Flaubert
is the most striking example among
Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most strik
Ingres--a
Haydn,
?
Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most strik
Ingres--a
Haydn,
?
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
compared.
A decided belief in oneself.
A leisured class which makes things hard for itself
and exercises a great deal of self-control. The
power of form, the will to form oneself. "Happi ness" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength
and energy behind all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of a life that is seemingly so
The Greeks seemed like children to the
? easy. French.
95.
The Three Centuries.
may
perhaps be best expressed as follows:-- Aristocracy: Descartes, the reign of reason,
evidence showing the sovereignty of the will. Feminism : Rousseau, the reign of feeling, evidence showing the sovereignty of the senses;
all lies.
Animalism : Schopenhauer, the reign of passion,
evidence showing the sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy.
The seventeenth century is aristocratic, all for order, haughty towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, "austere," and even free from sentiment, "non-German," averse to all that
Their different kinds of sensitiveness
? ? ? 78
THE WILL TO POWER.
is burlesque and natural, generalising and mai taining an attitude of sovereignty towards t
for it believes in itself. At bottom
past
partakes very much of the beast of prey, ar
practises
It is the century of strength of will, as also that strong passion.
The eighteenth century is dominated by woma it is gushing, spiritual, and flat; but with intelle
at the service of aspirations and of the heart, it
a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, underminin authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerfi
clear, humane, and sociable, false itself and bottom very rascally.
The nineteenth century more animal, mo
asceticism in order to remain maste
? subterranean, hateful, realistic, plebeian,
that very account "better," "more honest," mo
submissive "reality" what kind soever,
truer; but weak
and fatalistic. reverence, either the "heart";
will, sad, obscurely exactin has no feeling timidity
the presence "reason" thoroughly convinced
dominion the desires (Schopenhauer said "Will
but nothing more characteristic his philosoph
than that entirely lacks all actual willing). Eve morality reduced instinct ("Pity").
Auguste
eighteenth century (the dominion the heart ov the head, sensuality the theory knowledg
Comte the continuation of
altruistic exaltation).
The fact that science has become
sovereig to-day, proves how the nineteenth centul has emancipated itself from the dominion idea.
and
? ? of
of
t. th anc
as it is
all
of of as
of
of of
is
to
in
an
of
. .
isit of is
to
in It of is to
? NIHILISM.
79
A certain absence of "needs" and wishes makes our scientific curiosity and rigour possible--this is
our kind of virtue.
?
Romanticism is the counterstroke of the
eighteenth century; a sort of accumulated longing
for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of fact,
largely mingled with mummery and self-deception:
the desire was to represent strong nature and strong passion).
The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of theories by means of which it may feel its fatalistic submission to the empire of facts justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality and romantic idealism was already a sign of fatalistic trend thought, its belief that superior reason belongs the triumphant side,
and justification the actual "state" (in the place "humanity," etc. ). --Schopenhauer: we
are something foolish, and the best self suppressive. The success determinism, the genealogical derivation obligations which were formerly held absolute, the teaching environment and adaptation, the reduction will
process reflex movement, the denial the will "working cause"; finally -- real
? process re-christening:
that the word itself becomes available for another
purpose. Further theories: the teaching objectivity, "will-less" contemplation, the only
road truth, also beauty (also the belief "genius," order have the right
submissive); mechanism, the determinable rigidity the mechanical process; so-called "Naturalism,"
little will observed
? ? of in
to a
in
as
of
to
of
to to
be so
of
of to
in
to
as of a
in of its
of at
be of of its
to
a ofof
as
is
? 8O THE WILL TO POWER.
the elimination of the choosing, directing, inter preting subject, on principle.
Kant, with his "practical reason," with his moral
fanaticism, is quite eighteenth century style; still
completely outside the historical movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek
philosophy; he is a phantasist of the notion of duty,
a sensualist with a hidden leaning to dogmatic pampering.
The return to Kant in our century means a return to the eighteenth century: people desire to create
themselves a right to the old ideas and to the old exaltation--hence a theory of knowledge which "de scribes limits," that is to say, which admits of the
option of fixing a Beyond to the domain of reason. Hegel's way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of Goethe: see the latter on
the subject of Spinoza, for instance. The will to
deify the All and Life, in order to find both peace and happiness in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason everywhere--in the presence of
reason man may be submissive and resigned. In
Goethe we find a kind of fatalism which is almost joyous and confiding, which neither revolts nor weakens, which strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in totality does every
thing seem good and justified, and find itself resolved.
96.
The period of rationalism --followed by a period of sentimentality. To what extent does
? ? ? ? NIHILISM. 81
Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel under intellectuality ? )
97.
The seventeenth century suffers from humanity
as from a host of contradictions ("l'amas de con
tradictions" that we are ); it endeavours to discover
man, to co-ordinate him, to excavate him: whereas
the eighteenth century tries to forget what is
known of man's nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. "Superficial, soft, humane"--gushes
over "humanity. "
The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual in order that the artist's
work may resemble life as much as possible. The eighteenth century strives to create interest in
the author by means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and social reforms.
"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of making one's own personality
the centre of interest, subordination to the propa
ganda of social ideas, charlatanism--all this we derive from the eighteenth century.
The style of the seventeenth century: propre exact et libre.
. The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or
who appeals ardently to God--and that obtrusive ness and indiscretion of modern authors--these
things are opposites. "Showing-oneself-off"--what
a contrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal | VOL. I. F
? ? ? ? 82 THE WILL TO POWER.
Alfieri had a sense for the grand style.
The hate of the burlesque (that which lacks dignity), the lack of a sense of Nature belongs to the seventeenth century.
