"
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Summa Theologica
the grace of union, capital
grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of
Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also
distinct from the capital grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): "Of His fulness we all have
received. " Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him.
Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now
He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in
its perfection, as was said above ([3959]Q[7], A[9]). Hence His capital
and personal grace are not distinct.
I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act,
it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it
is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not
every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the
principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the
patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher
(De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain
pre-eminence. Now it was said above [3960](A[1]; Q[7], A[9]) grace was
received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from
this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this
grace is bestowed on others---and this belongs to the nature of head.
Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is
essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and
justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the
nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin,
because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this
corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity,
inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not
vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal
action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace
in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as
in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and
the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the
personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason
of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence
it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this
difference.
Reply to Objection 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an
act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the
personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the
essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the
personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch
as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of
union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though
there is a distinction of reason between them.
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Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the
Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): "When thou wast a little one
in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? "
Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore
it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head
of the Church.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His
bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also
to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil speech
proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of
faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers. " Therefore it seems
to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only
called "Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation. " Now Christ did not
retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4,
"And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a
never-fading crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation, according to
Apoc. 21:14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations. "
Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself
alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the Church is
that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied
with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God. " But
this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the
Church.
I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways.
First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and
sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a
certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which
are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the
interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood,
through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but
the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior
guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called
heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, "Ye great men, heads of the
people"; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ
is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time
and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain
special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a
determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz.
during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined
state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly,
because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and
authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10, "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned
anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ," and 2
Cor. 5:20, "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were,
exhorting by us. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in
regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his
kingdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx,
but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan. ): "If the
rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except
that all these are members of one Shepherd? " So likewise others may be
called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one
Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii),
"He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself
the Door. He kept this for Himself alone. " And this because by door is
implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all
enter the house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom also we have access .
. . into this grace, wherein we stand" (Rom. 5:2); but by the other
names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but
also the secondary authority.
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Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the
wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into
the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc.
But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds
from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the
head of the wicked.
Objection 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every
sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did
not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of
man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii):
"Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of
the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will. "
Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole
multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are
united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects,
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called
the head of all the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, "Let
the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of every
evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i. e. the devil.
I answer that, As was said above [3961](A[6]), the head not only
influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly,
directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is
the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i. e. by interior
influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the
Church, as was stated [3962](A[6]); or as regards exterior governance,
and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to
him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is
written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride. " Now
it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end.
But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from
God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from
obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an
end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty,
according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou
hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve. '" Hence,
inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under
the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their
head.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the devil does not influence the
rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: A governor does not always suggest to his
subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in
consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their
own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all
the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the
same way, the first sin of the devil, who "sinneth from the beginning"
(1 Jn. 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his
suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And
hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate
Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: "By the envy of the devil, death came
into the world. And they follow him that are of his side. "
Reply to Objection 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although
they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.
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Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the
wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is
the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not
their head.
Objection 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the
head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not
the head of the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But
Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him.
Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, "Ask
any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking of the
body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ
the head of all evil-doers. "
I answer that, As was said above [3963](A[1]), in the head are found
three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as
regards the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head
of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil
preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the
power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by
exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not
beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence
he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of
some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the
wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2
Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "As in
Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness
of all wickedness. " Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the
devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of
God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more
copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked
who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, according to 2 Thess.
2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh. "
Reply to Objection 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but
one; since Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness
of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4,
"Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all the
wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride
will be in him. " Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor
by indwelling, since "the Trinity alone dwells in the mind" (as is said
De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the
Head of the Church, as was said above (A[1], ad 2), so likewise
Anti-christ is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the
wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection.
For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in
the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he
executes it.
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OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the
consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general;
secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
(2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors
have?
(3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
(4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?
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Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except
the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known
thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore
any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But
all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God
is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ
no other knowledge except the Divine.
Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine
took place in the Person, as is clear from[3964] Q[2], A[2]. Now,
according to some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the
union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the
Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal
union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two
knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense
of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh. " But created knowledge
pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created
knowledge.
