They were increasingly concerned about the costs of the war as well, and some worried that a campaign of
expansion
would both jeopardize efforts to reach a sep- arate peace with Prussia and contradict the revolutionary ideals of liberty and self-determination.
Revolution and War_nodrm
r awareness of Russia's designs on Poland, which created the alluring possi- bility that Prussia might receive several Polish territories it had long coveted as compensation for its efforts in France.
77
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
? ? The French Revolution
Prussia's desire for action was based on the same sort of optimistic beliefs that the Girondins had promulgated so effectively within France. Influenced by the testimony of emigre and royal agents (who portrayed the new regime as unpopular and vulnerable) and by the successful suppression of earlier revolts in Holland and Belgium, the Prussians assumed that the campaign would be short and easy. The belief that the revolution had sapped French
strength was widespread, in part because the exodus of the emigres had robbed the army of many of its officers. Catherine the Great believed that "a corps of 10,000 men would be sufficient to traverse [France] from one end to the other," while a Prussian diplomat reported that "France is without dis- ciplined armies, without experienced generals, without money, and the highest degree of anarchy reigns in all departments. " Similarly, one of Fred- erick William's chief advisors predicted, "The. comedy will not last long. The army of lawyers will be annihilated in Belgium and we shall be home by the autumn. '178 Austria's leaders assumed that the threat of invasion would quiet the Assembly as it had the previous summer, although a few officials were beginning to favor ambitious schemes of their own. Thus, if the Girondins envisioned war as a triumphant crusade for liberty, their op- ponents believed it either would be avoided entirely or would lead to a swift and lucrative victory.
As T. C. W. Blanning writes, "with all three combatants believing their side to be invincible and their opponents on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch into war. ''79 The Austrian note of February 17 pro- voked an uproar in the Assembly and led to Delessart's impeachment. The remaining Feuillant ministers resigned, and Louis reluctantly appointed a new cabinet containing several Girondins. For foreign minister he chose Charles-Fran\ois Dumouriez, an ambitious general who believed that the Austrian Netlherlands were ripe for revolt and hoped to establish his own rule there following a successful invasion. 80
Dumouriez began by attempting to isolate the Austrians, whowere cop- ing with Leopold's unexpected death on March 1 . He obtained assurances of neutrality fmm England, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, but his efforts to sever Prussia and the German states from Vienna failed completely. His first message to Austria (on March 19) was mild, but a second note nine
78 QuotedinCraneBrinton,ADecadeofRevolution:1789-1799(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1934), 84; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
79 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
80 DumourieztoldtheCouncilofMinistersonMarch22,"Allthese[Belgian]provincesare permeated by the spirit of liberty and shaken by recent revolution. . . . They will join forces with our troops and will easily drive the dispersed hordes of Austrian mercenaries from their towns. " Quoted in Patricia Chastain Howe, "Charles-Fran,. ois Dumouriez and the Revolu- tionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792," French Historical Studies 4, no. 3 (1985-86), 386-87; and see also Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224; and Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 177-78.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
days later demanded that Austria renounce the concert against France or face "the sternest measures. " Dumouriez had already warned the Assem- bly's Diplomatic Committee that Austrian reinforcements were transform- ing Belgium and Liege into a "formidable military state. " He now argued
. that a preemptive strike was preferable to letting France's enemies complete their preparations. A harsh Austrian reply to Dumouriez's first message brought fresh denunciations within the Assembly, and Austrian agents in France now reported that war was imminent. 81
On April 2o, Dumouriez presented to the Assembly a formal report listing France's motives for war. Louis bowed to the inevitable and asked the As- sembly for a formal declaration of war against "the king of Austria and Hungary. " Although several prominent Jacobins (notably Maximilien Ro- bespierre) opposed the decision, the motion passed with only seven dis- senting votes. 82 Austria and Prussia had already begun mobilizing their forces, and the first shots were to be fired by the end of the month. 83
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war. First, the war was not simply the result of ideological antipathies between the old-regime monarchies of Aus- tria and Prussia and the new regime in France. France was still officially a monarchy when the war broke out, and Frederick William of Prussia had been willing to negotiate an alliance with France in 1790. Dumouriez sought a similar arrangement in 1792 and explored the possibility of an alliance with England as well. Even more significantly, the French decided to invite the duke of Brunswick to command the French armies; his reputation as a commander was clearly more important to the Assembly than his status within the ancien regime. 84 These events suggest that internal differences
81 On Dumouriez's efforts to shake the Austro-Prussian alliance, see Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolutionfranfaise, 2:352-56; and Howe, "Dumouriez and French Foreign Affairs," 385-87.
82 Robespierre had opposed war since November, arguing with remarkable foresight that it would either restore the monarchy or usher in a military dictatorship. He ridiculed the uni- versalist pretensions of the Cirondins, arguing that "no one likes an armed missionary, and no more extravagant idea ever sprang from the idea of a politician than to suppose that one people has on1ly to enter another's territory with arms in its hands to make the latter adopt its Constitution. " See J. M. Thompson, Robespierre (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 202-209; Georges Michon, Robespierre et Ia guerre rivolutionnaire (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1937), 51-55; and Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:395-<)6. An equally prophetic warning was given by Henri Becquet, a deputy from Haute-Marne; see Thompson, French Revolution, 261.
83 The Austrians deployed fifty thousand men to the frontiers on April 12, eight days before the formal declaration of war by the French Assembly. Frederick William ordered his own army to mobilize for war on April 24, but Prussia did not declare war for several months.
84 The duke of Brunswick had won renown as a general in the Seven Years War and was considered a reformer within his own domains. Ironically, he was eventually appointed com- mander of the Austro-Prussian armies, and he led the initial invasion of France. See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1 :397-98; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :56-57.
? ? ? The French Revolution
were less significant than Girondin rhetoric implied; similarly, while foreign monarchs were concerned about the long-term impact of events in France, neither Prussia nor Austria went to war to defend the monarchical principle.
Second, although the impact of the revolution on the balance of power played a role in causing the war, the importance of this factor should not be overstated. Perceptions of French weakness fueled Prussian acquisitiveness and encouraged the belief that victory would be swift, but Prussia would not have gone to war on its own, and the decline of French power also en- couraged other states to concentrate on more pressing issues. England re- mained neutral, Russia and Austria concerned themselves with events in the East, and even Frederick William preferred to gain territory from Poland than from France. French weakness made these gambits seem feasible, but the war did not arise solely (or even primarily) from the desire to exploit France's difficulties.
Third, several significant misperceptions, which both exacerbated and were reinforced by the ideology of the revolutionary movement and the in- ternal struggle for power in France, clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war. The revolution had fostered a profound sense of insecurity within France, culminating in the belief that the king, the emigres, the clergy, and several foreign monarchs were conspiring to restore the ancien regime. This fear helped the Girondins persuade the Assembly that a foreign war was unavoidable and that it would help preserve the revolution. Their argu- ments rested on erroneous beliefs about the influence of the emigres and the hostility of Austria and Prussia, resulting from their misreading of the Aus- tro-Prussian rapprochement, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pill- nitz. Austria's clumsy attempts to browbeat the Assembly merely reinforced these tendencies and facilitated the Girondins' efforts.
Interestingly, the revolution did not provoke a similar degree of insecurity in Austria or Prussia, whose responses were not driven by a strong sense of French bellicosity. 85 Leopold and Frederick William were worried about the spread of revolutionary ideas and by aspects of French behavior, but neither went to war for that reason. Rather, Frederick William's decisions reflected his perennial desire to expand (bolstered by the testimony of certain emi- gres), while Austria was forced into war by the French response to their ear- lier threats and its own latent expansionism. 86 The fear of contagion was
85 That the sense of threat was limited may have been partly due to the modest scope of the changes within France. Although royal authority had been sharply curtailed and the position of the king was still precarious, the Constitution of 1791 not only retained the monarchy but gave the king a substantial role.
86 Kaunitz seems to have discounted the danger of revolutionary subversion prior to the war, writing in November 1791, "The alleged danger of the possible effects that the bad ex- ample of the French could have on other peoples is nothing but a wild-eyed panic, a chimera contradicted by the facts. " Quoted in Vivenot and Zeissberg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiser- politik, 1:286.
[73]
? Revolution and War
more prevalent in Spain, Sweden, Russia, and the smaller German states, but leaders there were not actively involved in the initial decisions for war. In partial contrast to the predictions set forth in chapter 2, therefore, the spi- ral of suspicion that led to the war of 1792 was essentially one-sided.
Fourth, the revolution had obvious and important effects on perceptions of the offense-defense balance, such that the use of force appeared more at- tractive. This factor was most evident in the Girondin campaign for war, which rested! on the claims that Europe was ripe for revolt, foreign merce- naries would be no match for "free" soldiers, and France would win a quick and costless victory. France's opponents evinced equal optimism, based on the widespread assumption that the revolution had left France in no condi- tion to fight. These perceptions were at least partly influenced by self-serv- ing testimony from the emigres or the revolutionary exiles in Paris, which helps explain why their forecasts were so inaccurate.
