*
republic, and the incompatibility of a
"vivere politico " with the existence of
a class of "gentiluomini," i.
republic, and the incompatibility of a
"vivere politico " with the existence of
a class of "gentiluomini," i.
Thomas Carlyle
Hao
eadom potostate usi, filii Israel re-
ceeserunt a Rehoboam. . . . Et
quam vis super aliquem populum a Deo
acceperint aliquam jurisdictionem
civilem immodiate, ut videtur probabile
de Saule et Davide, nihilominus semper
toti coramunitate fuerunt subjecsti,
casu quo in destructionem com-
munitatis regerent. "
* Id. , 'De Potestate Ecclesiastica et
Laica,' Q. i. 5 (col. 766): "Et inter
has, summa et ultima est regnum,
innma autem censupotestas. . . .
Ultra supponitur quod nulla est
politia pure civilis, et nulla regalis,
quin posset mutari in aliam speciem,
puta timocratiam vel aristocratiam,
quia quaelibet talis est instituta jure
pure positivo, ergo quaelibet potest in
aliam mutari. "
Cf. Id. , Q. iii. 7 (col. 867).
? Id. id. , Q. i. 16 (col. 824): "Sed ilia
(politia) dicitur regalis, quando unus
solus dominatur, et non plures;
verum est regulariter, nam in civilibus
non dicitur politia regalis ex eo quod
? ? nulla congregatio sit super regem.
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? 246
[PABT HI.
THE EAKLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
In a later passage he sums up some of the functions and
limitations of the best prince. He is to render to every man
what belongs to him, that is, to administer justice, to establish
law, to appoint the inferior judges and officers, but especially
to correct and punish the transgressors. The prince must
rule for the common good, he must remember that he reigns
over free men and not slaves; it is inconsistent with the best
princely authority that he should have absolute power
(plenitudo potestatis), that is, that he should have authority
to transfer one man's property to another, without fault
or cause, or to do whatever he pleases, so far as it does not
conflict with the laws of nature and of God. 1
It is perhaps worth while to notice that Almain in the same
chapter represents the person whom he cites as "Doctor"
as saying that it was not inconsistent with the best
"principatus" that there should exist in the Community
a juridical (legal) authority, which in no way depends upon,
or is created by, the Supreme Prince; and he mentions, as
an illustration of this, that, in some countries, in Aragon,
as it is said, there are jurisdictions which the king does not
create but which descend by hereditary succession; the
nam congregatio nobilium politiae
civilis, immediate est super regem,
et pro idonietato possunt deponi
reges, ut patet in Childerico et Zach-
aria. Non vocatur ergo regalis, eo
quod nulla congregatio sit super
ilium qui gubernat. Sed in com-
munitatibus est congregatio super
regem, et semper manet in esse con-
gregatio. Sed in politia regali non
sio est, quia non est semper congregatio
nobilium congregata, quae sit super
regem. "
1 Id. id. , Q. iii. 6 (col. 865):
"Consequent er restat inquirer* quae
possunt adesse et abesse optimo
principatui; et broviter dicitur quod
ad optimum principatum spectat uni-
ouique quod suum est reddere, hoc
est justitiam ministrare, leges condere,
judices inferiores et alios officiales,
delegcre et constituent, operationes
quarumcunque virtutum praecipere;
et quilibet princeps ex officio ad ista
tenetur: sed tamen ad hoc videtur
esse principalissime constitutus ut
corrigat et puniat delinquent c. <. . . .
Ex his patet quae sunt optimo prin-
cipatui necossario annexa, et quae
incompossibilia et quae impertinent ia,
et dictum est quod ad optimum prin-
cipatum necesse est quod sit ad bonum
commune, et quod principans princi-
pei m- liberis, et non servis, et quod
sit unus principans et non plures.
Item repugnat optimo principatui
habere plenitudinem potestatis, puta
quod possit ad placitum suum trans-
ferre rem meam in alterum, sine
quocunque meo peccato, vol cauaa,
et facere quidquid non repugnat juri
naturae et di vino; et visum est otiam
quo modo praecipuus actus principalis
? ? est malorum punitione intendere. "
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? CHAP, m. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 247
sons succeed the fathers as judges and the king cannot deprive
them of their authority; rather, they are over the king, in
respect of this jurisdiction. 1
The whole position of Almain is exceedingly interesting.
He has the same preference for the monarchy as that which
we normally find in the mediaaval world, but he is also quite
clear not only that the source of political authority is the
Community, but that the ultimate authority always remains
in it and must in the nature of things do so, and though the
monarchy is the best form of government, it is strictly
limited by the purpose for which it exists, the furtherance
of the common good and the maintenance of justice; an
absolute monarch is to him impossible.
The character of the political theory of John Major is
very close to that of Almain; indeed, it would seem that
he was either directly influenced by Almain or that they were
both under the influence of some common tradition. John
Major was a Scotsman, but taught for many years in the
University of Paris, and the work with which we are now
dealing was apparently published in 1518. It is primarily
concerned, like those of Almain, with the ecclesiastical questions
of the relation between the Pope and the General Council,
but we are here only concerned with its political principles.
The king has no authority except that which is derived
from the kingdom, for he himself or his first predecessor was
elected by the people; the king is over every individual
person in the kingdom, but he is not over all the kingdom,
"regulariter et casualiter," he is "regulariter" over the
1 Id. id. id. (col. 868): "Jam
Doctor infert aliqua corollaria--Primo
Don repugnat Optimo principatui su-
premo, optimo ordinate aliquem esse
potefttatem juridicam alicujus, vol
aliquonim de communitate ilia, quae
nullo modo ab ipso supremo princi-
pante dependeat, et quae non eit
ab ipso instituto, hoc est, quae non
dependeat ab ipso, nec quoad insti-
tutionem noc ad destitutionem saltem
regulariter
Hinc est quod in aliquibus regnis,
ut fertur in regno Arragoniae, rex non
habet instituere jurisdictiones, imo
est aliqua potestas juridica, quae
habetur ex succeesione parentum.
Ita quod post patres, filii sunt judices
. . . nec illos rex potest destituere,
imo sunt supra regem quantum ad
iliam jurisdictionem. "
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? 248
[PAET III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
whole kingdom, while the kingdom is over him " casualiter. " 1
This is sharply stated, but the principle is even more com-
pletely expressed in another passage. The King of France
is over all France, but the "praecipua pars" from which
he derives his authority is over him, and can depose him for
reasonable cause. The people is "virtualiter" over the
king, and in difficult matters the three Estates of the Bealm
are called together and direct him, and a free people has
the power, for reasonable cause, to alter the form of the
Constitution. 2
He expresses the same principle again in another place.
