No More Learning

They included Shah Jahan's wonderful Peacock Throne, the
jewels alone of which, without reckoning the precious metal of
which the throne was made, were valued at twenty million rupees.
Sarbuland Khan, excused by his poverty from contributing any-
thing himself, was charged to collect from the nobles, the officers of
the court and army, and the wealthy inhabitants, and his zeal and
activity were stimulated from time to time by threats and rewards.
The property of Khan Dauran and his brother was confiscated and
yielded to Nadir's treasury fifty million rupees. Nizam-ul-Mulk and
Qamar-ud-din Khan each contributed fifteen million in jewels, trea-
sure and goods. Violence and torture were used in extorting contribu-
tions. A grand-daughter of Kam Bakhsh was married to Nadir's
youngest son, Nasr-ullah Mirza. Before leaving Delhi Nadir Shah
formally annexed the province of Kabul and all territory west of the
Indus, and gave Muhammad Shah advice which that prince had neither
the sense nor the moral courage to follow. He expressed his horror
at the idea of the misbelievers levying taxes in the dominions of Islam,
counselled him to resume all assignments and to pay his nobles and
officers direct from the treasury, permitting none to maintain troops.
At the charges of the state the emperor should have picked horsemen
under officers appointed by himself. He warned the emperor particu-
larly against Nizam-ul-Mulk, whom he had found to be cunning.
self-seeking and more ambitious than became a subject.
1 The most rigid discipline was maintained in the Persian army. “Eighty
Kuzzlebash had their Bellies ript up at Cabul, for only being present when
some of their own People forced one of the Country women” (Fraser, p. 151),


## p. 363 (#399) ############################################

INTRIGUES AGAINST THE TURANIAN FACTION 363
It is said that Nadir Shah admitted to some of his own officers that
he had acted indiscreetly in two matters, namely in permitting
Muhammad Shah to retain a throne of which he was not worthy
and in sparing the life of a courtier so crafty and unscrupulous as
Nizam-ul-Mulk.
On 16 May Nadir Shah left Delhi carrying with him his immense
booty. Different authorities estimate the cash alone at amounts
varying from eight to more than thirty million sterling, besides
jewels, plate, cash, stuffs and other valuable property. The emperor
also took with him a thousand elephants, seven thousand horses, ten
thousand camels, a hundred eunuchs, a hundred and thirty writers,
two hundred builders, a hundred masons, and two hundred carpen-
ters. By a decree issued from Delhi Nadir Shah generously remitted
all taxes throughout Persia for a period of three years.
His departure left Muhammad Shah and his courtiers stupefied
with the blow which had fallen on them. For two months nothing
was done or proposed in regard to the state of affairs in the empire.
Even this blow could not awaken from the heavy sleep of security,
and the lethargy of indolence, people who were so intoxicated with
the wine of pride and self-conceit. They agreed only in ill-will to
each other. It was not until November that the emperor and his
courtiers could summon up energy for active intrigue.
Nadir Shah's warnings had had some effect on Muhammad Shah,
who was now suspicious of Nizam-ul-Mulk and all the Turanian
nobles. After secret conversations with the object of undermining
the power and influence of the Turanian party, he promised to
appoint 'Umdat-ul-Mulk in place of Qamar-ud-din Khan, the mini-
ster, who was second in importance only to Nizam-ul-Mulk among
the Turanians. The latter now prepared to set out for his viceroyalty
in the Deccan. Qamar-ud-din Khan learnt what had passed and
wrote to Nizam-ul-Mulk, by whose advice he resigned his post, left
Delhi and joined the Nizam. Muhammad Shah consulted others
and was told that 'Umdat-ul-Mulk could never stand against the
power of the Turanian party. The result was the complete collapse
of the emperor's plot. 'Umdat-ul-Mulk was himself sent to the camp
to make his peace with Qamar-ud-din Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk,
and did so with such openness and honesty as to win the latter's
warm approval. As he could not remain in the capital after what had
passed, he left Delhi for Allahabad, of which province he held the
government. Nizam-ul-Mulk, in view of the necessity for frustrating
the emperor's schemes for the oppression of the Turanian faction,
deferred his departure for the Deccan.
At the same time Safdar Jang, the nephew and son-in-law of
Burhan-ul-Mulk, was formally confirmed in the government of Oudh,
in which he had been acting since his uncle's death, while Zakariya
Khan received the Punjab and Multan, in which, until the battle


## p. 364 (#400) ############################################

364
MUHAMMAD SHAH
of Karnal, he had been merely the deputy of his father, Khan
Dauran.
The affairs of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa now claim
our attention. The pernicious practice of uniting several rich provinces
under the government of a viceroy to whom, and not to the emperor,
the actual governor of each province was immediately subordinate
was now as firmly established in this region as in the Deccan. Prince
'Azim-ush-Shan had held these three provinces and that of Allahabad
in addition, and when the Sayyid brothers, who had been his deputies
in Allahabad, left their province with the object of placing Farrukh-
siyar on the throne Ja'far Khan, who had been the prince's deputy
in Bengal, governed the three provinces, from which Allahabad was
then separated, as viceroy. Ja'far Khan had died in 1726, when Khan
Dauran, who never concerned himself with the affairs of these pro-
vinces, was formally appointed viceroy, while the government of the
provinces was actually carried on by Shuja'-ud-din Muhammad Khan,
Ja'far Khan's son-in-law, who had been his deputy in Orissa, and
received, on his promotion, the title of Shuja'-ud-Daula. He ruled
the provinces ably and well for thirteen years and died on 24 March,
1739, while Nadir Shah was at Delhi. He was succeeded, as a matter
of course, the hereditary principle being by now established in the
great provincial governments, by his son Sarfaraz Khan, who bore
the title of 'Ala-ud-Daula. Sarfaraz Khan was pious and devout, but
weak, and attempted to favour his own personal servants at the
expense of his father's old advisers, who were too strong for him.
He also attempted to interfere in the administration of Bihar, the
governor of which, appointed by his father, was 'Ali Vardi Khan,
entitled Mahabat Jang. 'Ali Vardi wrote to an old friend at court
and offered, for a commission as viceroy of the three provinces and
written permission to expel Sarfaraz Khan, a gift to the emperor of
ten million rupees. He had also a private wrong to avenge. Sarfaraz
Khan had attempted to take away the wife of his grandson, Siraj-
ud-Daula, and to marry her to his own son. 'Ali Vardi's prayer
”
'
was supported by an accusation that Sarfaraz had obeyed the order
in a letter sent by Nadir Shah to his father, but received after his
father's death, and had caused the khutba to be read in the invader's
name. It was also suggested that if Sarfaraz Khan were captured
or slain his father's considerable wealth would escheat to the crown.
Money was scarce at Delhi, and these offers were very welcome, but
time was required for the completion of the transaction and it was
not until March, 1740, that 'Ali Vardi received his commission,
1 Also known as Murshid Quli Khan, the founder of Murshidabad.
3 The “Surajah Dowlah" of Macaulay and "Sir Roger Dowler" of contemporary
English prints, afterwards infamous as the author of the tragedy of the Black
Hole of Calcutta. See chap. VII, vol. v.
3 Coin was actually
struck at 'Azimabad (Patna) and at Murshidabad in the name of Nadir Shah
(Whitehead, Punjab Museum Catalogue, m, pp. lii and lxv) (Ed. ).


