By demonstrating that revolutions do not
necessarily
lead to war, therefore, this case presents an anomaly re- quiring explanation.
Revolution and War_nodrm
210; Hiro, Longest War, 86, and Iran under the Ayatol-
? Revolution and War
states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect ! knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
eager to restore relations with the United States; and that Iran could per- suade the Lebanese Shiites to release the U. S. hostages. m These hopes were notbasedonhardinformation,however,butontestimonyfromself-serving "sources" such as Manucher Ghorbanifar, who managed to persuade gullible U. S. officials such as Oliver North that the sale of arms to Iran would pave the way for the release of the hostages in Lebanon and help bring about a U. S. -Iranian rapprochement. 173
States never understand each other perfectly, of course, but the Iranian Revolution confirms how much worse this problem can be after a revolu- tion. Lacking reliable information, Iran and its foreign adversaries relied on stereotypes, worst-case scenarios, and the testimony of self-interested exiles and sleazy middlemen. The result was a heightened sense of threat, a greater willingness to use force, and incompetent, doomed attempts to im- prove relations. 174
Socialization and Learning
The Iranian case offers partial-but hardly overwhelming-support for the neorealist claim that the constraints of international anarchy will force states with radical international goals to moderate their objectives. Iran's foreign policy objectives were extremely unrealistic at first, and its leaders did modify some of their goals in order to ensure the survival of the new regime. The Islamic Republic did not abandon all of its revolutionary aims, however, and it continues today to engage in bellicose policies toward a number of states despite the high cost these positions entail. This persis- tence was the result of internal divisions within Iran and the sacrosanct character of certain elements in Iran's revolutionary worldview.
As we have seen, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic rested on a distinctly unrealistic set of ideologically inspired goals. Khomeini's ideol- ogy questioned the legitimacy of the existing state system. He initially welcomed Iran's international isolation as a means of preserving its inde- pendence and revolutionary purity. Although moderate leaders such as Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, and Qotbzadeh deplored the effects of these policies on
m Ironically,theoriginalCIAestimatethathelpedlaunchedtheentireinitiativewasaban- doned a year later. See Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras, 427; and "Soviet Threat toward Iran Overstated, Casey Concluded," Washington Post, January 13, 1987, A1, AS.
173 "MuchofthetroublethatbesettheAmericansinanyefforttoworkoutanewpolicyfor Iran, in order to achieve a 'strategic opening' or to liberate the hostages or both, resulted from an almost total American ignorance of what was going on in Iran. " Theodore Draper, Very Thin Line, 155.
174 As Rafsanjani put in 1986: "The Americans . . . despite their satellites, spies, the CIA, and the rest are so immensely uninformed about our region; uninformed about our internal af- fairs; how many half-baked analyses they tend to make. " Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 214.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
Iran's international position, Iran's behavior in the immediate aftermath of the revolution showed little sensitivity to the limits imposed by the interna- tional system. 175
As neorealism predicts, however, external constraints forced the Islamic Republic to moderate its conduct in several ways. One sign of learning was the growing professionalism of the Revolutionary Guards; over time, the war with Iraq forced Iran to worry more about military effectiveness and less about ideological purity. Similarly, Iran's willingness to obtain weapons from virtually any source-including the "Great Satan" and Israel-re- vealed its willingness to forgo its ideological scruples in order to deal with a serious external challenge. 176
Iran also abandoned its isolationist policy and began seeking diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of other states. It condemned Iraq's "atheistic" Baathist ideology but did not hesitate to align itself with Syria, which was governed by a rival branch of the same Baath movement. And having previously stated that "We must become isolated in order to become independent," by 1984 Khomeini had announced that Iran "wanted rela- tions with all countries" except the United States, Israel, and South Africa. Failure to establish such ties, he argued, "would mean defeat, annihilation, and being buried right to the end. " Khomeini now told his followers, "We should learn the good things from foreigners and reject the bad things," and Foreign Minister Velayati warned that "if Iran is not present on the world scene, then important issues wiU be decided without it. " President Khamenei called for "rational, sound, and healthy relations with all coun- tries," and some Iranian officials conceded that the revoiution was unlikely to spread anytime soon. As Prime Minister Musavi admitted in 1985, ini- tially "our view . . . was that the Islamic Revolution would spread within a year as a chain reaction. . . . But it seems we were wrong in our initial as- sessments. "177 Other officials acknowledged that Iran's own actions had contributed to its isolation; in Rafsanjani's words, "If Iran had demonstrated a little more tactfulness . . . [Saudi Arabia and Kuwait] would not have sup- ported Iraq. " The decision to end the war with Iraq was another triumph of necessity over ideological conviction, and the constitutional revisions that followed Khomeini's death and Khamenei's selection as supreme jurispru-
175 In November 1980, for example, former foreign minister Yazdi warned that the hostage issue "has not been handled well and politically we have lost in the world. " Quoted in Sick, All Fall Down, 33J
176 One source states that Iran obtained weapons from as many as forty-one different coun- tries, spending roughly $2-3 billion per year. See Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 66.
177 These quotations are from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," in his edited Iran's Revolution, 6o; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52; and Shirin T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah," Foreign Policy 66 (1987).
? ? ? Revolution and War
dent were equally striking departures from Khomeini's original blueprint for Islamic government. 178
These signs of moderation should not obscure the durability of Iran's commitment to radical ends and revolutionary means, however. Iran has continued to violate a number of diplomatic norms, as revealed by its sup- port for terrorist groups, its efforts to assassinate anti-Khomeini activists in several foreign countries, and the abuse and detention of foreign diplomats in Tehran. 179 Iran repeatedly used the annual hajj to spread its revolutionary message and to undermine the Saudi regime, and it has shown scant inter- est in normalizing relations with the United States or Israel. The Rushdie af- fair has jeopardized ties with Great Britain and France, and despite the continued deterioration of the Iranian economy and the obvious costs of its confrontational stance, Iran continues to back fundamentalist groups in a number of states and maintains a doctrine that is fundamentally hostile to the West. In short, although there has been some evidence of socialization since the falll of the shah, the process must be regarded as partial at best.
Iran's deradicalization has been limited in part because the evidence in favor of such a development was ambiguous. After the regime had accom- plished a host of seemingly impossible feats during its first years in power (including the ouster of the shah, the successful defiance of the United States, and the repulse of the Iraqi invasion), the necessity for moderation was partialliy obscured by faith in Islam and trust in Khomeini's charismatic leadership. Events such as the U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 may have reinforced this view as well, and the growth of Islamic activism throughout the Middle East undoubtedly helped sustain Iran's commitment to an ideologically oriented foreign policy. 180
Even more importantly, Iran's ability to learn and adapt has been con- strained by divisions within the revolutionary elite itself. Different factions have drawn differentlessons from Iran's postrevolutionary experience, and where Rafsanjani and others have sought to downplay the export of revolu- tion in order to cultivate diplomatic and commercial ties abroad, the hard-
178 Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52. Rafsanjani's pragmatism was also re- vealed by his statement that "by the use of an inappropriate method [the export of revolu- tion] . . . we have created enemies for our country," and he criticized Iranian extremists as "frozen in their beliefs. " In a remarkable display of candor, Rafsanjani also endorsed Khamenei's selection as supreme jurisprudent in 1989 by saying that "familiarity with na- tional issues" is "far more important than all other conditions such as [religious] knowledge [and even] justness. " Quoted in MECS 1988, 475, 480; and 1989, 352.
