) submerging in Krishna, on the other (H, 40). this con- tradiction cannot be resolved because the highest moment of Hindu con- sciousness, Brahm, is in itself without any determination. determinations all fall outside the unity and can only have the character of mere external or natural determination. "this very same opposition and contradiction appears everywhere, where external cult and ceremonies are connected at the same time with the consciousness of higher interiority" (H, 57).
Conclusion
the basic problem is that the Hindu religion, according to Hegel, is not capable of reconciling the abstraction of thinking in general with the par- ticularity of the concrete. for that very reason its spirit is only that unre- strained whirl (einen haltungslosen Taumel), Hegel talked about in l2 24, 323/226, from one to the other, ending up with the unhappy situation of having to experience happiness only as annihilation of the personality (H, 59). from this perspective, Hinduism is far from being a religion of freedom, in which the concreteness of one's personality and one's con- crete situation in the world is integrated, and not annihilated in the god relationship. these types of considerations, which show up time and again, make it clear that Hegel's conception of Hinduism is far from the romantic devotee's who expected a religious renewal to come from the east, despising the achievements of both Protestantism and the enlight- enment in the Christian tradition and expecting salvation to come from elsewhere. it goes without saying that Hegel's presentation and interpre- tation of the Hindu religion is not a neutral one, but the least one can say is that his treatment of it is a thoughtful one.
Avoiding nihilism by Affirming nothing: hegel on buddhism
henk oosterling
the image of buddha is in the thinking posture with feet and arms inter- twined so that a toe extends into the mouth--this [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself. hence the character of the people who adhere to this religion is one of tranquility, gentleness, and obedience, a character that stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire. great religious orders have been founded among these peoples; they share a common life of tranquility of spirit, in quiet, 'tranquil occupation of the spirit,' as do the bonze in China and 'the shamans of mongolia'. Attain- ment of this pure, inward stillness is expressly declared to be the goal for human beings, to be the highest state. (l2 27, 564/461)
1. introduction
the hegelian discourse on buddhism culminates in this image: the medi- tating buddha swallowing himself. this image expresses for hegel abso- lute immediacy, unarticulated in-itself. the toe-sucking posture resembles the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol for eternity, for the infi- nite. the finite being of the human body of the buddha is united with the infinite substance of divine power. it is devoid of negativity, at least in a dialectical sense, because its substance has not been objectified. the divine substance is not negated, made abstractly conscious in a for-itself. the divine rests fully in-itself. As one critic of hegel phrased it in a quasi- mystical wordplay: "Are swallower and swallowee the same. Are they different? this indeterminacy is structural, not epiphenomenal. subject, object and abject are smeared across one another unrecognizably. "1 for hegel awareness of human limitedness is a necessary step to an identi- fication, a union and uniting, with divine power and a precondition for
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
? 52 henk oosterling
subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz? ek in a quasi-ironical hegelian gesture with the revolutionary activist mentality of the man that institutionalized the Christian Church: st. Paul. 2 but is Z? iz? ek's disqualification of buddhism as one of the modes of postmodern nihilism the only option?
2 see: henk oosterling, 'radikale mediokrita? t oder revolutiona? re Akte? U? ber funda- mentales inter-esse', in: e. vogt, h. J. silverman (hrgs. ), U? ber Z? iz? ek. turia+Kant, vienna 2004, pp. 42-62; 'from russia with love: Avoiding the subject. Why is Z? iz? ek's st Paul a leninist? ' in International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 2009, pp. 236-253.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 53
Within the dialectical tradition the accusation of nihilism is very per- sistent. 3 When we follow the trace back to the days of hegel, the problem already starts with the very image that startled him: the toe sucking bud- dha. the choice of this image is already a mistake. hegel found this weird picture of what he thought was the buddha in one of the books he con- sulted frequently for his analysis of buddhism: friedrich Creutzer's Sym- bolik und Mythologie der alten Vo? lker (leipzig and darmstadt, 1819). this plate however does not represent the buddha, it refers to a hindu subject: brahma? nara? yana in the context of one of the canonical texts, the Laws of Manu. hegel was even mistaken--in retrospect--as to the specific nature of buddhism, because he relied mainly on sources that focused on the life of the tibetan lamas. the difference between buddhism and lamaism, he states in the lectures of 1824, "is only superficial". (l2 24, 307/211)
these 'mistakes' are exemplary for hegel's research on what enabled him indirectly to position himself in the controversy on pantheism as atheism. f. h. Jacobi thematized a proto-nihilist atheism in a book on spi- noza in 1785. together with schelling and ho? lderlin hegel read this book as a student and discussed the hen kai pan (one and all) principle, but the controversy haunted his thoughts till his very last days. his treatment of this controversy foreshadowed the nihilism debate that was installed as a philosophical topic by nietzsche and still resonates in Z? iz? ek's disquali- fications of buddhism in the Western hemisphere as 'new Age spiritual- ity' and 'Pop buddhism'. Z? iz? ek lifts hegel's parti pris over the turn of the century into the first decade of the 21st century.
is it possible to revalue hegel's analysis of buddhism on a more affirma- tive basis? Can the tight chain that connects nirvana, void and nothing- ness be broken? in order to throw some light on a different understanding of nothingness--and by implication to redirect the 'nihil' in nihilism-- i will firstly clarify how hegel applied his sources on buddhism for the positioning of this determinate phase of religious consciousness in his systematic philosophy (?
2) and why he kept shifting its position in the different series of lectures. (? 3) then i will turn the tables by focusing on buddhism's interpretation of hegel's philosophy. i will briefly describe the way Kyoto school based buddhist thinkers try to reconcile Zen bud- dhism with hegelian philosophy (? 4) and how they interpret nirvana
3 Adorno's remarks on nihilism in Negative Dialectics (1973, orig. 1966) scorn the possi- bility of 'believing in nothing' and qualify 'the image of nirvana' positively as 'nothingness as something' (380).