Finally, lack of information was an important contributing factor. Because they were unfamiliar with the subtleties of old-regime diplomacy, the deputies faHed to realize that Leopold's warnings were largely empty ges- tures. Similarly, because they had no reliable information about the rapid shifts in French domestic politics, Leopold and Kaunitz could not know that their efforts to browbeat the Assembly into a more moderate stance were having the opposite effect. The dearth of information played a key role in driving the spiral to war, therefore, as Austria's actions unintentionally con- firmed French fears and fortified the extremists.
With some qualifications, therefore, the war of 1792 illustrates many of the mechanisms that link revolution and war. The upheaval in France caused a destabilizing shift in the balance of power, an exaggerated percep- tion of hostility, an internal struggle for power in which foreign policy was a potent political issue, and visions of a mutual offensive advantage that in- flated both sides' confidence that they could improve their positions through war.
THE WAR OF THE FIRST CoALITION
When war broke out in April 1792, the combatants anticipated a short war and did not expect it to spread. Although the French proclaimed that they would wage a "war against kings," they delayed the declaration of war against Prussia, in an attempt to isolate Austria, and proceeded to launch a traditional limited war against the Austrian Netherlands. Austrian and Prussian war aims were unfocused, and both powers were soon distracted by the Russian invasion of Poland in May. 87 Divisions within the allied coali-
87 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 102-107.
? ? ? The French Revolution
tion helped the revolutionary government survive the initial clashes, and the conflict soon expanded throughout Europe and beyond.
The Second Revolution and the Expansion of the War
Contrary to the optimistic predictions of the Girondins, the war began with a series of embarrassing French defeats. The Army of the North in- vaded the Austrian Netherlands on April 28, but the inexperienced French troops broke and ran at their first encounter with the Austrian forces. A French general was murdered by his own troops, and the re- maining commanders declared an offensive impossible and refused to move. 88
The debacle further polarized the political climate in France. The gener- als blamed the defeat on lack of discipline and ministerial incompetence, while the Girondins accused the army and king of disloyalty, and Brissot warned that a secret "Austrian Committee" was at work to betray the country. 89 Given the initial belief that victory would be swift, treason seemed the only possible explanation for the initial setbacks. To stave off counterrevolution, the Assembly voted to deport the dissident clergy and dissolve the king's Swiss Guards, and ordered the deployment of provin- cial National Guards (known asfederes) around Paris. Louis promptly ve- toed these measures, dismissed the Girondin ministers, and reappointed the Feuillants. Now convinced that the radicals were intent on destroying the constitution, Lafayette left his troops and returned to Paris, where he tried unsuccessfully to rally the Assembly and the National Guard against the Jacobins. These events reunited opposition to the king, and the deputies overrode the royal veto on July 3 and authorized the federes to come to Paris to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. The As- sembly declared the country "in danger" on July 11 and decreed a new troop levy the following day. 90
TheFoundingoftheFirstRepublic. Demandstoabolishthemonarchywere growing by this point, exacerbating the divisions within the Jacobin move-
88 These events led Kaunitz to abandon his normal pessimism, and he predicted that France would fall in a single campaign. Another Austrian official declared that "two regi- ments of Hungarian hussars, with whips as their arms, would suffice to terminate the farce. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 174. On the failure of the initial campaign, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, 49-50; and Scott, Response of the Royal Army, 1 16-17.
89 Girondin accusations about the "Austrian committee" turned out to be partially true, as agents of the queen had sent information about French military plans to the Austrian com- manders. See Soboul, French Revolution, 242-44; Sutherland, France, 145; and Mathiez, French Revolution, 149-50.
90 See Mathiez, French Revolution, 148-56; and Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 137-46.
? ? ? Revolution and War
ment. 91 The Girondins were alarmed by the popular agitation in Paris and the growing strength of the more radical Montagnards, and they began ne- gotiating with Louis for reappointment after the Feuillant cabinet resigned on July 10.
The struggle for power reached a climax after France's opponents made yet another ill-advised attempt to intimidate the Assembly. When the Aus- tro-Prussian invasion finally got underway in July, concern for the royal fam- ily led the duke of Brunswick to issue an ultimatum threatening the destruction of Paris if its members were harmed. The so-called Brunswick Manifesto was actually the brainchild of a royalist emigre, and like Leopold! ' s earlier demarches, the declaration merely intensified French fears and un- dermined the king's position even inore. 92
Spurred on by Jacobin propaganda, deteriorating economic conditions, and the fear of foreign occupation, the population of Paris rose in protest on August 9? Angry sans-culottes replaced the municipal government with a new body-known as the Paris Commune-and a mob of Parisians and
federes stormed the Tuileries and forced the royal family to take refuge with the Assembly. Alarmed by the popular insurgency and fearing for their own safety, the deputies voted to recognize the Commune as a legitimate body and to suspend the king pending election of a national convention based on universal male suffrage. 93 Executive leadership (including the management of foreign policy) would be conducted by a provisional exec- utive council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Pierre Helene-Marie Lebrun, a parvenu journalist and protege of Dumouriez. 94 In a burst of revolutionary fervor, the Assembly voted to bestow French citi- zenship on a number of foreign sympathizers and approved a motion re- nouncing conquests and expressing its desire for "fraternity with all peoples. "95
After another outburst of mob violence and a hasty series of elections, the new National Convention convened in Paris on September 21. The deputies
91 A delegation from the fideres in Paris demanded the suspension of the king on July 17, claiming that "without the treason of the enemies of the interior, the others [i. e. , Austria, Prussia, a111d the emigres] were not to be feared or rather they would not exist. " Quoted in Sutherland, France, 147.
92 For the text of the manifesto, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 306-11; on its origins and effects, see H. A. Barton, "The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto," French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (1967); and Biro, German Policy, 1:68-71.
93 See Doyle, History of the French Revolution, 184-89; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:229-35?
94 The Executive Council was first led by Danton and later by Georges Roland, while the Diplomatic Committee of the Assembly included Brissot and several of his associates. See J. T. Murley, "The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1 793" (Ph. D. diss. , Oxford University, 1959), 5-21.
95 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:54-55; and Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution fran? aise, 3:15.
? ? ? The French Revolution
immediately voted to abolish the monarchy and place the king on trial and began to mobilize the nation for war. In less than six months, the war had destroyed both the monarchy and the Constitution of 1791 and given birth to the First Republic. 96
Revolutionary Expansion. By the end of the year, what had begun as a defensive struggle against a counterrevolutionary expedition had become an offensive war of conquest. This dramatic improvement in France's mil- itary fortunes was partly the result of an outpouring of patriotic feeling, which filled the ranks of the French forces with enthusiastic if unskilled volunteers. 97 Equally important, however, were the rivalries and distrac- tions that weakened France's opponents. The Austro-Prussian invasion was first delayed by negotiations over contributions and compensations and then undermined by overconfidence, mutual suspicions, and a pre- occupation with events in Eastern Europe. As a result, Austria con- tributed only 70,000 of its 2oo,ooo troops and Prussia sent only 40,000 out of 170,000. The invading force did not cross the French border until Au- gust 19, and! its slow rate of advance gave the French invaluable time to prepare. 98
The tide turned on September 20, when a body of French artillery halted a Prussian assault at the Battle of Valmy. With his army weakened from dis- ease and bad weather, Brunswick called off the advance and began negoti- ations with Dumouriez (who had resigned from the cabinet in June and taken command of the French Army of the North). These parleys continued for over a month, and though Frederick William kept up appearances by declining an offer of alliance and ordering Brunswick to issue another threatening manifesto, his enthusiasm for the war was fading rapidly. Du- mouriez eventually permitted the Prussian forces to withdraw unchal- lenged, and Frederick William informed the Austrians in late October that he would require additional compensation in Poland i? he were to continue the war. 99 The Prussian forces had left French territory by the end of Octo-
96 In September, Jacobin efforts to rally the population and reports that the foreign armies were advancing on Paris led to the murder of over a thousand imprisoned criminals who were mistakenly believed to be counterrevolutionaries. See Sutherland, France, 154-55; Thompson, French Revolution, 302-309; Patrice Gueniffy, "Paris Commune," and Fran? ois Furet, "Terror," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 138-39, 52<r-22. .
97 Samuel F. Scott reports that "during 1792 more than 70,000 men enlisted in the line army, an impressive achievement under any circumstances. " Response of the Royal Army, 165; also see Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 66-74.
98 Ross, European Diplomatic History, 51-52.
99 The negotiations between France and Prussia are recounted in Biro, German Policy, 1:7cr87; Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution franraise, 3:53-55, 77--96; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:139-48, 172-77, 185-88; Karl A. Raider, Jr. , Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), too-101; and Schroeder, Transforma- tion of European Politics, 1 1 8-20.
