No More Learning

The work was finished in the spring of 560; Flamininus once more assembled the deputies of all the Greek communities at Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use ot the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only return for the kindness of the Romans, that they would within thirty days send to him the Italian captives who had been sold into Greece during the Hannibalic war. Then he evacuated the last fortresses in which Roman
were still stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along with the smaller forts dependent upon it in Euboea, and Acrocorinthus — thus practically giving the lie to the assertion of the Aetolians that Rome had inherited from Philip the "fetters" of Greece —and departed homeward with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.
It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly sentimentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans were entirely in earnest with the liberation of Greece ; and the reason why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so sorry a structure, is to be sought only in the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic nation. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and as the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons and the unlimited right of self- government ; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation made the liberation of Greece a possibility for the Romans ; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus himself. If the Romans are liable
44*
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
garrisons
Results.
chap, vill THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
443
to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular Flamininus who overcame the well-founded scruples of the senate, were hindered by the magic charm of the Hellenic name from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character of the Greek states of that period, and so allowed yet further freedom for the doings of communities which, owing to the impotent antipathies that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations, knew neither how to act nor how to keep quiet As things stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if
not to instigate, at least to permit, a political murder, because the Romans had resolved to withdraw their troops from Greece and, consequently, could not prevent the Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their remedy in the usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with Antiochus would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but tor the military blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin — for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious
generosity.
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
CHAPTER DC
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
Antlochtn In the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidae had *TM been worn since 531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great- great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He had, like
Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years of age, and had dis played sufficient energy and enterprise, especially in his first campaigns in the east, to warrant his being without too ludi crous impropriety addressed in courtly style as " the Great" He had succeeded—more, however, through the negligence of his opponents and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular, than through any ability of his own — in restoring in some degree the integrity of the monarchy, and in reuniting with his crown first the eastern satrapies of Media and Parthyene, and then the separate state which Achaeus had founded on this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to wrest from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of which he sorely felt, had, in the year of the battle of the Trasimene lake, met with a bloody repulse from Philopator at Raphia; and Antiochus had taken good care not to resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man—even though he were but an indolent one—occupied the Egyptian
105. throne. But, after Philopator's death (549), the right moment for crushing Egypt appeared to have arrived ; with that view Antiochus entered into concert with Philip, and had thrown himself upon Coele-Syria, while Philip attacked
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
445
the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed in
that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would make common cause with Philip against them — the course suggested by the position of affairs, as well as by the treaty
of alliance. But, not far-seeing enough to repel at once with all his energy any interference whatever by the Romans
in the affairs of the east, Antiochus thought that his best course was to take advantage of the subjugation of Philip by
the Romans (which might easily be foreseen), in order to secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwith standing the close relations of Rome with the court of Alexandria and her royal ward, the senate by no means intended to be in reality, what it was in name, his
" protector ; " firmly resolved to give itself no concern about Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of Hercules and the Hellespont, it allowed the great-king to take his course. He himself was not probably in earnest
with the conquest of Egypt proper—which was more easily talked of than achieved—but he contemplated the sub jugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another,
and at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and Palestine. The great victory, which he gained in 556 over 198. the Egyptian general Scopas at Mount Panium near the sources of the Jordan, not only gave him complete posses
sion of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt proper, but so alarmed the Egyptian guardians of the young king that, to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they sub mitted to a peace and sealed it by the betrothal of their ward to Cleopatra the daughter of Antiochus. When he had thus achieved his first object, he proceeded in the fol lowing year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalae, with a strong fleet of 100 decked and 100 open vessels to Asia Minor, to take possession of the districts that formerly
Difficulties Rome.
belonged to Egypt on the south and west coasts of Asia Minor—probably the Egyptian government had ceded these districts, which were de facto in the hands of Philip, to Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced all their foreign possessions in his favour — and to recover the Greeks of Asia Minor generally for his empire. At the same time a strong Syrian land-army assembled in Sardes.
This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans, w^o from the first ^ad ^d it down as a condition for Philip that he should withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and should leave to the Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory and to the free cities their former constitution unimpaired, and who had now to look on while Antiochus took posses sion of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the Rhodians found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus with precisely the same danger as had driven them a few years before into the war with Philip ; and they naturally sought to involve the Romans in this war as well as in that
446
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
199-198. which had just terminated. Already in 555—6 Attalus had requested from the Romans military aid against Antiochus, who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic Rhodians even declared to king Antiochus, when in the
197. spring of 557 his fleet appeared off the coast of Asia Minor, that they would regard its passing beyond the Chelidonian islands (off the Lycian coast) as a declaration of war ; and, when Antiochus did not regard the threat, they, emboldened
by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle at Cynoscephalae, had immediately begun the war and had
actually protected from the king the most important of the Carian cities, Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the island of Samos. Most of the half-free cities had submitted to Antiochus, but some of them, more especially the important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and Lamp- sacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
447
taken courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent entreaties were combined with those of the Rhodians.
It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was at all capable of forming a resolution and adhering to had already made up his mind not only to attach to his empire the Egyptian possessions Asia, but also to make conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, not to seek on that account war with Rome, at any rate to risk The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that request of their allies, and to interfere directly Asia; but they showed little inclination to do so. They not only delayed as long as the Macedonian war lasted, and gave to Attalus nothing but the protection of diplomatic inter cession, which, we may add, proved in the first instance effective; but even after the victory, while they doubtless spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of Ptolemy and Philip ought not to be taken possession of Antiochus, and while the freedom of the Asiatic cities, Myrina, Abydus, Lampsacus,1 and Cius, figured in Roman documents, they took not the smallest step to give effect to
and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable
According to a recently discovered decree of the town of Lampsacus (Mitth. dts arch. Inst, in Athen, vi. 95) the Lampsacenes after the defeat of Philip sent envoys to the Roman senate with the request that the town might be embraced in the treaty concluded between Rome and (Philip) the king (Sirtot cvimptXriQBwim [tr reuf avrOJKOti] raft ytvotUrais 'Pwfialott rpis ti)c [fkuriXia]), which the senate, at least according to the view of the petitioners, granted to them and referred them, as regarded other matters, to Flamininus and the ten envoys. From the latter they then obtain in Corinth a guarantee of their constitution and letters to the kings. " Flamininus also gives to them similar letters of their contents we learn nothing more particular, than that in the decree the embassy is described as successful. But the senate and Flamininus had formally and positively guaranteed the autonomy and democracy of the Lampsacenes, the decree would hardly dwell so much at length on the courteous answers, which the Roman commanders, who had been appealed to on the way for their intercession with the senate, gave to the envoys. " "
Other remarkable points in this document are the brotherhood of the Lampsacenes and the Romans, certainly going back to the Trojan legend, and the mediation, invoked by the former with success, of the allies and friends of Rome, the Massiliots, who were connected with the Lampsacenes through their common mother-city Phocaea.
if
;
'
if in
1 it,
by
it.
it,
a
in
448
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons to introduce his own. In fact, they even went so far as to submit to his landing in Europe in the spring
196. of 558 and invading the Thracian Chersonese, where he occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a considerable time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had selected as his chief place of arms and as the capital of the newly-instituted satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who was entrusted with the conduct of these affairs, sent to the king at Lysimachia envoys, who talked of the integrity of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom of all the Hellenes ; but nothing came out of it The king talked in turn of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom of Lysimachus conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, ex plained that he was employed not in making territorial acquisitions but only in preserving the integrity of his hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention of the Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in Asia Minor. With justice he could add that peace had already been concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans were thus far deprived of any formal pretext for interfering. 1 The sudden return of the king to Asia occasioned by a false report of the death of the young king of Egypt, and the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the confer ences without coming to any conclusion, still less producing
195. any result. In the following year, 559, Antiochus returned to Lysimachia with his fleet and army reinforced, and employed himself in organizing the new satrapy which he
1 The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of the 198. Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in con
nection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. Syr. 3, and with the 193. actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond a doubt that the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt was in this case
formally uncalled for.
chap, xi THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
449
destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had been obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus;
and the singularly honourable reception accorded to the exile was virtually a declaration of war against Rome. Nevertheless Flamininus in the spring of 560 withdrew all 194. the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was under the existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not a criminal acting in opposition to his own better knowledge ;
for we cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to carry home with him the undiminished glory of having wholly terminated the war and liberated Hellas, contented himself with superficially covering up for the moment the smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced any attempt to bring Greece directly under the dominion of the Romans, and any intervention of the Romans in Asiatic affairs, to be a political blunder ; but the opposition fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance of the Asiatic king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of the bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the west in arms against Rome —all these were clear signs of
the approach of a fresh rising in arms on the part of the Hellenic east, which could not but have for its aim at least to transfer Greece from the clientship of Rome to that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if this object should be attained, would immediately extend the circle of its operations. It is plain that Rome could not allow this to take place. When Flamininus, ignoring all these sure indications of war, withdrew the garrisons from Greece,
and yet at the same time made demands on the king of Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to support, he overdid his part in words as much as *»» fell short in action, and forgot his duty as a general and aa a citizen in the indulgence of his personal vanity — a
vanity, which wished to confer, and imagined that it had vol. 11 61
Prepara tions of Antiochos for war with Rome.
