5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i.
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i.
Summa Theologica
On the other hand, venial sin is called a
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the
law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and
so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not
actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore
act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is
enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now
venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's
glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity,
which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that
he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good,
not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed
in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God,
which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87],
A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it
can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of
malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability
belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are
remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or
ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause,
as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do
not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3;
A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason
are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin.
Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result. " Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or
totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin
contains something diminishing its guilt, e. g. a sin committed through
weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause":
totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it
deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial
sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e. g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of
one's neighbor, e. g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such
sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the
sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's
neighbor, e. g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such
sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes
that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes
mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end
therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in
its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the
commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of
the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of
the act being imperfect, i. e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that
is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary
to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are
mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
dispositions and habits are engendered. " But mortal and venial sin
differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial
sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works
that it may destroy them. " Therefore even good works would be venial
sins, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little. " Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little
he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is
a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically
venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin
generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this
same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin
which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or
habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust
of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin:
since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to
that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often
venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a
sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because
he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some
particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to
the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a
mortal sin in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in
contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with
substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but
it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order,
albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to
mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin
accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to
mortal sin, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.
For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan. ): "The
slightest," i. e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them. " Now a
sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul.
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent
of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as
stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and
incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease
may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial
sin can become mortal.
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a
sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so
that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it
is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated
above [1928](A[2]).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many
venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because
all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment
equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the
duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as
stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the
pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the
privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as
Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth. ). It is also evident as regards
the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the
pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one
another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3])
with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial
sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial
sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which
preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the
movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may
undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which
cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an
imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being
perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a
disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident
which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be
frequent, they become mortal sins. " But anger and drunkenness are not
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal
sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but
that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of
an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such,
is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to
be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral
act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of
another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his
wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this
other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed
to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the
last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a
venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only
when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were,
the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a
sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something
supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e. g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act,
in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it
last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent
of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement
tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry
with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that
would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long
it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give
rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere
lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is
directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary
to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or
weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of
his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in
that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance
no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way
to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore
the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in
those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if
the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1):
because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on
account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because
venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
[1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,
that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who
sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that
a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple
fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits
the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to
refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting
counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and
accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more
distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of
justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
can a mortal sin become venial.
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial
sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the
purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become
imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by
the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for
the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter
an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said
above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of
deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from
deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species
of the act is destroyed.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from
perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man
and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin
altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that
commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either
mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the
ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the
love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby
he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those
things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good
end. " Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge
who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of
the common weal, are not murderers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Poenit. ) [*Hom. 50, inter. L. , 2], that if
venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as
to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of
sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial
sins cause a stain in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account
of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But,
in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the
affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86],
A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing
through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the
soul.
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph.
5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i. e. , some grievous sin. " Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way
of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors,
the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the
soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak,
intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial
sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual
comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of
charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on
([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their
acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the
thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial
sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in
so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many
venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they
would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act
destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a
temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace,
which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last
end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not
cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated
as "wood," "hay," and "stubble. " Because wood hay and stubble are said
( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins
are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be
saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who
commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e. g. when a man
dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial
sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who
build "gold, silver, precious stones," i. e. love of God and our
neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,
and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do
good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Therefore venial sins
are not suitably designated by these three.
Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and
degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
these three.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that
he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of
temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above
([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to
them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves
of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the
kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says
that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by
fire. " Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote
mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial
sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a
good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so
that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do
anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the
love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by
"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by
"wood," "hay," and "stubble. "
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are
designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a
house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be
burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in
a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers
fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after
this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the
spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but
because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written
(Ps. 136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i. e. "beside the waters":
because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay
and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
the "foundation. " And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17:
"Rooted and founded in charity. " Accordingly, he that dies in mortal
sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built
upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as
by fire.
Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of
temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight
venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of
charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do
not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy
about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such
frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2),
"all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the
end. " Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz.
to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt
up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins
are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or
less attached to them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the
state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a
gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was
possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done
was a venial sin. " But he would not have thought this unless he could
have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin
without sinning mortally.
Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not
suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all
there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should
have been checked. " Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat,
which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be
nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the
experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken
the forbidden fruit. " Again there seems to have been a certain movement
of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as
appears from her saying (Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die. " Now these
apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin
before he committed a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of
the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could
also sin venially.
On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive
him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's
state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species,
unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or
vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point.
Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal
by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore
understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was
impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before
losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now
each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of
the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden
rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality
not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a
movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution
of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which
proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that
the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end,
the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the
things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end,
which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in
matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3;
Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the
[1941]FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an unerring stability of order, so
that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as
man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13).
Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the
highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal
sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could
not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the
same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is
easily forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was
his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall
into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man,
by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for
she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention
the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.
Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the
original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial
sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is
incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the
first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.
Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which
is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in
Evang. ) that "man understands in common with the angels. " But man can
commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel
can commit a venial sin also.
Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel
could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning
mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God
inordinately, by sinning venially.
Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial
sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal
sin to be venial as stated above [1942](A[3]), unless there is a
special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel
can sin venially.
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the [1943]FP,
Q[58], A[3]; [1944]FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i. e. it does not
proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both
separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect
considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its
principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8],
A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), ends are like principles, while the
means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed
to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end.
Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness
in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an
inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now
good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the
due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so
that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are
moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin
of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of
their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural
good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ([1945]FP, Q[63],
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind
or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God,
without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end,
or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which
seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to
mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on
account of the end they have in view.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that
"there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who
walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the
concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7).
Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation
to those who walk not according to the flesh, i. e. by consenting to
concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are
not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of
condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal
sins.
Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those
who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow
the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh. "
But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels
the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it
seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are
mortal sins.
Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man
was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence. " Now this
liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which
the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an
unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts
against his duty.
On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a
respecter of persons. " Therefore he does not impute to one unto
condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not
impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither
therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of
unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is
evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not
be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ([1946]Q[79], A[4]). Now
the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers.
Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the
sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes
sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above ([1947]Q[73],
A[10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an
unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more
deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1
Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in
my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on
account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath
esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was
sanctified? "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due
to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus
Christ, although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the
fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign
of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore
the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was
a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such
liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with
original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a
disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ([1948]Q[88], A[3]).
Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted,
venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have
venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less
connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But
an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin
without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin
without committing a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child
is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that
time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal
sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible
for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short
it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin
alone and without mortal sin.
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on
(SS, Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than
mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be
punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore,
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he
is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the
first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate
about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will,
by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he
does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is
capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for
through not doing that which is in his power to do.
sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to
mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to
substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not
"against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law
forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts
"beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the
law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and
so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not
actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore
act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each
time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is
enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now
venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's
glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity,
which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that
he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good,
not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in
contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically
good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed
in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God,
which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87],
A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it
can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of
malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability
belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are
remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed
through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or
ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause,
as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do
not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3;
A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason
are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin.
Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial":
and this is called venial "from the result. " Secondly, a sin is called
venial because it does not contain anything either partially or
totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin
contains something diminishing its guilt, e. g. a sin committed through
weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause":
totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it
deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial
sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e. g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of
one's neighbor, e. g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such
sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the
sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's
neighbor, e. g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such
sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes
that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes
mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end
therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in
its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the
commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of
the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of
the act being imperfect, i. e. not deliberated by reason, which is the
proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that
is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence
it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary
to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are
mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to
mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated
above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,
wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
dispositions and habits are engendered. " But mortal and venial sin
differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore
venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to
mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial
sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works
that it may destroy them. " Therefore even good works would be venial
sins, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth
small things shall fall by little and little. " Now he that sins
venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little
he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is
a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the
effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves
indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is
said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin
disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically
venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin
generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this
same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin
which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or
habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust
of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin:
since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to
that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often
venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act
disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a
sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because
he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some
particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to
the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will
even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a
mortal sin in its genus.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in
contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with
substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but
it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order,
albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).
Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to
mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin
accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to
mortal sin, as stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.
For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: "He that believeth
not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan. ): "The
slightest," i. e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them. " Now a
sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul.
Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent
of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as
stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can
become mortal.
Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and
incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease
may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial
sin can become mortal.
I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be
understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at
first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a
sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so
that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the
act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it
is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,
becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in
that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated
above [1928](A[2]).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins
constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many
venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because
all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment
equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the
duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as
stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the
pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the
privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as
Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth. ). It is also evident as regards
the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the
pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one
another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one
mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3])
with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial
sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial
sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which
preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the
movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding
disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may
undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which
cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an
imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being
perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a
disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident
which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm.
xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be
frequent, they become mortal sins. " But anger and drunkenness are not
mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal
sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that
delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but
that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a
circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal
sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a
good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much
more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act
be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of
an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10]
,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such,
is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to
be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses
its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral
act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of
another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his
wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this
other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed
to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it
has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin
consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,
whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the
last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a
venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only
when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were,
the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a
sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by
something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new
species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something
supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e. g.
disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act,
in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it
last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent
of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement
tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry
with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that
would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long
it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give
rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere
lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is
directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary
to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or
weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of
his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in
that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the
excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance
no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way
to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore
the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in
those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if
the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1):
because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on
account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because
venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
[1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,
that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who
sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that
a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less
than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple
fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits
the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to
refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting
counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and
accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more
distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of
justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore
can a mortal sin become venial.
