No More Learning

The Duke was in his shirt, as he had leaped out of bed, and
leaning on a table near the window. “Art thou the villain,” cried
Deveroux to him, “who intends to deliver up the Emperor’s troops to the
enemy, and to tear the crown from the head of his Majesty? Now thou must
die! ” He paused for a few moments, as if expecting an answer; but scorn
and astonishment kept Wallenstein silent. Throwing his arms wide open,
he received in his breast, the deadly blow of the halberds, and without
uttering a groan, fell weltering in his blood.

The next day, an express arrived from the Duke of Lauenburg, announcing
his approach. The messenger was secured, and another in Wallenstein’s
livery despatched to the Duke, to decoy him into Egra. The stratagem
succeeded, and Francis Albert fell into the hands of the enemy. Duke
Bernard of Weimar, who was on his march towards Egra, was nearly sharing
the same fate. Fortunately, he heard of Wallenstein’s death in time to
save himself by a retreat. Ferdinand shed a tear over the fate of his
general, and ordered three thousand masses to be said for his soul at
Vienna; but, at the same time, he did not forget to reward his assassins
with gold chains, chamberlains’ keys, dignities, and estates.

Thus did Wallenstein, at the age of fifty, terminate his active and
extraordinary life. To ambition, he owed both his greatness and his
ruin; with all his failings, he possessed great and admirable qualities,
and had he kept himself within due bounds, he would have lived and died
without an equal. The virtues of the ruler and of the hero, prudence,
justice, firmness, and courage, are strikingly prominent features in his
character; but he wanted the gentler virtues of the man, which adorn the
hero, and make the ruler beloved. Terror was the talisman with which he
worked; extreme in his punishments as in his rewards, he knew how to
keep alive the zeal of his followers, while no general of ancient or
modern times could boast of being obeyed with equal alacrity.
Submission to his will was more prized by him than bravery; for, if the
soldiers work by the latter, it is on the former that the general
depends. He continually kept up the obedience of his troops by
capricious orders, and profusely rewarded the readiness to obey even in
trifles; because he looked rather to the act itself, than its object.
He once issued a decree, with the penalty of death on disobedience, that
none but red sashes should be worn in the army. A captain of horse no
sooner heard the order, than pulling off his gold-embroidered sash, he
trampled it under foot; Wallenstein, on being informed of the
circumstance, promoted him on the spot to the rank of Colonel. His
comprehensive glance was always directed to the whole, and in all his
apparent caprice, he steadily kept in view some general scope or
bearing. The robberies committed by the soldiers in a friendly country,
had led to the severest orders against marauders; and all who should be
caught thieving, were threatened with the halter. Wallenstein himself
having met a straggler in the open country upon the field, commanded him
to be seized without trial, as a transgressor of the law, and in his
usual voice of thunder, exclaimed, “Hang the fellow,” against which no
opposition ever availed. The soldier pleaded and proved his innocence,
but the irrevocable sentence had gone forth. “Hang then innocent,”
cried the inexorable Wallenstein, “the guilty will have then more reason
to tremble. ” Preparations were already making to execute the sentence,
when the soldier, who gave himself up for lost, formed the desperate
resolution of not dying without revenge. He fell furiously upon his
judge, but was overpowered by numbers, and disarmed before he could
fulfil his design. “Now let him go,” said the Duke, “it will excite
sufficient terror. ”

His munificence was supported by an immense income, which was estimated
at three millions of florins yearly, without reckoning the enormous sums
which he raised under the name of contributions. His liberality and
clearness of understanding, raised him above the religious prejudices of
his age; and the Jesuits never forgave him for having seen through their
system, and for regarding the pope as nothing more than a bishop of
Rome.

But as no one ever yet came to a fortunate end who quarrelled with the
Church, Wallenstein also must augment the number of its victims.
Through the intrigues of monks, he lost at Ratisbon the command of the
army, and at Egra his life; by the same arts, perhaps, he lost what was
of more consequence, his honourable name and good repute with posterity.

For in justice it must be admitted, that the pens which have traced the
history of this extraordinary man are not untinged with partiality, and
that the treachery of the duke, and his designs upon the throne of
Bohemia, rest not so much upon proven facts, as upon probable
conjecture. No documents have yet been brought to light, which disclose
with historical certainty the secret motives of his conduct; and among
all his public and well attested actions, there is, perhaps, not one
which could not have had an innocent end. Many of his most obnoxious
measures proved nothing but the earnest wish he entertained for peace;
most of the others are explained and justified by the well-founded
distrust he entertained of the Emperor, and the excusable wish of
maintaining his own importance. It is true, that his conduct towards
the Elector of Bavaria looks too like an unworthy revenge, and the
dictates of an implacable spirit; but still, none of his actions perhaps
warrant us in holding his treason to be proved. If necessity and
despair at last forced him to deserve the sentence which had been
pronounced against him while innocent, still this, if true, will not
justify that sentence. Thus Wallenstein fell, not because he was a
rebel, but he became a rebel because he fell. Unfortunate in life that
he made a victorious party his enemy, and still more unfortunate in
death, that the same party survived him and wrote his history.





BOOK V.



Wallenstein’s death rendered necessary the appointment of a new
generalissimo; and the Emperor yielded at last to the advice of the
Spaniards, to raise his son Ferdinand, King of Hungary, to that dignity.
Under him, Count Gallas commanded, who performed the functions of
commander-in-chief, while the prince brought to this post nothing but
his name and dignity. A considerable force was soon assembled under
Ferdinand; the Duke of Lorraine brought up a considerable body of
auxiliaries in person, and the Cardinal Infante joined him from Italy
with 10,000 men. In order to drive the enemy from the Danube, the new
general undertook the enterprise in which his predecessor had failed,
the siege of Ratisbon. In vain did Duke Bernard of Weimar penetrate
into the interior of Bavaria, with a view to draw the enemy from the
town; Ferdinand continued to press the siege with vigour, and the city,
after a most obstinate resistance, was obliged to open its gates to him.
Donauwerth soon shared the same fate, and Nordlingen in Swabia was now
invested. The loss of so many of the imperial cities was severely felt
by the Swedish party; as the friendship of these towns had so largely
contributed to the success of their arms, indifference to their fate
would have been inexcusable. It would have been an indelible disgrace,
had they deserted their confederates in their need, and abandoned them
to the revenge of an implacable conqueror. Moved by these
considerations, the Swedish army, under the command of Horn, and Bernard
of Weimar, advanced upon Nordlingen, determined to relieve it even at
the expense of a battle.

The undertaking was a dangerous one, for in numbers the enemy was
greatly superior to that of the Swedes. There was also a further reason
for avoiding a battle at present; the enemy’s force was likely soon to
divide, the Italian troops being destined for the Netherlands. In the
mean time, such a position might be taken up, as to cover Nordlingen,
and cut off their supplies. All these grounds were strongly urged by
Gustavus Horn, in the Swedish council of war; but his remonstrances were
disregarded by men who, intoxicated by a long career of success, mistook
the suggestions of prudence for the voice of timidity. Overborne by the
superior influence of Duke Bernard, Gustavus Horn was compelled to risk
a contest, whose unfavourable issue, a dark foreboding seemed already to
announce. The fate of the battle depended upon the possession of a
height which commanded the imperial camp. An attempt to occupy it
during the night failed, as the tedious transport of the artillery
through woods and hollow ways delayed the arrival of the troops. When
the Swedes arrived about midnight, they found the heights in possession
of the enemy, strongly entrenched. They waited, therefore, for
daybreak, to carry them by storm. Their impetuous courage surmounted
every obstacle; the entrenchments, which were in the form of a crescent,
were successfully scaled by each of the two brigades appointed to the
service; but as they entered at the same moment from opposite sides,
they met and threw each other into confusion. At this unfortunate
moment, a barrel of powder blew up, and created the greatest disorder
among the Swedes. The imperial cavalry charged upon their broken ranks,
and the flight became universal. No persuasion on the part of their
general could induce the fugitives to renew the assault.

