ou
vnd{er}sto{n}de
of alle manere o?
Chaucer - Boethius
4676
any o? er wey ? an ? us. but ? at ? ilke ? inge[s] ? at ? e p{re}scie{n}ce
woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. ? at is to
seyn ? at ? ei moten bitide.
[Sidenote: If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future
things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man's will
free and unconstrained? ]
? But ? an yif ? at p{re}science
ne putte? no necessite to ? inges to comen. as ? ou ? i self 4680
hast confessed it {and} byknowen a litel herbyforn{e}.
? what [[pg 162]]
cause [or what] is it. as who sei? ? ere may no cause be.
by whiche ? at ? e endes (exitus) uoluntarie of ? inges
my? ten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng.
[Sidenote: For argument sake let us suppose there is no
prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will
alone be under the power of necessity? ]
? For 4684
by grace of possessiou{n}. so ? at ? ou mowe ? e better vndirstonde
? is ? at folwe? . ? I pose (inpossibile) ? at
? er ne be no p{re}science. ? an axe I q{uo}d she in as
moche as app{er}teni? to ? at. sholde ? an ? inges ? at 4688
comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by
necessite.
[Sidenote: _B. _ No. ]
{Boici}us. nay q{uo}d I.
[Sidenote: _P. _ Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it
imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will
would still remain entire and absolute. ]
? an a? einward q{uo}d
she. I suppose ? at ? ere be p{re}science but ? at ne putte?
no necessite to ? inges. ? an trowe I ? at ? ilk self fredom 4692
of wille shal dwelle{n} al hool {and} absolut {and} vnbounden.
[Sidenote: But although Prescience, you may say, is not the
necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall
necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were
no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable
necessity. ]
but ? ou wolt sein ? at al be it so ? at p{re}science
nis nat cause of ? e necessite of bitidynge to ? inges to
comen. ? Algates ? itte it is a signe ? {a}t ? e ? inges ben 4696
to bytiden by necessite. by ? is manere ? an al ? ou? ? e
p{re}science ne hadde neuer yben. ? it algate or at ? e
lest[e] wey. it is certeyne ? ing ? at ? e e{n}dys {and} ? e
bitydynges of ? inges to come{n} sholde ben necessarie. 4700
[Sidenote: For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself,
but only points out what the individual is. ]
? For euery sygne shewe? {and} signifie? oonly what ? e
? ing is ? but it ne maki? nat ? e ? ing ? at it signifie? .
[Sidenote: Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything
happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a
sign of that necessity. ]
? For whiche it byhoue? firste to shewen ? at no ? ing
ne bitidi? [? {a}t it ne bytydith] by necessite. so ? at it 4704
may apere ? {a}t ? e p{re}scie{n}ce is signe of ? is necessite
[Sidenote: For if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the
sign of that which has no existence. ]
? or ellys yif ? ere nere no necessite. certys ? ilke p{re}science
ne my? t[e] nat ben signe of ? inge ? at nis nat.
[Linenotes:
4677 _? inge[s]_--thinges
4683 _whiche_--which
4685 _better_--beter{e}
4688 _moche_--mochel
4689 _frewille_--free wyl
4691 _? at ne_--? at is ne
4692 _? at_--MS. ? an
_? ilk self_--thilke selue
4693 _wille_--wil
4699 _lest[e]_--leeste
4700 _sholde_--sholden
4703 _whiche_--which
_firste_--fyrst
4704 [_? at----bytydith_]--from C.
4707 _my? t[e]_--myhte
_? inge_--thing]
[Headnote:
NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY. ]
[Sidenote: The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity,
must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and
agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign
causes. ]
? But certys it is nowe certeyne ? at ? e preue of ? is 4708
susteni? by stedfast resou{n} ne shal nat ben ladd ne
p{ro}ued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wi? oute.
but by causes couenable {and} necessarie ? But ? ou
mayst sein how may it be ? at ? e ? inges ne bitiden nat 4712
? at ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ry? t as we [[pg 163]]
trowen ? at ? o ? inges whiche ? at ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce woot byforn
to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [? {a}t] ne sholde
we nat demen. but ra? er al ? ou? [? at] ? ei schal bitiden. 4716
? it ne haue ? ei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.
