No More Learning

And when Ariston, his disciple, had been holding forth a good deal without much wit, but still in some points with a good deal of readiness and confidence, he said to him, "It would be impossible for you to speak thus, if your father had not been drunk when he begat you;" and for the same reason he nicknamed him the chatterer, as he himself was very concise in his speeches. [19] Once, when he was in company with an epicure who usually left nothing for his messmates, and when a large fish was set before him, he took it all as if he could eat the whole of it; and when the others looked at him with astonishment, he said, "What then do you think that your companions feel every day, if you cannot bear with my gluttony for one day? " On one occasion, when a youth was asking him questions with a pertinacity unsuited to his age, he led him to a looking-glass and bade him look at himself, and then asked him whether such questions appeared suitable to the face he saw there. And when a man said before him once, that in most points he did not agree with the doctrines of Antisthenes, he quoted to him an apophthegm of Sophocles, and asked him whether he thought there was much sense in that, and when he said that he did not know, "Are you not then ashamed," said he, "to pick out and recollect anything bad which may have been said by Antisthenes, but not to regard or remember what. ever is said that is good? " [20] A man once said, that the sayings of the philosophers appeared to him very trivial; "You say true," replied Zenon, "and their syllables too ought to be short, if that is possible. " When some one spoke to him of Polemon, and said that he proposed one question for discussion and then argued another, he became angry, and said, "At what value did he estimate the subject that had been proposed? " And he said that a man who was to discuss a question ought to have a loud voice and great energy, like the actors, but not to open his mouth too wide, which those who speak a great deal but only talk nonsense usually do. And he used to say that there was no need for those who argued well to leave their hearers room to look about them, as good workmen do, who want to have their work seen; but that, on the contrary, those who are listening to them ought to be so attentive to all that is said as to have no leisure to take notes. [21] Once when a young man was talking a great deal, he said, "Your ears have run down into your tongue. " On one occasion a very handsome man was saying that a wise man did not appear to him likely to fall in love; "Then," said he, "I cannot imagine anything that will be more miserable than you good-looking fellows. " He also used often to say that most philosophers were wise in great things, but ignorant of petty subjects and chance details; and he used to cite the saying of Caphisius, who, when one of his pupils was labouring hard to be able to blow very powerfully, gave him a slap, and said, that excellence did not depend upon greatness, but greatness on excellence. Once, when a young man was arguing very confidently, he said, "I should not like to say, O youth, all that occurs to me. " [22] And once, when a handsome and wealthy Rhodian, but one who had no other qualification, was pressing him to take him as a pupil, he, as he was not inclined to receive him, first of all made him sit on the dusty seats that he might dirt his cloak, then he put him down in the place of the poor that he might rub against their rags, and at last the young man went away. One of his sayings used to be, that vanity was the most unbecoming of all things, and especially so in the young. Another was, that one ought not to try and recollect the exact words and expressions of a discourse, but to fix all one's attention on the arrangement of the arguments, instead of treating it as if it were a piece of boiled meat, or some delicate eatable. He used also to say that young men ought to maintain the most scrupulous reserve in their walking, their gait, and their dress; and he was constantly quoting the lines of Euripides on Capaneus, that [Suppl_861]:
His wealth was ample.
But yet no pride did mingle with his state,
Nor had he haughty thought, or arrogance
More than the poorest man.

[23] And one of his sayings used to be, that nothing was more unfriendly to the comprehension of the accurate sciences than poetry; and that there was nothing that we stood in so much need of as time. When he was asked what a friend was, he replied, "Another I. " They say that he was once scourging a slave whom he had detected in theft; and when he said to him, "It was fated that I should steal ;" he rejoined, "Yes, and that you should be beaten. " He used to call beauty the flower of the voice; but some report this as if he had said that the voice is the flower of beauty. On one occasion, when he saw a slave belonging to one of his friends severely bruised, he said to his friend, "I see the footsteps of your anger. " He once accosted a man who was all over unguents and perfumes, "Who is this who smells like a woman ? " When Dionysius Metathemenos asked him why he was the only person whom he did not correct, he replied, "Because I have no confidence in you. " A young man was talking a great deal of nonsense, and he said to him, "This is the reason why we have two ears and only one mouth, that we may hear more and speak less. " [24] Once, when he was at an entertainment and remained wholly silent, he was asked what the reason was; and so he bade the person who found fault with him tell the king that there was a man in the room who knew how to hold his tongue; now the people who asked him this were ambassadors who had come from Ptolemy, and who wished to know what report they were to make of him to the king. He was once asked how he felt when people abused him, and he said, "As an ambassador feels when he is sent away without an answer. " Apollonius of Tyre tells us, that when Crates dragged him by the cloak away from Stilpon, he said. "O Crates, the proper way to take hold of philosophers is by the ears; so now do you convince me and drag me by them; but if you use force towards me, my body may be with you, but my mind with Stilpon. "

[25] {20} He used to devote a good deal of time to Diodorus, as we learn from Hippobotus; and he studied dialectics under him. And when he had made a good deal of progress he attached himself to Polemon because of his freedom from arrogance, so that it is reported that he said to him, "I am not ignorant, O Zenon, that you slip into the garden-door and steal my doctrines, and then clothe them in a Phoenician dress. " When a dialectician once showed him seven species of dialectic argument in the mowing [theriz? n] argument, he asked him how much he charged for them, and when he said "A hundred drachmas," he gave him two hundred, so exceedingly devoted was he to learning.

{21} They say too, that he was the first who ever employed the word duty (kath? kon), and who wrote a treatise on the subject. And that he altered the lines of Hesiodus thus [ Op_293 ]:
He is the best of all men who submits
To follow good advice; he too is good,
Who of himself perceives whatever is fit.

[26] For he said that that man who had the capacity to give a proper hearing to what was said, and to avail himself of it, was superior to him who comprehended everything by his own intellect; for that the one had only comprehension, but the one who took good advice had action also.

