Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is
exclusively
rupa.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Visible matter is color and shape.
Color is fourfold: blue, red,
yellow, white; other colors proceed from out of these four colors. Shape
(samsthdna, iv. 3c) is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high, low, 45
even, uneven.
10a. Or twentyfold.
2. Or there are some twenty types: the four primary colors, the eight shapes, and eight more colors: cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shade, hot light, light, darkness. Some make a color of the firmament [which appears like a wall of lapiz-lazuli]; this would give us the number twenty-one.
"Even" signifies "of even shape;" "uneven" is the opposite; mist is the vapor which rises from the ground and from water; "hot light" is the light of the sun; "light" is the light of the moon, the stars, fire, grasses and gems; "shade"--arisen from an obstacle to light--is where forms still remain visible; "darkness" is the opposite.
The other terms do not call for any explanation.
? 3. Visible matter can be color without being shape: yellow, white, shade, hot light, light, darkness.
46
blue, red, There can be shapes without there being color: that part of the
47 long, of the short, etc. , which constitutes bodily action (kdyavijnapti,
iv. 2).
There can be color and shape at one and the same time: all the
other categories of visible matter.
Some other Masters maintain that only hot light and light are
exclusively color; for blue, red, etc. , present themselves to the sight under the aspect of long, short, etc.
4. But, say the Sautrantikas, how could a single thing be (yidyate) twofold, [color and shape together? For, in the system of the Vaibhasikas, color and shape are distinct things, dravya, iv. 3. ]
Because color and shape are perceived in a single substance. The root vid has here the sense of "to know," and not the sense of "to exist. "
But, reply the Sautrantikas, you should admit that bodily action is at one and the same time color and shape.
48 10b. Sound is eightfold.
1. It is fourfold: having for its cause present primary elements
forming part of the organs, having for its cause other primary
elements (upattanupattamahabhutahetuka, i. 34c-d), belonging to liv-
49
ing beings, and not belonging to living beings. categories is agreeable or disagreeable.
Each of these four
First category: sound caused by the hand or by the voice.
Second category: sound of the wind, of the trees, of water.
Third category: sound of vocal action (iv. 3d). Fourth category:
every other sound
2. According to other masters, one sound can belong to the first
two categories at one and the same time, for example, a sound produced by the coming together of a hand and a drum. But the School (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 663cl2) does not admit that one atom [of matter] has for its cause only two tetrades of the primary elements; thus one cannot admit that one atom [of sound] is produced by the four primary
The Dhatus 65
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elements of a hand and the four primary elements of a drum.
50 lOb-c. Taste is of six types.
Sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.
51 10c. Odor is fourfold.
For good odors and bad odors are either excessive or non-excessive.
But, according to the Prakarana (p. 692c22), odor is threefold: good, bad, and equal or indifferent.
52 lOd. The tangible is of eleven types.
1. Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.
2. The elements will be explained below (i. 12). "Softness" is smoothness; "hardness" is roughness; "weight" is that by which bodies are susceptible of being weighed (i. 36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what produces a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated by the name of the effect. In the same way that it is said "The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who
53 are in agreement. "
54
3. Both hunger and thirst are lacking in Rupadhatu, but the other
tangibles are found there.
It is true that the clothes of the gods of Rupadhatu, individually,
have no weight; but, brought all together, they have weight.
It is true that bothersome cold is lacking in Rupadhatu but beneficent or pleasing cold is found there: such is the opinion of the
Vaibhasikas. [It is the absorption that the gods enjoy, not the cold. ]
55
It is possible for one visual consciousness to arise from a single
thing, from a single category of visible matter: when a characteristic of this thing (blue, etc. ) is separately distinguished. In other cases, one consciousness is produced by many things: when such a distinction is
? lacking; for example, when one sees the multiple colors and shapes that an army or a pile of jewels present at a distance and bunched together. The same remark is applicable to the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousnesses, etc.
But one touch consciousness arises from only five things at most, namely the four primary elements and one another of the other tangibles, soft, hard, etc. Such is the opinion of certain masters.
But, according to another opinion, one touch consciousness can arise from eleven tangibles at one and the same time.
[Objection]. According to what you say, each of the five sense consciousnesses bears on a totality, for example the visual conscious- ness bears on blue, red, etc. ; consequently the sense consciousnesses have "general characteristics for their object" and not, as Scripture teaches us, "specific characteristic" (svalaksana).
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 65cl2) answer that the Scripture] means by specific charaaeristic not the specific charaaeristic
56
of things, but the specific charaaeristic of an ayatana (ii. 62c).
When the organs of touch and of taste attain their objea at the
same time (i. 43c-d), which consciousness is the first to arise?
The one whose object is the strongest. But if the strength of the two objects is equal, the consciousness of taste arise first, because the
desire for food dominates.
***
We have explained the objeas of the five organs of sense consciousness, and how these objects are preceived. Let us now examine the avijnapti, which is the eleventh category of rupaskandha.
11. There is a serial continuity also in a person whose mind is
distracted, or who is without mind, pure or impure, in
dependence on the primary elements: this is called the 57
avijnapti.
"One whose mind is distracted" is one who has a mind different from the mind that provoked the avijnapti,--for example, a bad mind
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when the avijnapti has been provoked by a good mind
"One without mind" is one who has entered into one of the
absorptions of non-consciousness called asamjnisamapatti [and niro- dhasamapatti] (ii. 42).