## p. 365 (#401) ############################################

DEATH OF BAJI RAO PESHWA
865
Early in April 'Ali Vardi Khan marched from Patna for Murshi-
dabad. Sarfaraz Khan was surrounded by traitors who kept the news
of his enemy's movements from him as long as they could, and it was
not until he had reached Rajmahal that Sarfaraz Khan heard of his
advance. He marched from Murshidabad on 19 April, and two days
later reached Giria, on the eastern bank of the Bhagirathi, about
twenty-five miles north-west of his capital. 'Ali Vardi Khan encamped
on the opposite bank of the river and succeeded by protestations
of fidelity supported by a false oath sworn on a brick wrapped in
a cloth, which was supposed to be a copy of the Koran, and by the
treacherous assurances of false counsellors in persuading Sarfaraz
Khan that he had come to do homage. The simple Sarfaraz paid no
heed to warnings uttered by the very few servants who remained
faithful to him and 'Ali Vardi was able to surprise him shortly before
dawn. Notwithstanding the surprise and the treachery of many of
the troops as well as the counsellors the battle was fiercely contested.
but Sarfaraz Khan was ultimately shot in the forehead by one of
his own men and killed, and 'Ali Vardi Khan entered Murshidabad on
12 May, 1740, as viceroy of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.
On 28 April, 1740, Baji Rao, the Peshwa, died, and the Turanian
party at court took advantage of his death to appoint one of their
number, 'Azim-ullah Khan, as his successor in the government of
Malwa. The administration of the Maratha commonwealth now
exhibited some of the signs of weakness which were more clearly
perceptible in the Mughul empire. The expansion of their sphere
of activity had been followed by the enfeeblement of the central
authority and the introduction of the hereditary principle in the
great offices of state and the government of those parts of their
dominions which were at a distance from the royal residence.
Damaji Gaikwar had succeeded his father Pilaji in Gujarat; Ranoji
Sindia was established as collector of the Marathas' share of the
revenue in Malwa; Malhar Rao Holkar administered from Mahesh-
war territory corresponding nearly to the state over which his de-
scendant still rules, and a disputed succession in the Gond kingdom
of Deogarh had already given Raghuji Bhonsle, who was governing
Berar on behalf of the Peshwa, an opportunity of intervention, and
three years later he established himself in its new capital, Nagpur.
He was at this time commanding a mixed force of 50,000 men drawn
from the armies of Shahu, the Peshwa, and other chiefs and operating
in the Carnatic, where it had defeated and slain Dost Ali, the
nephew and successor of Daud Khan Pani in the eastern Carnatic,
and was busily intriguing to prevent the succession of Balaji Ran.
son of Baji Rao, as Peshwa. His intrigues were fruitless and Balaji
Rao succeeded.
The death of Baji Rao encouraged Nasir Jang, the second son of
1 See chap. XIV, p. 408.


## p. 366 (#402) ############################################

366
MUHAMMAD SHAH
1
Nizam-ul-Mulk, who had been left by his father as deputy in the
viceroyalty when he went to Delhi in 1737, to assume the position
of an independent ruler. Remonstrances went unheeded and on
7 August Nizam-ul-Mulk set out for the Deccan to reduce his re-
fractory son to obedience, leaving his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din Khan,
as his representative at the capital in the post of assistant minister.
He reached Burhanpur on 19 November and halted there for some
time while fruitlessly endeavouring to induce Nasir Jang to submit
without an appeal to arms. His arguments had no effect, and the
rebel continued to hide or fight till August, 1741, when he was taken
prisoner and was confined for a time in the fort of Kandhar.
The appointment of Azim-ullah Khan to Malwa was merely an
expression of the hopes which the death of an important Maratha
leader invariably raised in the breasts of the imperial statesmen and
soldiers, and which were as invariably blasted. The death of Shivaji
betokened to Aurangzib the immediate dissolution of the Maratha
forces, but was followed by no diminution of activity even under the
dissolute Shambhuji. After the capture and execution of Shambhuji
and the detention of his son Shahu, Raja Ram had stepped into the
breach. Now, too, Baji Rao was dead, but the Maratha grip was
closed on Malwa, and Balaji Rao, the new Peshwa, considered that
the appointment of a Muslim noble was an invasion of his rights.
'Azim-ullah Khan had made a futile attempt to assert himself as
governor by the despatch of a deputy whom his resources permitted
him neither to equip adequately nor to support efficiently. His failure
provided the emperor with a pretext for humiliating a Turanian
noble by dismissal. 'Azim-ullah Khan, smarting under his disgracé,
temporarily left Delhi but soon wearied of being continually watched
and returned to his house, dismissed his establishment and lived the
life of a recluse. In December, 1742, he again fled from Delhi to
Lahore, where he took refuge with the governor, Zakariya Khan,
with whom he was connected by marriage, but Zakariya Khan sur-
rendered him and he was carried back to Delhi and confined in the
palace, where he died on 24 October, 1744.
'Ali Vardi Khan had established his authority in Bengal, and in
Bihar where he appointed his son-in-law Haibat Jang as his deputy,
but Orissa was still in the hands of Murshid Quli Khan, who had
been Shuja'-ud-Daula's deputy in that province. After lulling suspi-
cions by messages which led Murshid to believe that he was to be
retained as governor of Orissa 'Ali Vardi marched from Murshidabad
on 20 December, 1740, at the head of a large force. Murshid Quli
Khan came from Cuttack to Balasore and encamped near the south
bank of the Burabalang river. 'Ali Vardi Khan
Khan halted at
Ramchandrapur and nearly a month was spent in negotiations.
See chap. XIII, p. 383.


