No More Learning

565 (#605) ############################################

MORLEY'S SCHEME
565
Lord Morley declined to sanction any advisory councils, on the
ground that the enlargements of the powers and size of the provincial
councils would give sufficient scope for the expression of views while
heads of provinces would always be able to consult persons whose
opinions and advice were valuable. He thought the scheme for a
chamber of princes was open to difficulties but promised to consider
any further proposals on this matter.
He accepted generally the proposals for numbers and constitution
of the provincial councils, with two reservations. While the Govern-
ment of India wished to allow each interest to elect its own repre-
sentatives, he suggested an electoral college the members of which,
chosen by the various interests, would be of such numbers that a
minority if unanimous could be certain of electing its own representa-
tives. He held further, in view of the restrictions on the powers of
provincial legislative councils under the act of 1861, that an official
majority should be dispensed with in their case, while it should be
substantial in the imperial council. Lord Morley accepted generally
the proposals for granting more freedom of discussion, and extended
these by allowing supplementary questions in addition to the right
of formal interpellation granted by the act of 1892. While in its
dispatch the Government of India had noted that the effect of its
scheme would be to throw greater burdens on the heads of local
governments, it refrained from proposing additions to the executive
councils already existing until experience had been gained of the
working of the new measure, and from recommending new executive
councils without the fullest consideration and consultation with the
heads of provinces to be affected. The secretary of state, who had
already appointed two Indians as members of his own council, and
agreed to the appointment of an Indian on the viceroy's council,
brushed aside these notes of caution and decided to increase the
possible number of three members in Madras and Bombay to four,
one of whom should in practice, though not by statute, always be an
Indian. And he proposed to take power to form such councils in
provinces where none existed. Lord Dufferin's committee had sug-
gested the constitution of an executive council because they antici-
pated that enlarging the functions of the legislative council would
materially alter the character of the administration, while Lord
Morley appears to have been more impressed by the desirability of
introducing Indian members than by administrative needs.
On 1 November, 1908, the fiftieth anniversary of the queen's
proclamation after the Indian Mutiny, a message to the Indian people
was published in the name of the king-emperor announcing the
extension of representative institutions, and the details were issued
publicly shortly after. They were well received in India where the
congress welcomed them as a large and liberal instalment of reform,
· Dispatch of 27 November, 1908.
1


## p. 566 (#606) ############################################

566
THE REFORMS OF 1909
and Mr Gokhale in the following budget debate described the authors
as having saved India from drifting into chaos. An increase in the
numbers of elected members and greater facilities for debate had been
so confidently expected that the appointment of Indians to executive
councils appeared the greatest novelty. But there was keen debate
as to the class of person who would be selected. Active politicians
hoped that the choice might fall on them, but feared that men whom
they stigmatised as nonentities would be chosen.
The Musļiin section of the community was, however, greatly dis-
satisfied with the suggestion that its representation should be secured
by the device of electoral colleges. Muslim and Hindu are divided by
differences of religious belief incomparably greater than the sectarian
variations of Christianity. Sacrifice of cows and bullocks and the
consumption of beef are intensely repugnant to the Hindu. These
practices and the clash of processions celebrating religious rites lead
to disturbances often accompanied by loss of life. For more than half
of the nineteenth century the Muslims had held back from the study
of English and thus had not fitted themselves for public life and office.
In Northern India especially, where they were numerous and till the
break-up of the Moghul Empire had been politically supreme, they
clung to their old traditions. A few years before the project for
reforms had been launched, their minds had been agitated by a
demand of the Hindus in one province that the Arabic character
should no longer be used in the courts, and even that the language
should be altered. As soon as it was known that organic changes were
being discussed (October, 1906), a Muslim deputation approached
Lord Minto to press for adequate representation both on local bodies
and on the council. They asked that Muslim representatives should
be elected by Muslim voters, and that the proportion of Muslim
members should not be fixed merely on the basis of the numerical
strength of the community. In replying Lord Minto went further
than Lord Dufferin had done. He agreed that their position should
be estimated, not merely on their numerical strength, but in respect
to the political importance of the community and the service it had
rendered to the empire. He thought that any electoral representation
in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at
granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and
traditions of the communities comprising the people of that continent.
Previous experience had justified the Muslim apprehension. While
they formed 23 per cent. of the total population of British India, only
12 per cent. of the members recommended by election for the imperial
council had belonged to this community. In the United Provinces,
with 14 per cent. of the population, the Muslims had never succeeded
in obtaining a single nominee by election. Some objections were
raised by Hindus to the initial proposals of the Government of India
for securing Muslim representation on the baseless ground that they


## p. 567 (#607) ############################################

PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS
567
were an attempt to set one religion against another and thus to create
a counterpoise to the influence of the educated middle classes. But
the final proposals of the Government of India insisted on the im-
portance of adequate and separate representation for this community,
part of it to be secured by a separate electorate.
There was little disposition in England to criticise the intended
enlargement of legislative councils and of their functions. Speaking
on Indian affairs in the House of Lords (30 June, 1908), Lord Curzon
described such measures as only carrying out the traditional policy of
the British in India, which no one would wish to retard. To broaden
the basis of government was the act of a wise statesman. But, referring
to the disquieting reports of outrages in India, he pressed that changes
should not have the appearance of having been extorted by force,
that they should not tend to weaken British rule, and that they should
be preceded by a resolute vindication of the authority of governmen .
Introducing the bill in the House of Lords in December, 1908,
however, Lord Morley foresaw that there would be grave discontent
with some of his proposals, and sought to avoid it. Every politician
or administrator of importance who has had to deal with the method
of government in India has deprecated the importation of British
institutions without discretion. Lord Dufferin, after setting out his
plan, had said:
From this it might be concluded that we were contemplating an approach, at
all events so far as the provinces are concerned, to English parliamentary govern-
ment and an English constitutional system. Such a conclusion would be very
wide of the mark, and it would be wrong to leave either the India Office or the
Indian public under so erroneous an impression.
Faced with the unmistakable nature of his own bill Lord Morley
assumed the necessity of defending his retention of an official majority
in the imperial council, a measure which beyond all others was outside
controversy, and he repudiated “almost passionately", as Lord
Curzon subsequently said, the intention of mingling East and West.
If I were attempting to set up a parliamentary system in India, or if it could
be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or necessarily up to the establish-
ment of a parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing to do
with it.
On the second reading, however, his deep political convictions
prevailed, and he explained more clearly his reasons for suggesting
an advance which led obviously in the direction he professed to avoid.
Lord Curzon, dealing with his own term as viceroy, described his aim
as being directed towards the progress of the people by the removal
of abuses, by adopting a just and sympathetic attitude towards them,
and by carrying out social reforms. 1 Political concessions were not
then in the field. While he was viceroy, he had been pressed at the
1 Hansard, 23 February, 1909.


