The Epicureans have said some good things,
although
they have not risen beyond the material quality.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
.
I believe he fully realized it but could do nothing about it.
This is why he says that the ultimate differences are unknown and cannot be expressed.
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Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is not easy, because absolutely nothing operates on itself alone, and there is always some distinction between an agent and what is produced or that on which the action and operation work. For that reason, it is good to distinguish matter from soul in the body of nature, and in the soul to distinguish the idea of the species. 15 Hence we affirm that in this body there are three things: first, the universal intellect inherent in things; second, the soul that vivifies all; and third, the substratum. But we shall not refuse the name of philosopher to someone who follows his own bent and takes this formed body, or (as we prefer to call it) this rational animal, and then begins to take as first principle, in some sense, the constituents of this body, such as air, earth, fire, or even the ethereal region and the astral region, or spirit and body, or the void and the plenum (though not the void in Aristotle's sense), or yet another convenient way. Such a philosophy, it seems to me, does not deserve to be repudiated, especially when, no mat- ter what basis is presupposed or what form of construction is contem- plated, it helps to improve speculative science and knowledge of natural things, as was, indeed, done by many ancient philosophers. For it is a sign of an ambitious, presumptuous, envious and vain mind to wish to persuade others that there is only one way to investigate and to attain knowledge of nature, and it is the sign of a madman or man without reason to believe that this way lies within himself alone. So that, although we should always rather prefer, honour and practise the most resolute and constant, the most contemplative and dignified way, and the most lofty method of inquiry, we 15 The universal intellect, mentioned in the following sentence.
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Third dialogue
? should not fault that other method, which is not without fruit, though it does not belong to the same tree.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You approve, then, of the study of different philosophies?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . For those who possess an abundance of time and wit, I recommend it. For others, I approve the study of the best way, provided the gods allow them to guess which it is.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am sure, however, that you do not approve of all philoso- phies, but only of the good or best.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue. Likewise,amongthedifferentmedicalmethods, I do not condemn the one that proceeds magically, applying roots, wearing stones or murmuring incantations, if the severity of the theologians will permit me to speak purely as a natural philosopher. I approve of what is done physically, carried out by means of apothecaries' prescriptions to flux or cause to run bile, blood, phlegm and melancholia. I accept that other method which proceeds alchemically, extracting the quintessences, and using fire to volatilize mercury, deposit salt, make sulphur grow luminous or extract oil from composites. But I do not wish to determine what method is the best among so many medical procedures. If the epileptic, to whom the physician and the alchemist have dedicated so much time in vain, chances to be cured by the magician, he will rightly endorse that medicine over the two other types. Keep to the same reasoning for other methods: none serves less well than another, if it attains the end it has set itself. In my case, I consider the doctor who cures me to be worth more than the others who hurt me or murder me.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What is the reason for the great enmity between these schools of medicine?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Greed, envy, ambition and ignorance. In the main, they hardly understand their own method of treatment, much less those of the other schools. Most of them try to get ahead by casting the others down and showing contempt for whatever they cannot acquire, being unable to ele- vate themselves to honour and profit thanks to their own merits. The best and truest among them is he who is not only physician, but also alchemist and astrologer. But, to return to our point, the best philosophy is that which brings about the perfection of the human intellect most easily and eminently, and most closely corresponds to the truth of nature. The best one renders us, as far as possible, co-operators with nature, whether by div- ination (I mean according to the natural order and the principles of change, not by animal instinct in the manner of beasts and those who resemble
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? them, nor by the inspiration of good or bad demons, like the prophets, nor, finally, under the effect of melancholic enthusiasm, like poets or other contemplatives), or by instituting laws and reforming customs, by practis- ing medicine, or even by becoming acquainted with and leading a blessed and more divine life. That is why no well-organized philosophy exists that does not contain some special quality not found in the others. I understand the same of medicine, which derives from principles that presuppose a fairly good philosophical outlook, as the function of the hand or foot pre- supposes that of the eye. Thus, it is said that there cannot be good medical principles where there is not a good point of departure in philosophy.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youpleasemegreatly,andIpraiseyouinequalmeasure,for just as you are not as vulgar as Aristotle, you are neither as pretentious nor offensive as he, devoting himself to belittling the opinions of all other philosophers as well as their manner of philosophizing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofallthephilosophers,Iknownonemorereliantuponfan- cies and more remote from nature than he. Even if he says excellent things at times, it is recognized that they are not derived from his own principles, but are always propositions borrowed from other philosophers, such as those divine things we see in the books On Generation, Meteors and On Animals and Plants.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Comingbacktothematterathand,doyouholdthatonecan give different definitions of matter, without error or contradiction?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, just as different senses may judge the same object and the same thing may reveal itself in diverse ways. In addition (as we have already mentioned), the same thing may be understood from different points of view.