## p. 367 (#403) ############################################

THE MARATHAS INVADE BENGAL
867
Murshid Quli's more impetuous son-in-law, Mirza Muhammad
Baqar Khan, descended of the royal house of Persia, lost patience
and on 16 February, 1741, crossed the river to attack, compelling
Murshid Quli Qhan to follow him. The issue was long doubtful, but
Murshid Quli Khan was at length defeated and escaped by sea to
Masulipatam. His family was conveyed from Cuttack to Ichchapu-
ram, beyond the reach of 'Ali Vardi Khan, and the latter, leaving
his nephew, Saulat Jang, in Cuttack as his deputy in Orissa, returned
to Murshidabad. Saulat Jang disgusted both his army and his people
by his parsimony and his unbridled passions, and within a year of
his instalment Baqar Khan returned from the Deccan and not only
deposed and imprisoned him, but carried his arms to the extreme
northern limits of the province and caused alarm and apprehension
even at Murshidabad. 'Ali Vardi Khan marched once more from
his capital, while Baqar Khan awaited him at Balasore; but the latter's
army lost heart, and he was compelled to retreat, carrying with him
for a time his prisoner, Saulat Jang, whom at last he had to leave
behind. Saulat Jang was rescued by his uncle's troops, and Baqar
Khan escaped once more into the Deccan.
Meanwhile a fresh calamity was impending over Bengal. The
Marathas had for some time past cast covetous eyes on the rich eastern
provinces of the empire, and when Murshid Quli Khan was defeated
by 'Ali Vardi Khan his minister, Mir Habib, had suggested to Bhaskar
Pant, Raghuji Bhonsle's minister, who was governing Berar during
his master's absence in the Carnatic, the invasion of Bengal.
Raghuji Bhonsle, on hearing that 'Ali Vardi Khan was again
engaged with Baqar Khan, sent Bhaskar Pant to invade Bengal.
'Ali Vardi Khan was chastising the Raja of Mayurbhanj when he
heard in April, 1742, that Bhaskar Pant had left Nagpur, and at once
marched towards Murshidabad; but Bhaskar Pant was before him
and attacked him with 12,000 horse at Uchalan, sixteen miles south
of Burdwan. He pushed on to Burdwan, but here he was surrounded
by the Marathas, who cut off all supplies. When with infinite difficulty
he fought his way to Katwa, on the Bhagirathi, about forty miles
south of Murshidabad, he found that the Marathas had plundered
the town. A supply of food had, however, been despatched from
Murshidabad and his army was refreshed. After a short halt at
Katwa he reached Murshidabad, but a party of Marathas, led by Mir
Habib, who had deserted to the enemy, had previously visited and
plundered it.
Bhaskar Pant now wished to return to Nagpur, fearing the approach
of the rains, but was persuaded by Mir Habib to remain in Bengal.
The Marathas occupied Katwa and the country from Rajmahal to
Jaleswar was in their hands throughout the rainy season. Hooghly
was also occupied in June.
'Ali Vardi Khan vainly sought aid from the emperor and from the


## p. 368 (#404) ############################################

868
MUHAMMAD SHAH
Peshwa, whose succession Raghuji Bhonsle had attempted to prevent.
Collecting boats and troops from parts of Bengal to the east of the
Bhagirathi still in his possession he moved rapidly down the river
and on a night in October, before the rivers had fallen, secretly
threw a bridge of boats across the river to the camp of the Marathas,
whom impunity had rendered careless. The lashings of several boats
in the bridge gave way and 1500 men were precipitated into the
swollen river, but the damage was repaired and the rest of the army
crossed. The Marathas filed in confusion, and 'Ali Vardi Khan's
unrelenting pursuit allowed them no opportunity of recovery. They
were driven into Bihar but returned to the Midnapore district and
after sustaining defeat at Jaleswar fled through western Orissa to
Nagpur.
The relief afforded by Bhaskar Pant's flight was not of long dura-
tion. His master, Raghuji Bhonsle, came in person from Nagpur to
establish his claim to the chauth and sardeshmukhi of Bengal. Follow-
ing the same route as Bhaskar Pant he arrived in the neighbourhood
of Murshidabad in March, 1743. But Balaji Rao Peshwa, receiving
from the emperor promise of the arrears of chauth due from Bihar
and the government of Malwa, arrived at Murshidabad when Raghuji
Bhonsle was encamped between Katwa and Burdwan.
As soon as Raghuji heard that an agreement about the chauth of
Bihar had been reached he retreated rapidly westward. 'Ali Vardi
Khan and Balaji Rao marched in pursuit, and the latter, pressing
ahead, came up with Raghuji Bhonsle, defeated him, and plundered
his baggage. Though the government of Malwa was then conferred
on the Peshwa, imperial susceptibilities were indulged by appointing
him as the deputy of the emperor's son, prince Ahmad. In the same
year an attempt was made to assert the unity of the empire and the
authority of the emperor over viceroys and governors who were
independent in all but name. 'Ali Vardi Khan of Bengal was excepted
owing to the danger of incursions of Marathas into his province, but
'Umdat-ul-Mulk of Allahabad and Safdar Jang, the latter after some
hesitation, obeyed the summons and appeared at court, while
Zakariya Khan of the Punjab sent his son as his representative. Bakht
Singh, the rebellious brother of Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, seems to
have taken no notice of the summons, and Sawai Jay Singh of Amber,
who held the government of Agra, was prevented by death from
obeying it. He had ruled Amber for forty-four years, and was a
generous patron of science. Latterly his friendship with the Peshwa,
Balaji Rao, had been of great service to the empire.
Nizam-ul-Mulk of the Deccan excused himself on the ground of
age and of important affairs in the Carnatic from obeying the
summons. There he had recovered Trichinopoly, which had been
captured by Raghuji Bhonsle during his absence at Delhi, and cap-
tured Arcot from Dost 'Ali the descendant of Aurangzib's general


## p. 369 (#405) ############################################

RISE OF THE ROHILLA POWER
369
Sa'adat-ullah Khan the Navait, in whose family the town and district
had become a hereditary principality.
Abhay Singh of Jodhpur had proved most inefficient in the
government of Gujarat, and since his dismissal none of the great
nobles at court could be induced to accept the government of a
province in a great part of which the Marathas were permanently
settled. Mumin Khan, who had acted as governor since the raja's
dismissal, could do nothing without the approval of Damaji Gaikwar.
In January, 1744, he was succeeded by Fakhr-ud-Daula, who was
encouraged to attempt the task by Muhammad Yar Khan. The latter,
weary of Nadir Shah's stern discipline, had deserted him and remained
in India with Safdar Jang of Oudh, but his actions displeased and
alarmed his new master who took advantage of the visit to Delhi
to dispense with his services. Muhammad Yar Khan had, however,
overestimated the fidelity of his troops, only a few of whom were
willing to accompany him to Gujarat. Here master and servant were
mutually dissatisfied, the one with the other. The enterprise was a
failure and the Marathas remained dominant in Gujarat. Muhammad
Yar Khan left India and returned to his old master. “You feared the
violence of my temper," said Nadir, "how is it that you have returned
to me? ” “To be slain by a man like you”, replied Muhammad Yar,
“is preferable to spending one's life among a pack of cowards. ”
For some time before this a new power had been growing up to the
east of Delhi. 'Ali Muhammad Khan was according to some accounts
by birth a Hindu,3 who had been brought up by an Afghan officer
in the imperial service and was accustomed to associate with Afghans.
He had entered the service of the governor of Katehr,* the chief towns
of which, Budaun and Sambhal, had lately been eclipsed by
Moradabad, which had become the governor's residence. When Nizam-
-Mulk was replaced in the Deccan by Sayyid Husain 'Ali Khan he
became governor of this tract and, as a sop to his wounded vanity,
the appointment was to rank with the greater provincial governments.
More recently it was held by the minister, Qamar-ud-din Khan, who
governed by deputies. 'Ali Muhammad rapidly gained advancement
and increased the number of his followers, who were always Afghans.
He increased his possessions by grants from landholders who were too
idle or too careless to defend their own lands, and when the Sayyid
brothers were overthrown he took an active part in the extinction
! A tribe of Muslims in southern India, descended from Hashim, many of
whose descendants were driven in the eighth century by the cruelties of Hajjaj
b. Yusuf, governor of 'Iraq, to take refuge in India. Wilks, 1, 150 n. ; Grant Duff,
1, 505 n. Also Tarikh-un-Navaitah by the Nawab 'Aziz Jang Shams-ul-'Ulama,
Khan Bahadur, of Hyderabad.
2 See chap. XIII p. 384.
3 His origin is doubtful. It has recently been asserted that he was by birth
a Sayyid.
4 Now Rohilkhand.
24