? 54 henk oosterling
as emptiness. this will enable me to formulate an affirmative approach to the void that favors relationality over identity, and affirmation over negation. (? 5) returning to Z? iz? ek's accusations i will counter these with current philosophical projects that have integrated the Kyoto affirmative approach to the void in their philosophy: french philosophy of differ- ences, especially in the works Jacques derrida and the cooperative works of gilles deleuze and fe? lix guattari. (? 6)
2. historical Context
Was hegel a religious man? there has been much debate on this issue. during his lifetime hegel frequently balanced on the edge of what was tolerable for the authorities. 4 An accusation of atheism would have been the end of his career as a university professor. it happened to fichte in the 1790's at the university of Jena. if atheism starts with the proclamation of the death of god then hegel is a suspect too. god's death was not for the first time proclaimed by nietzsche's madman on the marketplace in The Gay Science (section 108/125/343) and more prominently in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Kant had already spoken about faith within the limits of rea- son, proposing that we speak about morality as if god does not exist. the 'internalizing' effect of this denial was appreciated by hegel: methodologi- cally sublation (Aufhebung) focuses on internalization after the necessary alienation from one's self. the result of this rupture, i. e. of transcending of one's limits and realizing one is always part of a more encompassing whole, is called subjectivity.
nevertheless hegel criticized Kant's enlightenment aporia: the con- tradictory or antinomical conclusions of the systematic analytics of self consciousness. hegel concluded that this 'unhappy consciousnes' of the skeptic or cynic had to be overcome by reidentification with an all encom- passing totality, and in doing this becoming infinite in our finitude. in this context hegel raised the issue of the death of god several times in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 5 he had stated this already at the end of 'believing and Knowing' that was published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy of 1802. this urged some commentators to call him the first
4 terry Pinkard, Hegel: A biography, Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 2000, p. 577.
5 hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, bd. 3, frankfurt am main: suhrkamp verlag 1999, pp. 547/572.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 55
'death of god' theologian. 6 but we have to be aware of the fact that this conclusion was less an existential outcry--as with nietzsche--than an epistemological necessity.
in hegel's days atheism was supposed to be disguised as pantheism and for many a critical commentator of spinoza spinozism was synony- mous with pantheism. 7 hegel owed a lot to spinoza: 'omnis determinatio negatio est', everything is determined by negation, is a key clause to his systematic exploration of thought. hegel's interpretation of spinozism as a philosophy that differed from pantheism was thus indirectly politically motivated. As a university professor in the Prussian state hegel did not like to be unclear about this issue. "nonetheless, it is quite clear that in hegel's own mind, the philosophy of religion was crucial to his enterprise". 8 Philosophy, not religion was hegel's project.
formal-ontologically being progresses from a given position via nega- tion and contradiction to sublation that positions subjectivity as col- lective consciousness (World spirit) on more articulated levels of truth. self-consciousness of being limited--finite--and the realization of infi- niteness through coming to realize that one is always part of all encom- passing totality is the bottom line of hegel's exposition of religious faith. this subject constituting rupture even counts for god. Without man as his negation--Jesus--and the redeemer--Christ--as the upbeat to the holy ghost, even god would have been unaware of his existence. this is a rather blasphemous conclusion. it kept haunting hegel's efforts to ward off accusations of atheism.
At a certain stage of the historic unfolding of the religious truth--or the truth of religion--buddhism is dealt with. A biographical detail is instructive. hegel was motivated to lecture on the philosophy of reli- gion after being asked by his former student hermann friedrich Wilhelm hinrichs to write a preface to hinrichs' book on the philosophy of religion from a hegelian standpoint. "hegel used the opportunity of the preface
6 see Charles taylor, Hegel. Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 1975, p. 495.
7 there is a link between spinozism and Chinese religion that was used by spinozists who wanted to stay under cover in order not to be accused of atheism. this was for the first time thematized by Pierre bayle: "bayle's identification of spinozism with oriental thought exemplifies a need to come to terms with new and potentially dangerous ideas by locating them in a geographically remote part of the world". see: thijs Weststeijn, 'spinoza sinicus: An Asian Paragraph in the history of the radical enlightenment', in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, number 4 (october, 2007), p. 561.
8 Pinkard, Hegel, p. 578.
? 56 henk oosterling
to articulate his basic position on what he saw as the key modern issues in the philosophy of religion and to take some swipes at those who he thought had taken the wrong turn in the debate. "9 he is dealing here with post-Kantian thinkers as reinhold, Jacobi, friedrich von schlegel, and before all schleiermacher. for the latter the core business of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. hegel's polemical and provocative moods and his acidic sarcasm flare up in this text. to shock his romantic adversaries he compared the feeling of absolute dependence with that of a totally dependent dog that wags its tail when it gets its bone. An endur- ing academic and personal hostility towards the romantics influenced hegel's interpretation of oriental philosophy.
since knowing and understanding are hegel's core business, what sources did he consult for an adequate, up to date understanding of buddhism? given the sporadic and biased knowledge that was available in his days, he was relatively well informed and his writings were well- researched. 10 he consulted records of Jesuit missionaries, travel reports and translations of eastern philosophical texts. he frequently returned to henry thomas Colebrooke's Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society for Chinese and Indian history, culture, and religion. for buddhism hegel's main sources were the sixth and seventh volumes of the encyclopedic Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen that was published in 1750. next to this ency- clopedia the work of samuel turner had great influence on his system- atic explorations. 11 turner had visited the court of the dalai lama and the Panchen lama. his reports informed hegel about lamas or high teachers as reincarnations of previous lamas, i. e. about humans that-- like animals in hinduism's pantheon--are worshiped as particular beings because they incarnate a universal divine substance. not as a symbol, but unmediated.
9 idem, p. 498.
10 As to the subject of oriental religions his main sources are analyzed by reinhard leuze's Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1975).
11 samuel turner, 'Copy of an Account given by mr. turner, of his interview with the teshoo lama at the monastery of terpaling, enclosed in mr. turner's letter to the honourable the governor general, dated Patna, 2d march, 1784,' in Asiatic Researches 1: 197-205; 'An Account of a Journey in tibet' in Asiatic Researches 1: 207-220; An Account of an embassy to the Court of the teshoo lama, in Tibet: Containing a Narrative of a Jour- ney through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (london, 1800).