In France and Scotland it may be said that the supreme
power is in the king, but it would be better to say that there
are two powers of which one is supreme and more unlimited
than the other. In the kingdom and in the whole free people
1 John Major, 'De Auctoritate
Concilii super Pontificem maximum. '
(In J. Gerson, Opera, vol. i. , ed. 1606)
(col. 881): "Rex utilitatem reipublicae
dissipans et evertens incorrigibiliter,
est deponeadus a communitate cui
praeest. . . . Hex non habet robur
et auctoritatem nisi a regno, cui libere
praeest. "
(Col. 888): "Rex tamen non est
super omnes in regno regulariter et
casualiter, quia vel electus est, vel
enim primus predecessor erat oloctus
a populo, pro communi populi utilitate,
et non pro suo. . . . Ad politiam vero
regalem, non requiritur quod rex sit
super omnes sui regni tam regulariter
quam casualiter, ut ex dictis liquet:
sed sat est, quod rex sit super unum-
quemlibet; et super totum regnum
regulariter; et regnum sit super Gum
casualiter, et in aliquo eventu. "
>> Id. id. (col. 886): "Exemplum
in simili, Franciscus dicitur communiter
rex totius Franciae, et non modo est
super unam provinciam Galliae, sed
supor totam categorematice, non ob-
stante quod precipua pars est super
ipsum, a qua auctoritatem habet, quae
non potest tollere ab eo regnum suum,
sine rationabili et arduissima causa. . . .
Si contradicat, in hoc solum est
discrimen, pontificatus est de jura
divino et ex institutione Christi, et
rex habet regnum a toto populo . . .
respondeo, sed auctoritas communicata
est ecclesiae a Christo, sicut summus
pontificatus, et auctoritas ilia non
dependet ab auctoritate summi ponti.
ficatus, sed immediate a Deo, et sic
aliquo modo convenit potest as ecclesiae,
cum potestate populi unius regni et
aliquo modo differt; nam quoad
superioritatem convenit, ita quod
sicut populus virtualiter est super
regem, et in casu, ut in rebus arduis
in quibus convocantur tres status
regni, qui regem in casibus ancipitibua
habeant dirigere; sic, in casibus
arduis Concilium rito congregatum,
habet leges obligatorias pontifici im-
? ? ponere, quoad ejus personam, et non
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? chap, in. ]
249
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
there is a supreme power -which is the ultimate source of all
authority, and which cannot be abrogated, while the king
holds a power, honourable, indeed, but ministerial. 1
It is interesting to compare the position of Almain and
John Major with that of Machiavelli in Italy. We are not
here discussing the character and significance of his discussion
of statecraft in the administration of government as it is
set out in 'The Prince. ' Indeed, we venture to say that
there is but little relation between this and the history of the
development of political civilisation as embodied in the laws
and institutions of the countries of Western Europe.
It must not be thought that we are undervaluing the
importance of Machiavelli in history, or attempting to estimate
the significance of his penetrating analysis of the forces
which, rightly or wrongly, consciously or unconsciously,
have determined in so great a measure the relations of the
autonomous Communities of Europe; but the history of these
relations does not come within the scope of this work, and it
would be absurd to discuss them merely incidentally. We
deal, therefore, with certain aspects of his political theory
which are to be found mainly in the 'Discourses on Livy,'
and these are for our purposes very interesting and
significant.
Machiavelli sets out the traditional definition of the three
good forms of State, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and popular
government, and their three corrupt counterparts, the Tyranny,
the Oligarchy, and the corrupt Democracy. He adds that
the good forms of government had a fatal tendency to turn
into the corrupt ones, and points out that the wise founders
of States had therefore endeavoured to establish a constitution
1 Id. id. (col. 889): "Similiter in
regno Francorum vel Scotorum est
suprema potestas etiam in eorum
regibus; melius dicantur duae potestates
realiter, quarum una est superior et
illimitatior quam alia, ad quam alia
subordinatur, et sic est quodammodo
una. . t i
(Col. 890): "Similiter in regno et
in toto populo libero, est suprema et
fontalis potestas inabrogalis; in rege
vero, potestas ministerialis honesto
ministerio: et sic aliquo modo sunt
duae potestates, sed quia una ordin-
atur propter aliam, potest vocari
una effectualis. "
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? 250
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
which had something of all the good forms, something both
of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular government; and he
cites, as examples, Sparta and Eome. 1 This conception of
the virtue of a mixed constitution was, as we have seen,
not only known to the ancient writers, but was also current
among the mediaeval.
We come to a more complex subject when we endeavour to
ascertain what it is that Machiavelli meant by Liberty. He
looks upon it as being among the chief ends of government;
in one place he says expressly that to those who ordered the
Commonwealth with prudence, among the most necessary
things was the establishment of a protection for liberty. 2
What liberty meant to Machiavelli is not easy to define,
but it is possible to arrive at some conclusion as to his meaning
by putting together various passages. The words we have
just cited are followed by a discussion of the question whether
it is better to entrust the protection of liberty to the nobles
(Grandi), or to the people (Populari); and he concludes that
it is clearly better to put it in the hands of the people, for the
nobles desire "dominare," while the people only desire not
to be dominated, and have therefore a greater desire to live
in freedom. 3
1 Machiavelli, 'Discorsi sopra la
prima Deca di Tito Livio' (' Opera'
ed. , Milan, 1772), i. 2: "Dico adunque
che tutti i detti modi sono pestiferi
per la brevits della vita che e ne tre
buoni, e per la malignita` che e ne' tre
rei. Talche? avendo quelli che prudente-
mente ordinano leggi conosciuto questo
difetto, fuggendo ciascuno di questi
modi per so? stesso, ne elessero uno che
participasse di tutti, giudicandolo piu`
fermo e piu` stabile, percho` l'uno
guarda l'altro, sondo in una medesima
citta il principato, gli ottimati, ed il
governo populare. "
* Id. id. , i. 5: "Quelli che prudente-
mente hanno constituita una repubblica,
in tra le pui necessarie cose ordinate
da loro, e stato conatituere una guardia
alla liberta, e secondo che questa e`
bene collocata dura pui o meno quel
vivere libero. "
1 Id. id. , i. 5: "E venendo alle
ragioni dico (pigliando prima la parte
de Romani) come e' si dobbe mettero
in guardia coloro d'unii cosa che hanno
meno appetito d'usurparla. E senza
dubbio se si considera il fine de nobili e
degl' ignobili, si vedra` in quelli de-
siderio grande di dominaro, e in questi
solo desiderio di non ossero dominati, e
per consequente maggior volonta` di
vivere liberi, potendo meno sperare
d'usuparla che non possono i grandi;
talche essendo i popolari preposti a
guardia d'una liberta`, e` ragionevole no
abbiano piu cura, e non la potendo
occupare loro, non permettano che
altri l'occupi. "
Cf. on the need of equality in a
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? CHAP. HI. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 251
Machiavelli does not, so far as wo have seen, relate the
conception of liberty directly to that of the supremacy of
Law, but we may reasonably judge that he implies it. He
compares the character of the good Euler, who lives according
to the law, with that of the tyrant,1 and in another place
he says that Tarquin was driven from Eome, not because
Sextus had violated Lucretia, but because he had broken the
laws of the kingdom and ruled as a tyrant, and had thus
deprived Eome of that liberty which it had possessed under
the earlier kings. 2
Machiavelli certainly looked upon the subordination of
the Eulers to the Law as a matter of the first importance to
a free Commonwealth. We have pointed out in a previous
chapter that Machiavelli refers to France as an example of
the good results of this, and we repeat this here. The kingdom
of France lives in security, for the kings are bound by many
laws. Those who ordered that State provided that the king
should have the control of arms and money, but that in all
other matters they should only act as the Laws directed. 3
In another place he deals with this in more detail, and points
out how good was the effect in France, that that kingdom,
more than any other kingdom, lived under the control of
the laws. The "Parlemens," and especially that of Paris,
enforced these, and even delivered judgments against the king.