He resolved, therefore, in order to carry this important post, to lead
fresh troops to the attack. But in the interim, some Spanish regiments
had marched in, and every attempt to gain it was repulsed by their
heroic intrepidity. One of the duke’s own regiments advanced seven
times, and was as often driven back. The disadvantage of not occupying
this post in time, was quickly and sensibly felt. The fire of the
enemy’s artillery from the heights, caused such slaughter in the
adjacent wing of the Swedes, that Horn, who commanded there, was forced
to give orders to retire. Instead of being able to cover the retreat of
his colleague, and to check the pursuit of the enemy, Duke Bernard,
overpowered by numbers, was himself driven into the plain, where his
routed cavalry spread confusion among Horn’s brigade, and rendered the
defeat complete. Almost the entire infantry were killed or taken
prisoners. More than 12,000 men remained dead upon the field of battle;
80 field pieces, about 4,000 waggons, and 300 standards and colours fell
into the hands of the Imperialists. Horn himself, with three other
generals, were taken prisoners. Duke Bernard with difficulty saved a
feeble remnant of his army, which joined him at Frankfort.

The defeat at Nordlingen, cost the Swedish Chancellor the second
sleepless night he had passed in Germany. --[The first was occasioned by
the death of Gustavus Adolphus. ]--The consequences of this disaster were
terrible. The Swedes had lost by it at once their superiority in the
field, and with it the confidence of their confederates, which they had
gained solely by their previous military success. A dangerous division
threatened the Protestant Confederation with ruin. Consternation and
terror seized upon the whole party; while the Papists arose with
exulting triumph from the deep humiliation into which they had sunk.
Swabia and the adjacent circles first felt the consequences of the
defeat of Nordlingen; and Wirtemberg, in particular, was overrun by the
conquering army. All the members of the League of Heilbronn trembled at
the prospect of the Emperor’s revenge; those who could, fled to
Strasburg, while the helpless free cities awaited their fate with alarm.
A little more of moderation towards the conquered, would have quickly
reduced all the weaker states under the Emperor’s authority; but the
severity which was practised, even against those who voluntarily
surrendered, drove the rest to despair, and roused them to a vigorous
resistance.

In this perplexity, all looked to Oxenstiern for counsel and assistance;
Oxenstiern applied for both to the German States. Troops were wanted;
money likewise, to raise new levies, and to pay to the old the arrears
which the men were clamorously demanding. Oxenstiern addressed himself
to the Elector of Saxony; but he shamefully abandoned the Swedish cause,
to negociate for a separate peace with the Emperor at Pirna. He
solicited aid from the Lower Saxon States; but they, long wearied of the
Swedish pretensions and demands for money, now thought only of
themselves; and George, Duke of Lunenburg, in place of flying to the
assistance of Upper Germany, laid siege to Minden, with the intention of
keeping possession of it for himself. Abandoned by his German allies,
the chancellor exerted himself to obtain the assistance of foreign
powers. England, Holland, and Venice were applied to for troops and
money; and, driven to the last extremity, the chancellor reluctantly
resolved to take the disagreeable step which he had so long avoided, and
to throw himself under the protection of France.

The moment had at last arrived which Richelieu had long waited for with
impatience. Nothing, he was aware, but the impossibility of saving
themselves by any other means, could induce the Protestant States in
Germany to support the pretensions of France upon Alsace. This extreme
necessity had now arrived; the assistance of that power was
indispensable, and she was resolved to be well paid for the active part
which she was about to take in the German war. Full of lustre and
dignity, it now came upon the political stage. Oxenstiern, who felt
little reluctance in bestowing the rights and possessions of the empire,
had already ceded the fortress of Philipsburg, and the other long
coveted places. The Protestants of Upper Germany now, in their own
names, sent a special embassy to Richelieu, requesting him to take
Alsace, the fortress of Breyssach, which was still to be recovered from
the enemy, and all the places upon the Upper Rhine, which were the keys
of Germany, under the protection of France. What was implied by French
protection had been seen in the conduct of France towards the bishoprics
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which it had held for centuries against the
rightful owners. Treves was already in the possession of French
garrisons; Lorraine was in a manner conquered, as it might at any time
be overrun by an army, and could not, alone, and with its own strength,
withstand its formidable neighbour. France now entertained the hope of
adding Alsace to its large and numerous possessions, and,--since a
treaty was soon to be concluded with the Dutch for the partition of the
Spanish Netherlands--the prospect of making the Rhine its natural
boundary towards Germany. Thus shamefully were the rights of Germany
sacrificed by the German States to this treacherous and grasping power,
which, under the mask of a disinterested friendship, aimed only at its
own aggrandizement; and while it boldly claimed the honourable title of
a Protectress, was solely occupied with promoting its own schemes, and
advancing its own interests amid the general confusion.

In return for these important cessions, France engaged to effect a
diversion in favour of the Swedes, by commencing hostilities against the
Spaniards; and if this should lead to an open breach with the Emperor,
to maintain an army upon the German side of the Rhine, which was to act
in conjunction with the Swedes and Germans against Austria. For a war
with Spain, the Spaniards themselves soon afforded the desired pretext.
Making an inroad from the Netherlands, upon the city of Treves, they cut
in pieces the French garrison; and, in open violation of the law of
nations, made prisoner the Elector, who had placed himself under the
protection of France, and carried him into Flanders. When the Cardinal
Infante, as Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, refused satisfaction for
these injuries, and delayed to restore the prince to liberty, Richelieu,
after the old custom, formally proclaimed war at Brussels by a herald,
and the war was at once opened by three different armies in Milan, in
the Valteline, and in Flanders. The French minister was less anxious to
commence hostilities with the Emperor, which promised fewer advantages,
and threatened greater difficulties. A fourth army, however, was
detached across the Rhine into Germany, under the command of Cardinal
Lavalette, which was to act in conjunction with Duke Bernard, against
the Emperor, without a previous declaration of war.

A heavier blow for the Swedes, than even the defeat of Nordlingen, was
the reconciliation of the Elector of Saxony with the Emperor. After
many fruitless attempts both to bring about and to prevent it, it was at
last effected in 1634, at Pirna, and, the following year, reduced into a
formal treaty of peace, at Prague. The Elector of Saxony had always
viewed with jealousy the pretensions of the Swedes in Germany; and his
aversion to this foreign power, which now gave laws within the Empire,
had grown with every fresh requisition that Oxenstiern was obliged to
make upon the German states. This ill feeling was kept alive by the
Spanish court, who laboured earnestly to effect a peace between Saxony
and the Emperor. Wearied with the calamities of a long and destructive
contest, which had selected Saxony above all others for its theatre;
grieved by the miseries which both friend and foe inflicted upon his
subjects, and seduced by the tempting propositions of the House of
Austria, the Elector at last abandoned the common cause, and, caring
little for the fate of his confederates, or the liberties of Germany,
thought only of securing his own advantages, even at the expense of the
whole body.