98.
Against Rousseau. --Alas / man is no longer sufficiently evil; Rousseau's opponents, who say
that "man is a beast of prey," are unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the
softening and moralising of him is the curse. In
the sphere which Rousseau attacked most violently, the relatively strongest and most successful type
of man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great passions intact: Will to Power,
Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability to Com
mand). The man of the eighteenth century must
be compared with the man of the Renaissance (also
with the man of the seventeenth century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau
is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity--both signs that the dominating will is
? lacking:
own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the ruling classes.
he moralises and seeks the cause ofhis
99.
Voltaire -- Rousseau. -- A state of nature is
terrible; man is a beast of prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary triumph over this beast-of
prey
He was conscious of the mildness, the refinements,
in nature--this was Voltaire's conclusion.
? ? ? NIHILISM.
83
the intellectual joys of the civilised state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue,
and the lack of delicacy even in ascetics and monks.
The moral depravity of man seemed to pre occupy Rousseau; the words "unjust," "cruel," are
the best possible for the purpose of exciting the
instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under the ban of the vetitum and of
disgrace; so that their conscience is opposed to their
indulging any
emancipators seek one thing above all: to give
insurrectional desires. These
their party the great accents and attitudes of higher Nature,
? IOO.
Rousseau : the rule founded on
sentiment;
Nature as the source of justice; man perfects
himself in proportion as he approaches Nature
(according to Voltaire, in proportion as he leaves AVature behind). The very same periods seem to
the one to demonstrate the progress of humanity and, to the other, the increase of injustice and | inequality.
* . . . ,'2-4
--
Voltaire,
sense of the Renaissance, as also virti (as "higher
who still understood umanita in the
culture"), fights
gens," "la bonne compagnie," taste, science, arts,
for the cause of the "honne? tes
and even for the cause of progress and civilisation. The flare-up occurred towards 1760 : On the one hand the citizen of Geneva, on the other le
seigneur de Ferney. It is only from that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of
. "
? ? ? 84
THE WILL TO POWER.
his age, the philosopher, the representative
Toleration and of Disbelief (theretofore he ha
been merely un bel esprit). His envy and hatre
of Rousseau's success forced him upwards. "Pour "la canaille' un dieu re? mune? rateur
vengeur"--Voltaire.
The criticism of both standpoints in regard
the value of civilisation. To Voltaire nothir seems finer than the social invention : there
no higher goal than to uphold and perfect L'honne? tete? consists precisely in respecting soci
usage;
various necessary "prejudices" which favour th maintenance of society. Missionary of Cultu, aristocrat, representative of the triumphant ar ruling
virtue in a certain obedience towar.
? classes and their values. But Roussea remained a plebeian, even as hommes de lettres, th was preposterous; his shameless contempt f everything
that was not himself.
The morbid feature in Rousseau is the or
which happens to have been most admired an
imitated. (Lord Byron resembled him somewha
he too screwed himself up to sublime attitude and to revengeful rage--a sign of vulgarity; lat'
on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, he unde
stood what was more alleviating and did mo,
good . . . l'insouciance. )
In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is prou
of himself; but he is incensed if he is reminded his origin. . . .
In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brai
trouble; in Voltaire--rare health and lightsome ness. The revengefulness of the sick; his period
? ? ? NIHILISM.
85
of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his mistrust.
Rousseau's defence of Providence (against Vol
taire's Pessimism): he had need of God in order to be able to curse society and civilisation; every
thing must be good per because God had created it; man alone has corrupted man. The "good man" man Nature was pure fantasy;
but with the dogma God's authorship he became
something probable and even not devoid found ation.
Romanticism Rousseau: passion ("the
? sovereign right passion"); "naturalness";
the fascination madness (foolishness reckoned
greatness); the senseless vanity the weak; the
revengefulness the masses elevated the posi tion justice ("in politics, for one hundred years,'
the leader has been an invalid").
IOI.
Kant: makes the scepticism Englishmen, regard the theory knowledge, possible for Germans.
(1) By enlisting cause the interest the German's religious and moral needs: just the new academicians used scepticism for the same
reasons, Augustine); scepticism
preparation
for Platonism (vide
just
order
Pascal even used moral provoke (to justify) the
belief;
(2) By complicating and entangling with
need
scholastic flourishes view making more
? ? in
as
in its
of a la
of
of
it it
of
of
as
of
in
a
of of
as a
to
of
of
se,
as of ,
in
as
to
of
of
to
? 86 THE WILL TO POWER.
acceptable to the German's scientific taste in fo
(for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminati too clear--that is to say, judged according to
German valuing instinct, "too superficial"). Kant: a poor psychologist and mediocre ju
of human nature, made hopeless mistakes
regard to great historical values (the Fre Revolution); a moral fanatic a la Rousseau; w a subterranean current of Christian values thorough dogmatist,
but bored to extinction this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrant
over but quickly tired, even scepticism; not yet affected by any cosmopolitan thought antique beauty dawdler and go-betw.
; not all original (like Leibnitz, something betw
mechanism and spiritualism; like Goethe, someth between the taste the eighteenth century
that the "historical sense" [which essenti sense exoticism]; like German music, betw French and Italian music; like Charles the Gr
who mediated and built bridges between Roman Empire and Nationalism--a dawdler excellence).
O2.
what respect have the Christian centu with their Pessimism been stronger centuries the eighteenth--and how do they corresp.
with the tragic age the Greeks?
The nineteenth century versus the eighteel
How was an heir P--how was step backwa from the latter? (more lacking "spirit"
? ? ? it in a
of a
In it
of
at
it,
of
I
of
a
is t. ::
a
of
. . .