## p. 568 (#608) ############################################

568
THE REFORMS OF 1909
ba
a
1
instance of an Indian journalist to say that perhaps in fifty years India
might be self-governing. After long thought he had declined on the
ground that it might embarrass his successor if he raised any hopes
or expressed any opinion as to when self-government would come.
He criticised those provisions in the bill which went beyond the
proposals of the Government of India by giving up official majorities,
by enlarging and increasing executive councils, and by appointing
Indians to them. Lord Morley defended his scheme with the ardour
of a student of political history. Professing as much zeal for efficiency
as Lord Curzon he could not believe that any proposals could be true,
solid or endurable without concessions. He then quoted Lord Salis-
bury's warning against the introduction of occidental machinery into
India, to brush it aside with the remark that “we ought to have
thought of that before we tried occidental education; we applied that
and occidental machinery must follow". The elective principle had
been introduced (though tentatively) by the act of 1892, and was
demanded to bring proposals into harmony with the dominant senti-
ment of the people in India. It is to be noted that, both at this time
and in all subsequent political movements, the Indian politician has
shown himself possessed of imitative rather than of critical or con-
structive faculties, and has never wavered in his demand for a system
of government like that enjoyed by the self-governing dominions.
In the House of Lords the clause of the bill giving the government
power to create new executive councils was deleted at the instance of
Lord MacDonnell, who had himself held charge of three provinces.
Arguments against this power, which had not been immediately
recommended by the Government of India, and was known to be
opposed by most existing heads of provinces, were stigmatised by
Lord Morley as “good sound bureaucratic arguments but it was the
bureaucratic system they vere going to make a breach in”.
An overwhelming majority in the House of Commons replaced the
clause, but it was again modified in the House of Lords to create a
council only in Bengal, where the late Sir Edward Baker, the lieu-
tenant-governor, had asked for it, and in other provinces only after
a draft proclamation had lain on the table of both houses of parliament
for six weeks and no hostile address to the crown had been carried.
In the House of Commons Earl Percy, who had been under-
secretary of state for India, questioned Lord Morley's hope that this
measure would induce the more moderate Indian politicians to
abandon their dream of colonial self-government. He did not object
to enlarging the councils and giving greater power of discussion,
which would make them more useful for advisory and consultative
purposes. But he opposed the power of initiating legislation, moving
resolutions (even though like resolutions in the House of Commons,
they were not to bind government) and the creation of non-official
i Sir W, R. Lawrence, The India we served, p. 233.


## p. 569 (#609) ############################################

DIVERSITIES OF RACE AND CREED
569
a
majorities in the provincial councils. Mr A. J. Balfour was impressed
by the religious dissensions, and though accepting the view that
representative institutions were the highest development as yet dis-
covered by the human race in dealing with its own affairs, held that
they were suitable only where the population was in the main homo-
geneous, where a minority was prepared to accept the decision of the
majority, and where there was unity of tradition, general outlook,
and a broad view of national aspiration. He could not conceive how
India would ever be fit for representative government until the whole
structure of Indian society underwent radical and fundamental
modifications. A few days later his remarks were echoed by an Indian
politician. Discussing the ambition to build a united Indian nation,
he said:
Can we expect to achieve that ambition by obtaining political concessions
alone? Suppose all the seats in the executive council of the viceroy and those of
the governors and lieutenant-governors, when they come into existence, as we
hope and trust they soon will, were occupied by Indians-suppose all the members
of the supreme and provincial legislative councils were the elected representatives
of the people-let us go even further ahead and suppose that we attained the goal
of our aspirations, the colonial form of self-government; would all, without
purging the many social diseases that your body politic suffers from, convert you
into a united Indian nation?
Referring to the millions of ignorant and superstitious masses he said
that a handful of great men would never make a nation of them, and
"there is no process of legislation or diplomacy by which these
millions with all their diversities of caste and creed, could be fused
into a harmonious whole. . . . "
The prime minister's defence of the bill followed the lines of Lord
Morley's. Adopting almost the exact words of Lord Dufferin's
minute, he described it as not revolutionary, but merely an extension
and development of institutions which had been many years in
operation and the extension of which had always been contemplated.
Education and the spread of ideas must more and more associate the
people of the country with government. There was a movement in
Asia for greater association of the natives of various countries in
passing laws and also in holding high executive positions. In England
also democratic feeling was strong and could not be resisted.
One topic which, though not affected by the bill, was much dis-
cussed during the debates, was the intention to appoint an Indian
member of the viceroy's executive council. Lord Morley, when intro-
ducing the bill, had announced that if, during his tenure of office,
there should be a vacancy, he would feel it his duty to tender to the
king his advice that an Indian should be appointed. He supported
his opinion by his experience of having had two Indian members on
his own council, and thus being in a position to get the Indian point
· Pt. Moti Lal Nchru, Presidential address, United Provinces Social Congress at Agra
on 11 April, 1909.


