Wherefore
just as when the
husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the
marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in
this case.
husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the
marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in
this case.
Summa Theologica
Therefore the marriage of
unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified
afterwards by Christ's faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit
without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he
was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her
lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if
she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her
husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the
second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to
accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her
own fault.
Reply to Objection 3: After the believer has married, the marriage tie
is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as
to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence
it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of
the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however
she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take
another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.
Reply to Objection 4: The husband ought not to take a vow of continence
nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a
reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's
conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her
husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take
Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be
converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has
received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she
must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is
deprived of her husband.
Reply to Objection 5: The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by
disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no
comparison between an inheritance and a wife.
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Whether other sins dissolve marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve
marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage
than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so
that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same
effect.
Objection 2: Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is
any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is
spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will
dissolve marriage.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 5:30): "If thy right hand
scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee," and a gloss of
Jerome says that "by the hand and the right eye we may understand our
brother, wife, relatives and children. " Now these become obstacles to
us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account
of any kind of sin.
Objection 4: Further, covetousness is idolatry according to Eph. 5:5.
Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like
manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on
account of other sins graver than covetousness.
Objection 5: Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 5:32): "Whosoever shall put away his
wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit
adultery. "
Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since
it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall
into sin.
I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special
contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above [4997](A[3]).
Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages.
Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two
ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be
dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery.
But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party
remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has
married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by
adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce
to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another
wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the
act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or
fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on
account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from
intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of
the comfort of his presence.
Reply to Objection 1: Although adultery is opposed to marriage as
fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the
other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church,
from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it
signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore
the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage
tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.
Reply to Objection 2: The primal union of the soul to God is by faith,
and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were,
according to Osee 2:20, "I will espouse thee to Me in faith. " Hence in
Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of
fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a
more remote signification.
Reply to Objection 3: This applies to the case when the wife proves a
notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear
his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with
her, as stated above [4998](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of
a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the
idolater serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account
of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas
covetousness corrupts the affections.
Reply to Objection 5: The words of the Master refer to betrothal,
because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime.
Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the
severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the
case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of
sinning, for instance, if she were to say: "I will not remain your wife
unless you amass wealth for me by theft," for then he ought to leave
her rather than thieve.
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OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?
(2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
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Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the
act of adultery?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be
discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded
adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the
Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's own wife if she
be an adulteress.
Objection 2: Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly
done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can
rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death.
Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she
be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly
do so.
Objection 3: Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous
wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the
husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not
excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his
own wife if she be discovered in adultery.
Objection 4: Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But
correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the
just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it
would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.
On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that "the
Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has
none but a spiritual sword. " Therefore it would seem that he who wishes
to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which
permits a man to kill his wife.
Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for
a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery. Neither
therefore may a husband kill his wife.
I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife.
First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband,
moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can,
without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife
before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment
as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of
murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in
an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband
can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and
thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither
according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever
evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers
it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act,
not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the
punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which
the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is
not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of
the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be
awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is
quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in
no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own
authority.
Reply to Objection 1: The law has committed the infliction of this
punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are
deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's
judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge's
presence.
Reply to Objection 2: The civil law has not commissioned the husband to
kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin,
just as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned
to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which
reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from
killing his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but
that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of
punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: There are two kinds of community: the household,
such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom.
Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king
for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by
exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care
he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind,
can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond
the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of
death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over
his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some
other way.
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Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to
marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder
is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is
wife-murder.
Objection 2: Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother
than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas
it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an
impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another
man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he
who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither
therefore is he who kills his own wife.
Objection 4: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the
consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently
it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to
marry.
On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores)
says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance,
and they are absolutely forbidden to marry. " Further, in whatsoever a
man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife
sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived
of marriage.
I answer that, By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to
marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on
account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be
fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the
Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract,
as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has
committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry
her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not
however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women:
wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by
disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not
voided for this reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the
contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard
to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv[4999], Q[62], A[2])
in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary
to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good
of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to
marriage than wife-murder, and the argument is based on a false
premiss.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill
one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a
man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to
matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this
proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has
murdered his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: Such a man does not sin against marriage as he
does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow that because guilt has been
remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by
irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former
dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
stated above ([5000]Q[38], A[1], ad 3).