[77]
? Revolution and War
ber, while a French army occupied Savoy and Nice and another moved into the Rhineland. 100
J. T. Murley notes, "Had the Republic been prepared to compromise with the Austro-Prussian Coalition, a general peace might have resulted. "101 The main issue was whether the French would insist on imposing republican in- stitutions in the areas it had conquered or permit these peoples to choose their own rulers without interference. The latter outcome was not incon- ceivable, as the negotiations between France and Prussia had shown that the Executive Council was willing to cooperate with foreign monarchs and the Assembly had passed a resolution renouncing foreign conquests in Au- gust. Moreover, the Executive Council had reaffirmed that France would not "interfere in the internal government of other peoples," and the Gi- rondin leaders knew that ending the war would reduce the fear of counter- revolution and aid their ability to control the popular forces.
They were increasingly concerned about the costs of the war as well, and some worried that a campaign of expansion would both jeopardize efforts to reach a sep- arate peace with Prussia and contradict the revolutionary ideals of liberty and self-determination. 102
Yet other forces drew the Republic toward a policy of revolutionary ex- pansion. This outcome was partly due to the ambitions of men such as Du- mouriez-who saw the war primarily as an opportunity for personal advancement-as well as latent French hostility to Austria and the anticler- ical sentiments that dominated the Assembly. These concerns-together with a desire for territorial aggrandizement-account for the Executive Council's decision to authorize an invasion "to enfranchise the oppressed peoples" in the Netherlands on October 6. 103
Even more importantly, the policy of revolutionary expansion resulted from the same influences that had driven France to war seven months ear-
? 100 The expedition into the Rhineland was based on the unfulfilled hope of a general upris- ing among the local population. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:165-72.
101 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 98. Of course, peace in the west would not have ended the rivalries among the eastern powers, and might well have increased them. 102 On October 8, Brissot wrote that while "it would suit us to be surrounded by allied re- publics, our Republic would lose itself in expanding. " On October 24, the Diplomatic Com- mittee of the Convention advised against further expansion and declared that the French were not "conquerors of territory but the benefactors of the human race. " Similarly, Dumouriez's Manifesto to the Belgians, published at the beginning of his invasion, pledged, "We enter to help you plant the tree of liberty, but without involving ourselves at all in the constitution that you
wish to adopt. " All quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," ttS-19.
103 Brissot wrote Dumouriez that "the French Republic should not have any boundary other than the Rhine," and Lazare Camot justified annexation on the grounds that "the an- cient and natural boundaries of France are the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. " Similarly, Danton argued for the annexation of Belgium by saying it was "pointless to fear overextend- ing the Republic. Its boundaries have been set by nature. " See Denis Richet, "Natural Bor- ders," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 758.
? ? The French Revolution
lier. French foreign policy was in the hands of leaders who still saw them- selves as part of a universal movement for liberty and whose hostility to monarchical nnstitutions had led them to depose their own king. Although these ideological principles could be used to justify nonintervention (as im- posing liberty by force would violate the rights of the alleged beneficiaries), the belief that neighboring peoples were eager to receive the fruits of liberty obscured the possibility that they might actually not welcome the French as- sistance. Moreover, hostility to monarchical institutions increased French perceptions of threat so that expansion seemed necessary for security. For- eign Minister Lebrun told the deputies, "The moment of greatest danger will arrive next spring, when allied tyranny will make its last effort, and then we must repel the combined force of all the kings. " In September, Dan- ton told the Convention, "We have the right to say to the peoples: you shall have no more kings! " and warned that, were France to remain surrounded by monarchs, these peoples "would furnish us with an endless series of tyrants to combat. "104 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, en- dorsed a petition to annex Savoy by saying, "It in no way adds to the hatred of oppressors for the Revolution. . . . It adds to the resources by which we
shall break their league. . . . All Governments are our enemies, all Peoples are our allies; either we shall fall or all peoples shall become free. "105 Having defined the war as a campaign against kings, it was hard to limit it so long as a single monarch remained on a throne. As in the winter of 1791--92, the beliefs that foreign powers were intrinsically hostile and that the revolution was part of a universal trend combined to justify a policy of expansion.
The impact of these beliefs was accentuated by rivalries between the Girondin and Montagnard factions and the chaotic nature of decision-mak- ing within the Convention. Although the Girondins controlled the Execu- tive Council, they lacked an absolute majority in the Convention, and the Montagnards were more popular among the radical Parisian sections. To compensate for their moderation on domestic issues, therefore, the Girondins returned to the bellicose rhetoric they had used so successfully
104 Danton's words were somewhat disingenuous, as he was simultaneously negotiating for a separate peace with Prussia. Yet his willingness to use such rhetoric in the Convention reveals his awareness of its political potency, and he told the Convention that it "should be a committee of general insurrection against all the kings in the universe, and I ask that in call- ing all peoples to the conquest of liberty [the National Convention] offer them all the means of repulsing tyraMy. . . . The French cannot endure that peoples who aspire to liberty never- theless give themselves a government contrary to their interests. " Quoted in Albert Mathiez,
Danton et Ia paix (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1919), 58; also see his French Revolution, 278; Norman Hampsoll,l Danton (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 89-93; and Murley, "Origin oftheAnglo-FrenchWar," 102.
105 Like Danton, Gregoire also maintained that spreading the revolution would protect France from its opponents. In his words: "When my neighbor keeps a nest of vipers, I have the right to smother them lest I become their victim. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 285.
[791
? Revolution and War
the previous year. And as Murley points out, because the Convention still lacked fixed rules of procedure, "major decisions turned on the chance pas- sions of unregulated debates, . . . exposed to the harangue of the dema- gogue, to the irresponsible maneouvre of faction and, above all, to the popular enthusiasms of the great mass of deputies. " In this setting, ideolog- ically inspired passions dominated and a careful assessment of interests and capabilities was virtually impossible. 106
The key shift occurred on November 6, 1792, when Dumouriez's Army of the North defeated the Austrians at Jemappes and occupied the Austrian Netherlands, accompanied by two divisions of Belgian exiles. 107 The unex- pected victory seemed to confirm the Girondins' optimistic predictions, and doubts about the policy of expansion were swept away in an outpouring of revolutionary fervor. Vergniaud described Jemappes as a "victory for all hu- manity" and the Montagnards now joined the chorus, with one deputy pre- dicting that "the territory that separates Paris from Petersburg and Moscow will soon be Francicized, municipalized, and Jacobinized. " Gregoire pro- claimed, "A new era has opened . . . [and] this part of the globe will no longer contain either fortresses or foreign peoples. " The Vicaire Episcopal of the Cathedral of St. Font held a celebratory Te Deum in which he predicted that "the French will proceed from conquest to conquest, their glory will be envied by all nations, [and] the spectacle of their happiness will excite the emulation of all peoples. " Lebrun christened his infant daughter "Civilis- Victoires-Jemappes-Dumouriez" and expressed his hope that the French would soon "deliver their Batavian brothers from the Stadholder's yoke. " In the same spirit, Brissot told a friend, "We cannot be at ease until Europe, all
Europe, is ablaze," and he called for further "upheavals of the globe, these
great revolutions that we are called upon to make. "108
This heady atmosphere was quickly transformed into action. On Novem- ber 16, the Convention voted to open the River Scheidt to international ship- ping, even though it would violate several existing treaties and threaten
106 Murley also describes the Convention as "a running faction fight rather than a debate between organized parties" and concludes that "the internal conflict was an important, per- haps a decisive factor in the official conduct of the war and foreign policy. " "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 97-98, 1 14. On the Girondins' motivations, see Lefebvre, French Revolu-
tion, 1:273.
107 Pressure from foreign revolutionar;jes in Paris had already led the Assembly to establish
a Belgian-Liegeois Legion in April 1792, and Batavian, Allobrogian (for the Savoyards and Swiss), and Germanic legions were formed later in the year. See Palmer, Democratic Revolu- tion, 2:56; and Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " chap. 3?
108 Brissot also advised Dumouriez not to "busy oneself any longer with these projects of alliance with Prussia or England; [these are] sorry structures that are bound to disappear. " Thesequotations are from Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 125-28; Palmer, Demo- cratic Revolution, 2:6o; and Richet, "Natural Borders," 758. Even Kidner, who argues that the Girondists were not committed to a "propaganda war," concedes that Brissot's ambitions in this case were genuine. "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 232-35, 267-68.
?