{and} ? is maist ? ou ly? tly ap{er}ceyue{n} by ? is ? at I shal
seyn.
[Sidenote: We see many things when they are done before our eyes;
such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like
nature. ]
but we seen many ? inges whan ? ei ben don byforn
oure eyen ry? t as men seen ? e karter worken in ? e 4720
to{ur}nynge {and} in attempryng or in adressy{n}g of hys
kartes or chariottes. ? and by ? is manere as who sei?
mayst ?
ou vnd{er}sto{n}de of alle manere o? ir werkeme{n}.
[Sidenote: Now, is there any necessity which compels these things
to be done? ]
? Is ? ere ? anne any necessite as who sei? in oure lokynge 4724
[? {a}t] constreine? or compelli? any of ? ilke ? inges
to ben don so.
[Sidenote: _B. _ No. For if all things were moved by
compulsion--the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless. ]
b. nay q{uo}d I ? For in ydel {and} in
veyne were alle ? e effect of crafte yif ? at alle ? inges
weren moeued by constreynynge. ? at is to seyn by constreynynge 4728
of oure eyen or of oure sy? t.
[Sidenote: _P. _ The things, then, which are done are under no
necessity that they should be done; then first before they were
done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore
some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by
necessity. ]
_P. _ ? ise ? i{n}g{us}
? an q{uo}d she ? at whan men don hem ne han non
necessite ? at men don hem. eke ? o same ? inges first or
? ei be don. ? ei ben to comen wi? out necessite.
[Sidenote: [* fol. 37. ]]
for whi 4732
? er ben so{m}me ? inges to bytide of whiche ? e endys
{and} ? e bitidynges of hem ben absolut *{and} quit of alle
necessite.
[Sidenote: These things therefore, although foreknown, have free
events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no
necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the
foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to
come. ]
for certys I ne trowe nat ? at any man wolde seyn
? is. ? at ? o ? inges ? at men don now ? {a}t ? ei ne weren 4736
to bitiden. first or ? ei were ydon ? and ? ilk same
? inges al ? ou? ? {a}t men hadde{n} ywyst hem by-forn.
? itte ? ei han fre bitidynges. for ry? t as science of
? inges p{re}sent ne brynge? in no necessite to ? inges 4740
[? {a}t men doon // Ryht so the p{re}science of thinges to
comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden
[Sidenote: But you may doubt whether there can be any certain
prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for
here there seems to be an evident contradiction. ]
but ? ou mayst seyn ? at of ? ilke same it is ydouted. as
whe? er ? at of ? ilke ? inges ? at ne han non endes {and} 4744
bytidynges necessaryes yif ? er-of may ben any p{re}science
[Linenotes:
4708 _nowe_--now
4709 _susteni? _--ysustenyd
_stedfast_--stydefast
_ladd_--MS. ladde, C. lad
4714 _whiche_--which
4715 [_? at_]--from C.
_sholde_--sholden
4716 _demen_--MS. denyen
[_? at_]--from C.
4717 _necessite_--MS. necessites
4721 _hys_--hise
4725 [_? at_]--from C.
4727 _veyne_--veyn
_alle_--al
_crafte_--craft
4729 _? ise_--MS. ? ise ? ise, C. the
4732 _wi? out_--w{i}t{h}-owte
4733 _bytide_--bytyden
_whiche_--which
4737 _were_--weeren
_ydon_--MS. ydone, C. I-doon
_? ilk_--thilke
4741-2 [_? at----thinges_]--from C.
4744 _endes_--issues]
[[pg 164]]
[Headnote:
THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE. ]
[Sidenote: If things are foreknown, you may contend they must
necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they
cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing
but what is absolutely certain. ]
? For certys ? ei seme to discorde. for ? ou
wenest ? at yif ? at ? inges ben yseyn byforn ? at necessite
folwe? hem. and yif ({et} putas) necessite faile? hem ? ei ne 4748
my? ten nat ben wist byforn. {and} ? at no ? inge ne may
ben comp{re}hendid by science but certeyne.