*
republic, and the incompatibility of a
"vivere politico " with the existence of
a class of "gentiluomini," i. 55.
>> Id. , i. 10.
* Id. , iii. 5: "Non fu adunque
costui (i. e. , Tarquinius Superbus)
cacciato per avere Sesto suo figliuolo
stuprata Lucrezia, ma per aver rotte le
leggi del regno e governatolo tyran-
nicamente, avendo tolto al senato
ogni autorits e riddotola a se? proprio;
e quelle facendo che nei luoghi
publici con satisfazione del senato
Romano si facevano, le ridusse a fare
nel palazzo suo con carico ed invidia
sua. Talche in breve tempo egli
spoglio Roma di tutta quella liberta`
che ella aveva sotto li altri re
mantenuta. "
* Id. , i. 16: "In esempio ci e? il
regno di Francia, il quale non vivo
sicuro per altro che per essersi quelli
re obligati ad infinite leggi nelle quali
si comprende la sicurta` di tutti i suoi
populi. ? chi ordino` quello stato
volle che quelli re, dell' arme e del
danaio facessero a loro modo, ma che
d'ogni altra cosa non ne potessero
altrimenti disporro che le leggi si
ordins ssino. "
* Id. , iii. I: "E si vede quanto
buono effetto fa questa parte nel regno
di Francia, il qual regno vive sotto le
leggi e sotto le ordini pui cho alcun
altro regno. Delle quali legge, e
ordini ne sono mantenitori i parlia-
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? 252
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
It seems to us to be clear that Machiavelli held that the
prince should be subject to the Law, and that he related this
to the conception of liberty.
We find also in Machiavelli a very interesting discussion
of the ultimate foundations of a healthy political system.
He contrasts the success of Eome, in establishing and main-
taining liberty after the expulsion of the Tarquins, with its
inability to restore it when the opportunity was given by
the deaths of Caesar, or Caligula, or Nero, and he contends
that the reason of this was that in the time of the Tarquins
the Eoman people was not yet corrupt, while in the later
times it was most corrupt. And he adds that the same thing
could be said of his own time. Nothing, he says, could ever
restore liberty in Naples or Milan, the corruption of the people
had gone too far, and this could be seen in the fact that, on
the death of Filippo Visconti, Milan wished to recover its
liberty, but could not maintain it. 1
We must not, indeed, interpret Machiavelli's conception
of the corruption of the Community as related to what we
should call private morals; it has reference rather to what
we might call public spirit and honour. The importance of
Machiavelli's conception, from the point of view of our subject,
is that he is clear that the prosperity of a State and the char-
acter of its government depends in the long-run on the
qualities, not merely of the Euler but of all the members
of the Community.
menti, e massime quel di Parigi; le
quali sono da lui rinnovate qualunque
volta e' fa una esecuzione contro ad un
Principe di quel regno, e che ci con-
danna il Re nelle sue sentenze. "
1 Id. , i. 17: "Ma non si vede il
piu forte esempio che quello di Roma,
la quale cacciati i Tarquinii potette
subito prendere e mantenere quella
liberta; ma morto Caesare, morto
Caligula, morto Nerone, spenta tutta
la stirpe Caesarea, non potette mai,
non solamente mantenere ma pure
dare principio alla liberta; ne tanta
diversits di evento in una medesima
citta` nacque da altro, se non da non
essere dei tempi de Tarquinii il populo
Romano ancora corrotto, e in questi
ultimi tempi essere corrottissimo. . . .
E benche questo esempio di Roma
sia da proporre a qualunque altro
esempio, non di meno voglio a questo
proposito addurre inanzi popoli conos-
ciuti ne nostri tempi. Pertanto dico
che nessuno accidente, benche grave
e violento, potrebbe ridurre mai
Milano o Napoli libere, per essere
quelle membra tutte corrotte. Il
che se vide dopo la morte di Filippo
Visconti, che volendosi ridurre Milano
alla liberta non potette e non seppe
mantenerla. "
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? CHAP. HI. ]
253
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
The truth is, that though he asserted the principle that the
mixed or tempered constitution was the best, he held that the
people as a whole, if they accepted the control of the Laws,
were wiser and more prudent and less variable than a prince.
In one chapter he discusses at some length the opinion of
Livy and other historians that the multitude is inconstant,
and declares that this might be said equally of princes, when
they are not restrained by the Laws. A people which is well
ordered will be constant, prudent, and grateful as much as,
or more than, a prince, even a wise prince; while a prince,
who is not subject to the Laws, will be more ungrateful,
more variable, and more imprudent than the people. There
is some ground for the comparison of the voice of the people
to the voice of God. 1
The people is much wiser than the prince in the appoint-
1 Id. , i. 58: "Nessuna cosa esser
piu vana e piu inconstante che la
moltitudine, cosi T. Livio nostro
come tutti li altri Istorici affermano. . . .
Dico adunque como di quello difetto
di che accusano li scrittori la multi-
tudine, so ne possono accusare tutti
gli uomini, particolarmente, e massime
i principi . . . e de' buoni e de savi ne
sono stati pochi; io dico de' principi
che hanno potuto rompere quel freno
che li puo corre go re; tra i quali
non sono quelli Re che nascevano in
Egitto quando in quella antichissima
antichita` si governava quella provincia
con le leggi, ne quelli che nascevano
in Isparta, ni quelli che a nostri tempi
nascono in Francia, il qual regno e?
moderato piu delle leggi che alcun
altro regno di che no' nostri tempi si
abbi notizia. E questi Re che nascono
sotto tali costituzioni, non sono da
mettere in quel numero donde si abbia
a considerare la natura di ciascuno
uomo per se? , e vedore se egli e` simile
alla multitudine; perche all' incontro
loro si debbe porre una multitudine
medesimamente regolata dalle loggi
come sono essi, e si trovera` in lei
ossero quella medesima bonta` che noi
veggiamo essere in quelli.
Conchiudo adunque contra alla
commune opinione, la qual dice come i
Popoli, quando sono principi, sono
vari, mutabili, ingrati, affermando cho
in loro non sono nltrimente? questi
peccati che si siono ne Principi par.
titolari. Ed accusando alcuno i
Popoli e i Principi insieme, potrebbe
dire il vero; ma traendone i Principi,
s'inganna: perche? un Populo che
commanda e sia bene ordinato, sara
stabile, prudente, e grato, non altri,
mente cho un Principe, o meglio cha
un Principe, eziandio stimato savio;
E dal altra parte, un Principe sciolto
dalle leggi sara` ingrato, vario, e im-
prudente piu che un Populo . . . Bla
quanto alla prudenza e alla stabilita`,
dico come un Populo e? piu prudente,
piu stabile, e di miglior giudizio che
? ? un Principe. E non senza cagione si
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? 254
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
ment of the magistrates, and is more constant in its opinions.