179 See "Iran's Use of International Terrorism: An Unclassified Paper and Chronology," (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Department of State, 1987); Alex von Domoch [pseud. ], "Iran's Vio- lent Diplomacy," Surviva/ 30, no. 3 (1988); and "Killing off Iranian Dissenters. "
1110 Khomeini remarked in 1983: "Were it not for divine assistance and for [Allah's] special blessing, we would never have possessed the strength to withstand a satanic regime [Iraq] armed to the teeth, which was dependent upon world powers. " Quoted in Richard Cottam, "Iran's Perception of the Superpowers," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu tion, 142.
? [266]
? The Iranian Revolution
liners have remained firmly committed to a radical Islamic vision. Kho- meini contributed to this split by refusing to allow Rafsanjani and the prag- matists to either eliminate the hard-liners or move too far from the revolution's original ideals. Iranian foreign policy has remained erratic and inconsistent, therefore, and the Islamic Republic has failed to "learn" as rapidly as a unitary actor might. 181
Compounding the problem are the presence of numerous competing power centers and the relative weakness of the executive branch. Presiden- tial powers are limited by the constitution and subject to scrutiny by the supreme jurisprudent, while influential clerics control independent institu- tions whose actions are not subject to strict governmental controU82 Iran's costly commitment to a "revolutionary" foreign policy also underscores that a revolutionary regime is not a blank state; on the contrary, its leaders often take power with a clear set of expectations and objectives. The ideological visions that inspire a revolution set the standards by which the new regime will be judged and provide the moral justification for its rule. Having waged a violent struggle in order to implement a particular vision of soci-
ety, elites will find it difficult to reject these ideals openly (even if they de- part from them in practice), especially when the ruling ideology is regarded as sacrosanct and unchallengeable. Although important members of the Iranian elite have been willing to modify their principles in light of chang- ing conditions and new experiences, abandoning them completely would threaten the legitimacy of clerical rule and leave them open to the charge of betraying the revolution. As a result, core values such as anti-Americanism and the promotion of Islam in other countries remain central features of Iran's political agenda.
On the whole, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic provides strong support for the main arguments of this book. The revolution in Iran raised concerns about the global balance of power and had even more profound ef- fects on the balance of power within the region. The revolution disrupted re- lations between Iran and most of its neighbors and exacerbated the competition between the United States and Soviet Union as well. Iran and its adversaries saw each other as aggressive and dangerous, and although these perceptions were justified, Iran's rulers exaggerated the true degree of Western animosity. The fear that the revolution would spread increased for-
181 Shahram Chubin, Iran 's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Wash- ington, D. C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), esp. 71.
182 In 1992, for example, Iranian relations with Western Europe and the U. S. deteriorated after Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the head of the Fifteenth Khordad Foundation, announced that he had increased the reward for killing Rushdie and would send his own men to assassinate the author.
? ? ? Revolution and War
eign perceptions of threat further, and these various forces combined to leave Iran isolated for most of the 1980s.
As the theory suggests, uncertainty and lack of information damaged Iran's relations with most other states. As Iran and its neighbors began to form more accurate estimates of each other's capabilities and intentions, however, the belief that the revolution might soon spread began to fade. Al- though Khomeini's ideological legacy and the enduring rivalry among his successors have prevented an explicit repudiation of Iran's revolutionary program, efforts to establish more normal foreign relations have already begun and are likely to increase.
[268]
? [6]
The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
"As revolutions have begun, it is natural to expect that other revolutions
will follow. "
-Thomas Paine, 1791
What were the international effects of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions? Although the evidence presented here is not de- finitive, these four cases support the basic claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the risk of war. Each of them exhibited some or all of the destabilizing dynamics found in the three previous cases, and each state approached the brink of war at least once.
Yet three of these revolutions did not lead to all-out war. The absence of war following the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutions is best ex- plained by the participants' awareness that the use of force was likely to be costly and difficult. These revolutions did not foster powerful fears of con- tagion, and each took place in geopolitical circumstances that further dis- couraged the use of force. In other words, the relationship between these revolutionary states and foreign powers was characterized by a powerful condition of defense dominance. Thus, even when serious conflicts arose, the use of force was seen as neither necessary nor appealing. By contrast, fear of contagion and counterrevolution was widespread after the Chinese Revolu- tion, whose international consequences were similar to those of the French,
Russian, and Iranian cases.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
At first glance, the American Revolution seems an obvious exception to the main argument of this book. Contemporaries saw the War of American Independence and the creation of the United States as an event with poten-
?
? ? Revolution and War
tially far-reaching implications. 1 Unlike the other revolutions examined here, however, the new nation remained formally at peace with the other great powers for nearly three decades.
By demonstrating that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, therefore, this case presents an anomaly re- quiring explanation.
Closer examination suggests that the anomaly is not as significant as it first appears. Like other revolutionary leaders, U. S. statesmen were ob- sessed with questions of national security and combined awareness of their own vulnerability with a profound sense of optimism. 2 U. S. relations with other states suffered from misperceptions similar to those that have accom- panied other revolutions, and the resulting tensions were exacerbated by in- ternal divisions, the fear of subversion, and poor communication. Finally, although the revolution did not lead to war, the United States was involved in several "militarized disputes" and came very close to war on at least three occasions. The absence of open warfare was largely the result of geo- graphic isolation, favorable timing, and the unique worldview of the revo- lutionaries themselves; war would have been far more likely under any
other circumstances.
The Diplomacy ofthe "New Republic"
TheWarofIndependence(1775-1783). ThediplomacyoftheWarofInde- pendence supports several familiar propositions about the international ef- fects of revolutionary change. Foreign powers saw the revolution largely in terms of the balance of power; France supported the rebellious colonies in order to weaken England and avenge the losses it had suffered in the Seven Years War, and Spain took advantage of England's defeat to improve i. ts
own position in the Western Hemisphere. 3
The war also offers an example of a revolutionary movement modifying its initial preferences in response to external pressure. As the Model Treaty adopted by the Continental Congress in 1776 suggests, the Founding Fa- thers hoped to avoid foreign commitments and confine relations with for- eign powers to the realm of commerce. The pressure of war forced them to abandon this idealistic stance, however, and the American Confederation
1 For a persuasive argument that the American Revolution was a "real" revolution, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
2 As E. Wayne Carp notes, "In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that war, threats of war, and domestic insurrections were the major preoccupations of Americans in the 17905. " "The Prob- lem of National Defense in the Early American Republic," in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 35?