"Also in a person . . :" the word "also" indicates that avijnapti also exists in a person with a non-distraaed mind, and in a person whose mind is not in the two absorptions.
"A serial continuity" is a flux.
"Pure or impure" means good or bad.
"In dependence on the primary elements:" this in order to
distinguish the avijnapti series from the prapti series (ii. 36). Avijnapti depends on the primary elements, because they are its generating cause, etc. (ii. 65; Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 663a26).
"This is called the avijnapti* in order to indicate the reason for the name avijnapti.
This serial continuity, while being by its nature matter and action,--like vijnapti, bodily and vocal action,--nevertheless does nothing by way of informing another as vijnapti does.
"Is called," in order to show that the author here expresses the opinion of the Vaibhasikas, and not his own.
In short, avijnapti is a rupa, good or bad, arisen from vijnapti or from absorption.
***
What are the primary elements?
12a-b. The primary elements are the elementary substance
"earth," and the elementary substances "water," "fire" and
58 "wind. "
These four are the four dhatus, so called because they bear their own unique characteristics, as well as derived or secondary matter.
They are called "great" (=primary) because they are the point of support for all derived matter. Or it is because they assemble on a large scale in the mass of the earth, the water, the fire and the wind, where
? their modes of activity are manifested together (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 681al7,p. 663all). 59
What activity establishes the existence of these dhatus, and what is their nature?
12c. They are proven to exist by the actions of support, etc.
The elements of earth, water, fire, wind, are, in this order, proven to exist by the actions of support, cohesion, ripening and expansion. Expansion signifies growth and deplacement. These are their actions.
60 12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.
As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is
61
motion.
Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a 62
thing to reproduce itself in different places; in the same way that one
speaks of the motion of a flame (iv. 2c-d).
63 64
The Prakarana and the Sutra say: "What is the wind element?
It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived mpa. " Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind
65
element: its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.
What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?
13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.
That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,
13b. The same for water and fire.
In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.
13c. Wind is either the wind element,
But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.
13d. Or else [color and shape].
66
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What is called "wind" in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of "black wind," or "circular wind. "
***
Why do all these dharmas, from visibles to avijnapti, receive the name rupa? Why do they together constitute the rupaskandha?
i. The Blessed One said: "Because it is incessantly broken, Oh
Bhiksus, one terms it rupa updddnaskandha. By what it is broken? It is 67
broken by contact with the hand. "
"To be broken" signifies "to be damaged," as stated in the 68
Arthavargtya stanza of the Ksudrakdgama (-Apphakavagga, i. 2): "If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken. " (Compare Mbh xiii. 193,48).
But how is rupa damaged?
By deteriorating, by being transformed.
ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical
matter rupa, namely rupana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but 69
rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle th^t a rupa 70
opposes to its place being occupied by another rupa (see i. 43c-d). [iii. Objections. ]
1. If this is so, the rupa that constitutes an atom, a "monad," will not be rupa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rupana.
Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rupana\ but a monad never
71
exists in an isolated state;
agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 390al).
2. Rupas of the past and the future are not rupa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.
Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dhanna which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
in the state of agglomeration, being an
? 3. Avijnapti is not rupa, for it is devoid of resistance.
Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rupa attributed to avijnapti:
a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijnapti, is rupa; thus avijnapti is rupa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.
No. For avijtlapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijnapti should perish when the vijfiapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.
b. Second explanation. Avijnapti is rupa, for the primary elements,
72
which constitute its point of support, are rupa
[Objection. ] According to this principle, the five sense conscious-
nesses would be rupa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc) is rupa.
This response is not valid. Avijnapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.
[Answer. ] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhasikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: 'The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,"--the comparison to the shadow and avijnapti is
inadmissible. The Vaibhasikas admit that avijnapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation ("This response is not valid. Avijnapti. . . ") is worthless.
But, we would say, one can refute the objection: "According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rupa"
In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
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of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i. 29b), which is rUpa\ and 2. the mental organ (manas, i. 44c-d) which is not rupa.
Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is exclusively rupa. Thus, from the fact that avijnapti is called rupa because its point of support is rupa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rupa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.
*##
The organs and objects which have been defined as rupaskandha, I4a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten
1 ayatanas, ten dhatus. *
Considered as ayatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i. 20), they are ten ayatanas: caksurayatana, rupayatana,. . . kdyaya- tana, sprastavyayatana.
Considered as dhdtu, a mine (i. 20), they are ten dhatus: caksur- dhdtu, rupadhdtu . . . kayadhatu, sprastavyadhdtu.
***
We have explained rupaskandha and how it is distributed into ayatanas and dhdtus. We must now explain the skandhas.
74 14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.
Vedanaskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc. , with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii. 7 and following).
75 14c-d Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.
The grasping of the diverse natures--perceiving that this is blue,
? yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagree- able, etc. --is samjndskandha (see i. l6a). One can distinguish six types of samjfid, according to organ, as for sensation.
15a-b. Samkdraskandha are the samskaras different from the 76
The samskaras are everything that is conditioned (samskftajJa); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the skandhas of rupa, vedana, or samjnd, explained above, or in the skandha of vijndna explained below (i. 16).
other four skandhas.