## p. 370 (#406) ############################################

370
MUHAMMAD SHAH
of their influence in the province and in the murder of one of the
younger brothers. For this he was rewarded with the title of Nawab,
a command of horse, some assignments, and the government of some
parganas. Qamar-ud-din Khan's assignments had also been in his
.
charge since the minister had held the appointment of governor. Nadir
Shah's advance on Qandahar had driven from that neighbourhood a
large number of Afghans or Rohillas ? who feared his vengeance, and
most of whom had taken refuge in India and had been attracted to
'Ali Muhammad by his reputation as a patron and protector of
Afghans. His power had increased enormously and, encouraged by
the confusion prevailing throughout the empire, he had conceived
the idea of establishing himself as the ruler of an independent
principality, and retained, instead of remitting to Delhi, the rents of
Qamar-ud-din Khan's assignments. The minister appointed as
commandant of Moradabad, Raja Har Nand, and ordered him to look
into the accounts. Incensed by this, 'Ali Muhammad attacked and slew
the raja and then possessed himself of a large tract and maintaining
a considerable force of Afghan horse conducted himself as indepen-
dent.
Qamar-ud-din Khan, sunk in sloth and debauchery, entered into a
disgraceful compact by which the independence of the rebel was vir-
tually recognised, but Safdar Jang and "Umdat-ul-Mulk, who were 'Ali
Muhammad Khan's neighbours on the east and the south, aroused the
emperor to a sense of his humiliation and assured him of their support,
Safdar Jang's motives were partly selfish, for he had no liking for such
a neighbour, but his advice was sound, and it was followed.
On 18 March, 1745, Muhammad Shah left Delhi to attack the rebel,
but his movements were leisurely. 'Ali Muhammad Khan did not
venture to meet the imperial army in the field, and withdrew to his
fortress of Bangarh, 14 miles north-east of Budaun. Even here he
could not hold out, for the emperor had been joined by Raja Nawal
with the contingent of Safdar Jang and by Qaim Khan, the son
and successor of Muhammad Khan Bangash, with his contingent from
Farrukhabad. On 3 June he submitted, using the services of Qamar-
ud-din Khan as a mediator. His life was spared but Qamar-ud-din
Khan was ordered to kep him in custody. The death of Zakariya
Khan, governor of the Punjab, furnishes an example of the emperor's
impotence in administrative affairs. Zakariya's eldest son was in
the camp and the minister, Qamar-ud-din Khan, who was both his
uncle and his father-in-law, sent him off post haste to Lahore to settle
his father's affairs. After his arrival the minister for the first time
announced his brother-in-law's death and later persuaded the emperor
to confer the provinces of the Punjab and Multan on himself. Before
long Shah Nawaz Khan, a younger but more capable nephew, dis-
possessed his elder brother and became governor of the Punjab.
1 Men of the Roh, or hill country.


## p. 371 (#407) ############################################

AHMAD SHAH ABDALI SUCCEEDS NADIR SHAH 371
Muhammad Shah, contemptible as was his attitude to public
affairs, demanded that deference which a stronger character would
have commanded. 'Umdat-ul-Mulk, who had at one time been so
high in his esteem that he had proposed to make him his minister
and to employ him to break the power of the Turanian party, now
acquired great influence at court. When Qamar-ud-din Khan in-
capacitated himself for appearance at court for a period of seven
or eight months by a fall while intoxicated, he entrusted his official
business with the emperor to 'Umdat-ul-Mulk, rather than to any
of his own worthless sons. "Umdat-ul-Mulk, who was outspoken and
‘
unceremonious, was accustomed to use in his intercourse greater
freedom than Muhammad Shah considered becoming and on one
occasion he indiscreetly visited the princes of the imperial family
imprisoned in Salimgarh. On another occasion he was discussing
some tedious business with the emperor, who impatiently told him
to postpone it. 'Umdat-ul-Mulk persisted and began to repeat the
whole of his discourse from the beginning. The chief eunuch, who
was present, said in a low but audible tone that the matter was as
endless as the chatter of two old women. 'Umdat-ul-Mulk lost his
temper and Muhammad Shah was obliged to appease him by
promising to dismiss the chief eunuch, but after he had left complained
bitterly of the manner in which he was treated by 'Umdat-ul-Mulk.
The eunuch replied that the matter could be arranged and, with his
master's sanction, found a ruffian who had been dismissed from
'Umdat-ul-Mulk's service. On 6 January, 1747, 'Umdat-ul-Mulk
was stabbed as he entered the hall of audience, and died on the spot.
A dark cloud descended on the intellect of Nadir Shah of Persia
towards the close of his reign. He had always been a hard taskmaster
and a rigid though fair disciplinarian, but with advancing years he
suspected all his subjects, and suspicion became a sufficient ground
for punishment. He blinded his eldest and most promising son, and
none knew when mad caprice might single him out for destruction.
On 2 June, 1747, Nadir was stabbed to death in his own camp. His
line did not at once die out, but his great empire dissolved. Among
his chief commanders was Ahmad, of the Sadozai section of the
Abdali or Durrani tribe, an Afghan who had been captured when
Nadir conquered Herat. He afterwards gained his captor's favour
and rose to high rank in his service.
When Nadir was assassinated
Ahmad returned to his own country and with the help of his
tribe and a force of Qizilbash horse who threw in their fortunes with
him established himself in Herat, captured Qandahar from the
Ghilzai who held it for Nadir Shah, and expelled from Kabul Nasir
Khan, who having entered Nadir Shah's service had been governor
of that province for him as formerly for Muhammad Shah of Delhi,
and, having thus reduced to obedience the whole of Afghanistan
proper, assumed the royal title. He had hardly established his


