No More Learning

(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are
satisfactory?

(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying
that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means
of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given
to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as
appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain
[*Vulg. : 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']"
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be
penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will
they be: which is false.

Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo
i) "consists in giving due honor to God. " But this can be done by other
means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by
means of penal works.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the
sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the
greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his
sin. "

Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of
penal works.

I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction
regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its
means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in
both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works.
For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be
between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization
in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too
much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been
taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He
is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something
by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in
order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that
may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now
a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but
perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work
unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it
needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be
penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are
medicinal.

Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as
such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be
satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the
penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now
if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being
equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be
diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not
diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution
of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but
increases it.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the
offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It
is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?

Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by
God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is
meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said
([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own
power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these
scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them
most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these
scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:3,4): "Tribulation worketh
patience, and patience trial, i. e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss
explains it.

Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): "Although faith," i. e. the
consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies. " Therefore
the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either
by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such
compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature,
whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory.
Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of
sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a
satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so
far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking
advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them
patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are
not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

Reply to Objection 1: Although these scourges are not altogether in our
power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them
patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such
things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as
"the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same
scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of
their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,
satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

Reply to Objection 3: These scourges always regard past guilt, not
always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For
had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no
punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted
by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be
meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two
things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be
meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard
of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the works of satisfaction are
unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds,
fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But
prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is
a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): "Is any of
you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing. " Therefore
prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as
Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing,
but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting,
diseases of the mind, by prayer. " Therefore no other work of
satisfaction is necessary.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be
cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins,
according to Lk. 11:41: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean
unto you. " Therefore the other two are in excess.

Objection 4: On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For
contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of
sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

Objection 5: Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as
works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore
they are not sufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve
something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but
three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or
external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of
fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of
the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either
in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we
should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots
the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 Jn. 2:16),
viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and
"pride of life. " Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the
"flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer"
against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does
not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is
committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or
against our neighbor, and this is remedied by "alms-deeds," or against
ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting. "

Reply to Objection 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is
the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and
this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction.
The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal
and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character
of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to
the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech. , Hom. xiv), "doubtless,
when our soul's love is strengthened, our body's strength is weakened";
hence we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank
through his wrestling with the angel.

Reply to Objection 2: Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in
carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is
completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in
the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness.
Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that
they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of
likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is
reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and
that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed,
yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is
unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly
almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in
those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction
thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does
not follow that other works are in excess.

Reply to Objection 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are
reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which,
as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

Reply to Objection 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all
referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's
neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God
becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in
several ways.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under
which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?

(2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?

(3) Whether in the good or bad angels?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether penance can be in the innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For
penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent
have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

Objection 2: Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies
punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment.
Therefore penance is not in them.

Objection 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if
all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice.
Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the
innocent.

On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a
virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent
at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in
body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick
spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of
sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure
without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the
disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal
of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not
conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the
power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal
of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act
without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is
possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason
that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its
act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the
act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of
magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin,
nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of
penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps
with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the
habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a
perfection of the natural power.

Reply to Objection 2: Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet
it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve
to be punished.

Reply to Objection 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there would
be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the
act, if there were no actual sins.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the saints in glory have penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance.
For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), "the blessed remember their sins,
even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been
healed. " But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in
heaven have not penance.

Objection 2: Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But
there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the
principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints
in heaven.

Objection 3: Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its
act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if
they did, there would be something in them against their wish.
Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.

Objection 4: On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But
justice is "perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15), and will remain in
heaven. Therefore penance will also.

Objection 5: Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of
them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good.
But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and
which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question.
Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.

I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as
regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end.
Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a
cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will
have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now,
but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his
sins.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that they do not have the
same act as penance has now; and we grant this.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of
this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially:
so that there is no comparison between Him and others.

Reply to Objection 3: Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that
act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet
the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.

Reply OBJ 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth
Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven
as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be
altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His
antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things
should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it
with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly
calls penance.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a
subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is
in the angels, according to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and
tremble. " Therefore there can be penance in them.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "evil
men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them. "
Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that
they lack. Therefore they can repent.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is
according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus
water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its
natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to
their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which
is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore
they are susceptible to penance.

Objection 4: Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to
separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can
be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the
blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.

On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has
committed.
But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not
subjects of penance.

Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to
penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not
united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.

I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a
passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin
committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible
part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that
act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love
and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the
intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in
this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together
with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil,
or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil
befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And
since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any
creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion
of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in
Wis. 5:3 "(saying) within themselves, repenting," etc. This repentance,
as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the
blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the
wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls,
for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), "death is to men
what sin is to an angel. " But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of
an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we
call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore,
since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have not the power
to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the
angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain movement of penance is engendered in
them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and
inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the
movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but
of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of
virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined
to good by nature.

Reply to Objection 4: There is no parity between the holy angels and
the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have
been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that
though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their
previous states, which penance regards directly.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament,
which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place
we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of
indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the
keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the
nature and meaning of the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the
ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be
exercised.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?

(2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc. ?

(3) Whether there are two keys or only one?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there should be keys in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the
Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the
door of which is open. But it is written (Apoc. 4:1): "I looked and
behold a door was opened in heaven," which door is Christ, for He said
of Himself (Jn. 10:7): "I am the door. " Therefore the Church needs no
keys for the entrance into heaven.