3 See Richard W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The International History ofthe Amer- ican Revolution (New York: John Wiley, 1? 5), esp. chaps. 4 and 8.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
negotiated a formal treaty with France in 1778. 4 Yet an aversion to tradi- tional diplomacy was still widespread, and several prominent American leaders recommended that the new nation forgo regular diplomatic rela- tions with the other great powers. 5
Diplomacr;undertheConfederation(1783-1789). TheTreatyofParisin1783 acknowledged the formal independence of the American Confederation, and three main issues dominated its diplomacy for the rest of the decade. First, the colonists had expected the lure of American commerce to give them considerable leverage over the European powers, but trade with France remained modest, and England monopolized trade with its former colonies by denying U. S. vessels access to its home ports, Canada, or the West Indies. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the au-
thority to impose retaliatory restrictions, and the separate colonies soon found themselves in a damaging economic competition. 6 A second issue was payment for losses suffered during the War of Independence; the Treaty of Paris obliged the former colonies to compensate loyalists and British citi- zens for lost property, but the new Congress lacked the power to collect the necessary funds. As a result, Britain refused to withdraw from its network of forts along the northwestern frontier and continued to support a number of Indian tribes who were actively resisting the westward expansion of the new nation. Third, the United States and Spain were engaged in a pro- tracted border dispute over Florida and the Mississippi Valley, and the fed-
eral government was too weak to force Spain into a more conciliatory position. 7 U. S. weakness was further underscored by the predations of the
4 The principml architect of the Model Treaty, John Adams, had previously stated, "I am not for soliciting any political connection, or military assistance . . . from France. I wish for noth- ing but commerce. " Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy 1763-18oz (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 91; and see also William Stinchcombe, "John Adams and the Model Treaty," in The American Revolution and "A Candid World," ed. Lawrence S. Ka- plan (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977); 70.
5 Felix Gilbert argues that the Founding Fathers rejected balance-on-power diplomacy in favor of an idealistic internationalism based on the writings of the French philosophes, but more recent research suggests that U. S. leaders placed great importance on the balance of power and paid scant attention to the philosophes' opinions. See Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas ofEarly American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); James Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980), "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplo- matic History 1, no. 1 (1977), and "Early American Diplomacy: A Reappraisal," in Kaplan, American Revolution and "A Candid World," 49?
6 See Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution: British Policy toward the United States, 1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 18-45; Reginald Horsman, TheDiplomacyofthe New Republic, 1776-1815 (Arlington Heights, Ill. : Harlan Davidson, 1985), 29-31; and Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 158-63.
7 The dispute had important implications for U. S. economic development, as Spain's con- trol of New Orleans allowed it to prevent U. S. settlers from shipping goods via the river. See
? ? ? Revolution and War
Barbary pirates, who began attacking U. S. shipping once English protection was withdrawn. 8
These issues cast doubt on the long-term viability of the republican ex- periment. The belief that republics were inherently unstable and suitable only for small nations such as Switzerland convinced many contemporaries that the Confederation would soon collapse, and U. S. leaders were increas- ingly worried about the threat of foreign subversion. 9 These pressures helped convince the thirteen former colonies to replace the Articles of Con- federation with a constitution that would grant the federal government sig- nificantly more authority. 10
The Federalist Era: 1789-1801. U. S. foreign policy acquired greater force and coherence under the new Constitution, but it also became the main issue dividing the emerging Federalist and Republican factions. 11 Led by Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists wanted to create a strong central state that could curb local factionalism and preserve U. S. independence in a world of hostile powers. Convinced that British capital and commerce were essential to establishing U. S. credit and restoring the U. S. economy, Hamil- ton opposed schemes for commercial retaliation against England and sought to downplay the alliance with France. 12
By contrast, the Republican faction, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, sought to preserve a predominantly agrarian republic and fa- vored a close alliance with France. Viewing commerce as a potent diplo- matic weapon, they called for discriminatory duties against states that refused to sign commercial treaties, and they believed the United States
Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty: America's Advantagefrom Europe's Distress, 1783-1800 (New Haven: Yale Uruiversity Press, 196o); and Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), esp. B-10.
8 See H. G. B;unby, The Prisoners ofAlgiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War, 1 785-1797 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); and Horsman, Diplomacy of the New Republic, 3o-31.
9 See Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, 33-35.
10 As Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 1 1 , "Under a vigorous national government, the nat- ural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. " Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist (New York: Modem Library, 1937), 65. See also Frederick W. Marks,IndependenceonTrial:ForeignAffairsandtheMakingoftheConstitution (BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973).
11 The competing visions of the Federalists and Republicans are summarized in Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 3 1-65; Paul Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963), 73-80; and Richard Buel, Jr. , Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1 789-1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 29-49?
12 For a detailed description of Hamilton's "grand design," see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, TheAgeofFederalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 92-132.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
could develop its economy without close ties to the former imperial power. Thus, where Hamilton saw Anglo-American commerce as an indispensable source of revenue and manufactured goods, to Jefferson and Madison it was a source of potential corruption and a threat to Republican ideals. Republi- cans also saw Hamilton's blueprint for a strong central state as a threat to liberty, and they generally opposed efforts to increase U. S. military pre- paredness. 13
The differences between the Republican and Federalist prescriptions for U. S. foreign poHcy were compounded by the revolution in France and the outbreak of war in Europe. Jefferson and the Republicans saw the upheaval in France as another triumph for the cause of liberty, but Hamilton and the Federalists soon came to regard it as a threat to U. S. interests. 14 The Franco- American treaty of 1778 called for the United States to guarantee French possessions in the New World and authorized either power to dispose of prize vessels in the other's ports. But support for France would invite Eng- lish retaliation and disrupt the commercial ties that lay at the heart of Hamilton's financial system. Despite Republican misgivings, therefore, the United States formally proclaimed its neutrality in April 1793. 15
France saw U. S. neutrality as a betrayal of the 1778 alliance. Relations were strained further by the activities of Edward Charles Genet, the new French minister to the United States. Genet had received a tumultuous wel- come upon his arrival in Philadelphia in April 1793, and he promptly com- missioned a dozen U. S. ships to operate as privateers against English shipping. These acts were in clear violation of U. S. neutrality laws, but Genet answered requests to cease his activities by threatening to appeal di- rectly to the American people. Even Francophiles such as Jefferson were ap- palled by Genet's conduct, and the Cabinet issued a formal request for his recall in August 1793. 16
13 See Elkins and McKitrick, Age ofFederalism, 7<)-89, 133-63, 195-257, 315; and Robert C. Tucker and David Hendrickson, Empire ofLiberty: The Statecraft ofThomas Jefferson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), chaps. 2-5.
14 As U. S. minister to France, Jefferson helped draft the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and described the French Revolution as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty. " John Marshall declared that human liberty depended "in a great measure on the success of the French Revolutio11,1 " and even Hamilton later remarked that the French had "sullied a cause once glorious a1nd that might have been triumphant. " Quoted in Michael Hunt, Ideol- ogy in American Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age ofFederalism, 31cr11, 360; and also see Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal ofLiberty (Boston: LittEe, Brown, 1962), 48.
1 5 S e e M a l o n e , J effe r s o n a n d t h e O r d e a l of L i b e r t y , e s p . 6 8 - 7 5 ; D e c o n d e , E n t a n g l i n g A l l i a n c e , 87--91; 186--<}7; and Charles Marion Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793: A Study in Cabinet Government (New York: AMS Press, 1967), chap. 1.
1 6 See DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 284-85; Harry Ammon, The Genet Mission (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 141-45; and Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994).
.
? ? Revolution and War
These events accelerated the polarization between Federalists and Re- publicans. Jefferson and his associates saw U. S. neutrality as de facto sup- port for England and suspected the Federalists of seeking to establish a monarchy. 17 Hamilton and the Federalists were alarmed by the Republicans' pro-French sympathies, the surge of popular support for France, and Genet's overt attempts to encourage and exploit these sentiments. Thus, while Republicans brooded over "Anglomane" plans to subvert the Consti- tution and establish a monarchy, Federalists feared a Republican plot to em- broil the United States in a war with England and establish a "popular
? democracy" in league with France. 18
Ironically, the decision to remain neutral did not prevent Anglo-American relations from approaching war the following year. The central issue was a conflict over maritime policy, the catalyst being the English Order-in-Coun- cil of November 6, 1793, imposing a blockade over the French West Indies. The Royal Navy's policy of halting U. S. vessels in order to impress former English citizens intensified anti-British feeling, and confrontations between English and U. S. forces along the northwestern frontier further complicated Anglo-American relations. 19 Although London relaxed the November order in January, sympathy for France increased, and many Americans now be- lieved that a war with England was both likely and desirable. 20 Tensions rose higher when fears of a U. S. attack led English officials in Canada to
1 7 In May 1793, Jefferson described his domestic opponents as "zealous apostles of Eng- lish despotism" and France's enemies as "the confederacy of princes against liberty. " After resigning as secretary of state, he warned a friend, "There are in the U. 5. some characters of opposite principles . . . all of them hostile to France and looking to England as the staff of their hope. " Such men, he asserted, saw the Constitution "only as a stepping stone to monarchy. " Quoted in DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 56; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 317.
18 Hamilton regarded the Republicans as "deeply infected with those horrid principles of Jacobinism, which, proceeding from one excess to another, have made France a theater of blood. " He also suggested that their zeal for France was "intended by every art of misrepre- sentation and deception to be made the instruments first of controlling, finally of overturn- ing the Government of the Union. " The Federalists blamed Genet for the growth of
"Democratic Societies" during this period, which they mistakenly regarded as products of French subveFsion. Quoted in Buel, Securing the Revolution, 69; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 360, 456; and also see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, J 76o-1Boo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959'-64), 2:529-31.
1 9 I n the sprring o f 1794, Governor George Clinton o f New York reported that the British governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester, had told a gathering of Indian tribes that war was likely within a year. See Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, chap. 13; and Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 121-22.
20 The American minister in London, Edward Pinckney, was so certain that war was immi- nent that he requested permission to move his family to France. See Deconde, Entangling Al- liance, 99 n. 93, and 13o-31; and Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, 304-306.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
send troops to the Maumee rapids in March 1794, a step that placed the two nations on the verge of war. 21
The Federalists still believed that war with England would be a disaster for the United States, and President George Washington dispatched John Jay to London in a final effort to reach a negotiated settlement. The so-called Jay Treaty resolved most of the disputed issues (though not the question of impressment), but the Cabinet kept the terms of the treaty secret until the Senate had ratified it, in order to deflect Republican criticism. Despite its limitations, the treaty preserved peace between the United States and Great Britain and led to a final British withdrawal from U. S. territory. 22 The agree- ment also opened the way for the rapid expansion of U. S. commerce, par- ticularly in the Atlantic carrying trade, and the U.
? Revolution and War
states did by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council and backing Iraq). Given the asymmetry of power favoring existing regimes, it is not surpris- ing that revolutions seldom spread.
This interpretation helps explain why the revolution had its greatest im- pact among the Shiite population of Lebanon. The Lebanese state was a hol- low shell by 1979, so pro-Iranian groups such as Hezbollah were able to acquire considerable influence. Yet the fundamentalists in Lebanon proved to be no match for the Israeli and Syrian states, and their position deterio- rated as soon as Damascus abandoned them. Thus, the Lebanese experience actually confirms the rule: revolutions are likely to spread only when the target state has been gravely weakened or has ceased to exist already. 168 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in several other states does not under- mine this conclusion significantly, as these groups continue to face stiff op- position from regimes whose performance in other areas is unimpressive. All things considered, the modest direct impact of the Iranian Revolution shows that these events do not travel very well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Iran's relations with other states were also affected by uncertainty. In ad- dition to bringing inexperienced and unfamiliar elites to power, the revolu- tion's effects on existing channels of communication and information mad! e it more difficult for either side to pursue its interests in a rational and well- informed manner.
As discussed earlier, Iraq's decision to invade in 1980 was based on im- perfect ! knowledge about such crucial issues as the balance of militall'y power, tlhe danger of a pro-Iranian uprising among the Iraqi Shiites, and the likelihood that the Arabs of Khuzistan would welcome them. Although its armed forces appeared to have been gravely weakened by purges and de- fections, the explosion of martial enthusiasm unleashed by its opponent's revolution more than compensated for these deficiencies. And because nts military power rested in part on such new military institutionS as the Revo-
lutionary Guards, it is not surprising that outsiders failed to anticipate how well the new regime would fight. 169
In the same way, Iran's efforts to export its revolution (including its deci- sion to carry the war into Iraq in 1982) betrayed its ignorance about political
? ? 168 The formation of an Islamic government in Sudan supports this conclusion as well, in- sofar as the process of Islamization was actively promoted by the ruling elite itself.
169 Most experts underestimated Iran's military power. A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would lasft only three weeks after the Iraqi assault, Time magazine concluded that the war was unlikely to last long, and two U. S. experts concluded in 1981 that "Iran's prospects for victory can be termed simply as 'bleak. ' " See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 83-84; and MECS 1979-80, 4}
? ? The Iranian Revolution
conditions elsewhere in the Arab world. Although Khomeini had lived in Iraq for nearly fourteen years, his experience was limited primarily to reli- gious communities. As a result, his belief that the Iraqi Shiites would rise up against Hussein was based on a biased sample of Iraqi Shiites. The Iranian expectation that the revolution would soon spread to other Arab countries rested on equally inaccurate information about the revolutionary potential of these societies; instead of creating new Islamic republics, their efforts only encouraged potential victims to balance against them even more vigorously.