The Epicureans have said some good things, although they have not risen beyond the material quality. Heraclitus has shown us some excellent things, even though he has not gone beyond the soul. Anaxagoras manages to make progress in the study of nature, claiming to recognize, not only within nature but also outside and perhaps above it, an intellect which is the same as what Socrates, Plato, Trismegistus and our theolo- gians call God. Thus, those who begin from an experimental analysis of simple elements (as they call them)16 make as much progress in discover- ing the secrets of nature as those who start from a rational theory. And, among them, those who start from the study of physiological structure progress no less than those who begin from humours, and they, in turn, do
? 16 I. e. the materialists: on one hand, Anaxagoras (who speaks of 'parts'), and on the other, the followers of Democritus and Epicurus (who speak of 'atoms').
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Third dialogue
? no better than those who begin from the perceptible elements, or, more profoundly, from absolute elements, or from the one matter, which of all principles is the highest and most eminent. Sometimes, he who takes the longest way round does not make the best journey, especially if his purpose is not so much contemplation but action. As for the manner of doing phi- losophy, it will be no less advantageous to explicate forms as proceeding from something implicated than to distinguish them as from a chaos, or to distribute them, as from an ideal source, or have them pass into act as from some state of possibility, or draw them out as from a womb, or bring them out into the light as from a blind and gloomy abyss. For every foundation is good, if it is strong enough to support the edifice, and every seed is suitable, if the trees and the fruit are desirable.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . To come now to our objective, please present us with your own detailed theory of this principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, this principle, called matter, can be considered in two ways: first, as potency; second, as substratum. Regarded as potency, there is nothing in which it cannot be found in a certain way and in the appropriate sense; the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Stoics and others have placed it in the intelligible as well as in the sensible world. But we, who do not understand it exactly as they did, but in a more elevated and broader sense, speak of potency or possibility in the following way. Potency is com- monly divided into active potency, through which its substratum can oper- ate, and passive potency, through which it can exist, or receive, or have, or be the substratum of the efficient in some manner. Without taking active potency into consideration for the moment, I say that potency, in its pas- sive sense (although it is not always passive), may be considered either rel- atively or absolutely. Thus, there is nothing to which we can attribute being without also attributing to it the possibility of being. And this passive potency corresponds so perfectly to active potency that one cannot exist in any way without the other, so that, if the power to make, produce and create has always existed, so, likewise, has the power to be made, produced and created, for one potency implies the other. I mean that in positing one we necessarily posit the other. Since this passive potency does not indicate any weakness in that to which it is attributed, but confirms, rather, its virtue and efficacy, and since the active potency and the passive potency are, in the end, one and the same thing, there is no philosopher or theologian who hes- itates to attribute it to the first, supernatural principle. For the absolute possibility, through which the things that are in act can exist, does not come
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Cause, principle and unity
? before the actuality, nor even after it. Furthermore, the power to be accom- panies the being in act and does not come before it, for if what can exist made itself, it would exist before being made. Consider at present the prime and optimal principle, which is all it can be: if it could not be all, it would not be all; therefore, in it, act and potency are the same thing. This is not the case with other things, which, however much they are what they can be, could possibly not exist at all, or certainly could be something else, or be different from what they are, for nothing outside of the first principle is all that it can be. Man is what he can be, but not all that he can be. A stone is not all it can be, because it is not lime, nor dust, nor vase, nor grass. That which is all that it can be is a unity, which in its being comprises every being. Every other thing is not like that. That is why potency is