Wherefore
adultery is more grievous
than seduction.
than seduction.
Summa Theologica
For adultery takes its name
from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad
alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of
various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care,
or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that
adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not
for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an
adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman.
Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery
is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a
species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there
would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the
same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case
a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore
adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the
marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or
with the consent of the other party. " Now this implies a special
deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.
I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's
marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille
autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense
against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession
to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to
the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession
to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders
the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman
who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
23:32,33): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be
guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the
Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by
making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath
fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which
is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however,
is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to
the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a
determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in
venereal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: If a married man has intercourse with another
woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus
it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of
marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and
thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse
with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction,
or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the
woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above
[3542](A[1]) that the species of lust correspond to the various
conditions of women.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of
human offspring, as stated above [3543](A[2]). But adultery is
specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage
faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is
too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if
he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense
be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a
lover of another woman.
Reply to Objection 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as
united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's
authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin
of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin
of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ
specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in
the Third Part [*[3544]XP, Q[59], A[3]
; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of
lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste']
takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of
lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a
species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity. " Now affinity
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a
deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But
intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity
does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have
been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the
various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.
Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman,
because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a
determinate species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3545]AA[1],6) wherever we find
something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to bathe
with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what
has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in
venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with
respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly
that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason
seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is thy mother,
thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed
further on with regard to others.
The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the
Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to
those persons who must needs live together.
The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's
relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though
they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied
by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of
friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but
each should have one. "
Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this
be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love
would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust:
and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a
determinate species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to
one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of
the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of
love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who
is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the
other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
unbecomingness.
Reply to Objection 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and
contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons
related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are
directly and immediately related to one another, since children
naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a
horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and
threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching
to other persons who are related to one another not directly but
through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness
varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated
above [3546](A[2]), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common
good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv,
16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden
times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion
forbade it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust.
For the same species is not contained under different genera that are
not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of
irreligion, as stated above ([3547]Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege
cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
Objection 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be
done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is
not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.
Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how
much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds
of morals! " Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is
a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to
overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred
matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a
species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3548]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a
virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice,
assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of
adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that
as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by
being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in
the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest
that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of
God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may
be accounted a species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its
end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be
also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
Reply to Objection 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins
which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a
species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end,
and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship,
is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin
consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is
sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's
authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it
will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes
more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i,
iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape,
but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he
shall be liable to capital punishment. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing.
Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired
for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired
for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also
come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury
be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by
partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is
ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the
observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of
lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species
of lust.
Objection 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is
comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under
vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation,
as stated above ([3549]Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice
concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the
unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust
(2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says:
"Lasciviousness, i. e. , unnatural lust. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3550]AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a
special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in
two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is
common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is
contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice. " This may happen in
several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation,
for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of
"uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy. " Secondly, by copulation
with a thing of undue species, and this is called "bestiality. "
Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female
with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and this is called the
"vice of sodomy. " Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of
copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and
bestial manners of copulation.
Reply to Objection 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are
not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
Reply to Objection 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is
opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the
virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
Reply to Objection 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but
venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from
which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the
unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest
sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to
charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are
injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of
our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured.
Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of
lust.
Objection 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the
most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since
it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver
sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous
according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin
is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more
those persons who are united to him---and such are those whom he
defiles by incest---than persons who are not connected with him, and
whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore
incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more
it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,
since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and
patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that
uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true.
Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is
from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali,
viii. ]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that
which is against nature is the worst. "
I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the
principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are
those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes
things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things
according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative
and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the
most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the
knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of
action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as
determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man
transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to
the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is
gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above
[3551](A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons
related to us.
With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against
reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the
future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides.
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to
another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it
is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject
to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as
regards merely her guardianship.
Wherefore adultery is more grievous
than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of
violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of
a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the
head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds
from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins
contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should
be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were
those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they
should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath
not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that
very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when
that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the
perversity of lust. "
Reply to Objection 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as
stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity
of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and
more firm than any subsequently established order.