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OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We
shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated
marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a
consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can
enter religion without the other's consent?
(2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the
marriage?
(3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has
entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion
without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even after the marriage has been
consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent.
For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than
human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should
the Divine law permit it.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But
the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according
to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being
able to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind
of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict
religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable
to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage to a stricter
marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's
consent.
On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 Cor. 7:5) to abstain
from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent,
in order to have time for prayer.
Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another
without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow taken by one
consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the
other's body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without
the other's consent.
I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to
another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body
already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it
to God without her consent.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling
an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a
sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that a greater good be
hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered
by evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In every form of religious life marriage is
contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person
contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But
in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the
same person: wherefore that comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter
religion without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even before the marriage has been
consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's
consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament
of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ
with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its
consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the
present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of
the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the
other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and
the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without
the other's consent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:6): "What God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " But the union which precedes marital
intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the
will of man.
On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan. ] our Lord
called John from his wedding.
I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual
bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond
between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is
dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which
exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because
religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the
world and lives to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Before consummation marriage signifies the union
of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary
spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it
signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the
assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is
altogether indissoluble.
Reply to Objection 2: Before consummation the body of one consort is
not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but
conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a
better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is
completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of
the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they
are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting
marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed
them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about
entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the
solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of
a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu.
ii).
Reply to Objection 3: The marriage union, before consummation, is
indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as
to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and
consequently is not altogether indissoluble.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered
religion before the consummation of the marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wife may not take another husband,
if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the
marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve
the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who
equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters
religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as
she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, after entering religion and before making his
profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can
marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again
when he returns to the world: which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et
transeunt. ) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is
accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a
profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her
husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife
receive the power to marry again.
On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong
to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to
perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of
her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.
I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the
marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will,
according to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after
the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom
she will.
Reply to Objection 1: When both consorts take a like vow of continence,
neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but
when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the
marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.
Reply to Objection 2: A person is not accounted dead to the world by
entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his
wife is bound to wait for him until that time.
Reply to Objection 3: We must judge of a profession thus made before
the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow.
Wherefore just as when the
husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the
marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in
this case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY
FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after
its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a
previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie
remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account
of fornication?
(2) Whether he is bound to do so?
(3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?
(4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?
(5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?
(6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife
on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But
the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication,
seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.
Objection 2: Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication,
than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they
cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if
only one commits fornication.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are
more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot
be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account
of fornication.
Objection 4: Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the
marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.
Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than
fornication.
On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32.
Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith.
But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse.
Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.
I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account
of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of
the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital
intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to
be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has
committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or
both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also
has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his
wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account
of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man
has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the
fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been
reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has
committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the
state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and
she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is
bound to receive her back again.
Reply to Objection 1: A husband sins if through vindictive anger he
puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin
if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to
share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin, or in order
to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.
Reply to Objection 2: Divorce on account of fornication is effected by
the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty
of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have
committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when
both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.
Reply to Objection 3: Fornication is directly opposed to the good of
marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is
broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of
one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though
perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a
divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual
fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the
rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for
divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may
take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal
fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on
account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein
unbelief is perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on
account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the
same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it
does not so affect the certainty of offspring.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is
guilty of fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put
away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is
the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation
from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of
fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.
Objection 2: Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is
also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of
fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 6:16): "He who is joined to
a harlot is made one body. " Now a man cannot at once be a member of a
harlot and a member of Christ (1 Cor. 6:15). Therefore the husband who
is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of
Christ, and therefore sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so
does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband
becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally
if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally
if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.
Objection 5: On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:11, "Let not the
husband put away his wife" says that "Our Lord permitted a wife to be
put away on account of fornication. " Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 6: Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has
committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication,
sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not
putting her away.
I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was
prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that
punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment
has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her
husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is
bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having
recourse to her due correction.
Reply to Objection 1: The wife can be corrected for her sin of
fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows;
wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not
bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct
her.
Reply to Objection 2: The husband seems to consent with her when he
retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if,
however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.
Reply to Objection 3: She can no longer be called a harlot since she
has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her,
does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is
joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.
Reply to Objection 4: There is no parallel, because the effect of
consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that
carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication
does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself,
lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the
husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.
Reply to Objection 5: This permission is to be understood as an absence
of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept,
for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.
Reply to Objection 6: The wife sins not only against her husband, but
also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot
entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put
away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been
pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any
further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this
judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of
fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for this.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 1:19) that Joseph . . . being
a just man . . . "was minded to put" Mary "away privately. " Therefore
it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's
fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he
forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the
refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to
precede the judgment of the Church.
Objection 4: Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be
submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication
cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness"
(Job 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 5: Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription
[*Cf. [5001]SS, Q[33], A[7]], whereby a person binds himself under the
pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible
in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain
his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.
Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the
judgment of the Church.
Objection 6: Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a
stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of
another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing
him privately (Mat. 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring
his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked
her in private.
On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by
his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he
would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.
Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the
husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has
committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and
consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.
I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to
bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as
he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the
marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and
by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to
bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the
judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must
be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove
the wife's fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and
consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced
except at the judgment of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The sentence is an application of the general law
to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which
the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.
Reply to Objection 2: Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin
not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her
sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel,
because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning,
but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The
Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of
adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may
discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation.
Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong
suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the
fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together
alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum
nuda. "
Reply to Objection 5: A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two
ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual
judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under
the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as
the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be
punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription
to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he
fail to prove his case.
Reply to Objection 6: According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap.
Licet), "there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First,
by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by
accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf. [5002]SS,
Q[33], A[7]] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by
fraternal correction. " Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the
case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by
accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of
the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the
common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.
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Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with
each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife
ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the
New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old
Law (Mat. 5:31,32). Now in the "repudium" husband and wife were not
judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his
wife, but not "vice versa. " Therefore neither in divorce ought they to
be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 2: Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife
have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore
the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore
the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and
consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 3: Further, where there is greater injury to one's neighbor,
there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury
to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a
wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the
husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is the greater,
and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 4: Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the
crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the
wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than "vice versa. "
Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the
purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.
Objection 5: On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife
ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is
his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than
in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "lust is a passion
proper to women," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of
their being easily inclined to concupiscence," for neither can dumb
animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of
their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the
punishment of divorce.
Objection 6: Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in
order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman's and
so he should be punished the more.
I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a
par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par
with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for
divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is
sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of
adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as
regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally
bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against
marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a
sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring
the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the
husband's wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than
in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not
for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is
sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in
two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them
may have sinned more grievously than the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to
avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in
women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of
divorce, but not "vice versa. "
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in
comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for
divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does
not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the husband is the head of the wife, he
is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his.
Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the
husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
Reply to Objection 5: In adultery there is the same sinful character as
in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely
the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common
to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the
wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that
which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore
they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in
man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply
speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously
in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of
reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as
regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and
for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more
grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And
since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that,
simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the
adulterous husband, other things being equal.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the control which the husband receives
over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is
yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another
species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind
of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another's child.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?
Objection 1: It would seem that a husband can marry again after having
a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some
cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of
fornication, as stated above [5003](A[2]). Therefore seemingly at least
in this case he can marry again.
Objection 2: Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion
of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication
is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater
occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent
during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it
would seem lawful for her to marry again.
Objection 3: Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as
regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is
freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from
the law of her husband" [*Rom. 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and
the same applies to her husband.
Objection 4: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:9): "Whosoever shall put away
his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another
committeth adultery. " Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery
if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of
fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:10,11): "Not I, but the Lord,
commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she
depart, that she remain unmarried. "
Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress
would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired
marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish
to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the
husband to contract a second marriage.
I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it:
wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For,
according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they
live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor
union with another can destroy. " Therefore it is unlawful for one,
while the other lives, to marry again.
Reply to Objection 1: Although no one is absolutely bound to
continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife
contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal
intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease,
namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.
Reply to Objection 2: The very shame of having been divorced ought to
keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser
evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after divorce the wife is not bound to
her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with
him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and
consequently she cannot marry again during her husband's lifetime. She
can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband's will,
unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in
pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow
of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be
bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to
demand it.
Reply to Objection 4: The exception expressed in our Lord's words
refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on
a false interpretation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled
after being divorced.
unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified
afterwards by Christ's faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit
without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he
was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her
lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if
she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her
husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the
second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to
accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her
own fault.
Reply to Objection 3: After the believer has married, the marriage tie
is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as
to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence
it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of
the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however
she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take
another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.
Reply to Objection 4: The husband ought not to take a vow of continence
nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a
reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's
conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her
husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take
Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be
converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has
received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she
must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is
deprived of her husband.
Reply to Objection 5: The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by
disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no
comparison between an inheritance and a wife.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether other sins dissolve marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve
marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage
than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so
that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same
effect.
Objection 2: Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is
any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is
spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will
dissolve marriage.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 5:30): "If thy right hand
scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee," and a gloss of
Jerome says that "by the hand and the right eye we may understand our
brother, wife, relatives and children. " Now these become obstacles to
us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account
of any kind of sin.
Objection 4: Further, covetousness is idolatry according to Eph. 5:5.
Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like
manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on
account of other sins graver than covetousness.
Objection 5: Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).
On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 5:32): "Whosoever shall put away his
wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit
adultery. "
Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since
it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall
into sin.
I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special
contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above [4997](A[3]).
Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages.
Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two
ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be
dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery.
But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party
remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has
married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by
adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce
to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another
wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the
act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or
fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on
account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from
intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of
the comfort of his presence.
Reply to Objection 1: Although adultery is opposed to marriage as
fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the
other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church,
from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it
signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore
the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage
tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.
Reply to Objection 2: The primal union of the soul to God is by faith,
and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were,
according to Osee 2:20, "I will espouse thee to Me in faith. " Hence in
Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of
fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a
more remote signification.
Reply to Objection 3: This applies to the case when the wife proves a
notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear
his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with
her, as stated above [4998](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of
a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the
idolater serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account
of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas
covetousness corrupts the affections.
Reply to Objection 5: The words of the Master refer to betrothal,
because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime.
Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the
severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the
case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of
sinning, for instance, if she were to say: "I will not remain your wife
unless you amass wealth for me by theft," for then he ought to leave
her rather than thieve.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?
(2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the
act of adultery?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be
discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded
adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the
Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's own wife if she
be an adulteress.
Objection 2: Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly
done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can
rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death.
Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she
be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly
do so.
Objection 3: Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous
wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the
husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not
excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his
own wife if she be discovered in adultery.
Objection 4: Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But
correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the
just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it
would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.
On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that "the
Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has
none but a spiritual sword. " Therefore it would seem that he who wishes
to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which
permits a man to kill his wife.
Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for
a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery. Neither
therefore may a husband kill his wife.
I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife.
First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband,
moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can,
without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife
before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment
as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of
murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in
an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband
can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and
thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither
according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever
evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers
it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act,
not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the
punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which
the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is
not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of
the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be
awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is
quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in
no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own
authority.
Reply to Objection 1: The law has committed the infliction of this
punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are
deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's
judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge's
presence.
Reply to Objection 2: The civil law has not commissioned the husband to
kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin,
just as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned
to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which
reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from
killing his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but
that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of
punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: There are two kinds of community: the household,
such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom.
Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king
for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by
exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care
he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind,
can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond
the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of
death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over
his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some
other way.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to
marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder
is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is
wife-murder.
Objection 2: Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother
than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas
it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an
impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another
man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he
who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither
therefore is he who kills his own wife.
Objection 4: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the
consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently
it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to
marry.
On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores)
says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance,
and they are absolutely forbidden to marry. " Further, in whatsoever a
man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife
sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived
of marriage.
I answer that, By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to
marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on
account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be
fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the
Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract,
as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has
committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry
her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not
however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women:
wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by
disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not
voided for this reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the
contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard
to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv[4999], Q[62], A[2])
in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary
to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good
of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to
marriage than wife-murder, and the argument is based on a false
premiss.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill
one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a
man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to
matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this
proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has
murdered his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: Such a man does not sin against marriage as he
does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow that because guilt has been
remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by
irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former
dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
stated above ([5000]Q[38], A[1], ad 3).
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OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We
shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated
marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a
consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can
enter religion without the other's consent?
(2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the
marriage?