In fact, the misery of Germany had risen to such a height, that all
clamorously vociferated for peace; and even the most disadvantageous
pacification would have been hailed as a blessing from heaven. The
plains, which formerly had been thronged with a happy and industrious
population, where nature had lavished her choicest gifts, and plenty and
prosperity had reigned, were now a wild and desolate wilderness. The
fields, abandoned by the industrious husbandman, lay waste and
uncultivated; and no sooner had the young crops given the promise of a
smiling harvest, than a single march destroyed the labours of a year,
and blasted the last hope of an afflicted peasantry. Burnt castles,
wasted fields, villages in ashes, were to be seen extending far and wide
on all sides, while the ruined peasantry had no resource left but to
swell the horde of incendiaries, and fearfully to retaliate upon their
fellows, who had hitherto been spared the miseries which they themselves
had suffered. The only safeguard against oppression was to become an
oppressor. The towns groaned under the licentiousness of undisciplined
and plundering garrisons, who seized and wasted the property of the
citizens, and, under the license of their position, committed the most
remorseless devastation and cruelty. If the march of an army converted
whole provinces into deserts, if others were impoverished by winter
quarters, or exhausted by contributions, these still were but passing
evils, and the industry of a year might efface the miseries of a few
months. But there was no relief for those who had a garrison within
their walls, or in the neighbourhood; even the change of fortune could
not improve their unfortunate fate, since the victor trod in the steps
of the vanquished, and friends were not more merciful than enemies. The
neglected farms, the destruction of the crops, and the numerous armies
which overran the exhausted country, were inevitably followed by
scarcity and the high price of provisions, which in the later years was
still further increased by a general failure in the crops. The crowding
together of men in camps and quarters--want upon one side, and excess
on the other, occasioned contagious distempers, which were more fatal
than even the sword. In this long and general confusion, all the bonds
of social life were broken up;--respect for the rights of their fellow
men, the fear of the laws, purity of morals, honour, and religion, were
laid aside, where might ruled supreme with iron sceptre. Under the
shelter of anarchy and impunity, every vice flourished, and men became
as wild as the country. No station was too dignified for outrage, no
property too holy for rapine and avarice. In a word, the soldier
reigned supreme; and that most brutal of despots often made his own
officer feel his power. The leader of an army was a far more important
person within any country where he appeared, than its lawful governor,
who was frequently obliged to fly before him into his own castles for
safety. Germany swarmed with these petty tyrants, and the country
suffered equally from its enemies and its protectors. These wounds
rankled the deeper, when the unhappy victims recollected that Germany
was sacrificed to the ambition of foreign powers, who, for their own
ends, prolonged the miseries of war. Germany bled under the scourge, to
extend the conquests and influence of Sweden; and the torch of discord
was kept alive within the Empire, that the services of Richelieu might
be rendered indispensable in France.

But, in truth, it was not merely interested voices which opposed a
peace; and if both Sweden and the German states were anxious, from
corrupt motives, to prolong the conflict, they were seconded in their
views by sound policy. After the defeat of Nordlingen, an equitable
peace was not to be expected from the Emperor; and, this being the case,
was it not too great a sacrifice, after seventeen years of war, with all
its miseries, to abandon the contest, not only without advantage, but
even with loss? What would avail so much bloodshed, if all was to
remain as it had been; if their rights and pretensions were neither
larger nor safer; if all that had been won with so much difficulty was
to be surrendered for a peace at any cost? Would it not be better to
endure, for two or three years more, the burdens they had borne so long,
and to reap at last some recompense for twenty years of suffering?
Neither was it doubtful, that peace might at last be obtained on
favourable terms, if only the Swedes and the German Protestants should
continue united in the cabinet and in the field, and pursued their
common interests with a reciprocal sympathy and zeal. Their divisions
alone, had rendered the enemy formidable, and protracted the acquisition
of a lasting and general peace. And this great evil the Elector of
Saxony had brought upon the Protestant cause by concluding a separate
treaty with Austria.

He, indeed, had commenced his negociations with the Emperor, even before
the battle of Nordlingen; and the unfortunate issue of that battle only
accelerated their conclusion. By it, all his confidence in the Swedes
was lost; and it was even doubted whether they would ever recover from
the blow. The jealousies among their generals, the insubordination of
the army, and the exhaustion of the Swedish kingdom, shut out any
reasonable prospect of effective assistance on their part. The Elector
hastened, therefore, to profit by the Emperor’s magnanimity, who, even
after the battle of Nordlingen, did not recall the conditions previously
offered. While Oxenstiern, who had assembled the estates in Frankfort,
made further demands upon them and him, the Emperor, on the contrary,
made concessions; and therefore it required no long consideration to
decide between them.

In the mean time, however, he was anxious to escape the charge of
sacrificing the common cause and attending only to his own interests.
All the German states, and even the Swedes, were publicly invited to
become parties to this peace, although Saxony and the Emperor were the
only powers who deliberated upon it, and who assumed the right to give
law to Germany. By this self-appointed tribunal, the grievances of the
Protestants were discussed, their rights and privileges decided, and
even the fate of religions determined, without the presence of those who
were most deeply interested in it. Between them, a general peace was
resolved on, and it was to be enforced by an imperial army of execution,
as a formal decree of the Empire. Whoever opposed it, was to be treated
as a public enemy; and thus, contrary to their rights, the states were
to be compelled to acknowledge a law, in the passing of which they had
no share. Thus, even in form, the pacification at Prague was an
arbitrary measure; nor was it less so in its contents. The Edict of
Restitution had been the chief cause of dispute between the Elector and
the Emperor; and therefore it was first considered in their
deliberations. Without formally annulling it, it was determined by the
treaty of Prague, that all the ecclesiastical domains holding
immediately of the Empire, and, among the mediate ones, those which had
been seized by the Protestants subsequently to the treaty at Passau,
should, for forty years, remain in the same position as they had been in
before the Edict of Restitution, but without any formal decision of the
diet to that effect. Before the expiration of this term a commission,
composed of equal numbers of both religions, should proceed to settle
the matter peaceably and according to law; and if this commission should
be unable to come to a decision, each party should remain in possession
of the rights which it had exercised before the Edict of Restitution.
This arrangement, therefore, far from removing the grounds of
dissension, only suspended the dispute for a time; and this article of
the treaty of Prague only covered the embers of a future war.

The archbishopric of Magdeburg remained in possession of Prince Augustus
of Saxony, and Halberstadt in that of the Archduke Leopold William.
Four estates were taken from the territory of Magdeburg, and given to
Saxony, for which the Administrator of Magdeburg, Christian William of
Brandenburg, was otherwise to be indemnified. The Dukes of Mecklenburg,
upon acceding to this treaty, were to be acknowledged as rightful
possessors of their territories, in which the magnanimity of Gustavus
Adolphus had long ago reinstated them. Donauwerth recovered its
liberties. The important claims of the heirs of the Palatine, however
important it might be for the Protestant cause not to lose this
electorate vote in the diet, were passed over in consequence of the
animosity subsisting between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. All the
conquests which, in the course of the war, had been made by the German
states, or by the League and the Emperor, were to be mutually restored;
all which had been appropriated by the foreign powers of France and
Sweden, was to be forcibly wrested from them by the united powers. The
troops of the contracting parties were to be formed into one imperial
army, which, supported and paid by the Empire, was, by force of arms, to
carry into execution the covenants of the treaty.

As the peace of Prague was intended to serve as a general law of the
Empire, those points, which did not immediately affect the latter,
formed the subject of a separate treaty. By it, Lusatia was ceded to
the Elector of Saxony as a fief of Bohemia, and special articles
guaranteed the freedom of religion of this country and of Silesia.