The truth is that the government by the people is better than
that of the prince; if we compare the government of a prince
bound by the Laws with that of a people equally bound,
there is more excellence (virtu) in the people than in the
prince; while, if we compare the errors of the prince with
those of the people, the errors of the people are fewer and
loss serious, and more easily remedied. The truth is,
Machiavelli adds, that the common depreciation of the people
arises from the fact that everyone speaks evil freely, and
without fear, of them, even when they govern, while of princes,
men only speak with fear and deference. 1
It is clear that Machiavelli's political conceptions, aa
represented in the 'Discorsi,' are related primarily to the
tradition of the Italian City States, but it is significant that he
represents the same position as other mediaeval writers, that
the foundation of a civilised political life is the supremacy
of Law.
We turn to Spain, where we find in Soto a writer whose
work was not indeed published till after the middle of the
century, but who seems to us to belong in character to its
earlier part; for he does not seem to be affected by the great
political movements of the latter part of the century. Indeed,
the work of Soto is in the main a careful restatement of some
of the principles of St Thomas Aquinas, with occasional
modifications, no doubt.
1 Id. id. id. : M Vedesi ancora nelle
sue elezioni a i Magistrati fare di lungo
migliore elezione che un Principe, ne
mai si persuadera` ad un populo che
sia bene tirare alla dignita` un uomo
infame e di corrotti costumi, il che
facilmente e per mille vie si persuade
ad un Principe; vedesi un populo
cominciare ad avere in orrore una
cosa, e molti secoli stare in quella
opinione; il che non si vede in un
principe. . . . Il che non puo` nascere
da altro se non che sono migliori
governi quelli de' popoli ohe quelli
de' Principi. . . . Se adunque si
ragionera` d'un Principe obligato alle
leggi, e d'un populo incatenato da
quelle, si vedra piu virtu nel populo
ohe nel Principe; se si ragionera` del
uno e del altro sciolto, si vedra meno
errori del populo che nel Principe, o
quelli minori e arrano maggiori
remedi. . . . Ma l'opinione contra ai
populi nasce perche` de' popoli ciascun
dice male senza paura, e liberamente
ancora mentre che regnano; de
Principi si parla sempre con mille
paure e mille rispetti. "
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? CHAP. III. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER. 255
We have already noticed Soto's conception of Law in
general; we are now concerned with his conception of
the prince. Kings, he says, do not derive their authority
immediately or directly from God, except in some special
cases, such as those of Saul and David; they are normally
created by the people, and their authority is derived from the
people. Such words as those of the Proverbs, "By me kings
reign," only mean that God, as the source of Natural Law,
has granted to mortal men that every Commonwealth has
the right to govern itself, and if reason, which is itself an
inspiration (spiramen) of the Divine, demands it, to transfer
its authority to another. 1
The authority of the king is, however, conceived by Soto
as being very great. In a passage dealing with the practice
of selling public offices, he is met with the contention that
the king cannot do this, for he is merely "dispensator offi-
ciorum "; he emphatically disputes this, and says that the
king is not merely a " dispensator," but he is the Eespublica,
not a mere vicar of the Eespublica, like the Doge of Venice.
The people, in Ulpian's phrase, has conveyed to him all its
authority and force, and neither he nor his heirs can be de-
prived of this, except for manifest tyranny. Therefore, the
kingdom is his, as the house of a private citizen belongs to
the citizen, and every power and right (Jus) of the Eespublica
belongs to him. Only, the Eespublica was not made for him,
but he for the Eespublica, and he must therefore consider
everything from the point of view of its good. 2 In another
1 Soto, 'De Justitia et Jure,' i. 1, 3
(p. 9): '' Haud enim a Deo proximo, et
quod aiunt immediate croati sunt,
praetor Saulum et Davidem eorumque
prosapiam, cui sceptrum ipse commisit,
sed, ut habetur 1. quod placuit ft. de
Conati. prim (' Digest,' i. 4, 1), reges ac
principes a populo ureai i sunt, in quaa
mom transtulit imperium ac potes-
tatem. . . . Unde verbum illud apud
sapientem ex Proverb: viii. supra
citatum, 'Per me reges regunt, ete. '
non aliter intelligendum ost quam
quod ab ipso, tanquam naturalis juris
auctorem, donatum mortalibus est, ut
unaqueque respublica se ipsam regendi
habeat arbitrium; ac subinde, ubi
ratio, quod spiramen etiam est dtvini
numinis, postulaverit, in alium suam
transmittat potestatem, cujus legibus
providentius gubernetur. "
? Id. , iii. 6, 4 (p. 273): "Attamen
objoctio haec nisi fallor nullatenus
conclusionem nostra in expugnat. Rex
enim non tanquam dispensator, sed
tanquam ipse eadem respublica repu*
tandus. Enim vero non est estimandus
tanquam reipublicae vicarius, sicuti
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? 256
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
passage Soto speaks of the power of the prince in making
laws; and says emphatically that he is superior, not only
to all individuals, but to the whole State. 1
It should be observed that with all his emphasis on the
authority of the king, he is equally clear that he must use it
for the good of the State, and if he uses it tyrannically he
may be deposed. This is not merely an incidental judgment,
but is carefully developed, with due qualifications, in another
passage, where he discusses the question of tyrannicide. He
makes a distinction, with which we are by this time familiar,
between the tyrant by usurpation and the tyrant by practice.
As to the first there is no doubt; he may be slain by anyone,
for he is making war on the Commonwealth. The case of the
second is more difficult, as he has a lawful right to the kingdom;
he can therefore only be deprived of this by public judgment,
but when this has been pronounced, anyone may be appointed
to carry it out. If the Commonwealth has a superior, he should
be requested to provide a remedy, but if there is none, the
Commonwealth may take arms against the tyrant. It is
noteworthy that he interprets the Decree of the Council of
Constance concerning tyrannicide as referring to the action of
a private person. 2 It is clear that, with all his reverence for
Venetorum dux, qui est a republics ipsum est: licet non respublica propter
pondens, eed tanquam plenissimam ipsum, sod ipse propter rempublicam
habens potestatem reipublicae, eandem sit institutus: et ideo omnia debet in
scilicet quam ipsa habebat. Sic enim publicum commodum referre. "
expresso habet lex ilia, quod principi, 1 Id. , iv. 4, 1 (p. 309): "At bine sit,
fl. : de Constit. prim ('Dig. ' i. 4, 1). ut lib. i. Quest, vi. dicebamus, princi-
Quod principi placuit, legis habet pem potestate fungi ferendarum legum;
vigorem, utpote cum lege regia quae quibus rempublicam coerceat. Fitque
de imperio lata est, populus ei et in praeterea ut non solum singulis reipub-
eum omne suum imperium et potes- licae membris superior sit, verum et
tatem contulerit. Hac enim lege totius collectim corporis, oaput, totique
atque hac do causa non potest ilium adeo sio eminens, ut totam etiam simul
ullo pacto dimovere, neque filios jure punire valeat. Quare neque per rem-
hereditario regnandi expoliare, si illud publicam rex potest regni expoliari,
se mel ill i contulerit, nisi ubi a porta nisi fuerit in tyrannidem corruptus. "
tyrannide regnum pessundaret. Et * Id. id. , v. 1, 3 (p. 400): "Primum
tunc solo beneficio naturalis juris, do tyranno, an cuivis civium licet eum
quo vim vi repellere licet. Itaque privatim interficere. Apparet enim
regnum est suum, sicut cujusque civia id esse, natura magistra, legitimum.
sua est domus; atque adeo quaecunque Nam unicuique oonceditur jus de-
facultas et jus reipublicae penes fendendi sese. De hoc D.
eadom potostate usi, filii Israel re-
ceeserunt a Rehoboam. . . . Et
quam vis super aliquem populum a Deo
acceperint aliquam jurisdictionem
civilem immodiate, ut videtur probabile
de Saule et Davide, nihilominus semper
toti coramunitate fuerunt subjecsti,
casu quo in destructionem com-
munitatis regerent. "
* Id. , 'De Potestate Ecclesiastica et
Laica,' Q. i. 5 (col. 766): "Et inter
has, summa et ultima est regnum,
innma autem censupotestas. . . .