[Sidenote: And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as
certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion. ]
{and} yif ? o
? inges ? at ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied
as certeyn.
[Sidenote: For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of
things otherwise than they really are. ]
it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppiniou{n} nat 4752
so? efastnesse of science [{and} ? {o}u weenyst ? {a}t it be diu{er}se
fro the hoolnesse of science / ? {a}t any man sholde deme
a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self].
[Sidenote: The cause of this error is that men imagine that their
knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known,
whereas it is quite the reverse. ]
and ? e
cause of ? is errour is. ? at of alle ? e ? inges ? at euery 4756
wy? t ha? yknowe. ? ei wenen ? at ? o ? inges ben y-knowe
al oonly by ? e streng? e {and} by ? e nature of ? e ? inges
? at ben ywyst or yknowe. {and} it is al ? e contrarie. for
alle ? at eu{er}e is yknowe.
[Sidenote: Things are not known from their inherent properties,
but by the faculties of the observer. ]
it is ra? er comp{re}hendid {and} 4760
yknowe{n} nat after his strenge? {and} hys nature. but after
? e faculte ? at is to seyn ? e power {and} [the] nature of
hem ? at knowen.
[Sidenote: The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way,
and the touch in another. ]
{and} for ? at ? is shal mowe shewen by
a short ensample ? e same roundenes of a body . O. o? er 4764
weyes ? e sy? t of ? e eye knowe? it. {and} o? er weyes ? e
touchi{n}g.
[Sidenote: The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and
by beholding it comprehends its form. ]
? e lokynge by castynge of his bemes waite?
{and} see? fro afer alle ? e body to-gider wi? oute mouynge
of it self.
[Sidenote: But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless
the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round. ]
but ? e touchinge cliui? {and} conioigne? to ? e 4768
rounde body (orbi) {and} moue?
any o? er wey ? an ? us. but ? at ? ilke ? inge[s] ? at ? e p{re}scie{n}ce
woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. ? at is to
seyn ? at ? ei moten bitide.
[Sidenote: If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future
things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man's will
free and unconstrained? ]
? But ? an yif ? at p{re}science
ne putte? no necessite to ? inges to comen. as ? ou ? i self 4680
hast confessed it {and} byknowen a litel herbyforn{e}.
? what [[pg 162]]
cause [or what] is it. as who sei? ? ere may no cause be.
by whiche ? at ? e endes (exitus) uoluntarie of ? inges
my? ten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng.
[Sidenote: For argument sake let us suppose there is no
prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will
alone be under the power of necessity? ]
? For 4684
by grace of possessiou{n}. so ? at ? ou mowe ? e better vndirstonde
? is ? at folwe? . ? I pose (inpossibile) ? at
? er ne be no p{re}science. ? an axe I q{uo}d she in as
moche as app{er}teni? to ? at. sholde ? an ? inges ? at 4688
comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by
necessite.
[Sidenote: _B. _ No. ]
{Boici}us. nay q{uo}d I.
[Sidenote: _P. _ Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it
imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will
would still remain entire and absolute. ]
? an a? einward q{uo}d
she. I suppose ? at ? ere be p{re}science but ? at ne putte?
no necessite to ? inges. ? an trowe I ? at ? ilk self fredom 4692
of wille shal dwelle{n} al hool {and} absolut {and} vnbounden.
[Sidenote: But although Prescience, you may say, is not the
necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall
necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were
no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable
necessity. ]
but ? ou wolt sein ? at al be it so ? at p{re}science
nis nat cause of ? e necessite of bitidynge to ? inges to
comen. ? Algates ? itte it is a signe ? {a}t ? e ? inges ben 4696
to bytiden by necessite. by ? is manere ? an al ? ou? ? e
p{re}science ne hadde neuer yben. ? it algate or at ? e
lest[e] wey. it is certeyne ? ing ? at ? e e{n}dys {and} ? e
bitydynges of ? inges to come{n} sholde ben necessarie. 4700
[Sidenote: For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself,
but only points out what the individual is. ]
? For euery sygne shewe? {and} signifie? oonly what ? e
? ing is ? but it ne maki? nat ? e ? ing ? at it signifie? .