All the Protestant states were invited to accede to the treaty of
Prague, and on that condition were to benefit by the amnesty. The
princes of Wurtemberg and Baden, whose territories the Emperor was
already in possession of, and which he was not disposed to restore
unconditionally; and such vassals of Austria as had borne arms against
their sovereign; and those states which, under the direction of
Oxenstiern, composed the council of the Upper German Circle, were
excluded from the treaty,--not so much with the view of continuing the
war against them, as of compelling them to purchase peace at a dearer
rate. Their territories were to be retained in pledge, till every thing
should be restored to its former footing. Such was the treaty of
Prague. Equal justice, however, towards all, might perhaps have
restored confidence between the head of the Empire and its members--
between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics--between the Reformed
and the Lutheran party; and the Swedes, abandoned by all their allies,
would in all probability have been driven from Germany with disgrace.
But this inequality strengthened, in those who were more severely
treated, the spirit of mistrust and opposition, and made it an easier
task for the Swedes to keep alive the flame of war, and to maintain a
party in Germany.

The peace of Prague, as might have been expected, was received with very
various feelings throughout Germany. The attempt to conciliate both
parties, had rendered it obnoxious to both. The Protestants complained
of the restraints imposed upon them; the Roman Catholics thought that
these hated sectaries had been favoured at the expense of the true
church. In the opinion of the latter, the church had been deprived of
its inalienable rights, by the concession to the Protestants of forty
years’ undisturbed possession of the ecclesiastical benefices; while the
former murmured that the interests of the Protestant church had been
betrayed, because toleration had not been granted to their
co-religionists in the Austrian dominions. But no one was so bitterly
reproached as the Elector of Saxony, who was publicly denounced as a
deserter, a traitor to religion and the liberties of the Empire, and a
confederate of the Emperor.

In the mean time, he consoled himself with the triumph of seeing most of
the Protestant states compelled by necessity to embrace this peace. The
Elector of Brandenburg, Duke William of Weimar, the princes of Anhalt,
the dukes of Mecklenburg, the dukes of Brunswick Lunenburg, the Hanse
towns, and most of the imperial cities, acceded to it. The Landgrave
William of Hesse long wavered, or affected to do so, in order to gain
time, and to regulate his measures by the course of events. He had
conquered several fertile provinces of Westphalia, and derived from them
principally the means of continuing the war; these, by the terms of the
treaty, he was bound to restore. Bernard, Duke of Weimar, whose states,
as yet, existed only on paper, as a belligerent power was not affected
by the treaty, but as a general was so materially; and, in either view,
he must equally be disposed to reject it. His whole riches consisted in
his bravery, his possessions in his sword. War alone gave him greatness
and importance, and war alone could realize the projects which his
ambition suggested.

But of all who declaimed against the treaty of Prague, none were so loud
in their clamours as the Swedes, and none had so much reason for their
opposition. Invited to Germany by the Germans themselves, the champions
of the Protestant Church, and the freedom of the States, which they had
defended with so much bloodshed, and with the sacred life of their king,
they now saw themselves suddenly and shamefully abandoned, disappointed
in all their hopes, without reward and without gratitude driven from the
empire for which they had toiled and bled, and exposed to the ridicule
of the enemy by the very princes who owed every thing to them. No
satisfaction, no indemnification for the expenses which they had
incurred, no equivalent for the conquests which they were to leave
behind them, was provided by the treaty of Prague. They were to be
dismissed poorer than they came, or, if they resisted, to be expelled by
the very powers who had invited them. The Elector of Saxony at last
spoke of a pecuniary indemnification, and mentioned the small sum of two
millions five hundred thousand florins; but the Swedes had already
expended considerably more, and this disgraceful equivalent in money was
both contrary to their true interests, and injurious to their pride.
“The Electors of Bavaria and Saxony,” replied Oxenstiern, “have been
paid for their services, which, as vassals, they were bound to render
the Emperor, with the possession of important provinces; and shall we,
who have sacrificed our king for Germany, be dismissed with the
miserable sum of 2,500,000 florins? ” The disappointment of their
expectations was the more severe, because the Swedes had calculated upon
being recompensed with the Duchy of Pomerania, the present possessor of
which was old and without heirs. But the succession of this territory
was confirmed by the treaty of Prague to the Elector of Brandenburg; and
all the neighbouring powers declared against allowing the Swedes to
obtain a footing within the empire.

Never, in the whole course of the war, had the prospects of the Swedes
looked more gloomy, than in the year 1635, immediately after the
conclusion of the treaty of Prague. Many of their allies, particularly
among the free cities, abandoned them to benefit by the peace; others
were compelled to accede to it by the victorious arms of the Emperor.
Augsburg, subdued by famine, surrendered under the severest conditions;
Wurtzburg and Coburg were lost to the Austrians. The League of
Heilbronn was formally dissolved. Nearly the whole of Upper Germany,
the chief seat of the Swedish power, was reduced under the Emperor.
Saxony, on the strength of the treaty of Prague, demanded the evacuation
of Thuringia, Halberstadt, and Magdeburg. Philipsburg, the military
depot of France, was surprised by the Austrians, with all the stores it
contained; and this severe loss checked the activity of France. To
complete the embarrassments of Sweden, the truce with Poland was drawing
to a close. To support a war at the same time with Poland and in
Germany, was far beyond the power of Sweden; and all that remained was
to choose between them. Pride and ambition declared in favour of
continuing the German war, at whatever sacrifice on the side of Poland.
An army, however, was necessary to command the respect of Poland, and to
give weight to Sweden in any negotiations for a truce or a peace.

The mind of Oxenstiern, firm, and inexhaustible in expedients, set
itself manfully to meet these calamities, which all combined to
overwhelm Sweden; and his shrewd understanding taught him how to turn
even misfortunes to his advantage. The defection of so many German
cities of the empire deprived him, it is true, of a great part of his
former allies, but at the same time it freed him from the necessity of
paying any regard to their interests. The more the number of his
enemies increased, the more provinces and magazines were opened to his
troops. The gross ingratitude of the States, and the haughty contempt
with which the Emperor behaved, (who did not even condescend to treat
directly with him about a peace,) excited in him the courage of despair,
and a noble determination to maintain the struggle to the last. The
continuance of war, however unfortunate it might prove, could not render
the situation of Sweden worse than it now was; and if Germany was to be
evacuated, it was at least better and nobler to do so sword in hand, and
to yield to force rather than to fear.