198.
conferred, peace on Rome and freedom on the Greeks of both continents.
Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strength ening his position at home and his relations with his neighbours before beginning the war, on which for his part he was resolved, and became all the more so, the more the enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now (561) gave his daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage to the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time promised to restore the provinces wrested from his son-in- law, was afterwards affirmed on the part of Egypt, but probably without warrant ; at any rate the land remained actually attached to the Syrian kingdom. 1 He offered to
45°
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
197. restore to Eumenes, who had in 557 succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from him, and to give him also one of his daughters in marriage, if he would abandon the Roman alliance. In like manner he bestowed a daughter on Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gained the Galatians by presents, while he reduced by arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt, and other small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king declared that he would permit the independence of the old free cities such as Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would be content in the case of the others with a mere formal recognition of his sovereignty ; he even gave them to under stand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on the Aetolians, and he hoped to induce Philip again to take
1 For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. 1), which the sequel of the history of Judaea completely confirms ; Eusebius (p. 117, Mai) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly find
187. that about 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at Alex andria (Joseph, xii. 4, 7) ; but this doubtless took place without detriment to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of Cleopatra con stituted a charge on those revenues ; and from this very circumstance presumably arose the subsequent dispute.
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
451
up arms. In fact, a plan of Hannibal obtained the royal approval, according to which he was to receive from Antiochus a fleet of 100 sail and a land army of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was to employ them in kindling first a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a second Hannibalic war in Italy ; Tyrian emissaries pro ceeded to Carthage to pave the way for a rising in arms there 380). Finally, good results were anticipated from the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal left Carthage, was at its height (p. 390).
While the storm was thus gathering from far and wide Aetolian against Rome, was on this, as on all occasions, the Hel- "JJH*^? " lenes implicated in the enterprise, who were of the least Rome, moment, and yet took action of the greatest importance
and with the utmost impatience. The exasperated and arrogant Aetolians began by degrees to persuade them
selves that Philip had been vanquished by them and not
by the Romans, and could not even wait till Antiochus
should advance into Greece. Their policy character
istically expressed in the reply, which their strategus gave
soon afterwards to Flamininus, when he requested copy
of the declaration of war against Rome that he would
deliver to him in person, when the Aetolian army should
encamp on the Tiber. The Aetolians acted as the agents
of the Syrian king in Greece and deceived both parties,
to the king that all the Hellenes were waiting with open arms to receive him as their true deliverer, and telling those in Greece who were
disposed to listen to them that the landing of the king was nearer than was reality. Thus they actually succeeded inducing the simple obstinacy of Nabis to break loose and to rekindle in Greece the flame of war two years after Flamininus's departure, in the spring of
by representing
but in doing so they missed their aim. Nabis 192. attacked Gythium, one of the towns of the free Laconians
562
;
in
by
it
it in
it
(p.
:
is
a
45a
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
that by the last treaty had been annexed to the Achaean league, and took it ; but the experienced strategus of the Achaeans, Philopoemen, defeated him at the Barbos- thenian mountains, and the tyrant brought back barely a fourth part of his army to his capital, in which Philo poemen shut him up. As such a commencement was no sufficient inducement for Antiochus to come to Europe, the Aetolians resolved to possess themselves of Sparta, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and by gaining these important towns to prevail upon the king to embark. In the first place they thought to become masters of Sparta, by arranging that the Aetolian Alexamenus should march with iooo men into the town under pretext of bringing a contingent in terms of the alliance, and should embrace the opportunity of making away with Nabis and of occupying the town. This was done, and Nabis was killed at a review of the troops; but, when the Aetolians dispersed to plunder the town, the Lacedaemonians found time to rally and slew them to the last man. The city was then induced by Philopoemen to join the Achaean
league. After this laudable project of the Aetolians had thus not only deservedly failed, but had had precisely the opposite effect of uniting almost the whole Peloponnesus in the hands of the other party, it fared little better with them at Chalcis, for the Roman party there called in the citizens of Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, who were favourable to Rome, to render seasonable aid
against the Aetolians and the Chalcidian exiles. On the other hand the occupation of Demetrias was successful, for the
Magnetes to whom the city had been assigned were, not without reason, apprehensive that it had been promised by the Romans to Philip as a prize in return for his aid against Antiochus ; several squadrons of Aetolian horse moreover managed to steal into the town under the pretext of forming an escort for Eurylochus, the recalled
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
453
head of the opposition to Rome. Thus the Magnetes passed over, partly of their own accord, partly by com pulsion, to the side of the Aetolians, and the latter did not fail to make use of the fact at the court of the Seleucid.
Antiochus took his resolutioa A rupture with Rome, Rupture
in spite of endeavours to postpone it by the diplomatic palliative of embassies, could no longer be avoided. As early as the spring of 561 Flamininus, who continued to have the decisive voice in the senate as to eastern affairs, had expressed the Roman ultimatum to the envoys of the king, Menippus and Hegesianax; viz. that he should either evacuate Europe and dispose of Asia at his pleasure, or retain Thrace and submit to the Roman protectorate over Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria Troas. These demands had been again discussed at
Airtfoctau) "nd *•
^^
the chief place of arms and fixed quarters of
the king in Asia Minor, in the spring of 562, between Antiochus and the envoys of the senate, Publius Sulpicius
and Publius Villius ; and they had separated with the conviction on both sides that a peaceful settlement was
no longer possible. Thenceforth war was resolved on
in Rome. In that very summer of 562 a Roman fleet 192. of 30 sail, with 3000 soldiers on board, under Aulus Atilius Serranus, appeared off Gythium, where their arrival accelerated the conclusion of the treaty between the Achaeans and Spartans ; the eastern coasts of Sicily and Italy were strongly garrisoned, so as to be secure against
any attempts at a landing ; a land army was expected in Greece in the autumn. Since the spring of 562 Flami- 192. ninus, by direction of the senate, had journeyed through Greece to thwart the intrigues of the opposite party, and
to counteract as far as possible the evil effects of the ill-
timed evacuation of the country. The Aetolians had already gone so far as formally to declare war in their
Ephesus,
192.
454 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book in
diet against Rome. But Flamininus succeeded in saving Chalcis for the Romans by throwing into it a garrison of 500 Achaeans and 500 Pergamenes. He made an attempt also to recover Demetrias; and the Magnetes wavered. Though some towns in Asia Minor, which Antiochus had proposed to subdue before beginning the great war, still held out, he could now no longer delay his landing, unless he
was willing to let the Romans recover all the advantages which they had surrendered two years before by with drawing their garrisons from Greece. He collected the vessels and troops which were at hand — he had but 40 decked vessels and 10,000 infantry, along with 500 horse and 6 elephants—and started from the Thracian Chersonese
102. for Greece, where he landed in the autumn
Pteleum on the Pagasaean gulf, and immediately occupied the adjoining Demetrias. Nearly about the same time a Roman army of some 25,000 men under the praetor Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia. The war was thus begun on both sides.
Attitude of
powers. Carthage
Hannibal.