Iran's relationship with the United States also illustrates the obstacles that result from mutual ignorance. As a U. S. State Department desk officer com- plained after the shah's departure from Tehran, "We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups, or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran is massive. "170 Pre- occupied by its fears of a leftist takeover, the U. S. government did not es- tablish direct contact with Khomeini during his first year in power, and efforts to contact other clerics were rare. Instead, the United States tried to cultivate the short-lived Bazargan government and conducted secret talks with Bani-Sadr without realizing that his authority was actually quite lim- ited. Gary Sick reports that for several months after the embassy was taken, U. S. officials did not even know the precise number of U. S. hostages, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional hearing in May 1980 that information about the numbers, identity, and motives of the Iranians occupying the U. S. embassy was "still quite misty and vague. " At- tempts to resolve the crisis were further handicapped by the sheer difficulty of communicating with a regime in which any contact with the "Great Satan" could be attacked as an act of disloyalty. 171
Uncertainty and inaccurate information also played a crucial role in the Iran-contra imbroglio. The decision to provide arms to Iran was based on the following four beliefs: that Khomeini's regime was nearing collapse; that this collapse would make a Soviet takeover more likely; that the arms deal would strengthen the position of a group of Iranian "moderates" who were
170 Quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion,. 276. U. S. ignorance is also revealed by Ambassador William Sullivan's prediction that Khomeini would play a "Gandhi-like" role in a post-shah Iran, by UN ambassador Andrew Young's commerit that Khomeini "would one day be hailed as somewhat of a saint," and by Princeton professor Richard Falk's claim that Khomeini's en- tourage was "uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals" with "a notable record of concern for human rights. " Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 368; Wright, In the Name ofGod, 216; and Sick, All Fall Down, 166.
171 Intheabsenceofdiplomaticrelations,negotiationsforthereleaseofthehostageshadto be conducted via third parties or else covertly. Gary Sick relied heavily on information from an unidentified Iranian American with contacts among the revolutionary leaders and the exile community in the United States, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan met secretly with Iranian representatives several times in February 198o. See Sick, All Fall Down, 246 and chap. 12; . Salinger, America Held Hostage, 245-46; and Jordan, Crisis, esp. 146-53, 15? 8.
? ? ? ? ? Revolution and War
eager to restore relations with the United States; and that Iran could per- suade the Lebanese Shiites to release the U. S. hostages. m These hopes were notbasedonhardinformation,however,butontestimonyfromself-serving "sources" such as Manucher Ghorbanifar, who managed to persuade gullible U. S. officials such as Oliver North that the sale of arms to Iran would pave the way for the release of the hostages in Lebanon and help bring about a U. S. -Iranian rapprochement. 173
States never understand each other perfectly, of course, but the Iranian Revolution confirms how much worse this problem can be after a revolu- tion. Lacking reliable information, Iran and its foreign adversaries relied on stereotypes, worst-case scenarios, and the testimony of self-interested exiles and sleazy middlemen. The result was a heightened sense of threat, a greater willingness to use force, and incompetent, doomed attempts to im- prove relations. 174
Socialization and Learning
The Iranian case offers partial-but hardly overwhelming-support for the neorealist claim that the constraints of international anarchy will force states with radical international goals to moderate their objectives. Iran's foreign policy objectives were extremely unrealistic at first, and its leaders did modify some of their goals in order to ensure the survival of the new regime. The Islamic Republic did not abandon all of its revolutionary aims, however, and it continues today to engage in bellicose policies toward a number of states despite the high cost these positions entail. This persis- tence was the result of internal divisions within Iran and the sacrosanct character of certain elements in Iran's revolutionary worldview.
As we have seen, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic rested on a distinctly unrealistic set of ideologically inspired goals. Khomeini's ideol- ogy questioned the legitimacy of the existing state system. He initially welcomed Iran's international isolation as a means of preserving its inde- pendence and revolutionary purity. Although moderate leaders such as Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, and Qotbzadeh deplored the effects of these policies on
m Ironically,theoriginalCIAestimatethathelpedlaunchedtheentireinitiativewasaban- doned a year later. See Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras, 427; and "Soviet Threat toward Iran Overstated, Casey Concluded," Washington Post, January 13, 1987, A1, AS.
173 "MuchofthetroublethatbesettheAmericansinanyefforttoworkoutanewpolicyfor Iran, in order to achieve a 'strategic opening' or to liberate the hostages or both, resulted from an almost total American ignorance of what was going on in Iran. " Theodore Draper, Very Thin Line, 155.
174 As Rafsanjani put in 1986: "The Americans . . . despite their satellites, spies, the CIA, and the rest are so immensely uninformed about our region; uninformed about our internal af- fairs; how many half-baked analyses they tend to make. " Quoted in Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 214.
? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
Iran's international position, Iran's behavior in the immediate aftermath of the revolution showed little sensitivity to the limits imposed by the interna- tional system. 175
As neorealism predicts, however, external constraints forced the Islamic Republic to moderate its conduct in several ways. One sign of learning was the growing professionalism of the Revolutionary Guards; over time, the war with Iraq forced Iran to worry more about military effectiveness and less about ideological purity. Similarly, Iran's willingness to obtain weapons from virtually any source-including the "Great Satan" and Israel-re- vealed its willingness to forgo its ideological scruples in order to deal with a serious external challenge. 176
Iran also abandoned its isolationist policy and began seeking diplomatic and commercial relations with a number of other states. It condemned Iraq's "atheistic" Baathist ideology but did not hesitate to align itself with Syria, which was governed by a rival branch of the same Baath movement. And having previously stated that "We must become isolated in order to become independent," by 1984 Khomeini had announced that Iran "wanted rela- tions with all countries" except the United States, Israel, and South Africa. Failure to establish such ties, he argued, "would mean defeat, annihilation, and being buried right to the end. " Khomeini now told his followers, "We should learn the good things from foreigners and reject the bad things," and Foreign Minister Velayati warned that "if Iran is not present on the world scene, then important issues wiU be decided without it. " President Khamenei called for "rational, sound, and healthy relations with all coun- tries," and some Iranian officials conceded that the revoiution was unlikely to spread anytime soon. As Prime Minister Musavi admitted in 1985, ini- tially "our view . . . was that the Islamic Revolution would spread within a year as a chain reaction. . . . But it seems we were wrong in our initial as- sessments. "177 Other officials acknowledged that Iran's own actions had contributed to its isolation; in Rafsanjani's words, "If Iran had demonstrated a little more tactfulness . . . [Saudi Arabia and Kuwait] would not have sup- ported Iraq. " The decision to end the war with Iraq was another triumph of necessity over ideological conviction, and the constitutional revisions that followed Khomeini's death and Khamenei's selection as supreme jurispru-
175 In November 1980, for example, former foreign minister Yazdi warned that the hostage issue "has not been handled well and politically we have lost in the world. " Quoted in Sick, All Fall Down, 33J
176 One source states that Iran obtained weapons from as many as forty-one different coun- tries, spending roughly $2-3 billion per year. See Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Iran," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 66.