Ultra supponitur quod nulla est
politia pure civilis, et nulla regalis,
quin posset mutari in aliam speciem,
puta timocratiam vel aristocratiam,
quia quaelibet talis est instituta jure
pure positivo, ergo quaelibet potest in
aliam mutari. "
Cf. Id. , Q. iii. 7 (col. 867).
? Id. id. , Q. i. 16 (col. 824): "Sed ilia
(politia) dicitur regalis, quando unus
solus dominatur, et non plures;
verum est regulariter, nam in civilibus
non dicitur politia regalis ex eo quod
? ? nulla congregatio sit super regem.
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? 246
[PABT HI.
THE EAKLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
In a later passage he sums up some of the functions and
limitations of the best prince. He is to render to every man
what belongs to him, that is, to administer justice, to establish
law, to appoint the inferior judges and officers, but especially
to correct and punish the transgressors. The prince must
rule for the common good, he must remember that he reigns
over free men and not slaves; it is inconsistent with the best
princely authority that he should have absolute power
(plenitudo potestatis), that is, that he should have authority
to transfer one man's property to another, without fault
or cause, or to do whatever he pleases, so far as it does not
conflict with the laws of nature and of God. 1
It is perhaps worth while to notice that Almain in the same
chapter represents the person whom he cites as "Doctor"
as saying that it was not inconsistent with the best
"principatus" that there should exist in the Community
a juridical (legal) authority, which in no way depends upon,
or is created by, the Supreme Prince; and he mentions, as
an illustration of this, that, in some countries, in Aragon,
as it is said, there are jurisdictions which the king does not
create but which descend by hereditary succession; the
nam congregatio nobilium politiae
civilis, immediate est super regem,
et pro idonietato possunt deponi
reges, ut patet in Childerico et Zach-
aria. Non vocatur ergo regalis, eo
quod nulla congregatio sit super
ilium qui gubernat. Sed in com-
munitatibus est congregatio super
regem, et semper manet in esse con-
gregatio. Sed in politia regali non
sio est, quia non est semper congregatio
nobilium congregata, quae sit super
regem. "
1 Id. id. , Q. iii. 6 (col. 865):
"Consequent er restat inquirer* quae
possunt adesse et abesse optimo
principatui; et broviter dicitur quod
ad optimum principatum spectat uni-
ouique quod suum est reddere, hoc
est justitiam ministrare, leges condere,
judices inferiores et alios officiales,
delegcre et constituent, operationes
quarumcunque virtutum praecipere;
et quilibet princeps ex officio ad ista
tenetur: sed tamen ad hoc videtur
esse principalissime constitutus ut
corrigat et puniat delinquent c. <. . . .
Ex his patet quae sunt optimo prin-
cipatui necossario annexa, et quae
incompossibilia et quae impertinent ia,
et dictum est quod ad optimum prin-
cipatum necesse est quod sit ad bonum
commune, et quod principans princi-
pei m- liberis, et non servis, et quod
sit unus principans et non plures.
Item repugnat optimo principatui
habere plenitudinem potestatis, puta
quod possit ad placitum suum trans-
ferre rem meam in alterum, sine
quocunque meo peccato, vol cauaa,
et facere quidquid non repugnat juri
naturae et di vino; et visum est otiam
quo modo praecipuus actus principalis
? ? est malorum punitione intendere. "
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? CHAP, m. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 247
sons succeed the fathers as judges and the king cannot deprive
them of their authority; rather, they are over the king, in
respect of this jurisdiction. 1
The whole position of Almain is exceedingly interesting.
He has the same preference for the monarchy as that which
we normally find in the mediaaval world, but he is also quite
clear not only that the source of political authority is the
Community, but that the ultimate authority always remains
in it and must in the nature of things do so, and though the
monarchy is the best form of government, it is strictly
limited by the purpose for which it exists, the furtherance
of the common good and the maintenance of justice; an
absolute monarch is to him impossible.
The character of the political theory of John Major is
very close to that of Almain; indeed, it would seem that
he was either directly influenced by Almain or that they were
both under the influence of some common tradition. John
Major was a Scotsman, but taught for many years in the
University of Paris, and the work with which we are now
dealing was apparently published in 1518. It is primarily
concerned, like those of Almain, with the ecclesiastical questions
of the relation between the Pope and the General Council,
but we are here only concerned with its political principles.
The king has no authority except that which is derived
from the kingdom, for he himself or his first predecessor was
elected by the people; the king is over every individual
person in the kingdom, but he is not over all the kingdom,
"regulariter et casualiter," he is "regulariter" over the
1 Id. id. id. (col. 868): "Jam
Doctor infert aliqua corollaria--Primo
Don repugnat Optimo principatui su-
premo, optimo ordinate aliquem esse
potefttatem juridicam alicujus, vol
aliquonim de communitate ilia, quae
nullo modo ab ipso supremo princi-
pante dependeat, et quae non eit
ab ipso instituto, hoc est, quae non
dependeat ab ipso, nec quoad insti-
tutionem noc ad destitutionem saltem
regulariter
Hinc est quod in aliquibus regnis,
ut fertur in regno Arragoniae, rex non
habet instituere jurisdictiones, imo
est aliqua potestas juridica, quae
habetur ex succeesione parentum.
Ita quod post patres, filii sunt judices
. . . nec illos rex potest destituere,
imo sunt supra regem quantum ad
iliam jurisdictionem. "
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? 248
[PAET III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
whole kingdom, while the kingdom is over him " casualiter. " 1
This is sharply stated, but the principle is even more com-
pletely expressed in another passage. The King of France
is over all France, but the "praecipua pars" from which
he derives his authority is over him, and can depose him for
reasonable cause. The people is "virtualiter" over the
king, and in difficult matters the three Estates of the Bealm
are called together and direct him, and a free people has
the power, for reasonable cause, to alter the form of the
Constitution. 2
He expresses the same principle again in another place.