not the same as act, since act is not absolute but limited. Moreover, the potency is always limited to a single act, because it never has more than one, specific and particular being. And even if it aspires to every form and every act, this is by means of certain dispositions, and following a certain succession of beings, one after another. Hence, every potency, every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) enfolded, united and unique, is unfolded, dis- persed and multiplied in other things. The universe, which is the great simulacrum, the great image and sole-begotten nature, is also all that it can be, through the very species and principal members, and by containing the totality of matter, to which nothing is added, nothing taken away, of com- plete and unified form. But it is also not all that it can be, because of its very differences, its particulars, its modes and its individuals. It is only a shadow of the first act and the first potency, and, in consequence, potency and act are not absolutely one and the same thing in it, since none of its parts is all that it can be. Furthermore, in the specific way that we have mentioned, the universe is all that it can be, in an unfolded, dispersed and distinct man- ner, while its first principle is all it can be in a unified and undifferentiated way, since all is there as a whole, an absolutely one and the same thing without difference or distinction.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What do you say of death, corruption, vices, defects, mon- sters? Do you think they also have a place in that which is all it can be and which is in act all it is in potency?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . These things are neither act nor potency, but defect and impotency found in unfolded things, because they are not all they can be and are compelled into becoming what they can be. Hence, unable to be many things at once, they lose one being in order to have another, and
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Third dialogue
? sometimes they confound one with another, sometimes becoming dimin- ished, mutilated and maimed by the incompatibility of one being with another and by their occupation of the same matter. Getting back to our theme, the first absolute principle is greatness and magnitude, and it is a greatness and magnitude such that it is all it can be. It is not great with a greatness that can be superior or inferior, nor can it be divided, as can be every other greatness that is not all it can be. Hence, it is together maxi- mum, minimum, infinite, indivisible by any measure. It is minimum, yet with nothing greater; maximum, yet with nothing smaller. It is beyond every equality, because it is everything it can be. And what I say of the greatness must also be understood for everything that can be said of it, because it is similarly the goodness which is every possible goodness, the beauty which is every possible beauty. There is no other beautiful thing that is all that it can be except for this one. The unity is that which is all, and can be all absolutely. Moreover, among natural things, we see none which is other than what it is in act; it is through the act that it is what it can be, from the fact that it possesses one kind of actuality. Nevertheless, even in its unique, specific being, no particular thing is all it can be. Take the sun: it is not all the sun can be, nor is it everywhere it can be. When it is east of the earth, it is not to the west, nor at midday, nor any other point. But if we want to show how God is sun, we will say (since he is all that he can be) that he is simultaneously in the east, west, noon, midnight and any other point whatsoever of the convexity of the earth. And so, if we wish to understand that our sun (either because of its own revolution or that of the earth) moves and changes position, because it cannot be found now at one point without being found potentially at all other points, and hence possesses a disposi- tion to be at those points, if, therefore, the sun were all that it could be and possessed all that it was inclined to possess, it would be simultaneously everywhere and in all things; it would be so perfectly mobile and rapid that it would also be absolutely stable and immobile. Therefore, we find, in divine maxims, that the divinity is said to be eternally stable and absolutely rapid in its course from one end to the other. 17 For by immobile, we under- stand that which departs from and returns in the same instant to the east- ern point, and which is not seen any less in the east than in the west or any other point of its circuit. That is why there is no basis on which to affirm that it goes and returns or has gone and returned from and towards such and such a point, rather than from and towards any other of the infinitely 17 Book of Wisdom, ? , ? ? and ? , ? ? .