Reply to Objection 3: The nature of the species is more intimately
united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins
against the specific nature are more grievous.
Reply to Objection 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a
thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins
against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness,
which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While
the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due
species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, "He accused his
brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with
cattle. " After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right
manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the
"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other
circumstances.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1)
continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must
consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether continence is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) What is its subject?
(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether continence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species
and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But
continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according
to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
makes ill use of. " Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance,
if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it.
Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is
lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23,
"Faith, modesty," etc. , says that by continence a man refrains even
from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue.
Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure. " Therefore continence
is a virtue.
I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in two
ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal.
5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first
place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to
continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above
([3552]Q[152], A[3] ) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which
in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence
(Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of
the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in
opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does
not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the
sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions
contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a
mixture," inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls
short of virtue.
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same
division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according
to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to
that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now
whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which
is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as
good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly
and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil
desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from
good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate
in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first
sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from
unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser
goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?
Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not
the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General
decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous
is restrained* in its every action. " [*"Continentem" according to St.
Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].
Objection 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other
passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than
the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal
dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a
madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not
properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel. "
Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root
of all evils. " Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
for pleasures of touch
Objection 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
touch is not its proper matter.
Objection 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
bestial, both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating
human flesh; and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse
of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are
not the proper matter of continence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence
and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and
intemperance. " Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires
for pleasures of touch, as stated above ([3553]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore
continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing,
in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence
continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a
man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that
reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly
about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind
of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in
pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now
it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of
all supervening inclinations, as stated above ([3554]FP, Q[60], A[2]).
Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more
strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature
inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for
the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
desires for pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense
in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in
this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence
in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul---in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him---rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said
to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
Reply to Objection 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the
like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of
choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the
maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but
relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard
to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood
continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or
understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for
pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than
pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence
and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.
Reply to Objection 5: Continence is a good of the human reason:
wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay
hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural
passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be
continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as
stated [3555](A[2]), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the
concupiscible power.
Objection 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing"
[*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose
passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason. "
Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
Objection 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the
reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it
follows that it is in the concupiscible.
On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the
evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of
the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
not in the concupiscible power.
I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as
its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since
both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of
them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful
desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in
their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement
desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the
incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids.
Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act
it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ([3556]FS,
Q[13], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for
pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance
which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist
them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is
of one thing against another.
Reply to Objection 2: The will stands between reason and the
concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is
moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the
concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its
first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both
belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the passions are not in the will as
their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus
it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether continence is better than temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul. " Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the
greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater
reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned,
except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject
to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue
than temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in
the concupiscible, as stated above [3557](A[3]). Therefore continence
is a greater virtue than temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De
Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a
principal virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [3558](A[1]), continence has a twofold
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than
temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said
above (Q[152], A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over
chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken
as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are
vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than
continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that
which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more
in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former
even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by
reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite
strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is
compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways.
First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence
from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of
a continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the
flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of
virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ([3559]Q[152], AA[4],5).
Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in
which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus
it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," because its
value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable
according to weight.
Reply to Objection 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may
proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause:
because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to
concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which
inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for
others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas
strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or
strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause,
for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in
the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by
reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence
diminishes it.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the
concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of
which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to
the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the
temperate man---is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
will, as in the case of one who is continent.
__________________________________________________________________
OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in
desire?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul
but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from
the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described
either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains
not to the soul but to the body.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result
from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the
bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it
is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper
whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire. " Therefore incontinence
regards the body.
Objection 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the
vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul.
Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we
ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than
to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of
the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is
owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these
passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of
incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as
the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.
If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of
reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through
the vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of
continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the
judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent
forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason.
This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7):
first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has
given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or
"impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this
kind of incontinence is called "weakness. " Hence it is manifest that
incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has
certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the
senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds
to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to
Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman? " And since small and weak
things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys.
from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad
alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of
various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care,
or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that
adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not
for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an
adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman.
Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery
is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a
species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there
would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the
same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case
a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore
adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the
others.
On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is
sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the
marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or
with the consent of the other party. " Now this implies a special
deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.
I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's
marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille
autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense
against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession
to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to
the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession
to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders
the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman
who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
23:32,33): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be
guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the
Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by
making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath
fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which
is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however,
is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to
the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a
determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in
venereal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: If a married man has intercourse with another
woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus
it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of
marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and
thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse
with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction,
or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the
woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above
[3542](A[1]) that the species of lust correspond to the various
conditions of women.
Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of
human offspring, as stated above [3543](A[2]). But adultery is
specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage
faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is
too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if
he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense
be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a
lover of another woman.
Reply to Objection 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as
united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's
authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin
of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin
of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ
specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in
the Third Part [*[3544]XP, Q[59], A[3]
; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of
lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste']
takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of
lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a
species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a
man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity. " Now affinity
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a
deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But
intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity
does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have
been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the
various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.
Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman,
because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a
determinate species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3545]AA[1],6) wherever we find
something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to bathe
with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what
has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in
venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with
respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly
that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason
seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is thy mother,
thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed
further on with regard to others.
The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the
Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to
those persons who must needs live together.
The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's
relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though
they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied
by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of
friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but
each should have one. "
Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this
be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love
would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust:
and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a
determinate species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to
one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of
the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of
love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who
is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the
other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
unbecomingness.
Reply to Objection 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and
contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons
related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are
directly and immediately related to one another, since children
naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a
horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and
threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching
to other persons who are related to one another not directly but
through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness
varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated
above [3546](A[2]), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common
good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv,
16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden
times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion
forbade it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust.
For the same species is not contained under different genera that are
not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of
irreligion, as stated above ([3547]Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege
cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
Objection 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species
of lust.
Objection 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be
done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is
not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.
Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how
much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds
of morals! " Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is
a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to
overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred
matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a
species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above ([3548]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a
virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice,
assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of
adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that
as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by
being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in
the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest
that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of
God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may
be accounted a species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its
end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be
also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
Reply to Objection 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins
which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a
species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end,
and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship,
is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin
consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is
sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's
authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it
will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes
more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i,
iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape,
but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he
shall be liable to capital punishment. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing.
Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired
for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired
for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also
come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury
be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by
partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is
ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the
observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of
lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species
of lust.
Objection 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is
comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under
vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii,
5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation,
as stated above ([3549]Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice
concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the
unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust
(2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says:
"Lasciviousness, i. e. , unnatural lust. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3550]AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a
special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in
two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is
common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is
contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice. " This may happen in
several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation,
for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of
"uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy. " Secondly, by copulation
with a thing of undue species, and this is called "bestiality. "
Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female
with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and this is called the
"vice of sodomy. " Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of
copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and
bestial manners of copulation.
Reply to Objection 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are
not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
Reply to Objection 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is
opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the
virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
Reply to Objection 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but
venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from
which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the
unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest
sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to
charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are
injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of
our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured.
Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of
lust.
Objection 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the
most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since
it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver
sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous
according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin
is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more
those persons who are united to him---and such are those whom he
defiles by incest---than persons who are not connected with him, and
whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore
incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
Objection 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more
it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,
since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and
patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that
uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true.
Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is
from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali,
viii. ]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that
which is against nature is the worst. "
I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the
principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are
those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes
things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things
according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative
and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the
most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the
knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of
action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as
determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man
transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to
the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is
gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above
[3551](A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons
related to us.
With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against
reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the
future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides.
Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to
another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it
is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject
to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as
regards merely her guardianship.
Wherefore adultery is more grievous
than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of
violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of
a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the
head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds
from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins
contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should
be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were
those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they
should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath
not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that
very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when
that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the
perversity of lust. "
Reply to Objection 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as
stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity
of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and
more firm than any subsequently established order.
Reply to Objection 3: The nature of the species is more intimately
united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins
against the specific nature are more grievous.