## p. 570 (#610) ############################################

570
THE REFORMS OF 1909
of view direct from them. Lord MacDonnell's objection was based
on the existence of strong religious dissension. A Muslim could not
be appointed unless a Hindu was also added, and a Hindu, unless
he belonged to the . class against which recent protective legislation
had been passed, would command no influence at all among his
co-religionists. At a later stage he agreed to the appointment of
Indians on the executive councils of the governors of Madras and
Bombay which had been in existence for a long period, though he
objected to the provisions of the bill which allowed such appointments
to be made without requiring the qualification of long service which
applied in the case of European members. On the other hand Lord
Cromer, arguing from his experience in Egypt, supported the appoint-
ment. He described India as in the almost unique position of being
the only important country in the world where education was con-
siderably advanced, but which was governed in all essential particulars
by non-resident foreigners, and he thought it most desirable to asso-
ciate Indians with the administration. Earl Percy, having no doubt
knowledge of the excellent qualifications of Mr (afterwards Sir S. P.
and later Lord) Sinha, went no farther than to press that the appoint-
ment should not be taken as implying that an Indian must always be
appointed, a suggestion which was obviously futile. Outside parlia-
ment there were louder protests, and Lord Minto, whose first desire
had been to obtain an Indian colleague, wrote to King Edward at
this time urging that Indians, if fitted for high office, should not be
debarred by race. 1 Mr Sinha was appointed towards the end of
March, 1909.
The statute fixed the maximum number of nominated and elected
members at sixty for the legislative council of the governor-general,
at fifty in the larger provinces, and at thirty in the case of the Panjab
and Burma. The total membership of existing councils thus rose
from 124 to 331 and the number of elected members from thirty-nine
to 135, with majorities of non-official members (including those who
were nominated) in all councils except that of the governor-general.
Detailed regulations and rules for elections, and the conduct of business
in the legislative councils were to be framed in India, subject to the
sanction of the secretary of state, and the provision that they should
be laid before both houses of parliament. Some of the principles to
be followed in these had already come under discussion, especially
the question of Muhammadan representation. Lord Morley's scheme
of electoral colleges was strongly opposed by Muhammadans who
found it complicated and thought it likely to produce members who
would not really be representative. Religious intolerance was greatly
increased by misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the proposals.
The scheme finally passed gave Muslims a specified number of mem-
bers in a province based on their numerical proportion, varied in
Buchan, op. cit. p. 286, and Lord Morley, op. cit. 11, 299, 301.
1
>


## p. 571 (#611) ############################################

ELECTORAL METHODS
571
a
accordance with their political importance, and provided that these
members should be elected by Muslim voters only, who had certain
qualifications. In other electorates no distinction was made, and it
was hoped (though the hope was not in fact realised) that the electors
in these would exercise their vote with no religious prejudice.
Great elasticity of detail was observed in arranging elections to
represent the other interests. The member for a division was chosen
by a system of secondary election. In the first place the members of
a municipal or district board met and selected a number of delegates
fixed according to the population of the town or district, and all the
delegates thus chosen in a division elected the member. Land-holders'
representatives were elected in some provinces by land-holders paying
a minimum land-revenue, and in others by recognised associations.
Where it was not possible to form an electorate, e. g. in the case of
Indian commerce in some provinces, the interest was represented by
a nominated member. Voting was by secret hallot, and votes were
attested in most cases before the district officer, who also prepared
lists of voters, subject to claims and objections in constituencies where
electoral rolls existed. University members were elected by registered
graduates who could vote personally or by sending votes by post.
There was some difference of opinion as regards the qualifications
of candidates, and especially in connection with the eligibility of men
who had been deported under the regulation of 1818. Lord Morley
wished to give power to the Government of India to declare candidates
disqualified only after they had been elected, but Lord Minto pointed
out that the principles which the political training of years had ren-
dered dear to the people of England were totally unadapted to the
conditions of India. A political prisoner who becomes a member of
parliament in England after his release in no way threatens the safety
of the constitution, while such a person in India might start a blaze.
This opinion prevailed and the regulations gave power to the
governor-general in council to declare that in his opinion a person
was of such reputation and antecedents that his election would be
contrary to the public interest. This disqualification and others due
to dismissal from the public service, certain orders by criminal courts,
and disbarring, could be removed by similar declaration. In most
constituencies a substantial property qualification and the possession
of a residence or place of business within the constituency were
required. The age limit was twenty-five years, and women were
specifically excluded.
Fears had been expressed that officials who had not been accus-
tomed to public speaking might be embarrassed in the crisp informal
debates which were expected to arise out of the permission to put
supplementary questions, as happens in the House of Commons.
These were, therefore, limited by allowing only the member who had
1 Buchan, op. cit. p. 290.
a