(3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has
entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion
without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even after the marriage has been
consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent.
For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than
human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should
the Divine law permit it.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But
the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according
to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being
able to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind
of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict
religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable
to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage to a stricter
marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's
consent.
On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 Cor. 7:5) to abstain
from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent,
in order to have time for prayer.
Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another
without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow taken by one
consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the
other's body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without
the other's consent.
I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to
another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body
already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it
to God without her consent.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling
an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a
sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that a greater good be
hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered
by evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In every form of religious life marriage is
contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person
contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But
in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the
same person: wherefore that comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter
religion without the other's consent?
Objection 1: It would seem that even before the marriage has been
consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's
consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament
of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ
with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its
consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the
present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of
the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the
other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and
the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without
the other's consent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:6): "What God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " But the union which precedes marital
intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the
will of man.
On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan. ] our Lord
called John from his wedding.
I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual
bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond
between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is
dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which
exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because
religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the
world and lives to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Before consummation marriage signifies the union
of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary
spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it
signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the
assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is
altogether indissoluble.
Reply to Objection 2: Before consummation the body of one consort is
not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but
conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a
better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is
completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of
the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they
are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting
marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed
them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about
entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the
solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of
a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu.
ii).
Reply to Objection 3: The marriage union, before consummation, is
indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as
to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and
consequently is not altogether indissoluble.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered
religion before the consummation of the marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wife may not take another husband,
if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the
marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve
the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who
equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters
religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as
she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, after entering religion and before making his
profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can
marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again
when he returns to the world: which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et
transeunt. ) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is
accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a
profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her
husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife
receive the power to marry again.
On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong
to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to
perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of
her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.
I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the
marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will,
according to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after
the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom
she will.
Reply to Objection 1: When both consorts take a like vow of continence,
neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but
when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the
marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.
Reply to Objection 2: A person is not accounted dead to the world by
entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his
wife is bound to wait for him until that time.
Reply to Objection 3: We must judge of a profession thus made before
the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow.
Wherefore just as when the
husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the
marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in
this case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY
FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after
its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a
previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie
remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account
of fornication?
(2) Whether he is bound to do so?
(3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?
(4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?
(5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?
(6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife
on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But
the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication,
seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.
Objection 2: Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication,
than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they
cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if
only one commits fornication.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are
more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot
be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account
of fornication.
Objection 4: Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the
marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.
Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than
fornication.
On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32.
Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith.
But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse.
Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.
I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account
of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of
the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital
intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to
be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has
committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or
both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also
has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his
wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account
of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man
has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the
fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been
reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has
committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the
state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and
she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is
bound to receive her back again.
Reply to Objection 1: A husband sins if through vindictive anger he
puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin
if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to
share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin, or in order
to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.
Reply to Objection 2: Divorce on account of fornication is effected by
the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty
of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have
committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when
both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.
Reply to Objection 3: Fornication is directly opposed to the good of
marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is
broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of
one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though
perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a
divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual
fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the
rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for
divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may
take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal
fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on
account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein
unbelief is perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on
account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the
same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it
does not so affect the certainty of offspring.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is
guilty of fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put
away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is
the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation
from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of
fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.
Objection 2: Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is
also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of
fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 6:16): "He who is joined to
a harlot is made one body. " Now a man cannot at once be a member of a
harlot and a member of Christ (1 Cor. 6:15). Therefore the husband who
is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of
Christ, and therefore sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so
does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband
becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally
if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally
if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.
Objection 5: On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:11, "Let not the
husband put away his wife" says that "Our Lord permitted a wife to be
put away on account of fornication. " Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.
Objection 6: Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has
committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication,
sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not
putting her away.
I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was
prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that
punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment
has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her
husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is
bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having
recourse to her due correction.
Reply to Objection 1: The wife can be corrected for her sin of
fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows;
wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not
bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct
her.
Reply to Objection 2: The husband seems to consent with her when he
retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if,
however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.
Reply to Objection 3: She can no longer be called a harlot since she
has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her,
does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is
joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.
Reply to Objection 4: There is no parallel, because the effect of
consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that
carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication
does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself,
lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the
husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.