It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sutra, "The samskd- 77
raskandha is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from samskaraskandha 1. ) all the viprayuktasamskdras (ii. 35), and 2. ) the samprayuktasamskaras (ii. 23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sutra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital
78 definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed
importance of volition, which, being action by its nature,
One said, "The updddnaskandha called samskdra is so called because it
conditions conditioned things,"
determines the five skandhas of future existence.
79
that is to say, because it creates and 80
If we take the definition of the Sutra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental dharmas, with the exception of volition, and all of the dharmas of the viprayukta class (ii. 35), do not form part of any skandha. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single dharma which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi. 33). And again "If there is a single dharma which is not abandoned . . . " (Samyukta TD 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and viprayuktas is included within the samskaraskandha.
15b-d. These three skandhas\ with avijnapti and unconditioned things, are the dharmdyatana, the dharmadhdtu.
Vedanaskandha, samjndskandha, samskaraskandha, plus avijnapti
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(i. ll) and the three unconditioned things (i. 5b), are seven things which are called dharmdyatana or dharmadhdtu.
81 16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.
Vijnanaskandha is the impression relative to each object, the "raw
82 83
of each object. Vijnanaskandha is six classes of con-
grasping"
sciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness.
Considered as dyatana (i. 20a), 16b. It is the mental organ.
Considered as dhdtu (i. 20a), 16c. It is seven dhdtus.
What are the seven?
16d. The six consciousnesses and the manas.
That is to say: the dhdtu of the eye or visual consciousness {caksurvijndnadhdtu), the dhdtu of the ear or auditory consciousness {srotravijnanadhatu), the dhdtu of the nose or olfactory consciousness {ghranavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of tongue or taste consciousness (jihvdvijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of body or touch consciousness {kdyavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of mind or mental consciousness {manovijndnadhdtu), and the dhdtu of the mind (manodhdtu).
We have seen that there are five skandhas, twelve dyatanas, and eighteen dhdtus.
1. Rupaskandha is ten dyatanas, ten dhdtus, and avijnapti.
2. The dharmayatana, or dharmadhdtu is vedana, samjna and samskdrdskandha', avijnapti; and the unconditioned things.
3. Vijnanaskandha is the mana-dyatana\ it is seven dhdtus, namely the six classes of consciousness {vijndnakdya = vijndnadhdtu) and the mental organ.
Could a manas or manodhdtu be distinct from the six classes of consciousness, distina from the sense consciousness and from the mental consciousness?
84 There is no manas distina from the consciousness.
? 17a-b. Of these six consciousness, the one which continually
85 passes away, is the manas.
All consciousness which has just perished receives the name of manodhatu; in the same way, a man is both son and father, the same vegetable element is both fruit and seed.
[Objection. ] If the six consciousnesses which make up six dhatus constitute the manas, and if the manas is not a thing other than the six consciousnesses, then there would be either seventeen dhatus,--by excluding the manas which is co-functional with the six conscious- nesses,--or else twelve dhatus, by excluding the six consciousnesses which are co-functional with the manas,--supposing of course that you want to enumerate distinct things and not mere designations.
This is true; but
17c-d. One counts eighteen dhatus with a view to assigning a point of support to the sixth consciousness.
The first five consciousnesses have>>for their point of support the five material organs, organ of sight, etc. (see i. 44c-d); but the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have such a point of support. Consequently, with a view to attributing a point of support to this consciousness, one calls manas or manodhatu, or again mana- ayatana and mana-indriya, that which serves it as its point of support, that is to say, any one of the six consciousnesses which depend on these six points of support, and six objects.
[Objection. ] If the consciousness or mind is called manas when, having perished, it is the point of support of another consciousness, the last mind of an Arhat will not be a manas, for it is not followed by a mind of which it would be the immediately antecedent cause and point of support (i. 44c-d).
This last mind has indeed the nature of manas, the nature of being a point of support. If it is not followed by a new mind, namely the consciousness-of-conception of a new existence (punarbhava), this is not related to its nature; rather, this results from the absence of other causes, actions and defilements, necessary to the production of a new thought.
The Dbdtus 75
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***
All conditioned dharmas are included within the totality of the skandhas (i. 7); all of the impure dharmas are included within the totality of the updddnaskandhas (i. 8); and all the dharmas are included within the totality of the dyatanas and the dhatus (i. 14). But, more briefly,
18a-b. All the dharmas are included in one skandha, one 86
dyatana, and one dhdtu.
In rupaskandha, mana-dyatana and dharmadhdtu.
87 18c. A dharma is included in its own nature.
Not in another nature. Why is this?
18d. For it is distinct from the nature of others.
A dharma is not included {samgraha) in that from which it is distinct. For example, the organ of sight is included within the rupaskandha, being rupa by its nature; within the caksurdyatana and within the caksurdhdtu, for it is the caksurayatana and caksurdhdtu\ within the Truth of Suffering and Arising, for it is suffering and arising; but it is not included within the other skandhas, ayatanas, etc. , for it is distinct by its nature from that which is not itself.
Without doubt the assemblies are won over by alms-giving and 88
other samgrahavastus: there is therefore samgraha of one thing by a thing different from it.
But the samgraha is occasional and as a consequence, not real, but conventional.
But, there are two organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell; consequently one should count twenty-one dhatus.
19a-c. The organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell, although twofold, form only, in pairs, one dhdtu, for their nature, their sphere of activity, and their consciousnesses are common.