## p. 372 (#408) ############################################

372
MUHAMMAD SHAH
authority in Afghanistan when the treachery of Shah Nawaz Khan,
governor of the Punjab, encouraged him to devise schemes of foreign
conquest.
Among the advisers of Shah Nawaz Khan was one Adina Beg
Khan, “a devil in human form”, who seems to have gone about
deliberately to ruin him. He reminded him that his elder brother,
whom he had ousted, was the minister's son-in-law as well as nephew,
and advised him, therefore, to come to terms with the Abdali. Shah
Nawaz Khan followed this advice and his unexpected advances were
welcomed by Ahmad Shah, who accepted his offers and concluded
an alliance. Adina Beg Khan then informed the minister Qamar-ud-
din Khan of this treasonable correspondence. The crafty minister mis-
led his nephew by suggesting that the emperor wished him to conquer
the provinces of Kabul, Kashmir, Sind and Multan, and to confer
the government of these provinces, as well as that of the Punjab, on
him. Shah Nawaz Khan now regretted his precipitancy and, acting
still on the advice of Adina Beg Khan, resolved to repudiate his
agreement. Ahmad Shah advanced to Peshawar and called on Shan
Nawaz Khan to permit him to pass freely through the Punjab and
to join him with his troops. Receiving a flat refusal Ahmad Shah
crossed the Indus with 30,000 horse and invaded the Punjab. Shah
Nawaz Khan entrenched himself before Lahore. Superstitious faith
in the warning of a darvish kept him inactive and his troops lost spirit.
An indecisive movement from his tent towards the city, which he
was persuaded might be a better defensive position than his entrenched
camp, was construed as an attempt at flight. Soon the whole army
was on its way to Delhi and Shah Nawaz Khan had no choice but
to accompany it. The Afghan and Qizilbash troops entered and sacked
the undefended city.
The emperor' and the courtiers, on learning that Ahmad Shah
Abdali had crossed the Indus, made preparations to resist the invader.
A large army was assembled under the nominal command of princa
Ahmad, the emperor's son, who was placed under the tutelage of
Sadat Khan, Zu-'l-fiqar Jang, and the great amirs. Safdar Jang,
-
Qamar-ud-din Khan, and others joined it with their contingents. On
this occasion many of the chiefs of Rajasthan assisted in the defence
of the empire.
The army left Delhi on 19 January, 1748, and marched through
Sirhind to Machiwara on the Sutlej. Meanwhile Ahmad Shah
Abdali had left Lahore and, marching by Ludhiana, avoided the
imperial army and occupied Sirhind, between it and Delhi, Sirhind
was plundered and all men bearing arms were put to the sword.
Prince Ahmad was thus forced to retrace his steps and near Sirhind,
as had now become usual with the demoralised forces of the emperor
of Delhi, he entrenched himself before an army greatly inferior in
numerical strength. Ahmad Shah Abdali's troops had captured part


## p. 373 (#409) ############################################

MUGHULS REPEL AHMAD SHAH
373
of the imperial train of artillery and had thus supplied themselves
with arms and munitions of which they stood much in need. The
imperial army, devoid of every military virtue, was besieged in its
entrenched camp from 15 March to 28 March and on 22 March the
death of Qamar-ud-din Khan, the minister, who was killed by a
gunshot while he was sitting at prayers in his tent, still further
discouraged the army and caused the desertion of all the Rajput
chiefs.
There still remained some able and brave officers in the army,
and Safdar Jang, with a useful force of Persian troops, and Mu'in-
ul-Mulk, son of the late minister, insisted on taking the field. After
three or four days of this desultory and indecisive fighting, operations
assumed a more serious character. Ahmad Shah Abdali led a deter-
mined attack on Mu'in-ul-Mulk, who opposed to it a resistance as
determined. Another attack was then led on the imperial centre, com-
manded by the prince, who was so hard pressed that Safdar Jang was
obliged to send some of his troops to his assistance. Safdar Jang then
advanced with his Persian troops on foot, preceded by his artillery
which kept up a continuous fire on the enemy, and attacked Ahmad
Shah Abdali. By great good fortune a rocket or some other missile
ignited the waggon-loads of rockets which the invaders had captured
and these exploded in all directions, causing many casualties among
the Afghan troops and throwing them into confusion. Many fled,
but Ahmad Shah Abdali contrived to hold his ground until the
evening, and during the night began his retreat towards Afghanistan.
The news of the victory was received with great joy in Delhi and
Mu'in-ul-Mulk was rewarded for his services with the government
of the Punjab and set out for Lahore, while the prince, Sadat Khan,
and Safdar Jang returned slowly towards Delhi.
Muhammad Shah had now fallen sick of dropsy and grew rapidly
worse. Feeling his end approaching he sent repeated messages to
his son and Safdar Jang, begging them to hasten, that he might see
his son once more. The army moved, therefore, with greater speed,
but Ahmad failed to reach Delhi in time to see his father alive and
was met at Panipat by the news that he had died on 26 April.
Safdar Jang at once raised an umbrella over Ahmad's head in the
camp, the march to Delhi was continued and on 29 April, 1748, the
prince was enthroned in the Shalamar garden as Ahmad Shah.
Muhammad Shah demands our pity if he may not command our
respect. Placed in a position which called for a genius he was a very
ordinary person. Historians blame him for his devotion to pleasure
rather than to business, but the tragedy of his situation was that the
most absolute devotion to business by a man of his mental calibre
would in no way have altered the course of events. A mere sickly
puppet like Rafi'-ud-Darajat or Rafi -ud-Daula was perhaps hardly
conscious of humiliation, but Muhammad Shah appears to have


## p. 374 (#410) ############################################

374
MUHAMMAD SHAH
realised both the hopelessness of the situation and his own powerless-
ness to amend it. The seeds of decay had been sown by Aurangzib
and the process was now nearly complete. The bigotry which had
alienated the Rajputs and exasperated the Marathas, the leniency
which regarded laxity and even treachery as venial faults in a military
officer and ultimately dissolved the bonds of discipline throughout
the army, the shortsightedness which permitted or rather encouraged
the erection of principalities on agglomerations of provinces, had now
caused a result which is clear from a survey of the condition of the
empire at the time of Muhammad Shah's death.
India south of the Narbada and west of the Wainganga and the
Godavari was ruled by a prince independent in all but name. This
prince's authority was, indeed, disputed not without success by a great
Hindu power, but in this dispute the emperor had neither a share
nor an interest. The three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa
were ruled by another independent prince, whose authority, like
that of his neighbour to the south-west, was contested by a Hindu
power that at this time wrested one of the three provinces from him.
In the same region a power was rising which was destined, at no
distant date, to overthrow both Muslim and Hindu rule. With all
these disputes between the competitors the emperor had no concern,
save when a prince who deigned to describe himself as lieutenant
found it convenient to appeal for aid. The viceroyalty of Bengal
contributed not an officer or a man to the defence of the empire
during the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali. West
of this state lay the viceroyalty of Oudh, already virtually independent
under a hereditary ruler and destined soon to absorb the provinces
of Allahabad and Rohilkhand, as Katehr soon began to be called
from its new masters. The rich province of Malwa formed part of
the dominions of that Hindu power which was contesting supremacy
with Muslim princes in the Deccan and Bengal, and the same may
be said of the still richer province of Gujarat. Rajputana stood
sullenly aloof from the empire, ruled by the descendants of her
princesses, and the Punjab, Multan and Sind lay at the feet of the
Afghan king. All that remained to Delhi were the northern half of
the Gangetic Duab, a region of about twice the area of that tract
on the west of the Jumna, the southern portion of which, however,
was occupied by the rebellious Jats, and a strip of territory which
only at one point attained a width of a hundred miles, extending
eastward from about the seventieth degree of east longitude, along the
southern banks of the Indus, Panjnad and Sutlej rivers. Within this
limited area the emperor of India exercised such authority as his
ministers were pleased to leave in his hands.
The demoralisation of the army was one of the principal factors
in the disintegration of the empire. It cannot be attributed to the
puppets who during the first half of the eighteenth century disgraced
1