In the extremity in which the Swedes were now placed by the desertion of
their allies, they addressed themselves to France, who met them with the
greatest encouragement. The interests of the two crowns were closely
united, and France would have injured herself by allowing the Swedish
power in Germany to decline.
The helpless situation of the Swedes, was
rather an additional motive with France to cement more closely their
alliance, and to take a more active part in the German war. Since the
alliance with Sweden, at Beerwald, in 1632, France had maintained the
war against the Emperor, by the arms of Gustavus Adolphus, without any
open or formal breach, by furnishing subsidies and increasing the number
of his enemies. But alarmed at the unexpected rapidity and success of
the Swedish arms, France, in anxiety to restore the balance of power,
which was disturbed by the preponderance of the Swedes, seemed, for a
time, to have lost sight of her original designs. She endeavoured to
protect the Roman Catholic princes of the empire against the Swedish
conqueror, by the treaties of neutrality, and when this plan failed, she
even meditated herself to declare war against him. But no sooner had
the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and the desperate situation of the
Swedish affairs, dispelled this apprehension, than she returned with
fresh zeal to her first design, and readily afforded in this misfortune
the aid which in the hour of success she had refused. Freed from the
checks which the ambition and vigilance of Gustavus Adolphus placed upon
her plans of aggrandizement, France availed herself of the favourable
opportunity afforded by the defeat of Nordlingen, to obtain the entire
direction of the war, and to prescribe laws to those who sued for her
powerful protection. The moment seemed to smile upon her boldest plans,
and those which had formerly seemed chimerical, now appeared to be
justified by circumstances. She now turned her whole attention to the
war in Germany; and, as soon as she had secured her own private ends by
a treaty with the Germans, she suddenly entered the political arena as
an active and a commanding power. While the other belligerent states
had been exhausting themselves in a tedious contest, France had been
reserving her strength, and maintained the contest by money alone; but
now, when the state of things called for more active measures, she
seized the sword, and astonished Europe by the boldness and magnitude of
her undertakings. At the same moment, she fitted out two fleets, and
sent six different armies into the field, while she subsidized a foreign
crown and several of the German princes. Animated by this powerful
co-operation, the Swedes and Germans awoke from the consternation, and
hoped, sword in hand, to obtain a more honourable peace than that of
Prague. Abandoned by their confederates, who had been reconciled to the
Emperor, they formed a still closer alliance with France, which
increased her support with their growing necessities, at the same time
taking a more active, although secret share in the German war, until at
last, she threw off the mask altogether, and in her own name made an
unequivocal declaration of war against the Emperor.

To leave Sweden at full liberty to act against Austria, France commenced
her operations by liberating it from all fear of a Polish war. By means
of the Count d’Avaux, its minister, an agreement was concluded between
the two powers at Stummsdorf in Prussia, by which the truce was
prolonged for twenty-six years, though not without a great sacrifice on
the part of the Swedes, who ceded by a single stroke of the pen almost
the whole of Polish Prussia, the dear-bought conquest of Gustavus
Adolphus. The treaty of Beerwald was, with certain modifications, which
circumstances rendered necessary, renewed at different times at
Compiegne, and afterwards at Wismar and Hamburg. France had already
come to a rupture with Spain, in May, 1635, and the vigorous attack
which it made upon that power, deprived the Emperor of his most valuable
auxiliaries from the Netherlands. By supporting the Landgrave William
of Cassel, and Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Swedes were enabled to act
with more vigour upon the Elbe and the Danube, and a diversion upon the
Rhine compelled the Emperor to divide his force.

The war was now prosecuted with increasing activity. By the treaty of
Prague, the Emperor had lessened the number of his adversaries within
the Empire; though, at the same time, the zeal and activity of his
foreign enemies had been augmented by it. In Germany, his influence was
almost unlimited, for, with the exception of a few states, he had
rendered himself absolute master of the German body and its resources,
and was again enabled to act in the character of emperor and sovereign.
The first fruit of his power was the elevation of his son, Ferdinand
III. , to the dignity of King of the Romans, to which he was elected by a
decided majority of votes, notwithstanding the opposition of Treves, and
of the heirs of the Elector Palatine. But, on the other hand, he had
exasperated the Swedes to desperation, had armed the power of France
against him, and drawn its troops into the heart of the kingdom. France
and Sweden, with their German allies, formed, from this moment, one firm
and compactly united power; the Emperor, with the German states which
adhered to him, were equally firm and united. The Swedes, who no longer
fought for Germany, but for their own lives, showed no more indulgence;
relieved from the necessity of consulting their German allies, or
accounting to them for the plans which they adopted, they acted with
more precipitation, rapidity, and boldness. Battles, though less
decisive, became more obstinate and bloody; greater achievements, both
in bravery and military skill, were performed; but they were but
insulated efforts; and being neither dictated by any consistent plan,
nor improved by any commanding spirit, had comparatively little
influence upon the course of the war.

Saxony had bound herself, by the treaty of Prague, to expel the Swedes
from Germany. From this moment, the banners of the Saxons and
Imperialists were united: the former confederates were converted into
implacable enemies. The archbishopric of Magdeburg which, by the
treaty, was ceded to the prince of Saxony, was still held by the Swedes,
and every attempt to acquire it by negociation had proved ineffectual.
Hostilities commenced, by the Elector of Saxony recalling all his
subjects from the army of Banner, which was encamped upon the Elbe. The
officers, long irritated by the accumulation of their arrears, obeyed
the summons, and evacuated one quarter after another. As the Saxons, at
the same time, made a movement towards Mecklenburg, to take Doemitz, and
to drive the Swedes from Pomerania and the Baltic, Banner suddenly
marched thither, relieved Doemitz, and totally defeated the Saxon
General Baudissin, with 7000 men, of whom 1000 were slain, and about the
same number taken prisoners. Reinforced by the troops and artillery,
which had hitherto been employed in Polish Prussia, but which the treaty
of Stummsdorf rendered unnecessary, this brave and impetuous general
made, the following year (1636), a sudden inroad into the Electorate of
Saxony, where he gratified his inveterate hatred of the Saxons by the
most destructive ravages. Irritated by the memory of old grievances
which, during their common campaigns, he and the Swedes had suffered
from the haughtiness of the Saxons, and now exasperated to the utmost by
the late defection of the Elector, they wreaked upon the unfortunate
inhabitants all their rancour. Against Austria and Bavaria, the Swedish
soldier had fought from a sense, as it were, of duty; but against the
Saxons, they contended with all the energy of private animosity and
personal revenge, detesting them as deserters and traitors; for the
hatred of former friends is of all the most fierce and irreconcileable.
The powerful diversion made by the Duke of Weimar, and the Landgrave of
Hesse, upon the Rhine and in Westphalia, prevented the Emperor from
affording the necessary assistance to Saxony, and left the whole
Electorate exposed to the destructive ravages of Banner’s army.

At length, the Elector, having formed a junction with the Imperial
General Hatzfeld, advanced against Magdeburg, which Banner in vain
hastened to relieve. The united army of the Imperialists and the Saxons
now spread itself over Brandenburg, wrested several places from the
Swedes, and almost drove them to the Baltic. But, contrary to all
expectation, Banner, who had been given up as lost, attacked the allies,
on the 24th of September, 1636, at Wittstock, where a bloody battle took
place. The onset was terrific; and the whole force of the enemy was
directed against the right wing of the Swedes, which was led by Banner
in person. The contest was long maintained with equal animosity and
obstinacy on both sides. There was not a squadron among the Swedes,
which did not return ten times to the charge, to be as often repulsed;
when at last, Banner was obliged to retire before the superior numbers
of the enemy. His left wing sustained the combat until night, and the
second line of the Swedes, which had not as yet been engaged, was
prepared to renew it the next morning. But the Elector did not wait for
a second attack. His army was exhausted by the efforts of the preceding
day; and, as the drivers had fled with the horses, his artillery was
unserviceable. He accordingly retreated in the night, with Count
Hatzfeld, and relinquished the ground to the Swedes. About 5000 of the
allies fell upon the field, exclusive of those who were killed in the
pursuit, or who fell into the hands of the exasperated peasantry. One
hundred and fifty standards and colours, twenty-three pieces of cannon,
the whole baggage and silver plate of the Elector, were captured, and
more than 2000 men taken prisoners. This brilliant victory, achieved
over an enemy far superior in numbers, and in a very advantageous
position, restored the Swedes at once to their former reputation; their
enemies were discouraged, and their friends inspired with new hopes.
Banner instantly followed up this decisive success, and hastily crossing
the Elbe, drove the Imperialists before him, through Thuringia and
Hesse, into Westphalia. He then returned, and took up his winter
quarters in Saxony.