## p. 572 (#612) ############################################

572
THE REFORMS OF 1909
asked a question to follow it up. Existing limitations on the powers of
councils to deal with measures affecting the public debt and revenues,
religion or religious rites and usages, military and naval affairs, and
relations with foreign or native states were also imposed on the dis-
cussion of matters of public interest by way of resolution, and a similar
bar was laid on resolutions affecting the internal affairs of native
states, matters still being discussed between the Government of India
and local governments, and matters which were sub judice. There was
also a general power of disallowance on the ground that a resolution
could not be moved consistently with the public interests or that it
should be moved in another place.
An important difference between the budget procedure of England
and India existed at this period. While in England the government
decided on the measures it proposed to undertake in the budget year
and then varied rates of taxation in order to meet the cost of these,
in India taxation was not altered for considerable periods, and the
annual problem was to make the best use of existing sources of
income. Before 1909 estimates prepared for the provinces were sub-
mitted to the Government of India, minutely checked and often
altered, by the finance department, and incorporated in the budget
for the whole country. This was discussed in the imperial council, and
extracts relating to provinces in the provincial councils, but no resolu-
tions could be moved and no votes taken. The division of revenues
and control over various classes of expenditure between imperial and
provincial, which had been subject to periodical changes since the
first devolution in 1870, had now become quasi-permanent, and
in accordance with the recommendations of the Decentralisation
Commission meticulous alterations of the provincial estimates were
reduced. In the provinces a draft budget, after examination by the
Government of India, which fixed the limit of expenditure on new
projects costing more than Rs. 5000 (£350), was discussed by a small
committee of the council, at least half the members of which were
elected, and their views were considered. The draft for the whole of
India was then placed before the imperial council, members of which
could move resolutions affecting proposals for new taxation for grants
to the provinces, or items of imperial (but not provincial) expenditure.
Any changes made were communicated to and a similar procedure was
followed in the provincial councils. While in parliament a proposal
to increase expenditure is moved by a fictitious reduction, it was
provided in India, in order to avoid conventional discussions, that any
such proposal must be accompanied by a motion to reduce an equal
amount of expenditure in some other part of the budget. This device
failed in its object, and was sometimes embarrassing, as the govern-
ment was not informed beforehand whether the increase or the re-
duction was the main object of the mover, and it sometimes involved
a double debate.


## p. 573 (#613) ############################################

CONGRESS CRITICISMS
573
a
No scheme of reform could stop or appreciably slacken the course
of sedition, and a series of outrages occurred throughout 1909. Lord
Morley's instincts were in favour of pacification, and as soon as his
bill was safely through the House of Commons, he warned Lord
Minto that no more suspects could be deported, and later in the year
telegraphed to say that the cabinet was unanimous in wishing for the
release of men already detained. The viceroy, with a keener
apprecia-
tion of the movement, resisted, as he pointed out the real effect of the
reforms was that they had prevented moderate politicians from
joining the minority of extremists whose activities could be repressed
only by other methods.
While the general scheme of the reforms as set out in the bill had
been highly praised by the moderate politicians in India in 1908, the
detailed regulations were the subject of attack a year later in the
congress at Lahore. The separate representation of Muslims and the
scheme of direct voting aroused jealous comments in a body which
chiefly comprised Hindus. In particular, the few cases (not as a rule
repeated in later elections) where Muslims were successful candidates
in constituencies open to all classes were particularly resented, and,
apart from the religious contest, members of the congress were dis-
appointed in not capturing all the seats allotted to representatives of
the district and municipal boards. Complaints were also made that
the non-official majority was nullified by the fact that it included
nominated members. Some of these criticisms were really directed
against the objects of the authors of the scheme, which had been to
secure a more effective representation of important interests than the
act of 1892 had done. Success in this aim was marked, and certainly
quickened the political sense of communities to whom public life had
been an opportunity for personal glorification rather than for civic
responsibility.
1 Lord Morley, op. cit. 11, 308-9.


## p. 574 (#614) ############################################

CHAPTER XXXII
a
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
ATTENDANCE at the congress of 1909 in Lahore was much
smaller than usual, for a variety of reasons. The effects of the split in
the movement after the break-up of the meeting at Surat had not
subsided, and the more advanced section of the movement held aloof.
In the minds of the moderate leaders there was disgust at the crimes
which had been perpetrated during the year and some anxiety as to
their effect on future constitutional development. One of the first
measures to be placed before the new legislative council of he
Government of India was an act to control the press. It had been
recommended in a remarkable series of letters written by the rulers
of the Indian states in reply to Lord Minto, and the insufficiency of
the Newspapers Act of 1908 to control the poisonous flood of seditious
publication was abundantly clear from the evidence which had been
accumulated about conspiracies to commit murder and armed rob-
beries. Even in 1908, in a debate on that measure in the House of
Lords, Lord Cromer had admitted that, though he supported in India
the repeal of Lord Lytton's press act of 1878, the experience of twenty-
five years had convinced him that a policy of complete freedom had
not proved successful in either India or Egypt. A newspaper founded
at Allahabad in 1907 had had nine irresponsible editors, four of whom
had been convicted under the ordinary law and sentenced to long
terms for objectionable publications. The main principle of the new
act was supported by Mr Gokhale, who had recently warned students
against the attempts made to corrupt their minds. It was challenged
by only two non-official members, and passed on 9 February without
a division. It provided that the keepers of new presses must deposit
security before they opened them, and that this was liable to forfeiture
if the press was used to produce seditious matter. Forfeiture entailed
cancellation of registration, and, if it were proposed to reopen the
press, the security could be doubled. A second offence might involve
confiscation of the whole press. Similar powers extended over the
publishers of newspapers. Any person against whom an order of
forfeiture was passed might appeal to the High Court to set aside the
order, and the case was to be tried by a special bench of three judges.
This measure checked, though it was too late to stop entirely, the
progress of revolutionary activity, which continued to show itself by
murders and dacoities in Bengal especially. With the passing of the
act the Bengalis who had been interned were released, though one of
· Rowlatt Report, para. 120.