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 57
in contrast to buddhism, records on and texts of hinduism were already available in the 18th century. from the days of herodotus, strabo and marco Polo historians and explorers had written down their experi- ences and observations. due to the long occupation of great parts of india by the british empire written observations of officials of the east indian Company determined the view on eastern religion. of course their colo- nial interests biased these observations and influenced their judgment on the ideas and behavior of the indigenous people and their rituals. images of yogis were printed in travel reports. because buddhism was mentioned by John toland as "the religion of fo"--the Chinese name for buddha-- hegel refers to buddhism also as the religion of the fo. he is however mainly focusing on lamaism.
translations of religious Chinese texts--i Ching and tao te Ching-- and hindu texts--laws of manu, bhagavadgi? ta? --were already published in hegel's lifetime. by that time publications were at hand on the struc- tural relations between sanskrit and european languages. franz bopp's analyses, published in 1816, enabled hegel to analyze hinduism more ade- quately than buddhism. yet his knowledge on buddhism was inaccurate, not being able to distinguish between the different schools of hi? naya? na, maha? ya? na, vajraya? na and following his scientific sources in situating bud- dha's life around 1000 b. C. this explains his historical estimation of bud- dhism as preceding hinduism. on top of that he mixed up the life time of siddhartha gautama--supposed to be only one of many buddha's-- varying from "some forty years before Christ" (l2 24, 308/211) to the intro- duction of buddhism in China around 67 A. d. 12
in contrast to hinduism buddhism was less known. this has a 'geo- political' background too. buddhism was driven from its homeland in northern india, as a result of which texts of the dharma were shattered and dispersed across languages as Pali, sanskrit, tibetan, and some Chi- nese dialects. information on buddhism became ready at hand only after the exploration of the transhimalayan regions of nepal and tibet in the second half of the 19th century. by then systematic insights in linguistic orientalism had deepened. new research provided both tools and infor- mation to acknowledge and evaluate the importance of buddhism, as was done by schopenhauer and nietzsche, two fierce critics of hegel.
12 hegel's major source on this is francis buchanan's article on burmese buddhism in Asiatic Researches. buchanan also suggests the existence of several buddhas.
? 58 henk oosterling
so by the time hegel gave his first series of lectures in 1824 scientific analyses of buddhism were not yet vast and far less accurate than in the second half of the 19th century. it was mainly maha? ya? na buddhism with hi? naya? na elements through the tibetan lama accounts of turner that provided hegel with information on a particular sect of tibetan bud- dhism: the gelugpa that was headed by the dalai lama. 13
3. systematical incorporation in the system
notwithstanding the simplistic qualifications by critics of hegelian thought as to the forced incorporation of all available knowledge into his dialectical system, sequential reading of the different versions of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religions bears witness to the fact that he 'updated' his knowledge and diversified positions continuously. in retro- spect his categorization of buddhism might seem inadequate, but given the limited and biased knowledge that was available to him his inquisitive shifting and rephrasing show a keen awareness of aspects that still are relevant today. however, his philosophy was still metaphysically rooted in the Western tradition that emphasizes being rather than becoming, and interprets nothing as a privation of being. hegel's evaluation of the eastern notion of emptiness is influenced by this tradition. in the final foundation of his systematic philosophy in Science of Logic the notion of nothing appears at the very beginning as the negation of absolute being. this being is historically anchored in the texts of Parmenides. its nega- tion--nothing--leads to the systematic conclusion that the contradiction between something instead of either being or not being is first and for all an instance of becoming: growth and decay, progress and decadence, these are all manifestations of this dialectical configuration. becoming is historically anchored in the philosophy of heraclites. but how is nothing situated historically? that is where buddhism enters the world stage as a methodologically necessary, transitional state of mind.
References in Hegel's Other Texts
in order to pinpoint and evaluate buddhism's positioning it is instructive to briefly locate hegel's incorporation of buddhist's thought in the publica-
13 this the main thesis of morton's article. Within this specific perspective buddhism turns out to be a mixture of asceticism with a limited philosophical view of the absolute as the void, shot through with xenophobic superstition. see ? ? 3 and 8.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 59
tions that precede the period of his lectures on philosophy of religion. in a long chapter on religion at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) little details about oriental philosophies can be found. the chapter (b) on the 'religion of the plant and the animal', in which he refers to ideas and rituals of the indian hindu-religion, is systematically positioned between the religion of the light in Persia (a) and that of creation by craftsmen in egypt and in greece (c). buddhism is not mentioned.
in the first publication of Science of Logic (1812-1816) a reference to bud- dhism is made in a remark added to paragraphs in book i: the doctrine of being. As already referred to, there is no equivalent for the fundamental notion of nothing in the european history of philosophy. in referring to buddhism hegel can instantiate the nothing as an articulation of the void or nothingness found in buddhism: "As we know in the oriental systems, principally in buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. "14 but this void--hegel refers to it with this english term--is voided of any sub- jectivity. there is no discursive self reflection. negativity has come to a standstill in buddhism. At the very end of book i in the paragraphs on measure a new remark is added in the second edition of 1832 on the rela- tion between spinoza and hinduism and buddhism within the context of pantheism. i will return to this remark at the end of my exposition of the lectures.
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy the exposition of oriental Philosophy is a prelude to Western philosophy that was inaugurated by the Pre-socratics. hegel mentions Confucius, the i Ching, and daoism as elements of Chinese Philosophy. under the heading of indian Philosophy he deals with the samkhya-philosophy and the philosophy of gautama and Kanade. samkhya is one of the six schools of classical indian phi- losophy, categorized under hinduism but originally a buddhist doctrine based on a dual ontology: the dialectical tension between purusha (con- sciousness) and prakriti (phenomenal realm of matter). the dialectical force of oriental thought--Chinese philosophy with its duality of yin and yang, the trimurti of brahma? , vishnu, and shiva in hinduism--must have intrigued hegel, because it was proof for his dialectical insights in the formal-ontological foundation of the World and of history. 15
in 1827 hegel reviewed humboldt's book on the bhagavadgi? ta? in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik. "We must now recognize in regard
14 see Science of Logic, trans. A. v. miller, george Allen & unwin ltd. , london/new york: humanities Press, 1969/2002, p. 83.
15 see for the following passage hegel, Werke, bd. 11, pp. 131-204.