? [8o]
? The French Revolution
long-standing English interests. 109 An equally rash and even more ominous step was the so-called Decree on Liberty of November 19, which declared that France would "grant fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to re- cover their libenty. " The decree was not the result of a well-formed plan for exporting the revolution; on the contrary, it was an impromptu response to foreign requests for protection against counterrevolution. Yet with an "ex- cess of oratory and a deficit of deliberation," the deputies once again suc- cumbed to a vnsion of a universal crusade for liberty and approved the motion after a cursory debate. 110
The November 19 decree was followed by a second decree, on December 15, intended to provide specific guidance to the French military leaders in the conquered regions. The new measure ordered French commanders to abolish feudal institutions in the occupied regions and to finance these ac- tions by confiscating property from the privileged orders. The decree was partly a response to the mounting costs of the war, but it was also intended to give the Convention greater control over ambitious generals like Du- mouriez. 111 In practice, the decree was a license to use the wealth of the oc- cupied regions to pay for French occupation and to support pro-French factions within them. By this step, "the revolutionaries progressed from a war of prudence to a war of propaganda to a war of imperial expansion. "112
Like their predecessors in the Legislative Assembly, the deputies in the Convention had fallen victim to a fictitious image of irreducibly hostile monarchies, restive foreign subjects, and irresistible revolutionary momen- tum. The rhetoric behind their actions was often instrumental, and some of the deputies wel! 'e aware of the hazards of a revolutionary war a outrance. 113 But depicting the war in such stark and universal terms committed them to a policy of expansion that they never examined carefully, and both their rhetoric and their behavior reinforced foreign fears about French intentions and the possibility that the revolution might spread. 114
109 Lebrun was apparently responsible for this initiative, which was designed to win the support of Belgian merchants. See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 227-30.
110 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 136-37; Stewart, Documentary Survey, 381; Biro, German Policy, 1:112-14; and Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda Wa? ,' " 2JD-J- 8.
111 To preserve his popularity, Dumouriez had refused to levy forced requisitions, arranged elections for a Belgian assembly, and agreed to preserve the property and tithes of the ruling classes, in exchange for a loan to support his own forces and an independent Belgian army. The Convention began to fear that Dumouriez would become strong enough to take inde- pendent action, correctly as it turned out. See Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 153; Ross, Euro- pean Diplomatic History, 62-63; and Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:76-78. The text of the December 15 decree is in Stewart, Documentary Survey, )81--84.
112 Blanning,FrenchRevolutionaryWars,136.
113 Lebrun tried unsuccessfully to qualify the Decree on Liberty shortly after its passage, and various foreign revolutionaries (most notably the Dutch) were disappointed by the pal- try1support they received from France.
1 4ByDecember,someGirondinleaderswereconvincedthatwarwasnecessarytokeepthe [81]
? Revolution and War
England's Entrance into the War. Nowhere were these fears more evident or important than in England. As described earlier, England's leaders had seen the revolution as a favorable development at first and had maintained a policy of steadfast neutrality despite entreaties from the emigres and the fulminations of Edmund Burke and others. This position did not waver as the war with Austria and Prussia approached, and Pitt justified further re- ductions in the military budget in February 1792 with the confident claim that "there never was a time in the history of this country, when . . . we
might reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than at the present time. " England's leaders expected France to collapse quickly and anticipated fur- ther gains: according to Foreign Minister Grenville, "as soon as the German troops arrive in Paris, whatever is the ruling party in Paris must apply to us to mediate ! for them. "115
Anglo-French relations began to deteriorate after the "Second Revolu- tion" in August. The suspension of the king and the September Massacres alarmed and repelled England's leaders, and the decision to recall the En- glish ambassador (who was formally appointed to the now nonexistent royal court) awoke French suspicions. Yet even the French victory at Valmy did not provoke much concern, and Grenville congratulated the Cabinet in November for having "the wit to keep ourselves out of this glorious enter- prise. . . . We are not tempted by the hope of sharing the spoils in the divi- sion of France, nor by the prospect of crushing all democratical principles all over the world. . . . We shall do nothing. "116
Yet despite their desire to avoid a direct clash, France and England soon saw each other both as a source of danger and as an obstacle that would be easy to overcome. England's insecurity arose primarily from its fear of French control over the Low Countries; as Grenville admitted on November
? ? ? army from directly threatening public order. The minister of finance, Etienne Claviere, wrote General Custine, "We must maintain a state of war; the return of our soldiers would increase the disorder everywhere and ruin us" and Roland reportedly remarked, "It is necessary to march the thousands of men whom we have under arms as far away as their legs will carry them, or else they will come back and cut our throats. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 286.
115 Quoted in Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:32. A British military representative in France reported that the revolution had so weakened the discipline of the French Army that it could not "frustrate, or even derange, the plans of the combined army of Austria and Prussia. " Quoted in Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 214.
116 Grenville was willing to recognize the republic "once order was restored," and George Ill remarked in September, "There is no step I should not take for the personal safety of the French King and his family that does not draw this country into meddling with the internal affairs of that ill-<<ated kingdom. " Pitt greeted the storming of the Tuileries in August by say- ing "I can see no step that would not do more harm than good," and in November he hoped that "some opportunity may arise which may enable us to contribute to the termination of the war between the different powers in Europe, leaving France . . . to arrange its own affairs as best it can. " See Ehrman, Reluctant Transition, 202-205; Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 41-43, 48, 195; and Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:6<HJ1.
[82]
? The French Revolution
14, "The conquest of Flanders . . . has brought the business to a much nearer issue here than any reasonable man could believe a month ago. " A British warning against reopening the River Scheidt arrived too late to stop the de- cree of November 16, but Pitt and Grenville immediately reaffirmed their commitment to defend Holland "against any attempt to invade it or disturb
its government. "117 This warning, which was explicitly intended to deter France from further expansion, shows how worried England's leaders were about French intentions. 118 These concerns were heightened by the Decree on Liberty, French support for the Dutch Patriot Party, and reports of Du- mouriez's plans to invade Holland. 119 The independence of the Low Coun- tries remained England's overriding concern from November forward and provided its ]primary motive for war.
A growing fear that the revolution might spread to England itself intensi- fied these perceptions of threat. Pressure for parliamentary reform had been building within the country for more than a decade, and the revolution in France had allready provoked a lively debate over the relative merits of the English and French constitutions. 120 A poor harvest and high prices fueled popular discontent and the growth of various radical associations, leading George III to issue a proclamation banning seditious writings in May.
The rising visibility of these radical movements seemed especially worri- some as Anglo-French relations deterioriated, because many English radi- cals were strongly pro-French. The popular societies welcomed the French victories at Valmy and Jemappes, and a dozen radical groups sent messages expressing their support for the revolution to the Convention and predicted
117 Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 198; and J. Holland Rose, "The Struggle with Revolutionary France," in Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, 1:226-27.
118 After the French conquest of Belgium, Grenville stated, "The only probable means of averting the danger is to meet it with firmness. . . . The King's intentions should be early and publicly notified, both to give encouragement to the Dutch Government . . . and to apprize those who may have hostile intentions of all the extent of those consequences which must arise from the execution of their plans. " Quoted in J. Holland Rose, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France in 1793, Part 1," English Historical Review 27, no. 105 (1912), 1 19.
119 British intelligence had intercepted a letter from Dumouriez stating that he was "count- ing on carrying liberty to the Batavians as I have to the Belgians. " Lebrun expressed similar ambitions in a letter to Dumouriez on November 22, and Dumouriez responded by predict- ing that "the Bat01vian Legion will promptly push the Revolution to the point where it will break out at the moment I appear on the Dutch border. " See Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:73-74, 76, 84; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 141; and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 235, 272.
120 The reform movement in England and the effects of the revolution are examined in Al- bert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movemen t in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); esp. chaps. 4 and 6; H. T. Dickinson,
British Radicalism and the French Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Revolution, I79J-IBI5 (Totowa, N. J. : Rowman and Littlefield, 1979); Mark Philp, ed. , The French Revolution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1991); and Colin Jones, ed. , Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion, and Propaganda (Exeter, England: University of Exeter, 1985).
? ? Revolution and War
that similar upheavals would soon occur in England. 121 The fear of revohn- tionary subversion was compounded by the bellicose rhetoric emanating from the Convention itself, on the one hand, and the enthusiastic welcome the deputies had extended to foreign sympathizers, on the other. 122 British leaders were also concerned by the growing number of French agents i? n London, and especially by emigre warnings of a French-backed plot to over- throw the govemment. 123
These developments brought a swift end to English complacency. By No- vember 18, Pitt said that "the unexpected tum of events in France is but too much likely to give encouragement to the forces of disorder in every part of the world," and Home Secretary Henry Dundas warned that "if the spirit of liberty and equality continues to spread with the same rapidity, . . . it must soon break out in open sedition. " These dangers were blamed on "secrefr
machinations" and "dangerous and unprincipled emissaries. " Lord Auck- land told one confidant at the end of November, "We may expect in about six months to be walking about on all fours in the woods, at least as many of us as can save our throats from the knife of liberty. "124 In response, the govern- ment called out the militia in December and began a campaign to discredit the radical forces and promote popular support for the govemment. 125
121 Aradical society in Rochester wrote Lebrun that "a great part of this generous nation is ready to make common cause with France," and emissaries from the Society for Constitu- tional Information appeared at the Convention in November and stated that "after the ex- ample given by France, revolutions will become easy. . . . [It) would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of con- gratulations to a National Convention of England. " A delegation of Irish and English radicals told the deputies, "It is for the French nation to free all Europe," adding that these beliefs were shared by "the vast majority of our compatriots. " For these and similar statements, see Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 244? 7, 501-12; Rose, Life ofPitt, 7o--'J1; and Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 55?