177 These quotations are from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," in his edited Iran's Revolution, 6o; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52; and Shirin T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah," Foreign Policy 66 (1987).
? ? ? Revolution and War
dent were equally striking departures from Khomeini's original blueprint for Islamic government. 178
These signs of moderation should not obscure the durability of Iran's commitment to radical ends and revolutionary means, however. Iran has continued to violate a number of diplomatic norms, as revealed by its sup- port for terrorist groups, its efforts to assassinate anti-Khomeini activists in several foreign countries, and the abuse and detention of foreign diplomats in Tehran. 179 Iran repeatedly used the annual hajj to spread its revolutionary message and to undermine the Saudi regime, and it has shown scant inter- est in normalizing relations with the United States or Israel. The Rushdie af- fair has jeopardized ties with Great Britain and France, and despite the continued deterioration of the Iranian economy and the obvious costs of its confrontational stance, Iran continues to back fundamentalist groups in a number of states and maintains a doctrine that is fundamentally hostile to the West. In short, although there has been some evidence of socialization since the falll of the shah, the process must be regarded as partial at best.
Iran's deradicalization has been limited in part because the evidence in favor of such a development was ambiguous. After the regime had accom- plished a host of seemingly impossible feats during its first years in power (including the ouster of the shah, the successful defiance of the United States, and the repulse of the Iraqi invasion), the necessity for moderation was partialliy obscured by faith in Islam and trust in Khomeini's charismatic leadership. Events such as the U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 may have reinforced this view as well, and the growth of Islamic activism throughout the Middle East undoubtedly helped sustain Iran's commitment to an ideologically oriented foreign policy. 180
Even more importantly, Iran's ability to learn and adapt has been con- strained by divisions within the revolutionary elite itself. Different factions have drawn differentlessons from Iran's postrevolutionary experience, and where Rafsanjani and others have sought to downplay the export of revolu- tion in order to cultivate diplomatic and commercial ties abroad, the hard-
178 Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 52. Rafsanjani's pragmatism was also re- vealed by his statement that "by the use of an inappropriate method [the export of revolu- tion] . . . we have created enemies for our country," and he criticized Iranian extremists as "frozen in their beliefs. " In a remarkable display of candor, Rafsanjani also endorsed Khamenei's selection as supreme jurisprudent in 1989 by saying that "familiarity with na- tional issues" is "far more important than all other conditions such as [religious] knowledge [and even] justness. " Quoted in MECS 1988, 475, 480; and 1989, 352.
179 See "Iran's Use of International Terrorism: An Unclassified Paper and Chronology," (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Department of State, 1987); Alex von Domoch [pseud. ], "Iran's Vio- lent Diplomacy," Surviva/ 30, no. 3 (1988); and "Killing off Iranian Dissenters. "
1110 Khomeini remarked in 1983: "Were it not for divine assistance and for [Allah's] special blessing, we would never have possessed the strength to withstand a satanic regime [Iraq] armed to the teeth, which was dependent upon world powers. " Quoted in Richard Cottam, "Iran's Perception of the Superpowers," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu tion, 142.
? [266]
? The Iranian Revolution
liners have remained firmly committed to a radical Islamic vision. Kho- meini contributed to this split by refusing to allow Rafsanjani and the prag- matists to either eliminate the hard-liners or move too far from the revolution's original ideals. Iranian foreign policy has remained erratic and inconsistent, therefore, and the Islamic Republic has failed to "learn" as rapidly as a unitary actor might. 181
Compounding the problem are the presence of numerous competing power centers and the relative weakness of the executive branch. Presiden- tial powers are limited by the constitution and subject to scrutiny by the supreme jurisprudent, while influential clerics control independent institu- tions whose actions are not subject to strict governmental controU82 Iran's costly commitment to a "revolutionary" foreign policy also underscores that a revolutionary regime is not a blank state; on the contrary, its leaders often take power with a clear set of expectations and objectives. The ideological visions that inspire a revolution set the standards by which the new regime will be judged and provide the moral justification for its rule. Having waged a violent struggle in order to implement a particular vision of soci-
ety, elites will find it difficult to reject these ideals openly (even if they de- part from them in practice), especially when the ruling ideology is regarded as sacrosanct and unchallengeable. Although important members of the Iranian elite have been willing to modify their principles in light of chang- ing conditions and new experiences, abandoning them completely would threaten the legitimacy of clerical rule and leave them open to the charge of betraying the revolution. As a result, core values such as anti-Americanism and the promotion of Islam in other countries remain central features of Iran's political agenda.
On the whole, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic provides strong support for the main arguments of this book. The revolution in Iran raised concerns about the global balance of power and had even more profound ef- fects on the balance of power within the region. The revolution disrupted re- lations between Iran and most of its neighbors and exacerbated the competition between the United States and Soviet Union as well. Iran and its adversaries saw each other as aggressive and dangerous, and although these perceptions were justified, Iran's rulers exaggerated the true degree of Western animosity. The fear that the revolution would spread increased for-
181 Shahram Chubin, Iran 's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Wash- ington, D. C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), esp. 71.
182 In 1992, for example, Iranian relations with Western Europe and the U. S. deteriorated after Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, the head of the Fifteenth Khordad Foundation, announced that he had increased the reward for killing Rushdie and would send his own men to assassinate the author.
? ? ? Revolution and War
eign perceptions of threat further, and these various forces combined to leave Iran isolated for most of the 1980s.
As the theory suggests, uncertainty and lack of information damaged Iran's relations with most other states. As Iran and its neighbors began to form more accurate estimates of each other's capabilities and intentions, however, the belief that the revolution might soon spread began to fade. Al- though Khomeini's ideological legacy and the enduring rivalry among his successors have prevented an explicit repudiation of Iran's revolutionary program, efforts to establish more normal foreign relations have already begun and are likely to increase.
[268]
? [6]
The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
"As revolutions have begun, it is natural to expect that other revolutions
will follow. "
-Thomas Paine, 1791
What were the international effects of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions? Although the evidence presented here is not de- finitive, these four cases support the basic claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the risk of war. Each of them exhibited some or all of the destabilizing dynamics found in the three previous cases, and each state approached the brink of war at least once.