In France and Scotland it may be said that the supreme
power is in the king, but it would be better to say that there
are two powers of which one is supreme and more unlimited
than the other. In the kingdom and in the whole free people
1 John Major, 'De Auctoritate
Concilii super Pontificem maximum. '
(In J. Gerson, Opera, vol. i. , ed. 1606)
(col. 881): "Rex utilitatem reipublicae
dissipans et evertens incorrigibiliter,
est deponeadus a communitate cui
praeest. . . . Hex non habet robur
et auctoritatem nisi a regno, cui libere
praeest. "
(Col. 888): "Rex tamen non est
super omnes in regno regulariter et
casualiter, quia vel electus est, vel
enim primus predecessor erat oloctus
a populo, pro communi populi utilitate,
et non pro suo. . . . Ad politiam vero
regalem, non requiritur quod rex sit
super omnes sui regni tam regulariter
quam casualiter, ut ex dictis liquet:
sed sat est, quod rex sit super unum-
quemlibet; et super totum regnum
regulariter; et regnum sit super Gum
casualiter, et in aliquo eventu. "
>> Id. id. (col. 886): "Exemplum
in simili, Franciscus dicitur communiter
rex totius Franciae, et non modo est
super unam provinciam Galliae, sed
supor totam categorematice, non ob-
stante quod precipua pars est super
ipsum, a qua auctoritatem habet, quae
non potest tollere ab eo regnum suum,
sine rationabili et arduissima causa. . . .
Si contradicat, in hoc solum est
discrimen, pontificatus est de jura
divino et ex institutione Christi, et
rex habet regnum a toto populo . . .
respondeo, sed auctoritas communicata
est ecclesiae a Christo, sicut summus
pontificatus, et auctoritas ilia non
dependet ab auctoritate summi ponti.
ficatus, sed immediate a Deo, et sic
aliquo modo convenit potest as ecclesiae,
cum potestate populi unius regni et
aliquo modo differt; nam quoad
superioritatem convenit, ita quod
sicut populus virtualiter est super
regem, et in casu, ut in rebus arduis
in quibus convocantur tres status
regni, qui regem in casibus ancipitibua
habeant dirigere; sic, in casibus
arduis Concilium rito congregatum,
habet leges obligatorias pontifici im-
? ? ponere, quoad ejus personam, et non
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? chap, in. ]
249
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
there is a supreme power -which is the ultimate source of all
authority, and which cannot be abrogated, while the king
holds a power, honourable, indeed, but ministerial. 1
It is interesting to compare the position of Almain and
John Major with that of Machiavelli in Italy. We are not
here discussing the character and significance of his discussion
of statecraft in the administration of government as it is
set out in 'The Prince. ' Indeed, we venture to say that
there is but little relation between this and the history of the
development of political civilisation as embodied in the laws
and institutions of the countries of Western Europe.
It must not be thought that we are undervaluing the
importance of Machiavelli in history, or attempting to estimate
the significance of his penetrating analysis of the forces
which, rightly or wrongly, consciously or unconsciously,
have determined in so great a measure the relations of the
autonomous Communities of Europe; but the history of these
relations does not come within the scope of this work, and it
would be absurd to discuss them merely incidentally. We
deal, therefore, with certain aspects of his political theory
which are to be found mainly in the 'Discourses on Livy,'
and these are for our purposes very interesting and
significant.
Machiavelli sets out the traditional definition of the three
good forms of State, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and popular
government, and their three corrupt counterparts, the Tyranny,
the Oligarchy, and the corrupt Democracy. He adds that
the good forms of government had a fatal tendency to turn
into the corrupt ones, and points out that the wise founders
of States had therefore endeavoured to establish a constitution
1 Id. id. (col. 889): "Similiter in
regno Francorum vel Scotorum est
suprema potestas etiam in eorum
regibus; melius dicantur duae potestates
realiter, quarum una est superior et
illimitatior quam alia, ad quam alia
subordinatur, et sic est quodammodo
una. . t i
(Col. 890): "Similiter in regno et
in toto populo libero, est suprema et
fontalis potestas inabrogalis; in rege
vero, potestas ministerialis honesto
ministerio: et sic aliquo modo sunt
duae potestates, sed quia una ordin-
atur propter aliam, potest vocari
una effectualis. "
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? 250
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
which had something of all the good forms, something both
of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular government; and he
cites, as examples, Sparta and Eome. 1 This conception of
the virtue of a mixed constitution was, as we have seen,
not only known to the ancient writers, but was also current
among the mediaeval.
We come to a more complex subject when we endeavour to
ascertain what it is that Machiavelli meant by Liberty. He
looks upon it as being among the chief ends of government;
in one place he says expressly that to those who ordered the
Commonwealth with prudence, among the most necessary
things was the establishment of a protection for liberty. 2
What liberty meant to Machiavelli is not easy to define,
but it is possible to arrive at some conclusion as to his meaning
by putting together various passages. The words we have
just cited are followed by a discussion of the question whether
it is better to entrust the protection of liberty to the nobles
(Grandi), or to the people (Populari); and he concludes that
it is clearly better to put it in the hands of the people, for the
nobles desire "dominare," while the people only desire not
to be dominated, and have therefore a greater desire to live
in freedom. 3
1 Machiavelli, 'Discorsi sopra la
prima Deca di Tito Livio' (' Opera'
ed. , Milan, 1772), i. 2: "Dico adunque
che tutti i detti modi sono pestiferi
per la brevits della vita che e ne tre
buoni, e per la malignita` che e ne' tre
rei. Talche? avendo quelli che prudente-
mente ordinano leggi conosciuto questo
difetto, fuggendo ciascuno di questi
modi per so? stesso, ne elessero uno che
participasse di tutti, giudicandolo piu`
fermo e piu` stabile, percho` l'uno
guarda l'altro, sondo in una medesima
citta il principato, gli ottimati, ed il
governo populare. "
* Id. id. , i. 5: "Quelli che prudente-
mente hanno constituita una repubblica,
in tra le pui necessarie cose ordinate
da loro, e stato conatituere una guardia
alla liberta, e secondo che questa e`
bene collocata dura pui o meno quel
vivere libero. "
1 Id. id. , i. 5: "E venendo alle
ragioni dico (pigliando prima la parte
de Romani) come e' si dobbe mettero
in guardia coloro d'unii cosa che hanno
meno appetito d'usurparla. E senza
dubbio se si considera il fine de nobili e
degl' ignobili, si vedra` in quelli de-
siderio grande di dominaro, e in questi
solo desiderio di non ossero dominati, e
per consequente maggior volonta` di
vivere liberi, potendo meno sperare
d'usuparla che non possono i grandi;
talche essendo i popolari preposti a
guardia d'una liberta`, e` ragionevole no
abbiano piu cura, e non la potendo
occupare loro, non permettano che
altri l'occupi. "
Cf. on the need of equality in a
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? CHAP. HI. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 251
Machiavelli does not, so far as wo have seen, relate the
conception of liberty directly to that of the supremacy of
Law, but we may reasonably judge that he implies it. He
compares the character of the good Euler, who lives according
to the law, with that of the tyrant,1 and in another place
he says that Tarquin was driven from Eome, not because
Sextus had violated Lucretia, but because he had broken the
laws of the kingdom and ruled as a tyrant, and had thus
deprived Eome of that liberty which it had possessed under
the earlier kings. 2
Machiavelli certainly looked upon the subordination of
the Eulers to the Law as a matter of the first importance to
a free Commonwealth. We have pointed out in a previous
chapter that Machiavelli refers to France as an example of
the good results of this, and we repeat this here. The kingdom
of France lives in security, for the kings are bound by many
laws. Those who ordered that State provided that the king
should have the control of arms and money, but that in all
other matters they should only act as the Laws directed. 3
In another place he deals with this in more detail, and points
out how good was the effect in France, that that kingdom,
more than any other kingdom, lived under the control of
the laws. The "Parlemens," and especially that of Paris,
enforced these, and even delivered judgments against the king.