But, without the material aid furnished by the diversion upon the Rhine,
and the activity there of Duke Bernard and the French, these important
successes would have been unattainable. Duke Bernard, after the defeat
of Nordlingen, reorganized his broken army at Wetterau; but, abandoned
by the confederates of the League of Heilbronn, which had been dissolved
by the peace of Prague, and receiving little support from the Swedes, he
found himself unable to maintain an army, or to perform any enterprise
of importance. The defeat at Nordlingen had terminated all his hopes on
the Duchy of Franconia, while the weakness of the Swedes, destroyed the
chance of retrieving his fortunes through their assistance. Tired, too,
of the constraint imposed upon him by the imperious chancellor, he
turned his attention to France, who could easily supply him with money,
the only aid which he required, and France readily acceded to his
proposals. Richelieu desired nothing so much as to diminish the
influence of the Swedes in the German war, and to obtain the direction
of it for himself. To secure this end, nothing appeared more effectual
than to detach from the Swedes their bravest general, to win him to the
interests of France, and to secure for the execution of its projects the
services of his arm. From a prince like Bernard, who could not maintain
himself without foreign support, France had nothing to fear, since no
success, however brilliant, could render him independent of that crown.
Bernard himself came into France, and in October, 1635, concluded a
treaty at St. Germaine en Laye, not as a Swedish general, but in his
own name, by which it was stipulated that he should receive for himself
a yearly pension of one million five hundred thousand livres, and four
millions for the support of his army, which he was to command under the
orders of the French king. To inflame his zeal, and to accelerate the
conquest of Alsace, France did not hesitate, by a secret article, to
promise him that province for his services; a promise which Richelieu
had little intention of performing, and which the duke also estimated at
its real worth. But Bernard confided in his good fortune, and in his
arms, and met artifice with dissimulation. If he could once succeed in
wresting Alsace from the enemy, he did not despair of being able, in
case of need, to maintain it also against a friend. He now raised an
army at the expense of France, which he commanded nominally under the
orders of that power, but in reality without any limitation whatever,
and without having wholly abandoned his engagements with Sweden. He
began his operations upon the Rhine, where another French army, under
Cardinal Lavalette, had already, in 1635, commenced hostilities against
the Emperor.

Against this force, the main body of the Imperialists, after the great
victory of Nordlingen, and the reduction of Swabia and Franconia had
advanced under the command of Gallas, had driven them as far as Metz,
cleared the Rhine, and took from the Swedes the towns of Metz and
Frankenthal, of which they were in possession. But frustrated by the
vigorous resistance of the French, in his main object, of taking up his
winter quarters in France, he led back his exhausted troops into Alsace
and Swabia. At the opening of the next campaign, he passed the Rhine at
Breysach, and prepared to carry the war into the interior of France. He
actually entered Burgundy, while the Spaniards from the Netherlands made
progress in Picardy; and John De Werth, a formidable general of the
League, and a celebrated partisan, pushed his march into Champagne, and
spread consternation even to the gates of Paris. But an insignificant
fortress in Franche Comte completely checked the Imperialists, and they
were obliged, a second time, to abandon their enterprise.

The activity of Duke Bernard had hitherto been impeded by his dependence
on a French general, more suited to the priestly robe, than to the baton
of command; and although, in conjunction with him, he conquered Alsace
Saverne, he found himself unable, in the years 1636 and 1637, to
maintain his position upon the Rhine. The ill success of the French
arms in the Netherlands had cheated the activity of operations in Alsace
and Breisgau; but in 1638, the war in that quarter took a more brilliant
turn. Relieved from his former restraint, and with unlimited command of
his troops, Duke Bernard, in the beginning of February, left his winter
quarters in the bishopric of Basle, and unexpectedly appeared upon the
Rhine, where, at this rude season of the year, an attack was little
anticipated. The forest towns of Laufenburg, Waldshut, and Seckingen,
were surprised, and Rhinefeldt besieged. The Duke of Savelli, the
Imperial general who commanded in that quarter, hastened by forced
marches to the relief of this important place, succeeded in raising the
siege, and compelled the Duke of Weimar, with great loss to retire.
But, contrary to all human expectation, he appeared on the third day
after, (21st February, 1638,) before the Imperialists, in order of
battle, and defeated them in a bloody engagement, in which the four
Imperial generals, Savelli, John De Werth, Enkeford, and Sperreuter,
with 2000 men, were taken prisoners. Two of these, De Werth and
Enkeford, were afterwards sent by Richelieu’s orders into France, in
order to flatter the vanity of the French by the sight of such
distinguished prisoners, and by the pomp of military trophies, to
withdraw the attention of the populace from the public distress. The
captured standards and colours were, with the same view, carried in
solemn procession to the church of Notre Dame, thrice exhibited before
the altar, and committed to sacred custody.

The taking of Rhinefeldt, Roeteln, and Fribourg, was the immediate
consequence of the duke’s victory. His army now increased by
considerable recruits, and his projects expanded in proportion as
fortune favoured him. The fortress of Breysach upon the Rhine was
looked upon as holding the command of that river, and as the key of
Alsace. No place in this quarter was of more importance to the Emperor,
and upon none had more care been bestowed. To protect Breysach, was the
principal destination of the Italian army, under the Duke of Feria; the
strength of its works, and its natural defences, bade defiance to
assault, while the Imperial generals who commanded in that quarter had
orders to retain it at any cost. But the duke, trusting to his good
fortune, resolved to attempt the siege. Its strength rendered it
impregnable; it could, therefore, only be starved into a surrender; and
this was facilitated by the carelessness of the commandant, who,
expecting no attack, had been selling off his stores. As under these
circumstances the town could not long hold out, it must be immediately
relieved or victualled. Accordingly, the Imperial General Goetz rapidly
advanced at the head of 12,000 men, accompanied by 3000 waggons loaded
with provisions, which he intended to throw into the place. But he was
attacked with such vigour by Duke Bernard at Witteweyer, that he lost
his whole force, except 3000 men, together with the entire transport. A
similar fate at Ochsenfeld, near Thann, overtook the Duke of Lorraine,
who, with 5000 or 6000 men, advanced to relieve the fortress. After a
third attempt of general Goetz for the relief of Breysach had proved
ineffectual, the fortress, reduced to the greatest extremity by famine,
surrendered, after a blockade of four months, on the 17th December 1638,
to its equally persevering and humane conqueror.

The capture of Breysach opened a boundless field to the ambition of the
Duke of Weimar, and the romance of his hopes was fast approaching to
reality. Far from intending to surrender his conquests to France, he
destined Breysach for himself, and revealed this intention, by exacting
allegiance from the vanquished, in his own name, and not in that of any
other power. Intoxicated by his past success, and excited by the
boldest hopes, he believed that he should be able to maintain his
conquests, even against France herself. At a time when everything
depended upon bravery, when even personal strength was of importance,
when troops and generals were of more value than territories, it was
natural for a hero like Bernard to place confidence in his own powers,
and, at the head of an excellent army, who under his command had proved
invincible, to believe himself capable of accomplishing the boldest and
largest designs. In order to secure himself one friend among the crowd
of enemies whom he was about to provoke, he turned his eyes upon the
Landgravine Amelia of Hesse, the widow of the lately deceased Landgrave
William, a princess whose talents were equal to her courage, and who,
along with her hand, would bestow valuable conquests, an extensive
principality, and a well disciplined army. By the union of the
conquests of Hesse, with his own upon the Rhine, and the junction of
their forces, a power of some importance, and perhaps a third party,
might be formed in Germany, which might decide the fate of the war. But
a premature death put a period to these extensive schemes.