I answer that, As said above ([3965]Q[5]), the Son of God assumed an
entire human nature, i. e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not
only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved
Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of
the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in
potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet
on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through
the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De
Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced
to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an
imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was
to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the
soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its
proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be
another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the
soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the
rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its
operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an
intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and
this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created
knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby
we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge
for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was
wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated
above ([3966]Q[5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied that
in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge
by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's
understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii,
text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ,
seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been
no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing;
and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is
on account of its operation.
Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same
order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun
dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But
if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants
and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not
dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the
air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge
is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the
light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn.
1:9.
Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a
knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature;
so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God
and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man
are attributed to God, as was said above ([3967]Q[3], AA[1],6). But on
the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ.
For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person
only by reason of a nature.
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Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge
of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a
participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we
shall see light. " Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had
the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9:
"For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally. "
Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " But this Man
was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps.
64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee.
"
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Objection 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge---one by
nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which
consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his
nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural
knowledge, i. e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of
the knowledge of the blessed in Christ.
On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge
of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn.
8:55: "I do know Him, and do keep His word. " Therefore in Christ there
was the knowledge of the blessed.
I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in
act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is
in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the
vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational
creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made
in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by
the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: "For it became Him, for
Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many
children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His
passion. " And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which
consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently,
since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect.
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in
Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains
the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is
a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine
Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in
essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the
uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the
uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human
nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established
in the last end of human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some
extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot
reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance
with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been
made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated
knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.
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Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused
knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of
faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ
there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it
would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms.
Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the
disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary.
Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition,
as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that
since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to
have any other knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to
sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to
intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at
once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither
can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and
the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. "
I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible
things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its
completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38.
And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge,
inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is
personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which
the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of
the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species
upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning
knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening
knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused
species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in
Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the
Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species
proportioned to the human mind.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially
opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith
to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1],
A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to
beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two
ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive
the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but
remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a
dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by
demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain
the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to
say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he
who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the
probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise
in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains
infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that
is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP,
Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately,
inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind
as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a
form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together
with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being
in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.
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Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by
which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn.
7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters,
having never learned? " Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no
acquired knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the
power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could
accrue to His soul.
Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge,
acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses
(otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing
together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and
increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge,
it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He
perceived by the senses.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the
Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i. e.
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ
an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now
it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but
an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of
Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect.
But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of
Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation
is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of
the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by
abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18)
that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual. "
And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible
species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active
intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which
some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii,
D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was
acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion,
both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause.
For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].
Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring
knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is
the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said
(Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself:
yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright. " And hence it was more
fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by
being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice. "
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher
things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i. e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect.
Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ
should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was
insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to
be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the
human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot
be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different
nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from
phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
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OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however,
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now
remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge;
(2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here
only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any
other creature?
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Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed. " Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity
in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is
the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ
comprehends the Divine Essence.
Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in
Christ. " Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the
soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ
comprehended the Divine Essence.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs
by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself. " But the Divine Essence is not
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i. e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is
not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul
of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine
Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards
comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge
above the rest of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the
human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for
although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of
the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by
the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was
united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the
world's government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body. " So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i. e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of
the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of
God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of
the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul,
but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man
is the Creator.
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Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?
Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father. " Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of
Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know
all things in the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i. e. the created would equal the uncreated,
which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i. e. "the knowledge
of all things. "
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For
every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many
more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified
intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to
Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as
all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of
all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and
therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in
whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so
that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can
be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His
soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may
be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act
at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the
Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know
in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do,
which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the
Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it
can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in
the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in
the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature,
and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the
Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge.
But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by
Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by
the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the
contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i. e.
"Now I have made thee know. " But the Father is said to know, because He
imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we
are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine
Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom.
lxxviii in Matth. ), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to
judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the
less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract.
xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant
of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the
adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is
said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can
do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in
the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all
things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not
all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in
the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of
things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the
uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created
light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking,
the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not
only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of
things known, as was stated above.
