And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Summa Theologica
Hence the Philosopher, after the
words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now
every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in
this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about
something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether
without passion.
Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from
its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom.
7:5) they are called "passions of sins. " Therefore perfect virtue is
altogether without passion.
Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the
sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the
will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]).
Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue
is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces
ordinate passion.
Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that
leads to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of
its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels,
as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels
is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the
good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
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Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because
just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the
subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong
to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts
their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is
but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one
common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and
proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves
are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in
the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral
virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ
specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as
stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of
appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it
receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the
passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it
receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the
agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if
the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a
form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity
something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter
receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically
as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:
thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received
into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the
adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for
instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations
to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species
and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all
moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one
kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such
matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive
power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its
various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account
of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from
the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they
be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into
those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an
operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or
sorrow. " Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above
([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which
is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
habit.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action.
If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill
towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive
appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about
operations are also about passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about
operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions
(Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq. ).
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no
matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and
evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the
operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to
another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about
operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some
operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent.
Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like
operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which
are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with
temperance, fortitude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion
of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due
measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is
destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed
in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate
anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first
considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two
consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in
some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about
passions, for the reason given above.
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Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's
actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not
cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there
are not different virtues about different operations.
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both
of which are about operations.
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in
one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to
another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The
reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is
established, as we have stated [1556](A[2]), not according as how man
is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness
of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of
something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it
pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such
virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of
justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these
virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in
another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt
differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor
already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt
there are various virtues: e. g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to
God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;
"Gratitude," whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue,
whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent.
But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which
something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is
another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an
individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and
Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man
to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it
directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice,
receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save
logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61],
A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that
concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and
they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4;[1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear
and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is
no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is
but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there
are not different moral virtues about different passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but
one mean between contraries, e. g. between black and white. Secondly,
because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same
manner, e. g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by
withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the
different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require
different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in
a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love
proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the
same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or
dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible
passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different
things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and
despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome
something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are
different virtues about such like passions: e. g. temperance, about the
concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle
and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle
causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as
in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a
second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
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Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral
virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore
neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according
to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia"
[*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason
is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing
hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions,
without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about
several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference
of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference
of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e. g.
pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a
difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always
causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference
between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower
powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence,
one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by
sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to
the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason,
and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and
pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the
inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to
man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's
good in relation to other men.
And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance. " As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence
there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern
the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which
way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has
no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base
condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in
common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money
considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or
love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult
to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence"
[*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia"
[*{philotimia}], i. e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard
to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity. "
Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible
part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may
be rendered "affability. " Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another
virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For
frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters
than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games,
which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have
the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule
as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because
evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to
reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there
being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,
again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other
hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be
not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there
are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
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OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,
perfect, and exemplar virtues?
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Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal
rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
division of the genus "virtue. " Therefore none of them should be called
principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means.
But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the
moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral
virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated
above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are
principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. " But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56],
A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which
requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues
which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual
virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly
shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are
called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated
above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called
not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject,
they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards
good, which is the object of the appetite.
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Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as
is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone
is a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral
virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical
reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
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Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
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Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
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Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.
words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now
every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in
this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about
something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.
For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether
without passion.
Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from
its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom.
7:5) they are called "passions of sins. " Therefore perfect virtue is
altogether without passion.
Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as
Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all
things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is
without any passion.
On the contrary, "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as
stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as
the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is
without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of
the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about
the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue
makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the
function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their
proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by
exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the
bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the
sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but
about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:
because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion.
Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the
will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased
through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]).
Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue
is, the more does it cause passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces
ordinate passion.
Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that
leads to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of
its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels,
as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels
is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the
good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the
body's help.
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HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?
(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are
distinct from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of
the passions?
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Whether there is only one moral virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because
just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the
subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong
to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is
only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.
Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts
their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material
objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the
formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one
thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is
but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one
common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and
proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves
are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above
(Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in
the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there
cannot be only one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral
virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ
specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as
stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of
appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it
receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the
passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it
receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the
agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if
the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a
form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity
something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter
receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically
as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation:
thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received
into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the
adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for
instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of
various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved.
But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so
to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation
(Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of
reason belong to various species, according to their various relations
to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species
and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all
moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one
kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such
matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive
power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its
various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account
of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from
the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they
be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are
about passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into
those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an
operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or
sorrow. " Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above
([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which
is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative
habit.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action.
If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues
are about both passions and operations.
Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill
towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive
appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about
operations are also about passions.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about
operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions
(Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq. ).
I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to
virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow
which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about
which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which
are about operations must needs differ from those which are about
passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain
operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no
matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and
evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the
operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such
operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to
another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about
operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some
operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent.
Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in
which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like
operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which
are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with
temperance, fortitude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that
the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion
of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due
measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is
destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed
in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate
anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first
considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two
consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in
some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about
passions, for the reason given above.
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Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good,
does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's
actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not
cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of
operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there
are not different virtues about different operations.
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both
of which are about operations.
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in
one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to
another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The
reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is
established, as we have stated [1556](A[2]), not according as how man
is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness
of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of
something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it
pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such
virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of
justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these
virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in
another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt
differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor
already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt
there are various virtues: e. g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to
God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;
"Gratitude," whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue,
whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent.
But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which
something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is
another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an
individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and
Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man
to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it
directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice,
receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save
logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61],
A[1]).
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Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that
concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and
they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4;[1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear
and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is
no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is
but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there
are not different moral virtues about different passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but
one mean between contraries, e. g. between black and white. Secondly,
because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same
manner, e. g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by
withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the
different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require
different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in
a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love
proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the
same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or
dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible
passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different
things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and
despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome
something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are
different virtues about such like passions: e. g. temperance, about the
concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle
and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle
causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as
in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a
second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
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Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral
virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore
neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according
to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia"
[*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason
is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing
hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions,
without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about
several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference
of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference
of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e. g.
pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a
difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always
causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference
between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower
powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence,
one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by
sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to
the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason,
and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and
pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the
inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to
man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's
good in relation to other men.
And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance. " As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence
there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern
the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which
way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has
no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base
condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in
common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money
considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or
love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult
to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence"
[*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia"
[*{philotimia}], i. e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard
to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity. "
Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible
part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may
be rendered "affability. " Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another
virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For
frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters
than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games,
which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have
the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule
as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because
evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to
reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there
being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,
again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other
hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be
not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there
are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,
perfect, and exemplar virtues?
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Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal
rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
division of the genus "virtue. " Therefore none of them should be called
principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means.
But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the
moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral
virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated
above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are
principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. " But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56],
A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which
requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues
which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual
virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly
shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are
called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated
above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called
not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject,
they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards
good, which is the object of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as
is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone
is a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral
virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical
reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.