? 60 henk oosterling
to hindu mythology that it does in fact contain these basic determina- tions of the concept, the development of the concept. this trinity is the basic form, the abstract basic form of spirit; this is what the hindus rep- resent as trimurti" (l2 24, 327/230). for hegel this is the ultimate proof of the universal validity of his dialectic ontology. hegel even qualified gautama's philosophy of nyaya, i. e. a 'method' of reasoning and inves- tigation, as 'a very articulated dialectic. '16 And he refers to Kanada, a hindu sage who lived either around the 6th or 2nd century b. C. , and who founded the philosophical school of vaisheshika. Kanada developed a theory of physics, based on dvyanuka (biatomic molecule) and tryanuka (triatomic molecule). his belief that all living beings are composed of five elements--water, fire, earth, air, ether--strongly suggested a transition to eleatic thinkers and Pre-socratics.
in the second and third edition of 1827 and 1830 of hegel's Encyclopedia (1817) references are made to animal worshiping in indian religion and to the reincarnation of lamas within the context of atheism and pantheism. hegel cites from the bhagavadgi? ta? in an 1823 published latin translation by the writer, literature critic and translator August Wilhelm von schlegel (1767-1845), brother of the earlier mentioned friedrich von schlegel. he lets Krishna explain the omnipresence in all beings, which enables him to sort out some misunderstandings on spinozism as pantheism. A reference to Colebrooke's remark on indian religion as being monotheistic due to the abstract universality of the brahman principle is valued in a typical dialectical turn of phrase: "this positioning is not incorrect". 17
in sum, we may conclude that in hegel's work buddhism is sporadi- cally referred to and that the scarcely available information initially had to meet the formal criteria of the hegelian system. hegel applies inter- nal and external categories. the triad of internal categorization of any religion always contains 1) the metaphysical concept of a divinity, 2) its concrete representation in texts and symbols, and 3) a practical cultus. the external categories are derived from the dialectical division of the Sci- ence of Logic: being, essence, and Concept, but now in the mode of deter- minateness and finitude. in the oriental religions--and by implication in buddhism--being is therefore qualified as prereflective immediacy or
16 eastern thinking already developed a vast tradition of dialectical thinking.
6. Cultic aspects
How does a Hindu relate to his gods? that is the topic of cult, which Hegel pays attention to both in his lectures and in the Humboldt review. Cult is an essential part of religion that completes the concrete representations of the god or gods.
the "absolute or highest cult", Hegel affirms in the 1827 lectures, con- sists in a "complete emptying out of the human, the renunciation in which the Hindus relinquish all consciousness and willing, all passions and needs (nirvana), [or] this union with god in the mode of integral self- concentration (yoga)". (l2 27, 595/490) it presupposes a "growing lonely of the soul in emptiness" (Vereinsamen der Seele in die Leerheit) which might be compared to Christian or other forms of mysticism, but that Hegel, as far as Hinduism is concerned, radically rejects as being mere "numb- ing" (Verstumpfung) (H, 42; see also H, 34). the absence of any content, the emptiness of consciousness which the yogi is striving for, is not what Hegel recognizes in true mysticism, which has been "rich of spiritual, often highly pure, sublime and beautiful productions, because in the externally silent soul it is at once a going of it into itself and a development of the rich subject (Gegenstand) to which it relates and of its relationships to the latter" (ibid. ). this typical contrast between the Hindu cult, which is not just to be reduced to ritual sacrifices but encompasses a whole ethos, on the one hand, and a dimension of the Christian religion that is more or less akin to it, on the other, is symptomatic of Hegel's rejection of the excesses of the yogi ethos.
in the 1824 lectures, Hegel distinguishes three different forms depend- ing on the duration of the cult, being either momentaneous or more enduring.
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 47
1) in the first place, each Hindu is supposed to be Brahma himself, at least momentaneously, during the moments of prayer and meditation. the individual has to elevate itself to the level of abstract thought, to the level of the universal. insofar as it is capable of doing so, it is Brahma indeed. 23 (l2 24, 336/238) this "deification, or rather Brahmification" (H, 68) makes it understandable that there is, strictly speaking, no veneration of Brahma itself: Brahma has no temples dedicated to him or it, people do not pray to him. in fact, everyone capable of the higher forms of medita- tion can declare: "i am Brahm or the highest being" (l2 24, 337/239). 24
2) Whereas this first form of relationship of self-consciousness to the one is only momentaneous, the other ones are more enduring. one's whole existence should correspond to the universal represented by the god Brahm. therefore, a transition must be made from the moment of silent solitude and prayer into life. as a matter of fact this implies that the human individual should renounce all forms of vitality: "total indifference toward everything, and complete austerity" (l2 27, 595/491) appears to be the motto. the one shall penetrate the entire concrete life. therefore, the Hindus who are not Brahmans (see infra), have to make themselves into abstract egos: they must give up any movement, any interest, any incli- nation, any connection with their families. thus these saints, the yogis, venerated and fed by the other citizens, are making their lives into an enduring existence of Brahm.
23 this is the place where Hegel makes a reference to the modern religious belief that speaks in terms of immediate knowledge (Jacobi) (l2 24, 340/243-244): "Comparison with modern belief of reflection. immediate knowledge; god unknown. Jenseits. god is outside me: but as a negative for me. abstract being is the negative itself. Cf. the abstractum that Brahm is. existence only in my selfconsciousness. illusion to say something objective: god is only through my positing. the affirmative: only the i. modernity: i am the universal, master of all determinations; i am the one that posited them. But modern reflection is more developed, more free than Hinduism saying silently: i am Brahm. Hinduism: candid (unbefangene) stage of abstraction, beside of which the rest of the divine world remains objective. in modernity: everything is posited by me. Positing has volatilized all content of sensuous and supersensuous world. "
24 Cf. Hegel's quote from francis Wilford's Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West: "Wenn ich das gebet verrichte zu irgendeinem der go? tter, wenn ich mich auf den Boden setze, die Beine u? bereinander verschra? nke, die Ha? nde falte und gen Himmel blicke und meinen geist und meine gedanken sammle, ohne die Zunge zu bewegen, so sage ich mir selbst, ich bin Brahm oder das ho? chste Wesen" (l2 24, 337/239). ["When i perform the pu? ja? in honor of some of the gods, i seat myself on the ground, with my legs crossed in such a manner, that each foot rests upon the opposite thigh, (not under it, like a taylor, but) like those who perform tapasya. then with my eyes closed, and looking up to heaven, my hands moderately open, and close to each other, an a little elevated, i compose my mind and thoughts, and without moving the tongue, or using any of the organs of speech, i say inwardly i am Brahme, or the supreme Being. " (4b 720)]
? 48 paul cruysberghs
the yoga-doctrine, which Hegel also deals with extensively in the Humboldt review, is not considered by him as a real doctrine or science, as some philosophers had the tendency to do, but as a collection of asser- tions, which are primarily constructive and edifying (H, 30). their main aim is "a deepening without any content, a giving up of any attention of external objects, of the activity of the senses as well as the silencing of any inner sensation of a wish or a hope or a fear surging up, the silence of all inclinations and passions, as well as the absence of all images, represen- tations and of all determinate thoughts" (H, 34). Being oriented towards a complete absence of content (Inhaltslosigkeit) both of the subject and of the object, the yogi is trying to reach a state of complete unconscious- ness (H, 35). this state of abstraction is not to be understood as a transi- tional tension, but has to become a "habitual state of mind" (H, 35). 25 the highest form of perfection is a permanent state of abstraction--"a peren- nial solitude of the self-consciousness that has given up all sensations, all needs and representations of external things, thus no longer being consciousness,--even not a filled self-consciousness, which would have spirit as its content and would be insofar as it is still a consciousness;--an intuition, that does not intuit anything, that is not aware of anything--the pure emptiness of itself in itself " (H, 58). 26 ultimately, the transformation into Brahma will liberate the yogi even from metempsychosis (ibid. ).