## p. 575 (#615) ############################################

THE DELHI DURBAR
575
.
them was arrested six months later and convicted with a number of
other men of conspiracy, at Dacca and elsewhere, to wage war against
the king.
Between Lord Minto and Lord Morley there was now a divergence
regarding the method of dealing with the situation. In replying to
a suggestion for a general amnesty Lord Minto distinguished such
a measure from the clemency of former oriental rulers who were
autocrats and summary in their measures. He pointed out that the
influence of sentiment and imagination “may bring grateful tears to
the eyes of the effeminate Bengali, or it may shock the spirited tradi-
tions and warlike imagination of more manly races”. 1 It was signi-
ficant that shortly afterwards Mr Montagu in his Indian budget
speech laid stress on the powers of control over the viceroy vested in
the secretary of state, and claimed all the credit of the recent reforms
for Lord Morley and his council. So deeply had seditious teaching
penetrated that the prosecution of the Dacca conspiracy case did not
stop the increase in violent crime. Half a dozen cases occurred round
Dacca in the second half of 1910, and sixteen more during the next
year. In one of the latter the teachers and students of a national school
were implicated, and the school library was found to contain books
dealing with the lives of Tilak and Sivaji, and a garbled history of the
Indian Mutiny.
The list of crimes includes the murders of a witness in the Dacca
case and of several police officers. Bengali influence can also be
traced in Madras, where a revolutionary movement gathered
strength after lectures by a Bengali in 1907, and seditious publications
and conspiracies increased. When a newspaper closed at Madras,
owing to the conviction of the printer and publisher, it was again
issued from Pondichery in French India. The district magistrate of
Tinnevelly was shot dead in June, 1911, by a man who had been in
touch at Pondichery with Indians trained abroad.
The accession of King George V was marked in India by a durbar
at Delhi held by Their Majesties in person in December, 1911.
Loyalty to the throne had not yet been questioned by any section in
India, and the visit confirmed and illustrated its strength. In a
gracious message His Majesty announced that the event of the
coronation would be commemorated by certain marks of especial
favour and consideration, which were later announced by the
governor-general. They were designed to impress the memory of the
occasion on the widest possible circles of the Indian public, from the
rulers of states, who were excused the payment of succession duties,
to the military and civil (subordinate) servants of the government who
1 Buchan, Life of Lord Minto, p. 305.
* Mr Montagu quoted from the Statute of 1833 the powers of the Board of Control,
which were transferred to the secretary of state by the act of 1858. Mill, however, had
described the Board of Control as a deliberative rather than an executive body. Cf.
Buchan, p. 309.
3 Rowlatt Report, para. 153.


## p. 576 (#616) ############################################

576
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
a
received bcuuses of pay, and to the masses by special grants for the
spread of popular education. Officers, nien and reservists of the Indian
Army were made eligible for the receipt of the Victoria Cross, which
had hitherto never been granted to them.
A further act of great administrative importance, announced in the
name of the king-emperor, was the transfer of the seat of government
from Calcutta to Delhi, a former capital, whose history stretches back
to legendary times. At the same time the presidency of Bengal was
to become a governorship, and the territories of the existing provinces
of Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam were to be redistributed,
Assam being restored as a chief commissionership, and a new pro-
vince being formed under a lieutenant-governor with charge of Bihar,
Orissa and Chota Nagpur. As part of this new province had been
under council government, an executive council was also appointed.
In the minds of Indian politicians this cancelment of the partition
of 1905 counted for more than all the other concessions. Lord Morley,
though pressed on several occasions, had declined to reopen it, and
agitation had almost died down. It had indeed been regarded more
as a local matter than as one affecting the whole of India, and when
in the congress of 1906 the delegates from Bengal attempted to extend
the boycott of British goods and even association in government
work, such as holding the post of honorary magistrate, to other parts
of India, protests had been made. Success was, however, treated as
a concession to clamour, rather than to reasoned argument, and the
Muslim politicians resented the change. For in Eastern Bengal and
Assam their co-religionists numbered nearly 60 per cent of the popu-
lation, and they had looked forward to holding a more important
share in the control of affairs than they were able to secure in other
parts of India where they were in a minority. They had also held aloof
from seditious activities and had supported the government, and an
impression was made that the change was partly due to violence.
The congress of 1910 had elected as president the late Sir W.
Wedderburn, whose message had been one of conciliation between
officials and non-officials, between Hin lus and Muslims, and between
moderate reformers and extremists. Though no formal resolution was
passed, a Hindu-Muslim conference met, and it was decided to con-
tinue attempts to reduce ill-feeling. All hopes of success were, how-
ever, extinguished by the action of a Hindu member who, though
opposed by his leader, moved a resolution on 24 January, 1911, in the
imperial legislative council, asking the government to abolish separate
representation, whether in the councils, or in local bodies. This
attempt to reduce the security of their political influence embittered
the Muslims so much that even their disappointment at the reversal
•
1 Indian National Congress Report, Calcutta, 1907, pp. 87-9.
: “A bitter jest ‘No bombs no boons' was passed round among Mahomedans at Delhi. ”
Sir R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India, p. 147.