The two organs of sight have a community of nature, for they
? are--both of them--the organ of sight; community of sphere, for they both have visible matter for their sphere; and community of con- sciousness, for they are both the point of support of the visual consciousness. Consequently the two organs of sight form a single dhdtu.
The same holds for the organs of hearing and smell. 19d. It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold
Although they form only one dhdtu, these organs are produced in pairs, with a view to the beauty of the body. With but a single eye, a
89
What is the meaning of the terms skandha, dyatana, and dhdtu? 20a-b. Skandha signifies "heap," dyatana signifies "gate of
entry," "gate of arising," and dhdtu signifies "lineage. "
i. In the Sutra, skandha signifies "heap:" "Whatever rupa there is,
past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or
single ear, or a single nostril, one would be very ugly (ii. la; i. 43, 30).
***
excellent, far or near, if one puts together all this rilpa, that which is 90
past, etc. , one has that which is called rupaskandha"
[According to the Vaibhasikas,] (1) past rupa is rupa destroyed by
91
impermanence, future rupa is rupa which has not arisen, and present
rupa is rilpa which has arisen and which has not been destroyed; (2) rupa is internal when it forms part of the series called "me" (i. 39); all other rupa is external; or rather the terms internal and external are understood from the point of view of dyatana: the organ of sight is internal because it forms part of my series or of the series of another; (3) rilpa is gross when it offers resistance; or rather these two designations are relative and not absolute.
Should one say that, in this second hypothesis, the gross and the subtle are not proven, since the same rilpa is gross or subtle according to whether one compares it to a rupa more subtle or gross?
This objection is invalid, for terms of comparison do not vary:
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when a rupa is gross in relation to another rupa, it is not subtle in relation to this same other rupa: like father and son.
(5) past and future rupa are distant; present rupa is near.
The same for the other skandhas, with this difference: gross consciousness is that which has for its point of support the five organs; subtle consciousness is the mental consciousness; or rather conscious- ness is gross or subtle according to whether it belongs to a stage which
is inferior or superior.
According to the Bhadanta, (1) gross rupa is that which is
perceived by the five organs; all other rupa is subtle; (2) "inferior" signifies "unpleasant," "excellent" signifies "pleasant;" (3) distant rupa is that which is found in an invisible place; near rupa is that which is found in a visible place.
[The explanation of the Vaibhasikas is bad, for] past rupa, etc. , has already been designated by its name. The same for sensation; it is far or near according to whether its point of support is visible or invisible; it is gross or subtle according to whether it is corporeal or mental (ii. 7).
ii. ayatana signifies "gate of entry or of arising of the mind and of
the mental states" (cittacaitta, ii. 23). Etymologically, ayatana is that
place, the mountain, where there are many "families" of gems,--iron, copper, silver, gold,--is said "to have numerous dhdtus" in this same way in the human complex or series, there are eighteen types of "families" which are called the eighteen dhdtus.
96
(4) Inferior rupa is defiled rupa\ excellent rupa is non-defiled rupa; 92
93
which extends (tanvanti) the entry (aya) of the mind and of the 94
mental states.
iii. Dhdtu signifies gotra, race, lineage. In the same way that the
Gotra is thus a mine.
Of what are the other dhdtus the mine?
95
Of what is the organ of the eye the mine?
The dhdtus are the mine of their own species: the eye, being a "cause similar to its effect" (sabhdgahetu, ii. 52) of the later moments of the existence of the eye, is the mine, the dhdtu of the eye.
But then unconditioned things, which are eternal, cannot be considered as dhdtu?
Let us say that they are the mine of the mind and mental states.
? According to another opinion, dhdtu signifies species. The specific nature of the eighteen dhdtus is what is understood by the eighteen dhdtus.
97
iv. [Objections. ]1. Ifskandhasignifies"heap,"theskandhashave
only a nominal existence, not a real existence, for collections are not a
9 thing: for example a pile of wheat, or the pudgala. *
"No, [reply the Vaibhasikas,] for an atom is a skandha.
As an atom in this hypothesis cannot have the quality of being a heap, do not say that skandha signifies "heap. "
2. According to another opinion (Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 407c9), 10
skandha signifies "that which bears the burden, namely its effect. " ? 101
Or else skandha signifies "part, section," as one says in the world, "I
will lend you three skandhas, if you promise to return them to me. " 103
These two explanations are not in conformity with the Sutra. The Sutra, in fact, attributes the sense of heap to skandha and no other sense:"Whateverrupathereis,past,present,orfuture,. . . ifoneputs together all this rupa . . . "
3. [The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra teaches that] all rupa,--past rupa, future rupa, etc. ,--is, individually, called skandha, the same way that it teaches that hair, etc. , is earth-element (below, note 120); thus each "real" (atomic) element of past rupa, future rupa, etc. , receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.
This interpretation is inadmissible, for the Sutra says ". . . if one puts together all this rupa,. . . one has that which is called
y rupaskandha!
4. [The Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, then the material dyatanas,--the organs and objects of the five sense consciousnesses,-- have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a "gate of arising of the mind or mental states" does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.
[Answer:] No, since each of these atoms individually possesses the quality of being "a gate of the arising of the mind," of being the cause of consciousness (compare i. 44a-b. iii). If you do not accept this
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doctrine, you will refuse to the organ, in its totality, the quality of being a cause of consciousness, for it does not produce a consciousness by itself, without the cooperation of an object.