Everything depended on the extent to which that com- prehensively - planned coalition against Rome, of which Antiochus came forward as the head, might be realized As to the plan, first of all, of stirring up enemies to the Romans in Carthage and Italy, it was the fate of Hannibal at the court of Ephesus, as through his whole career, to have projected his noble and high-spirited plans for the behoof of people pedantic and mean. Nothing was done towards their execution, except that some Cartha
ginian patriots were compromised; no choice was left to the Carthaginians but to show unconditional submission to Rome. The camarilla would have nothing to do with Hannibal—such a man was too inconveniently great for court cabals; and, after having tried all sorts of absurd expedients, such as accusing the general, with whose name the Romans frightened their children, of concert with the
of 562 at
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
455
Roman envoys, they succeeded in persuading Antiochus the Great, who like all insignificant monarchs plumed himself greatly on his independence and was influenced by nothing so easily as by the fear of being ruled, into the wise belief that he ought not to allow himself to be thrown into the shade by so celebrated a man. Accordingly it was in solemn council resolved that the Phoenician should be employed in future only for subordinate enter prises and for giving advice — with the reservation, of course, that the advice should never be followed. Hannibal revenged himself on the rabble, by accepting every commission and brilliantly executing all.
In Asia Cappadocia adhered to the great-king ; Prusias States of of Bithynia on the other hand took, as always, the side of j^0T the stronger. King Eumenes remained faithful to the old
policy of his house, which was now at length to yield to
him its true fruit He had not only persistently refused
the offers of Antiochus, but had constantly urged the
Romans to a war, from which he expected the aggrandize
ment of his kingdom. The Rhodians and
likewise joined their old allies. Egypt too took the side of
Rome and offered support in supplies and men ; which, however, the Romans did not accept
In Europe the result mainly depended on the position Mace-
onu*
which Philip of Macedonia would take up. It would have been perhaps the right policy for him, notwithstanding all
the injuries or shortcomings of the past, to unite with Antiochus. But Philip was ordinarily influenced not by such considerations, but by his likings and dislikings ; and his hatred was naturally directed much more against the faithless ally, who had left him to contend alone with the common enemy, had sought merely to seize his own share in the spoil, and had become a burdensome neighbour to him in Thrace, than against the conqueror, who had treated him respectfully and honourably. Antiochus had,
Byzantines
Greek
moreover, given deep offence to the hot temper of Philip by the setting up of absurd pretenders to the Macedonian crown, and by the ostentatious burial of the Macedonian bones bleaching at Cynoscephalae. Philip therefore placed his whole force with cordial zeal at the disposal of the Romans.
The second power of Greece, the Achaean league, adhered no less decidedly than the first to the alliance with Rome. Of the smaller powers, the Thessalians and the Athenians held by Rome; among the latter an Achaean garrison introduced by Flamininus into the citadel brought
the patriotic party, which was pretty strong, to reason. The Epirots exerted themselves to keep on good terms, if
Antiochus fa Greece.
456
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
with both parties. Thus, in addition to the Aetolians and the Magnetes who were joined by a portion of the neighbouring Perrhaebians, Antiochus was supported only by Amynander, the weak king of the Athamanes, who allowed himself to be dazzled by foolish designs on the Macedonian crown ; by the Boeotians, among whom the party opposed to Rome was still at the helm ; and in the Peloponnesus by the Eleans and Messenians, who were in the habit of taking part with the Aetolians against the Achaeans. This was indeed a hopeful beginning ; and the title of commander-in-chief with absolute power, which the Aetolians decreed to the great-king, seemed insult added to injury. There had been, just as usual, deception on both sides. Instead of the countless hordes of Asia, the king brought up a force scarcely half as strong as an ordinary consular army; and instead of the open arms with which all the Hellenes were to welcome their deliverer from the Roman yoke, one or two bands of klephts and some dissolute civic communities offered to the brotherhood in arms.
For the moment, indeed, Antiochus had anticipated the Romans in Greece proper. Chalcis was garrisoned by the
possible,
king
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
457
Greek allies of the Romans, and refused the first summons ;
but the fortress surrendered when Antiochus advanced
with all his force; and a Roman division, which arrived
too late to occupy was annihilated Antiochus at
Delium. Euboea was thus lost to the Romans. Antiochus
still made even in winter an attempt, in concert with the Aetolians and Athamanes, to gain Thessaly Thermopylae
was occupied, Pherae and other towns were taken, but
Appius Claudius came up with 2000 men from Apollonia, relieved Larisa, and took up his position there. Antiochus,
tired of the winter campaign, preferred to return to his pleasant quarters at Chalcis, where the time was spent
merrily, and the king even, in spite of his fifty years and
his warlike schemes, wedded fair Chalcidian. So the
winter of 562-3 passed, without Antiochus doing much 192-191. more than sending letters hither and thither through
Greece he waged the war— Roman officer remarked — means of pen and ink.
In the beginning of spring 563 the Roman staff arrived 191.
at Apollonia. The commander-in-chief was Marius Acilius £f^n* Glabrio, man of humble origin, but an able general feared Roman*, both by his soldiers and the enemy; the admiral was
Gaius Livius; and among the military tribunes were Marcus Porcius Cato, the conqueror of Spain, and Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who after the old Roman wont did not
disdain, although they had been consuls, to re-enter the army as simple war-tribunes. They brought with them rein forcements in ships and men, including Numidian cavalry and Libyan elephants sent Massinissa, and the permission of the senate to accept auxiliary troops to the number of 5000 from the extra-Italian allies, so that the whole number of the Roman forces was raised to about 40,000 men. The king, who in the beginning of spring had gone to the Aetolians and had thence made an aimless expedition to Acarnania, on the news of Glabrio's landing returned to his
by
by
a
by
:
a
a
;
by
it,
Battle at Thermo pylae.
head-quarters to begin the campaign in earnest. But incom prehensibly, through his own negligence and that of his lieutenants in Asia, reinforcements had wholly failed to reach him, so that he had nothing but the weak army—now further decimated by sickness and desertion in its dissolute winter-quarters —with which he had landed at Pteleum in the autumn of the previous year. The Aetolians too, who had professed to send such enormous numbers into the field, now, when their support was of moment, brought to their commander-in-chief no more than 4000 men. The Roman troops had already begun operations in Thessaly, where the vanguard in concert with the Macedonian army drove the garrisons of Antiochus out of the Thessalian towns and occupied the territory of the Athamanes. The consul with the main army followed ; the whole force of the Romans assembled at Larisa.
Instead of returning with all speed to Asia and evacuat ing the field before an enemy in every respect superior, Antiochus resolved to entrench himself at Thermopylae, which he had occupied, and there to await the arrival of the great army from Asia. He himself took up a position in the chief pass, and commanded the Aetolians to occupy the mountain-path, by which Xerxes had formerly succeeded in turning the Spartans. But only half of the Aetolian contin gent was pleased to comply with this order of the com mander-in-chief; the other 2000 men threw themselves into the neighbouring town of Heraclea, where they took no other part in the battle than that of attempting during its progress to surprise and plunder the Roman camp. Even the Aetolians posted on the heights discharged their duty of watching with remissness and reluctance ; their post on the Callidromus allowed itself to be surprised by Cato, and
the Asiatic phalanx, which the consul had meanwhile assailed in front, dispersed, when the Romans hastening down the mountain fell upon its flank. As Antiochus had made no
458
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
459
provision for any case and had not thought of retreat, the army was destroyed partly on the field of battle, partly during its flight; with difficulty a small band reached Demetrias, and the king himself escaped to Chalcis with 500 men. He embarked in haste for Ephesus ; Europe was lost to him all but his possessions in Thrace, and even the fortresses could be no longer defended. Chalcis sur- rendered to the Romans, and Demetrias to Philip, who received permission —as a compensation for the conquest of the town of Lamia in Achaia Phthiotis, which he was on the point of accomplishing and had then abandoned by orders of the consul —to make himself master of all the communities that had gone over to Antiochus in Thessaly proper, and even of the territories bordering on Aetolia, the districts of Dolopia and Aperantia. All the Greeks that had pronounced in favour of Antiochus hastened to make their peace ; the Epirots humbly besought pardon for their ambiguous conduct, the Boeotians surrendered at discretion, the Eleans and Messenians, the latter after some struggle, submitted to the Achaeans. The prediction of Hannibal to the king was fulfilled, that no dependence at all could be placed upon the Greeks, who would submit to any con queror. Even the Aetolians, when their corps shut up in Heraclea had been compelled after obstinate resistance to capitulate, attempted to make their peace with the sorely
Romans ; but the stringent demands of the Roman consul, and a consignment of money seasonably arriving from Antiochus, emboldened them once more to break off the negotiations and to sustain for two whole months a siege in Naupactus. The town was already reduced to extremities, and its capture or capitulation could not have been long delayed, when Flamininus, constantly striving to save every Hellenic community from the worst consequences of its own folly and from the severity of his ruder colleagues, interposed and arranged in the first
Greece
^the Roman*
provoked
Resistance °f *•
Maritime
prepare- tions for
crossincr to Ajh,
instance an armistice on tolerable terms. This terminated, at least for the moment, armed resistance in Greece.