[Sidenote: Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything
happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a
sign of that necessity. ]
? For whiche it byhoue? firste to shewen ? at no ? ing
ne bitidi? [? {a}t it ne bytydith] by necessite. so ? at it 4704
may apere ? {a}t ? e p{re}scie{n}ce is signe of ? is necessite
[Sidenote: For if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the
sign of that which has no existence. ]
? or ellys yif ? ere nere no necessite. certys ? ilke p{re}science
ne my? t[e] nat ben signe of ? inge ? at nis nat.
[Linenotes:
4677 _? inge[s]_--thinges
4683 _whiche_--which
4685 _better_--beter{e}
4688 _moche_--mochel
4689 _frewille_--free wyl
4691 _? at ne_--? at is ne
4692 _? at_--MS. ? an
_? ilk self_--thilke selue
4693 _wille_--wil
4699 _lest[e]_--leeste
4700 _sholde_--sholden
4703 _whiche_--which
_firste_--fyrst
4704 [_? at----bytydith_]--from C.
4707 _my? t[e]_--myhte
_? inge_--thing]
[Headnote:
NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY. ]
[Sidenote: The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity,
must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and
agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign
causes. ]
? But certys it is nowe certeyne ? at ? e preue of ? is 4708
susteni? by stedfast resou{n} ne shal nat ben ladd ne
p{ro}ued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wi? oute.
but by causes couenable {and} necessarie ? But ? ou
mayst sein how may it be ? at ? e ? inges ne bitiden nat 4712
? at ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ry? t as we [[pg 163]]
trowen ? at ? o ? inges whiche ? at ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce woot byforn
to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [? {a}t] ne sholde
we nat demen. but ra? er al ? ou? [? at] ? ei schal bitiden. 4716
? it ne haue ? ei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.
{and} ? is maist ? ou ly? tly ap{er}ceyue{n} by ? is ? at I shal
seyn.
[Sidenote: We see many things when they are done before our eyes;
such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like
nature. ]
but we seen many ? inges whan ? ei ben don byforn
oure eyen ry? t as men seen ? e karter worken in ? e 4720
to{ur}nynge {and} in attempryng or in adressy{n}g of hys
kartes or chariottes. ? and by ? is manere as who sei?
mayst ?
ou vnd{er}sto{n}de of alle manere o? ir werkeme{n}.
[Sidenote: Now, is there any necessity which compels these things
to be done? ]
? Is ? ere ? anne any necessite as who sei? in oure lokynge 4724
[? {a}t] constreine? or compelli? any of ? ilke ? inges
to ben don so.
[Sidenote: _B. _ No. For if all things were moved by
compulsion--the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless. ]
b. nay q{uo}d I ? For in ydel {and} in
veyne were alle ? e effect of crafte yif ? at alle ? inges
weren moeued by constreynynge. ? at is to seyn by constreynynge 4728
of oure eyen or of oure sy? t.
[Sidenote: _P. _ The things, then, which are done are under no
necessity that they should be done; then first before they were
done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore
some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by
necessity. ]
_P. _ ? ise ? i{n}g{us}
? an q{uo}d she ? at whan men don hem ne han non
necessite ? at men don hem. eke ? o same ? inges first or
? ei be don. ? ei ben to comen wi? out necessite.
[Sidenote: [* fol. 37. ]]
for whi 4732
? er ben so{m}me ? inges to bytide of whiche ? e endys
{and} ? e bitidynges of hem ben absolut *{and} quit of alle
necessite.
