Therefore
neither is the will stained by sin.
Summa Theologica
Reply to Objection 4: An accident does not act effectively on its
subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say
that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to
hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as
sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an
inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the
agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact
that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive
element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the
sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above
([1869]Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not
as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the
object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out
of order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be
destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human
nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away,
if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature
can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can
be entirely taken away.
Objection 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts
are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all
bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform.
Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that
the whole can also be taken away by sin.
Objection 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is
aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on
account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more
than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of
nature entirely.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not
exist except in some good. " But the evil of sin cannot be in the good
of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it
must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it
entirely.
I answer that, As stated above [1870](A[1]), the good of nature, that
is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is
befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it
is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is
to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact
that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of
sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be
destroyed entirely.
Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished
by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example
of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely
destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a
finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity,
it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite
length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the
subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the
same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a
quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be
possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted
in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not
apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not
diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more,
if it be a more grievous sin.
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the
aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two
others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and
tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its
diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its
rood, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not
diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated
above [1871](A[1]). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far
as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were
diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at
last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however,
it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its
attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished
indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as
man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be
destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always
remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which
has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is
transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part
of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature
of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by
subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and
this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform:
nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its
term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on
the one hand, and not on the other.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to
virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it
is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by
Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in
the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally
endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the
lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite
for sight.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned
as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and
concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature
consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of
the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears
from what has been said above ([1872]Q[76], A[1];[1873] Q[77],
AA[3],5;[1874] Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they should not be reckoned as
effects of sin.
Objection 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should
have no place among the effects of sin.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is
an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not
be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be
reckoned a wound of nature.
Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([1875]Q[77], A[3]) that to
sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence
is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons
"two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz.
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which
four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that
one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect
hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was
perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original
justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already
stated ([1876]Q[81], A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are
left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are
naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of
nature.
Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of
virtue, as stated above ([1877]Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where
prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the
subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance.
Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true,
there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of
its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the
irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound
of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its
order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of
concupiscence.
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human
nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination
to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of
actual sin, as was explained above ([1878]AA[1], 2), these four wounds
are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the
reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened
to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more
impetuous.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin
should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning
once, is more easily inclined to sin again.
Reply to Objection 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a
certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn.
8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The
imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his
youth. '].
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1879]Q[82], A[3], ad 1),
concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason:
whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is
unnatural to man.
Reply to Objection 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be
called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and
clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as
contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
Reply to Objection 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book
of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive
powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing
to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good.
"Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed
through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is
not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that
"where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less,
there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all. " But
sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy
mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the
"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura
Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the
effect of sin.
Objection 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now
since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding
privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result
of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is
not the effect of each sin.
On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body,
according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. " Now
weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
I answer that, As stated in the [1880]FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and
order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon
every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its
form from which it derives its "species. " Again, any kind of form,
whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according
to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the
forms of things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode"
corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has
a relation of "order" to something else.
Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order,
corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good
belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode,
species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.
There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its
mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above
([1881]AA[1] ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the
good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and
is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in
the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order,
the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how
sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or
diminishes mode, species and order.
This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the
other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished
together.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not
the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these
defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others,
whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to
result, is equal in all, as stated above ([1882]Q[82], A[4]). Therefore
death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.
Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed.
But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism
or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.
Objection 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt
than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the
body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does
original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the
result of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death. "
I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason
of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is
the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power
of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly
intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are
beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of
itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the
cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is
stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man
moves accidentally the stone resting thereon. " In this way the sin of
our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in
human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original
justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the
soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder
whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to
the soul, without any defect, as stated in the [1883]FP, Q[97], A[1].
Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our
first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the
disorder among the powers, as stated above [1884](A[3]; Q[82], A[3]),
so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the
body.
Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment,
even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all
consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although
the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are
ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as
punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves,
if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or
diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of
an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing
a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow
that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal; but
that one will move with greater velocity, which has the greater weight
according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the
obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice
is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that
according to diverse natural temperaments, some men's bodies are
subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal
in all.
Reply to Objection 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the
same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom.
8:11): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His
Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order
of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should
first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to
the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and
by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should
remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit
the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the
substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance
of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and
die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us
of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the
soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original
justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as
original sin does.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death and other defects are natural to man?
Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural
to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically"
(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals
which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally
corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally
corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such
is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now
human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the
vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated
in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are
natural to man.
On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now
"God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to
man.
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment
or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But
death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as
stated above [1885](A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its
end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2],
A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational
soul, as was proved in the [1886]FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human
body is naturally incorruptible.
I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways;
first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its
particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of
action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every
corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii,
text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of the
thing to which it belongs.