“Courage, Father Joseph, Breysach is ours! ” whispered Richelieu in the
ear of the Capuchin, who had long held himself in readiness to be
despatched into that quarter; so delighted was he with this joyful
intelligence. Already in imagination he held Alsace, Breisgau, and all
the frontiers of Austria in that quarter, without regard to his promise
to Duke Bernard. But the firm determination which the latter had
unequivocally shown, to keep Breysach for himself, greatly embarrassed
the cardinal, and no efforts were spared to retain the victorious
Bernard in the interests of France. He was invited to court, to witness
the honours by which his triumph was to be commemorated; but he
perceived and shunned the seductive snare. The cardinal even went so
far as to offer him the hand of his niece in marriage; but the proud
German prince declined the offer, and refused to sully the blood of
Saxony by a misalliance. He was now considered as a dangerous enemy,
and treated as such. His subsidies were withdrawn; and the Governor of
Breysach and his principal officers were bribed, at least upon the event
of the duke’s death, to take possession of his conquests, and to secure
his troops. These intrigues were no secret to the duke, and the
precautions he took in the conquered places, clearly bespoke the
distrust of France. But this misunderstanding with the French court had
the most prejudicial influence upon his future operations. The
preparations he was obliged to make, in order to secure his conquests
against an attack on the side of France, compelled him to divide his
military strength, while the stoppage of his subsidies delayed his
appearance in the field. It had been his intention to cross the Rhine,
to support the Swedes, and to act against the Emperor and Bavaria on the
banks of the Danube. He had already communicated his plan of operations
to Banner, who was about to carry the war into the Austrian territories,
and had promised to relieve him so, when a sudden death cut short his
heroic career, in the 36th year of his age, at Neuburgh upon the Rhine
(in July, 1639).

He died of a pestilential disorder, which, in the course of two days,
had carried off nearly 400 men in his camp. The black spots which
appeared upon his body, his own dying expressions, and the advantages
which France was likely to reap from his sudden decease, gave rise to a
suspicion that he had been removed by poison--a suspicion sufficiently
refuted by the symptoms of his disorder. In him, the allies lost their
greatest general after Gustavus Adolphus, France a formidable competitor
for Alsace, and the Emperor his most dangerous enemy. Trained to the
duties of a soldier and a general in the school of Gustavus Adolphus, he
successfully imitated his eminent model, and wanted only a longer life
to equal, if not to surpass it. With the bravery of the soldier, he
united the calm and cool penetration of the general and the persevering
fortitude of the man, with the daring resolution of youth; with the wild
ardour of the warrior, the sober dignity of the prince, the moderation
of the sage, and the conscientiousness of the man of honour.
Discouraged by no misfortune, he quickly rose again in full vigour from
the severest defeats; no obstacles could check his enterprise, no
disappointments conquer his indomitable perseverance. His genius,
perhaps, soared after unattainable objects; but the prudence of such
men, is to be measured by a different standard from that of ordinary
people. Capable of accomplishing more, he might venture to form more
daring plans. Bernard affords, in modern history, a splendid example of
those days of chivalry, when personal greatness had its full weight and
influence, when individual bravery could conquer provinces, and the
heroic exploits of a German knight raised him even to the Imperial
throne.

The best part of the duke’s possessions were his army, which, together
with Alsace, he bequeathed to his brother William. But to this army,
both France and Sweden thought that they had well-grounded claims; the
latter, because it had been raised in name of that crown, and had done
homage to it; the former, because it had been supported by its
subsidies. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate also negociated for
its services, and attempted, first by his agents, and latterly in his
own person, to win it over to his interests, with the view of employing
it in the reconquest of his territories. Even the Emperor endeavoured
to secure it, a circumstance the less surprising, when we reflect that
at this time the justice of the cause was comparatively unimportant, and
the extent of the recompense the main object to which the soldier
looked; and when bravery, like every other commodity, was disposed of to
the highest bidder. But France, richer and more determined, outbade all
competitors: it bought over General Erlach, the commander of Breysach,
and the other officers, who soon placed that fortress, with the whole
army, in their hands.

The young Palatine, Prince Charles Louis, who had already made an
unsuccessful campaign against the Emperor, saw his hopes again deceived.
Although intending to do France so ill a service, as to compete with her
for Bernard’s army, he had the imprudence to travel through that
kingdom. The cardinal, who dreaded the justice of the Palatine’s cause,
was glad to seize any opportunity to frustrate his views. He
accordingly caused him to be seized at Moulin, in violation of the law
of nations, and did not set him at liberty, until he learned that the
army of the Duke of Weimar had been secured. France was now in
possession of a numerous and well disciplined army in Germany, and from
this moment began to make open war upon the Emperor.

But it was no longer against Ferdinand II. that its hostilities were to
be conducted; for that prince had died in February, 1637, in the 59th
year of his age. The war which his ambition had kindled, however,
survived him. During a reign of eighteen years he had never once laid
aside the sword, nor tasted the blessings of peace as long as his hand
swayed the imperial sceptre. Endowed with the qualities of a good
sovereign, adorned with many of those virtues which ensure the happiness
of a people, and by nature gentle and humane, we see him, from erroneous
ideas of the monarch’s duty, become at once the instrument and the
victim of the evil passions of others; his benevolent intentions
frustrated, and the friend of justice converted into the oppressor of
mankind, the enemy of peace, and the scourge of his people. Amiable in
domestic life, and respectable as a sovereign, but in his policy ill
advised, while he gained the love of his Roman Catholic subjects, he
incurred the execration of the Protestants. History exhibits many and
greater despots than Ferdinand II. , yet he alone has had the unfortunate
celebrity of kindling a thirty years’ war; but to produce its lamentable
consequences, his ambition must have been seconded by a kindred spirit
of the age, a congenial state of previous circumstances, and existing
seeds of discord. At a less turbulent period, the spark would have
found no fuel; and the peacefulness of the age would have choked the
voice of individual ambition; but now the flash fell upon a pile of
accumulated combustibles, and Europe was in flames.

His son, Ferdinand III. , who, a few months before his father’s death,
had been raised to the dignity of King of the Romans, inherited his
throne, his principles, and the war which he had caused. But Ferdinand
III. had been a closer witness of the sufferings of the people, and the
devastation of the country, and felt more keenly and ardently the
necessity of peace. Less influenced by the Jesuits and the Spaniards,
and more moderate towards the religious views of others, he was more
likely than his father to listen to the voice of reason. He did so, and
ultimately restored to Europe the blessing of peace, but not till after
a contest of eleven years waged with sword and pen; not till after he
had experienced the impossibility of resistance, and necessity had laid
upon him its stern laws.