A more serious war was impending in Asia — a war which appeared of a very hazardous character on account not So much of the enemy as of the great distance and the insecurity of the communications with home, while yet, owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of Antiochus, the struggle could not well be terminated otherwise than by an attack on the enemy in his own country. The first object was to secure the sea. The Roman fleet, which during the campaign in Greece was charged with the task of interrupt
ing the communication between Greece and Asia Minor, and which had been successful about the time of the battle at Thermopylae in seizing a strong Asiatic transport fleet near Andros, was thenceforth employed in making prepara tions for the crossing of the Romans to Asia next year and first of all in driving the enemy's fleet out of the Aegean Sea. It lay in the harbour of Cyssus on the southern shore of the tongue of land that projects from Ionia towards Chios ; thither in search of it the Roman fleet proceeded, consisting of 75 Roman, 24 Pergamene, and 6 Cartha ginian, decked vessels under the command of Gaius Livius. The Syrian admiral, Polyxenidas, a Rhodian emigrant, had only 70 decked vessels to oppose to it ; but, as the Roman fleet still expected the ships of Rhodes, and as Polyxenidas relied on the superior seaworthiness of his vessels, those of Tyre and Sidon in particular, he immediately accepted battle. At the outset the Asiatics succeeded in sinking one of the Carthaginian vessels; but, when they came to grapple, Roman valour prevailed, and it was owing solely to the swiftness of their rowing and sailing that the enemy lost no more than 23 ships. During the pursuit the Roman fleet was joined by 25 ships from Rhodes, and the superiority of the Romans in those waters was now doubly assured. The enemy's fleet thenceforth kept the shelter of
460
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
461
the harbour of Ephesus, and, as it could not be induced to risk a second battle, the fleet of the Romans and allies broke up for the winter ; the Roman ships of war proceeded to the harbour of Cane in the neighbourhood of Pergamus.
Both parties were busy during the winter in preparing for the next campaign. The Romans sought to gain over the Greeks of Asia Minor; Smyrna, which had persever- ingly resisted all the attempts of the king to get possession of the city, received the Romans with open arms, and the Roman party gained the ascendency in Samos, Chios,
Clazomenae, Phocaea, Cyme, and elsewhere. Antiochus was resolved, if possible, to prevent the Romans from crossing to Asia, and with that view he made zealous naval preparations —employing Polyxenidas to fit out and augment the fleet stationed at Ephesus, and Hannibal to equip a new fleet in Lycia, Syria, and Phoenicia ; while he further collected in Asia Minor a powerful land army from
all regions of his extensive empire. Early next year (564) 19flL the Roman fleet resumed its operations. Gaius Livius left
the Rhodian fleet —which had appeared in good time this year, numbering 36 sail — to observe that of the enemy in
the offing of Ephesus, and went with the greater portion of
the Roman and Pergamene vessels to the Hellespont in
Erythrae,
accordance with his instructions, to pave the way for the passage of the land army by the capture of the fortresses there. Sestus was already occupied and Abydus reduced to extremities, when the news of the defeat of the Rhodian fleet recalled him. The Rhodian admiral Pausistratus, lulled into security by the representations of his countryman that he wished to desert from Antiochus, had allowed himself to be surprised in the harbour of Samos ; he him self fell, and all his vessels were destroyed except five
Rhodian and two Coan ships ; Samos, Phocaea, and Cyme on hearing the news went over to Seleucus, who held the chief command by land in those provinces for his father.
Polyxenl-
j^^^^ tm.
462
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
But when the Roman fleet arrived partly from Cane, partly from the Hellespont, and was after some time joined by twenty new ships of the Rhodians at Samos, Polyxenidas was once more compelled to shut himself up in the harbour of Ephesus. As he declined the offered naval battle, and as, owing to the small numbers of the Roman force, an attack by land was not to be thought of, nothing remained for the Roman fleet but to take up its position in like manner at Samos. A division meanwhile proceeded to Patara on the Lycian coast, partly to relieve the Rhodians from the very troublesome attacks that were directed against them from that quarter, partly and chiefly to prevent the hostile fleet, which Hannibal was expected to bring up, from entering the Aegean Sea. When the squadron sent against Patara achieved nothing, the new admiral Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who had arrived with 20 war-vessels from Rome and had relieved Gaius Livius at Samos, was so indignant that he proceeded thither with the whole fleet ; his officers with difficulty succeeded, while they were on their voyage, in making him understand that the primary object was not the conquest of Patara but the command of the Aegean Sea, and in inducing him to return to Samos. On the mainland of Asia Minor Seleucus had in the meanwhile begun the siege of Pergamus, while Antiochus with his chief army ravaged the Pergamene territory and the possessions of the Mytilenaeans on the mainland ; they hoped to crush the hated Attalids, before Roman aid appeared. The Roman fleet went to Elaea and the port of Adramytium to help their ally; but, as the admiral wanted troops, he accomplished nothing.
Pergamus seemed lost ; but the laxity and negligence with which the siege was conducted allowed Eumenes to throw into the city Achaean auxiliaries under Diophanes, whose bold and successful sallies compelled the Gallic mercenaries, whom Antiochus had entrusted with the siege, to raise it
chap, w THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
463
In the southern waters too the projects of Antiochus were Engage frustrated. The fleet equipped and led by Hannibal, after ment off
having been long detained by the constant westerly winds, attempted at length to reach the Aegean; but at the
Aspendua,
mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in Pamphylia, it encountered a Rhodian squadron under Eudamus ; and in the battle, which ensued between the two fleets, the ex cellence of the Rhodian ships and naval officers carried the victory over Hannibal's tactics and his numerical supe riority. It was the first naval battle, and the last battle against Rome, fought by the great Carthaginian. The victorious Rhodian fleet then took its station at Patara, and there prevented the intended junction of the two Asiatic fleets. In the Aegean Sea the Romano- Rhodian fleet at Samos, after being weakened by detaching the Pergamene ships to the Hellespont to support the land
army which had arrived there, was in its turn attacked by
that of Polyxenidas, who now numbered nine sail more
than his opponents. On December 23 of the uncorrected Battle of calendar, according to the corrected calendar about the ne^? " end of August, in 564, a battle took place at the promon- 190.
tory of Myonnesus between Teos and Colophon; the
Romans broke through the line of the enemy, and totally surrounded the left wing, so that they took or sank 42
ships. An inscription in Saturnian verse over the temple
of the Lares Permarini, which was built in the Campus
Martius in memory of this victory, for many centuries thereafter proclaimed to the Romans how the fleet of the
Asiatics had been defeated before the eyes of king Antiochus and of all his land army, and how the Romans
thus "settled the mighty strife and subdued the kings. " Thenceforth the enemy's ships no longer ventured to show themselves on the open sea, and made no further attempt
to obstruct the crossing of the Roman land army.
The conqueror of Zama had been selected at Rome to
THE WAR WITH ANTlOCHUS OF ASIA book lit Expedition conduct the war on the Asiatic continent ; he practically
to Asia.
