Objection
3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mat.
Summa Theologica
For contraries by
their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are
contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above [2522](A[4]),
it seems that it can also decrease.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity. " For this it
seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches
charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can
increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God
makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the
man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
operation. " From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in
man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into
him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into
him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity,
He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore
charity can decrease.
On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according
to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i. e. of charity, "are fire and
flames. " Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as
long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i. e.
decrease.
I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its
proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as
stated above (A[4], ad 2).
Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
altogether through cessation from act, as stated above ([2523]FS,
Q[53], A[3]). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to
friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i. e. the
neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a
friendship. " Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on
its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when
human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last
ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is
not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated
above [2524](A[2]). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it
does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the
cessation involves a sin.
The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way
of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal
sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it
entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to
charity, as we shall state further on [2525](A[12]), and by way of
merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he
deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.
In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin
is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for
the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as
regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes,
though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet:
and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are
derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the
principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity;
for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be
mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more
than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in
respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted
in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.
The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may
be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial
sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that
subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in
equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his
end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its
poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less
(i. e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by
diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we
must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee. " This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which
we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not
actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is
always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish
charity, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above ([2526]FS, Q[113], A[3]).
Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the
part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?
Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is
born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
cannot sin, because he is born of God. " But none save the children of
God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love
be not true, it should not be called love. " Now, as he says again in a
letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true. " [*The
quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii. ,
among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the
Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino. ] Therefore it was no charity at all.
Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
work it is not charity. " Now no man loses charity by doing great
things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by
some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
cannot be lost.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against
thee, because thou hast left thy first charity. "
I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above
[2527](A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three
ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love
God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the
power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do.
Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same
time---that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act
of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the
gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby
"whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says
in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).
Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at
all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is
changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form
in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit
as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its
subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely
fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things
generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one
form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form,
as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one
form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On
the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the
potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the
potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably.
Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the
potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that
mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably:
whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality
of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to
God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may
occur whereby charity is lost.
It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to
a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges
of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind
judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so
does the end appear to him. " Accordingly charity is inseparable from
its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear
otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity
of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because
in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view
of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He
wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
Reply to Objection 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is
no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness
of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act,
this is not contrary to true charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its
purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work
great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
Reply to Objection 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every
motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal
sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted to
the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will
become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually
and by little and little. " But man falls away by losing charity.
Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60)
addresses Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not
an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
fount of charity. " From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat.
et Dig. Amoris. vi. ] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter was not
quenched, but cooled. " But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ.
Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now
a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor.
Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
above (A[10] ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.
Objection 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last
end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has
been committed.
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death,
according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death. " On the other hand
whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written
(Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I
will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation
everlasting life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal
life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom
Thou hast sent. " Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal
life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have
charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal
sin.
I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
very nature is capable of destroying charity.
If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its
subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act
is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a
habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that
when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done
away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God
Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping
of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as
stated above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently, just as the light would
cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up
by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through
the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the
soul.
Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity,
since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's
friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows
that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by
God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because
distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of
the will. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one
way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go
so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above ([2528]FS, Q[88], A[3]).
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if
he commits it.
Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may
reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and
falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through
malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly,
by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through
some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in
this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, i. e. , for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin,
but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
Reply to Objection 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and
hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as
stated above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is
contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as
charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above
([2529]Q[23], A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be
twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order
in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love
our neighbor also?
(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
(5) Whether one's own body?
(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy
God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him? " Now the
fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above
([2530]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
loved is to be honored. " Now the honor due to God, which is known as
"latria," is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
"dulia. " Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
from that with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mat.
1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. "
Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; [2531]FS,
Q[54], A[3]) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same
habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object,
considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is
specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and
that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the
same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color
under the aspect of light.
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love
him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him,
as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God;
as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the
ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its
justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as
neither is such like love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor
regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in
recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated
specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various
persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas
honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is
God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to
each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor
of latria on account of His singular virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved
him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we should love charity out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the
two precepts of charity (Mat. 22:37-39): and neither of them includes
charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore
charity need not be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of
happiness, as stated above ([2532]Q[23], A[1]). But charity cannot
participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2533]Q[23], A[1]). But no man can have friendship for charity or for
an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity
need not be loved out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his
neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself. " But we love our
neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is
loved out of charity.
I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of
the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of
its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a
spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from
the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above ([2534]Q[23], A[1]). Now by friendship a thing is loved in
two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out
of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those
whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love
both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our
neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual
life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good
which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to
those with whom we are friends.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves,
He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love
irrational creatures out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and
extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of
image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear
the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. [2535]FP, Q[45], A[7]]. Therefore
charity extends also to irrational creatures.
Objection 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and
birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and
plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational
creatures.
On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our
neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life.
Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([2536]Q[13],
A[1]) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship
is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for
our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be
loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer
in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational
creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to
whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good
things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly
speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature
which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good
it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not
speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except
metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some
fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to
live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now
irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is
regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is
impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper
to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting
happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to
wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use;
thus too does God love them out of charity.
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and
so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a
natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of
charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can
be no charity between less than two. " Therefore no man has charity
towards himself.
Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual
love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man
towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2537]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards
himself.
Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be
blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now
a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2
Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves. " Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself. " Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2538]Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must
hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but
something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a
man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which
a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have
friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of
friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves. "
Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than
science, namely understanding.
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself
who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so
far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which
they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's
rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which
pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is
through charity that a man loves himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of
charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death? " and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ. " Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship
in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is
towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot
love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of
charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there
are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he
reckons our own body.
I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
and its punishment.
Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God. " Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the
removal of such things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of
his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not
be unclothed, but clothed over. " He did, however, wish to escape from
the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the
corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it
from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this
death. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by
knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body,
we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz. , "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states
(Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a
share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is
for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust. "
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather
than loved, out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt
not suffer to live. " Therefore sinners should not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire
and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V. : 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection. ]. " Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will
the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will,
nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary.
Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
Objection 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners,
according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them. " Therefore we
should not love sinners out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it
is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to
look upon every man as our neighbor. " Now sinners do not cease to be
men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love
sinners out of charity.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature
and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a
capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as
stated above [2539](A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to
happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate,
in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man
capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for
God's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the
object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such
hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated
them with a perfect hatred. " Now hatred of a person's evil is
equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs
to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when
our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money
to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and
become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is
for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like
sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of
their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the
judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out
of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good
to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the
judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his
crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to
the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any
more.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in
Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of
prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked
be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell. " Secondly, by way
of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps.
57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," since,
according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction
of the wicked [Vulg.
their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are
contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above [2522](A[4]),
it seems that it can also decrease.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity. " For this it
seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches
charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can
increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God
makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the
man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
operation. " From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in
man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into
him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into
him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity,
He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore
charity can decrease.
On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according
to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i. e. of charity, "are fire and
flames. " Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as
long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i. e.
decrease.
I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its
proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as
stated above (A[4], ad 2).
Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
altogether through cessation from act, as stated above ([2523]FS,
Q[53], A[3]). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to
friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i. e. the
neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a
friendship. " Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on
its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when
human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last
ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is
not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated
above [2524](A[2]). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it
does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the
cessation involves a sin.
The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way
of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.
It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal
sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it
entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to
charity, as we shall state further on [2525](A[12]), and by way of
merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he
deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.
In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin
is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for
the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as
regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes,
though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet:
and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are
derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the
principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity;
for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be
mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more
than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in
respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted
in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.
The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may
be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial
sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that
subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in
equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his
end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its
poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less
(i. e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by
diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we
must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee. " This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which
we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not
actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is
always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish
charity, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above ([2526]FS, Q[113], A[3]).
Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the
part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?
Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is
born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
cannot sin, because he is born of God. " But none save the children of
God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love
be not true, it should not be called love. " Now, as he says again in a
letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true. " [*The
quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii. ,
among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the
Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino. ] Therefore it was no charity at all.
Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
work it is not charity. " Now no man loses charity by doing great
things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by
some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
cannot be lost.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against
thee, because thou hast left thy first charity. "
I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above
[2527](A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three
ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love
God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the
power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do.
Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same
time---that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act
of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the
gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby
"whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says
in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).
Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at
all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).
Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is
changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form
in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit
as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its
subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely
fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things
generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one
form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form,
as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one
form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On
the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the
potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the
potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably.
Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the
potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that
mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably:
whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality
of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to
God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may
occur whereby charity is lost.
It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to
a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges
of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind
judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so
does the end appear to him. " Accordingly charity is inseparable from
its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear
otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His
Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity
of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because
in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view
of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He
wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
Reply to Objection 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is
no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness
of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act,
this is not contrary to true charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its
purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work
great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
Reply to Objection 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every
motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal
sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted to
the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will
become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually
and by little and little. " But man falls away by losing charity.
Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60)
addresses Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not
an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
fount of charity. " From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat.
et Dig. Amoris. vi. ] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter was not
quenched, but cooled. " But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ.
Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now
a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor.
Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
above (A[10] ). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.
Objection 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last
end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has
been committed.
On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death,
according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death. " On the other hand
whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written
(Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I
will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation
everlasting life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal
life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom
Thou hast sent. " Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal
life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have
charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal
sin.
I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
very nature is capable of destroying charity.
If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its
subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act
is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a
habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that
when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done
away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God
Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping
of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as
stated above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently, just as the light would
cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up
by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through
the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the
soul.
Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity,
since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's
friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows
that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by
God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because
distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of
the will. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one
way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go
so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above ([2528]FS, Q[88], A[3]).
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if
he commits it.
Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may
reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and
falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through
malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly,
by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through
some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in
this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 4: Not every inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, i. e. , for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin,
but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
Reply to Objection 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and
hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as
stated above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is
contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as
charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above
([2529]Q[23], A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be
twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order
in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love
our neighbor also?
(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?
(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?
(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?
(5) Whether one's own body?
(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?
(7) Whether sinners love themselves?
(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?
(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?
(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy
God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him? " Now the
fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above
([2530]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
loved is to be honored. " Now the honor due to God, which is known as
"latria," is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
"dulia. " Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
from that with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mat.
1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. "
Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; [2531]FS,
Q[54], A[3]) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same
habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object,
considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is
specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and
that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the
same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color
under the aspect of light.
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love
him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him,
as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God;
as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the
ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its
justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as
neither is such like love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor
regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in
recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated
specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various
persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas
honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is
God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to
each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor
of latria on account of His singular virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved
him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
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Whether we should love charity out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the
two precepts of charity (Mat. 22:37-39): and neither of them includes
charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore
charity need not be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of
happiness, as stated above ([2532]Q[23], A[1]). But charity cannot
participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2533]Q[23], A[1]). But no man can have friendship for charity or for
an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity
need not be loved out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his
neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself. " But we love our
neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is
loved out of charity.
I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of
the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of
its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a
spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from
the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above ([2534]Q[23], A[1]). Now by friendship a thing is loved in
two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out
of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those
whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love
both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our
neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual
life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good
which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to
those with whom we are friends.
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Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves,
He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love
irrational creatures out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and
extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of
image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear
the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. [2535]FP, Q[45], A[7]]. Therefore
charity extends also to irrational creatures.
Objection 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and
birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and
plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational
creatures.
On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our
neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life.
Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([2536]Q[13],
A[1]) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship
is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for
our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be
loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer
in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational
creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to
whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good
things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly
speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature
which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good
it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not
speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except
metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some
fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to
live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now
irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is
regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is
impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper
to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting
happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we
cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to
wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use;
thus too does God love them out of charity.
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and
so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a
natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of
charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can
be no charity between less than two. " Therefore no man has charity
towards himself.
Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual
love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man
towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2537]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards
himself.
Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be
blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now
a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2
Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves. " Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself. " Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2538]Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must
hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but
something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a
man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which
a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have
friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of
friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves. "
Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than
science, namely understanding.
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself
who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of
charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so
far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which
they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's
rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which
pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is
through charity that a man loves himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of
charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death? " and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with
Christ. " Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship
in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
Objection 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is
towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot
love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of
charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there
are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he
reckons our own body.
I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin
and its punishment.
Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God. " Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the
removal of such things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of
his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not
be unclothed, but clothed over. " He did, however, wish to escape from
the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the
corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it
from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this
death. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by
knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body,
we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz. , "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states
(Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a
share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is
for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust. "
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather
than loved, out of charity.
Objection 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt
not suffer to live. " Therefore sinners should not be loved out of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire
and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V. : 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection. ]. " Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will
the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will,
nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary.
Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
Objection 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners,
according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them. " Therefore we
should not love sinners out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it
is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to
look upon every man as our neighbor. " Now sinners do not cease to be
men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love
sinners out of charity.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature
and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a
capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as
stated above [2539](A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love
sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.
On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to
happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate,
in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man
capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for
God's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the
object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such
hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated
them with a perfect hatred. " Now hatred of a person's evil is
equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs
to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when
our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money
to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and
become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is
for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like
sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of
their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the
judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out
of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good
to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the
judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his
crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to
the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any
more.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in
Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of
prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked
be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell. " Secondly, by way
of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps.
57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," since,
according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction
of the wicked [Vulg.