*
republic, and the incompatibility of a
"vivere politico " with the existence of
a class of "gentiluomini," i. 55.
>> Id. , i. 10.
* Id. , iii. 5: "Non fu adunque
costui (i. e. , Tarquinius Superbus)
cacciato per avere Sesto suo figliuolo
stuprata Lucrezia, ma per aver rotte le
leggi del regno e governatolo tyran-
nicamente, avendo tolto al senato
ogni autorits e riddotola a se? proprio;
e quelle facendo che nei luoghi
publici con satisfazione del senato
Romano si facevano, le ridusse a fare
nel palazzo suo con carico ed invidia
sua. Talche in breve tempo egli
spoglio Roma di tutta quella liberta`
che ella aveva sotto li altri re
mantenuta. "
* Id. , i. 16: "In esempio ci e? il
regno di Francia, il quale non vivo
sicuro per altro che per essersi quelli
re obligati ad infinite leggi nelle quali
si comprende la sicurta` di tutti i suoi
populi. ? chi ordino` quello stato
volle che quelli re, dell' arme e del
danaio facessero a loro modo, ma che
d'ogni altra cosa non ne potessero
altrimenti disporro che le leggi si
ordins ssino. "
* Id. , iii. I: "E si vede quanto
buono effetto fa questa parte nel regno
di Francia, il qual regno vive sotto le
leggi e sotto le ordini pui cho alcun
altro regno. Delle quali legge, e
ordini ne sono mantenitori i parlia-
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? 252
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
It seems to us to be clear that Machiavelli held that the
prince should be subject to the Law, and that he related this
to the conception of liberty.
We find also in Machiavelli a very interesting discussion
of the ultimate foundations of a healthy political system.
He contrasts the success of Eome, in establishing and main-
taining liberty after the expulsion of the Tarquins, with its
inability to restore it when the opportunity was given by
the deaths of Caesar, or Caligula, or Nero, and he contends
that the reason of this was that in the time of the Tarquins
the Eoman people was not yet corrupt, while in the later
times it was most corrupt. And he adds that the same thing
could be said of his own time. Nothing, he says, could ever
restore liberty in Naples or Milan, the corruption of the people
had gone too far, and this could be seen in the fact that, on
the death of Filippo Visconti, Milan wished to recover its
liberty, but could not maintain it. 1
We must not, indeed, interpret Machiavelli's conception
of the corruption of the Community as related to what we
should call private morals; it has reference rather to what
we might call public spirit and honour. The importance of
Machiavelli's conception, from the point of view of our subject,
is that he is clear that the prosperity of a State and the char-
acter of its government depends in the long-run on the
qualities, not merely of the Euler but of all the members
of the Community.
menti, e massime quel di Parigi; le
quali sono da lui rinnovate qualunque
volta e' fa una esecuzione contro ad un
Principe di quel regno, e che ci con-
danna il Re nelle sue sentenze. "
1 Id. , i. 17: "Ma non si vede il
piu forte esempio che quello di Roma,
la quale cacciati i Tarquinii potette
subito prendere e mantenere quella
liberta; ma morto Caesare, morto
Caligula, morto Nerone, spenta tutta
la stirpe Caesarea, non potette mai,
non solamente mantenere ma pure
dare principio alla liberta; ne tanta
diversits di evento in una medesima
citta` nacque da altro, se non da non
essere dei tempi de Tarquinii il populo
Romano ancora corrotto, e in questi
ultimi tempi essere corrottissimo. . . .
E benche questo esempio di Roma
sia da proporre a qualunque altro
esempio, non di meno voglio a questo
proposito addurre inanzi popoli conos-
ciuti ne nostri tempi. Pertanto dico
che nessuno accidente, benche grave
e violento, potrebbe ridurre mai
Milano o Napoli libere, per essere
quelle membra tutte corrotte. Il
che se vide dopo la morte di Filippo
Visconti, che volendosi ridurre Milano
alla liberta non potette e non seppe
mantenerla. "
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? CHAP. HI. ]
253
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
The truth is, that though he asserted the principle that the
mixed or tempered constitution was the best, he held that the
people as a whole, if they accepted the control of the Laws,
were wiser and more prudent and less variable than a prince.
In one chapter he discusses at some length the opinion of
Livy and other historians that the multitude is inconstant,
and declares that this might be said equally of princes, when
they are not restrained by the Laws. A people which is well
ordered will be constant, prudent, and grateful as much as,
or more than, a prince, even a wise prince; while a prince,
who is not subject to the Laws, will be more ungrateful,
more variable, and more imprudent than the people. There
is some ground for the comparison of the voice of the people
to the voice of God. 1
The people is much wiser than the prince in the appoint-
1 Id. , i. 58: "Nessuna cosa esser
piu vana e piu inconstante che la
moltitudine, cosi T. Livio nostro
come tutti li altri Istorici affermano. . . .
Dico adunque como di quello difetto
di che accusano li scrittori la multi-
tudine, so ne possono accusare tutti
gli uomini, particolarmente, e massime
i principi . . . e de' buoni e de savi ne
sono stati pochi; io dico de' principi
che hanno potuto rompere quel freno
che li puo corre go re; tra i quali
non sono quelli Re che nascevano in
Egitto quando in quella antichissima
antichita` si governava quella provincia
con le leggi, ne quelli che nascevano
in Isparta, ni quelli che a nostri tempi
nascono in Francia, il qual regno e?
moderato piu delle leggi che alcun
altro regno di che no' nostri tempi si
abbi notizia. E questi Re che nascono
sotto tali costituzioni, non sono da
mettere in quel numero donde si abbia
a considerare la natura di ciascuno
uomo per se? , e vedore se egli e` simile
alla multitudine; perche all' incontro
loro si debbe porre una multitudine
medesimamente regolata dalle loggi
come sono essi, e si trovera` in lei
ossero quella medesima bonta` che noi
veggiamo essere in quelli.
Conchiudo adunque contra alla
commune opinione, la qual dice come i
Popoli, quando sono principi, sono
vari, mutabili, ingrati, affermando cho
in loro non sono nltrimente? questi
peccati che si siono ne Principi par.
titolari. Ed accusando alcuno i
Popoli e i Principi insieme, potrebbe
dire il vero; ma traendone i Principi,
s'inganna: perche? un Populo che
commanda e sia bene ordinato, sara
stabile, prudente, e grato, non altri,
mente cho un Principe, o meglio cha
un Principe, eziandio stimato savio;
E dal altra parte, un Principe sciolto
dalle leggi sara` ingrato, vario, e im-
prudente piu che un Populo . . . Bla
quanto alla prudenza e alla stabilita`,
dico come un Populo e? piu prudente,
piu stabile, e di miglior giudizio che
? ? un Principe. E non senza cagione si
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? 254
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
ment of the magistrates, and is more constant in its opinions.
The truth is that the government by the people is better than
that of the prince; if we compare the government of a prince
bound by the Laws with that of a people equally bound,
there is more excellence (virtu) in the people than in the
prince; while, if we compare the errors of the prince with
those of the people, the errors of the people are fewer and
loss serious, and more easily remedied. The truth is,
Machiavelli adds, that the common depreciation of the people
arises from the fact that everyone speaks evil freely, and
without fear, of them, even when they govern, while of princes,
men only speak with fear and deference. 1
It is clear that Machiavelli's political conceptions, aa
represented in the 'Discorsi,' are related primarily to the
tradition of the Italian City States, but it is significant that he
represents the same position as other mediaeval writers, that
the foundation of a civilised political life is the supremacy
of Law.