3. the third moment is particular to the members of one particular caste, that of the Brahmans. each Brahman, each member of the caste is considered as Brahm. thus the Brahman is the god for every other Hindu who does not belong to the caste. typical of the Brahman is that his relationship to god no longer takes the negative form of renounce- ment. this is not so by accident: according to the logic of negation itself, we might say, the necessity of an affirmative relationship is confirmed. However, since the unity of Brahm remains "solitary, by itself " (einsam, fu? r sich), the concrete fulfilment of this affirmative relationship is "a wild and unruly one" (eine wilde, ausgelassene) (l2 27, 600/495).
this is the source of the fanciful polytheism (phantastische Vielgo? tterei) (l2 27, 601/496) of Hinduism, to which we have already referred. ignoring the independency of natural things, they endow them with the shape of
25 Comparing the yogi's practice to the Christian meditation (Andacht), Hegel, after hav- ing stressed the fact that both are essentially different because the Christian Andacht is not empty (cf. mysticism supra), sees an analogy between both, insofar as the Christian Andacht has to turn into a habitual state of mind as well in the form of piety (Fro? mmigkeit).
26 Hegel compares his interpretation with the modern (i. e. Jacobi's) conception of 'immedi- ate knowing'.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 49
the only independent being they know, the human being. thus the imagi- nation (Phantasie) deifies everything in an anthropomorphic way. at the same time, however, the human being itself, not yet being able to distin- guish its freedom from its natural side, is thought of in natural terms. as a consequence its life has no higher value than that of the natural objects upon which it depends. "for the Hindus" indeed, Hegel suggests, "human life is something contemptible and despicable--it has no more value than a sip of water" (l2 27, 602/497). life gains worth only through its negation. this explains, according to Hegel, the cult of human beings sacrificing themselves, their wives, or their children. 27 the dependency on natural objects on the other hand, explains the many forms of superstition, which Hegel interprets as an indication of the fact that a true concept of freedom and of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is absent. "and just as the superstition aris- ing from this lack of freedom is unbounded, so it also follows that there is no ethics to be found, no determinate form of rational freedom, no right, no duty. the Hindu people are utterly sunk in the depths of an unethical life (in die tiefste Unsittlichkeit)" (l2 27, 603/498). 28 not just in the lectures, but in the Humboldt review as well, Hegel argues that ethical life and true education (Bildung) are "eternally" impossible amongst Hindus. He con- nects this with the fact that Hindu religiosity and the doctrine of duties connected with it, are determined exclusively by the law of the castes (H, 37). Hence Hegel's conclusion: "instead of the work of wisdom, of good- ness and justice, which is known as the work of the divine world govern- ment in a higher religion, the work that is fulfilled perpetually by Krishna, is just the maintaining of the caste difference" (H, 38). 29 in the caste of the Brahmans the inner relationship to the one has taken the form of something external and natural: that of being born as a Brahman (l2 24, 345/248). those who belong to the caste of Brahmans are conscious of
27 Hegel praises Humboldt paying attention to the fact that Krishna suggests the prin- ciple that when acting, we should renounce the fruits of our acts, somehow in the line of the modern Kantian principle that the good be done for its own case, duty for the case of duty. But just as for the Kantian morality, Hegel complains that there is no transition in the mahabharata episode to the question of the goals of our actions and the content of our duty (H, 23; 35).
28 in the Humboldt review Hegel quotes the general governor of india, Warren Hast- ings, who in his foreword to the english translation of the Bhagavad-gita, warns the readers that he has to admit "zum voraus die eigenschaften von Dunkelheit, Absurdita? t, barbarischen Gebra? uchen und einer verdorbenen Moralita? t" (H, 22).
29 Here again Hegel compares the Hindu religion to the Christian religion, in which, he assumes, all distinctions of social position disappear and the human beings relate equally to god as human beings (gW 16, 38).
? 50 paul cruysberghs
their essence as thinking beings. as such they are the reincarnated ones, those who are born twice: once in a natural way, and a second time via the abstraction of spirit.
as a matter of fact the caste system reveals the fundamental contra- diction which is present at the very heart of Hinduism: that between the (ethical) order of acting, on the one hand, and the order of merely inactive (handlungslosen) submerging in Krishna, on the other (H, 40). this con- tradiction cannot be resolved because the highest moment of Hindu con- sciousness, Brahm, is in itself without any determination. determinations all fall outside the unity and can only have the character of mere external or natural determination. "this very same opposition and contradiction appears everywhere, where external cult and ceremonies are connected at the same time with the consciousness of higher interiority" (H, 57).
Conclusion
the basic problem is that the Hindu religion, according to Hegel, is not capable of reconciling the abstraction of thinking in general with the par- ticularity of the concrete. for that very reason its spirit is only that unre- strained whirl (einen haltungslosen Taumel), Hegel talked about in l2 24, 323/226, from one to the other, ending up with the unhappy situation of having to experience happiness only as annihilation of the personality (H, 59). from this perspective, Hinduism is far from being a religion of freedom, in which the concreteness of one's personality and one's con- crete situation in the world is integrated, and not annihilated in the god relationship. these types of considerations, which show up time and again, make it clear that Hegel's conception of Hinduism is far from the romantic devotee's who expected a religious renewal to come from the east, despising the achievements of both Protestantism and the enlight- enment in the Christian tradition and expecting salvation to come from elsewhere. it goes without saying that Hegel's presentation and interpre- tation of the Hindu religion is not a neutral one, but the least one can say is that his treatment of it is a thoughtful one.