? NIHILISM,
87
in taste)--how did it show an advance on the latter ? (more gloomy, more realistic, stronger).
IO3.
How can we explain the fact that we feel something in common with the Campagna romana P And the high mountain chain?
Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes
in 18o3 writes his first impression of the Campagna 70%a/Za.
The President de Brosses says of the Campagna romana: "Il fallait que Romulus fe^t ivre quand il songea a ba? tir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid. "
Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him. He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did.
The? ophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be forgotten.
Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo.
Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que
aucune autre nation n'a moins emprunte? a` l'antiquite? , parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence classique. "
104. '
The two great attempts that were made to overcome the eighteenth century:
Mapoleon, in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle for power, to life again,
? and conceived Europe as a united political power.
Goethe, in that he imagined a European
&:
? ? ? 88 THE WILL TO POWER.
[which would consist of the whole heritage of what humanity had attained to up to his time.
German culture in this century inspires mistrust --the music of the period lacks that complete
element which liberates and binds as well, to wit--Goethe.
The pre-eminence of music in the romanticists
of 1830 and 1840. Delacroix.
passionate musician (admired Gluck, Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome:
"Si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres"--likewise Horace
Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who
says of himself: "Combien de lieues ne ferais-je pas a` pied, et a` combien de jours de prison ne me soumetterais-je pas pour entendre Don Juan ou le
Matrimonio segreto; et je ne sais pour quelle autre
chose je ferais cet effort. " He was then fifty-six years old.
The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as
a typical "Epigone," likewise Mendelssohn's cul
tured Protestantism (a former "soul" is turned into poetry posthumously . . . )
--the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used one art as a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked.
--the "historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas.
--that characteristic transformation of which
G.
Flaubert is the most striking example among
Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most strik
Ingres--a
Haydn,
? N
ing example among Germans,
shows how the
? ? ? NIHILISM.
89
changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.
romantic belief in love and the future
IO6. --
How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of German romanti *. . . * *
*A*-* *-*
How is it that German music lacks
cism P.
Goethe P On the other hand, how much Schiller,
or more exactly, how much "Thekla. "* is there not in Beethoven |
Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him. Richard Wagner has Freischu? tz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga,
the mystic catholicism of instinct, symbolism, "the free-spiritedness of passion" (Rousseau's
intention). The Flying . Dutchman savours of
France, where le te? ne`breux (1830) was the type of the seducer.
The cult of music, the revolutionary romanticism
of form. Wagner synthesises German and French romanticism.
Io? .
From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German mis fortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But
what does it matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also seems to
me that to no country on earth is he less related than to Germany; nothing was prepared there for
* Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's Wallen stein. --TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
Schumann has
? ? ? ? **
90
THE WILL TO POWER.
his advent; his whole type is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst,
wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible.
people carefully avoid acknowledging this: they are
too kind, too square-headed--too German for that.
"Credo quia absurdus est": thus did the German
spirit wish it to be, in this case too--hence it is
content meanwhile to believe everything Richard
Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In
all ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in
subtlety and divining powers concerning psycho
logical matters. Now that it happens to be under the highpressureof patrioticnonsenseandself-adoration,
it is visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to the problem of Wagner !
IO8.
The Germans are not yet anything, but they are becoming something; that is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot yet have any culture l--They are not yet anything:
that means they are all kinds of things. They , are becoming something: that means that they will
one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope
yet. Fortunately
can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation, of discomfort,-yea, even of bitterness,--in short, we Germans will get something out of ourselves, something that has not
yet been wanted of us--we want something more !
it is a wish with which one
But
? ? ? ? NIHILISM.
9I
That this "German, as he is not as yet"-- has a right to something better than the present
German "culture"; that all who wish to become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of contentment, an impudent "setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of self censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard to which my opinions have not yet changed.
(c) SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH. I O9.
First Principle: everything that characterises
modern men savours of decay: but side by side
with the prevailing sickness there are signs of a
strength and powerfulness of soul which are still
untried. The same causes which tend to promote ** the belittling of men, also force the stronger and ,"
rarer individuals upwards to greatness.
I IO.
General survey: the ambiguous character of our.
modern world -- precisely the same symptoms
might at the same time be indicative of either decline or strength. And the signs of strength
and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional (or hereditary) appreciations con cerned with the feelings, be misunderstood as in dications of weakness. In short, feeling, as a
means of fixing valuations, is not on a level with the times.
? ? ? ? 92
THE WILL TO POWER.
Generalised: Every valuation is always back ward; it is merely the expression of the con
ditions which favoured survival and growth ir a much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence out of which it did no
arise, and which it therefore necessarily misunder stands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against all that is new.
I I I.
The problem of the nineteenth century. --To dis
cover whether its strong and weak side belong to
each other. Whether they have been cut from
one and the same piece. Whether the variety o its ideals and their contradictions are conditioned
by a higher purpose: whether they are something higher. --For it might be the prerequisite of great
ness, that growth should take place amid such
? Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, migh
II 2.
General survey. --As a matter of fact, al
abundant growth involves a concomitant proces of crumbling to bits and decay: suffering and th
symptoms of decline belong to ages of enormou progress; every fruitful and powerful movemen
of mankind has always brought about a concurren Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances
the appearance of the extremest form of Pessimism and actual Nihilism might be the sign of a proces: of incisive and most essential growth, and of man
kind's transit into completely new conditions o existence. This is what I have understood.
violent tension. be a good sign.
? ? ? allow ourselves to be deceived
by appearance:
NIHILISM,
II 3.
A.
.