5.
yellow, white; other colors proceed from out of these four colors. Shape
(samsthdna, iv. 3c) is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high, low, 45
even, uneven.
10a. Or twentyfold.
2. Or there are some twenty types: the four primary colors, the eight shapes, and eight more colors: cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shade, hot light, light, darkness. Some make a color of the firmament [which appears like a wall of lapiz-lazuli]; this would give us the number twenty-one.
"Even" signifies "of even shape;" "uneven" is the opposite; mist is the vapor which rises from the ground and from water; "hot light" is the light of the sun; "light" is the light of the moon, the stars, fire, grasses and gems; "shade"--arisen from an obstacle to light--is where forms still remain visible; "darkness" is the opposite.
The other terms do not call for any explanation.
? 3. Visible matter can be color without being shape: yellow, white, shade, hot light, light, darkness.
46
blue, red, There can be shapes without there being color: that part of the
47 long, of the short, etc. , which constitutes bodily action (kdyavijnapti,
iv. 2).
There can be color and shape at one and the same time: all the
other categories of visible matter.
Some other Masters maintain that only hot light and light are
exclusively color; for blue, red, etc. , present themselves to the sight under the aspect of long, short, etc.
4. But, say the Sautrantikas, how could a single thing be (yidyate) twofold, [color and shape together? For, in the system of the Vaibhasikas, color and shape are distinct things, dravya, iv. 3. ]
Because color and shape are perceived in a single substance. The root vid has here the sense of "to know," and not the sense of "to exist. "
But, reply the Sautrantikas, you should admit that bodily action is at one and the same time color and shape.
48 10b. Sound is eightfold.
1. It is fourfold: having for its cause present primary elements
forming part of the organs, having for its cause other primary
elements (upattanupattamahabhutahetuka, i. 34c-d), belonging to liv-
49
ing beings, and not belonging to living beings. categories is agreeable or disagreeable.
Each of these four
First category: sound caused by the hand or by the voice.
Second category: sound of the wind, of the trees, of water.
Third category: sound of vocal action (iv. 3d). Fourth category:
every other sound
2. According to other masters, one sound can belong to the first
two categories at one and the same time, for example, a sound produced by the coming together of a hand and a drum. But the School (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 663cl2) does not admit that one atom [of matter] has for its cause only two tetrades of the primary elements; thus one cannot admit that one atom [of sound] is produced by the four primary
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elements of a hand and the four primary elements of a drum.
50 lOb-c. Taste is of six types.
Sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.
51 10c. Odor is fourfold.
For good odors and bad odors are either excessive or non-excessive.
But, according to the Prakarana (p. 692c22), odor is threefold: good, bad, and equal or indifferent.
52 lOd. The tangible is of eleven types.
1. Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.
2. The elements will be explained below (i. 12). "Softness" is smoothness; "hardness" is roughness; "weight" is that by which bodies are susceptible of being weighed (i. 36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what produces a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated by the name of the effect. In the same way that it is said "The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who
53 are in agreement. "
54
3. Both hunger and thirst are lacking in Rupadhatu, but the other
tangibles are found there.
It is true that the clothes of the gods of Rupadhatu, individually,
have no weight; but, brought all together, they have weight.
It is true that bothersome cold is lacking in Rupadhatu but beneficent or pleasing cold is found there: such is the opinion of the
Vaibhasikas. [It is the absorption that the gods enjoy, not the cold. ]
55
It is possible for one visual consciousness to arise from a single
thing, from a single category of visible matter: when a characteristic of this thing (blue, etc. ) is separately distinguished. In other cases, one consciousness is produced by many things: when such a distinction is
? lacking; for example, when one sees the multiple colors and shapes that an army or a pile of jewels present at a distance and bunched together. The same remark is applicable to the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousnesses, etc.
But one touch consciousness arises from only five things at most, namely the four primary elements and one another of the other tangibles, soft, hard, etc. Such is the opinion of certain masters.
But, according to another opinion, one touch consciousness can arise from eleven tangibles at one and the same time.
[Objection]. According to what you say, each of the five sense consciousnesses bears on a totality, for example the visual conscious- ness bears on blue, red, etc. ; consequently the sense consciousnesses have "general characteristics for their object" and not, as Scripture teaches us, "specific characteristic" (svalaksana).
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 65cl2) answer that the Scripture] means by specific charaaeristic not the specific charaaeristic
56
of things, but the specific charaaeristic of an ayatana (ii. 62c).
When the organs of touch and of taste attain their objea at the
same time (i. 43c-d), which consciousness is the first to arise?
The one whose object is the strongest. But if the strength of the two objects is equal, the consciousness of taste arise first, because the
desire for food dominates.
***
We have explained the objeas of the five organs of sense consciousness, and how these objects are preceived. Let us now examine the avijnapti, which is the eleventh category of rupaskandha.
11. There is a serial continuity also in a person whose mind is
distracted, or who is without mind, pure or impure, in
dependence on the primary elements: this is called the 57
avijnapti.
"One whose mind is distracted" is one who has a mind different from the mind that provoked the avijnapti,--for example, a bad mind
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when the avijnapti has been provoked by a good mind
"One without mind" is one who has entered into one of the
absorptions of non-consciousness called asamjnisamapatti [and niro- dhasamapatti] (ii. 42).