Reply to Objection 5: This permission is to be understood as an absence
of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept,
for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.
Reply to Objection 6: The wife sins not only against her husband, but
also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot
entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of
fornication?
Objection 1: It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put
away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been
pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any
further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this
judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of
fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for this.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 1:19) that Joseph . . . being
a just man . . . "was minded to put" Mary "away privately. " Therefore
it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's
fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he
forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the
refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to
precede the judgment of the Church.
Objection 4: Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be
submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication
cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness"
(Job 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on
the judgment of the Church.
Objection 5: Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription
[*Cf. [5001]SS, Q[33], A[7]], whereby a person binds himself under the
pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible
in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain
his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.
Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the
judgment of the Church.
Objection 6: Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a
stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of
another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing
him privately (Mat. 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring
his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked
her in private.
On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by
his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he
would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.
Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the
husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has
committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and
consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.
I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to
bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as
he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the
marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and
by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to
bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the
judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must
be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove
the wife's fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and
consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced
except at the judgment of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The sentence is an application of the general law
to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which
the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.
Reply to Objection 2: Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin
not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her
sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel,
because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning,
but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The
Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of
adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may
discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation.
Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong
suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the
fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together
alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum
nuda. "
Reply to Objection 5: A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two
ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual
judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under
the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as
the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be
punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription
to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he
fail to prove his case.
Reply to Objection 6: According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap.
Licet), "there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First,
by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by
accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf. [5002]SS,
Q[33], A[7]] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by
fraternal correction. " Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the
case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by
accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of
the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the
common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with
each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife
ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the
New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old
Law (Mat. 5:31,32). Now in the "repudium" husband and wife were not
judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his
wife, but not "vice versa. " Therefore neither in divorce ought they to
be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 2: Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife
have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore
the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore
the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and
consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 3: Further, where there is greater injury to one's neighbor,
there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury
to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a
wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the
husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is the greater,
and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 4: Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the
crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the
wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than "vice versa. "
Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the
purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.
Objection 5: On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife
ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is
his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than
in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "lust is a passion
proper to women," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of
their being easily inclined to concupiscence," for neither can dumb
animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of
their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the
punishment of divorce.
Objection 6: Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in
order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman's and
so he should be punished the more.
I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a
par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par
with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for
divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is
sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of
adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as
regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally
bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against
marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a
sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring
the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the
husband's wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than
in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not
for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is
sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in
two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them
may have sinned more grievously than the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to
avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in
women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of
divorce, but not "vice versa. "
Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in
comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for
divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does
not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the husband is the head of the wife, he
is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his.
Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the
husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
Reply to Objection 5: In adultery there is the same sinful character as
in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely
the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common
to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the
wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that
which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore
they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in
man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply
speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously
in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of
reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as
regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and
for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more
grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And
since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that,
simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the
adulterous husband, other things being equal.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the control which the husband receives
over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is
yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another
species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind
of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another's child.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?
Objection 1: It would seem that a husband can marry again after having
a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some
cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of
fornication, as stated above [5003](A[2]). Therefore seemingly at least
in this case he can marry again.
Objection 2: Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion
of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication
is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater
occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent
during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it
would seem lawful for her to marry again.
Objection 3: Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as
regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is
freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from
the law of her husband" [*Rom. 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and
the same applies to her husband.
Objection 4: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:9): "Whosoever shall put away
his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another
committeth adultery. " Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery
if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of
fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:10,11): "Not I, but the Lord,
commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she
depart, that she remain unmarried. "
Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress
would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired
marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish
to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the
husband to contract a second marriage.
I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it:
wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For,
according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they
live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor
union with another can destroy. " Therefore it is unlawful for one,
while the other lives, to marry again.
Reply to Objection 1: Although no one is absolutely bound to
continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife
contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal
intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease,
namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.
Reply to Objection 2: The very shame of having been divorced ought to
keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser
evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after divorce the wife is not bound to
her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with
him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and
consequently she cannot marry again during her husband's lifetime. She
can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband's will,
unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in
pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow
of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be
bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to
demand it.
Reply to Objection 4: The exception expressed in our Lord's words
refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on
a false interpretation.
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Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?
Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled
after being divorced.