93
Starting out with a thoroughly courageous appreciation of our men of to-day:--we must not
this mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges of lasting strength, its
tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is richer.
Healthiness is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy body are on the point of being known,
and will gradually be created, "asceticism" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a #. . .
certain confidence in the "right way," no raving: . . .
* s
. .
? a periodical self-habituation to narrower values (such as "mother-land," "science," etc. ).
". ambiguous: it might be a movement either of *
This whole picture, however, would still be .
increase or decline Life.
B.
The belief "progress"--in lower spheres intelligence, appears increasing life: but this self-deception;
higher spheres intelligence sign declining life.
Description the symptoms.
The unity the aspect: uncertainty regard to the standard of valuation.
Fear general "in vain. " Nihilism.
? ? of a
of of
in
in
a
of in
as of
it
is
is of
. ". .
in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
II. 4.
94
in need of an antidote against the first Ni
Life is no longer so uncertain, accident.
senseless in modern Europe. All such trem
exaggeration of the value of men, of the vi evil, etc. , are not so necessary now; we can
a considerable diminution of this value, w grant a great deal of nonsense and accider
power man has acquired now allows of a lo of the means of discipline, of which the str was the moral interpretation of the universe. hypothesis "God" is much too extreme.
II 5.
As a matter of fact, we are no longer soul
? If anything shows that our humanisatio genuine sign of progress, it is the fact that longer require excessive contraries, that longer require
contraries at all. . . .
We may love the senses; for we have
ualised them in every way and made them a
We have a right to all things which h have been most calumniated.
II 6.
The reversal of the order of rank--Thos counterfeiters--the priests--are becoming Ch in our midst:--they occupy the position
charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of t
? ? ? NIHILISM.
95
as the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of
Life, and as the rebels among the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of
our servant-caste--the Sudra--that is to say, our
people or the body which wields the political power.
On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the blasphemers, the im moralists, the independents of all kinds, the artists, the Jews, the minstrels--and, at bottom, all dis
reputable classes are in the van.
We have elevated ourselves to honourable
thoughts,'--even more, we determine what honour is on earth,--"nobility. " . . . All of us to-day
are advocates of life. --We Immoralists are to-day the strongest power: the other great powers are
in need of us . . . we re-create the world in our own image.
We have transferred the label "Chandala " to
the priests, the backworldsmen, and to the deformed
Christian society which has become associated with
these people, together with creatures of like origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity,
criminals, and men of vicious habits--the whole
sphere in which the idea of "God" is that of Saviour. . . .
We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and detractors of Life. . . .
I 17.
? -a*-da- --
** ** 5--> --~~~ *
? century upon the eighteenth (at bottom we good Europeans
The advance of the nineteenth
* -
? ? ? 96
THE WILL TO POWER.
are carrying on a war against the eigl century):
(1) "The return to Nature" is getting understood, ever more definitely, in a way
is quite the reverse of that in which Rousses the phrase--away from idylls and operas /
(2) Ever more decided, more anti-id more objective, more fearless, more indu
more temperate, more suspicious ofsudden cl anti-revolutionary;
(3) The question of bodily health is being
ever more decidedly in front of the health &
soul": the latter is regarded as a condition b
about by the former, and bodily health is b to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual l
II 8.
If anything at all has been achieved, it is
innocent attitude towards the senses, a h
more favourable demeanour in regard to sen: resembling rather the position taken up by G
a prouder feeling has also been developed in ledge, and the "reine Thor"* meets wit
? faith.
II 9.
We "objective people. "--It is not "pity
opens up the way for us to all that is most and most strange in life and culture; b
* This is a reference to Wagner's Parsifal. The c as is well known, is written to represent a son o affliction, and a child of wisdom--humble, guileless
pure, and a fool. --TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
? ? ? NIHILISM.
A. . . . "
accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely
does not "pity," but rather takes pleasure in hun dreds of things which formerly caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are certainly not the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain
may shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof.
pain and error, we have grown stronger and more
was, <-tax *****
97
In this deliberate desire to look on at powerful than the eighteenth century;
? proof
our increase strength (we have drawn the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). profound mistake regard our "roman
closer
But
ticism" proof our "beautified souls. " We want stronger sensations than all coarser ages and classes have wanted. (This fact must not be con founded with the needs neurotics and decadents;
their case, course, there craving for pepper --even for cruelty. )
We are all seeking conditions which are eman cipated from the bourgeois, and greater degree
from the priestly, notion
everything insipid which not forbidden and con sidered compromising bourgeois circles; and the
case the same with books, music, politics, and
opinions on women. WOL.
which savours all
gives the impression
mental indigence). "Good company," fact, finds
morality (every book priestdom and theology
pitiful niaiserie and
? ? I.
us
is to of as a
in G
of is
of
of
of
is
it
of
of
is
at
in
a in
a to
to
in
a of
it is a
all
? - s
**
he never turns
**
(Morality
98
THE WILL TO POWER.
I2O.
The simplification of man in the nineteenth cen tury (The eighteenth century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling). --Not "return to
nature"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values
beginning; - only
are the rule and the man reaches
'Nature after a long struggle
"back" to her. . . . To be natural means, to dare
to be as immoral as Nature is.
We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony
towards generous feelings, even when we are be neath them.
Our haute vole? e, the society consisting of our
rich and leisured men, is more natural: people hunt
each other, the love of the sexes is a kind of sport
in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle;
people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily advantages stand in the first rank,
and curiosity and daring are the rule.
Our attitude towards knowledge is more natural;
we are innocent in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic manners, we delight
in that which is most strictly prohibited, we should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we
were bored in acquiring
Our attitude morality also more natural. Principles have become laughing-stock; no one
irony.