Objection 2: Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But
this belongs to Christ alone, "Who openeth and no man shutteth,
shutteth and no man openeth" (Apoc. 3:7). Therefore the Church has no
keys in the hands of her ministers.

Objection 3: Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and
vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of
hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore
neither has she the keys of heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): "To thee will I give the
keys of the kingdom of heaven. "

Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he
dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the
divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Cor. 4:1. Therefore they ought to
have the keys.

I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a
door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as
to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of
removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine
Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of
"authority. " But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle,
through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door;
hence some say that He has the keys of "excellence. " And since "the
sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ
while He lay asleep on the cross" [*Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 138], the
efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church.
Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is
bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the
sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion
of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is
the key of "ministry. "

Reply to Objection 1: The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever
open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some
obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle
which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man
was removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an
opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or
that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or
the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and
the keys of the Church.

Reply to Objection 2: This refers to His closing Limbo, so that
thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the
obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the
power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is
taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by
the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of
bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to
Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt
of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the
kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather
than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what
has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of
the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the
kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.

It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also
the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that
very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of
the two.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc. ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and
loosing, whereby "the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to
the kingdom and exclude the unworthy" therefrom, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is
the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to
be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by
the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a
power.

Objection 2: Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has
jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the
keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have
been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the
keys.

Objection 3: Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not
to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the
kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not
concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.

Objection 4: Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the
Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she
does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is
concerned.

Objection 5: Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end
belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the
principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission
to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those
who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33),
"powers are defined from their acts. " Wherefore, since the key is a
kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference
to the act should include its object from which it takes its species,
and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered.
Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely,
since it is already open, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but for this or
that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due
consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven.
Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz.
"power," the subject of the power, viz. the "ecclesiastical judge," and
the act, viz. "of excluding or admitting," corresponding to the two
acts of a material key which are to open and shut; the object of which
act is referred to in the words "from the kingdom," and the mode, in
the words, "worthy" and "unworthy," because account is taken of the
worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

Reply to Objection 1: The same power is directed to two things, of
which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to
make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in
a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is
essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby
he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a
logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects,
even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and
in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the
priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to
which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is
the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of
consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same
essentially, but differ logically.

Reply to Objection 2: All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of
consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet
the use of the key requires due matter, i. e. a people subject through
jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the
keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is
defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to
jurisdiction.

Reply to Objection 3: A person may be worthy to have something in two
ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is
worthy has heaven already opened to him---or so that it is meet that he
should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are
worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but
by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he
placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an
obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has
already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter
Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his
opinion. Cf. [4860]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4861]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4862]TP,
Q[86], A[6]. ] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there
may be room for the priest's absolution.

Reply to Objection 5: The priest's act does not bear immediately on the
kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the
kingdom.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are two keys or only one?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not two keys but only one.
For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of
which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church
does not require two keys for one sin.

Objection 2: Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But
knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor
is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some
who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there
is but one key, viz. the power of judging.

Objection 3: Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic
body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true
body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one.
Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body is but one. But
this is a key. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two
keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so
is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so
is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be
counted as a key.

Objection 5: Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the
priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins.
Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the
Trinity.

I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the
recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the
act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment
of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what
he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether
he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for
both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power;
nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since
judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it
derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot
be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the power of command
vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires
fitness in the person on whom it is exercised---because the
ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, "admits the worthy and
excludes the unworthy," as may be seen from the definition given above
[4863](A[2])---therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion
whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of
receiving (that man's confession); and for both these things a certain
power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two
keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of
the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.

These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since
both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison
with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

Reply to Objection 1: One key is ordained immediately to the opening of
one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to
the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the
second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the
lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that
lock should be opened.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about the key of
knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired
or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal
key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so
that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for
instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests
lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or
infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their
natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key,
so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet
with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was
not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 19).

But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby
the keys are promised to Peter (Mat. 16:19), so that not only one but
two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that
the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to
exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without
knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the
authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge
may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the
law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of the law
without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to
which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and
not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without
both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of
knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge;
whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of consecrating is directed to only one
act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor
is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to
different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is
but one, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs
authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.

Reply to Objection 5: All three Persons remit sins in the same way as
one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the
minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since
the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as
stated above (ad 4).
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?

(2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?

(3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?

(4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? [*St.
Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the
negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. TP, Q[62], A[1]; TP,
Q[64], A[1]; TP, Q[86], A[6]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the
remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (Jn. 20:23):
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. " Now this was
not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states
(Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament
would have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament.
Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.

Objection 2: Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of
sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the
keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the
punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest
operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.

Objection 3: Further, the priest receives more power by his
consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the
baptismal water receives the power "to touch the body and cleanse the
heart," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan. ). Much more, therefore,
does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the
heart from the stain of sin.

On the contrary, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has
not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the
inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would
co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the
keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.

Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the
power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (Sent. i, D,
14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.

I answer that, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), "the sacraments, by
virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace. " Now this
sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards
the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation,
and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes,
however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of
the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it
depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in
the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the
consecration or sanctification of the minister without any
sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is
in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in
the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as
the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now
Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect,
since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in
the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of
Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be
given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the
sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults,
sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by
Baptism children receive grace and remission of sin without any
previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be
disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes
precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the
reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before
they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the
desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede
the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous
with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed
through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never
given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed
either simultaneously or before. Hence the power of the keys operates
unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through
being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as
Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does
not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even
instrumentally [*See note at beginning of this article], but merely
disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so
is it with the power of the keys.