Avoiding nihilism by Affirming nothing: hegel on buddhism
henk oosterling
the image of buddha is in the thinking posture with feet and arms inter- twined so that a toe extends into the mouth--this [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself. hence the character of the people who adhere to this religion is one of tranquility, gentleness, and obedience, a character that stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire. great religious orders have been founded among these peoples; they share a common life of tranquility of spirit, in quiet, 'tranquil occupation of the spirit,' as do the bonze in China and 'the shamans of mongolia'. Attain- ment of this pure, inward stillness is expressly declared to be the goal for human beings, to be the highest state. (l2 27, 564/461)
1. introduction
the hegelian discourse on buddhism culminates in this image: the medi- tating buddha swallowing himself. this image expresses for hegel abso- lute immediacy, unarticulated in-itself. the toe-sucking posture resembles the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol for eternity, for the infi- nite. the finite being of the human body of the buddha is united with the infinite substance of divine power. it is devoid of negativity, at least in a dialectical sense, because its substance has not been objectified. the divine substance is not negated, made abstractly conscious in a for-itself. the divine rests fully in-itself. As one critic of hegel phrased it in a quasi- mystical wordplay: "Are swallower and swallowee the same. Are they different? this indeterminacy is structural, not epiphenomenal. subject, object and abject are smeared across one another unrecognizably. "1 for hegel awareness of human limitedness is a necessary step to an identi- fication, a union and uniting, with divine power and a precondition for
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
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subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz? ek in a quasi-ironical hegelian gesture with the revolutionary activist mentality of the man that institutionalized the Christian Church: st. Paul. 2 but is Z? iz? ek's disqualification of buddhism as one of the modes of postmodern nihilism the only option?
2 see: henk oosterling, 'radikale mediokrita? t oder revolutiona? re Akte? U? ber funda- mentales inter-esse', in: e. vogt, h. J. silverman (hrgs. ), U? ber Z? iz? ek. turia+Kant, vienna 2004, pp. 42-62; 'from russia with love: Avoiding the subject. Why is Z? iz? ek's st Paul a leninist? ' in International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 2009, pp. 236-253.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 53
Within the dialectical tradition the accusation of nihilism is very per- sistent. 3 When we follow the trace back to the days of hegel, the problem already starts with the very image that startled him: the toe sucking bud- dha. the choice of this image is already a mistake. hegel found this weird picture of what he thought was the buddha in one of the books he con- sulted frequently for his analysis of buddhism: friedrich Creutzer's Sym- bolik und Mythologie der alten Vo? lker (leipzig and darmstadt, 1819). this plate however does not represent the buddha, it refers to a hindu subject: brahma? nara? yana in the context of one of the canonical texts, the Laws of Manu. hegel was even mistaken--in retrospect--as to the specific nature of buddhism, because he relied mainly on sources that focused on the life of the tibetan lamas. the difference between buddhism and lamaism, he states in the lectures of 1824, "is only superficial". (l2 24, 307/211)
these 'mistakes' are exemplary for hegel's research on what enabled him indirectly to position himself in the controversy on pantheism as atheism. f. h. Jacobi thematized a proto-nihilist atheism in a book on spi- noza in 1785. together with schelling and ho? lderlin hegel read this book as a student and discussed the hen kai pan (one and all) principle, but the controversy haunted his thoughts till his very last days. his treatment of this controversy foreshadowed the nihilism debate that was installed as a philosophical topic by nietzsche and still resonates in Z? iz? ek's disquali- fications of buddhism in the Western hemisphere as 'new Age spiritual- ity' and 'Pop buddhism'. Z? iz? ek lifts hegel's parti pris over the turn of the century into the first decade of the 21st century.
is it possible to revalue hegel's analysis of buddhism on a more affirma- tive basis? Can the tight chain that connects nirvana, void and nothing- ness be broken? in order to throw some light on a different understanding of nothingness--and by implication to redirect the 'nihil' in nihilism-- i will firstly clarify how hegel applied his sources on buddhism for the positioning of this determinate phase of religious consciousness in his systematic philosophy (?
2) and why he kept shifting its position in the different series of lectures. (? 3) then i will turn the tables by focusing on buddhism's interpretation of hegel's philosophy. i will briefly describe the way Kyoto school based buddhist thinkers try to reconcile Zen bud- dhism with hegelian philosophy (? 4) and how they interpret nirvana
3 Adorno's remarks on nihilism in Negative Dialectics (1973, orig. 1966) scorn the possi- bility of 'believing in nothing' and qualify 'the image of nirvana' positively as 'nothingness as something' (380).
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as emptiness. this will enable me to formulate an affirmative approach to the void that favors relationality over identity, and affirmation over negation. (? 5) returning to Z? iz? ek's accusations i will counter these with current philosophical projects that have integrated the Kyoto affirmative approach to the void in their philosophy: french philosophy of differ- ences, especially in the works Jacques derrida and the cooperative works of gilles deleuze and fe? lix guattari. (? 6)
2. historical Context
Was hegel a religious man? there has been much debate on this issue. during his lifetime hegel frequently balanced on the edge of what was tolerable for the authorities. 4 An accusation of atheism would have been the end of his career as a university professor. it happened to fichte in the 1790's at the university of Jena. if atheism starts with the proclamation of the death of god then hegel is a suspect too. god's death was not for the first time proclaimed by nietzsche's madman on the marketplace in The Gay Science (section 108/125/343) and more prominently in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Kant had already spoken about faith within the limits of rea- son, proposing that we speak about morality as if god does not exist. the 'internalizing' effect of this denial was appreciated by hegel: methodologi- cally sublation (Aufhebung) focuses on internalization after the necessary alienation from one's self. the result of this rupture, i. e. of transcending of one's limits and realizing one is always part of a more encompassing whole, is called subjectivity.
nevertheless hegel criticized Kant's enlightenment aporia: the con- tradictory or antinomical conclusions of the systematic analytics of self consciousness. hegel concluded that this 'unhappy consciousnes' of the skeptic or cynic had to be overcome by reidentification with an all encom- passing totality, and in doing this becoming infinite in our finitude. in this context hegel raised the issue of the death of god several times in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 5 he had stated this already at the end of 'believing and Knowing' that was published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy of 1802. this urged some commentators to call him the first
4 terry Pinkard, Hegel: A biography, Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 2000, p. 577.