## p. 577 (#617) ############################################

KHILAFAT AGITATION
577
of the partition was not immediately sufficient to make them combine
with the Hindus. A marked change was, however, noticeable in their
attitude towards the government, and especially in their public utter-
ances and in their newspapers. No Muslim had taken the place of Sir
Sayyid Ahmad who had died in 1898, and the younger men educated
at his college were beginning to chafe at the restraints imposed by
those who remembered his teachings of moderation and sobriety.
Their influence in the college was disruptive, and made it impossible
for the Government of India to accept the proposals framed to raise
its status to that of a university. Affairs in Europe and in Persia had
also excited them. The war between Italy and Turkey, the agreement
between Russia and England regarding Persia, and still more the
Balkan War, had combined to arouse fears that independent Islamic
powers were in danger. Muslim opinion varies as to the right to
recognition as khalifa, or representative of Muhammad, since the
Mongols overthrew the Abbasid line of Baghdad in 1258, and when
Selim I of Turkey assumed the title in 1517 Indian Muslims hardly
recognised it. When the Moghul Empire of India had been ex-
tinguished, however, the fact that a khalifa must enjoy temporal as
well as spiritual power led some sections of the Indian Muslims to
accept the khilafat of the sultan, and this increased their natural
sympathy with co-religionists during the Crimean War, though even
devout Sunnis, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad held that the institution had
lapsed in 1258. 1 Twenty years later, Lord Lytton wrote to warn
Lord Salisbury, after the conference at Constantinople which took
place shortly before war broke out between Turkey and Russia, that
Indian Muslims were by no means indifferent to the fate of Turkey. 2
In October, 1912, war broke out between Turkey and the Balkan
states, and a medical mission composed of Indians was organised at
Delhi and dispatched to help the Turks, while the Red Crescent
(corresponding to the Red Cross) movement also received support.
A society was formed called the Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or servants of
the Kaaba, which aimed at arousing interest in maintaining the
integrity of the Turkish kingdom as responsible for the safety of the
sacred places of Islam. Drawing inspiration perhaps from the success
of the Salvation Army, it addressed its efforts to the humbler classes
of the community, who were invited to become members on payment
of a very small subscription, and were excited by inflammatory
addresses on the dangers besetting their co-religionists abroad.
An opportunity of testing the powers of agitation soon occurred.
Some street improvements at Cawnpore involved the removal of
buildings. It was found possible to avoid the demolition of a Hindu
temple standing in the middle of a new road which was being opened.
Close to it stood a small mosque, and it was proposed to remove an
1 Sir Verney Lovett, History of the Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 282-4.
2 Lady Betty Balfour, Letlers of the Earl of Lytton, 11, 64.
CHI VI
37


## p. 578 (#618) ############################################

578
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909–1917
addition to the original building containing a room and a platform
on which ceremonial ablutions were performed. Religious jealousy.
led to a demand that this should also be spared. Similar constructions,
and even whole mosques, had been demolished in the past without
complaint, but an agitation was fostered from outside and rapidly
grew. Stories of tortures inflicted on Muslims by the Balkan powers
were published, and the reoccupation of Adrianople by the Turks in
July, after Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria had begun to fight among
themselves, encouraged boldness in India. More than a month after
the room had been pulled down, a violent mob, after listening to a
sermon, rushed to the spot and began to pile up bricks. They attacked
the police, who were compelled to fire, causing some loss of life.
Agitation in the press was redoubled, especially in Calcutta and
Lahore and false rumours were circulated about the facts. Though
local feeling had calmed down, these narratives, as is not uncommon,
continued to excite people in distant parts of India. Lord Hardinge,
the governor-general, was so impressed by reports he received that he
decided to visit Cawnpore. There he announced a settlement of the
affair, which was in fact in accordance with the original plans for
improvement, viz. that the room should be rebuilt over an arcade
which extended along the street.
While the rearrangement of Bengal had contributed to the new
political activities of the Muslims, its effect on Hindus had not been
as sedative as had been hoped. Bengali politicians were gratified,
while the lawyers and traders of Calcutta, who had anticipated
material loss from the constitution of a new capital at Dacca, felt
relief. But to the virus of sedition, spread by the press, and by revolu-
tionaries in some of the private educational institutions with ill-paid
staffs, no antidote was afforded by a measure which did not affect the
persons engaged in spreading the poison. In December, 1912, a bomb
was thrown in Delhi at Lord Hardinge who narrowly escaped with
his life, and throughout the next year revolutionary crime in Eastern
Bengal was marked by murderous brutality in dacoities committed
in order to obtain funds for revolutionary purposes. It has been
observed that between 1906 and 1910 prices rose to an extent which
had not been known since the Mutiny, and that the literate classes
who furnished revolutionary recruits were hit harder than the agri-
culturists.
In other parts of India the influence of the Bengali revolutionaries
showed itself, partly by imitation, and partly by direct incitement.
A club modelled on thé Anusilan Samiti (society for the promotion of
culture and training) at Dacca was started at Benares in the United
Provinces in 1908 by young Bengali students who are numerous in
that city. Its founder aimed at making it a school of sedition, and was
instigated by members of the revolutionary party in Bengal. The
i Sir Bampfylde Fuller in United Empire, 1910, p. 559.


## p. 579 (#619) ############################################

WORKING OF THE NEW COUNCILS
579
methods followed, however, alienated a number of members who did
not approve its political activities and hostility to the government.
Subsequently the more active members seceded and formed a fresh
association, which throughout 1913 was in close touch with Bengal.
In the Panjab the deportations of 1907 had been followed by calm
for some time, but the bomb manual prepared in Bengal was received
there, and a Panjabi student, who had been in England and had
come under the influence of Krishnavarma, started propaganda and
then left for America, whence he subsequently attempted to organise
ghadr (mutiny) in India. Some of his pupils got into touch with a
Bengali employed in the United Provinces and organised the spread
of seditious literature extolling the attempt on Lord Hardinge's life.
A bomb placed by this association near the European Club at Lahore
caused the death of an Indian in May, 1913. In Bihar a particularly
revolting murder was committed to obtain funds for revolutionary
purposes by two youths from Bombay, who had been excited by the
inflammatory journals of the Bombay Brahman clique, and by lectures
on the Bengal “martyrs”.
The working of the new legislative councils was examined in
chapter iv of the Montagu-Chelmsford report. One unforeseen
result of the enlargement of the non-official element was that it was
found necessary to curb the criticism of government measures by
officials within the councils, and to prevent provincial governors from
using their councils to question orders passed by the secretary of state.
Non-official members were able to influence legislation, not so much
by debate when bills were actually before the councils, as in the
previous discussions, or in select committees. In India it had been
customary to publish proposals for legislation as widely as possible
and obtain criticisms of these before bills were introduced, and in
one province special provision was made to employ members of the
council in this manner. The right to move resolutions was freely used
and its effect on government action may be estimated by the fact that
out of 168 resolutions moved in the imperial council to the end of
1917 about seventy-three were fructuous. Questions were also freely
put, though many of these were to elicit information alrcady easily
available or statistical information of no real public value.
During this period an attempt was made to constitute an executive
council in the United Provinces. 3 Sir John Hewett, the lieutenant-
governor, had reported in 1909 that the work coming before him in
the United Provinces was not sufficiently heavy to justify the con-
stitution of such a body, and that it would be difficult to obtain
suitable Indian nominees, as non-official Indians had little experience
of administrative business, though capable men were available. He
i Cd. 910g of 1918.
2 Lord Curzon (Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, 11, 104) disliked this system, as different
from what he was accustomed to.
: Parl. Papers (House of Lords), 1914-16, sessional no. 49 (VIII, 5 $99. ).
37-2


## p. 580 (#620) ############################################

580
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909–1917
did not agree with the considerations pressed upon him by the Govern-
ment of India, which regarded the secretary of state's views as final.
The new councils would increase work in some directions, but should
relieve it in others, and it was premature to anticipate future needs.
After a long experience in the Government of India he could not say
that public business was discussed with more discrimination by a
governor in council than by a lieutenant-governor without one.
Executive councils were desired by Indian politicians for several
reasons. They wished the heads of provinces to be selected from men
in public life in England rather than from the Indian Civil Service,
and the Decentralisation Commission had pointed out that councils
would be necessary if this change was made. i Government by council
was considered a superior form, and in any case the constitution of a
council would admit one or two Indians to new high offices. In reply
to a resolution moved in the imperial legislative council, 24 January,
1911, the Home Member said that the practical test was whether the
head of the province could cope with the work and the Government of
India would not move in the matter while Sir John Hewett was
lieutenant-governor.
Two years later a similar resolution was moved in the local council
and Sir James (now Lord) Meston, who had followed Sir John Hewett,
declined to accept it on the formal ground that his views could not be
published until the Government of India and secretary of state had
considered the question. In forwarding a report of the debate he took
the same view of the state of work as Sir John Hewett. But he thought
it advisable to meet the demand on the ground that it would steadily
grow and was bound to be conceded in time. Opinion in the Govern-
ment of India was divided. Three of the civilian members, and (at the
time the decision was taken) the commander-in-chief were opposed.
One of them pointed out
that Sir Edward Baker, who was the only lieutenant-governor (in 1909) in favour
of having a council, sent up proposals for the distribution of work, which reduced
his council to a position subordinate to himself and struggled to retain in his
hands powers which the Government of India considered incompatible with
council government.
The dissentients were all impressed by the bitterness of feeling between
Hindu and Muslim in northern India and by the lack of experience
of council government in provinces under lieutenant-governors. The
majority considered that council government was a natural conse-
quence of the increase in work and greater complication in adminis-
tration, and, impressed by Sir James Meston's advice, supported the
proposal. This was accepted by Lord Crewe, the secretary of state,
and a draft proclamation was laid before both houses of parliament.
An address to the crown was, however, carried against it in the House
of Lords on 16 March, 1915.
1 Report, pp. 154-5.
2 Minute of Dissent by Sir Harcourt Butler.


## p. 581 (#621) ############################################

INDIANS IN THE COLONIES
581
Another matter which engaged public attention was the treatment
of Indians in the dominions and crown colonies, which had long been
a source of grievance, and the position in South Africa was particularly
complained of. Before the Boer War it had been the cause of re-
monstrance with the Boer government. In 1900 and again in 1901
the congress passed resolutions calling attention to the matter, but
even after the war crown colony administrations did nothing to
remedy the disabilities, which were indeed increased. Restrictions
were most severe in the Free State which had completely excluded
Indians, and in the Transvaal where they were not permitted to own
land and had to live in special localities. In Natal, where the largest
population of Indians was found, a licence fee had been imposed on
İndians who had entered the colony as-indentured labourers, if they
remained at the end of their term of service, and on their children as
they became adolescent. Political franchise was taken away in 1896
on the ground that it was not enjoyed in India, and there were
proposals to abolish the municipal franchise, and to stop licences in
order to get rid of all Indians. Cape Colony was more reasonable,
and Indians there had fewer grievances though these were still
appreciable. In 1907 the new responsible government in the Trans-
vaal passed acts to prevent the ingress of Indians not already domiciled
there and to compel registration of all Indian residents.
Mr M. K. Gandhi, an Indian barrister, who had visited South
Africa on legal business in 1893 and had remained there to assist his
fellow-countrymen in resisting oppressive measures, organised a move-
ment of passive resistance, which he was later to repeat in India.
Sympathetic agitation began in India where the discussion of ad-
ministrative reforms was already exciting men's minds, and the
Indian government supported the claims for more liberal treatment.
The home government found it difficult to reconcile the undoubted
rights of Indians as British subjects, and those of South Africans to
whom the Union Act of 1909 gave full powers of self-government.
Colonies like Natal had found Indian labour useful in agriculture and
unskilled occupations. But the Indian labourer at the end of his term
of service was engaging in trade (usually as a small shopkeeper) and
in market-gardening where he came into competition with the lower
classes of European origin. There was some apprehension of large
numbers of competitors arriving, if all restrictions were removed.
Most important of all, it was feared that if Indians were admitted
freely and obtained the franchise, it could not in time be refused to
the indiger ous races who would then swamp the predominating
influence of the white population.
In 1910 the Government of India decided to stop the recruitment
of indentured labour for Natal from the following year. The British
1 See Keith, Imperial Unity and the Doncinions, 1916, pp. 202 599. , where full references
are given.
2 Doke, M. K. Gandhi, 1909.