"Also in a person . . :" the word "also" indicates that avijnapti also exists in a person with a non-distraaed mind, and in a person whose mind is not in the two absorptions.
"A serial continuity" is a flux.
"Pure or impure" means good or bad.
"In dependence on the primary elements:" this in order to
distinguish the avijnapti series from the prapti series (ii. 36). Avijnapti depends on the primary elements, because they are its generating cause, etc. (ii. 65; Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 663a26).
"This is called the avijnapti* in order to indicate the reason for the name avijnapti.
This serial continuity, while being by its nature matter and action,--like vijnapti, bodily and vocal action,--nevertheless does nothing by way of informing another as vijnapti does.
"Is called," in order to show that the author here expresses the opinion of the Vaibhasikas, and not his own.
In short, avijnapti is a rupa, good or bad, arisen from vijnapti or from absorption.
***
What are the primary elements?
12a-b. The primary elements are the elementary substance
"earth," and the elementary substances "water," "fire" and
58 "wind. "
These four are the four dhatus, so called because they bear their own unique characteristics, as well as derived or secondary matter.
They are called "great" (=primary) because they are the point of support for all derived matter. Or it is because they assemble on a large scale in the mass of the earth, the water, the fire and the wind, where
? their modes of activity are manifested together (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 681al7,p. 663all). 59
What activity establishes the existence of these dhatus, and what is their nature?
12c. They are proven to exist by the actions of support, etc.
The elements of earth, water, fire, wind, are, in this order, proven to exist by the actions of support, cohesion, ripening and expansion. Expansion signifies growth and deplacement. These are their actions.
60 12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.
As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is
61
motion.
Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a 62
thing to reproduce itself in different places; in the same way that one
speaks of the motion of a flame (iv. 2c-d).
63 64
The Prakarana and the Sutra say: "What is the wind element?
It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived mpa. " Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind
65
element: its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.
What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?
13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.
That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,
13b. The same for water and fire.
In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.
13c. Wind is either the wind element,
But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.
13d. Or else [color and shape].
66
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What is called "wind" in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of "black wind," or "circular wind. "
***
Why do all these dharmas, from visibles to avijnapti, receive the name rupa? Why do they together constitute the rupaskandha?
i. The Blessed One said: "Because it is incessantly broken, Oh
Bhiksus, one terms it rupa updddnaskandha. By what it is broken? It is 67
broken by contact with the hand. "
"To be broken" signifies "to be damaged," as stated in the 68
Arthavargtya stanza of the Ksudrakdgama (-Apphakavagga, i. 2): "If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken. " (Compare Mbh xiii. 193,48).
But how is rupa damaged?
By deteriorating, by being transformed.
ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical
matter rupa, namely rupana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but 69
rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle th^t a rupa 70
opposes to its place being occupied by another rupa (see i. 43c-d). [iii. Objections. ]
1. If this is so, the rupa that constitutes an atom, a "monad," will not be rupa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rupana.
Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rupana\ but a monad never
71
exists in an isolated state;
agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 390al).
2. Rupas of the past and the future are not rupa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.
Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dhanna which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
in the state of agglomeration, being an
? 3. Avijnapti is not rupa, for it is devoid of resistance.
Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rupa attributed to avijnapti:
a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijnapti, is rupa; thus avijnapti is rupa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.
No. For avijtlapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijnapti should perish when the vijfiapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.
b. Second explanation. Avijnapti is rupa, for the primary elements,
72
which constitute its point of support, are rupa
[Objection. ] According to this principle, the five sense conscious-
nesses would be rupa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc) is rupa.
This response is not valid. Avijnapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.
[Answer. ] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhasikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: 'The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,"--the comparison to the shadow and avijnapti is
inadmissible. The Vaibhasikas admit that avijnapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation ("This response is not valid. Avijnapti. . . ") is worthless.
But, we would say, one can refute the objection: "According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rupa"
In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
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of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i. 29b), which is rUpa\ and 2. the mental organ (manas, i. 44c-d) which is not rupa.
Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is exclusively rupa. Thus, from the fact that avijnapti is called rupa because its point of support is rupa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rupa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.
*##
The organs and objects which have been defined as rupaskandha, I4a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten
1 ayatanas, ten dhatus. *
Considered as ayatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i. 20), they are ten ayatanas: caksurayatana, rupayatana,. . . kdyaya- tana, sprastavyayatana.
Considered as dhdtu, a mine (i. 20), they are ten dhatus: caksur- dhdtu, rupadhdtu . . . kayadhatu, sprastavyadhdtu.
***
We have explained rupaskandha and how it is distributed into ayatanas and dhdtus. We must now explain the skandhas.
74 14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.
Vedanaskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc. , with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii. 7 and following).
75 14c-d Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.
The grasping of the diverse natures--perceiving that this is blue,
? yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagree- able, etc. --is samjndskandha (see i. l6a). One can distinguish six types of samjfid, according to organ, as for sensation.
15a-b. Samkdraskandha are the samskaras different from the 76
The samskaras are everything that is conditioned (samskftajJa); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the skandhas of rupa, vedana, or samjnd, explained above, or in the skandha of vijndna explained below (i. 16).
other four skandhas.