## p. 375 (#411) ############################################

THE DEGENERATION OF THE MUGHUL ARMY 375
the throne of Babur and of Akbar, or even to Aurangzib. The source
of the weakness was the composition of the army, which consisted
chiefly of contingents maintained by the great nobles from the
revenues of assignments held by them for the purpose. The defects
of this system had been clearly perceived both by 'Ala-ud-Din Khalji
and by Akbar, as later by Nadir Shah, but neither had succeeded
in permanently abolishing it. They were less apparent in the reign
of a monarch who could command the affections and the obedience
of the nobles, but the system was radically unsound, as every system
must be which depends upon such an uncertain factor as the personal
character of a monarch, and as the authority of the sovereign relaxed
the general tendency among the great nobles was naturally to hold
as their own those assignments which maintained their troops. Thus,
the later emperors had no personal body of troops with which to assert
authority.
Two other grave defects appeared, as early as in 1595, at the first
siege of Ahmadnagar. The first was the jealousy which afterwards
became so prominent a characteristic of the imperial officers that
a commander would sometimes deliberately refrain from bringing
to a successful conclusion a battle already more than half won or
a siege which had reduced the garrison of a fortress to extremities
if he perceived that another would share the credit of his success.
The second was the habit of treacherous correspondence with the
enemy. The constant internecine wars between the five independent
Muhammadan kingdoms of the Deccan had been conducted on a most
pernicious system. A campaign was regarded by the commanders
on either side as an occasion for the display of diplomatic as well as
of military skill, and as an opportunity for enriching themselves.
This spirit appears to have infected the imperial army in the Deccan
and during Aurangzib's quarter of a century of warfare in that region
only one fortress was taken by storm. Conflicts in the field, as well
as the attack and defence of förtified places, were decided by negotia-
tions and money payments as often as by force of arms.
Finally, the general laxity of discipline converted the army into
a mob. Drill was unknown and a soldier's training, which he might
undergo or not, as he liked, consisted in muscular exercise and in
individual practice in the use of the weapons with which he was
armed. He mounted guard or not as he liked, the punishment for
absence, not invariably inflicted, consisting in the loss of a day's pay.
There was, indeed, no regular punishment for military crimes. An
infuriated commander might occasionally expose officers and men
guilty of cowardice to the ridicule of their comrades by mounting
them on asses and parading them through the camp, but even this
grave crime frequently went unpunished, and Aurangzib himself
habitually overlooked as matters of course acts of treason, cowardice
and deliberate neglect of duty before the enemy.


## p. 376 (#412) ############################################

376
MUHAMMAD SHAH
In an army thus composed and thus commanded no military spirit
was to be looked for, and the imperial troops, both officers and men,
were characterised by a complete absence of the will to victory.
"The Deccan is the bread of the soldier” ran the proverb, and
probably nobody, except Aurangzib, saw why the war should ever
end. In such circumstances an army dissolved before the first foreign
invader.


## p. 377 (#413) ############################################

CHAPTER XIII
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
()
NIZAM-UL-MULK (Qamar-ud-din, Chin Qilich Khan, Khan
Dauran) had held the viceroyalty of the Mughul Deccan once in
1713-14 and again from 1720 to 1722, and though in February,
1722, he migrated to Delhi to take up the post of chief minister of
the empire, he retained his Deccan appointment by means of his
agents. Early in 1724, in despair of reforming the government of
Delhi, he set out for the Deccan, with the secret intention of resigning
the more responsible office. The intrigue by which his enemies sought
to destroy his position in the Deccan by urging his deputy Mubariz
Khan to usurp power there, and the failure of the plan and death of
Mubariz Khan in the battle of Shakarkhelda, have been related in
chap. XII. This one blow was decisive, and its effect was completed
by the Nizam's wise conciliation of his dead rival's son and his
peaceful acquisition of Golconda by liberal gifts (early in 1725). In
a short time the entire Mughul Deccan was brought under his control
and revenue began to be collected regularly. The emperor recog.
nised the accomplished fact by “pardoning" the Nizam and confir-
ming him in the viceroyalty of the Deccan, with the title of Asaf Jah
(June, 1725). This was the foundation of the present state of Hydera.
bad.
When in 1724 Nizam-ul-Mulk went to the Deccan for the last time
as its governor, he dropped the curtain on one act of his career and
began a new one. All his aspirations for restoring the power and pres-
tige of the Mughul empire and guiding the government from its
centre, as its minister, were abandoned, for he felt that the mean and
jealous favourites of the fickle emperor would not let him do any:
thing, and he was not the man to agree to a passive sleepy existence
like Muhammad Amin Khan, his predecessor, or Muhammad Amin's
son, his successor. He thus set out for the Deccan, determined to
make it a stage on which he could at least play a man's part and build
up a political structure that would justify his title of “Regulator of
the Realm”.
In the history of the Mughul Deccan, too, a new scene opens with
the battle of Shakarkhelda. The constant succession of short-term
viceroys, the discord due to the six divisions being held by six
different officers, and the civil strife between rivals for the viceroyalty,
henceforth ceased. There was now one ruler over the whole tract;
he made it his home and planted his dynasty there; and he had not to
take his orders from a far-off master. His strong arm brought peace
to that unhappy land harried by war for forty years since the invasion