Yet three of these revolutions did not lead to all-out war. The absence of war following the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutions is best ex- plained by the participants' awareness that the use of force was likely to be costly and difficult. These revolutions did not foster powerful fears of con- tagion, and each took place in geopolitical circumstances that further dis- couraged the use of force. In other words, the relationship between these revolutionary states and foreign powers was characterized by a powerful condition of defense dominance. Thus, even when serious conflicts arose, the use of force was seen as neither necessary nor appealing. By contrast, fear of contagion and counterrevolution was widespread after the Chinese Revolu- tion, whose international consequences were similar to those of the French,
Russian, and Iranian cases.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
At first glance, the American Revolution seems an obvious exception to the main argument of this book. Contemporaries saw the War of American Independence and the creation of the United States as an event with poten-
?
? ? Revolution and War
tially far-reaching implications. 1 Unlike the other revolutions examined here, however, the new nation remained formally at peace with the other great powers for nearly three decades.
By demonstrating that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, therefore, this case presents an anomaly re- quiring explanation.
Closer examination suggests that the anomaly is not as significant as it first appears. Like other revolutionary leaders, U. S. statesmen were ob- sessed with questions of national security and combined awareness of their own vulnerability with a profound sense of optimism. 2 U. S. relations with other states suffered from misperceptions similar to those that have accom- panied other revolutions, and the resulting tensions were exacerbated by in- ternal divisions, the fear of subversion, and poor communication. Finally, although the revolution did not lead to war, the United States was involved in several "militarized disputes" and came very close to war on at least three occasions. The absence of open warfare was largely the result of geo- graphic isolation, favorable timing, and the unique worldview of the revo- lutionaries themselves; war would have been far more likely under any
other circumstances.
The Diplomacy ofthe "New Republic"
TheWarofIndependence(1775-1783). ThediplomacyoftheWarofInde- pendence supports several familiar propositions about the international ef- fects of revolutionary change. Foreign powers saw the revolution largely in terms of the balance of power; France supported the rebellious colonies in order to weaken England and avenge the losses it had suffered in the Seven Years War, and Spain took advantage of England's defeat to improve i. ts
own position in the Western Hemisphere. 3
The war also offers an example of a revolutionary movement modifying its initial preferences in response to external pressure. As the Model Treaty adopted by the Continental Congress in 1776 suggests, the Founding Fa- thers hoped to avoid foreign commitments and confine relations with for- eign powers to the realm of commerce. The pressure of war forced them to abandon this idealistic stance, however, and the American Confederation
1 For a persuasive argument that the American Revolution was a "real" revolution, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
2 As E. Wayne Carp notes, "In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that war, threats of war, and domestic insurrections were the major preoccupations of Americans in the 17905. " "The Prob- lem of National Defense in the Early American Republic," in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 35?
3 See Richard W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The International History ofthe Amer- ican Revolution (New York: John Wiley, 1? 5), esp. chaps. 4 and 8.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
negotiated a formal treaty with France in 1778. 4 Yet an aversion to tradi- tional diplomacy was still widespread, and several prominent American leaders recommended that the new nation forgo regular diplomatic rela- tions with the other great powers. 5
Diplomacr;undertheConfederation(1783-1789). TheTreatyofParisin1783 acknowledged the formal independence of the American Confederation, and three main issues dominated its diplomacy for the rest of the decade. First, the colonists had expected the lure of American commerce to give them considerable leverage over the European powers, but trade with France remained modest, and England monopolized trade with its former colonies by denying U. S. vessels access to its home ports, Canada, or the West Indies. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the au-
thority to impose retaliatory restrictions, and the separate colonies soon found themselves in a damaging economic competition. 6 A second issue was payment for losses suffered during the War of Independence; the Treaty of Paris obliged the former colonies to compensate loyalists and British citi- zens for lost property, but the new Congress lacked the power to collect the necessary funds. As a result, Britain refused to withdraw from its network of forts along the northwestern frontier and continued to support a number of Indian tribes who were actively resisting the westward expansion of the new nation. Third, the United States and Spain were engaged in a pro- tracted border dispute over Florida and the Mississippi Valley, and the fed-
eral government was too weak to force Spain into a more conciliatory position. 7 U. S. weakness was further underscored by the predations of the
4 The principml architect of the Model Treaty, John Adams, had previously stated, "I am not for soliciting any political connection, or military assistance . . . from France. I wish for noth- ing but commerce. " Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy 1763-18oz (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 91; and see also William Stinchcombe, "John Adams and the Model Treaty," in The American Revolution and "A Candid World," ed. Lawrence S. Ka- plan (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977); 70.
5 Felix Gilbert argues that the Founding Fathers rejected balance-on-power diplomacy in favor of an idealistic internationalism based on the writings of the French philosophes, but more recent research suggests that U. S. leaders placed great importance on the balance of power and paid scant attention to the philosophes' opinions. See Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas ofEarly American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); James Hutson, John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980), "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplo- matic History 1, no. 1 (1977), and "Early American Diplomacy: A Reappraisal," in Kaplan, American Revolution and "A Candid World," 49?
6 See Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution: British Policy toward the United States, 1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 18-45; Reginald Horsman, TheDiplomacyofthe New Republic, 1776-1815 (Arlington Heights, Ill. : Harlan Davidson, 1985), 29-31; and Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 158-63.
7 The dispute had important implications for U. S. economic development, as Spain's con- trol of New Orleans allowed it to prevent U. S. settlers from shipping goods via the river. See
? ? ? Revolution and War
Barbary pirates, who began attacking U. S. shipping once English protection was withdrawn. 8
These issues cast doubt on the long-term viability of the republican ex- periment. The belief that republics were inherently unstable and suitable only for small nations such as Switzerland convinced many contemporaries that the Confederation would soon collapse, and U. S. leaders were increas- ingly worried about the threat of foreign subversion. 9 These pressures helped convince the thirteen former colonies to replace the Articles of Con- federation with a constitution that would grant the federal government sig- nificantly more authority. 10
The Federalist Era: 1789-1801. U. S. foreign policy acquired greater force and coherence under the new Constitution, but it also became the main issue dividing the emerging Federalist and Republican factions. 11 Led by Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists wanted to create a strong central state that could curb local factionalism and preserve U. S. independence in a world of hostile powers. Convinced that British capital and commerce were essential to establishing U. S. credit and restoring the U. S. economy, Hamil- ton opposed schemes for commercial retaliation against England and sought to downplay the alliance with France. 12
By contrast, the Republican faction, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, sought to preserve a predominantly agrarian republic and fa- vored a close alliance with France. Viewing commerce as a potent diplo- matic weapon, they called for discriminatory duties against states that refused to sign commercial treaties, and they believed the United States
Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty: America's Advantagefrom Europe's Distress, 1783-1800 (New Haven: Yale Uruiversity Press, 196o); and Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783-1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), esp. B-10.