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
? ? The French Revolution
Prussia's desire for action was based on the same sort of optimistic beliefs that the Girondins had promulgated so effectively within France. Influenced by the testimony of emigre and royal agents (who portrayed the new regime as unpopular and vulnerable) and by the successful suppression of earlier revolts in Holland and Belgium, the Prussians assumed that the campaign would be short and easy. The belief that the revolution had sapped French
strength was widespread, in part because the exodus of the emigres had robbed the army of many of its officers. Catherine the Great believed that "a corps of 10,000 men would be sufficient to traverse [France] from one end to the other," while a Prussian diplomat reported that "France is without dis- ciplined armies, without experienced generals, without money, and the highest degree of anarchy reigns in all departments. " Similarly, one of Fred- erick William's chief advisors predicted, "The. comedy will not last long. The army of lawyers will be annihilated in Belgium and we shall be home by the autumn. '178 Austria's leaders assumed that the threat of invasion would quiet the Assembly as it had the previous summer, although a few officials were beginning to favor ambitious schemes of their own. Thus, if the Girondins envisioned war as a triumphant crusade for liberty, their op- ponents believed it either would be avoided entirely or would lead to a swift and lucrative victory.
As T. C. W. Blanning writes, "with all three combatants believing their side to be invincible and their opponents on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch into war. ''79 The Austrian note of February 17 pro- voked an uproar in the Assembly and led to Delessart's impeachment. The remaining Feuillant ministers resigned, and Louis reluctantly appointed a new cabinet containing several Girondins. For foreign minister he chose Charles-Fran\ois Dumouriez, an ambitious general who believed that the Austrian Netlherlands were ripe for revolt and hoped to establish his own rule there following a successful invasion. 80
Dumouriez began by attempting to isolate the Austrians, whowere cop- ing with Leopold's unexpected death on March 1 . He obtained assurances of neutrality fmm England, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, but his efforts to sever Prussia and the German states from Vienna failed completely. His first message to Austria (on March 19) was mild, but a second note nine
78 QuotedinCraneBrinton,ADecadeofRevolution:1789-1799(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1934), 84; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
79 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
80 DumourieztoldtheCouncilofMinistersonMarch22,"Allthese[Belgian]provincesare permeated by the spirit of liberty and shaken by recent revolution. . . . They will join forces with our troops and will easily drive the dispersed hordes of Austrian mercenaries from their towns. " Quoted in Patricia Chastain Howe, "Charles-Fran,. ois Dumouriez and the Revolu- tionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792," French Historical Studies 4, no. 3 (1985-86), 386-87; and see also Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224; and Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 177-78.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
days later demanded that Austria renounce the concert against France or face "the sternest measures. " Dumouriez had already warned the Assem- bly's Diplomatic Committee that Austrian reinforcements were transform- ing Belgium and Liege into a "formidable military state. " He now argued
. that a preemptive strike was preferable to letting France's enemies complete their preparations. A harsh Austrian reply to Dumouriez's first message brought fresh denunciations within the Assembly, and Austrian agents in France now reported that war was imminent. 81
On April 2o, Dumouriez presented to the Assembly a formal report listing France's motives for war. Louis bowed to the inevitable and asked the As- sembly for a formal declaration of war against "the king of Austria and Hungary. " Although several prominent Jacobins (notably Maximilien Ro- bespierre) opposed the decision, the motion passed with only seven dis- senting votes. 82 Austria and Prussia had already begun mobilizing their forces, and the first shots were to be fired by the end of the month. 83
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war. First, the war was not simply the result of ideological antipathies between the old-regime monarchies of Aus- tria and Prussia and the new regime in France. France was still officially a monarchy when the war broke out, and Frederick William of Prussia had been willing to negotiate an alliance with France in 1790. Dumouriez sought a similar arrangement in 1792 and explored the possibility of an alliance with England as well. Even more significantly, the French decided to invite the duke of Brunswick to command the French armies; his reputation as a commander was clearly more important to the Assembly than his status within the ancien regime. 84 These events suggest that internal differences
81 On Dumouriez's efforts to shake the Austro-Prussian alliance, see Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolutionfranfaise, 2:352-56; and Howe, "Dumouriez and French Foreign Affairs," 385-87.
82 Robespierre had opposed war since November, arguing with remarkable foresight that it would either restore the monarchy or usher in a military dictatorship. He ridiculed the uni- versalist pretensions of the Cirondins, arguing that "no one likes an armed missionary, and no more extravagant idea ever sprang from the idea of a politician than to suppose that one people has on1ly to enter another's territory with arms in its hands to make the latter adopt its Constitution. " See J. M. Thompson, Robespierre (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 202-209; Georges Michon, Robespierre et Ia guerre rivolutionnaire (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1937), 51-55; and Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:395-<)6. An equally prophetic warning was given by Henri Becquet, a deputy from Haute-Marne; see Thompson, French Revolution, 261.
83 The Austrians deployed fifty thousand men to the frontiers on April 12, eight days before the formal declaration of war by the French Assembly. Frederick William ordered his own army to mobilize for war on April 24, but Prussia did not declare war for several months.
84 The duke of Brunswick had won renown as a general in the Seven Years War and was considered a reformer within his own domains. Ironically, he was eventually appointed com- mander of the Austro-Prussian armies, and he led the initial invasion of France. See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1 :397-98; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :56-57.
? ? ? The French Revolution
were less significant than Girondin rhetoric implied; similarly, while foreign monarchs were concerned about the long-term impact of events in France, neither Prussia nor Austria went to war to defend the monarchical principle.
Second, although the impact of the revolution on the balance of power played a role in causing the war, the importance of this factor should not be overstated. Perceptions of French weakness fueled Prussian acquisitiveness and encouraged the belief that victory would be swift, but Prussia would not have gone to war on its own, and the decline of French power also en- couraged other states to concentrate on more pressing issues. England re- mained neutral, Russia and Austria concerned themselves with events in the East, and even Frederick William preferred to gain territory from Poland than from France. French weakness made these gambits seem feasible, but the war did not arise solely (or even primarily) from the desire to exploit France's difficulties.
Third, several significant misperceptions, which both exacerbated and were reinforced by the ideology of the revolutionary movement and the in- ternal struggle for power in France, clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war. The revolution had fostered a profound sense of insecurity within France, culminating in the belief that the king, the emigres, the clergy, and several foreign monarchs were conspiring to restore the ancien regime. This fear helped the Girondins persuade the Assembly that a foreign war was unavoidable and that it would help preserve the revolution. Their argu- ments rested on erroneous beliefs about the influence of the emigres and the hostility of Austria and Prussia, resulting from their misreading of the Aus- tro-Prussian rapprochement, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pill- nitz. Austria's clumsy attempts to browbeat the Assembly merely reinforced these tendencies and facilitated the Girondins' efforts.
Interestingly, the revolution did not provoke a similar degree of insecurity in Austria or Prussia, whose responses were not driven by a strong sense of French bellicosity. 85 Leopold and Frederick William were worried about the spread of revolutionary ideas and by aspects of French behavior, but neither went to war for that reason. Rather, Frederick William's decisions reflected his perennial desire to expand (bolstered by the testimony of certain emi- gres), while Austria was forced into war by the French response to their ear- lier threats and its own latent expansionism. 86 The fear of contagion was
85 That the sense of threat was limited may have been partly due to the modest scope of the changes within France. Although royal authority had been sharply curtailed and the position of the king was still precarious, the Constitution of 1791 not only retained the monarchy but gave the king a substantial role.
86 Kaunitz seems to have discounted the danger of revolutionary subversion prior to the war, writing in November 1791, "The alleged danger of the possible effects that the bad ex- ample of the French could have on other peoples is nothing but a wild-eyed panic, a chimera contradicted by the facts. " Quoted in Vivenot and Zeissberg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiser- politik, 1:286.
[73]
? Revolution and War
more prevalent in Spain, Sweden, Russia, and the smaller German states, but leaders there were not actively involved in the initial decisions for war. In partial contrast to the predictions set forth in chapter 2, therefore, the spi- ral of suspicion that led to the war of 1792 was essentially one-sided.
Fourth, the revolution had obvious and important effects on perceptions of the offense-defense balance, such that the use of force appeared more at- tractive. This factor was most evident in the Girondin campaign for war, which rested! on the claims that Europe was ripe for revolt, foreign merce- naries would be no match for "free" soldiers, and France would win a quick and costless victory. France's opponents evinced equal optimism, based on the widespread assumption that the revolution had left France in no condi- tion to fight. These perceptions were at least partly influenced by self-serv- ing testimony from the emigres or the revolutionary exiles in Paris, which helps explain why their forecasts were so inaccurate.