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Cause, principle and unity
? numerous points. It will, therefore, be found entirely, and always, in the totality of the circle as well as in any of its parts; consequently, each indi- vidual point of the ecliptic contains the entire diameter of the sun. Thus, an indivisible is found to contain the divisible, and this is brought about not through any natural possibility, but through supernatural possibility - I mean, if one supposes this sun to be that which is in act all it can be. This absolute potency is not only what the sun can be, it is also what everything is and what everything can be. Potency of all potencies, act of all acts, life of all lives, soul of all souls, being of all beings; from whence the profound saying of the author of Revelation, 'He who is hath sent me to you; He who is speaks thus. '18 And so, what is elsewhere contrary and opposed is one and the same in him, and every thing in him is the same. And you must reason regarding the differences of time and duration in the same manner as regarding the differences of actuality and possibility. He is, therefore, neither ancient, nor new, so that the author of Revelation describes him rightly as 'first and last'. 19
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency, cannot be comprehended by the intellect, except by way of negatives: I mean, it cannot be grasped either in so far as it can be all, nor in so far as it is all things, for when the intellect wants to understand, it must try to form an intelligible species, and to assimilate and measure itself with that species. But this is an impossible task, for the intellect is never so great that it can- not be more so, while the absolute act, because it is immense on all sides and in all ways, cannot be greater. There is, then, no eye capable of approaching it or gaining access to such a sublime light and so profound an abyss.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The coincidence of this act with absolute potency has been very plainly described by the divine spirit, when it says, 'Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut tenebrae eius, ita et lumen eius' [Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee]. 20 In conclusion, you see, then, how great is the excellence of the potency, and if you like to des- ignate it the essence of matter, into which the vulgar philosophers have not penetrated, you may, without detracting from the divinity, treat it in a man- ner more lofty than has Plato in his Republic and his Timaeus. These works
? 18 The author of the Revelation is the Holy Spirit speaking through scripture; the quote is adapted from Exodus, ? , ? ? .
19 Frequent affirmation in the Bible, e. g. in Isaiah ? ? , ? . 20 Psalms ? ? ? , ? ? .
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Third dialogue
? have scandalized certain theologians because they have placed matter too highly. This has occurred either because these works were lacking in expression, or because the theologians, having been bred on Aristotle's opinions to consider matter solely in the sense of the substratum of natural things, have not understood them well. They do not see that, according to others, matter is understood as being common to the intelligible and sen- sible worlds (to use their terms, which give an equivocal meaning to mat- ter based on an analogy). This is why opinions should be examined with great care before being condemned, and why it is necessary to distinguish terms as much as thoughts, for even if thinkers sometimes agree on a generic idea of matter, they go on to differ in their specific concepts. As for our argument, it is impossible that any theologian should be found (if we suppress the term 'matter', and however captious and malevolent his way of thinking) who would accuse me of impiety for what I say and think of the coincidence between potency and act, taking both terms in an absolute sense. Whence I would like to infer (in the measure allowed) that, in the simulacrum of that act and that potency, insofar as it is in specific act all that it can be in specific potency, the universe being all that it can be (let it be as it will in terms of the particular act and potency), there is a potency that is not separated from the act, a soul which is not separated from that which is animated - I mean, the simple, not the composite, so that the universe has a first principle taken as a unity, and no longer considered dou- bled into material principle and formal principle. This principle may be inferred by comparison with the aforesaid, which is absolute potency and act, so that it is neither difficult nor harmful to admit definitively that as a substance, the whole is one, as Parmenides, treated ignobly by Aristotle, perhaps conceived it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You, therefore, hold that although, in descending along the ladder of nature, there are two substances, one spiritual and one material, both are eventually reduced to one being and one root.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,ifyouthinkthatitcanbetoleratedbythosewhodonot penetrate into the matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Very easily, provided that you do not raise yourself beyond the limits of nature.
? ? ? ? ? ?
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Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
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Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is not easy, because absolutely nothing operates on itself alone, and there is always some distinction between an agent and what is produced or that on which the action and operation work. For that reason, it is good to distinguish matter from soul in the body of nature, and in the soul to distinguish the idea of the species. 15 Hence we affirm that in this body there are three things: first, the universal intellect inherent in things; second, the soul that vivifies all; and third, the substratum. But we shall not refuse the name of philosopher to someone who follows his own bent and takes this formed body, or (as we prefer to call it) this rational animal, and then begins to take as first principle, in some sense, the constituents of this body, such as air, earth, fire, or even the ethereal region and the astral region, or spirit and body, or the void and the plenum (though not the void in Aristotle's sense), or yet another convenient way. Such a philosophy, it seems to me, does not deserve to be repudiated, especially when, no mat- ter what basis is presupposed or what form of construction is contem- plated, it helps to improve speculative science and knowledge of natural things, as was, indeed, done by many ancient philosophers. For it is a sign of an ambitious, presumptuous, envious and vain mind to wish to persuade others that there is only one way to investigate and to attain knowledge of nature, and it is the sign of a madman or man without reason to believe that this way lies within himself alone. So that, although we should always rather prefer, honour and practise the most resolute and constant, the most contemplative and dignified way, and the most lofty method of inquiry, we 15 The universal intellect, mentioned in the following sentence.
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Third dialogue
? should not fault that other method, which is not without fruit, though it does not belong to the same tree.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You approve, then, of the study of different philosophies?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . For those who possess an abundance of time and wit, I recommend it. For others, I approve the study of the best way, provided the gods allow them to guess which it is.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am sure, however, that you do not approve of all philoso- phies, but only of the good or best.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue. Likewise,amongthedifferentmedicalmethods, I do not condemn the one that proceeds magically, applying roots, wearing stones or murmuring incantations, if the severity of the theologians will permit me to speak purely as a natural philosopher. I approve of what is done physically, carried out by means of apothecaries' prescriptions to flux or cause to run bile, blood, phlegm and melancholia. I accept that other method which proceeds alchemically, extracting the quintessences, and using fire to volatilize mercury, deposit salt, make sulphur grow luminous or extract oil from composites. But I do not wish to determine what method is the best among so many medical procedures. If the epileptic, to whom the physician and the alchemist have dedicated so much time in vain, chances to be cured by the magician, he will rightly endorse that medicine over the two other types. Keep to the same reasoning for other methods: none serves less well than another, if it attains the end it has set itself. In my case, I consider the doctor who cures me to be worth more than the others who hurt me or murder me.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What is the reason for the great enmity between these schools of medicine?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Greed, envy, ambition and ignorance. In the main, they hardly understand their own method of treatment, much less those of the other schools. Most of them try to get ahead by casting the others down and showing contempt for whatever they cannot acquire, being unable to ele- vate themselves to honour and profit thanks to their own merits. The best and truest among them is he who is not only physician, but also alchemist and astrologer. But, to return to our point, the best philosophy is that which brings about the perfection of the human intellect most easily and eminently, and most closely corresponds to the truth of nature. The best one renders us, as far as possible, co-operators with nature, whether by div- ination (I mean according to the natural order and the principles of change, not by animal instinct in the manner of beasts and those who resemble
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? them, nor by the inspiration of good or bad demons, like the prophets, nor, finally, under the effect of melancholic enthusiasm, like poets or other contemplatives), or by instituting laws and reforming customs, by practis- ing medicine, or even by becoming acquainted with and leading a blessed and more divine life. That is why no well-organized philosophy exists that does not contain some special quality not found in the others. I understand the same of medicine, which derives from principles that presuppose a fairly good philosophical outlook, as the function of the hand or foot pre- supposes that of the eye. Thus, it is said that there cannot be good medical principles where there is not a good point of departure in philosophy.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youpleasemegreatly,andIpraiseyouinequalmeasure,for just as you are not as vulgar as Aristotle, you are neither as pretentious nor offensive as he, devoting himself to belittling the opinions of all other philosophers as well as their manner of philosophizing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofallthephilosophers,Iknownonemorereliantuponfan- cies and more remote from nature than he. Even if he says excellent things at times, it is recognized that they are not derived from his own principles, but are always propositions borrowed from other philosophers, such as those divine things we see in the books On Generation, Meteors and On Animals and Plants.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Comingbacktothematterathand,doyouholdthatonecan give different definitions of matter, without error or contradiction?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, just as different senses may judge the same object and the same thing may reveal itself in diverse ways. In addition (as we have already mentioned), the same thing may be understood from different points of view.