464
exercised the supreme command for the nominal com mander-in-chief, his brother Lucius Scipio, whose intellect was insignificant, and who had no military capacity. The reserve hitherto stationed in Lower Italy was destined for Greece, the army of Glabrio for Asia: when it became known who was to command 5000 veterans from the Hannibalic war voluntarily enrolled, to fight once more under their beloved leader. In the Roman July, but according to the true time in March, the Scipios arrived at the army to commence the Asiatic campaign but tbey were disagreeably surprised to find themselves instead in volved, in the first instance, in an endless struggle with the desperate Aetolians. The senate, finding that Flamininus pushed his boundless consideration for the Hellenes too far, had left the Aetolians to choose between paying an
exorbitant war contribution and unconditional surrender, and thus had driven them anew to arms none could tell when this warfare among mountains and strong holds would come to an end. Scipio got rid of the convenient obstacle concerting six-months' armistice, and then entered on his march to Asia. As the one fleet of the enemy was only blockaded in the Aegean Sea, and the other, which was coming up from the south, might daily arrive there in spite of the squadron charged to inter cept seemed advisable to take the land route through Macedonia and Thrace and to cross the Hellespont In that direction no real obstacles were to be anticipated for Philip of Macedonia might be entirely depended on, Prusias king of Bithynia was in alliance with the Romans, and the Roman fleet could easily establish itself in the straits. The long and weary march along the coast of Macedonia and Thrace was accomplished without material loss Philip made provision on the one hand for supplying their wants, on the other for their friendly reception the
utterly
by
;
; in
;
it, it
by
a
;
it,
chap, « THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
465
Thracian barbarians. They had lost so much time how ever, partly with the Aetolians, partly on the march, that the army only reached the Thracian Chersonese about the time of the battle of Myonnesus. But the marvellous good fortune of Scipio now in Asia, as formerly in Spain and Africa, cleared his path of all difficulties.
On the news of the battle at Myonnesus Antiochus so Passage completely lost his judgment, that in Europe he caused Hellespont the strongly-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress of by the
Lysimachia to be evacuated by the garrison and by the inhabitants who were faithfully devoted to the restorer of their city, and withal even forgot to withdraw in like manner the garrisons or to destroy the rich magazines at Aenus and Maronea ; and on the Asiatic coast he opposed not the slightest resistance to the landing of the Romans, but on the contrary, while it was taking place, spent his time at Sardes in upbraiding destiny. It is scarcely doubt ful that, had he but provided for the defence of Lysimachia down to the no longer distant close of the summer, and moved forward his great army to the Hellespont, Scipio would have been compelled to take up winter quarters on
the European shore, in a position far from being, in a military or political point of view, secure.
While the Romans, after disembarking on the Asiatic shore, paused for some days to refresh themselves and to await their leader who was detained behind by religious duties, ambassadors from the great-king arrived in their camp to negotiate for peace. Antiochus offered half the expenses of the war, and the cession of his European possessions as well as of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor that had gone over to Rome; but Scipio demanded the whole costs of the war and the surrender of all Asia Minor. The former terms, he declared, might have been accepted, had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the European side of the Hellespont ; but they did not suffice
vol n, t
omans*
466
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
now, when the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The attempts of the great -king to purchase peace from his antagonist after the Oriental manner by sums of money— he offered the half of his year's revenues ! —failed as they deserved; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the great-king with the friendly advice to make peace on any terms. This was not in reality necessary : had the king possessed the resolution to prolong the war and to draw the enemy after him by retreating into the interior, a favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But
Antiochus, irritated by the presumably intentional arrogance of his antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and consistent warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to expose his unwieldy, but unequal, and undisciplined mass
of an army to the shock of the Roman legions.
In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot
0j \fount Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman
190. fell in with the enemy late in the autumn of 564. The
force of Antiochus numbered close on 80,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry ; the Romans —who had along with them about 5000 Achaeans, Pergamenes, and Mace donian volunteers — had not nearly half that number, but they were so sure of victory, that they did not even wait for the recovery of their general who had remained behind sick at Elaea ; Gnaeus Domitius took the command in his stead. Antiochus, in order to be able even to place his immense mass of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were placed the mass of the light troops, the peltasts, bowmen, slingers, the mounted archers of Mysians, Dahae, and Elymaeans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and the scythe- chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the Cataphractae, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the flanks; next to these, in the intermediate division, the Gallic and Cappadocian infantry ; and in the very centre
Battle of Magnesia.
troops
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
467
the phalanx armed after the Macedonian fashion, 16,000 strong, the flower of the army, which, however, had not room in the narrow space and had to be drawn up in double files 32 deep. In the space between the two divisions were placed 54 elephants, distributed between the bands of the phalanx and of the heavy cavalry. The Romans stationed but a few squadrons on the left wing, where the river gave protection ; the mass of the cavalry and all the light armed were placed on the right, which was led by Eumenes; the legions stood in the centre. Eumenes began the battle by despatching his archers and slingers against the scythe-chariots with orders to shoot at the teams ; in a short time not only were these thrown into disorder, but the camel-riders stationed next to them were also carried away, and even in the second division the left wing of heavy cavalry placed behind fell into confusion. Eumenes now threw himself with all the Roman cavalry, numbering 3000 horse, on the mercenary infantry , which was placed in the second division between the phalanx and the left wing of heavy cavalry, and, when these gave way, the cuirassiers who had already fallen into disorder also fled. The phalanx, which had just allowed the light troops to pass through and was preparing to advance
the Roman legions, was hampered by the attack of the cavalry in flank, and compelled to stand still and to form front on both sides—a movement which the depth of its disposition favoured. Had the heavy Asiatic cavalry been at hand, the battle might have been restored ; but the left wing was shattered, and the right, led by Antiochus in person, had driven before it the little division of Roman cavalry opposed to and had reached the Roman camp, which was with great difficulty defended from its attack. In this way the cavalry were at the decisive moment absent
from the scene of action. The Romans were careful not to assail the phalanx with their legions, but sent against the
against
it
it,
Conclusion
archers and slingers, not one of whose missiles failed to take effect on the densely-crowded mass. The phalanx neverthe less retired slowly and in good order, till the elephants stationed in the interstices became frightened and broke the ranks. Then the whole army dispersed in tumultuous flight ; an attempt to hold the camp failed, and only increased the number of the dead and the prisoners. The estimate of the loss of Antiochus at 50,000 men considering the infinite confusion, not incredible the legions of the Romans had never been engaged, and the victory, which gave them third continent, cost them 24 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers. Asia Minor submitted including even Ephesus, whence the admiral had hastily to withdraw his fleet, and
Sardes the residence of the court.
The king sued for peace and consented to the terms
proposed by the Romans, which, as usual, were just the same as those offered before the battle and consequently included the cession of Asia Minor. Till they were ratified, the army remained in Asia Minor at the expense of the king which came to cost him not less than 3000 talents (,£730,000). Antiochus himself in his careless fashion soon consoled himself for the loss of half his kingdom
was in keeping with his character, that he declared himself grateful to the Romans for saving him the trouble of governing too large an empire. But with the day of Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never perhaps did great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidae under this Antiochus the Great He himself
468
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK m
187. was soon afterwards (567) slain the indignant inhabit ants of Elymais at the head of the Persian gulf, on occasion of pillaging the temple of Bel, with the treasures of which he had sought to replenish his empty coffers.