[Sidenote: These things therefore, although foreknown, have free
events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no
necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the
foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to
come. ]
for certys I ne trowe nat ? at any man wolde seyn
? is. ? at ? o ? inges ? at men don now ? {a}t ? ei ne weren 4736
to bitiden. first or ? ei were ydon ? and ? ilk same
? inges al ? ou? ? {a}t men hadde{n} ywyst hem by-forn.
? itte ? ei han fre bitidynges. for ry? t as science of
? inges p{re}sent ne brynge? in no necessite to ? inges 4740
[? {a}t men doon // Ryht so the p{re}science of thinges to
comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden
[Sidenote: But you may doubt whether there can be any certain
prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for
here there seems to be an evident contradiction. ]
but ? ou mayst seyn ? at of ? ilke same it is ydouted. as
whe? er ? at of ? ilke ? inges ? at ne han non endes {and} 4744
bytidynges necessaryes yif ? er-of may ben any p{re}science
[Linenotes:
4708 _nowe_--now
4709 _susteni? _--ysustenyd
_stedfast_--stydefast
_ladd_--MS. ladde, C. lad
4714 _whiche_--which
4715 [_? at_]--from C.
_sholde_--sholden
4716 _demen_--MS. denyen
[_? at_]--from C.
4717 _necessite_--MS. necessites
4721 _hys_--hise
4725 [_? at_]--from C.
4727 _veyne_--veyn
_alle_--al
_crafte_--craft
4729 _? ise_--MS. ? ise ? ise, C. the
4732 _wi? out_--w{i}t{h}-owte
4733 _bytide_--bytyden
_whiche_--which
4737 _were_--weeren
_ydon_--MS. ydone, C. I-doon
_? ilk_--thilke
4741-2 [_? at----thinges_]--from C.
4744 _endes_--issues]
[[pg 164]]
[Headnote:
THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE. ]
[Sidenote: If things are foreknown, you may contend they must
necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they
cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing
but what is absolutely certain. ]
? For certys ? ei seme to discorde. for ? ou
wenest ? at yif ? at ? inges ben yseyn byforn ? at necessite
folwe? hem. and yif ({et} putas) necessite faile? hem ? ei ne 4748
my? ten nat ben wist byforn. {and} ? at no ? inge ne may
ben comp{re}hendid by science but certeyne.
[Sidenote: And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as
certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion. ]
{and} yif ? o
? inges ? at ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied
as certeyn.
[Sidenote: For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of
things otherwise than they really are. ]
it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppiniou{n} nat 4752
so? efastnesse of science [{and} ? {o}u weenyst ? {a}t it be diu{er}se
fro the hoolnesse of science / ? {a}t any man sholde deme
a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self].
[Sidenote: The cause of this error is that men imagine that their
knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known,
whereas it is quite the reverse. ]
and ? e
cause of ? is errour is. ? at of alle ? e ? inges ? at euery 4756
wy? t ha? yknowe. ? ei wenen ? at ? o ? inges ben y-knowe
al oonly by ? e streng? e {and} by ? e nature of ? e ? inges
? at ben ywyst or yknowe. {and} it is al ? e contrarie. for
alle ? at eu{er}e is yknowe.
[Sidenote: Things are not known from their inherent properties,
but by the faculties of the observer. ]
it is ra? er comp{re}hendid {and} 4760
yknowe{n} nat after his strenge? {and} hys nature. but after
? e faculte ? at is to seyn ? e power {and} [the] nature of
hem ? at knowen.
[Sidenote: The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way,
and the touch in another. ]
{and} for ? at ? is shal mowe shewen by
a short ensample ? e same roundenes of a body . O. o? er 4764
weyes ? e sy? t of ? e eye knowe? it. {and} o? er weyes ? e
touchi{n}g.
[Sidenote: The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and
by beholding it comprehends its form. ]
? e lokynge by castynge of his bemes waite?
{and} see? fro afer alle ? e body to-gider wi? oute mouynge
of it self.
[Sidenote: But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless
the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round. ]
but ? e touchinge cliui? {and} conioigne? to ? e 4768
rounde body (orbi) {and} moue?