The Epicureans have said some good things, although they have not risen beyond the material quality. Heraclitus has shown us some excellent things, even though he has not gone beyond the soul. Anaxagoras manages to make progress in the study of nature, claiming to recognize, not only within nature but also outside and perhaps above it, an intellect which is the same as what Socrates, Plato, Trismegistus and our theolo- gians call God. Thus, those who begin from an experimental analysis of simple elements (as they call them)16 make as much progress in discover- ing the secrets of nature as those who start from a rational theory. And, among them, those who start from the study of physiological structure progress no less than those who begin from humours, and they, in turn, do
? 16 I. e. the materialists: on one hand, Anaxagoras (who speaks of 'parts'), and on the other, the followers of Democritus and Epicurus (who speak of 'atoms').
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Third dialogue
? no better than those who begin from the perceptible elements, or, more profoundly, from absolute elements, or from the one matter, which of all principles is the highest and most eminent. Sometimes, he who takes the longest way round does not make the best journey, especially if his purpose is not so much contemplation but action. As for the manner of doing phi- losophy, it will be no less advantageous to explicate forms as proceeding from something implicated than to distinguish them as from a chaos, or to distribute them, as from an ideal source, or have them pass into act as from some state of possibility, or draw them out as from a womb, or bring them out into the light as from a blind and gloomy abyss. For every foundation is good, if it is strong enough to support the edifice, and every seed is suitable, if the trees and the fruit are desirable.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . To come now to our objective, please present us with your own detailed theory of this principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, this principle, called matter, can be considered in two ways: first, as potency; second, as substratum. Regarded as potency, there is nothing in which it cannot be found in a certain way and in the appropriate sense; the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Stoics and others have placed it in the intelligible as well as in the sensible world. But we, who do not understand it exactly as they did, but in a more elevated and broader sense, speak of potency or possibility in the following way. Potency is com- monly divided into active potency, through which its substratum can oper- ate, and passive potency, through which it can exist, or receive, or have, or be the substratum of the efficient in some manner. Without taking active potency into consideration for the moment, I say that potency, in its pas- sive sense (although it is not always passive), may be considered either rel- atively or absolutely. Thus, there is nothing to which we can attribute being without also attributing to it the possibility of being. And this passive potency corresponds so perfectly to active potency that one cannot exist in any way without the other, so that, if the power to make, produce and create has always existed, so, likewise, has the power to be made, produced and created, for one potency implies the other. I mean that in positing one we necessarily posit the other. Since this passive potency does not indicate any weakness in that to which it is attributed, but confirms, rather, its virtue and efficacy, and since the active potency and the passive potency are, in the end, one and the same thing, there is no philosopher or theologian who hes- itates to attribute it to the first, supernatural principle. For the absolute possibility, through which the things that are in act can exist, does not come
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Cause, principle and unity
? before the actuality, nor even after it. Furthermore, the power to be accom- panies the being in act and does not come before it, for if what can exist made itself, it would exist before being made. Consider at present the prime and optimal principle, which is all it can be: if it could not be all, it would not be all; therefore, in it, act and potency are the same thing. This is not the case with other things, which, however much they are what they can be, could possibly not exist at all, or certainly could be something else, or be different from what they are, for nothing outside of the first principle is all that it can be. Man is what he can be, but not all that he can be. A stone is not all it can be, because it is not lime, nor dust, nor vase, nor grass. That which is all that it can be is a unity, which in its being comprises every being. Every other thing is not like that. That is why potency is