5 hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, bd. 3, frankfurt am main: suhrkamp verlag 1999, pp. 547/572.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 55
'death of god' theologian. 6 but we have to be aware of the fact that this conclusion was less an existential outcry--as with nietzsche--than an epistemological necessity.
in hegel's days atheism was supposed to be disguised as pantheism and for many a critical commentator of spinoza spinozism was synony- mous with pantheism. 7 hegel owed a lot to spinoza: 'omnis determinatio negatio est', everything is determined by negation, is a key clause to his systematic exploration of thought. hegel's interpretation of spinozism as a philosophy that differed from pantheism was thus indirectly politically motivated. As a university professor in the Prussian state hegel did not like to be unclear about this issue. "nonetheless, it is quite clear that in hegel's own mind, the philosophy of religion was crucial to his enterprise". 8 Philosophy, not religion was hegel's project.
formal-ontologically being progresses from a given position via nega- tion and contradiction to sublation that positions subjectivity as col- lective consciousness (World spirit) on more articulated levels of truth. self-consciousness of being limited--finite--and the realization of infi- niteness through coming to realize that one is always part of all encom- passing totality is the bottom line of hegel's exposition of religious faith. this subject constituting rupture even counts for god. Without man as his negation--Jesus--and the redeemer--Christ--as the upbeat to the holy ghost, even god would have been unaware of his existence. this is a rather blasphemous conclusion. it kept haunting hegel's efforts to ward off accusations of atheism.
At a certain stage of the historic unfolding of the religious truth--or the truth of religion--buddhism is dealt with. A biographical detail is instructive. hegel was motivated to lecture on the philosophy of reli- gion after being asked by his former student hermann friedrich Wilhelm hinrichs to write a preface to hinrichs' book on the philosophy of religion from a hegelian standpoint. "hegel used the opportunity of the preface
6 see Charles taylor, Hegel. Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 1975, p. 495.
7 there is a link between spinozism and Chinese religion that was used by spinozists who wanted to stay under cover in order not to be accused of atheism. this was for the first time thematized by Pierre bayle: "bayle's identification of spinozism with oriental thought exemplifies a need to come to terms with new and potentially dangerous ideas by locating them in a geographically remote part of the world". see: thijs Weststeijn, 'spinoza sinicus: An Asian Paragraph in the history of the radical enlightenment', in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, number 4 (october, 2007), p. 561.
8 Pinkard, Hegel, p. 578.
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to articulate his basic position on what he saw as the key modern issues in the philosophy of religion and to take some swipes at those who he thought had taken the wrong turn in the debate. "9 he is dealing here with post-Kantian thinkers as reinhold, Jacobi, friedrich von schlegel, and before all schleiermacher. for the latter the core business of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. hegel's polemical and provocative moods and his acidic sarcasm flare up in this text. to shock his romantic adversaries he compared the feeling of absolute dependence with that of a totally dependent dog that wags its tail when it gets its bone. An endur- ing academic and personal hostility towards the romantics influenced hegel's interpretation of oriental philosophy.
since knowing and understanding are hegel's core business, what sources did he consult for an adequate, up to date understanding of buddhism? given the sporadic and biased knowledge that was available in his days, he was relatively well informed and his writings were well- researched. 10 he consulted records of Jesuit missionaries, travel reports and translations of eastern philosophical texts. he frequently returned to henry thomas Colebrooke's Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society for Chinese and Indian history, culture, and religion. for buddhism hegel's main sources were the sixth and seventh volumes of the encyclopedic Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen that was published in 1750. next to this ency- clopedia the work of samuel turner had great influence on his system- atic explorations. 11 turner had visited the court of the dalai lama and the Panchen lama. his reports informed hegel about lamas or high teachers as reincarnations of previous lamas, i. e. about humans that-- like animals in hinduism's pantheon--are worshiped as particular beings because they incarnate a universal divine substance. not as a symbol, but unmediated.
9 idem, p. 498.
10 As to the subject of oriental religions his main sources are analyzed by reinhard leuze's Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1975).
11 samuel turner, 'Copy of an Account given by mr. turner, of his interview with the teshoo lama at the monastery of terpaling, enclosed in mr. turner's letter to the honourable the governor general, dated Patna, 2d march, 1784,' in Asiatic Researches 1: 197-205; 'An Account of a Journey in tibet' in Asiatic Researches 1: 207-220; An Account of an embassy to the Court of the teshoo lama, in Tibet: Containing a Narrative of a Jour- ney through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (london, 1800).
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 57
in contrast to buddhism, records on and texts of hinduism were already available in the 18th century. from the days of herodotus, strabo and marco Polo historians and explorers had written down their experi- ences and observations. due to the long occupation of great parts of india by the british empire written observations of officials of the east indian Company determined the view on eastern religion. of course their colo- nial interests biased these observations and influenced their judgment on the ideas and behavior of the indigenous people and their rituals. images of yogis were printed in travel reports. because buddhism was mentioned by John toland as "the religion of fo"--the Chinese name for buddha-- hegel refers to buddhism also as the religion of the fo. he is however mainly focusing on lamaism.
translations of religious Chinese texts--i Ching and tao te Ching-- and hindu texts--laws of manu, bhagavadgi? ta? --were already published in hegel's lifetime. by that time publications were at hand on the struc- tural relations between sanskrit and european languages. franz bopp's analyses, published in 1816, enabled hegel to analyze hinduism more ade- quately than buddhism. yet his knowledge on buddhism was inaccurate, not being able to distinguish between the different schools of hi? naya? na, maha? ya? na, vajraya? na and following his scientific sources in situating bud- dha's life around 1000 b. C. this explains his historical estimation of bud- dhism as preceding hinduism. on top of that he mixed up the life time of siddhartha gautama--supposed to be only one of many buddha's-- varying from "some forty years before Christ" (l2 24, 308/211) to the intro- duction of buddhism in China around 67 A. d. 12
in contrast to hinduism buddhism was less known. this has a 'geo- political' background too. buddhism was driven from its homeland in northern india, as a result of which texts of the dharma were shattered and dispersed across languages as Pali, sanskrit, tibetan, and some Chi- nese dialects. information on buddhism became ready at hand only after the exploration of the transhimalayan regions of nepal and tibet in the second half of the 19th century. by then systematic insights in linguistic orientalism had deepened. new research provided both tools and infor- mation to acknowledge and evaluate the importance of buddhism, as was done by schopenhauer and nietzsche, two fierce critics of hegel.