{22} When he was asked why he, who was generally austere, relaxed at a dinner party, he said, "Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked they become sweet. " And Hecaton, in the second book of his Apophthegms, says, that in entertainments of that kind, he used to indulge himself freely. And he used to say that it was better to trip with the feet, than with the tongue. And that goodness was attained by little and little, but was not itself a small thing. Some authors, however, attribute this saying to Socrates.

{23} He was a person of great powers of abstinence and endurance; and of very simple habits, living on food which required no fire to dress it, and wearing a thin cloak, [27] so that it was said of him:
The cold of winter, and the ceaseless rain,
Come powerless against him; weak is the dart
Of the fierce summer sun, or fell disease,
To bend that iron frame. He stands apart,
In nought resembling the vast common crowd;
But, patient and unwearied, night and day,
Clings to his studies and philosophy.

{24} And the comic poets, without intending it, praise him in their very attempts to turn him into ridicule. Philemon speaks thus of him in his play entitled The Philosophers:
This man adopts a new philosophy,
He teaches to be hungry; nevertheless,
He gets disciples. Bread his only food,
His best desert dried figs; water his drink.

But some attribute these lines to Poseidippus. And they have become almost a proverb. Accordingly it used to be said of him, "More temperate than Zenon the philosopher. " Poseidippus also writes thus in his Men Transported:
So that for ten whole days he did appear
More temperate than Zenon's self.

[28] {25} For in reality he did surpass all men in this description of virtue, and in dignity of demeanour, and, by Zeus, in happiness. For he lived ninety-eight years, and then died, without any disease, and continuing in good health to the last. But Persaeus, in his Ethical School, states that he died at the age of seventy-two, and that he came to Athens when he was twenty-two years old. But Apollonius says that he presided over his school for forty-eight years.

{26} And he died in the following manner. When he was going out of his school, he tripped, and broke one of his toes; and striking the ground with his hand, he repeated the line out of the Niobe:
I come: why call me so?

And immediately he strangled himself, and so he died. [29] But the Athenians buried him in the Cerameicus, and honoured him with the decrees which I have mentioned before, bearing witness to his virtue. And Antipater, the Sidonian, wrote an inscription for him, which runs thus
Here Citium's pride, wise Zenon, lies, who climbed
The summits of Olympus; but unmoved
By wicked thoughts never strove to raise on Ossa
The pine-clad Pelion; nor did he emulate
The immortal toils of Heracles; but found
A new way for himself to the highest heaven,
By virtue, temperance, and modesty.

[30] And Zenodotus, the Stoic, a disciple of Diogenes, wrote another:
You made contentment the chief rule of life,
Despising haughty wealth, O God-like Zenon.
With solemn look, and hoary brow serene,
You taught a manly doctrine; and didst found
By your deep wisdom, a great novel school,
Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.
And if your country was Phoenicia,
Why need we grieve, from that land Cadmus came,
Who gave to Greece her written books of wisdom.

And Athenaeus, the Epigrammatic poet, speaks thus of all the Stoics in common
O, ye who've learnt the doctrines of the Porch,
And have committed to your books divine
The best of human learning; teaching men
That the mind's virtue is the only good.
And she it is who keeps the lives of men,
And cities, safer than high gates or walls.
But those who place their happiness in pleasure,
Are led by the least worthy of the Muses.

[31] And we also have ourselves spoken of the manner of Zenon's death, in our collection of poems in all metres, in the following terms:
Some say that Zenon, pride of Citium,
Died of old age, when weak and quite worn out;
Some say that famine's cruel tooth did slay him;
Some that he fell, and striking hard the ground,
Said, "See, I come, why call me thus impatiently? "

For some say that this was the way in which he died. And this is enough to say concerning his death. {27} But Demetrius, the Magnesian, says, in his essay on People of the Same Name, that his father Mnaseas often came to Athens, as he was a merchant, and that he used to bring back many of the books of the Socratic philosophers, to Zenon, while be was still only a boy; and that, from this circumstance, Zenon had already become talked of in his own country; [32] and that in consequence of this he went to Athens, where he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that it was he who first recommended a clear enunciation of principles, as the best remedy for error. He is said, too, to have been in the habit of swearing "By Capers," as Socrates swore "By the Dog. "

{28} Some, indeed, among whom is Cassius the Sceptic, attack Zenon on many accounts, saying first of all that he denounced the general system of education in vogue at the time, as useless, which he did in the beginning of his Republic. And in the second place, that he used to call all who were not virtuous, adversaries, and enemies, and slaves, and unfriendly to one another, parents to their children, brethren to brethren. and kinsmen to kinsmen; [33] and again, that in his Republic, he speaks of the virtuous as the only citizens, and friends, and relations, and free men, so that in the doctrine of the Stoic, even parents and their children are enemies; for they are not wise. Also, that he lays down the principle of the community of women both in his Republic and in a poem of two hundred verses, and teaches that neither temples nor courts of law, nor gymnasia, ought to be erected in a city; moreover, that he writes thus about money, "That he does not think that men ought to coin money either for purposes of traffic, or of travelling. " Besides ail this, he enjoins men and women to wear the same dress, and to leave no part of their person uncovered. [34] {29} And that this treatise on the Republic is his work we are assured by Chrysippus, in his Republic. He also discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled the Art of Love. And in his Conversations he writes in a similar manner. Such are the charges made against him by Cassius, and also by Isidorus of Pergamum, the orator, who says that all the unbecoming doctrines and assertions of the Stoics were cut out of their books by Athenodorus, the Stoic, who was the curator of the library at Pergamum. And that subsequently they were replaced, as Athenodorus was detected, and placed in a situation of great danger; and this is sufficient to say about those doctrines of his which were impugned.

[35] {30} There were eight different persons of the name of Zenon. The first was the Eleatic, whom we shall mention hereafter; the second was this man of whom we are now speaking; the third was a Rhodian, who wrote a history of his country in one book; the fourth was a historian who wrote an account of the expedition of Pyrrhus into Italy and Sicily; and also an epitome of the transactions between the Romans and Carthaginians; the fifth was a disciple of Chrysippus, who wrote very few books, but who left a great number of disciples; the sixth was a physician, a follower of Herophilus and a very shrewd man in intellect, but a very indifferent writer; the seventh was a grammarian, who, besides other writings, has left some epigrams behind him; the eighth was a Sidonian by descent, a philosopher of the Epicurean school, a deep thinker, and very clear writer.