## p. 378 (#414) ############################################

378
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
of Aurangzib. Ambitious local officers, rebel chieftains and robber
leaders thought twice before challenging the vanquisher of Dilavar
'Ali, 'Alim 'Ali and Mubariz Khan. This enforcement of law and order,
coupled with his moderate revenue assessment and strict prohibition
of illegal cesses, gave security to the peasant and the trader, and the
wealth of the country increased rapidly.
It was a splendid heritage into which Asaf Jah had entered. The
six Deccan provinces had a standard revenue of 160 million rupees,
against 170 million from the other twelve provinces of the Indian
empire taken together; and though the actual collection here had now
fallen to 130 million or even less, it was still larger than what came
to the impoverished exchequer of Delhi, and was capable of rapid
improvement under an orderly and beneficent administration. For the
land in the old Qutb Shahi kingdom was exceedingly fertile and its
wealth had excited the cupidity of prince Aurangzib in 1654, when he
described it to his father as “a spacious kingdom, well cultivated, rich
in mines of diamond, crystal etc. —a money-yielding country, un-
matched by the imperial dominions". Its annexe of the eastern
Carnatic was proverbially rich, “a kingdom by itself”. Bijapur, though
less favoured by nature, was enriched by the tributes of a wide belt
of vassal states on its south and west, which made it the richest
among the six provinces, Hyderabad being a close second. The
population in Hyderabad and Berar was dense and industrious. Such
a soil required only peace to yield gold, and that peace Asaf Jah's
long and uninterrupted rule for a quarter of a century assured to it.
After the victory of Shakarkhelda, the terror of Asaf Jah's arms
and the high reputation for capacity and spirit which he had brought
with him cowed his own refractory subjects. But the Marathas were
an ever present menace to his state and proved his chief preoccupation
throughout his rule, and they succeeded in nibbling away his state
when he was no more. And yet he was sincerely desirous of living
at peace with them. He had seen with his own eyes how the whole
force of the empire wielded by a sovereign of the stamp of Aurangzib
for twenty-five years had failed to crush the Maratha people. Asaf
Jah therefore recognised the basic truth that the Marathas were the
native landowners of the Deccan and that the Mughul governor of
that country must cultivate their friendship if he was to live at all.
On the other side, Raja Shahu too was eager to remain on good terms
with the Mughul government and to avoid war at all costs. Com-
pletely enervated by his long captivity in Aurangzib's harem, con-
stitutionally weak and unenterprising, faced with disobedience and
tumult by many of his own subjects, the Maratha king was content
with the chauth and sardeshmukhi which had been legally granted to
him by the Delhi sovereign in 1718, so long as he could collect them
in peace. Thus, the principals on the two sides sincerely sought
"
- 1 Chap. XI, P: 338.


## p. 379 (#415) ############################################

NIZAM-UL-MULK AND RAJA SHAHU
379
peace and the maintenance of the status quo established in 1718, but
their followers forced their hands.
The Nizam rightly claimed to enter into the full territorial legacy
of Aurangzib in the Deccan, modified only by the grant of 1718. This
completely barred the expansion of the Maratha race and threatened
to coop them up for ever within the narrow limits of Shivaji's small
possessions in their homeland. Then began the inevitable clash
between a legitimate but static authority and the dynamic spirit of
expansion of a new people trying to find its place in the sun, which
was witnessed a century and a half earlier when the Elizabethan
adventurers burst upon the lawful Spanish government of the New
World. There were some distinct cen es of friction. The Nizam's
possession of Baglan blocked the easiest path for Maratha penetration
into Gujarat; similarly, his province of Khandesh lay across their
way to Malwa. Much of the true home of the Maratha race, like the
districts of Junnar and Ahmadnagar, still owned Mughul sway. In
the closing years of his life the triumphant Marathas swept onwards
to raid the eastern Carnatic and also penetrated into the Kanarese
country southwards (Savanur, Bednur, etc. ), and squeezed the
(
Nizam's tribute-payers there, while in the north-east the Bhonsles
of Nagpur conquered the Gond rajas and encroached upon the
Deccan province of Berar.
Shahu's authority as king was so little backed by force and was
recognised by so few of the Marathas that it was beyond his power
to control the actions of the free-lances and adventurers among his
nominal subjects and effectively keep them out of the Mughul
Deccan. Thus, the regular payment of the stipulated contribution
(chauth) did not invariably safeguard the Nizam's dominions from
Maratha depredation.
One of Asaf Jah's earliest acts, after taking full possession of his
charge (1725), was to make an agreement with the Marathas. The
chauth of the Deccan provinces having been granted by the emperor
by a royal rescript, Asaf Jah had to recognise the settled fact. But
he did what was possible in the circumstances to save his realm from
ruinous occupation and unlimited extortion by a host of greedy
Maratha tribute-collectors and their troops. He settled with Raja
Shahu that in respect of the province of Hyderabad he would himself
pay the amount of the tribute in cash from his treasury, so that no
Maratha collector need enter his dominions for the money. Un-
authorised extra taxes (like the sardeshmukhi and rahdari), which the
Marathas used to realise in the Mughul Deccan by sharing with the
former governors, were definitely abolished. This arrangement was
concluded on Shahu's behalf by his minister, Shrinivas Rao, while
the Peshwa Baji Rao advocated a more aggressive and ambitious
policy. Its details had not been fully worked out and the agreement
had not been put into actual operation before war broke out. The


## p. 380 (#416) ############################################

380
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
Nizam encountered opposition in taking possession of the Mughul
territories in the Kanarese districts (south-west), while Maratha
raiders disturbed the country west and south of Aurangabad.
Unable to keep the Marathas within their own limits, Asaf Jah
took refuge in diplomatic machination. Malcontents among Shahu's
subjects and those ministers of his government who were jealous of
the Peshwa's ascendancy all found welcome at the Nizam's court.
By their advice, he planned to create division and weakness in the
Maratha state by undertaking to instal Shambhuji of Kolhapur (the
first cousin of Shahu) as the head of the Maratha royal family
(Chhatrapati) and to make an equal partition of Shivaji's kingdom
between the two cousins. He attached the ancestral estate (watan)
of the house of Shivaji, which Shahu had so long enjoyed and to
which Shahu like all other Marathas felt an almost religious attach-
ment. The attempt ultimately failed through the utter incapacity of
the Nizam's puppet Chhatrapati and the unreliability of his Maratha
allies, but mainly because of the superior genius and energy of Baji
Rao. It left behind it two results very harmful to the Nizam's
interests : Shahu was bitterly estranged from him, and Baji Rao's
ascendancy in the council of his king became unrivalled.
Shambhuji of Kolhapur had gone to Asaf Jah in October, 1726,
and kept claiming to be placed on Shivaji's throne. Two great
Maratha nobles, Rambha Nimbalkar and Chandra Sen Jadav (the
ex-commander-in-chief of Shahu), were on the Nizam's side. Shahu's
officer (Rajadnya) Chimnaji Damodar joined Shambhuji in 1727 and
became his prime minister. Several captains of lesser note like Thorat
were also in the same camp. With their support, Asaf Jah assembled
a large army for the invasion of Maharashtra in November, 1727,
in the interests of Shambhuji. But his plan leaked out, Shahu learnt
of it long in advance, warned all his fort garrisons to be carefully
on the defensive, and struck the first blow by launching Baji Rao
upon the Nizam's dominions. The Peshwa, passing west of Parner,
forded the Godavari at Puntambe, and skirting the larger cities like
Baizapur and Aurangabad some distance on their west and north,
burst into the Jalna and Sindhkhed districts at the end of October
and sacked the country right and left. But now at last the Nizam
was on the move; his advanced division led by 'Iwaz Khan attacked
the Maratha bands dispersed for plunder (17 November) and beat
them back. Baji Rao, avoiding pitched battles, began a series of
bewilderingly rapid marches, which completely baffled and exhausted
his enemy. In fact, in this cross-country race over a vast broken
country, the Nizam, with his mail-clad heavy cavalry and cumbrous
artillery, was completely out-mancuvred by the Maratha light horse
and toiled painfully behind it without being able to prevent its
ravages or to bring it to an action. After a feint against Burhanpur,
Baji Rao made a dash eastwards to Mangrul, beyond Basim in the