## p. 582 (#622) ############################################

582
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
government then pressed the Union to repeal the Transvaal Act of
1907 and to conrider milder legislation, which was introduced and
passive resistance ceased in 1911. There was, however, long delay and
in 1913 Lord Hardinge, the governor-general, spoke publicly on the
undoubted grievances of Indians in a manner which was resented,
though unreasonably, in South Africa. The same year an act was
passed which made admission subject to the ability to read and write
in a European language, though it was still possible to declare any
person or class of persons unsuitable on economic grounds or on
account of the standard or habits of life. There were also limits on the
admission of wives or offspring of persons not following a rule of
monogamy. Some discussions in 1912 had been attended by Mr G. K.
Gokhale, a prominent Indian politician, and the Indians believed
that the repeal of the licence tax in Natal had been promised, but this
was not in the act. A fresh resort to passive resistance led to serious
riots and many prosecutions, followed by a commission of enquiry,
which led to some remedial measures.
At the outbreak of the war in 1914 revolutionary activity was still
continuing in Bengal, though slightly checked by the active police
measures taken against it. Muslims, especially in northern India, had
been worked up to oppose thegovernment, and their younger politicians
showed a disposition to identify their aims with those of the congress.
In March, 1913, indeed, the All-India Muslim League had adopted
as its ideal the attainment of self-government of a kind suitable to
India, and had been pressed by some members, though without success,
to adopt the congress formula of a "system of government similar to
that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and
a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the empire
on equal terms with those members”. ? The first important event,
however, was connected with an agitation differing from these. The
ghadr movement in America3 had been widely advertised among
Indians in that country by a newspaper bearing the same title as the
movement. From the United States it spread among the Sikhs and
other Indians in British Columbia, who had a grievance arising from
the local immigration rules. Some of them visited the Panjab and at
public meetings obtained the passing of resolutions of protest against
the rules. Early in 1914 a Sikh who had been in business in Singapore
and the Malay states chartered a ship and conveyed 373 Indians to
Vancouver. As most of them had not complied with the rules, the
authorities forbade their landing. Revolutionary literature which had
been conveyed on board added to the resentment caused by the
failure of the plan, and the passengers were landed ner Calcutta, in
September, 1914, in an angry and rebellious spirit. The government had
Mr Gokhale's speech. Bankipur Congress Report, 1912, p. 53, gives an excellent account
of the Indian side of the controversy.
· Appendix B, Congress Report of 1908, Madras, 1909.
: Cf. p. 579, supra.


## p. 583 (#623) ############################################

SEDITION IN THE PANJAB
583
enacted an ordinance to regulate the ingress into India of emigrants
of this description, and provided a train to take the passengers to the
Panjab. They refused to enter it, and a riot with loss of life occurred,
a
as many of the rioters were armed with revolvers. Some of those who
had escaped, joining emigrants who returned later, then committed
a series of violent offences, mainly designed to obtain funds for revo-
lutionary purposes. A Bombay Brahman reached the Panjab in
December with offers of Bengali co-operation (including a bomb
expert), and a general rising was planned to take place in February,
1915. This was frustrated. By this time forty-five serious crimes had
been committed in five months. There was evidence that most of the
conspirators were ignorant peasants, who had been corrupted by the
movement in America. The Defence of India Act was passed and rules
made under it for the summary trial of revolutionary offences by a
strong bench of judges, with no preliminary commitment and no
appeal, and for the internment of suspects. Though a few offences
were committed later, firm action soon had its due effect, and the
leading Sikhs, proud of the achievements of their caste fellows at the
front, co-operated with the government to restore confidence. Con-
nected with the main conspiracy in the Panjab was a similar movement
at Benares, which grewout of the revolutionary club described above,
and aimed at co-operation in the general rising planned in the Panjab.
It was detected and some of the chief conspirators were convicted.
Just as the political movements in Bengal and Bombay had produced
undercurrents of violent crime and sedition owing to the manner ir.
which they had been pushed, so did the ill-balanced khilafat agitation.
War against the allies had been declared by Turkey, but even this
had no sobering effect on the wilder spirits in India. Their devotion
to the khilafat of the sultan was strengthened by the revolt of the
Sharif of Mecca, which became known in June, 1915, and they were
not moved by his explanation that he had been impelled to it by the
action of the young Turks. The allies had guaranteed the sanctity of
the sacred places of Islam, but a section of Indian Muslims professed
to believe that these were in danger, and the government found it
necessary to warn their leaders.
A number of young students left their colleges at Lahore in February,
1915, and crossed the border to join a small body of fanatics in tribal
territory who had for nearly a century maintained a spirit of opposi-
tion to the British. Some months later a Sikh convert to Islam, who
had been attempting to promote sedition in a Muslim religious school
in the United Provinces, also visited the fanatics and then proceeded
to Kabul. With the help of a Turco-German mission he hatched an
absurd plot for overthrowing the British government in India and
setting up an alternative government, in which some of the students
were to hold high rank. More serious than this was a conspiracy set
1 Cf. p. 578, supra.


## p. 584 (#624) ############################################

584
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
1
1
1
1
1
A
1
C
0
4
on foot by the ghadr party in America, who sent emissaries through
Bangkok into Burma. There they communicated with two Muslims
who had been members of the Red Crescent Society and had been
helping in medical aid in Turkey during the Balkan War. An
Indian regiment was then corrupted and ready to mutiny, attempts
were made to seduce the large force of military police in Burma, and
other outrages were planned.
German influence had been at work even before war was declared.
As far back as 1911 or earlier, the Indian revolutionaries in America
had been in touch with German agents and had been propagating
the doctrine that Germany would attack England. After war broke
out Indians were employed in propaganda, in attempting to seduce
from their allegiance Indian prisoners of war, and in plotting an
attack on Burma from Siam.