A leisured class which makes things hard for itself
and exercises a great deal of self-control. The
power of form, the will to form oneself. "Happi ness" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength
and energy behind all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of a life that is seemingly so
The Greeks seemed like children to the
? easy. French.
95.
The Three Centuries.
may
perhaps be best expressed as follows:-- Aristocracy: Descartes, the reign of reason,
evidence showing the sovereignty of the will. Feminism : Rousseau, the reign of feeling, evidence showing the sovereignty of the senses;
all lies.
Animalism : Schopenhauer, the reign of passion,
evidence showing the sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy.
The seventeenth century is aristocratic, all for order, haughty towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, "austere," and even free from sentiment, "non-German," averse to all that
Their different kinds of sensitiveness
? ? ? 78
THE WILL TO POWER.
is burlesque and natural, generalising and mai taining an attitude of sovereignty towards t
for it believes in itself. At bottom
past
partakes very much of the beast of prey, ar
practises
It is the century of strength of will, as also that strong passion.
The eighteenth century is dominated by woma it is gushing, spiritual, and flat; but with intelle
at the service of aspirations and of the heart, it
a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, underminin authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerfi
clear, humane, and sociable, false itself and bottom very rascally.
The nineteenth century more animal, mo
asceticism in order to remain maste
? subterranean, hateful, realistic, plebeian,
that very account "better," "more honest," mo
submissive "reality" what kind soever,
truer; but weak
and fatalistic. reverence, either the "heart";
will, sad, obscurely exactin has no feeling timidity
the presence "reason" thoroughly convinced
dominion the desires (Schopenhauer said "Will
but nothing more characteristic his philosoph
than that entirely lacks all actual willing). Eve morality reduced instinct ("Pity").
Auguste
eighteenth century (the dominion the heart ov the head, sensuality the theory knowledg
Comte the continuation of
altruistic exaltation).
The fact that science has become
sovereig to-day, proves how the nineteenth centul has emancipated itself from the dominion idea.
and
? ? of
of
t. th anc
as it is
all
of of as
of
of of
is
to
in
an
of
. .
isit of is
to
in It of is to
? NIHILISM.
79
A certain absence of "needs" and wishes makes our scientific curiosity and rigour possible--this is
our kind of virtue.
?
Romanticism is the counterstroke of the
eighteenth century; a sort of accumulated longing
for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of fact,
largely mingled with mummery and self-deception:
the desire was to represent strong nature and strong passion).
The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of theories by means of which it may feel its fatalistic submission to the empire of facts justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality and romantic idealism was already a sign of fatalistic trend thought, its belief that superior reason belongs the triumphant side,
and justification the actual "state" (in the place "humanity," etc. ). --Schopenhauer: we
are something foolish, and the best self suppressive. The success determinism, the genealogical derivation obligations which were formerly held absolute, the teaching environment and adaptation, the reduction will
process reflex movement, the denial the will "working cause"; finally -- real
? process re-christening:
that the word itself becomes available for another
purpose. Further theories: the teaching objectivity, "will-less" contemplation, the only
road truth, also beauty (also the belief "genius," order have the right
submissive); mechanism, the determinable rigidity the mechanical process; so-called "Naturalism,"
little will observed
? ? of in
to a
in
as
of
to
of
to to
be so
of
of to
in
to
as of a
in of its
of at
be of of its
to
a ofof
as
is
? 8O THE WILL TO POWER.
the elimination of the choosing, directing, inter preting subject, on principle.
Kant, with his "practical reason," with his moral
fanaticism, is quite eighteenth century style; still
completely outside the historical movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek
philosophy; he is a phantasist of the notion of duty,
a sensualist with a hidden leaning to dogmatic pampering.
The return to Kant in our century means a return to the eighteenth century: people desire to create
themselves a right to the old ideas and to the old exaltation--hence a theory of knowledge which "de scribes limits," that is to say, which admits of the
option of fixing a Beyond to the domain of reason. Hegel's way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of Goethe: see the latter on
the subject of Spinoza, for instance. The will to
deify the All and Life, in order to find both peace and happiness in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason everywhere--in the presence of
reason man may be submissive and resigned. In
Goethe we find a kind of fatalism which is almost joyous and confiding, which neither revolts nor weakens, which strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in totality does every
thing seem good and justified, and find itself resolved.
96.
The period of rationalism --followed by a period of sentimentality. To what extent does
? ? ? ? NIHILISM. 81
Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel under intellectuality ? )
97.
The seventeenth century suffers from humanity
as from a host of contradictions ("l'amas de con
tradictions" that we are ); it endeavours to discover
man, to co-ordinate him, to excavate him: whereas
the eighteenth century tries to forget what is
known of man's nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. "Superficial, soft, humane"--gushes
over "humanity. "
The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual in order that the artist's
work may resemble life as much as possible. The eighteenth century strives to create interest in
the author by means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and social reforms.
"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of making one's own personality
the centre of interest, subordination to the propa
ganda of social ideas, charlatanism--all this we derive from the eighteenth century.
The style of the seventeenth century: propre exact et libre.
. The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or
who appeals ardently to God--and that obtrusive ness and indiscretion of modern authors--these
things are opposites. "Showing-oneself-off"--what
a contrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal | VOL. I. F
? ? ? ? 82 THE WILL TO POWER.
Alfieri had a sense for the grand style.
The hate of the burlesque (that which lacks dignity), the lack of a sense of Nature belongs to the seventeenth century.
98.