12 hegel's major source on this is francis buchanan's article on burmese buddhism in Asiatic Researches. buchanan also suggests the existence of several buddhas.
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so by the time hegel gave his first series of lectures in 1824 scientific analyses of buddhism were not yet vast and far less accurate than in the second half of the 19th century. it was mainly maha? ya? na buddhism with hi? naya? na elements through the tibetan lama accounts of turner that provided hegel with information on a particular sect of tibetan bud- dhism: the gelugpa that was headed by the dalai lama. 13
3. systematical incorporation in the system
notwithstanding the simplistic qualifications by critics of hegelian thought as to the forced incorporation of all available knowledge into his dialectical system, sequential reading of the different versions of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religions bears witness to the fact that he 'updated' his knowledge and diversified positions continuously. in retro- spect his categorization of buddhism might seem inadequate, but given the limited and biased knowledge that was available to him his inquisitive shifting and rephrasing show a keen awareness of aspects that still are relevant today. however, his philosophy was still metaphysically rooted in the Western tradition that emphasizes being rather than becoming, and interprets nothing as a privation of being. hegel's evaluation of the eastern notion of emptiness is influenced by this tradition. in the final foundation of his systematic philosophy in Science of Logic the notion of nothing appears at the very beginning as the negation of absolute being. this being is historically anchored in the texts of Parmenides. its nega- tion--nothing--leads to the systematic conclusion that the contradiction between something instead of either being or not being is first and for all an instance of becoming: growth and decay, progress and decadence, these are all manifestations of this dialectical configuration. becoming is historically anchored in the philosophy of heraclites. but how is nothing situated historically? that is where buddhism enters the world stage as a methodologically necessary, transitional state of mind.
References in Hegel's Other Texts
in order to pinpoint and evaluate buddhism's positioning it is instructive to briefly locate hegel's incorporation of buddhist's thought in the publica-
13 this the main thesis of morton's article. Within this specific perspective buddhism turns out to be a mixture of asceticism with a limited philosophical view of the absolute as the void, shot through with xenophobic superstition. see ? ? 3 and 8.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 59
tions that precede the period of his lectures on philosophy of religion. in a long chapter on religion at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) little details about oriental philosophies can be found. the chapter (b) on the 'religion of the plant and the animal', in which he refers to ideas and rituals of the indian hindu-religion, is systematically positioned between the religion of the light in Persia (a) and that of creation by craftsmen in egypt and in greece (c). buddhism is not mentioned.
in the first publication of Science of Logic (1812-1816) a reference to bud- dhism is made in a remark added to paragraphs in book i: the doctrine of being. As already referred to, there is no equivalent for the fundamental notion of nothing in the european history of philosophy. in referring to buddhism hegel can instantiate the nothing as an articulation of the void or nothingness found in buddhism: "As we know in the oriental systems, principally in buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. "14 but this void--hegel refers to it with this english term--is voided of any sub- jectivity. there is no discursive self reflection. negativity has come to a standstill in buddhism. At the very end of book i in the paragraphs on measure a new remark is added in the second edition of 1832 on the rela- tion between spinoza and hinduism and buddhism within the context of pantheism. i will return to this remark at the end of my exposition of the lectures.
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy the exposition of oriental Philosophy is a prelude to Western philosophy that was inaugurated by the Pre-socratics. hegel mentions Confucius, the i Ching, and daoism as elements of Chinese Philosophy. under the heading of indian Philosophy he deals with the samkhya-philosophy and the philosophy of gautama and Kanade. samkhya is one of the six schools of classical indian phi- losophy, categorized under hinduism but originally a buddhist doctrine based on a dual ontology: the dialectical tension between purusha (con- sciousness) and prakriti (phenomenal realm of matter). the dialectical force of oriental thought--Chinese philosophy with its duality of yin and yang, the trimurti of brahma? , vishnu, and shiva in hinduism--must have intrigued hegel, because it was proof for his dialectical insights in the formal-ontological foundation of the World and of history. 15
in 1827 hegel reviewed humboldt's book on the bhagavadgi? ta? in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik. "We must now recognize in regard
14 see Science of Logic, trans. A. v. miller, george Allen & unwin ltd. , london/new york: humanities Press, 1969/2002, p. 83.
15 see for the following passage hegel, Werke, bd. 11, pp. 131-204.
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to hindu mythology that it does in fact contain these basic determina- tions of the concept, the development of the concept. this trinity is the basic form, the abstract basic form of spirit; this is what the hindus rep- resent as trimurti" (l2 24, 327/230). for hegel this is the ultimate proof of the universal validity of his dialectic ontology. hegel even qualified gautama's philosophy of nyaya, i. e. a 'method' of reasoning and inves- tigation, as 'a very articulated dialectic. '16 And he refers to Kanada, a hindu sage who lived either around the 6th or 2nd century b. C. , and who founded the philosophical school of vaisheshika. Kanada developed a theory of physics, based on dvyanuka (biatomic molecule) and tryanuka (triatomic molecule). his belief that all living beings are composed of five elements--water, fire, earth, air, ether--strongly suggested a transition to eleatic thinkers and Pre-socratics.
in the second and third edition of 1827 and 1830 of hegel's Encyclopedia (1817) references are made to animal worshiping in indian religion and to the reincarnation of lamas within the context of atheism and pantheism. hegel cites from the bhagavadgi? ta? in an 1823 published latin translation by the writer, literature critic and translator August Wilhelm von schlegel (1767-1845), brother of the earlier mentioned friedrich von schlegel. he lets Krishna explain the omnipresence in all beings, which enables him to sort out some misunderstandings on spinozism as pantheism. A reference to Colebrooke's remark on indian religion as being monotheistic due to the abstract universality of the brahman principle is valued in a typical dialectical turn of phrase: "this positioning is not incorrect". 17
in sum, we may conclude that in hegel's work buddhism is sporadi- cally referred to and that the scarcely available information initially had to meet the formal criteria of the hegelian system. hegel applies inter- nal and external categories. the triad of internal categorization of any religion always contains 1) the metaphysical concept of a divinity, 2) its concrete representation in texts and symbols, and 3) a practical cultus. the external categories are derived from the dialectical division of the Sci- ence of Logic: being, essence, and Concept, but now in the mode of deter- minateness and finitude. in the oriental religions--and by implication in buddhism--being is therefore qualified as prereflective immediacy or
16 eastern thinking already developed a vast tradition of dialectical thinking.