Finally, lack of information was an important contributing factor. Because they were unfamiliar with the subtleties of old-regime diplomacy, the deputies faHed to realize that Leopold's warnings were largely empty ges- tures. Similarly, because they had no reliable information about the rapid shifts in French domestic politics, Leopold and Kaunitz could not know that their efforts to browbeat the Assembly into a more moderate stance were having the opposite effect. The dearth of information played a key role in driving the spiral to war, therefore, as Austria's actions unintentionally con- firmed French fears and fortified the extremists.
With some qualifications, therefore, the war of 1792 illustrates many of the mechanisms that link revolution and war. The upheaval in France caused a destabilizing shift in the balance of power, an exaggerated percep- tion of hostility, an internal struggle for power in which foreign policy was a potent political issue, and visions of a mutual offensive advantage that in- flated both sides' confidence that they could improve their positions through war.
THE WAR OF THE FIRST CoALITION
When war broke out in April 1792, the combatants anticipated a short war and did not expect it to spread. Although the French proclaimed that they would wage a "war against kings," they delayed the declaration of war against Prussia, in an attempt to isolate Austria, and proceeded to launch a traditional limited war against the Austrian Netherlands. Austrian and Prussian war aims were unfocused, and both powers were soon distracted by the Russian invasion of Poland in May. 87 Divisions within the allied coali-
87 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 102-107.
? ? ? The French Revolution
tion helped the revolutionary government survive the initial clashes, and the conflict soon expanded throughout Europe and beyond.
The Second Revolution and the Expansion of the War
Contrary to the optimistic predictions of the Girondins, the war began with a series of embarrassing French defeats. The Army of the North in- vaded the Austrian Netherlands on April 28, but the inexperienced French troops broke and ran at their first encounter with the Austrian forces. A French general was murdered by his own troops, and the re- maining commanders declared an offensive impossible and refused to move. 88
The debacle further polarized the political climate in France. The gener- als blamed the defeat on lack of discipline and ministerial incompetence, while the Girondins accused the army and king of disloyalty, and Brissot warned that a secret "Austrian Committee" was at work to betray the country. 89 Given the initial belief that victory would be swift, treason seemed the only possible explanation for the initial setbacks. To stave off counterrevolution, the Assembly voted to deport the dissident clergy and dissolve the king's Swiss Guards, and ordered the deployment of provin- cial National Guards (known asfederes) around Paris. Louis promptly ve- toed these measures, dismissed the Girondin ministers, and reappointed the Feuillants. Now convinced that the radicals were intent on destroying the constitution, Lafayette left his troops and returned to Paris, where he tried unsuccessfully to rally the Assembly and the National Guard against the Jacobins. These events reunited opposition to the king, and the deputies overrode the royal veto on July 3 and authorized the federes to come to Paris to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. The As- sembly declared the country "in danger" on July 11 and decreed a new troop levy the following day. 90
TheFoundingoftheFirstRepublic. Demandstoabolishthemonarchywere growing by this point, exacerbating the divisions within the Jacobin move-
88 These events led Kaunitz to abandon his normal pessimism, and he predicted that France would fall in a single campaign. Another Austrian official declared that "two regi- ments of Hungarian hussars, with whips as their arms, would suffice to terminate the farce. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 174. On the failure of the initial campaign, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, 49-50; and Scott, Response of the Royal Army, 1 16-17.
89 Girondin accusations about the "Austrian committee" turned out to be partially true, as agents of the queen had sent information about French military plans to the Austrian com- manders. See Soboul, French Revolution, 242-44; Sutherland, France, 145; and Mathiez, French Revolution, 149-50.
90 See Mathiez, French Revolution, 148-56; and Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 137-46.
? ? ? Revolution and War
ment. 91 The Girondins were alarmed by the popular agitation in Paris and the growing strength of the more radical Montagnards, and they began ne- gotiating with Louis for reappointment after the Feuillant cabinet resigned on July 10.
The struggle for power reached a climax after France's opponents made yet another ill-advised attempt to intimidate the Assembly. When the Aus- tro-Prussian invasion finally got underway in July, concern for the royal fam- ily led the duke of Brunswick to issue an ultimatum threatening the destruction of Paris if its members were harmed. The so-called Brunswick Manifesto was actually the brainchild of a royalist emigre, and like Leopold! ' s earlier demarches, the declaration merely intensified French fears and un- dermined the king's position even inore. 92
Spurred on by Jacobin propaganda, deteriorating economic conditions, and the fear of foreign occupation, the population of Paris rose in protest on August 9? Angry sans-culottes replaced the municipal government with a new body-known as the Paris Commune-and a mob of Parisians and
federes stormed the Tuileries and forced the royal family to take refuge with the Assembly. Alarmed by the popular insurgency and fearing for their own safety, the deputies voted to recognize the Commune as a legitimate body and to suspend the king pending election of a national convention based on universal male suffrage. 93 Executive leadership (including the management of foreign policy) would be conducted by a provisional exec- utive council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Pierre Helene-Marie Lebrun, a parvenu journalist and protege of Dumouriez. 94 In a burst of revolutionary fervor, the Assembly voted to bestow French citi- zenship on a number of foreign sympathizers and approved a motion re- nouncing conquests and expressing its desire for "fraternity with all peoples. "95
After another outburst of mob violence and a hasty series of elections, the new National Convention convened in Paris on September 21. The deputies
91 A delegation from the fideres in Paris demanded the suspension of the king on July 17, claiming that "without the treason of the enemies of the interior, the others [i. e. , Austria, Prussia, a111d the emigres] were not to be feared or rather they would not exist. " Quoted in Sutherland, France, 147.
92 For the text of the manifesto, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 306-11; on its origins and effects, see H. A. Barton, "The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto," French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (1967); and Biro, German Policy, 1:68-71.
93 See Doyle, History of the French Revolution, 184-89; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:229-35?
94 The Executive Council was first led by Danton and later by Georges Roland, while the Diplomatic Committee of the Assembly included Brissot and several of his associates. See J. T. Murley, "The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1 793" (Ph. D. diss. , Oxford University, 1959), 5-21.
95 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:54-55; and Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution fran? aise, 3:15.
? ? ? The French Revolution
immediately voted to abolish the monarchy and place the king on trial and began to mobilize the nation for war. In less than six months, the war had destroyed both the monarchy and the Constitution of 1791 and given birth to the First Republic. 96
Revolutionary Expansion. By the end of the year, what had begun as a defensive struggle against a counterrevolutionary expedition had become an offensive war of conquest. This dramatic improvement in France's mil- itary fortunes was partly the result of an outpouring of patriotic feeling, which filled the ranks of the French forces with enthusiastic if unskilled volunteers. 97 Equally important, however, were the rivalries and distrac- tions that weakened France's opponents. The Austro-Prussian invasion was first delayed by negotiations over contributions and compensations and then undermined by overconfidence, mutual suspicions, and a pre- occupation with events in Eastern Europe. As a result, Austria con- tributed only 70,000 of its 2oo,ooo troops and Prussia sent only 40,000 out of 170,000. The invading force did not cross the French border until Au- gust 19, and! its slow rate of advance gave the French invaluable time to prepare. 98
The tide turned on September 20, when a body of French artillery halted a Prussian assault at the Battle of Valmy. With his army weakened from dis- ease and bad weather, Brunswick called off the advance and began negoti- ations with Dumouriez (who had resigned from the cabinet in June and taken command of the French Army of the North). These parleys continued for over a month, and though Frederick William kept up appearances by declining an offer of alliance and ordering Brunswick to issue another threatening manifesto, his enthusiasm for the war was fading rapidly. Du- mouriez eventually permitted the Prussian forces to withdraw unchal- lenged, and Frederick William informed the Austrians in late October that he would require additional compensation in Poland i? he were to continue the war. 99 The Prussian forces had left French territory by the end of Octo-
96 In September, Jacobin efforts to rally the population and reports that the foreign armies were advancing on Paris led to the murder of over a thousand imprisoned criminals who were mistakenly believed to be counterrevolutionaries. See Sutherland, France, 154-55; Thompson, French Revolution, 302-309; Patrice Gueniffy, "Paris Commune," and Fran? ois Furet, "Terror," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 138-39, 52<r-22. .
97 Samuel F. Scott reports that "during 1792 more than 70,000 men enlisted in the line army, an impressive achievement under any circumstances. " Response of the Royal Army, 165; also see Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 66-74.
98 Ross, European Diplomatic History, 51-52.
99 The negotiations between France and Prussia are recounted in Biro, German Policy, 1:7cr87; Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution franraise, 3:53-55, 77--96; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:139-48, 172-77, 185-88; Karl A. Raider, Jr. , Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), too-101; and Schroeder, Transforma- tion of European Politics, 1 1 8-20.