Against Rousseau. --Alas / man is no longer sufficiently evil; Rousseau's opponents, who say
that "man is a beast of prey," are unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the
softening and moralising of him is the curse. In
the sphere which Rousseau attacked most violently, the relatively strongest and most successful type
of man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great passions intact: Will to Power,
Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability to Com
mand). The man of the eighteenth century must
be compared with the man of the Renaissance (also
with the man of the seventeenth century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau
is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity--both signs that the dominating will is
? lacking:
own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the ruling classes.
he moralises and seeks the cause ofhis
99.
Voltaire -- Rousseau. -- A state of nature is
terrible; man is a beast of prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary triumph over this beast-of
prey
He was conscious of the mildness, the refinements,
in nature--this was Voltaire's conclusion.
? ? ? NIHILISM.
83
the intellectual joys of the civilised state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue,
and the lack of delicacy even in ascetics and monks.
The moral depravity of man seemed to pre occupy Rousseau; the words "unjust," "cruel," are
the best possible for the purpose of exciting the
instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under the ban of the vetitum and of
disgrace; so that their conscience is opposed to their
indulging any
emancipators seek one thing above all: to give
insurrectional desires. These
their party the great accents and attitudes of higher Nature,
? IOO.
Rousseau : the rule founded on
sentiment;
Nature as the source of justice; man perfects
himself in proportion as he approaches Nature
(according to Voltaire, in proportion as he leaves AVature behind). The very same periods seem to
the one to demonstrate the progress of humanity and, to the other, the increase of injustice and | inequality.
* . . . ,'2-4
--
Voltaire,
sense of the Renaissance, as also virti (as "higher
who still understood umanita in the
culture"), fights
gens," "la bonne compagnie," taste, science, arts,
for the cause of the "honne? tes
and even for the cause of progress and civilisation. The flare-up occurred towards 1760 : On the one hand the citizen of Geneva, on the other le
seigneur de Ferney. It is only from that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of
. "
? ? ? 84
THE WILL TO POWER.
his age, the philosopher, the representative
Toleration and of Disbelief (theretofore he ha
been merely un bel esprit). His envy and hatre
of Rousseau's success forced him upwards. "Pour "la canaille' un dieu re? mune? rateur
vengeur"--Voltaire.
The criticism of both standpoints in regard
the value of civilisation. To Voltaire nothir seems finer than the social invention : there
no higher goal than to uphold and perfect L'honne? tete? consists precisely in respecting soci
usage;
various necessary "prejudices" which favour th maintenance of society. Missionary of Cultu, aristocrat, representative of the triumphant ar ruling
virtue in a certain obedience towar.
? classes and their values. But Roussea remained a plebeian, even as hommes de lettres, th was preposterous; his shameless contempt f everything
that was not himself.
The morbid feature in Rousseau is the or
which happens to have been most admired an
imitated. (Lord Byron resembled him somewha
he too screwed himself up to sublime attitude and to revengeful rage--a sign of vulgarity; lat'
on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, he unde
stood what was more alleviating and did mo,
good . . . l'insouciance. )
In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is prou
of himself; but he is incensed if he is reminded his origin. . . .
In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brai
trouble; in Voltaire--rare health and lightsome ness. The revengefulness of the sick; his period
? ? ? NIHILISM.
85
of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his mistrust.
Rousseau's defence of Providence (against Vol
taire's Pessimism): he had need of God in order to be able to curse society and civilisation; every
thing must be good per because God had created it; man alone has corrupted man. The "good man" man Nature was pure fantasy;
but with the dogma God's authorship he became
something probable and even not devoid found ation.
Romanticism Rousseau: passion ("the
? sovereign right passion"); "naturalness";
the fascination madness (foolishness reckoned
greatness); the senseless vanity the weak; the
revengefulness the masses elevated the posi tion justice ("in politics, for one hundred years,'
the leader has been an invalid").
IOI.
Kant: makes the scepticism Englishmen, regard the theory knowledge, possible for Germans.
(1) By enlisting cause the interest the German's religious and moral needs: just the new academicians used scepticism for the same
reasons, Augustine); scepticism
preparation
for Platonism (vide
just
order
Pascal even used moral provoke (to justify) the
belief;
(2) By complicating and entangling with
need
scholastic flourishes view making more
? ? in
as
in its
of a la
of
of
it it
of
of
as
of
in
a
of of
as a
to
of
of
se,
as of ,
in
as
to
of
of
to
? 86 THE WILL TO POWER.
acceptable to the German's scientific taste in fo
(for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminati too clear--that is to say, judged according to
German valuing instinct, "too superficial"). Kant: a poor psychologist and mediocre ju
of human nature, made hopeless mistakes
regard to great historical values (the Fre Revolution); a moral fanatic a la Rousseau; w a subterranean current of Christian values thorough dogmatist,
but bored to extinction this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrant
over but quickly tired, even scepticism; not yet affected by any cosmopolitan thought antique beauty dawdler and go-betw.
; not all original (like Leibnitz, something betw
mechanism and spiritualism; like Goethe, someth between the taste the eighteenth century
that the "historical sense" [which essenti sense exoticism]; like German music, betw French and Italian music; like Charles the Gr
who mediated and built bridges between Roman Empire and Nationalism--a dawdler excellence).
O2.
what respect have the Christian centu with their Pessimism been stronger centuries the eighteenth--and how do they corresp.
with the tragic age the Greeks?
The nineteenth century versus the eighteel
How was an heir P--how was step backwa from the latter? (more lacking "spirit"
? ? ? it in a
of a
In it
of
at
it,
of
I
of
a
is t. ::
a
of
. . .