Reply to Objection 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a
thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins
against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness,
which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While
the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due
species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, "He accused his
brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with
cattle. " After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right
manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the
"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other
circumstances.
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OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1)
continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must
consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether continence is a virtue?
(2) What is its matter?
(3) What is its subject?
(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
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Whether continence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species
and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But
continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according
to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
makes ill use of. " Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance,
if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it.
Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is
lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23,
"Faith, modesty," etc. , says that by continence a man refrains even
from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue.
Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure. " Therefore continence
is a virtue.
I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in two
ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal.
5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first
place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to
continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above
([3552]Q[152], A[3] ) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which
in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence
(Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of
the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in
opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does
not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the
sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions
contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a
mixture," inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls
short of virtue.
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same
division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according
to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to
that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now
whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which
is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as
good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly
and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil
desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from
good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate
in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first
sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from
unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser
goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
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Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?
Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not
the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General
decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous
is restrained* in its every action. " [*"Continentem" according to St.
Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].
Objection 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other
passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than
the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal
dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a
madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not
properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel. "
Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root
of all evils. " Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
for pleasures of touch
Objection 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
touch is not its proper matter.
Objection 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
bestial, both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating
human flesh; and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse
of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are
not the proper matter of continence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence
and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and
intemperance. " Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires
for pleasures of touch, as stated above ([3553]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore
continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing,
in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence
continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a
man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that
reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly
about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind
of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in
pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now
it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of
all supervening inclinations, as stated above ([3554]FP, Q[60], A[2]).
Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more
strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature
inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for
the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
desires for pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense
in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in
this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence
in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul---in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him---rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said
to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
Reply to Objection 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the
like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of
choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the
maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but
relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard
to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood
continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or
understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for
pleasures of touch.
Reply to Objection 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than
pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence
and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.
Reply to Objection 5: Continence is a good of the human reason:
wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay
hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural
passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be
continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as
stated [3555](A[2]), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the
concupiscible power.
Objection 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing"
[*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose
passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason. "
Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
Objection 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the
reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it
follows that it is in the concupiscible.
On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the
evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of
the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
not in the concupiscible power.
I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as
its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since
both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of
them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful
desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in
their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement
desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the
incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids.
Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act
it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ([3556]FS,
Q[13], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for
pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance
which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist
them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is
of one thing against another.
Reply to Objection 2: The will stands between reason and the
concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is
moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the
concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its
first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both
belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the passions are not in the will as
their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus
it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether continence is better than temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul. " Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the
greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater
reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned,
except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject
to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue
than temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in
the concupiscible, as stated above [3557](A[3]). Therefore continence
is a greater virtue than temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De
Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a
principal virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [3558](A[1]), continence has a twofold
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than
temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said
above (Q[152], A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over
chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken
as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are
vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than
continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that
which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more
in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former
even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by
reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite
strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is
compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways.
First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence
from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of
a continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the
flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of
virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ([3559]Q[152], AA[4],5).
Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in
which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus
it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," because its
value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable
according to weight.
Reply to Objection 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may
proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause:
because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to
concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which
inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for
others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas
strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or
strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause,
for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in
the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by
reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence
diminishes it.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the
concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of
which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to
the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the
temperate man---is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
will, as in the case of one who is continent.
__________________________________________________________________
OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in
desire?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul
but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from
the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described
either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains
not to the soul but to the body.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result
from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the
bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it
is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper
whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire. " Therefore incontinence
regards the body.
Objection 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the
vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul.
Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we
ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.
I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than
to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of
the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is
owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the
sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these
passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of
incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as
the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.
If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of
reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through
the vehemence of their passions---the essential conditions of
continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the
judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent
forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason.
This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7):
first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has
given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or
"impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this
kind of incontinence is called "weakness. " Hence it is manifest that
incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has
certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the
senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament,
the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds
to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to
Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman? " And since small and weak
things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys.