[36] {31} The disciples of Zenon were very numerous. The most eminent were, first of all, Persaeus, of Citium, the son of Demetrius, whom some call a friend of his, but others describe him as a servant and one of the amanuenses who were sent to him by Antigonus, to whose son, Halcyoneus, he also acted as tutor. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy; and as he began to look gloomy at this news, he said to him, "You see that wealth is not a matter of indifference. " The following works are attributed to him:

one on Kingly Power;
one entitled the Constitution of the Lacedaemonians;
one on Marriage;
one on Impiety;
Thyestes;
an Essay on Love;
a volume of Exhortations;
one of Conversations;
four of Apophthegms;
one of Reminiscences;
seven treatises on the Laws of Plato.
[37] The next was Ariston, of Chios, the son of Miltiades, who was the first author of the doctrine of indifference; then Herillus, who called knowledge the chief good; then Dionysius, who transferred this description to pleasure; as, on account of the violent disease which he had in his eyes, he could not yet bring himself to call pain a thing indifferent. He was a native of Heracleia; there was also Sphaerus, of the Bosporus; and Cleanthes of Assus, the son of Phanias, who succeeded him in his school, and whom he used to liken to tablets of hard wax, which are written upon with difficulty, but which retain what is written upon them. And after Zenon's death, Sphaerus became a pupil of Cleanthes. And we shall speak of him in our account of Cleanthes. [38] The following also were all disciples of Zenon, as we are told by Hippobotus, namely:- Philonides of Thebes; Callippus of Corinth; Poseidonius of Alexandria; Athenodorus of Soli; and Zenon, a Sidonian.

[38] {32} I have thought it best to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zenon, because he it was who was the founder of the sect. He has written a great many books, of which I have already given a list, in which he has spoken as no other of the Stoics has. And his doctrines in general are these. But we will enumerate them briefly, as we have been in the habit of doing in the case of the other philosophers.

[39] {33} The Stoics divide reason according to philosophy, into three parts; and say that one part relates to natural philosophy, one to ethics, and one to logic. And Zenon, the Citiaean, was the first who made this division, in his treatise on Reason; and he was followed in it by Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on Reason, and in the first book of his treatise on Natural Philosophy; and also by Apollodorus and by Syllus, in the first book of his Introduction to the Doctrines of the Stoics; and by Eudromus, in his Ethical Elements; and by Diogenes, the Babylonian; and Poseidonius. Now these divisions are called topics by Apollodorus, species by Chrysippus and Eudromus, and genera by all the rest. [40] And they compare philosophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and sinews, natural philosophy to the fleshy parts, and ethical philosophy to the soul. Again, they compare it to an egg; calling logic the shell, and ethics the white, and natural philosophy the yolk. Also to a fertile field; in which logic is the fence which goes round it, ethics are the fruit, and natural philosophy the soil, or the fruit-trees. Again, they compare it to a city fortified by walls, and regulated by reason; and then, as some of them say, no one part is preferred to another, but they are all combined and united inseparably; and so they treat of them all in combination. But others class logic first, natural philosophy second, and ethics third as Zenon does in his treatise on Reason, and in this he is followed by Chrysippus, and Archidemus, and Eudromus. [41] For Diogenes of Ptolemais begins with ethics; but Apollodorus places ethics second; and Panaetius and Poseidonius begin with natural philosophy, as Phanias, the friend of Poseidonius asserts, in the first book of his treatise on the School of Poseidonius.

But Cleanthes says, that there are six divisions of reason according to philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics physics, and theology; but others assert that these are not divisions of reason, but of philosophy itself; and this is the opinion advanced by Zenon of Tarsus, among others. {34} Some again say, that the logical division is properly subdivided into two sciences, namely, rhetoric and dialectics; and some divide it also into a definitive species, which is concerned with rules and tests; while others deny the propriety of this last division altogether, and argue that the object of rules and tests is the discovery of the truth; for it is in this division that they explain the differences of representations. [42] They also argue that, on the other side, the science of definitions has equally for its object the discovery of truth, since we only know things by the intervention of ideas. They also call rhetoric a science conversant about speaking well concerning matters which admit of a detailed narrative; and dialectics they call the science of arguing correctly in discussions which can be carried on by question and answer; on which account they define it thus: a knowledge of what is true, and false, and neither one thing nor the other. Again, rhetoric itself they divide into three kinds; for one description they say is concerning about giving advice, another is forensic, and the third encomiastic; [43] and it is also divided into several parts, one relating to the discovery of arguments, one to style, one to the arrangement of arguments, and the other to the delivery of the speech. And a rhetorical oration they divide into the exordium, the narration, the reply to the statements of the adverse party, and the peroration.

{35} Dialectics, they say, is divided into two parts; one of which has reference to the things signified, the other to the expression. That which has reference to the things signified or spoken of, they divide again into the topic of things conceived in the fancy, and into those of axioms, of perfect determinations, of categorems, of things alike, whether upright or prostrate, of tropes, of syllogisms, and of sophisms, which are derived either from the voice or from the things. [44] And these sophisms are of various kinds; there is the false one, the one which states facts, the negative, the sorites, and others like these; the imperfect one, the inexplicable one, the conclusive one, the veiled one, the horned one, the nobody, and the mower (theriz? n). In the second part of dialectics, that which has for its object the expression, they treat of written language, of the different parts of a discourse, of solecism and barbarism, of poetical forms of expression, of ambiguity, of a melodious voice, of music; and some even add definitions, divisions, and diction. [45] They say that the most useful of these parts is the consideration of syllogisms; for that they show us what are the things which are capable of demonstration, and that contributes much to the formation of our judgment, and their arrangement and memory give a scientific character to our knowledge. They define reasoning to be a system composed of assumptions and conclusions; and syllogism is a syllogistic argument proceeding on them. Demonstration they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; [46] and perception they divide into comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, and which is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object; Incomprehensible, which has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation. Dialectics itself they pronounce to be a necessary science, and a virtue which comprehends several other virtues under its species. And the disposition not to take up one side of an argument hastily, they defined to be a knowledge by which we are taught when we ought to agree to a statement, and when we ought to withhold our agreement. [47] Discretion they consider to be a powerful reason, having reference to what is becoming, so as to prevent our yielding to an irrelevant argument. Irrefutability they define to be a power in an argument, which prevents one from being drawn from it to its opposite. Freedom from vanity, according to them, is a habit which refers the perceptions back to right reason.