The Roman government, after having achieved the victory, had to arrange the affairs of Asia Minor and of
by
is,
a
;
;
;
it a
;
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
469
Greece. If the Roman rule was here to be erected on a Expedition firm foundation, it was by no means enough that Antiochus J? "^,. should have renounced the supremacy in the west of Asia of Asia Minor. The circumstances of the political situation there Mtaor- have been set forth above 401 ff. ). The Greek free cities
on the Ionian and Aeolian coast, as well as the kingdom of Pergamus of substantially similar nature, were certainly the natural pillars of the new Roman supreme power, which here too came forward essentially as protector of the Hellenes kindred in race. But the dynasts in the interior of Asia Minor and on the north coast of the Black Sea had hardly yielded for long any serious obedience to the kings of Asia, and the treaty with Antiochus alone gave to the Romans no power over the interior. was indispensable to draw
certain line within which the Roman influence was hence forth to exercise control. Here the element of chief importance was the relation of the Asiatic Hellenes to the Celts who had been for century settled there. These had formally apportioned among them the regions of Asia Minor, and each one of the three cantons raised its fixed tribute from the territory laid under contribution. Doubt less the burgesses of Pergamus, under the vigorous guid ance of their presidents who had thereby become hereditary princes, had rid themselves of the unworthy yoke and the fair afterbloom of Hellenic art, which had recently emerged afresh from the soil, had grown out of these last Hellenic wars sustained national public spirit But was vigorous counterblow, not decisive success; again and again the Pergamenes had to defend with arms their urban peace against the raids of the wild hordes from the eastern mountains, and the great majority of the other Greek cities probably remained in their old state of dependence. 1
From the decree of Lampsacus mentioned at p. 447, appears pretty certain that the Lampsacenes requested from the Massiliots not merely intercession at Rome, but also intercession with the Tolistoagii (so the Celts, elsewhere named Tolistobogi, are designated in this document and in the
1
it
a
a
It
(p.
by a
; it
a
a
a
470
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book m
If the protectorate of Rome over the Hellenes was to be in Asia more than a name, an end had to be put to this tributary obligation of their new clients ; and, as the Roman policy at this time declined, much more even in Asia than on the Graeco-Macedonian peninsula, the possession of the country on its own behalf and the permanent occupation therewith connected, there was no course in fact left but to carry the arms of Rome up to the limit which was to be staked off for the domain of Rome's power, and effectively to inaugurate the new supremacy among the inhabitants of Asia Minor generally, and above all in the Celtic cantons.
This was done by the new Roman commander-in-chief, Gnaeus Manlius Volso, who relieved Lucius Scipio in Asia Minor. He was subjected to severe reproach on this score ; the men in the senate who were averse to the new turn of policy failed to see either the aim, or the pretext, for such a war. There is no warrant for the former objection, as directed against this movement in particular; it was on the con trary, after the Roman state had once interfered in Hellenic affairs as it had done, a necessary consequence of this
Whether it was the right course for Rome to undertake the protectorate over the Hellenes collectively, may certainly be called in question ; but regarded from the point of view which Flamininus and the majority led by him had now taken up, the overthrow of the Galatians was in fact a duty of prudence as well as of honour. Better founded was the objection that there was not at the time a proper ground of war against them ; for they had not been, strictly speaking, in alliance with Antiochus, but had only according to their wont allowed him to levy hired troops in their country. But on the other side there fell
Pergamene inscription, C. J. Gr. 3536,—the oldest monuments which mention them). Accordingly the Lampsacenes were probably still about the time of the war with Philip tributary to this canton (comp. Li*. xxxviii. 16).
policy.
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
471
the decisive consideration, that the sending of a Roman military force to Asia could only be demanded of the Roman burgesses under circumstances altogether extra ordinary, and, if once such an expedition was necessary, everything told in favour of carrying it out at once and
with the victorious army that was now stationed in Asia.
So, doubtless under the influence of Flamininus and of those who shared his views in the senate, the campaign
into the interior of Asia Minor was undertaken in the spring of 565. The consul started from Ephesus, levied 189. contributions from the towns and princes on the upper Maeander and in Pamphylia without measure, and then turned northwards against the Celts. Their western canton, the Tolistoagii, had retired with their belongings
to Mount Olympus, and the middle canton, the Tectosages, to Mount Magaba, in the hope that they would be able there to defend themselves till the winter should compel the strangers to withdraw. But the missiles of the Roman slingers and archers—which so often turned the scale against the Celts unacquainted with such weapons, almost as in more recent times firearms have turned the scale against savage tribes — forced the heights, and the Celts succumbed in a battle, such as had often its parallels before and after on the Po and on the Seine, but here appears as singular as the whole phenomenon of this northern race emerging amidst the Greek and Phrygian nations. The number of the slain was at both places enormous, and still greater that of the captives. The survivors escaped over the Halys to the third Celtic canton of the Trocmi, which the consul did not attack. That river was the limit at which the leaders of Roman policy at that time had resolved to halt. Phrygia, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia were to become de pendent on Rome; the regions lying farther to the east were left to themselves.
The affairs of Asia Minor were regulated partly by the
affairs of Minor.
Antiochus had to furnish hostages, one of whom was his younger son of the same name, and to pay a war-contribution —proportional in amount to the treasures of Asia—of 1 5,000 Euboic talents (^3, 600,000), a fifth of which was to be paid at once, and the remainder in twelve yearly instalments. He was called, moreover, to cede all the lands which he possessed in Europe and, in Asia Minor, all his possessions
and claims of right to the north of the range of the Taurus and to the west of the mouth of the Cestrus between Aspendus and Perga in Pamphylia, so that he retained nothing in Asia Minor but eastern Pamphylia and Cilicia. His protectorate over its kingdoms and principalities of course ceased. Asia, or, as the kingdom of the Seleucids was thenceforth usually and more appropriately named, Syria, lost the right of waging aggressive wars against the western states, and in the event of a defensive war, of acquiring territory from them on the conclusion of peace ; lost, moreover, the right of navigating the sea to the west of the mouth of the Calycadnus in Cilicia with vessels of war, except for the conveyance of envoys, hostages, or tribute; was further prevented from keeping more than ten decked vessels in all, except in the case of a defensive war, from taming war-elephants, and lastly from the levying of mercenaries in the western states, or receiving political refugees and deserters from them at court The war vessels which he possessed beyond the prescribed number, the elephants, and the political refugees who had sought shelter with him, he delivered up. By way of compensation the great-king received the title of a friend of the Roman commonwealth. The state of Syria was thus by land and sea completely and for ever dislodged from the west ; it is a significant indication of the feeble and loose organization of the kingdom of the Seleucidae, that it alone
472
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
189. peace with Antiochus (565), partly by the ordinances of a of'the*00" Roman commission presided over by the consul Volso.
chap, :x THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
473
of all the great states conquered by Rome never after the first conquest desired a second appeal to the decision of arms.
The two Armenias, hitherto at least nominally Asiatic Armenia, satrapies, became transformed, if not exactly in pursuance
with the Roman treaty of peace, yet under its influence
into independent kingdoms; and their holders, Artaxias and Zariadris, became founders of new dynasties.
Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, whose land lay beyond Cappa-
°
Prusias, king of Bithynia, retained his territory as it BUhynU, stood, and so did the Celts; but they were obliged to
In the western portion of Asia Minor the regulation of The free the territorial arrangements was not without difficulty, espe- <^ek cially as the dynastic policy of Eumenes there came into collision with that of the Greek Hansa. At last an un derstanding was arrived at to the following effect All the
Greek cities, which were free and had joined the Romans
on the day of the battle of Magnesia, had their liberties confirmed, and all of them, excepting those
tributary to Eumenes, were relieved from the payment of tribute to the different dynasts for the future. In this way
the towns of Dardanus and Ilium, whose ancient affinity with the Romans was traced to the times of Aeneas,
the boundary laid down by the Romans for their protector- ate, escaped with a money-fine of 600 talents (^146,000) ; which was afterwards, on the intercession of his son-in-law Eumenes, abated to half that sum.
that they would no longer send armed bands their bounds, and the disgraceful payments of
promise
beyond
tribute by the cities of Asia Minor came to an end. The Asiatic Greeks did not fail to repay the benefit — which was certainly felt as a general and permanent one — with golden chaplets and transcendental panegyrics.
free, along with Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenae, 'Erythrae, Chios, Colophon, Miletus, and other names of old renown. Phocaea also, which in spite of its capitula-
became
previously
474
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
tion had been plundered by the soldiers of the Roman fleet —although it did not fall under the category designated in
the treaty — received back by way of compensation its territory and its freedom. Most of the cities of the Graeco-Asiatic Hansa acquired additions of territory and other advantages. Rhodes of course received most con sideration; it obtained Lycia exclusive of Telmissus, and the greater part of Caria south of the Maeander ; besides, Antiochus guaranteed the property and the claims of the Rhodians within his kingdom, as well as the exemption from customs-dues which they had hitherto enjoyed.