not the same as act, since act is not absolute but limited. Moreover, the potency is always limited to a single act, because it never has more than one, specific and particular being. And even if it aspires to every form and every act, this is by means of certain dispositions, and following a certain succession of beings, one after another. Hence, every potency, every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) enfolded, united and unique, is unfolded, dis- persed and multiplied in other things. The universe, which is the great simulacrum, the great image and sole-begotten nature, is also all that it can be, through the very species and principal members, and by containing the totality of matter, to which nothing is added, nothing taken away, of com- plete and unified form. But it is also not all that it can be, because of its very differences, its particulars, its modes and its individuals. It is only a shadow of the first act and the first potency, and, in consequence, potency and act are not absolutely one and the same thing in it, since none of its parts is all that it can be. Furthermore, in the specific way that we have mentioned, the universe is all that it can be, in an unfolded, dispersed and distinct man- ner, while its first principle is all it can be in a unified and undifferentiated way, since all is there as a whole, an absolutely one and the same thing without difference or distinction.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What do you say of death, corruption, vices, defects, mon- sters? Do you think they also have a place in that which is all it can be and which is in act all it is in potency?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . These things are neither act nor potency, but defect and impotency found in unfolded things, because they are not all they can be and are compelled into becoming what they can be. Hence, unable to be many things at once, they lose one being in order to have another, and
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Third dialogue
? sometimes they confound one with another, sometimes becoming dimin- ished, mutilated and maimed by the incompatibility of one being with another and by their occupation of the same matter. Getting back to our theme, the first absolute principle is greatness and magnitude, and it is a greatness and magnitude such that it is all it can be. It is not great with a greatness that can be superior or inferior, nor can it be divided, as can be every other greatness that is not all it can be. Hence, it is together maxi- mum, minimum, infinite, indivisible by any measure. It is minimum, yet with nothing greater; maximum, yet with nothing smaller. It is beyond every equality, because it is everything it can be. And what I say of the greatness must also be understood for everything that can be said of it, because it is similarly the goodness which is every possible goodness, the beauty which is every possible beauty. There is no other beautiful thing that is all that it can be except for this one. The unity is that which is all, and can be all absolutely. Moreover, among natural things, we see none which is other than what it is in act; it is through the act that it is what it can be, from the fact that it possesses one kind of actuality. Nevertheless, even in its unique, specific being, no particular thing is all it can be. Take the sun: it is not all the sun can be, nor is it everywhere it can be. When it is east of the earth, it is not to the west, nor at midday, nor any other point. But if we want to show how God is sun, we will say (since he is all that he can be) that he is simultaneously in the east, west, noon, midnight and any other point whatsoever of the convexity of the earth. And so, if we wish to understand that our sun (either because of its own revolution or that of the earth) moves and changes position, because it cannot be found now at one point without being found potentially at all other points, and hence possesses a disposi- tion to be at those points, if, therefore, the sun were all that it could be and possessed all that it was inclined to possess, it would be simultaneously everywhere and in all things; it would be so perfectly mobile and rapid that it would also be absolutely stable and immobile. Therefore, we find, in divine maxims, that the divinity is said to be eternally stable and absolutely rapid in its course from one end to the other. 17 For by immobile, we under- stand that which departs from and returns in the same instant to the east- ern point, and which is not seen any less in the east than in the west or any other point of its circuit. That is why there is no basis on which to affirm that it goes and returns or has gone and returned from and towards such and such a point, rather than from and towards any other of the infinitely 17 Book of Wisdom, ? , ? ? and ? , ? ? .