Again, they define knowledge itself as an assertion or safe comprehension, or habit, which, in the perception of what is seen, never deviates from the truth. And they say further, that without dialectic speculation, the wise man cannot be free from all error in his reasoning. For that that is what distinguishes what is true from what is false, and which easily detects those arguments which are only plausible, and those which depend upon an ambiguity of language. And without dialectics they say it is not possible to ask or answer questions correctly. [48] They also add, that immoderate haste in denials extends to those things which are done, so that those who have not properly exercised their perceptions fall into irregularity and thoughtlessness. Again, without dialectics, the wise man cannot be acute, and ingenious, and wary, and altogether dangerous as an arguer. For that it belongs to the same man to speak correctly and to reason correctly, and to discuss properly those subjects which are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him, all which qualities belong to a man who is skilful in dialectics. This then is a brief summary of their opinions on logic.

{36} And, that we may also enter into some more minute details respecting them, we will subjoin what refers to what they call their introductory science, as it is stated by Diocles, of Magnesia, in his Overview of Philosophers, where he speaks as follows, and we will give his account word for word.

[49] The Stoics have chosen to treat, in the first place, of perception and sensation, because the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception, and because the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception. For perception leads the way; and then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception. [50] But there is a difference between phantasiaand phantasma. For phantasma is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep; but phantasia is an impression, tup? sis, produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration, alloi? sis, as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul. For we must not take this impression to resemble that made by a seal, since it is impossible to conceive that there should be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing. But phantasia is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object; [51] and, according to their ideas of the phantasiai, some are sensible, and some are not. Those they call sensible, which are derived by us from some one or more senses; and those they call not sensible, which emanate directly from the thought, as for instance, those which relate to incorporeal objects, or any others which are embraced by reason. Again, those which are sensible, are produced by a real object, which imposes itself on the intelligence, and compels its acquiescence; and there are also some others, which are simply apparent, mere shadows, which resemble those which are produced by real objects. Again, these phantasiai are divided into rational and irrational; those which are rational belong to animals capable of reason; those which are irrational to animals destitute of reason. Those which are rational are thoughts; those which are irrational have no name; but are again subdivided into artificial and not artificial. At all events, an image is contemplated in a different light by a man skilful in art, from that in which it is viewed by a man ignorant of art.

[52] By sensation, the Stoics understand a species of breath which proceeds from the dominant portion of the soul to the senses, whether it be a sensible perception, or an organic disposition, which, according to the notions of some of them, is crippled and vicious. They also call sensation the energy, or active exercise, of the sense. According to them, it is to sensation that we owe our comprehension of white and black, and rough and smooth: from reason, that we derive the notions which result from a demonstration, those for instance which have for their object the existence of Gods, and of Divine Providence. For all our thoughts are formed either by indirect perception, or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or opposition. [53] By a direct perception, we perceive those things which are the objects of sense; by similarity, those which start from some point present to our senses; as, for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy, adopting either an increased idea of the thing, as of Tityus, or the Cyclops; or a diminished idea, as of a pigmy. So, too, the idea of the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition when we fancy eyes in a man's breast; combination, when we take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a comparison of words and places.

There is also nature; as by nature we comprehend what is just and good. And privation, when for instance, we form a notion of a man without hands. Such are the doctrines of the Stoics, on the subject of phantasia, and sensation, and thought. [54] {37} They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension, phantasia; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics; and he is followed by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethus leaves a great many criteria, such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason, says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of Poseidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria.

[55] {38} On the subject of logical speculation, there appears to be a great unanimity among the greater part of the Stoics, in beginning with the topic of the voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air; or, as Diogenes the Babylonian, defines it, in his essay on the Voice, a sensation peculiar to the hearing. The voice of a beast is a mere percussion of the air by some impetus: but the voice of a man is articulate, and is emitted by intellect, as Diogenes lays it down, and is not brought to perfection in a shorter period than fourteen years. And the voice is a body according to the Stoics; for so it is laid down by Archidemus, in his book on the Voice, and by Diogenes, and Antipater, and also by Chrysippus, in the second volume of his Physics. [56] For everything which makes anything, is a body; and the voice makes something when it proceeds to those who hear from those who speak.

A word (lexis), again, is, according to Diogenes, a voice consisting of letters, as "Day. " A sentence (logos) is a significant voice, sent out by the intellect, as for instance, "It is day;" but dialect is a peculiar style imprinted on the utterance of nations, according to their race; and causes varieties in the Greek language, being a sort of local habit, as for instance, the Attics say thalatta, and the Ionians say h? mer? . The elements of words are the twenty-four letters and the word letter is used in a triple division of sense, meaning the element itself, the graphical sign of the element, and the name, as Alpha. [57] There are seven vowels , a, e, ? , i, o, u, ? ; six mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. But voice is different from a word, because voice is a sound; but a word is an articulate sound. And a word differs from a sentence, because a sentence always signifies something, but a word by itself has no signification, as for instance, blituri. But this is not the case with a sentence. Again, there is a difference between speaking and pronouncing; the sounds are pronounced, but what are spoken are things which are capable of being spoken of.