All the rest, forming by far the largest share of the spoil,
Extension
kingdom of ^ to tne Attalids, whose ancient fidelity to Rome, as well Pergamus. as the hardships endured by Eumenes in the war and his
personal merit in connection with the issue of the decisive battle, were rewarded by Rome as no king ever rewarded his ally. Eumenes received, in Europe, the Chersonese with Lysimachia ; in Asia—in addition to Mysia which he already possessed —the provinces of Phrygia on the Hellespont, Lydia with Ephesus and Sardes, the northern district of Caria as far as the Maeander with Tralles and Magnesia, Great Phrygia and Lycaonia along with a portion of Cilicia, the district of Milyas between Phrygia and Lycia, and, as a port on the southern sea, the Lycian town Telmissus. There was a dispute afterwards between Eumenes and Antiochus regarding Pamphylia, as to how far it lay on this side of or beyond the prescribed boundary, and accordingly belonged to the former or to the latter. He further acquired the protectorate over, and the right of receiving tribute from, those Greek cities which did not receive absolute freedom ; but it was stipulated in this case that the cities should retain their charters, and that the tribute should not be heightened. Moreover, Antiochus had to bind himself to pay to Eumenes the 350 talents (£85,000) which he owed to his father Attalus, and like
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
475
wise to pay a compensation of 127 talents (^31,000) for arrears in the supplies of corn. Lastly, Eumenes obtained the royal forests and the elephants delivered up by Antiochus, but not the ships of war, which were burnt : the Romans tolerated no naval power by the side of their own. By these means the kingdom of the Attalids became in the east of Europe and Asia what Numidia was in Africa, a powerful state with an absolute constitution dependent on Rome, destined and able to keep in check both Mace donia and Syria without needing, except in extraordinary cases, Roman support With this creation dictated by policy the Romans had as far as possible combined the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, which was dictated republican and national sympathy and by vanity. About the affairs of the more remote east beyond the Taurus and Halys they were firmly resolved to give themselves no concern. This is clearly shown by the terms of the peace with Antiochus, and still more decidedly by the peremptory refusal of the senate to guarantee to the town of Soli in Cilicia the freedom which the Rhodians requested for With equal fidelity they adhered to the fixed principle of
no direct transmarine possessions. After the Roman fleet had made an expedition to Crete and had accomplished the release of the Romans sold thither into slavery, the fleet and land army left Asia towards the end
of the summer of 566 on which occasion the land army, 188. which again marched through Thrace, in consequence of
the negligence of the general suffered greatly on the route from the attacks of the barbarians. The Romans brought nothing home from the east but honour and gold, both of
which were already at this period usually conjoined in the practical shape assumed the address of thanks — the golden chaplet
European Greece also had been agitated this Asiatic Settlement war, and needed reorganization. The Aetolians, who had
acquiring
by
°
it.
by
by
;
190. Conflicts
with aiT* Aetoiians.
not yet learned to reconcile themselves to their insignifi cance, had, after the armistice concluded with Scipio in the spring of 564, rendered intercourse between Greece and Italy difficult and unsafe by means of their Cephal- lenian corsairs ; and not only so, but even perhaps while the armistice yet lasted, they, deceived by false reports as to the state of things in Asia, had the folly to place Amynander once more on his Athamanian throne, and to carry on a desultory warfare with Philip in the districts occupied by him on the borders of Aetolia and Thessaly, in the course of which Philip suffered several discomfitures. After this, as a matter of course, Rome replied to their request for peace by the landing of the consul Marcus Fulvius Nobilior. He arrived among the legions in the spring of 565, and after fifteen days' siege gained possession of Ambracia by a capitulation honourable for the garrison ; while simultaneously the Macedonians, Illyrians, Epirots, Acarnanians, and Achaeans fell upon the Aetolians. There was no such thing as resistance in the strict sense ; after
repeated entreaties of the Aetolians for peace the Romans at length desisted from the war, and granted conditions which must be termed reasonable when viewed with refer ence to such pitiful and malicious opponents. The Aetolians lost all cities and territories which were in the
189.
476
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA took m
hands of their adversaries, more especially Ambracia which afterwards became free and independent in consequence of an intrigue concocted in Rome against Marcus Fulvius, and Oenia which was given to the Acarnanians : they likewise ceded Cephallenia. They lost the right of making peace and war, and were in that respect dependent on the foreign relations of Rome. Lastly, they paid a large sum of money. Cephallenia opposed this treaty on its own account, and only submitted when Marcus Fulvius landed on the island. In fact, the inhabitants of Same, who feared that they would be dispossessed from their well-situated
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
477
town by a Roman colony, revolted after their first sub mission and sustained a four months' siege; the town, however, was finally taken and the whole inhabitants were sold into slavery.
In this case also Rome adhered to the principle of con- Mace- fining herself to Italy and the Italian islands. She took no doni* portion of the spoil for herself, except the two islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus, which formed a desirable sup plement to the possession of Corcyra and other naval stations in the Adriatic. The rest of the territorial gain
went to the allies of Rome. But the two most important
of these, Philip and the Achaeans, were by no means content with the share of the spoil granted to them. Philip
felt himself aggrieved, and not without reason. He might safely say that the chief difficulties in the last war—diffi culties which arose not from the character of the enemy,
but from the distance and the uncertainty of the communi cations —had been overcome mainly by his loyal aid. The senate recognized this by remitting his arrears of tribute
and sending back his hostages ; but he did not receive
those additions to his territory which he expected. He
got the territory of the Magnetes, with Demetrias which he
had taken from the Aetolians; besides, there practically remained in his hands the districts of Dolopia and Athamania and a part of Thessaly, from which also the Aetolians had been expelled by him. In Thrace the interior remained under Macedonian protection, but nothing
was fixed as to the coast towns and the islands of Thasos and Lemnos which were de facto in Philip's hands, while the Chersonese was even expressly given to Eumenes ; and it
was not difficult to see that Eumenes received possessions
in Europe, simply that he might in case of need keep not
only Asia but Macedonia in check. The exasperation of
the proud and in many respects chivalrous king was natural;
it was not chicane, however, but an unavoidable political
The Achaean s.
necessity that induced the Romans to take this course. Macedonia suffered for having once been a power of the first rank, and for having waged war on equal terms with Rome ; there was much better reason in her case than in that of Carthage for guarding against the revival of her old powerful position.
It was otherwise with the Achaeans. They had, in the course of the war with Antiochus, gratified their long-che
rished wish to bring the whole Peloponnesus into their confederacy ; for first Sparta, and then, after the expulsion of the Asiatics from Greece, Elis and Messene had more or less reluctantly joined it. The Romans had allowed this to take place, and had even tolerated the intentional disregard of Rome which marked their proceedings. When
Messene declared that she wished to submit to the Romans but not to enter the confederacy, and the latter thereupon employed force, Flamininus had not failed to remind the Achaeans that such separate arrangements as to the disposal of a part of the spoil were in themselves unjust, and were, in the relation in which the Achaeans stood to the Romans, more than unseemly ; and yet in his very impolitic com plaisance towards the Hellenes he had substantially done what the Achaeans willed. But the matter did not end there. The Achaeans, tormented by their dwarfish thirst for aggrandizement, would not relax their hold on the town of Pleuron in Aetolia which they had occupied during the war, but on the contrary made it an involuntary member of their confederacy ; they bought Zacynthus from Amynander the lieutenant of the last possessor, and would gladly have acquired Aegina also. It was with reluctance that they gave up the former island to Rome, and they heard with great displeasure the good advice of Flamininus that they should content themselves with their Peloponnesus.