[77]
? Revolution and War
ber, while a French army occupied Savoy and Nice and another moved into the Rhineland. 100
J. T. Murley notes, "Had the Republic been prepared to compromise with the Austro-Prussian Coalition, a general peace might have resulted. "101 The main issue was whether the French would insist on imposing republican in- stitutions in the areas it had conquered or permit these peoples to choose their own rulers without interference. The latter outcome was not incon- ceivable, as the negotiations between France and Prussia had shown that the Executive Council was willing to cooperate with foreign monarchs and the Assembly had passed a resolution renouncing foreign conquests in Au- gust. Moreover, the Executive Council had reaffirmed that France would not "interfere in the internal government of other peoples," and the Gi- rondin leaders knew that ending the war would reduce the fear of counter- revolution and aid their ability to control the popular forces.
They were increasingly concerned about the costs of the war as well, and some worried that a campaign of expansion would both jeopardize efforts to reach a sep- arate peace with Prussia and contradict the revolutionary ideals of liberty and self-determination. 102
Yet other forces drew the Republic toward a policy of revolutionary ex- pansion. This outcome was partly due to the ambitions of men such as Du- mouriez-who saw the war primarily as an opportunity for personal advancement-as well as latent French hostility to Austria and the anticler- ical sentiments that dominated the Assembly. These concerns-together with a desire for territorial aggrandizement-account for the Executive Council's decision to authorize an invasion "to enfranchise the oppressed peoples" in the Netherlands on October 6. 103
Even more importantly, the policy of revolutionary expansion resulted from the same influences that had driven France to war seven months ear-
? 100 The expedition into the Rhineland was based on the unfulfilled hope of a general upris- ing among the local population. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:165-72.
101 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 98. Of course, peace in the west would not have ended the rivalries among the eastern powers, and might well have increased them. 102 On October 8, Brissot wrote that while "it would suit us to be surrounded by allied re- publics, our Republic would lose itself in expanding. " On October 24, the Diplomatic Com- mittee of the Convention advised against further expansion and declared that the French were not "conquerors of territory but the benefactors of the human race. " Similarly, Dumouriez's Manifesto to the Belgians, published at the beginning of his invasion, pledged, "We enter to help you plant the tree of liberty, but without involving ourselves at all in the constitution that you
wish to adopt. " All quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," ttS-19.
103 Brissot wrote Dumouriez that "the French Republic should not have any boundary other than the Rhine," and Lazare Camot justified annexation on the grounds that "the an- cient and natural boundaries of France are the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. " Similarly, Danton argued for the annexation of Belgium by saying it was "pointless to fear overextend- ing the Republic. Its boundaries have been set by nature. " See Denis Richet, "Natural Bor- ders," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 758.
? ? The French Revolution
lier. French foreign policy was in the hands of leaders who still saw them- selves as part of a universal movement for liberty and whose hostility to monarchical nnstitutions had led them to depose their own king. Although these ideological principles could be used to justify nonintervention (as im- posing liberty by force would violate the rights of the alleged beneficiaries), the belief that neighboring peoples were eager to receive the fruits of liberty obscured the possibility that they might actually not welcome the French as- sistance. Moreover, hostility to monarchical institutions increased French perceptions of threat so that expansion seemed necessary for security. For- eign Minister Lebrun told the deputies, "The moment of greatest danger will arrive next spring, when allied tyranny will make its last effort, and then we must repel the combined force of all the kings. " In September, Dan- ton told the Convention, "We have the right to say to the peoples: you shall have no more kings! " and warned that, were France to remain surrounded by monarchs, these peoples "would furnish us with an endless series of tyrants to combat. "104 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, en- dorsed a petition to annex Savoy by saying, "It in no way adds to the hatred of oppressors for the Revolution. . . . It adds to the resources by which we
shall break their league. . . . All Governments are our enemies, all Peoples are our allies; either we shall fall or all peoples shall become free. "105 Having defined the war as a campaign against kings, it was hard to limit it so long as a single monarch remained on a throne. As in the winter of 1791--92, the beliefs that foreign powers were intrinsically hostile and that the revolution was part of a universal trend combined to justify a policy of expansion.
The impact of these beliefs was accentuated by rivalries between the Girondin and Montagnard factions and the chaotic nature of decision-mak- ing within the Convention. Although the Girondins controlled the Execu- tive Council, they lacked an absolute majority in the Convention, and the Montagnards were more popular among the radical Parisian sections. To compensate for their moderation on domestic issues, therefore, the Girondins returned to the bellicose rhetoric they had used so successfully
104 Danton's words were somewhat disingenuous, as he was simultaneously negotiating for a separate peace with Prussia. Yet his willingness to use such rhetoric in the Convention reveals his awareness of its political potency, and he told the Convention that it "should be a committee of general insurrection against all the kings in the universe, and I ask that in call- ing all peoples to the conquest of liberty [the National Convention] offer them all the means of repulsing tyraMy. . . . The French cannot endure that peoples who aspire to liberty never- theless give themselves a government contrary to their interests. " Quoted in Albert Mathiez,
Danton et Ia paix (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1919), 58; also see his French Revolution, 278; Norman Hampsoll,l Danton (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 89-93; and Murley, "Origin oftheAnglo-FrenchWar," 102.
105 Like Danton, Gregoire also maintained that spreading the revolution would protect France from its opponents. In his words: "When my neighbor keeps a nest of vipers, I have the right to smother them lest I become their victim. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 285.
[791
? Revolution and War
the previous year. And as Murley points out, because the Convention still lacked fixed rules of procedure, "major decisions turned on the chance pas- sions of unregulated debates, . . . exposed to the harangue of the dema- gogue, to the irresponsible maneouvre of faction and, above all, to the popular enthusiasms of the great mass of deputies. " In this setting, ideolog- ically inspired passions dominated and a careful assessment of interests and capabilities was virtually impossible. 106
The key shift occurred on November 6, 1792, when Dumouriez's Army of the North defeated the Austrians at Jemappes and occupied the Austrian Netherlands, accompanied by two divisions of Belgian exiles. 107 The unex- pected victory seemed to confirm the Girondins' optimistic predictions, and doubts about the policy of expansion were swept away in an outpouring of revolutionary fervor. Vergniaud described Jemappes as a "victory for all hu- manity" and the Montagnards now joined the chorus, with one deputy pre- dicting that "the territory that separates Paris from Petersburg and Moscow will soon be Francicized, municipalized, and Jacobinized. " Gregoire pro- claimed, "A new era has opened . . . [and] this part of the globe will no longer contain either fortresses or foreign peoples. " The Vicaire Episcopal of the Cathedral of St. Font held a celebratory Te Deum in which he predicted that "the French will proceed from conquest to conquest, their glory will be envied by all nations, [and] the spectacle of their happiness will excite the emulation of all peoples. " Lebrun christened his infant daughter "Civilis- Victoires-Jemappes-Dumouriez" and expressed his hope that the French would soon "deliver their Batavian brothers from the Stadholder's yoke. " In the same spirit, Brissot told a friend, "We cannot be at ease until Europe, all
Europe, is ablaze," and he called for further "upheavals of the globe, these
great revolutions that we are called upon to make. "108
This heady atmosphere was quickly transformed into action. On Novem- ber 16, the Convention voted to open the River Scheidt to international ship- ping, even though it would violate several existing treaties and threaten
106 Murley also describes the Convention as "a running faction fight rather than a debate between organized parties" and concludes that "the internal conflict was an important, per- haps a decisive factor in the official conduct of the war and foreign policy. " "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 97-98, 1 14. On the Girondins' motivations, see Lefebvre, French Revolu-
tion, 1:273.
107 Pressure from foreign revolutionar;jes in Paris had already led the Assembly to establish
a Belgian-Liegeois Legion in April 1792, and Batavian, Allobrogian (for the Savoyards and Swiss), and Germanic legions were formed later in the year. See Palmer, Democratic Revolu- tion, 2:56; and Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " chap. 3?
108 Brissot also advised Dumouriez not to "busy oneself any longer with these projects of alliance with Prussia or England; [these are] sorry structures that are bound to disappear. " Thesequotations are from Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 125-28; Palmer, Demo- cratic Revolution, 2:6o; and Richet, "Natural Borders," 758. Even Kidner, who argues that the Girondists were not committed to a "propaganda war," concedes that Brissot's ambitions in this case were genuine. "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 232-35, 267-68.
?