? NIHILISM,
87
in taste)--how did it show an advance on the latter ? (more gloomy, more realistic, stronger).
IO3.
How can we explain the fact that we feel something in common with the Campagna romana P And the high mountain chain?
Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes
in 18o3 writes his first impression of the Campagna 70%a/Za.
The President de Brosses says of the Campagna romana: "Il fallait que Romulus fe^t ivre quand il songea a ba? tir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid. "
Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him. He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did.
The? ophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be forgotten.
Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo.
Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que
aucune autre nation n'a moins emprunte? a` l'antiquite? , parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence classique. "
104. '
The two great attempts that were made to overcome the eighteenth century:
Mapoleon, in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle for power, to life again,
? and conceived Europe as a united political power.
Goethe, in that he imagined a European
&:
? ? ? 88 THE WILL TO POWER.
[which would consist of the whole heritage of what humanity had attained to up to his time.
German culture in this century inspires mistrust --the music of the period lacks that complete
element which liberates and binds as well, to wit--Goethe.
The pre-eminence of music in the romanticists
of 1830 and 1840. Delacroix.
passionate musician (admired Gluck, Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome:
"Si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres"--likewise Horace
Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who
says of himself: "Combien de lieues ne ferais-je pas a` pied, et a` combien de jours de prison ne me soumetterais-je pas pour entendre Don Juan ou le
Matrimonio segreto; et je ne sais pour quelle autre
chose je ferais cet effort. " He was then fifty-six years old.
The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as
a typical "Epigone," likewise Mendelssohn's cul
tured Protestantism (a former "soul" is turned into poetry posthumously . . . )
--the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used one art as a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked.
--the "historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas.
--that characteristic transformation of which
G.
Flaubert is the most striking example among
Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most strik
Ingres--a
Haydn,
? N
ing example among Germans,
shows how the
? ? ? NIHILISM.
89
changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.
romantic belief in love and the future
IO6. --
How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of German romanti *. . . * *
*A*-* *-*
How is it that German music lacks
cism P.
Goethe P On the other hand, how much Schiller,
or more exactly, how much "Thekla. "* is there not in Beethoven |
Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him. Richard Wagner has Freischu? tz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga,
the mystic catholicism of instinct, symbolism, "the free-spiritedness of passion" (Rousseau's
intention). The Flying . Dutchman savours of
France, where le te? ne`breux (1830) was the type of the seducer.
The cult of music, the revolutionary romanticism
of form. Wagner synthesises German and French romanticism.
Io? .
From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German mis fortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But
what does it matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also seems to
me that to no country on earth is he less related than to Germany; nothing was prepared there for
* Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's Wallen stein. --TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
Schumann has
? ? ? ? **
90
THE WILL TO POWER.
his advent; his whole type is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst,
wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible.
people carefully avoid acknowledging this: they are
too kind, too square-headed--too German for that.
"Credo quia absurdus est": thus did the German
spirit wish it to be, in this case too--hence it is
content meanwhile to believe everything Richard
Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In
all ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in
subtlety and divining powers concerning psycho
logical matters. Now that it happens to be under the highpressureof patrioticnonsenseandself-adoration,
it is visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to the problem of Wagner !
IO8.
The Germans are not yet anything, but they are becoming something; that is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot yet have any culture l--They are not yet anything:
that means they are all kinds of things. They , are becoming something: that means that they will
one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope
yet. Fortunately
can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation, of discomfort,-yea, even of bitterness,--in short, we Germans will get something out of ourselves, something that has not
yet been wanted of us--we want something more !
it is a wish with which one
But
? ? ? ? NIHILISM.
9I
That this "German, as he is not as yet"-- has a right to something better than the present
German "culture"; that all who wish to become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of contentment, an impudent "setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of self censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard to which my opinions have not yet changed.
(c) SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH. I O9.
First Principle: everything that characterises
modern men savours of decay: but side by side
with the prevailing sickness there are signs of a
strength and powerfulness of soul which are still
untried. The same causes which tend to promote ** the belittling of men, also force the stronger and ,"
rarer individuals upwards to greatness.
I IO.
General survey: the ambiguous character of our.
modern world -- precisely the same symptoms
might at the same time be indicative of either decline or strength. And the signs of strength
and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional (or hereditary) appreciations con cerned with the feelings, be misunderstood as in dications of weakness. In short, feeling, as a
means of fixing valuations, is not on a level with the times.
? ? ? ? 92
THE WILL TO POWER.
Generalised: Every valuation is always back ward; it is merely the expression of the con
ditions which favoured survival and growth ir a much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence out of which it did no
arise, and which it therefore necessarily misunder stands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against all that is new.
I I I.
The problem of the nineteenth century. --To dis
cover whether its strong and weak side belong to
each other. Whether they have been cut from
one and the same piece. Whether the variety o its ideals and their contradictions are conditioned
by a higher purpose: whether they are something higher. --For it might be the prerequisite of great
ness, that growth should take place amid such
? Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, migh
II 2.
General survey. --As a matter of fact, al
abundant growth involves a concomitant proces of crumbling to bits and decay: suffering and th
symptoms of decline belong to ages of enormou progress; every fruitful and powerful movemen
of mankind has always brought about a concurren Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances
the appearance of the extremest form of Pessimism and actual Nihilism might be the sign of a proces: of incisive and most essential growth, and of man
kind's transit into completely new conditions o existence. This is what I have understood.
violent tension. be a good sign.
? ? ? allow ourselves to be deceived
by appearance:
NIHILISM,
II 3.
A.
.
93
Starting out with a thoroughly courageous appreciation of our men of to-day:--we must not
this mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges of lasting strength, its
tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is richer.