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Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken.
grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of
Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also
distinct from the capital grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): "Of His fulness we all have
received. " Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him.
Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now
He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in
its perfection, as was said above ([3959]Q[7], A[9]). Hence His capital
and personal grace are not distinct.
I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act,
it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it
is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not
every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the
principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the
patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher
(De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain
pre-eminence. Now it was said above [3960](A[1]; Q[7], A[9]) grace was
received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from
this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this
grace is bestowed on others---and this belongs to the nature of head.
Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is
essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and
justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the
nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin,
because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this
corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity,
inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not
vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal
action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace
in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as
in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.
Reply to Objection 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and
the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the
personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason
of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence
it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this
difference.
Reply to Objection 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an
act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the
personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the
essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the
personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch
as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of
union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though
there is a distinction of reason between them.
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Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the
Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): "When thou wast a little one
in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? "
Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore
it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head
of the Church.
Objection 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His
bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also
to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil speech
proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of
faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers. " Therefore it seems
to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only
called "Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation. " Now Christ did not
retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4,
"And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a
never-fading crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation, according to
Apoc. 21:14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations. "
Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself
alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the Church is
that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied
with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God. " But
this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the
Church.
I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways.
First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and
sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a
certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which
are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the
interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood,
through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but
the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior
guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called
heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, "Ye great men, heads of the
people"; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ
is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time
and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain
special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a
determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz.
during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined
state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly,
because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and
authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10, "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned
anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ," and 2
Cor. 5:20, "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were,
exhorting by us. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in
regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his
kingdom.
Reply to Objection 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx,
but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan. ): "If the
rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except
that all these are members of one Shepherd? " So likewise others may be
called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one
Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii),
"He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself
the Door. He kept this for Himself alone. " And this because by door is
implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all
enter the house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom also we have access .
. . into this grace, wherein we stand" (Rom. 5:2); but by the other
names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but
also the secondary authority.
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Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the
wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into
the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc.
But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds
from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the
head of the wicked.
Objection 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every
sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did
not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of
man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii):
"Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of
the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will. "
Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole
multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are
united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects,
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called
the head of all the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, "Let
the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of every
evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i. e. the devil.
I answer that, As was said above [3961](A[6]), the head not only
influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly,
directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is
the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i. e. by interior
influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the
Church, as was stated [3962](A[6]); or as regards exterior governance,
and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to
him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is
written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride. " Now
it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end.
But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from
God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from
obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an
end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty,
according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou
hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve. '" Hence,
inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under
the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their
head.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the devil does not influence the
rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: A governor does not always suggest to his
subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in
consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their
own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all
the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the
same way, the first sin of the devil, who "sinneth from the beginning"
(1 Jn. 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his
suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And
hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate
Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: "By the envy of the devil, death came
into the world. And they follow him that are of his side. "
Reply to Objection 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although
they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.
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Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the
wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is
the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not
their head.
Objection 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the
head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not
the head of the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But
Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him.
Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.
On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, "Ask
any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking of the
body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ
the head of all evil-doers. "
I answer that, As was said above [3963](A[1]), in the head are found
three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as
regards the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head
of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil
preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the
power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by
exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not
beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence
he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of
some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the
wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2
Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "As in
Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness
of all wickedness. " Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the
devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of
God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more
copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked
who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, according to 2 Thess.
2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh. "
Reply to Objection 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but
one; since Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness
of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4,
"Showing himself as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all the
wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride
will be in him. " Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor
by indwelling, since "the Trinity alone dwells in the mind" (as is said
De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the
Head of the Church, as was said above (A[1], ad 2), so likewise
Anti-christ is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the
wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection.
For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in
the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he
executes it.
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OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the
consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general;
secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
(2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors
have?
(3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
(4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?
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Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except
the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known
thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore
any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But
all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God
is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ
no other knowledge except the Divine.
Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine
took place in the Person, as is clear from[3964] Q[2], A[2]. Now,
according to some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the
union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the
Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal
union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two
knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense
of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh. " But created knowledge
pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created
knowledge.