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? numerous points. It will, therefore, be found entirely, and always, in the totality of the circle as well as in any of its parts; consequently, each indi- vidual point of the ecliptic contains the entire diameter of the sun. Thus, an indivisible is found to contain the divisible, and this is brought about not through any natural possibility, but through supernatural possibility - I mean, if one supposes this sun to be that which is in act all it can be. This absolute potency is not only what the sun can be, it is also what everything is and what everything can be. Potency of all potencies, act of all acts, life of all lives, soul of all souls, being of all beings; from whence the profound saying of the author of Revelation, 'He who is hath sent me to you; He who is speaks thus. '18 And so, what is elsewhere contrary and opposed is one and the same in him, and every thing in him is the same. And you must reason regarding the differences of time and duration in the same manner as regarding the differences of actuality and possibility. He is, therefore, neither ancient, nor new, so that the author of Revelation describes him rightly as 'first and last'. 19
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency, cannot be comprehended by the intellect, except by way of negatives: I mean, it cannot be grasped either in so far as it can be all, nor in so far as it is all things, for when the intellect wants to understand, it must try to form an intelligible species, and to assimilate and measure itself with that species. But this is an impossible task, for the intellect is never so great that it can- not be more so, while the absolute act, because it is immense on all sides and in all ways, cannot be greater. There is, then, no eye capable of approaching it or gaining access to such a sublime light and so profound an abyss.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The coincidence of this act with absolute potency has been very plainly described by the divine spirit, when it says, 'Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut tenebrae eius, ita et lumen eius' [Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee]. 20 In conclusion, you see, then, how great is the excellence of the potency, and if you like to des- ignate it the essence of matter, into which the vulgar philosophers have not penetrated, you may, without detracting from the divinity, treat it in a man- ner more lofty than has Plato in his Republic and his Timaeus. These works
? 18 The author of the Revelation is the Holy Spirit speaking through scripture; the quote is adapted from Exodus, ? , ? ? .
19 Frequent affirmation in the Bible, e. g. in Isaiah ? ? , ? . 20 Psalms ? ? ? , ? ? .
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Third dialogue
? have scandalized certain theologians because they have placed matter too highly. This has occurred either because these works were lacking in expression, or because the theologians, having been bred on Aristotle's opinions to consider matter solely in the sense of the substratum of natural things, have not understood them well. They do not see that, according to others, matter is understood as being common to the intelligible and sen- sible worlds (to use their terms, which give an equivocal meaning to mat- ter based on an analogy). This is why opinions should be examined with great care before being condemned, and why it is necessary to distinguish terms as much as thoughts, for even if thinkers sometimes agree on a generic idea of matter, they go on to differ in their specific concepts. As for our argument, it is impossible that any theologian should be found (if we suppress the term 'matter', and however captious and malevolent his way of thinking) who would accuse me of impiety for what I say and think of the coincidence between potency and act, taking both terms in an absolute sense. Whence I would like to infer (in the measure allowed) that, in the simulacrum of that act and that potency, insofar as it is in specific act all that it can be in specific potency, the universe being all that it can be (let it be as it will in terms of the particular act and potency), there is a potency that is not separated from the act, a soul which is not separated from that which is animated - I mean, the simple, not the composite, so that the universe has a first principle taken as a unity, and no longer considered dou- bled into material principle and formal principle. This principle may be inferred by comparison with the aforesaid, which is absolute potency and act, so that it is neither difficult nor harmful to admit definitively that as a substance, the whole is one, as Parmenides, treated ignobly by Aristotle, perhaps conceived it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You, therefore, hold that although, in descending along the ladder of nature, there are two substances, one spiritual and one material, both are eventually reduced to one being and one root.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,ifyouthinkthatitcanbetoleratedbythosewhodonot penetrate into the matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Very easily, provided that you do not raise yourself beyond the limits of nature.
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