But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above
[3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature.
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above
[3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature.
Summa Theologica
For all other knowledge
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of
faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ
there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it
would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms.
Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the
disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary.
Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition,
as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that
since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to
have any other knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to
sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to
intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at
once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither
can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and
the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. "
I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible
things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its
completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38.
And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge,
inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is
personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which
the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of
the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species
upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning
knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening
knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused
species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in
Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the
Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species
proportioned to the human mind.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially
opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith
to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1],
A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to
beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two
ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive
the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but
remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a
dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by
demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain
the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to
say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he
who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the
probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise
in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains
infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that
is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP,
Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately,
inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind
as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a
form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together
with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being
in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.
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Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by
which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn.
7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters,
having never learned? " Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no
acquired knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the
power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could
accrue to His soul.
Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge,
acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses
(otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing
together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and
increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge,
it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He
perceived by the senses.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the
Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i. e.
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ
an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now
it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but
an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of
Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect.
But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of
Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation
is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of
the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by
abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18)
that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual. "
And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible
species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active
intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which
some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii,
D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was
acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion,
both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause.
For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].
Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring
knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is
the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said
(Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself:
yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright. " And hence it was more
fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by
being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice. "
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher
things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i. e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect.
Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ
should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was
insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to
be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the
human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot
be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different
nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from
phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however,
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now
remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge;
(2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here
only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any
other creature?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed. " Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity
in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is
the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ
comprehends the Divine Essence.
Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in
Christ. " Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the
soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ
comprehended the Divine Essence.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs
by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself. " But the Divine Essence is not
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i. e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is
not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul
of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine
Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards
comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge
above the rest of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the
human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for
although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of
the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by
the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was
united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the
world's government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body. " So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i. e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of
the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of
God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of
the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul,
but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man
is the Creator.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?
Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father. " Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of
Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know
all things in the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i. e. the created would equal the uncreated,
which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i. e. "the knowledge
of all things. "
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For
every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many
more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified
intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to
Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as
all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of
all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and
therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in
whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so
that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can
be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His
soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may
be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act
at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the
Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know
in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do,
which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the
Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it
can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in
the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in
the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature,
and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the
Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge.
But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by
Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by
the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the
contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i. e.
"Now I have made thee know. " But the Father is said to know, because He
imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we
are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine
Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom.
lxxviii in Matth. ), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to
judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the
less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract.
xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant
of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the
adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is
said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can
do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in
the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all
things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not
all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in
the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of
things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the
uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created
light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking,
the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not
only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of
things known, as was stated above.
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Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken. " But it is impossible for the definition
to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that
contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the
soul of Christ knows the infinite.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But
the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its
capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ
cannot know the infinite.
Objection 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite.
But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking,
than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above [3977](A[2]).
Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can
do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He is
the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for
those of the whole world. " Therefore the soul of Christ knows the
infinite.
I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are
convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First,
simply, i. e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i. e.
whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph.
ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in
potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act,
and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of
itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence,
with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not
know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even
though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever,
since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever:
consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking
generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and
corruption.
But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above
[3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in
the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it
knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple
intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: As we said in the [3979]FP, Q[8], A[1], the
infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus
we have the negatively infinite, i. e. a form or act not limited by
being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is
most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is
not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is
said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet
does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter,
which is taken privatively, i. e. inasmuch as it has not the form it
ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity.
Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it
were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all
knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known
according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is
that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this
way it is true that, if we take something from it, i. e. taking part
after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material
things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things
unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not
after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in
themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in
this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things,
inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but
in a certain unity, i. e. in any creature in whose potentiality infinite
things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being
infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we
imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if
there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative
infinity, i. e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be
finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific
nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said
in the [3980]FP, Q[7], A[2]. Now the proper object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the
notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a
finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply
infinite in essence, as stated above (A[1] ). But the infinite in
potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of
Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in
which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a
universal---for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a
manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite
number.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but
one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies
have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies.
Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the
existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose
several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth.
Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to
things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys.
iii, 37,38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so,
too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that
it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it
is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence,
if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the
infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is
plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this
particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts;
yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts
besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even
numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are
infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus
it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every
way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect,
nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater
outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things
in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the
power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the
soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple
intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or
understanding.
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Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly
than does any other creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of
knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have
by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which
we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the
Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the
[3981]FP, Q[12], A[2]. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than any other creature.
Objection 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the
power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul
of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see
the Word more perfectly than the angels.