Healthiness is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy body are on the point of being known,
and will gradually be created, "asceticism" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a #. . .
certain confidence in the "right way," no raving: . . .
* s
. .
? a periodical self-habituation to narrower values (such as "mother-land," "science," etc. ).
". ambiguous: it might be a movement either of *
This whole picture, however, would still be .
increase or decline Life.
B.
The belief "progress"--in lower spheres intelligence, appears increasing life: but this self-deception;
higher spheres intelligence sign declining life.
Description the symptoms.
The unity the aspect: uncertainty regard to the standard of valuation.
Fear general "in vain. " Nihilism.
? ? of a
of of
in
in
a
of in
as of
it
is
is of
. ". .
in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
II. 4.
94
in need of an antidote against the first Ni
Life is no longer so uncertain, accident.
senseless in modern Europe. All such trem
exaggeration of the value of men, of the vi evil, etc. , are not so necessary now; we can
a considerable diminution of this value, w grant a great deal of nonsense and accider
power man has acquired now allows of a lo of the means of discipline, of which the str was the moral interpretation of the universe. hypothesis "God" is much too extreme.
II 5.
As a matter of fact, we are no longer soul
? If anything shows that our humanisatio genuine sign of progress, it is the fact that longer require excessive contraries, that longer require
contraries at all. . . .
We may love the senses; for we have
ualised them in every way and made them a
We have a right to all things which h have been most calumniated.
II 6.
The reversal of the order of rank--Thos counterfeiters--the priests--are becoming Ch in our midst:--they occupy the position
charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of t
? ? ? NIHILISM.
95
as the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of
Life, and as the rebels among the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of
our servant-caste--the Sudra--that is to say, our
people or the body which wields the political power.
On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the blasphemers, the im moralists, the independents of all kinds, the artists, the Jews, the minstrels--and, at bottom, all dis
reputable classes are in the van.
We have elevated ourselves to honourable
thoughts,'--even more, we determine what honour is on earth,--"nobility. " . . . All of us to-day
are advocates of life. --We Immoralists are to-day the strongest power: the other great powers are
in need of us . . . we re-create the world in our own image.
We have transferred the label "Chandala " to
the priests, the backworldsmen, and to the deformed
Christian society which has become associated with
these people, together with creatures of like origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity,
criminals, and men of vicious habits--the whole
sphere in which the idea of "God" is that of Saviour. . . .
We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and detractors of Life. . . .
I 17.
? -a*-da- --
** ** 5--> --~~~ *
? century upon the eighteenth (at bottom we good Europeans
The advance of the nineteenth
* -
? ? ? 96
THE WILL TO POWER.
are carrying on a war against the eigl century):
(1) "The return to Nature" is getting understood, ever more definitely, in a way
is quite the reverse of that in which Rousses the phrase--away from idylls and operas /
(2) Ever more decided, more anti-id more objective, more fearless, more indu
more temperate, more suspicious ofsudden cl anti-revolutionary;
(3) The question of bodily health is being
ever more decidedly in front of the health &
soul": the latter is regarded as a condition b
about by the former, and bodily health is b to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual l
II 8.
If anything at all has been achieved, it is
innocent attitude towards the senses, a h
more favourable demeanour in regard to sen: resembling rather the position taken up by G
a prouder feeling has also been developed in ledge, and the "reine Thor"* meets wit
? faith.
II 9.
We "objective people. "--It is not "pity
opens up the way for us to all that is most and most strange in life and culture; b
* This is a reference to Wagner's Parsifal. The c as is well known, is written to represent a son o affliction, and a child of wisdom--humble, guileless
pure, and a fool. --TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
? ? ? NIHILISM.
A. . . . "
accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely
does not "pity," but rather takes pleasure in hun dreds of things which formerly caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are certainly not the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain
may shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof.
pain and error, we have grown stronger and more
was, <-tax *****
97
In this deliberate desire to look on at powerful than the eighteenth century;
? proof
our increase strength (we have drawn the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). profound mistake regard our "roman
closer
But
ticism" proof our "beautified souls. " We want stronger sensations than all coarser ages and classes have wanted. (This fact must not be con founded with the needs neurotics and decadents;
their case, course, there craving for pepper --even for cruelty. )
We are all seeking conditions which are eman cipated from the bourgeois, and greater degree
from the priestly, notion
everything insipid which not forbidden and con sidered compromising bourgeois circles; and the
case the same with books, music, politics, and
opinions on women. WOL.
which savours all
gives the impression
mental indigence). "Good company," fact, finds
morality (every book priestdom and theology
pitiful niaiserie and
? ? I.
us
is to of as a
in G
of is
of
of
of
is
it
of
of
is
at
in
a in
a to
to
in
a of
it is a
all
? - s
**
he never turns
**
(Morality
98
THE WILL TO POWER.
I2O.
The simplification of man in the nineteenth cen tury (The eighteenth century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling). --Not "return to
nature"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values
beginning; - only
are the rule and the man reaches
'Nature after a long struggle
"back" to her. . . . To be natural means, to dare
to be as immoral as Nature is.
We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony
towards generous feelings, even when we are be neath them.
Our haute vole? e, the society consisting of our
rich and leisured men, is more natural: people hunt
each other, the love of the sexes is a kind of sport
in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle;
people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily advantages stand in the first rank,
and curiosity and daring are the rule.
Our attitude towards knowledge is more natural;
we are innocent in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic manners, we delight
in that which is most strictly prohibited, we should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we
were bored in acquiring
Our attitude morality also more natural. Principles have become laughing-stock; no one
irony.