{39} Now of sentences there are five parts, as Diogenes tells us in his treatise on Voice; and he is followed by Chrysippus. There is the noun, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. Antipater adds also quality, in his treatise upon Words and the things expressed by them. [58] And a common noun (pros? goria) is, according to Diogenes, a part of a sentence signifying a common quality, as for instance, man, horse. But a noun is a part of a sentence signifying a peculiar quality, such as Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is a part of a sentence signifying an uncombined categorem, according to Diogenes; or, as others define it, an element of a sentence, devoid of case, signifying something compound in reference to some person or persons, as, "I write," "I say. " A conjunction is a part of a sentence destitute of case, uniting the divisions of the sentence. An article is an element of a sentence, having cases, defining the genders of nouns and their numbers; as ho, h? , to, hoi, hai, ta. [59] {40} The excellences of a sentence are five:- good Greek, clearness, conciseness, suitableness, elegance. Good Greek (Hell? nismos) is a correct style, according to art, keeping aloof from any vulgar form of expression; clearness is a style which states that which is conceived in the mind in such a way that it is easily known: conciseness is a style which embraces all that is necessary to the clear explanation of the subject under. discussion; suitableness is a style suited to the subject; elegance is a style which avoids all peculiarity of expression. Of the vices of a sentence, on the other hand, barbarism is a use of words contrary to that in vogue among the well-educated Greeks; solecism is a sentence incongruously put together. [60] {41} A poetical expression is, as Poseidonius defines it in his introduction on Style, "A metrical or rhythmical diction, proceeding in preparation, and avoiding all resemblance to prose. " For instance, "The vast and boundless earth," "The expanse of heaven," are rhythmical expressions; and poetry is a collection of poetical expressions signifying something, containing an imitation of divine and human beings. {42} A definition is, as Antipater explains it in the first book of his treatise on Definitions, a sentence proceeding by analysis enunciated in such a way as to give a complete idea; or, as Chrysippus says in his treatise on Definitions, it is the explanation of an idea.
Description is a sentence which, in a figurative manner, brings one to a knowledge of the subject, or it may be called a simpler kind of definition, expressing the power of a definition in plainer language. Genus is a comprehending of many ideas indissolubly connected, as animal; for this one expression comprehends all particular kinds of animals. [61] An idea is an imagination of the mind which does not express actually anything real, or any quality, but only a quasi reality and a quasi quality; such, for instance, is the idea of a horse when a horse is not present. Species is that which is comprehended under genus, as man is comprehended under animal. Again, that is the most general genus which, being a genus itself, has no other genus, as the existent. And that is the most special species, which being a species has no other species, as, for instance, Socrates. {43} The division of genus is a dissection of it into the proximate species; as, for instance, "Of animals, some are rational, others irrational. " Contrary division is the dissection of genus into species on the principle of the contrary; so as to be by a sort of negation; as, for instance, "Of existent things, some are good and some not good;" and, "Of things which arc not good, some are bad and some indifferent. " [62] Partition is an arrangement of a genus with reference to place, as Crinis says, for instance, "Of goods, some have reference to the mind and some to the body. " {44} Ambiguity (amphibolia) is an expression signifying two or more things having an ordinary or a peculiar meaning, according to the pronunciation, in such a way that more things than one may be understood by the very same expression. Take, for instance, the words aul? tris pept? ke. For you may understand by them, a house has fallen down three times (aul? tris pept? ke), or, a female flute-player has fallen, taking aul? tris as synonymous with aul? tria.

{45} Dialectics are, as Poseidonius explains them, the science of what is true and false, and neither one or the other, and it is, as Chrysippus explains it, concerned with words that signify and things that are signified; these then are the doctrines asserted by the Stoics in their speculations on the subject of the voice. [63] {46} But in that part of dialectics which concerns things and ideas signified, they treat of propositions, of perfect enunciations, of judgments, of syllogisms, of imperfect enunciations, of attributes and deficiencies, and of both direct and indirect categorems. {47} And they say that enunciation is the manifestation of the ideal perception; and these enunciations the Stoics pronounce some to be perfect in themselves, and some to be defective; now those are defective, which furnish an incomplete sense, as for instance, "He writes. " For then we ask further, "Who writes? " But those are perfect in themselves, which give a sense entirely complete, as for instance, "Socrates writes. " Accordingly, in the defective enunciations, categorems are applied; but in those which are perfect in themselves, axioms, and syllogisms, and questions, and interrogations, are brought into play. [64] Now a categorem is something which is predicated of something else, being either a thing which is added to one or more objects, according to the definition of Apollodorus, or else a defective enunciation added to the nominative case, for the purpose of forming a proposition. Now of categorems, some are accidents . . . . as for instance, "The sailing through a rock. " . . . . And of categorems, some are direct, some indirect, and some neither one nor the other. Now those are correct, which are construed with one of the oblique cases, in such a manner as to produce a categorem, as for instance, "He hears, he sees, he converses. " And those are indirect, which are construed with the passive voice, as for instance, "I am heard, I am seen. " And those which are neither one nor the other, are those which are construed in a neutral kind of manner, as for instance, "To think, to walk. " And those are reciprocal, which are among the indirect ones, with out being indirect themselves. Those are effects, energ? mata, which are such words as, "He is shaved;" for then, the man who is shaved, implies himself. [65] The oblique cases, are the genitive, the dative, and the accusative. {48} An axiom, is that thing which is true, or false, or perfect in itself, being asserted, or denied positively, as far as depends upon itself; as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions; as for instance, "It is day," "Dion is walking. " And it has received the name of axiom, axi? ma, because it is either maintained, axioutai, or repudiated. For the man who says, "It is day," appears to maintain the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the axiom put before one is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. [66] And an axiom, a question, and an interrogation, differ from one another, and so does an imperative proposition from one which is related to oaths, or imprecatory, or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an axiom which we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or false. And a question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an axiom, but which requires an answer, as for instance, " Is it day? " Now this is neither true nor false; but, as "It is day" is an axiom; so is, "Is it day? " a question. But an interrogation, pusma, is a thing to which it is not possible to make an answer symbolically, as in the case of a question er? t? ma, saying merely "Yes," but we must reply, "He does live in this place. " [67] The imperative proposition is a thing which we utter when we give an order, as for instance this: "Do you now go to the sweet stream of Inachus. "