We turn to Spain, where we find in Soto a writer whose
work was not indeed published till after the middle of the
century, but who seems to us to belong in character to its
earlier part; for he does not seem to be affected by the great
political movements of the latter part of the century. Indeed,
the work of Soto is in the main a careful restatement of some
of the principles of St Thomas Aquinas, with occasional
modifications, no doubt.
1 Id. id. id. : M Vedesi ancora nelle
sue elezioni a i Magistrati fare di lungo
migliore elezione che un Principe, ne
mai si persuadera` ad un populo che
sia bene tirare alla dignita` un uomo
infame e di corrotti costumi, il che
facilmente e per mille vie si persuade
ad un Principe; vedesi un populo
cominciare ad avere in orrore una
cosa, e molti secoli stare in quella
opinione; il che non si vede in un
principe. . . . Il che non puo` nascere
da altro se non che sono migliori
governi quelli de' popoli ohe quelli
de' Principi. . . . Se adunque si
ragionera` d'un Principe obligato alle
leggi, e d'un populo incatenato da
quelle, si vedra piu virtu nel populo
ohe nel Principe; se si ragionera` del
uno e del altro sciolto, si vedra meno
errori del populo che nel Principe, o
quelli minori e arrano maggiori
remedi. . . . Ma l'opinione contra ai
populi nasce perche` de' popoli ciascun
dice male senza paura, e liberamente
ancora mentre che regnano; de
Principi si parla sempre con mille
paure e mille rispetti. "
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? CHAP. III. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER. 255
We have already noticed Soto's conception of Law in
general; we are now concerned with his conception of
the prince. Kings, he says, do not derive their authority
immediately or directly from God, except in some special
cases, such as those of Saul and David; they are normally
created by the people, and their authority is derived from the
people. Such words as those of the Proverbs, "By me kings
reign," only mean that God, as the source of Natural Law,
has granted to mortal men that every Commonwealth has
the right to govern itself, and if reason, which is itself an
inspiration (spiramen) of the Divine, demands it, to transfer
its authority to another. 1
The authority of the king is, however, conceived by Soto
as being very great. In a passage dealing with the practice
of selling public offices, he is met with the contention that
the king cannot do this, for he is merely "dispensator offi-
ciorum "; he emphatically disputes this, and says that the
king is not merely a " dispensator," but he is the Eespublica,
not a mere vicar of the Eespublica, like the Doge of Venice.
The people, in Ulpian's phrase, has conveyed to him all its
authority and force, and neither he nor his heirs can be de-
prived of this, except for manifest tyranny. Therefore, the
kingdom is his, as the house of a private citizen belongs to
the citizen, and every power and right (Jus) of the Eespublica
belongs to him. Only, the Eespublica was not made for him,
but he for the Eespublica, and he must therefore consider
everything from the point of view of its good. 2 In another
1 Soto, 'De Justitia et Jure,' i. 1, 3
(p. 9): '' Haud enim a Deo proximo, et
quod aiunt immediate croati sunt,
praetor Saulum et Davidem eorumque
prosapiam, cui sceptrum ipse commisit,
sed, ut habetur 1. quod placuit ft. de
Conati. prim (' Digest,' i. 4, 1), reges ac
principes a populo ureai i sunt, in quaa
mom transtulit imperium ac potes-
tatem. . . . Unde verbum illud apud
sapientem ex Proverb: viii. supra
citatum, 'Per me reges regunt, ete. '
non aliter intelligendum ost quam
quod ab ipso, tanquam naturalis juris
auctorem, donatum mortalibus est, ut
unaqueque respublica se ipsam regendi
habeat arbitrium; ac subinde, ubi
ratio, quod spiramen etiam est dtvini
numinis, postulaverit, in alium suam
transmittat potestatem, cujus legibus
providentius gubernetur. "
? Id. , iii. 6, 4 (p. 273): "Attamen
objoctio haec nisi fallor nullatenus
conclusionem nostra in expugnat. Rex
enim non tanquam dispensator, sed
tanquam ipse eadem respublica repu*
tandus. Enim vero non est estimandus
tanquam reipublicae vicarius, sicuti
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? 256
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
passage Soto speaks of the power of the prince in making
laws; and says emphatically that he is superior, not only
to all individuals, but to the whole State. 1
It should be observed that with all his emphasis on the
authority of the king, he is equally clear that he must use it
for the good of the State, and if he uses it tyrannically he
may be deposed. This is not merely an incidental judgment,
but is carefully developed, with due qualifications, in another
passage, where he discusses the question of tyrannicide. He
makes a distinction, with which we are by this time familiar,
between the tyrant by usurpation and the tyrant by practice.
As to the first there is no doubt; he may be slain by anyone,
for he is making war on the Commonwealth. The case of the
second is more difficult, as he has a lawful right to the kingdom;
he can therefore only be deprived of this by public judgment,
but when this has been pronounced, anyone may be appointed
to carry it out. If the Commonwealth has a superior, he should
be requested to provide a remedy, but if there is none, the
Commonwealth may take arms against the tyrant. It is
noteworthy that he interprets the Decree of the Council of
Constance concerning tyrannicide as referring to the action of
a private person. 2 It is clear that, with all his reverence for
Venetorum dux, qui est a republics ipsum est: licet non respublica propter
pondens, eed tanquam plenissimam ipsum, sod ipse propter rempublicam
habens potestatem reipublicae, eandem sit institutus: et ideo omnia debet in
scilicet quam ipsa habebat. Sic enim publicum commodum referre. "
expresso habet lex ilia, quod principi, 1 Id. , iv. 4, 1 (p. 309): "At bine sit,
fl. : de Constit. prim ('Dig. ' i. 4, 1). ut lib. i. Quest, vi. dicebamus, princi-
Quod principi placuit, legis habet pem potestate fungi ferendarum legum;
vigorem, utpote cum lege regia quae quibus rempublicam coerceat. Fitque
de imperio lata est, populus ei et in praeterea ut non solum singulis reipub-
eum omne suum imperium et potes- licae membris superior sit, verum et
tatem contulerit. Hac enim lege totius collectim corporis, oaput, totique
atque hac do causa non potest ilium adeo sio eminens, ut totam etiam simul
ullo pacto dimovere, neque filios jure punire valeat. Quare neque per rem-
hereditario regnandi expoliare, si illud publicam rex potest regni expoliari,
se mel ill i contulerit, nisi ubi a porta nisi fuerit in tyrannidem corruptus. "
tyrannide regnum pessundaret. Et * Id. id. , v. 1, 3 (p. 400): "Primum
tunc solo beneficio naturalis juris, do tyranno, an cuivis civium licet eum
quo vim vi repellere licet. Itaque privatim interficere. Apparet enim
regnum est suum, sicut cujusque civia id esse, natura magistra, legitimum.
sua est domus; atque adeo quaecunque Nam unicuique oonceditur jus de-
facultas et jus reipublicae penes fendendi sese. De hoc D.