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said
by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature. " This force intends the
good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate
generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect
corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the
inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection,
but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted
proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of
the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as
far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own
perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the latter is
not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an
immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the [1887]FP, Q[75],
A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to
man than to other corruptible things. But since that very form has a
matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter
there results corruptibility in the whole. In this respect man is
naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to
itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.
The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul,
in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible,
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form,
and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in
any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not
chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a
smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and
flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in
respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but
that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural
disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron,
indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition
of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose
of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by
nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it
may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive
and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a
condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would
choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every
nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by
the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility,
as was stated in the [1888]FP, Q[97], A[1]. It is in this sense that it
is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of
sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?
(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a
higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence
the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as
Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a
much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning.
Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning.
Objection 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above
([1889]Q[74], AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De
Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by
considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby.
Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.
Objection 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either
something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive,
it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that
nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor
habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a
disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a
mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the
opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in
the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. Because all sins agree
on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow
that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is
not the effect of sin.
On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast
stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might
present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle":
and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain
is the effect of sin.
I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a
comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body,
e. g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is
ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a
twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of
reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the
refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man
is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions.
Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of
contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things,
against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above
([1890]Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by
this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by
their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the
soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them
inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by
the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of
the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by
them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement
towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing
loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves
inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable as
those things were which they loved. "
Reply to Objection 3: The stain is neither something positive in the
soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of
the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore
diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the
privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which
varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul
after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul
except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or
disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does
not remain in the soul after the act of sin.
Objection 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the
body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when
the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul
when the act of sin is past.
Objection 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause
of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no
longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to
you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime
remaineth in you [Vulg. : 'us'] to this day? "
I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act
of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above
(A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of
its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And
therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin
remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the
Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For
although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of
reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state
in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a
movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted
from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to
him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him
and to return by a contrary movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the
act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain
something private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the
transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards
the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the
sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and
so there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting
causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local
parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not
removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the
debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the
punishment due to them.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?
(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in
quantity?
(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?
(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?
(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect
of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not
seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is
accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the
sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is
good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect
of sin, which is evil.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every
inordinate affection is its own punishment. " But punishment does not
incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on
indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish
upon every soul of man that worketh evil. " But to work evil is to sin.
Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words
"tribulation and anguish. "
I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that
whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment
therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary
supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot
water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we
find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise
up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an
order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that
order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by
that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an
inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense
against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that
same order, which repression is punishment.
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject.
In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own
reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who
governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member
either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to
the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders
is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and
against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold
punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience;
another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an
evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is
accidental to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is
the debt of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted
either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect
of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man
deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment
is. " Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly
the effect of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is
due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs
a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or
human law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of
virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not
bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite
direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
Objection 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.
Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something
against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above
([1891]Q[74], AA[1] ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech. ) that some sins are
punishments of others.
I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence,
as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such
can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its
essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that
it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially
something against the will, as stated in the [1892]FP, Q[48], A[5].
Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise
be the punishment of sin.
On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in
three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an
impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the
like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace
which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of
grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above ([1893]Q[79],
A[3]), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a
punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks
(Rom. 1:24) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of
their heart," i. e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are
deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their
passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a
preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which
is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly
the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with
one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a
sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied ourselves in the way of
iniquity. " Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said
to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin
is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with
regard to itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to
fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed
it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise
from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the
amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the
more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is
evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment,
since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a
nature to withdraw man from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such:
and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice
is equality: wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): "In measure against
measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it. " Now sin is
temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.
Objection 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii,
3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an
end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be
infinite.
Objection 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in
it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of
men" [Vulg. : 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal
punishment on man.
Objection 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is
accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore
it cannot be of infinite duration.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into
everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme
against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be
guilty of an everlasting sin. "
I answer that, As stated above [1894](A[1]), sin incurs a debt of
punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long
as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order
remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance
of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a
defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the
principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that
principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight
cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of
sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of
sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order
there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently
if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is
subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in
itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power
of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man
adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so
as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of
eternal punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of
severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment,
however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for
punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that
adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a
momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by
imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein
account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the
expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living,
so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of
punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it
is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should
be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own
eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole
life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in
sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says
(Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that
they might abide in their sins for ever. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according
to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is
punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged,
this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at
least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment,
according to Prov. 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool
shall be wiser. " Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God
on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from
sin through the thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6:
"Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee
from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered. "
Reply to Objection 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own
sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires
them.
Reply to Objection 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to
nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of
the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance
lasts, the punishment endures.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment
infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O
Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to
nothing. " Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the
vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an
infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes
infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded
a punishment infinite in quantity.
Objection 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of
fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure also of the stripes be. " Now a sin which is committed
against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases
according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a
more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual),
and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is
due for a sin committed against God.
Objection 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration,
and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore
it is infinite in quantity also.
On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal
sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.