Objection 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than
does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate
degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner
in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert
that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more
perfectly than does every other creature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that God set Christ
"on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and
power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in
this world, but also in that which is to come. " But in that heavenly
glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God.
Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any
other creature.
I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the
blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from
the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: "The Word of
God on high is the fountain of Wisdom. " Now the soul of Christ, since
it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word
of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light
in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And
therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First
Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jn.
1:14): "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten
of the Father," "full" not only of "grace" but also of "truth. "
Reply to Objection 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing
known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on
the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a
conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this
way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light,
knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed,
although all see the Divine Essence in itself.
Reply to Objection 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the
natural power of any creature, as was said in the [3982]FP, Q[12],
A[4]. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace
in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the
angelic nature is placed before the human.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3983]Q[7], A[12]), there cannot
be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union
with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the
Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher
and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of
Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
(3) Whether this knowledge was collative?
(4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;
(5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?
(6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?
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Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know
all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the
perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the
human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply,
but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act
by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are
knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not
know what exceeded the natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to
sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to
the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color.
Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to
know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate
substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the
perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He
did not know separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the
intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge
the soul of Christ did not know singulars.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that "the Spirit of wisdom
and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him [*Vulg. :
'The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and
understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . .
. '; cf. Ecclus. 15:5]," under which are included all that may be
known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the
knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of
all conclusions to knowledge [scientia], the knowledge of all practical
things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ
had the knowledge of all things.
I answer that, As was said above ([3984]Q[9], A[1]), it was fitting
that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of
its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the
human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one
in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the
first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a
natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential
power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to
act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of
Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man's active
intellect, e. g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this
knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine
revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of
prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ
knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not
know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of
which we spoke above ([3985]Q[10]).
Reply to Objection 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an
intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the
active intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since
it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand
without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the
state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to
know separate substances by itself, as was said in the [3986]FP, Q[89],
AA[1],2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the
blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but
also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in
the same way that a separated soul could.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the
perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but
in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of
singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence
for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of
present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De
Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the
gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things---present,
past, and future.
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Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand
by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated
De Anima iii, 18,31,39, phantasms are compared to man's intellective
soul as colors to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become
actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could
understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours.
otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what
the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of
men. " But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms.
Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.
Objection 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect.
Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to
phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul
of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it
seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to
phantasms.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not
be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could
understand without turning to phantasms.
I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same
time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown
([3987]Q[15], A[10]). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on
the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a
comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the
condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject
to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after
the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the
soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered
by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And
hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand
without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of
Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor.
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is
not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the
power of seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective
power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which
it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the
present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both
powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of
both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different
states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never
but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing
without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know
without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same
nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in
fact, but only in hope, i. e. the state of comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand
without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning
to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as
the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge,
but for the need of animal life.
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Whether this knowledge is collative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this
knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
14): "We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ. " Now these things
are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and
discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or
discursive knowledge in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in
order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything,
as was said above ([3988]Q[10], A[2]). Hence there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of
comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Mat. 22:30.
Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as
Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.
On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown ([3989]Q[5],
A[4]). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in
comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there
was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.
I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways.
First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who
proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to
effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul
was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now
considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of
reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in
use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in
order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in
this way the knowledge in Christ's soul could be collative or
discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it
pleased, as in Mat. 17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: "Of whom do
the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of
strangers? " On Peter replying: "Of strangers," He concluded: "Then the
children are free. "
Reply to Objection 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is
with doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such
counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison,
as used to acquire knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the
gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And
hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of
the blessed, but not to angels.
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Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in
Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing
perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the
angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is
imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this
knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is
perfected.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure
comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the
knowledge of the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it
is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the
knowledge of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a
body, and turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels.
Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of
Christ's soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus, Who
was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death,
crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that Christ is
said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of
death. And hence, not in knowledge.
I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked
at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause;
secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now
with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of
Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the
number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the
spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more
excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as
regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is
less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is
natural to the human soul, i. e. by turning to phantasms, and by
comparison and discursion.
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of
faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ
there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it
would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a
more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms,
disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms.
Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the
disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary.
Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition,
as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that
since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to
have any other knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to
sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to
intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at
once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither
can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and
the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. "
I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the
human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now
everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act.
But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible
things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its
completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38.
And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge,
inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is
personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which
the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of
the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species
upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge---one the morning
knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening
knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused
species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in
Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the
Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge,
whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species
proportioned to the human mind.
Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially
opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith
to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1],
A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to
beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two
ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect
proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive
the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but
remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a
dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by
demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain
the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to
say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he
who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the
probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise
in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains
infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by
beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that
is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the
Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP,
Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately,
inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind
as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a
form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together
with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being
in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.
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Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and
acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most
perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most
perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by
which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn.
7:15): "The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters,
having never learned? " Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no
acquired knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the
power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely
infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could
accrue to His soul.
Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge,
acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses
(otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing
together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and
increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge,
it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He
perceived by the senses.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the
Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i. e.
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ
an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.
I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now
it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but
an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of
Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect.
But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the
Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of
Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation
is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of
the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by
abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18)
that the active intellect is that "whereby everything is made actual. "
And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible
species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active
intellect---which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which
some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii,
D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was
acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion,
both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause.
For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is
natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the
soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of
knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific
knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and
natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].
Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring
knowledge---by discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is
the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said
(Ethic. i, 4): "He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself:
yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright. " And hence it was more
fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by
being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all,
according to Joel 2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He
hath given you a Teacher of justice. "
Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher
things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused
knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i. e. to phantasms,
which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect.
Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ
should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was
insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to
be also perfected with regard to phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed
together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the
human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot
be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different
nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from
phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.
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OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however,
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now
remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge;
(2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.
But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here
only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine
Essence?
(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?
(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?
(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any
other creature?
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Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man
assumed. " Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity
in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is
the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ
comprehends the Divine Essence.
Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater
than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6), "the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in
Christ. " Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the
soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ
comprehended the Divine Essence.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs
by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever
comprehends itself is finite to itself. " But the Divine Essence is not
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.
I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i. e. "the uncreated
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was
shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is
not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul
of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine
Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards
comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge
above the rest of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the
human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for
although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of
the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by
the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I
would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was
united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the
world's government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He
transferred it to that little body. " So likewise the soul of Christ
sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it
does not see It totally, i. e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as
was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of
the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of
God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of
the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son
of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul,
but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man
is the Creator.
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Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?
Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all
things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the
Father. " Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.
Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the
more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly
than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of
Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know
all things in the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known.
If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word
knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would
equal the Divine knowledge, i. e. the created would equal the uncreated,
which is impossible.
On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i. e. "the knowledge
of all things. "
I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done,
said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it
must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For
every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many
more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified
intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to
Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as
all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of
all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and
therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in
whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so
that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can
be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His
soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may
be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act
at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never
have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the
Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know
in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do,
which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the
Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it
can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in
the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in
the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature,
and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the
power of the creature.
Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of
the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as
was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the
Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge.
But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God,
as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by
Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.
He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the
Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by
the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the
contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i. e.
"Now I have made thee know. " But the Father is said to know, because He
imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we
are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine
Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom.
lxxviii in Matth. ), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to
judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the
less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract.
xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant
of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the
adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly
than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all
things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is
said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can
do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in
the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all
things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not
all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and
thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the
number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge.
Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in
the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of
things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the
knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the
uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created
light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking,
the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not
only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of
things known, as was stated above.
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Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the
infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is
repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is
said to be that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken. " But it is impossible for the definition
to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that
contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the
soul of Christ knows the infinite.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But
the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its
capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ
cannot know the infinite.
Objection 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite.
But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking,
than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above [3977](A[2]).
Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can
do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He is
the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for
those of the whole world. " Therefore the soul of Christ knows the
infinite.
I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are
convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First,
simply, i. e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i. e.
whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph.
ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in
potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act,
and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of
itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence,
with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not
know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even
though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever,
since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever:
consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking
generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and
corruption.
But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above
[3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in
the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it
knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple
intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: As we said in the [3979]FP, Q[8], A[1], the
infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus
we have the negatively infinite, i. e. a form or act not limited by
being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is
most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is
not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is
said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet
does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter,
which is taken privatively, i. e. inasmuch as it has not the form it
ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity.
Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it
were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all
knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known
according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is
that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this
way it is true that, if we take something from it, i. e. taking part
after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material
things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things
unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not
after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in
themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in
this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things,
inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but
in a certain unity, i. e. in any creature in whose potentiality infinite
things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being
infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we
imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if
there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative
infinity, i. e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be
finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific
nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said
in the [3980]FP, Q[7], A[2]. Now the proper object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the
notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a
finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply
infinite in essence, as stated above (A[1] ). But the infinite in
potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of
Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in
which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a
universal---for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a
manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite
number.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but
one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies
have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies.
Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the
existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose
several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth.
Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to
things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys.
iii, 37,38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so,
too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that
it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it
is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence,
if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the
infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is
plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this
particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts;
yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts
besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even
numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are
infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus
it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every
way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect,
nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater
outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things
in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the
power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the
soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple
intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or
understanding.
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Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly
than does any other creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of
knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have
by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which
we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the
Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the
[3981]FP, Q[12], A[2]. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the
Word more perfectly than any other creature.
Objection 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the
power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul
of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see
the Word more perfectly than the angels.
Objection 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than
does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate
degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner
in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert
that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more
perfectly than does every other creature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that God set Christ
"on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and
power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in
this world, but also in that which is to come. " But in that heavenly
glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God.
Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any
other creature.
I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the
blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from
the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: "The Word of
God on high is the fountain of Wisdom. " Now the soul of Christ, since
it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word
of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light
in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And
therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First
Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jn.
1:14): "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten
of the Father," "full" not only of "grace" but also of "truth. "
Reply to Objection 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing
known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on
the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a
conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this
way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light,
knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed,
although all see the Divine Essence in itself.
Reply to Objection 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the
natural power of any creature, as was said in the [3982]FP, Q[12],
A[4]. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace
in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the
angelic nature is placed before the human.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3983]Q[7], A[12]), there cannot
be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union
with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the
Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher
and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of
Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?
(2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
(3) Whether this knowledge was collative?
(4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;
(5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?
(6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?
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Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know
all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the
perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the
human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply,
but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act
by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are
knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not
know what exceeded the natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to
sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to
the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color.
Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to
know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate
substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the
perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He
did not know separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the
intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge
the soul of Christ did not know singulars.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that "the Spirit of wisdom
and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him [*Vulg. :
'The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and
understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . .
. '; cf. Ecclus. 15:5]," under which are included all that may be
known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the
knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of
all conclusions to knowledge [scientia], the knowledge of all practical
things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ
had the knowledge of all things.
I answer that, As was said above ([3984]Q[9], A[1]), it was fitting
that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of
its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the
human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one
in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the
first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a
natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential
power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to
act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of
Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man's active
intellect, e. g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this
knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine
revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of
prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ
knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not
know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of
which we spoke above ([3985]Q[10]).
Reply to Objection 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an
intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the
active intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since
it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand
without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the
state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to
know separate substances by itself, as was said in the [3986]FP, Q[89],
AA[1],2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the
blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but
also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in
the same way that a separated soul could.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the
perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but
in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of
singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence
for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of
present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De
Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the
gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things---present,
past, and future.
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Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand
by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated
De Anima iii, 18,31,39, phantasms are compared to man's intellective
soul as colors to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become
actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could
understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours.
otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what
the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of
men. " But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms.
Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.
Objection 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect.
Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to
phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul
of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it
seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to
phantasms.
On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not
be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could
understand without turning to phantasms.
I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same
time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown
([3987]Q[15], A[10]). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on
the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a
comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the
condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject
to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after
the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the
soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered
by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And
hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand
without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of
Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor.
Reply to Objection 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is
not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the
power of seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective
power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which
it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the
present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both
powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of
both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different
states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never
but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing
without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know
without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same
nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in
fact, but only in hope, i. e. the state of comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand
without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning
to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as
the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge,
but for the need of animal life.
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Whether this knowledge is collative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this
knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
14): "We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ. " Now these things
are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and
discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or
discursive knowledge in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in
order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything,
as was said above ([3988]Q[10], A[2]). Hence there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of
comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Mat. 22:30.
Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as
Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or
collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.
On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown ([3989]Q[5],
A[4]). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in
comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there
was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.
I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways.
First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who
proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to
effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul
was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now
considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of
reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in
use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in
order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in
this way the knowledge in Christ's soul could be collative or
discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it
pleased, as in Mat. 17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: "Of whom do
the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of
strangers? " On Peter replying: "Of strangers," He concluded: "Then the
children are free. "
Reply to Objection 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is
with doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such
counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison,
as used to acquire knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the
gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And
hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of
the blessed, but not to angels.
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Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in
Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing
perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the
angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is
imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this
knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is
perfected.
Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure
comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the
knowledge of the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it
is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the
knowledge of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a
body, and turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels.
Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of
Christ's soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus, Who
was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death,
crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that Christ is
said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of
death. And hence, not in knowledge.
I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked
at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause;
secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now
with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of
Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the
number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the
spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more
excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as
regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is
less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is
natural to the human soul, i. e. by turning to phantasms, and by
comparison and discursion.