The appellative proposition is one which is used in the case in which, when a man says anything, he must address somebody, as for instance [Homer, Il_2'434]:
Atreides, glorious king of men,
Most mighty Agamemnon.
A false judgment is a proposition, which, while it has at the same time the appearance of a real judgment, loses this character by the addition, and under the influence of, some particle, as for instance "The Parthenon at least is beautiful" or "How like the herdsman is to Priamus' sons. "

[68] There is also the dubitative proposition, which differs from the judgment, inasmuch as it is always uttered in the form of a doubt; as for instance: "Are not, then, grief and life two kindred states? "

But questions, and interrogations, and things like these, are neither true nor false, while judgments and propositions are necessarily one or the other. Now of axioms, some are simple, and others are not simple; as Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Athenodorus, and Antipater, and Crinis, agree in dividing them. Those are simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition, which is not ambiguous, (or of several axioms, or propositions of the same character,) as for instance the sentence, "It is day. " And; those are not simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition; which is ambiguous, or of several axioms or propositions of that character. [69] Of an axiom, or proposition, which is ambiguous, as "If it is day;" of several axioms, or propositions of that character, as, "If it is day, it is light. "

And simple propositions are divided into the affirmative, the negative, the privative, the categorical, the definite, and the indefinite; those which are not simple, are divided into the combined, and the adjunctive, the connected and the disjunctive, and the causal and the augmentative, and the diminutive. That is an affirmative proposition, "It is not day. " And the species of this is doubly affirmative. That again is doubly affirmative, which is affirmative of an affirmative, as for instance, "It is not not day;" for this amounts to, "It is day. " [70] That is a negative proposition, which consists of a negative particle and a categorem, as for instance, "No one is walking. " That is a privative proposition which consists of a privative particle and an axiom according to power, as "This man is inhuman. " That is a categorical proposition, which consists of a nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, "Dion is walking. " That is a definite proposition, which consists of a demonstrative nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, "This man is walking. " That is an indefinite one which consists of an indefinite particle, or of indefinite particles, as for instance, " Somebody is walking," "He is moving. "

[71] Of propositions which are not simple, the combined proposition is, as Chrysippus states, in his Dialectics, and Diogenes, too, in his Dialectic Art; that which is held together by the copulative conjunction "if. " And this conjunction professes that the second member of the sentence follows the first, as for instance, "If it is day, it is light. " That which is adjunctive is, as Crinis states in his Dialectic Art, an axiom which is made to depend on the conjunction "since" (epei), beginning with an axiom and ending in an axiom, as for instance, "Since it is day, it is light. " And this conjunction professes both that the second portion of the proposition follows the first, and the first is true. [72] That is a connected proposition which is connected by some copulative conjunctions, as for instance, "It both is day, and it is light. " That is a disjunctive proposition which is disconnected by the disjunctive conjunction, "or" (? toi) as for instance, "It is either day or night. " And this proposition professes that one or other of these propositions is false. That is a causal proposition which is connected by the word, "because;" as for instance, "Because it is day, it is light. " For the first is, as it were, the cause of the second. [73] That is an augmentative proposition, which explains the greater, which is construed with an augmentative particle, and which is placed between the two members of the proposition, as for instance, "It is rather day than night. " The diminutive proposition is, in every respect, the exact contrary of the preceding one; as for instance, "It is less night than day. " Again, at times, axioms or propositions are opposed to one another in respect of their truth and falsehood, when one is an express denial of the other; as for instance, "It is day," and, "It is not day. "

Again, a conjunctive proposition is correct, when it is such that the opposite of the conclusion is contradictory of the premise; as for instance, the proposition, "If it is day, it is light," is true; for, "It is not light," which is the opposite to the conclusion expressed, is contradictory to the premise, "It is day. " And a conjunctive proposition is incorrect, when it is such that the opposite of the conclusion is not inconsistent with the premise, as for instance, " If it is day, Dion is walking. " For the fact that Dion is not walking, is not contradictory of the premise, "It is day. " [74] An adjunctive proposition is correct, which begins with a true premise, and ends in a consequence which follows of necessity, as for instance, "Since it is day, the sun is above the earth. " But it is incorrect when it either begins with a false premise, or ends with a consequence which does not follow properly; as for instance, "Since it is night, Dion is walking," for this may be said in the day-time. A causal proposition is correct, when it begins with a true premise, and ends in a consequence which necessarily follows from it, but yet does not have its premise reciprocally consequent upon its conclusion; as for instance, "Because it is day, it is light. " For the fact of its being light, is a necessary consequence of its being day; but the fact of its being day, is not necessarily a consequence of its being light. A causal proposition is incorrect, which either begins with a false premise, or ends with a conclusion that does not follow from it, or which has a premise which does not correspond to the conclusion; as for instance, "Because it is night, Dion is walking. " [75] A proposition is persuasive, which leads to the assent of the mind, as for instance, "If she brought him forth, she is his mother. " But still this is a falsehood, for a hen is not the mother of an egg. Again, there are some propositions which are possible, and some which are impossible; and some which are necessary, and some which are not necessary. That is possible, which is capable of being true, since external circumstances are no hindrance to its being true; as for instance, "Diocles lives. " And that is impossible which is not capable of being true; as for instance, "The earth flies. " That is necessary which, being true, is not capable of being false ; or perhaps is intrinsically capable of being false, but still has external circumstances which hinder its being false, as for instance, "Virtue profits a man. " That again, is not necessary, which is true, but which has a capacity of being false, though external circumstances offer no hindrance to either alternative; as for instance, "Dion walks. " [76] That is a reasonable or probable proposition, which has a great preponderance of opportunities in favour of its being true; as for instance, "I shall be alive to-morrow. " And there are other different kinds of propositions and conversions of them, from true to false, and re-conversions again; concerning which we must speak at some length.

{49} An argument, as Crinis says, is that which is composed of a lemma or major premise, an assumption or minor premise, and a conclusion; as for instance this, "If it is day, it is light;" "But it is day, therefore it is light. " For the lemma, or major premise, is, "If it is day, it is light. " The assumption, or minor premise, is, "It is day. " The conclusion follows, "Therefore it is light. " The mode of a proposition is, as it were, a figure of an argument, as for instance, such as this, "If it is the first, it is the second ; but it is the first, therefore it is the second. " [77] A conditional syllogism is that which is composed of both the preceding arguments; as for instance, "If Plato is alive, Plato breathes; but the first fact is so, therefore so is the second. " And this conditional syllogism has been introduced for the sake, in long and complex sentences, of not being forced to repeat the assumption, as it was a long one, and also the conclusion ; but of being able, instead, to content one's self with summing it up briefly thus, "The first case put is true, therefore so is the second. " Of arguments, some are conclusive, others are inconclusive. Those are inconclusive which are such, that the opposite of the conclusion drawn in them is not necessarily incompatible with the connection of the premises. As for instance, such arguments as these, " If it is day, it is light ; but it is day, therefore, Dion is walking. " But of conclusive arguments, some are called properly by the kindred name conclusions, and some are called syllogistic arguments. Those then are syllogistic which are either such as do not admit of demonstration, or such as are brought to an indemonstrable conclusion, according to some one or more propositions; such for instance as the following: "If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion. " [78] Those are conclusive, which infer their conclusion specially, and not syllogistically ; such for instance, as this, "The proposition it is both day and night is false. Now it is day; therefore, it is not night. " Those again, are unsyllogistic arguments which have an air of probability about them, and a resemblance to syllogistic ones, but which still do not lead to the deduction of proper. conclusions. As for instance, "If Dion is a horse, Dion is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore, Dion is not an animal. " [79] Again, of arguments, some are true, and some are false. Those are true which deduce a conclusion from true premises, as, for instance, "If virtue profits, then vice injures. " And those are false which have some falsehood in their premises, or which are inconclusive; as, for instance, "If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore, Dion is alive. " There are also arguments which are possible, and others which are impossible; some likewise which are necessary, and others which are not necessary. There are too, some which are not demonstrated from their not standing in need of demonstration, and these are laid down differently by different people; but Chrysippus enumerates five kinds, which serve as the foundation for every kind of argument; and which are assumed in conclusive arguments properly so called, and in syllogisms, and in modes.

[80] The first kind that is not demonstrated, is that in which the whole argument consists of a conjunctive and an antecedent; and in which the first term repeats itself so as to form a sort of conjunctive proposition, and to bring forward as the conclusion the last term. As, for instance, "If the first be true, so is the second; but the first is true, therefore, so is the second. " The second kind that is not demonstrated, is that which, by means of the conjunctive and the opposite of the conclusion, has a conclusion opposite to the first premise. As, for instance, "If it be day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day. " For here the assumption arises from the opposite of the conclusion, and the conclusion from the opposite of the first term. The third kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by a negative combination, and by one of the terms in the proposition, produces the contradictory of the remainder; as, for instance, "Plato is not dead and alive at the same time but Plato is dead; therefore, Plato is not alive. " [81] The fourth kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by means of a disjunctive, and one of those terms which are in the disjunctive, has a conclusion opposite to what remains; as, for instance, "It is either the first, or the second: but it is the first; therefore, it is not the second. " The fifth kind that is not demonstrative, is that in which the whole argument consists of a disjunctive proposition, and the opposite of one of the terms, and then one makes the conclusion identical with the remainder; as, for instance, "It is either day or night but it is not night; therefore it is day. " According to the Stoics, truth follows upon truth, as "It is light," follows upon "It is day. " And falsehood follows upon falsehood; as, "If it is false that it is night, it is also false that it is dark. " Sometimes too, truth follows from falsehood; for instance, though it is false that "the earth flies," it is true that "there is the earth. " But falsehood does never follow from truth; for, from the fact that "there is the earth," it does not follow "that the earth flies. " [82] There are also some arguments which are perplexed, being veiled and escaping notice; or such as are called sorites, the horned one, or the nobody. That is a veiled argument, which resembles the following one; "two are not a few, nor three, nor those, nor four, and so on to ten; but two are few; therefore, so are ten few. " The nobody is a conjunctive argument, and one that consists of the indefinite and the definite, and which has a minor premise and a conclusion; as, for instance, "If any one is here, he is not in Rhodes. "

[83] {50} Such then are the doctrines which the Stoics maintain on the subject of logic, in order as far as possible to establish their point that the logician is the only wise man. For they assert that all affairs are looked at by means of that speculation which proceeds by argument, including under this assertion both those that belong to natural and also those which belong to moral philosophy for, say they, how else could one determine the exact value of nouns, or how else could one explain what laws are imposed upon such and such actions? Moreover, as there are two habits both incidental to virtue, the one considers what each existing thing is, and the other inquires what it is called. These then are the notions of the Stoics on the subject of logic. [84] {51} The ethical part of philosophy they divide into the topic of inclination, the topic of good and bad, the topic of the passions, the topic of virtue, the topic of the chief good, and of primary estimation, and of actions; the topic of what things are becoming, and of exhortation and dissuasion. And this division is the one laid down by Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Zenon of Tarsus, and Apollodorus, and Diogenes, and Antipater, and Poseidonius. For Zenon of Citium, and Cleanthes, have, as being more ancient they were likely to, adopted a more simple method of treating these subjects. But these men divided logical and the natural philosophy.

[85] {52} They say that the first inclination which an animal has is to protect itself, as nature brings herself to take an interest in it from the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Ends; where he says, that the first and dearest object to every animal is its own existence, and its consciousness of that existence. For that it is not natural for any animal to be alienated from itself, or even to be brought into such a state as to be indifferent to itself, being neither alienated from nor interested in itself. It remains, therefore, that we must assert that nature has bound the animal to itself by the greatest unanimity and affection for by that means it repels all that is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable. But as for what some people say, that the first inclination of animals is to pleasure, they say what is false. [86] For they say that pleasure, if there be any such thing at all, is an accessory only, which, nature, having sought it out by itself, as well as these things which are adapted to its constitution, receives incidentally in the same manner as animals are pleased, and plants made to flourish.