8 See H. G. B;unby, The Prisoners ofAlgiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War, 1 785-1797 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); and Horsman, Diplomacy of the New Republic, 3o-31.
9 See Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, 33-35.
10 As Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 1 1 , "Under a vigorous national government, the nat- ural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. " Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist (New York: Modem Library, 1937), 65. See also Frederick W. Marks,IndependenceonTrial:ForeignAffairsandtheMakingoftheConstitution (BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973).
11 The competing visions of the Federalists and Republicans are summarized in Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham: Duke University Press, 1956), 3 1-65; Paul Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963), 73-80; and Richard Buel, Jr. , Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1 789-1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 29-49?
12 For a detailed description of Hamilton's "grand design," see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, TheAgeofFederalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 92-132.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
could develop its economy without close ties to the former imperial power. Thus, where Hamilton saw Anglo-American commerce as an indispensable source of revenue and manufactured goods, to Jefferson and Madison it was a source of potential corruption and a threat to Republican ideals. Republi- cans also saw Hamilton's blueprint for a strong central state as a threat to liberty, and they generally opposed efforts to increase U. S. military pre- paredness. 13
The differences between the Republican and Federalist prescriptions for U. S. foreign poHcy were compounded by the revolution in France and the outbreak of war in Europe. Jefferson and the Republicans saw the upheaval in France as another triumph for the cause of liberty, but Hamilton and the Federalists soon came to regard it as a threat to U. S. interests. 14 The Franco- American treaty of 1778 called for the United States to guarantee French possessions in the New World and authorized either power to dispose of prize vessels in the other's ports. But support for France would invite Eng- lish retaliation and disrupt the commercial ties that lay at the heart of Hamilton's financial system. Despite Republican misgivings, therefore, the United States formally proclaimed its neutrality in April 1793. 15
France saw U. S. neutrality as a betrayal of the 1778 alliance. Relations were strained further by the activities of Edward Charles Genet, the new French minister to the United States. Genet had received a tumultuous wel- come upon his arrival in Philadelphia in April 1793, and he promptly com- missioned a dozen U. S. ships to operate as privateers against English shipping. These acts were in clear violation of U. S. neutrality laws, but Genet answered requests to cease his activities by threatening to appeal di- rectly to the American people. Even Francophiles such as Jefferson were ap- palled by Genet's conduct, and the Cabinet issued a formal request for his recall in August 1793. 16
13 See Elkins and McKitrick, Age ofFederalism, 7<)-89, 133-63, 195-257, 315; and Robert C. Tucker and David Hendrickson, Empire ofLiberty: The Statecraft ofThomas Jefferson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), chaps. 2-5.
14 As U. S. minister to France, Jefferson helped draft the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and described the French Revolution as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty. " John Marshall declared that human liberty depended "in a great measure on the success of the French Revolutio11,1 " and even Hamilton later remarked that the French had "sullied a cause once glorious a1nd that might have been triumphant. " Quoted in Michael Hunt, Ideol- ogy in American Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age ofFederalism, 31cr11, 360; and also see Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal ofLiberty (Boston: LittEe, Brown, 1962), 48.
1 5 S e e M a l o n e , J effe r s o n a n d t h e O r d e a l of L i b e r t y , e s p . 6 8 - 7 5 ; D e c o n d e , E n t a n g l i n g A l l i a n c e , 87--91; 186--<}7; and Charles Marion Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793: A Study in Cabinet Government (New York: AMS Press, 1967), chap. 1.
1 6 See DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 284-85; Harry Ammon, The Genet Mission (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 141-45; and Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994).
.
? ? Revolution and War
These events accelerated the polarization between Federalists and Re- publicans. Jefferson and his associates saw U. S. neutrality as de facto sup- port for England and suspected the Federalists of seeking to establish a monarchy. 17 Hamilton and the Federalists were alarmed by the Republicans' pro-French sympathies, the surge of popular support for France, and Genet's overt attempts to encourage and exploit these sentiments. Thus, while Republicans brooded over "Anglomane" plans to subvert the Consti- tution and establish a monarchy, Federalists feared a Republican plot to em- broil the United States in a war with England and establish a "popular
? democracy" in league with France. 18
Ironically, the decision to remain neutral did not prevent Anglo-American relations from approaching war the following year. The central issue was a conflict over maritime policy, the catalyst being the English Order-in-Coun- cil of November 6, 1793, imposing a blockade over the French West Indies. The Royal Navy's policy of halting U. S. vessels in order to impress former English citizens intensified anti-British feeling, and confrontations between English and U. S. forces along the northwestern frontier further complicated Anglo-American relations. 19 Although London relaxed the November order in January, sympathy for France increased, and many Americans now be- lieved that a war with England was both likely and desirable. 20 Tensions rose higher when fears of a U. S. attack led English officials in Canada to
1 7 In May 1793, Jefferson described his domestic opponents as "zealous apostles of Eng- lish despotism" and France's enemies as "the confederacy of princes against liberty. " After resigning as secretary of state, he warned a friend, "There are in the U. 5. some characters of opposite principles . . . all of them hostile to France and looking to England as the staff of their hope. " Such men, he asserted, saw the Constitution "only as a stepping stone to monarchy. " Quoted in DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 56; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 317.
18 Hamilton regarded the Republicans as "deeply infected with those horrid principles of Jacobinism, which, proceeding from one excess to another, have made France a theater of blood. " He also suggested that their zeal for France was "intended by every art of misrepre- sentation and deception to be made the instruments first of controlling, finally of overturn- ing the Government of the Union. " The Federalists blamed Genet for the growth of
"Democratic Societies" during this period, which they mistakenly regarded as products of French subveFsion. Quoted in Buel, Securing the Revolution, 69; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 360, 456; and also see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, J 76o-1Boo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959'-64), 2:529-31.
1 9 I n the sprring o f 1794, Governor George Clinton o f New York reported that the British governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester, had told a gathering of Indian tribes that war was likely within a year. See Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, chap. 13; and Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 121-22.
20 The American minister in London, Edward Pinckney, was so certain that war was immi- nent that he requested permission to move his family to France. See Deconde, Entangling Al- liance, 99 n. 93, and 13o-31; and Ritcheson, Aftermath ofRevolution, 304-306.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
send troops to the Maumee rapids in March 1794, a step that placed the two nations on the verge of war. 21
The Federalists still believed that war with England would be a disaster for the United States, and President George Washington dispatched John Jay to London in a final effort to reach a negotiated settlement. The so-called Jay Treaty resolved most of the disputed issues (though not the question of impressment), but the Cabinet kept the terms of the treaty secret until the Senate had ratified it, in order to deflect Republican criticism. Despite its limitations, the treaty preserved peace between the United States and Great Britain and led to a final British withdrawal from U. S. territory. 22 The agree- ment also opened the way for the rapid expansion of U. S. commerce, par- ticularly in the Atlantic carrying trade, and the U.