## p. 381 (#417) ############################################

PALKHED CAMPAIGN AGAINST BAJI RAO 381
extreme east of Berar (20 December), and then turning sharply to
the north-west, crossed the Tapti some distance west of Chopra (30
December) and the Narbada at the Baba Piara ford (14 January,
1728), and arrived wthin twenty-five miles of Broach. Then he
swooped down due south, spending a fortnight near Songarh (forty-
five miles east of Surat), and doubled back northwards across the
Tapti and the Narbada to the 'Ali Mohan country (fifty miles east
of Baroda city) on 11 February. From this point he was recalled
by news of the danger to Poona and reached Betavad (twenty miles
north of Dhulia in west Khandesh) on 24 February.
In the meantime the Nizam, worn out by his long and futile marches,
had wisely changed his plan of war. Giving up the pursuit of the
elusive Baji Rao, he in full force entered the Poona district now
denuded of defenders, his vanguard under Turktaz Khan opening
the way. Nothing could stand against him. Raja Shahu and Chimaji
(the Peshwa's brother and agent at court) took refuge in Purandar
fort; every military station and town in the Poona district submitted
to the Nizam in terror and was placed in charge of some agent of
Shambhuji. One fort alone, Udapur, made a bold defence and had to
be taken by bombardment. Finally, the Nizam entered Poona city,
,
proclaimed Shambhuji's authority over the country, and celebrated
that raja's marriage with a princess of Ramnagar.
All this time, owing to Baji Rao's rapid marches, Shahu had
received little news of his position and success, and was frantically
writing to him to come back for the defence of his home. From Betavad,
Baji Rao turned southwards, crossed the Ajanta range at Kasar ghati
about 28 February, and like a master strategist ensured the automatic
relief of Poona by marching upon the Nizam's capital Aurangabad.
While he was sacking the Gandapur and Baizapur districts west of
that city, the-Nizam evacuated the Poona district, deposited his camp
and baggage at Ahmadnagar, and then on 4 March set out in light
marching order to overtake Baji Rao. But the Peshwa, by his
"Cossack-like tactics", plundered on both sides of the Nizam's line
of advance, stopped his grain supply, and harassed his troops at every
difficult place like a watercourse or ravine. At last the Nizam was
manæuvred into a broken waterless ground near Palkhed (twelve
miles east of Baizapur and twenty miles west of Daulatabad) and
completely hemmed in (11 March). However, after undergoing
unspeakable hardship, he cut his way out, but in utter disgust at the
worthlessness of his Maratha allies, he gave up the plan of backing
Shambhuji. Negotiations were opened with Baji Rao and a treaty
was made at Shevgaon (22 March) by which the Nizam abandoned
Shambhuji's cause, gave up several forts as security for the payment
of the tribute (including all arrears), and made Rambha Rao Nim-
1 Twenty miles due east of Manmad railway junction and the same distance
north of Baizapur.


## p. 382 (#418) ############################################

382
THE HYDERABAD STATE (1724-1762)
balkar transfer "the Twelve Mavals" (western Poona and Nasik)
to Baji Rao. Shahu's collectors were restored to all their former
places and the Nizam returned to Hyderabad. It was a complete
triumph for Shahu.
But this treaty did not bring peace, any more than the former
settlement of the Hyderabad tribute had done. Though there were
no more regular wars between the Nizam and Shahu's government,
the events of 1727 left behind them a spirit of mutual suspicion and
alarm which continued for the next four years, with occasional
conflicts between local officers and small invading bands of both sides.
Shambhuji having been cast off as a broken tool, the Nizam formed
a plot with Trimbak Rao Dabhade (the Maratha commander-in-chief,
jealous of the Brahman Peshwa) and many other malcontents to
crush Baji Rao. But before the two allies could complete their musters
and effect a junction, Baji Rao's alertness again triumphed. Hastening
to Gujarat he slew Dabhade near Dabhoi (12 April, 1731) and broke
up his party. In the preceding month the Nizam had gone to Bur-
hanpur, suppressed a rebel, Mohan Singh, and held secret consulta-
tions with Muhammad Khan Bangash (the new viceroy of Malwa)
on the bank of the Narbada, and now after a fruitless chase of Baji
Rao through Khandesh and Baglan, he returned to Aurangabad. Un-
successful in war, the Nizam at last entered into a secret compact with
Baji Rao, by which the Maratha government promised to leave the
Deccan unmolested and to levy nothing beyond the stipulated chauth
and sardeshmukhi from them, while the Nizam agreed to remain
neutral during the projected Maratha invasions of Hindustan, pro-
vided that they did not injure his province of Khandesh in their
northward march through it. This pact was confirmed during Baji
Rao's visit to the Nizam in the Christmas week of 1732. Thus Maratha
ambition was diverted to the north, and the heart of the Mughul
Deccan enjoyed comparative peace.
During the next four years, the government of the Deccan followed
an even course, only disturbed by minor Maratha raids here and
there. The Nizam used to go out on tour every winter and return to
Aurangabad or Burhanpur for cantoning during the rainy season.
He collected tribute from his dependents, like the Rajas of (western)
Kanara and the Pathan Nawabs, and attended to the normal admi-
nistration, following his usual practice of changing the local officers
every two years.
When in 1736-37 the Marathas carried their depredations to the
gates of Delhi, the emperor repeatedly wrote to Asaf Jah to come to
his aid. The Nizam reached Delhi on 13 July, 1737. His defeat by
Baji Rao at Bhopal (December, 1737) and the humiliating treaty
(16 January, 1738) by which he extricated himself, his passive
participation in the battle of Karnal with Nadir Shah (24 February,
1739), and his quarrels with the emperor's new favourites after the


## p. 383 (#419) ############################################

NASIR JANG'S REBELLION SUPPRESSED
383
departure of Nadir, do not belong to the history of the Deccan and
have been dealt with elsewhere. A second time despairing of reform-
ing his master's government or even of preserving his own honour in
that worthless court, he finally left Delhi on 7 August, 1740, and
returned to Burhanpur on 19 November.
Here he found a perilous situation created by the ambition of his
second son Nasir Jang, whom he had left in the Deccan as his deputy
during his three and a half years' absence in northern India. This
young noble was of a fiery impetuous nature, in contrast with his
father's cool and far-sighted judgment and perfect self-control.
Taking advantage of the shock given to the imperial power by Nadir's
invasion and Asaf Jah's absence, the Marathas achieved some con-
spicuous successes. Raghuji Bhonsle of Nagpur slew the Mughul
governor of Berar (January, 1738) and exacted contribution from
Ellichpur. Chimaji raided the environs of Burhanpur. Gopal Rao
seized the fort of Mahur (in Berar). In April, 1739, Baji Rao began
to confiscate grants near the capital of Khandesh, but retired at the
end of next month on hearing of Nadir's retreat. In the winter of
1739–40 he renewed his depredations south of Aurangabad, but Nasir
Jang sallied out and drove him beyond the Godavari. For one
month (28 January-29 February, 1740) there was daily marching
and fighting.