Moreover, say they, nature makes no difference between animals and plants, when she regulates them. so as to leave them without voluntary motion or sense; and some things too take place in ourselves in the same manner as in plants. But, as inclination in animals tends chiefly to the point of making them pursue what is appropriate to them, we may say that their inclinations are regulated by nature. And as reason is given to rational animals according to a more perfect principle, it follows, that to live correctly according to reason, is properly predicated of those who live according to nature. For nature is as it were the artist who produces the inclination. [87] {53} On which account Zenon was the first writer who, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, said, that the chief good was confessedly to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point. And in like manner Cleanthes speaks in his treatise on Pleasure, and so do Poseidonius and Hecaton in their essays on Ends. And again, to live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to one's experience of those things which happen by nature; as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good. [88] For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one's own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things.

Again, this very thing is the virtue of the happy man and the perfect happiness of life when everything is done according to a harmony with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the universal governor and manager of all things. Diogenes, accordingly, says expressly that the chief good is to act according to sound reason in our selection of things according to our nature. And Archidemus defines it to be living in the discharge of all becoming duties. [89] Chrysippus again understands that the nature, in a manner corresponding to which we ought to live, is both the common nature, and also human nature in particular; but Cleanthes will not admit of any other nature than the common one alone, as that to which people ought to live in a manner corresponding; and repudiates all mention of a particular nature. And he asserts that virtue is a disposition of the mind always consistent and always harmonious; that one ought to seek it out for its own sake, without being influenced by fear or hope by any external influence. Moreover, that it is in it that happiness consists, as producing in the soul the harmony of a life always consistent with itself; and that if a rational animal goes the wrong way, it is because it allows itself to be misled by the deceitful appearances of exterior things, or perhaps by the instigation of those who surround it; for nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations. [90] {54} Now virtue is, to speak generally, a perfection in everything, as in the case of a statue; whether it is invisible as good health, or speculative as prudence. For Hecaton says, in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, that the scientific and speculative virtues are those which have a constitution arising from speculation and study, as, for instance, prudence and justice; and that those which are not speculative are those which are generally viewed in their extension as a practical result or effect of the former; such for instance, as health and strength. Accordingly, temperance is one of the speculative virtues, and it happens that good health usually follows it, and is marshalled as it were beside it; in the same way as strength follows the proper structure of an arch. [91] And the unspeculative virtues derive their name from the fact of their not proceeding from any acquiescence reflected by intelligence; but they are derived from others, are only accessories, and are found even in worthless people, as in the case of good health, or courage. And Poseidonius, in the first book of his treaties on Ethics, says that the great proof of the reality of virtue is that Socrates, and Diogenes, and Antisthenes, made great improvement; and the great proof of the reality of vice may be found in the fact of its being opposed to virtue.

Again, Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good, and Cleanthes, and also Poseidonius in his Exhortations, and Hecaton, all agree that virtue may be taught. And that they are right, and that it may be taught, is plain from men becoming good after having been bad. [92] On this account Panaetius teaches that there are two virtues, one speculative and the other practical; but others make three kinds, the logical, the natural, and the ethical. Poseidonius divides virtue into four divisions; and Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater make the divisions more numerous still; for Apollophanes asserts that there is but one virtue, namely, prudence. Among the virtues some are primary, and some are derived. The primary ones are prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance. And subordinate to these, as a kind of species contained in them, are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in council. And the Stoics define prudence as a knowledge of what is good, and bad, and indifferent; justice as a knowledge of what ought to be chosen, what ought to be avoided, and what is indifferent; [93] magnanimity as a knowledge of engendering a lofty habit, superior to all such accidents as happen to all men indifferently, whether they be good or bad; continence they consider a disposition which never abandons right reason, or a habit which never yields to pleasure; endurance they call a knowledge or habit by which we understand what we ought to endure, what we ought not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind they define as a habit which is prompt at finding out what is suitable on a sudden emergency; and wisdom in counsel they think a knowledge which leads us to judge what we are to do, and how we are to do it, in order to act becomingly. And analogously, of vices too there are some which are primary, and some which are subordinate; as, for instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and intemperance, are among the primary vices ; incontinence, slowness, and folly in counsel among the subordinate ones. And the vices are ignorance of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge.

[94] {55} Good, looked at in a general way, is some advantage, with the more particular distinction, being partly what is actually useful, partly what is not contrary to utility. On which account virtue itself and the good which partakes of virtue are spoken of in a threefold view of the subject. First, as to what kind of good it is, and from what it ensues. [Secondly, as to the cause of the actions;] as, for instance, in an action done according to virtue. Thirdly, as to the agent, in the case of a good man who partakes of virtue.

At another time, they define the good in a peculiar manner, as being what is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as rational being. And, secondly, they say that it is conformity to virtue, se that all actions which partake of virtue, and all good men, are themselves in some sense the good. And in the third place, they speak of its accessories, joy, and mirth, and things of that kind. [95] In the same manner they speak of vices, which they divide into folly, cowardice, injustice. , and things of that hind. And they consider that these things which partake of vices, and actions done according to vice, and bad men, are themselves in some sense the evil; and its accessories are despondency, and melancholy, and other things of that kind. {56} Again, of goods, some have reference to the mind, and some are external; and some neither have reference to the mind, nor are external. The goods having reference to the mind are virtues, and actions according to the virtues. The external goods are the having a virtuous country, a virtuous friend, and the happiness of one's country and friend. And these which are not external, and which have no reference to the mind, are such as a man's being virtuous and happy to himself. [96] And reciprocally, of evils, some have reference to the mind, such as the vices and actions according to them; some are external, such as having a foolish country, or a foolish friend, or one's country or one's friend being unhappy. And these evils which are not external, and which have no reference to the mind, are such as a man's being worthless and unhappy to himself. {57} Again, of goods, some are final, some are efficient, and some are both final and efficient.