The Achaeans believed it their duty to display the inde pendence of their state all the more, the less they really
478
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book III
The Achaean patriots.
chap, ix
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
479
had ; they talked of the rights of war, and of the faithful aid of the Achaeans in the wars of the Romans ; they asked the Roman envoys at the Achaean diet why Rome should concern herself about Messene when Achaia put no questions as to Capua; and the spirited patriot, who had thus spoken, was applauded and was sure of votes at the elections. All this would have been very right and very dignified, had it not been much more ridiculous. There was a profound justice and a still more profound melancholy in the fact, that Rome, however earnestly she endeavoured to establish the freedom and to earn the thanks of the Hellenes, yet gave them nothing but anarchy and reaped nothing but ingratitude. Undoubtedly very generous sentiments lay at the bottom of the Hellenic anti pathies to the protecting power, and the personal bravery of some of the men who took the lead in the movement was unquestionable; but this Achaean patriotism remained not the less a folly and a genuine historical caricature. With all that ambition and all that national susceptibility the whole nation was, from the highest to the lowest, per vaded by the most thorough sense of impotence. Every one was constantly listening to learn the sentiments of Rome, the liberal man no less than the servile ; they thanked heaven, when the dreaded decree was not issued; they were sulky, when the senate gave them to understand that they would do well to yield voluntarily in order that they might not need to be compelled ; they did what they were obliged to do, if possible, in a way offensive to the Romans, " to save forms " ; they reported, explained, postponed, evaded, and, when all this would no longer avail, yielded with a patriotic sigh. Their proceedings might have claimed •ndulgence at any rate, if not approval, had their leaders been resolved to fight, and had they preferred the destruc tion of the nation to its bondage ; but neither Philopoemen nor Lycortas thought of any such political suicide — they
*So
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
wished, if possible, to be free, but they wished above all to live. Besides all this, the dreaded intervention of Rome in the internal affairs of Greece was not the arbitrary act of the Romans, but was always invoked by the Greeks them selves, who, like boys, brought down on their own heads the rod which they feared. The reproach repeated ad nauseam by the erudite rabble in Hellenic and Hellenic times — that the Romans had been at pains to stir up internal discord in Greece — is one of the most foolish absurdities which philologues dealing in politics have ever invented. It was not the Romans that"carried strife to Greece —which in truth would have been carrying owls to Athens "—but the Greeks that carried their dissensions to Rome.
The Achaeans in particular, who, in their eagerness to round their territory, wholly failed to see how much it would have been for their own good that Flamininus had not incorporated the towns of Aetolian sympathies with their league, acquired in Lacedaemon and Messene a very hydra of intestine strife. Members of these communities were incessantly at Rome, entreating and beseeching to be released from the odious connection ; and amongst them, characteristically enough, were even those who were indebted to the Achaeans for their return to their native land. The
Achaean league was incessantly occupied in the work of reformation and restoration at Sparta and Messene; the wildest refugees from these quarters determined the measures of the diet Four years after the nominal admis sion of Sparta to the confederacy matters came even to open war and to an insanely thorough restoration, in which all the slaves on whom Nabis had conferred citizenship were once more sold into slavery, and a colonnade was built from the proceeds in the Achaean city of Megalopolis ; the old state of property in Sparta was re-established, the b^s of I. vcurgus were superseded by Achaean laws, and
post-
Quarrels between Achaeans and Spartans.
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
481
the walls were pulled down (566). At last the Roman 188. senate was summoned by all parties to arbitrate on all these doings — an annoying task, which was the righteous punish
ment of the sentimental policy that the senate had pursued.
Far from mixing itself up too much in these affairs, the senate not only bore the sarcasms of Achaean candour with exemplary composure, but even manifested a culpable indifference while the worst outrages were committed. There was cordial rejoicing in Achaia when, after that restoration, the news arrived from Rome that the senate had found fault with but had not annulled it. Nothing was done for the Lacedaemonians by Rome, except that the senate, shocked at the judicial murder of from sixty to eighty Spartans committed by the Achaeans, deprived the diet of criminal jurisdiction over the Spartans—truly heinous interference with the internal affairs of an inde pendent state The Roman statesmen gave themselves as
little concern as possible about this tempest in nut-shell, as best shown by the many complaints regarding the superficial, contradictory, and obscure decisions of the senate in fact, how could its decisions be expected to be clear, when there were four parties from Sparta simultane ously speaking against each other at its bar Add to this the personal impression, which most of these Peloponnesian statesmen produced in Rome even Flamininus shook his head, when one of them showed him on the one day how to perform some dance, and on the next entertained him with affairs of state. Matters went so far, that the senate at last lost patience and informed the Peloponnesians that
would no longer listen to them, and that they might do what they chose (572). This was natural enough, but 182. was not right; situated as the Romans were, they were under moral and political obligation earnestly and stead fastly to rectify this melancholy state of things. Callicrates
the Achaean, who went to the senate in 575 to enlighten 179.
vok it
63
it a
is ;
;
?
it a
a
!
it,
Death of
it as to the state of matters in the Peloponnesus and to demand a consistent and calm intervention, may have had somewhat less worth as a man than his countryman Philopoemen who was the main founder of that patriotic policy ; but he was in the right.
Thus the protectorate of the Roman community now embraced all the states from the eastern to the western end of the Mediterranean. There nowhere existed a state that the Romans would have deemed it worth while to fear. But there still lived a man to whom Rome accorded this rare honour—the homeless Carthaginian, who had raised in arms against Rome first all the west and then all the east, and whose schemes perhaps had been only frustrated by infamous aristocratic policy in the former case, and by stupid court policy in the latter. Antiochus had been obliged to bind himself in the treaty of peace to deliver up Hannibal ; but the latter had escaped, first to Crete, then to Bithynia,1 and now lived at the court of Prusias king of
Bithynia, employed in aiding the latter in his wars with Eumenes, and victorious as ever by sea and by land. It is affirmed that he was desirous of stirring up Prusias also to make war on Rome ; a folly, which, as it is told, sounds very far from credible. It is more certain that, while the Roman senate deemed it beneath its dignity to have the
old man hunted out in his last asylum—for the tradition which inculpates the senate appears to deserve no credit — Flamininus, whose restless vanity sought after new oppor tunities for great achievements, undertook on his own part to deliver Rome from Hannibal as he had delivered the Greeks from their chains, and, if not to wield —which was not diplomatic —at any rate to whet and to point, the
1 The story that he went to Armenia and at the request of king Artaxias built the town of Artaxata on the Araxes (Strabo, xi. p. 528 ; Plutarch, Luc. 31), is certainly a fiction ; but it is a striking circumstance that Hannibal should have become mixed up, almost like Alexander, with Oriental fables.
482
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book in
chaf. ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
483
dagger against the greatest man of his time. Prusias, the most pitiful among the pitiful princes of Asia, was delighted
to grant the little favour which the Roman envoy in ambiguous terms requested ; and, when Hannibal saw his house beset by assassins, he took poison. He had long been prepared to do so, adds a Roman, for he knew the Romans and the word of kings. The year of his death is uncertain ; probably he died in the latter half of the year
571, at the age of sixty-seven. When he was born, Rome 183. was contending with doubtful success for the possession of Sicily ; he had lived long enough to see the West wholly subdued, and to fight his own last battle with the Romans against the vessels of his native city which had itself become Roman ; and he was constrained at last to remain
a mere spectator, while Rome overpowered the East as the tempest overpowers the ship that has no one at the helm, and to feel that he alone was the pilot that could have weathered the storm. There was left to him no further hope to be disappointed, when he died ; but he had honestly, through fifty years of struggle, kept the oath which he had sworn when a boy.
About the same time, probably in the same year, died Dwth of also the man whom the Romans were wont to call his conqueror, Publius Scipio. On him fortune had lavished
all the successes which she denied to his antagonist— successes which did belong to him, and successes which
did not He had added to the empire Spain, Africa, and Asia; and Rome, which he had found merely the first community of Italy, was at his death mistress of the civilized world. He himself had so many titles of victory, that some of them were made over to his brother and his cousin. 1 And yet he too spent his last years in bitter vexation, and died when little more than fifty years of age in voluntary banishment, leaving orders to his relatives not
1 Africanus, Asiagenus, Hispallui,
484
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
to bury his remains in the city for which he had lived and in which his ancestors reposed. It is not exactly known what drove him from the city. The charges of corruption and embezzlement, which were directed against him and still more against his brother Lucius, were beyond doubt empty calumnies, which do not sufficiently explain such bitterness of feeling ; although it is characteristic of the man, that instead of simply vindicating himself by means of his account-books, he tore them in pieces in presence of the people and of his accusers, and summoned the Romans to accompany him to the temple of Jupiter and to celebrate the anniversary of his victory at Zama. The people left the accuser on the spot, and followed Scipio to the Capitol; but this was the last glorious day of the illustrious man. His proud spirit, his belief that he was different from, and better than, other men, his very decided family -policy, which in the person of his brother Lucius especially brought forward a clumsy man of straw as a hero, gave offence to many, and not without reason.