On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal
sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the
genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial
sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to
the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the
purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become
imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by
the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for
the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter
an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by
reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not
completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a
deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said
above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of
deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from
deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species
of the act is destroyed.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from
perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man
and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin
altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that
commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either
mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the
ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the
love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby
he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those
things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good
end. " Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be
well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge
who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of
the common weal, are not murderers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay,"
"stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
For Augustine says (De Poenit. ) [*Hom. 50, inter. L. , 2], that if
venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as
to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of
sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial
sins cause a stain in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account
of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But,
in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the
affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a
temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86],
A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing
through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the
soul.
On the contrary, it is written, (Eph.
5:27): "That He might present it
to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the
gloss says: "i. e. , some grievous sin. " Therefore it seems proper to
mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of
comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal
matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way
of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness,
one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors,
the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the
soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak,
intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial
sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual
comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of
charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on
([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their
acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the
thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial
sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated
anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in
so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many
venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they
would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act
destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a
temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace,
which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last
end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not
cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated
as "wood," "hay," and "stubble. " Because wood hay and stubble are said
( 1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins
are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not
suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be
saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who
commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e. g. when a man
dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial
sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who
build "gold, silver, precious stones," i. e. love of God and our
neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,
and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do
good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Therefore venial sins
are not suitably designated by these three.
Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and
degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
these three.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds
up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that
he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of
temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above
([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith,
upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to
them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves
of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the
kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says
that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by
fire. " Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote
mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are
indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial
sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a
good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his
possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so
that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do
anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the
love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by
"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by
"wood," "hay," and "stubble. "
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate
themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are
designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a
house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be
burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in
a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers
fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after
this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the
spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but
because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written
(Ps. 136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i. e. "beside the waters":
because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay
and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
the "foundation. " And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have
esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17:
"Rooted and founded in charity. " Accordingly, he that dies in mortal
sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built
upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as
by fire.
Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of
temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight
venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of
charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do
not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy
about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such
frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2),
"all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the
end. " Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz.
to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt
up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins
are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or
less attached to them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the
state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a
gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was
possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done
was a venial sin. " But he would not have thought this unless he could
have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin
without sinning mortally.
Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not
suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all
there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should
have been checked. " Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat,
which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be
nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the
experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken
the forbidden fruit. " Again there seems to have been a certain movement
of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as
appears from her saying (Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die. " Now these
apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin
before he committed a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of
the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could
also sin venially.
On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal
was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive
him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's
state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a
venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be
understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin
which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had
committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that
aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species,
unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or
vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point.
Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal
by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore
understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was
impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before
losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through
the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a
genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things
referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now
each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of
the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden
rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality
not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a
movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution
of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which
proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that
the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end,
the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the
things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end,
which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in
matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3;
Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the
[1941]FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an unerring stability of order, so
that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as
man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13).
Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the
highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal
sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could
not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the
same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is
easily forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was
his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall
into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man,
by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for
she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention
the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.
Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the
original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial
sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is
incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the
first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.
Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which
is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in
Evang. ) that "man understands in common with the angels. " But man can
commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel
can commit a venial sin also.
Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel
could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning
mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God
inordinately, by sinning venially.
Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial
sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal
sin to be venial as stated above [1942](A[3]), unless there is a
special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel
can sin venially.
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man
in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the [1943]FP,
Q[58], A[3]; [1944]FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i. e. it does not
proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both
separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect
considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its
principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8],
A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), ends are like principles, while the
means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed
to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end.
Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness
in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an
inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now
good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the
due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so
that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are
moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin
of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of
their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural
good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ([1945]FP, Q[63],
A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind
or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God,
without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end,
or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which
seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to
mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on
account of the end they have in view.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that
"there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who
walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the
concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7).
Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation
to those who walk not according to the flesh, i. e. by consenting to
concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are
not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of
condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal
sins.
Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those
who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow
the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh. "
But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels
the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it
seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are
mortal sins.
Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man
was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence. " Now this
liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which
the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an
unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts
against his duty.
On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a
respecter of persons. " Therefore he does not impute to one unto
condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not
impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither
therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of
unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is
evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not
be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ([1946]Q[79], A[4]). Now
the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers.
Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality
in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the
sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes
sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above ([1947]Q[73],
A[10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an
unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more
deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1
Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in
my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on
account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath
esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was
sanctified? "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due
to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus
Christ, although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the
fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign
of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore
the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was
a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such
liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with
original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a
disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ([1948]Q[88], A[3]).
Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted,
venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have
venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less
connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But
an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin
without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin
without committing a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child
is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that
time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal
sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible
for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short
it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin
alone and without mortal sin.
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on
(SS, Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than
mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be
punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore,
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he
is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the
first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate
about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will,
by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he
does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is
capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for
through not doing that which is in his power to do.