It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sutra, "The samskd- 77
raskandha is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from samskaraskandha 1. ) all the viprayuktasamskdras (ii. 35), and 2. ) the samprayuktasamskaras (ii. 23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sutra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital
78 definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed
importance of volition, which, being action by its nature,
One said, "The updddnaskandha called samskdra is so called because it
conditions conditioned things,"
determines the five skandhas of future existence.
79
that is to say, because it creates and 80
If we take the definition of the Sutra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental dharmas, with the exception of volition, and all of the dharmas of the viprayukta class (ii. 35), do not form part of any skandha. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single dharma which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi. 33). And again "If there is a single dharma which is not abandoned . . . " (Samyukta TD 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and viprayuktas is included within the samskaraskandha.
15b-d. These three skandhas\ with avijnapti and unconditioned things, are the dharmdyatana, the dharmadhdtu.
Vedanaskandha, samjndskandha, samskaraskandha, plus avijnapti
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(i. ll) and the three unconditioned things (i. 5b), are seven things which are called dharmdyatana or dharmadhdtu.
81 16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.
Vijnanaskandha is the impression relative to each object, the "raw
82 83
of each object. Vijnanaskandha is six classes of con-
grasping"
sciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness.
Considered as dyatana (i. 20a), 16b. It is the mental organ.
Considered as dhdtu (i. 20a), 16c. It is seven dhdtus.
What are the seven?
16d. The six consciousnesses and the manas.
That is to say: the dhdtu of the eye or visual consciousness {caksurvijndnadhdtu), the dhdtu of the ear or auditory consciousness {srotravijnanadhatu), the dhdtu of the nose or olfactory consciousness {ghranavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of tongue or taste consciousness (jihvdvijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of body or touch consciousness {kdyavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of mind or mental consciousness {manovijndnadhdtu), and the dhdtu of the mind (manodhdtu).
We have seen that there are five skandhas, twelve dyatanas, and eighteen dhdtus.
1. Rupaskandha is ten dyatanas, ten dhdtus, and avijnapti.
2. The dharmayatana, or dharmadhdtu is vedana, samjna and samskdrdskandha', avijnapti; and the unconditioned things.
3. Vijnanaskandha is the mana-dyatana\ it is seven dhdtus, namely the six classes of consciousness {vijndnakdya = vijndnadhdtu) and the mental organ.
Could a manas or manodhdtu be distinct from the six classes of consciousness, distina from the sense consciousness and from the mental consciousness?
84 There is no manas distina from the consciousness.
? 17a-b. Of these six consciousness, the one which continually
85 passes away, is the manas.
All consciousness which has just perished receives the name of manodhatu; in the same way, a man is both son and father, the same vegetable element is both fruit and seed.
[Objection. ] If the six consciousnesses which make up six dhatus constitute the manas, and if the manas is not a thing other than the six consciousnesses, then there would be either seventeen dhatus,--by excluding the manas which is co-functional with the six conscious- nesses,--or else twelve dhatus, by excluding the six consciousnesses which are co-functional with the manas,--supposing of course that you want to enumerate distinct things and not mere designations.
This is true; but
17c-d. One counts eighteen dhatus with a view to assigning a point of support to the sixth consciousness.
The first five consciousnesses have>>for their point of support the five material organs, organ of sight, etc. (see i. 44c-d); but the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have such a point of support. Consequently, with a view to attributing a point of support to this consciousness, one calls manas or manodhatu, or again mana- ayatana and mana-indriya, that which serves it as its point of support, that is to say, any one of the six consciousnesses which depend on these six points of support, and six objects.
[Objection. ] If the consciousness or mind is called manas when, having perished, it is the point of support of another consciousness, the last mind of an Arhat will not be a manas, for it is not followed by a mind of which it would be the immediately antecedent cause and point of support (i. 44c-d).
This last mind has indeed the nature of manas, the nature of being a point of support. If it is not followed by a new mind, namely the consciousness-of-conception of a new existence (punarbhava), this is not related to its nature; rather, this results from the absence of other causes, actions and defilements, necessary to the production of a new thought.
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***
All conditioned dharmas are included within the totality of the skandhas (i. 7); all of the impure dharmas are included within the totality of the updddnaskandhas (i. 8); and all the dharmas are included within the totality of the dyatanas and the dhatus (i. 14). But, more briefly,
18a-b. All the dharmas are included in one skandha, one 86
dyatana, and one dhdtu.
In rupaskandha, mana-dyatana and dharmadhdtu.
87 18c. A dharma is included in its own nature.
Not in another nature. Why is this?
18d. For it is distinct from the nature of others.
A dharma is not included {samgraha) in that from which it is distinct. For example, the organ of sight is included within the rupaskandha, being rupa by its nature; within the caksurdyatana and within the caksurdhdtu, for it is the caksurayatana and caksurdhdtu\ within the Truth of Suffering and Arising, for it is suffering and arising; but it is not included within the other skandhas, ayatanas, etc. , for it is distinct by its nature from that which is not itself.
Without doubt the assemblies are won over by alms-giving and 88
other samgrahavastus: there is therefore samgraha of one thing by a thing different from it.
But the samgraha is occasional and as a consequence, not real, but conventional.
But, there are two organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell; consequently one should count twenty-one dhatus.
19a-c. The organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell, although twofold, form only, in pairs, one dhdtu, for their nature, their sphere of activity, and their consciousnesses are common.