Fortune favoured him at the commencement of his reign, and his arms were
victorious against the Swedes. The latter, under the command of the
victorious Banner, had, after their success at Wittstock, taken up their
winter quarters in Saxony; and the campaign of 1637 opened with the
siege of Leipzig. The vigorous resistance of the garrison, and the
approach of the Electoral and Imperial armies, saved the town, and
Banner, to prevent his communication with the Elbe being cut off, was
compelled to retreat into Torgau. But the superior number of the
Imperialists drove him even from that quarter; and, surrounded by the
enemy, hemmed in by rivers, and suffering from famine, he had no course
open to him but to attempt a highly dangerous retreat into Pomerania, of
which, the boldness and successful issue border upon romance. The whole
army crossed the Oder, at a ford near Furstenberg; and the soldiers,
wading up to the neck in water, dragged the artillery across, when the
horses refused to draw. Banner had expected to be joined by General
Wrangel, on the farther side of the Oder in Pomerania; and, in
conjunction with him, to be able to make head against the enemy. But
Wrangel did not appear; and in his stead, he found an Imperial army
posted at Landsberg, with a view to cut off the retreat of the Swedes.
Banner now saw that he had fallen into a dangerous snare, from which
escape appeared impossible. In his rear lay an exhausted country, the
Imperialists, and the Oder on his left; the Oder, too, guarded by the
Imperial General Bucheim, offered no retreat; in front, Landsberg,
Custrin, the Warta, and a hostile army; and on the right, Poland, in
which, notwithstanding the truce, little confidence could be placed. In
these circumstances, his position seemed hopeless, and the Imperialists
were already triumphing in the certainty of his fall. Banner, with just
indignation, accused the French as the authors of this misfortune. They
had neglected to make, according to their promise, a diversion upon the
Rhine; and, by their inaction, allowed the Emperor to combine his whole
force upon the Swedes. “When the day comes,” cried the incensed General
to the French Commissioner, who followed the camp, “that the Swedes and
Germans join their arms against France, we shall cross the Rhine with
less ceremony. ” But reproaches were now useless; what the emergency
demanded was energy and resolution. In the hope of drawing the enemy by
stratagem from the Oder, Banner pretended to march towards Poland, and
despatched the greater part of his baggage in this direction, with his
own wife, and those of the other officers. The Imperialists immediately
broke up their camp, and hurried towards the Polish frontier to block up
the route; Bucheim left his station, and the Oder was stripped of its
defenders. On a sudden, and under cloud of night, Banner turned towards
that river, and crossed it about a mile above Custrin, with his troops,
baggage, and artillery, without bridges or vessels, as he had done
before at Furstenberg. He reached Pomerania without loss, and prepared
to share with Wrangel the defence of that province.

But the Imperialists, under the command of Gallas, entered that duchy at
Ribses, and overran it by their superior strength. Usedom and Wolgast
were taken by storm, Demmin capitulated, and the Swedes were driven far
into Lower Pomerania. It was, too, more important for them at this
moment than ever, to maintain a footing in that country, for Bogislaus
XIV. had died that year, and Sweden must prepare to establish its title
to Pomerania. To prevent the Elector of Brandenburg from making good
the title to that duchy, which the treaty of Prague had given him,
Sweden exerted her utmost energies, and supported its generals to the
extent of her ability, both with troops and money. In other quarters of
the kingdom, the affairs of the Swedes began to wear a more favourable
aspect, and to recover from the humiliation into which they had been
thrown by the inaction of France, and the desertion of their allies.
For, after their hasty retreat into Pomerania, they had lost one place
after another in Upper Saxony; the princes of Mecklenburg, closely
pressed by the troops of the Emperor, began to lean to the side of
Austria, and even George, Duke of Lunenburg, declared against them.
Ehrenbreitstein was starved into a surrender by the Bavarian General de
Werth, and the Austrians possessed themselves of all the works which had
been thrown up on the Rhine. France had been the sufferer in the
contest with Spain; and the event had by no means justified the pompous
expectations which had accompanied the opening of the campaign. Every
place which the Swedes had held in the interior of Germany was lost; and
only the principal towns in Pomerania still remained in their hands.
But a single campaign raised them from this state of humiliation; and
the vigorous diversion, which the victorious Bernard had effected upon
the Rhine, gave quite a new turn to affairs.

The misunderstandings between France and Sweden were now at last
adjusted, and the old treaty between these powers confirmed at Hamburg,
with fresh advantages for Sweden. In Hesse, the politic Landgravine
Amelia had, with the approbation of the Estates, assumed the government
after the death of her husband, and resolutely maintained her rights
against the Emperor and the House of Darmstadt. Already zealously
attached to the Swedish Protestant party, on religious grounds, she only
awaited a favourable opportunity openly to declare herself. By artful
delays, and by prolonging the negociations with the Emperor, she had
succeeded in keeping him inactive, till she had concluded a secret
compact with France, and the victories of Duke Bernard had given a
favourable turn to the affairs of the Protestants. She now at once
threw off the mask, and renewed her former alliance with the Swedish
crown. The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate was also stimulated, by
the success of Bernard, to try his fortune against the common enemy.
Raising troops in Holland with English money, he formed a magazine at
Meppen, and joined the Swedes in Westphalia. His magazine was, however,
quickly lost; his army defeated near Flotha, by Count Hatzfeld; but his
attempt served to occupy for some time the attention of the enemy, and
thereby facilitated the operations of the Swedes in other quarters.
Other friends began to appear, as fortune declared in their favour, and
the circumstance, that the States of Lower Saxony embraced a neutrality,
was of itself no inconsiderable advantage.

Under these advantages, and reinforced by 14,000 fresh troops from
Sweden and Livonia. Banner opened, with the most favourable prospects,
the campaign of 1638. The Imperialists who were in possession of Upper
Pomerania and Mecklenburg, either abandoned their positions, or deserted
in crowds to the Swedes, to avoid the horrors of famine, the most
formidable enemy in this exhausted country. The whole country betwixt
the Elbe and the Oder was so desolated by the past marchings and
quarterings of the troops, that, in order to support his army on its
march into Saxony and Bohemia, Banner was obliged to take a circuitous
route from Lower Pomerania into Lower Saxony, and then into the
Electorate of Saxony through the territory of Halberstadt. The
impatience of the Lower Saxon States to get rid of such troublesome
guests, procured him so plentiful a supply of provisions, that he was
provided with bread in Magdeburg itself, where famine had even overcome
the natural antipathy of men to human flesh. His approach spread
consternation among the Saxons; but his views were directed not against
this exhausted country, but against the hereditary dominions of the
Emperor. The victories of Bernard encouraged him, while the prosperity
of the Austrian provinces excited his hopes of booty. After defeating
the Imperial General Salis, at Elsterberg, totally routing the Saxon
army at Chemnitz, and taking Pirna, he penetrated with irresistible
impetuosity into Bohemia, crossed the Elbe, threatened Prague, took
Brandeis and Leutmeritz, defeated General Hofkirchen with ten regiments,
and spread terror and devastation through that defenceless kingdom.
Booty was his sole object, and whatever he could not carry off he
destroyed. In order to remove more of the corn, the ears were cut from
the stalks, and the latter burnt. Above a thousand castles, hamlets,
and villages were laid in ashes; sometimes more than a hundred were seen
burning in one night. From Bohemia he crossed into Silesia, and it was
his intention to carry his ravages even into Moravia and Austria. But
to prevent this, Count Hatzfeld was summoned from Westphalia, and
Piccolomini from the Netherlands, to hasten with all speed to this
quarter. The Archduke Leopold, brother to the Emperor, assumed the
command, in order to repair the errors of his predecessor Gallas, and to
raise the army from the low ebb to which it had fallen.

The result justified the change, and the campaign of 1640 appeared to
take a most unfortunate turn for the Swedes. They were successively
driven out of all their posts in Bohemia, and anxious only to secure
their plunder, they precipitately crossed the heights of Meissen. But
being followed into Saxony by the pursuing enemy, and defeated at
Plauen, they were obliged to take refuge in Thuringia. Made masters of
the field in a single summer, they were as rapidly dispossessed; but
only to acquire it a second time, and to hurry from one extreme to
another. The army of Banner, weakened and on the brink of destruction
in its camp at Erfurt, suddenly recovered itself.