? [8o]
? The French Revolution
long-standing English interests. 109 An equally rash and even more ominous step was the so-called Decree on Liberty of November 19, which declared that France would "grant fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to re- cover their libenty. " The decree was not the result of a well-formed plan for exporting the revolution; on the contrary, it was an impromptu response to foreign requests for protection against counterrevolution. Yet with an "ex- cess of oratory and a deficit of deliberation," the deputies once again suc- cumbed to a vnsion of a universal crusade for liberty and approved the motion after a cursory debate. 110
The November 19 decree was followed by a second decree, on December 15, intended to provide specific guidance to the French military leaders in the conquered regions. The new measure ordered French commanders to abolish feudal institutions in the occupied regions and to finance these ac- tions by confiscating property from the privileged orders. The decree was partly a response to the mounting costs of the war, but it was also intended to give the Convention greater control over ambitious generals like Du- mouriez. 111 In practice, the decree was a license to use the wealth of the oc- cupied regions to pay for French occupation and to support pro-French factions within them. By this step, "the revolutionaries progressed from a war of prudence to a war of propaganda to a war of imperial expansion. "112
Like their predecessors in the Legislative Assembly, the deputies in the Convention had fallen victim to a fictitious image of irreducibly hostile monarchies, restive foreign subjects, and irresistible revolutionary momen- tum. The rhetoric behind their actions was often instrumental, and some of the deputies wel! 'e aware of the hazards of a revolutionary war a outrance. 113 But depicting the war in such stark and universal terms committed them to a policy of expansion that they never examined carefully, and both their rhetoric and their behavior reinforced foreign fears about French intentions and the possibility that the revolution might spread. 114
109 Lebrun was apparently responsible for this initiative, which was designed to win the support of Belgian merchants. See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 227-30.
110 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 136-37; Stewart, Documentary Survey, 381; Biro, German Policy, 1:112-14; and Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda Wa? ,' " 2JD-J- 8.
111 To preserve his popularity, Dumouriez had refused to levy forced requisitions, arranged elections for a Belgian assembly, and agreed to preserve the property and tithes of the ruling classes, in exchange for a loan to support his own forces and an independent Belgian army. The Convention began to fear that Dumouriez would become strong enough to take inde- pendent action, correctly as it turned out. See Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 153; Ross, Euro- pean Diplomatic History, 62-63; and Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:76-78. The text of the December 15 decree is in Stewart, Documentary Survey, )81--84.
112 Blanning,FrenchRevolutionaryWars,136.
113 Lebrun tried unsuccessfully to qualify the Decree on Liberty shortly after its passage, and various foreign revolutionaries (most notably the Dutch) were disappointed by the pal- try1support they received from France.
1 4ByDecember,someGirondinleaderswereconvincedthatwarwasnecessarytokeepthe [81]
? Revolution and War
England's Entrance into the War. Nowhere were these fears more evident or important than in England. As described earlier, England's leaders had seen the revolution as a favorable development at first and had maintained a policy of steadfast neutrality despite entreaties from the emigres and the fulminations of Edmund Burke and others. This position did not waver as the war with Austria and Prussia approached, and Pitt justified further re- ductions in the military budget in February 1792 with the confident claim that "there never was a time in the history of this country, when . . . we
might reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than at the present time. " England's leaders expected France to collapse quickly and anticipated fur- ther gains: according to Foreign Minister Grenville, "as soon as the German troops arrive in Paris, whatever is the ruling party in Paris must apply to us to mediate ! for them. "115
Anglo-French relations began to deteriorate after the "Second Revolu- tion" in August. The suspension of the king and the September Massacres alarmed and repelled England's leaders, and the decision to recall the En- glish ambassador (who was formally appointed to the now nonexistent royal court) awoke French suspicions. Yet even the French victory at Valmy did not provoke much concern, and Grenville congratulated the Cabinet in November for having "the wit to keep ourselves out of this glorious enter- prise. . . . We are not tempted by the hope of sharing the spoils in the divi- sion of France, nor by the prospect of crushing all democratical principles all over the world. . . . We shall do nothing. "116
Yet despite their desire to avoid a direct clash, France and England soon saw each other both as a source of danger and as an obstacle that would be easy to overcome. England's insecurity arose primarily from its fear of French control over the Low Countries; as Grenville admitted on November
? ? ? army from directly threatening public order. The minister of finance, Etienne Claviere, wrote General Custine, "We must maintain a state of war; the return of our soldiers would increase the disorder everywhere and ruin us" and Roland reportedly remarked, "It is necessary to march the thousands of men whom we have under arms as far away as their legs will carry them, or else they will come back and cut our throats. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 286.
115 Quoted in Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:32. A British military representative in France reported that the revolution had so weakened the discipline of the French Army that it could not "frustrate, or even derange, the plans of the combined army of Austria and Prussia. " Quoted in Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 214.
116 Grenville was willing to recognize the republic "once order was restored," and George Ill remarked in September, "There is no step I should not take for the personal safety of the French King and his family that does not draw this country into meddling with the internal affairs of that ill-<<ated kingdom. " Pitt greeted the storming of the Tuileries in August by say- ing "I can see no step that would not do more harm than good," and in November he hoped that "some opportunity may arise which may enable us to contribute to the termination of the war between the different powers in Europe, leaving France . . . to arrange its own affairs as best it can. " See Ehrman, Reluctant Transition, 202-205; Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 41-43, 48, 195; and Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:6<HJ1.
[82]
? The French Revolution
14, "The conquest of Flanders . . . has brought the business to a much nearer issue here than any reasonable man could believe a month ago. " A British warning against reopening the River Scheidt arrived too late to stop the de- cree of November 16, but Pitt and Grenville immediately reaffirmed their commitment to defend Holland "against any attempt to invade it or disturb
its government. "117 This warning, which was explicitly intended to deter France from further expansion, shows how worried England's leaders were about French intentions. 118 These concerns were heightened by the Decree on Liberty, French support for the Dutch Patriot Party, and reports of Du- mouriez's plans to invade Holland. 119 The independence of the Low Coun- tries remained England's overriding concern from November forward and provided its ]primary motive for war.
A growing fear that the revolution might spread to England itself intensi- fied these perceptions of threat. Pressure for parliamentary reform had been building within the country for more than a decade, and the revolution in France had allready provoked a lively debate over the relative merits of the English and French constitutions. 120 A poor harvest and high prices fueled popular discontent and the growth of various radical associations, leading George III to issue a proclamation banning seditious writings in May.
The rising visibility of these radical movements seemed especially worri- some as Anglo-French relations deterioriated, because many English radi- cals were strongly pro-French. The popular societies welcomed the French victories at Valmy and Jemappes, and a dozen radical groups sent messages expressing their support for the revolution to the Convention and predicted
117 Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 198; and J. Holland Rose, "The Struggle with Revolutionary France," in Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, 1:226-27.
118 After the French conquest of Belgium, Grenville stated, "The only probable means of averting the danger is to meet it with firmness. . . . The King's intentions should be early and publicly notified, both to give encouragement to the Dutch Government . . . and to apprize those who may have hostile intentions of all the extent of those consequences which must arise from the execution of their plans. " Quoted in J. Holland Rose, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France in 1793, Part 1," English Historical Review 27, no. 105 (1912), 1 19.
119 British intelligence had intercepted a letter from Dumouriez stating that he was "count- ing on carrying liberty to the Batavians as I have to the Belgians. " Lebrun expressed similar ambitions in a letter to Dumouriez on November 22, and Dumouriez responded by predict- ing that "the Bat01vian Legion will promptly push the Revolution to the point where it will break out at the moment I appear on the Dutch border. " See Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:73-74, 76, 84; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 141; and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 235, 272.
120 The reform movement in England and the effects of the revolution are examined in Al- bert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movemen t in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); esp. chaps. 4 and 6; H. T. Dickinson,
British Radicalism and the French Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Revolution, I79J-IBI5 (Totowa, N. J. : Rowman and Littlefield, 1979); Mark Philp, ed. , The French Revolution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1991); and Colin Jones, ed. , Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion, and Propaganda (Exeter, England: University of Exeter, 1985).
? ? Revolution and War
that similar upheavals would soon occur in England. 121 The fear of revohn- tionary subversion was compounded by the bellicose rhetoric emanating from the Convention itself, on the one hand, and the enthusiastic welcome the deputies had extended to foreign sympathizers, on the other. 122 British leaders were also concerned by the growing number of French agents i? n London, and especially by emigre warnings of a French-backed plot to over- throw the govemment. 123
These developments brought a swift end to English complacency. By No- vember 18, Pitt said that "the unexpected tum of events in France is but too much likely to give encouragement to the forces of disorder in every part of the world," and Home Secretary Henry Dundas warned that "if the spirit of liberty and equality continues to spread with the same rapidity, . . . it must soon break out in open sedition. " These dangers were blamed on "secrefr
machinations" and "dangerous and unprincipled emissaries. " Lord Auck- land told one confidant at the end of November, "We may expect in about six months to be walking about on all fours in the woods, at least as many of us as can save our throats from the knife of liberty. "124 In response, the govern- ment called out the militia in December and began a campaign to discredit the radical forces and promote popular support for the govemment. 125
121 Aradical society in Rochester wrote Lebrun that "a great part of this generous nation is ready to make common cause with France," and emissaries from the Society for Constitu- tional Information appeared at the Convention in November and stated that "after the ex- ample given by France, revolutions will become easy. . . . [It) would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of con- gratulations to a National Convention of England. " A delegation of Irish and English radicals told the deputies, "It is for the French nation to free all Europe," adding that these beliefs were shared by "the vast majority of our compatriots. " For these and similar statements, see Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 244? 7, 501-12; Rose, Life ofPitt, 7o--'J1; and Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 55?