The two organs of sight have a community of nature, for they
? are--both of them--the organ of sight; community of sphere, for they both have visible matter for their sphere; and community of con- sciousness, for they are both the point of support of the visual consciousness. Consequently the two organs of sight form a single dhdtu.
The same holds for the organs of hearing and smell. 19d. It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold
Although they form only one dhdtu, these organs are produced in pairs, with a view to the beauty of the body. With but a single eye, a
89
What is the meaning of the terms skandha, dyatana, and dhdtu? 20a-b. Skandha signifies "heap," dyatana signifies "gate of
entry," "gate of arising," and dhdtu signifies "lineage. "
i. In the Sutra, skandha signifies "heap:" "Whatever rupa there is,
past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or
single ear, or a single nostril, one would be very ugly (ii. la; i. 43, 30).
***
excellent, far or near, if one puts together all this rilpa, that which is 90
past, etc. , one has that which is called rupaskandha"
[According to the Vaibhasikas,] (1) past rupa is rupa destroyed by
91
impermanence, future rupa is rupa which has not arisen, and present
rupa is rilpa which has arisen and which has not been destroyed; (2) rupa is internal when it forms part of the series called "me" (i. 39); all other rupa is external; or rather the terms internal and external are understood from the point of view of dyatana: the organ of sight is internal because it forms part of my series or of the series of another; (3) rilpa is gross when it offers resistance; or rather these two designations are relative and not absolute.
Should one say that, in this second hypothesis, the gross and the subtle are not proven, since the same rilpa is gross or subtle according to whether one compares it to a rupa more subtle or gross?
This objection is invalid, for terms of comparison do not vary:
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when a rupa is gross in relation to another rupa, it is not subtle in relation to this same other rupa: like father and son.
(5) past and future rupa are distant; present rupa is near.
The same for the other skandhas, with this difference: gross consciousness is that which has for its point of support the five organs; subtle consciousness is the mental consciousness; or rather conscious- ness is gross or subtle according to whether it belongs to a stage which
is inferior or superior.
According to the Bhadanta, (1) gross rupa is that which is
perceived by the five organs; all other rupa is subtle; (2) "inferior" signifies "unpleasant," "excellent" signifies "pleasant;" (3) distant rupa is that which is found in an invisible place; near rupa is that which is found in a visible place.
[The explanation of the Vaibhasikas is bad, for] past rupa, etc. , has already been designated by its name. The same for sensation; it is far or near according to whether its point of support is visible or invisible; it is gross or subtle according to whether it is corporeal or mental (ii. 7).
ii. ayatana signifies "gate of entry or of arising of the mind and of
the mental states" (cittacaitta, ii. 23). Etymologically, ayatana is that
place, the mountain, where there are many "families" of gems,--iron, copper, silver, gold,--is said "to have numerous dhdtus" in this same way in the human complex or series, there are eighteen types of "families" which are called the eighteen dhdtus.
96
(4) Inferior rupa is defiled rupa\ excellent rupa is non-defiled rupa; 92
93
which extends (tanvanti) the entry (aya) of the mind and of the 94
mental states.
iii. Dhdtu signifies gotra, race, lineage. In the same way that the
Gotra is thus a mine.
Of what are the other dhdtus the mine?
95
Of what is the organ of the eye the mine?
The dhdtus are the mine of their own species: the eye, being a "cause similar to its effect" (sabhdgahetu, ii. 52) of the later moments of the existence of the eye, is the mine, the dhdtu of the eye.
But then unconditioned things, which are eternal, cannot be considered as dhdtu?
Let us say that they are the mine of the mind and mental states.
? According to another opinion, dhdtu signifies species. The specific nature of the eighteen dhdtus is what is understood by the eighteen dhdtus.
97
iv. [Objections. ]1. Ifskandhasignifies"heap,"theskandhashave
only a nominal existence, not a real existence, for collections are not a
9 thing: for example a pile of wheat, or the pudgala. *
"No, [reply the Vaibhasikas,] for an atom is a skandha.
As an atom in this hypothesis cannot have the quality of being a heap, do not say that skandha signifies "heap. "
2. According to another opinion (Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 407c9), 10
skandha signifies "that which bears the burden, namely its effect. " ? 101
Or else skandha signifies "part, section," as one says in the world, "I
will lend you three skandhas, if you promise to return them to me. " 103
These two explanations are not in conformity with the Sutra. The Sutra, in fact, attributes the sense of heap to skandha and no other sense:"Whateverrupathereis,past,present,orfuture,. . . ifoneputs together all this rupa . . . "
3. [The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra teaches that] all rupa,--past rupa, future rupa, etc. ,--is, individually, called skandha, the same way that it teaches that hair, etc. , is earth-element (below, note 120); thus each "real" (atomic) element of past rupa, future rupa, etc. , receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.
This interpretation is inadmissible, for the Sutra says ". . . if one puts together all this rupa,. . . one has that which is called
y rupaskandha!
4. [The Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, then the material dyatanas,--the organs and objects of the five sense consciousnesses,-- have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a "gate of arising of the mind or mental states" does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.
[Answer:] No, since each of these atoms individually possesses the quality of being "a gate of the arising of the mind," of being the cause of consciousness (compare i. 44a-b. iii). If you do not accept this
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doctrine, you will refuse to the organ, in its totality, the quality of being a cause of consciousness, for it does not produce a consciousness by itself, without the cooperation of an object.
5.