I answer that, As said above ([3965]Q[5]), the Son of God assumed an
entire human nature, i. e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not
only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved
Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of
the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in
potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet
on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through
the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De
Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced
to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an
imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was
to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the
soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its
proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be
another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the
soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the
rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its
operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an
intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and
this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created
knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby
we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge
for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was
wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated
above ([3966]Q[5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied that
in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge
by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's
understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii,
text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ,
seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been
no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing;
and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is
on account of its operation.
Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same
order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun
dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But
if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants
and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not
dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the
air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge
is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the
light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn.
1:9.
Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a
knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature;
so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God
and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man
are attributed to God, as was said above ([3967]Q[3], AA[1],6). But on
the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ.
For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person
only by reason of a nature.
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Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge
of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a
participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we
shall see light. " Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had
the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9:
"For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally. "
Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " But this Man
was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps.
64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee.
"
Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed
in Him.
Objection 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge---one by
nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which
consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his
nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural
knowledge, i. e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of
the knowledge of the blessed in Christ.
On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge
of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn.
8:55: "I do know Him, and do keep His word. " Therefore in Christ there
was the knowledge of the blessed.
I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in
act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is
in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the
vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational
creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made
in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by
the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: "For it became Him, for
Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many
children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His
passion. " And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which
consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently,
since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect.
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in
Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains
the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is
a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine
Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in
essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the
uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the
uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human
nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established
in the last end of human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some
extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot
reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance
with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been
made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated
knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.
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Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused
knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of
faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ
there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it
would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms.
Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the
disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary.
Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition,
as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that
since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to
have any other knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to
sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to
intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at
once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither
can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and
the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. "
I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible
things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its
completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38.
And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge,
inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is
personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which
the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of
the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species
upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning
knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening
knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused
species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in
Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the
Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species
proportioned to the human mind.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially
opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith
to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1],
A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to
beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two
ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive
the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but
remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a
dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by
demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain
the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to
say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he
who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the
probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise
in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains
infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that
is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP,
Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately,
inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind
as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a
form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together
with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being
in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.
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Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by
which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn.
7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters,
having never learned? " Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no
acquired knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the
power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could
accrue to His soul.
Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge,
acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses
(otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing
together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and
increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge,
it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He
perceived by the senses.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the
Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i. e.
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ
an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now
it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but
an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of
Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect.
But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of
Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation
is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of
the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by
abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18)
that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual. "
And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible
species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active
intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which
some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii,
D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was
acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion,
both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause.
For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].
Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring
knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is
the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said
(Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself:
yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright. " And hence it was more
fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by
being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice. "
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher
things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i. e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect.
Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ
should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was
insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to
be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the
human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot
be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different
nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from
phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however,
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now
remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge;
(2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here
only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any
other creature?
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Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed. " Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity
in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is
the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ
comprehends the Divine Essence.
Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in
Christ. " Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the
soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ
comprehended the Divine Essence.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs
by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself. " But the Divine Essence is not
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i. e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is
not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul
of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine
Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards
comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge
above the rest of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the
human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for
although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of
the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by
the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was
united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the
world's government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body. " So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i. e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of
the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of
God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of
the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul,
but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man
is the Creator.
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Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?
Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father. " Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of
Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know
all things in the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i. e. the created would equal the uncreated,
which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i. e. "the knowledge
of all things. "
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For
every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many
more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified
intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to
Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as
all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of
all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and
therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in
whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so
that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can
be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His
soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may
be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act
at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the
Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know
in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do,
which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the
Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it
can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in
the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in
the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature,
and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the
Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge.
But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by
Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by
the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the
contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i. e.
"Now I have made thee know. " But the Father is said to know, because He
imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we
are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine
Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom.
lxxviii in Matth. ), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to
judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the
less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract.
xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant
of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the
adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is
said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can
do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in
the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all
things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not
all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in
the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of
things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the
uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created
light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking,
the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not
only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of
things known, as was stated above.
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Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken.
