No More Learning

Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness. "
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the
gift of knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow
does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not
concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9).
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good. "

I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last
end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment
of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be
the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of
knowledge.

Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except
in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge
there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in
this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the
reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to
come.

Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth;
yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he
considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far
as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude
of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not
ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about
Divine things.
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OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.

As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?

(5) Of the species of unbelief;

(6) Of their comparison, one with another;

(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?

(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?

(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?

(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?

(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?

(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
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Whether unbelief is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is
contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful. "
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a
sin.

Objection 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since
every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid
unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the
Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they
have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? " Therefore
unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2383]FS, Q[84], A[4]), there
are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief
does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is
not a sin.

On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and
unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure
negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has
not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to
the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises
it, according to Is. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report? " It is this
that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that
unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those
who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of
sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is
a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are
damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away
without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our
Lord said (Jn. 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they
would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan. )
as "referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ. "

Reply to Objection 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature,
but it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his
inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this
way, unbelief is contrary to nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure
negation.

Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from
pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the
rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise
from vainglory. "

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital
vices.
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Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its
subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De
Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above
[2384](A[1]). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the
intellect.

Objection 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the
preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore
unbelief is in the will.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx. ] on 2 Cor.
11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says
that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a
good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or
says what is becoming to a good angel. " This seems to be because of the
rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his
intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief
seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it
does not reside in the intellect.

On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the
same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the
intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above ([2385]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2), sin is said
to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a
sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal
principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,
because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act
is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:
thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore
these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is
the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however,
by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's
dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of
unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one,
does not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right
judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,
according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to
invite one to his abode, i. e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a
heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact
that he is a heretic. " But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we
ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was a
blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .
mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief. " Therefore
unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be. " Now a greater punishment is due to
believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more,
do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under
foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament
unclean, by which he was sanctified? " Therefore unbelief is not the
greatest of sins.

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not
come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix
in Joan. ): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great
sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be
traced. " Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above ([2386]FS, Q[71], A[6]; [2387]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the
more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than
ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach
Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the
sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
further on ([2388]Q[20], A[3];[2389] Q[34], A[2], ad 2;[2390] Q[39],
A[2], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its
genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not
sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave
generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the
sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.

Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect
it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has
a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from
malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his
sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we
consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e. g.
adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer,
other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both
on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which
he insults by committing sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says:
"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin. " Now the life of unbelievers
consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a
sin.

Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.

Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.

On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.

I answer that, As stated above ([2391]FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either
that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no
sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin.
Hence the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously. "

Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct
the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural
reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in
them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth
of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to
give him fuller instruction in the faith.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are several species of unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not
on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several
species of unbelief, according to the various points which the
unbeliever disbelieves.

Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith
in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our
consideration.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different
species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a
diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species
of unbelief.

On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith
is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.

I answer that, As stated above ([2392]FS, Q[55], A[4]; [2393]FS, Q[64],
A[1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation.
Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed
to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to
their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are
determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral
virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by
falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed
to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the
various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite
number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e. g. temperance or
fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the
various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the
rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held
evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number.
For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this
may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in
two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which
case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his
sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may
be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken
is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to
the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to
charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various
temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to
God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First
Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers
follow many false opinions.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of
unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.

Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many
things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many
things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet
nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief,
even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
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Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according
as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so
does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which
holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most
important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the
heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is
the gravest of all.

Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those
which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more
numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they
do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.

Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some
good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known
it, to turn back. " Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some
way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

I answer that, As stated above [2394](A[5]), two things may be
considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from
this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins
more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins
more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the
unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of
the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however,
they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they
corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the
Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above [2395](A[1]) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere
absence of faith, for the latter as was stated [2396](A[1]) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely,
the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not
in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers. " But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.

Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone
ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once
been judged and disposed of. " Now all matters of faith have been
decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.

Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas
things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter
of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of
faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul increased
much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . .
. to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks. "

I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the
faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though
he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as
being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is
praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or
for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence.
But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because
either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance,
Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or
else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those
countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is
necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those
who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in
this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers
are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to
withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would
tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as
a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed. " On the other
hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the
faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very
reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from
what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what
unbelievers have to say against the faith.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid
disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious
words rather than of sound speeches.

Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about
the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not
as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending
the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy
everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in
you [*Vulg. : 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is
apparently taken from Bede]. " Sometimes again, it is necessary, in
order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That
he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the
gainsayers. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mat. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked
him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up? " and that he answered:
"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also
together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in
Matth. ): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it
is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily
slay many innocent persons. " Therefore it seems that for the same
reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can. , De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for
the future, none are to be compelled to believe. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing. " Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]):
"I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg. : 'of him that dieth']. "
Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
([2397]FS, Q[19], AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in. " Now men enter into the house
of God, i. e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.

I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because
to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled
by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder
the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even
by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's
faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of
forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and
take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if
they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of
Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil
what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to
forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears
from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent.
xciii) of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be
compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight
with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was
so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our
chains asunder. " Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer
both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from those which
precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also
together with it. " For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
"these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say,
when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he
has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of
discipline should not slacken. "

Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith,
ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they
have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated
in the same chapter.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and
keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a
matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has
received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be
compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface
(Ep. clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel? '
They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards
taught Him. "

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to
have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he
had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers
together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her
maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations. "
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Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that
is set before you. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb. ): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any
reservation. " Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with
him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to
do to judge them that are without? " Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate
with unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages
with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of
the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we
should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have
any dealings with them. "

I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be
gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? " and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within? "

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i. e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. "

With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me. "
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Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them. " Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward. " Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.

Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed.