Every effort
was made by its citizens to sustain the credit of the paper;
but such were their impoverishment and discord, that it
was thought necessary to pass laws tantamount to closing
the courts of justice.
was made by its citizens to sustain the credit of the paper;
but such were their impoverishment and discord, that it
was thought necessary to pass laws tantamount to closing
the courts of justice.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
This important letter was not presented.
The
reasons for suspending its delivery are stated in the follow-
ing reply:--
New-York, September 3, 1785.
Reasons assigned for suspending the delivery to con-
gress of the governor's letter for revising and altering the
confederation.
It may be necessary previously to observe, that many
are of opinion the states have not yet had experience suf-
ficient to determine the extent of the powers vested in
congress by the confederation, and therefore that every
measure at this time proposing an alteration is premature;
but admitting the necessity of immediately investing con-
gress with more commercial powers, it may be expedient
to inquire--
First--Whether good policy does not require that those
powers should be temporary?
In determining this question, we are led to consider the
commercial evils to be remedied, the efficacy of tempo-
rary powers for this purpose, and the disposition of the
several states touching the subject.
The evils principally consist in the impositions, restric-
tions, and prohibitions of foreign powers on our commerce,
and in the embarrassment resulting from the commercial
regulations of our own states. How far temporary pow-
ers can remedy these evils, perhaps time and experience
can only determine. Thus much may nevertheless be
suggested; that as several treaties which are now negotia-
ting by our commissioners in Europe are not to exceed
45
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? 354
THE LIFE OF
the term of fifteen years, if the commercial powers to be
vested in congress should be of a similar duration, they
may remedy the evils for that term, and at the expiration
thereof a new commercial epoch will commence, when the
states will have a more clear and comprehensive view of
their commercial interests, and of the best means for pro-
moting the same, whether by treaties abroad, or by the
delegation and exercise of greater commercial powers at
home.
Whatever the disposition of the states may be, it can only
be known by their acts; but the different views which they
have had of the subject, give reason to suppose that some
legislatures will think temporary commercial powers eligible
under present circumstances ; and should this be the opinion
of but one, an attempt immediately to delegate perpetual
commercial powers must fail, and may prevent a delega-
tion of temporary powers. For in politics as in private
life, by aiming at too much, one ofttimes accomplishes no-
thing.
Secondly--If the states are unanimously disposed to in-
crease the commercial powers of the confederacy, should
not the additional powers be in the first instance tempo-
rary, and the adoption of them as part of the confederation
depend on their beneficial effects 1 This is a question on
which we propose not to venture a decided opinion; but
experience teaches us, that in the formation of constitu-
tions and laws, the wisest men have not been able to fore-
see the evasions and abuses which in the operation have
resulted from vague terms and expressions, latent incon-
sistencies, artful constructions, and from too full and un-
guarded a delegation of powers.
Whether the subject of commerce, and the danger to
which the states may be exposed by a surrender to the
union of their commercial authority, are so fully under-
stood as to justify the consideration of an immediate altera-
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? HAMILTON.
tion of the confederation, is a matter that the legislatures
alone are competent to determine. Any of them who may
not be clear as to either of these points, will probably (as
in the other case) be in the first instance in favour of tem-
porary commercial powers, and, if approved by experience,
of adopting them as part of the confederation; but should
all the states be in favour of an immediate alteration of
the articles, will it not be expedient for them previously to
consider--that however great the abuse of this trust may
hereafter be, however grievous to a considerable part of
the union, the powers once delegated in the confederation,
cannot be revoked without the unanimous consent of the
states--that this may be earnestly sought for, but never
obtained--that the federal and state constitutions are the
great bulwarks of liberty--that if they are subject on tri-
vial, or even important occasions, to be revised and re-
revised, altered and realtered, they must cease to be con-
sidered as effectual and sacred barriers, and, like landmarks
frequently changed, will afford no certain rule for ascer-
taining the boundaries, no criterion for distinguishing be-
tween the rights of government and those of the people--
and, therefore, that every alteration of the articles should
be so thoroughly understood and digested, as scarcely to
admit the possibility of a disposition for reconsideration.
Thirdly--Shall any alteration, either temporary or per-
petual, be proposed in a way not expressly pointed out
by the confederation? The thirteenth article provides
"that every state shall abide by the determination of the
United States in congress assembled, on all questions
which by this confederation are submitted to them. And
the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably ob-
served by every state, and the union shall be perpetual;
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a con-
gress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed
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? 356
THE LIFE OF
by the legislatures of every state. " Here no provision is
made for or against a convention, and therefore it may be
said not to be inconsistent with this article; but as the
proceedings of a convention would not be binding on
congress, should the latter think themselves under the ne-
cessity of rejecting the report of the former, would not
the states, after having thus incurred a considerable ex-
pense, be dissatisfied on the occasion? Would not the mem-
bers of the convention, which it must be supposed would
be men of the first abilities and influence in the several
states, be hurt, and opposed in this instance to congress?
And would not parties in the legislatures and among the
people, be the consequence? If so, may not an apprehen-
sion of these evils have a tendency to influence some mem-
bers of congress to give up their opinions respecting the
repeal, rather than be involved in contentions ; and if such
are the prospects of a convention, will not congress con-
sider it as being contrary to the spirit of the confedera-
tion? Indeed wc are doubtful whether a measure of this
kind would not be viewed as manifesting a want of confi-
dence in congress, and on this ground meet their disappro-
bation.
Fourthly--If an alteration, either temporary or perpet-
ual, of the commercial powers of congress is to be consid-
ered by a convention, shall the latter be authorized to re-
vise the confederation generally, or only for express pur-
poses? The great object of the revolution was the estab-
lishment of good government, and each of the states in
forming their own as well as the federal constitution, have
adopted republican principles. Notwithstanding this,
plans have been artfully laid and vigorously pursued,
which, had they been successful, we think would have inev-
itably changed our republican governments into baleful
aristocracies. These plans are frustrated, but the same
spirit rejnains in their abettors, and the institution of the
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? HAMILTON.
357
Cincinnati, honourable and beneficent as the views may
have been of the officers who composed it, we fear, if not
totally abolished, will have the same tendency. What the
effect then may be of calling a convention to revise the
confederation generally, we leave with your excellency
and the honourable legislature to determine.
We are apprehensive, and it is our duty to declare it,
that such a measure would produce throughout the union,
an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send mem-
bers who would promote a change of government; and we
can form some judgment of the p! an which such mem-
bers would report to congress. But should the members
be altogether republican, such have been the declamations
of designing men against the confederation generally,
against the rotation of members, which, perhaps, is the
best check to corruption, and against the mode of altering
the confederation by the unanimous consent of the legisla-
tures, which effectually prevents innovations in the arti-
cles by intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great
danger of a report which would invest congress with pow-
ers that the honourable legislature have not the most dis-
tant intention to delegate. Perhaps it may be said, this
can produce no ill effect, because congress may correct
the report, however exceptionable; or, if passed by them,
any of the states may refuse to ratify it. True it is that
congress and the states have such power, but would not
such a report affect the tranquillity and weaken the gov-
ernment of the union? We have already considered
the operation of the report as it would respect con-
gress; and if animosities and parties would naturally arise
from their rejecting it, how much would these be increased
if the report, approved by congress and some of the states,
should be rejected by other states! Would there not be
danger of a party spirit being thus more generally diffused
and warmly supported? Far distant we know it to be
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? 358
THE LIFE OF
from the honourable legislature of Massachusetts to give up
a single principle of republicanism, but when a general
revision shall have proceeded from their motion, and a re-
port, which to them may be highly offensive, shall have
been confirmed by seven states in congress, and ratified by
several legislatures, will not these be ready to charge Mas-
sachusetts with inconsistency in being the first to oppose a
measure which the state will be said to have originated?
Massachusetts has great weight, and is considered as one
of the most republican states in the union, and when it is
known that the legislature have proposed a general re-
vision, there can be no doubt that they will be represented
as being convinced of the necessity of increasing generally
the powers of congress, and the opinion of the state will
be urged with such art as to convince numbers that the
articles of the confederation are altogether exceptionable;
thus, while measures are taken to guard against the evils
arising from the want, in one or two particulars, of power
in congress, we are in great danger of incurring the other
extreme. "More power in congress," has been the cry
from all quarters, but especially of those whose views, not
being confined to a government that will best promote the
happiness of the people, are extended to one that will af-
ford lucrative employments civil and military. Such a
government is an aristocracy, which would require a
standing army and a numerous train of pensioners and
placemen to prop and support its exalted administration.
To recommend one's self to such an administration would be
to secure an establishment for life, and at the same time to
provide for his posterity. These are pleasing prospects
which republican governments do not afford, and it is not
to be wondered at, that many persons of elevated views
and idle habits in these states, are desirous of the change.
We are for increasing the power of congress as far as it
will promote the happiness of the people, but at the same
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? HAMILTON.
359
time are clearly of opinion that every measure should
be avoided which would strengthen the hands of the ene-
mies to free government, and that an administration of
the present confederation, with all its inconveniences, is
preferable to the risk of general dissensions and animosi-
ties, which may approach to anarchy, and prepare the way
to a ruinous system of government.
Having thus from a sense of duty we owe to the Uni-
ted States, as well as to our constituents, communicated to
your excellency our sentiments on this important subject,
we request you to lay them before the honourable legislature
at their next session, and to inform them that their meas-
ures for a general revision of the confederation, if confirm-
ed, shall be immediately communicated to congress. That
no time will be lost by the suspension, since the requisi-
tion to the important matters before congress would have
prevented them from an early attention to the propositions
of Massachusetts, and that if these had been approved by
congress, many of the legislatures being now adjourned,
could not take the same into consideration.
E. Gerry,
S. Holten,
R. King.
The consequence of this reply was a vote of the state
legislature, annulling the resolution recommending a con-
vention. * While Massachusetts had been thus urging a
change in the federal system, she passed a temporary act
of navigation and commerce. f This act prohibited the
exportation of American manufactures or productions in
British bottoms, until the English restrictions were repealed;
limited the entry of all foreign vessels to three designated
ports; and, in order to encourage ship-building, levied an
? November 25th, 1785.
tJune 13th, 1785.
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? 360
THE LIFE OF
additional tonnage duty, and a double duty upon all imports
in such vessels. * At the same session she imposed discri-
minating advalorem duties upon certain enumerated arti-
cles, and various specific duties, for the avowed purposes
of encouraging agriculture, improving the raw materials,
promoting manufactures, and inducing economy, and levied
an excise duty on distilled spirits, and on several articles
of luxury.
New-Hampshire followed the example of Massachusetts.
The acts of both of these states, it has been mentioned,
were infractions of the treaty with France. A similar
policy was adopted by Rhode Island.
These laws proved the inefficacy of state legislation.
During their operation almost every foreign ship, destined
for those states, sought other ports. Thus a commerce of
great value was lost, and with it the revenue which had
partly prompted to the discrimination. f These restrictive
enactments were soon repealed, and thus all the injuries
were suffered which are the fruits of precipitate legislation.
But these evils had a wider influence. The laws levy-
ing imposts disregarded all uniformity, both as to the rates
of duties, and as to the articles on which they were charged. J
* The tonnage duty was five shillings per ton. There was a clause in this
act, by which vessels built in Massachusetts, though owned by British sub-
jects, should, on their first outward-bound cargo, pay the same duties as native
vessels. ,
t Representations were made to the Virginia legislature that her commerce
had passed into other states, and that what she lost Maryland gained by her
lower duties.
t The disparity of duties is seen in the fiscal provisions of the southern
states, whose interests at that time approximated. Maryland had one shil-
ling and sixpence per ton on goods of those in treaty--two shillings and eight-
pence on those not in treaty. On British goods, six shillings and eight-pence,
and two shillings per ton extra on other goods. Virginia had three shillings
and sixpence on those in treaty--six shillings and sixpence on those not in
treaty, besides two per cent, extra. South Carolina, two shillings and nine-
pence on British sugars--one shilling and eight pence on those of other nations.
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? HAMILTON. 361
The consequences of this inequality were soon felt, but in-
stead of looking to the want of uniformity, as the radical
source of the mischief, the wildest remedies were resorted
to. Oppressive penalties, accumulated oaths, multiplied
revenue officers, extravagant and partial exemptions--the
obvious resources of ignorant legislation--followed; and
when these failed, the states were seen competing with
each other in a reduction of duties, in order to secure a
preference to their own ports. Another consequence of
this disordered state of things was the negotiation of com-
mercial leagues, growing out of geographical causes, be-
tween the states of New-Jersey and Pennsylvania, and of
Maryland and Virginia, in direct contravention of the sixth
article of the confederation. The remedy for these evils
had been recommended by congress--the investing them
with a general power for the regulation of commerce.
The delay to embrace it is more decisive than any other
fact of the irrational adherence to state rights. Only four
states had fully complied with this recommendation. Six
had enacted laws clogged with embarrassing conditions.
Two had wholly disregarded it.
How narrow were the views which could not see the
advantages of an unrestrained intercourse between the
states, thus increasing the variety of exports, and enlarging
the field of commercial enterprise! How blind the jeal-
ousy which, in withholding a central power to regulate
commerce, overlooked the obvious facts, that, intersected
as the states are by deeply penetrating rivers, or divided by
artificial boundaries, no efficient guards against illicit trade
could be interposed by means consistent with the maxims
of a mild policy, and with a moderate expense; and that
the necessary expense would compel a resort to harsh and
onerous systems of taxation; that thus the states "would
be obliged," in Hamilton's language, "to strengthen the
executive arm of government, in doing which their consti-
46
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? 362 THE LIFE OF
t
tutions would acquire a progressive direction towards
monarchy. "
At the meeting of the legislature of New-York, in the
year seventeen hundred and eighty-four, Governor Clinton
proposed an enlargement of the powers of congress, if ne-
cessary, to counteract the British proclamations. He also
suggested the establishment of funds to pay the interest
and discharge the principal of the state debt, and indicated
as means, exclusive of direct taxation, the sale of the pub-
lic lands, internal duties and excises, marine passes, and a
tax on sales at auction. The suggestion as to the enlarge-
ment of the powers of congress, was not acted upon.
The state preferred exercising a control over its com-
merce, and having established a customhouse, passed an
act regulating the customs. This act imposed a double
duty on distilled spirits imported in vessels having a Brit-
ish register, but made no other discrimination. A similar
duty was, during the next year, proposed on all imports in
vessels owned in whole or in part by British subjects, un-
less, for the purpose of encouraging navigation, such ves-
sels were built within the state. *
Sensible of the necessity of conferring this power on the
confederacy, General Schuyler opposed this act in the sen-
ate, and Duer in the assembly. It was negatived by the
council of revision, on the ground " that every attempt by
a state to regulate trade without the concurrence of others,
must produce injury to the state, without any general
good; that partial duties would lead to countervailing du-
ties, and that state legislation on this subject, would inter-
fere with and embarrass the commercial treaties. " It nev-
ertheless became a law.
* Congress had, in April, 1784, recommended the grant of a general pow-
er to them for this purpose. This local act was passed in the following No-
vember.
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? HAMILTON. 363
Assured that the conferring on congress the sole power
of commercial regulation, would be an important step to-
wards the institution of a more efficient government,
Hamilton is now seen again exerting his influence. The
chamber of commerce were advised to petition the legisla-
ture. A large meeting was convened in New-York,
which was earnestly addressed by him, and passed resolu-
tions recommending the measure. Circulars were issued
to the other states, and a correspondence opened, which
urged an enlargement of the powers of congress to enable
them to regulate trade and to establish a navy.
The legislature yielded to these combined efforts, and at
the end of the session of seventeen hundred and eighty-five,
passed an act to vest congress for a term of fifteen years
with power to prohibit the importation or exportation of
articles of commerce in the vessels of states " not in treaty,"
and also to prohibit the subjects of any foreign state, not in
treaty, from importing any goods or merchandise, not the
produce or manufacture of the sovereign whose subjects
they were. But an express proviso was annexed, excluding
the United States from collecting any revenue or duties
within the state, without the sanction of its legislature.
The delay of New-York to concur in this measure of
general relief, had created great excitement in the adjoin-
ing states of New-Jersey and Connecticut. The former
declared Perth Amboy and Burlington free ports, and of-
fered special exemptions to merchants removing thither, as
lures to commercial capital. In Connecticut, such was the
discontent, that an entire prohibition of all intercourse
with its southern neighbour was proposed, and would
probably soon have been attempted.
While this conflicting legislation prevailed in the various
states, the patience of the suffering people was nearly ex--
hausted. In several, the debtors were seen striving to obtain
an ascendency in the legislatures, and by suspension acts to
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? 3G4 THE LIFE OF
delay the collection of debts; and a general disposition was
discovered, notwithstanding its evils had so recently been
felt, to seek relief in state emissions of paper money.
A majority was found in New-York, in despite of the
most earnest remonstrances through the press, in favour of
the issue of bills of credit, which were declared a legal
tender, and a discrimination was contemplated among the
different classes of creditors. Two-fifths of the debt due
by congress to the state were to be provided for, and the
claims of the army, of the holders of the loan-office certifi-
cates, and of the board of treasury, were to be turned over
to the exhausted exchequer of the union,--thus by divi-
ding the interests of the creditors, to weaken one of the
principal supports of the continental system. A bill for
the emission of state paper also passed the assembly of
New-Jersey, but was rejected by the council through the
firmness of Governor Livingston. So great was the pop-
ular excitement against him, that this virtuous patriot was
loudly decried and burned in effigy.
South Carolina adopted a similar policy.
Every effort
was made by its citizens to sustain the credit of the paper;
but such were their impoverishment and discord, that it
was thought necessary to pass laws tantamount to closing
the courts of justice. North Carolina and Georgia* fol-
lowed this vicious example. Thus, of the southern states,
Maryland and Virginia only escaped the contagion.
Rhode Island, whose conduct had become a reproach
to its inhabitants, did not merely issue a state paper, but
finding it rapidly sinking, passed laws, rendering a refusal
of it at specie value highly penal in the first instance--
declared that a second offence should be followed by
disfranchisement, and created special tribunals to try the
? The paper of North Carolina is stated to have depreciated 25 per cent;
that of Georgia and Rhode Island, 80 per cent.
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? HAMILTON.
365
offenders, depriving, by a formal enactment, the accused
party of trial by jury. Clauses were added imposing
a test oath to support the paper at par, suspending all
officers who should not subscribe it within twenty days
after its date, rendering a subscription of this oath a quali-
fication of the next legislature, and compelling every male
who had arrived at manhood to take it, or be disfranchised.
It was called the bloody bill. An information was filed
for refusing the paper. The judges of the supreme court
decided against it. They were summoned to appear before
the assembly to explain their decision: four of them were
displaced by the omnipotence of the democracy.
Indignant at these reckless proceedings, Connecticut
enacted a retaliatory law suspending existing suits, and
forbidding the commencement of others.
Indications of a similar temper were evinced in Massa-
chusetts. A proposition was widely circulated, that the
New-England states should virtually abdicate the union by
the withdrawal of their delegates from congress; and in the
disorganizing rage for dismemberment, her western coun-
ties began to look to a severance from her dominion. But
, as a state, Massachusetts firmly adhered to the obligations
of good faith, resisted every effort to emit paper, rejected
with indignation a proposal to purchase her securities at
a depreciated value, granted the impost to congress, and
subsequently passed a law to carry into effect its proposi-
tions for supplementary funds.
The vigour of character which distinguished her in her
support of the public faith, was not less shown by that
part of her population who, from a variety of causes, were
opposed to the requirements of justice.
While in other states much noisy discontent and angry
clamour were heard, among this energetic people dissatis-
faction soon ripened into rebellion.
Peculiar causes had combined to increase the pressure
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? 300
THE LIFE OF
on the states of Massachusetts and New-Hampshire.
Their seaboard population, from being engaged in the
fisheries, and thus following pursuits far removed from
the influence of the laws, were little accustomed to re-
straint. Thrown out of their ordinary occupations at a
time when the price of labour was low, they were com-
pelled to seek subsistence on any terms, and thus diminished
its general value. The demand for supplies created by
their remote expeditions had ceased. The commercial
restrictions prevented the outlet of the surplus produce
of the state; and thus each class, the grower and the con-
sumer, were mutually impoverished; and^ the taxes, which
prior to the revolution had little exceeded one hundred
thousand pounds, had augmented to an enormous amount.
The depreciation of the currency increased the distress.
While it enhanced the nominal amount of the taxes and
public charges, by interrupting private credit, it deterred
from pursuits which alone could provide resources for their
discharge, and led on to speculative measures, all of which
aggravated the evil.
A large number also of the inhabitants had been called out
by military requisitions during the war on temporary expe-'
ditions, and leaving the sober routine of ordinary life, had
acquired all the licentiousness without the discipline of the
camp. The firmness of the legislature put in motion every
active and turbulent spirit. Combinations were formed en-
tertaining desperate designs, and conventions of delegates
from extensive districts of the state were held, which adopt-
ed the most violent resolutions, censuring every measure that
had been taken to fulfil the public engagements; declaring
open hostility to the ministers of justice; calling for an
abolition of all existing contracts; claiming an equal dis-
tribution of property; and at the same time professing
that their proceedings were constitutional!
This ebullition was soon followed by acts of open resist-
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? HAMILTON.
3G7
ance to the laws. The courts were surrounded by insur-
gents; mobs accompanied the judges in their circuits; and
in the three western and largest counties of the state, all
legal process was defied. On intelligence of these pro-
ceedings, the state government attempted to exert its civil
power; but instead of repressing, this confirmed and irri-
tated the insurgents. The contagion spread from town to
town, and it at last became manifest that a military force
could alone overawe their violence.
The legislature having been convened, measures were
adopted, not without opposition from those claiming
the appellation of the friends of the people, conferring
powers on the executive equal to the emergency. These
became the subjects of louder clamours and greater irri-
tation. Offers of pardon were disregarded. Renewed
and more extensive opposition was excited against the
courts of justice, which were in one instance compelled
to stipulate to hold no future sessions, and in another to
give hostages for the protection of. the insurgents. In
Taunton, it was deemed necessary to station a body
of militia to secure the judges and the jury from per-
sonal violence. The discontented, who had previously
shown themselves in detached parties, moved to a com-
mon point; and at last a body of a thousand insurgents
was collected under the command of a late captain in the
continental army, who billeted themselves upon the inhabit-
ants, and apprehended every person obnoxious to their
views. The necessity of abandoning the lenity which had
thus far governed the councils of the state, now became ob-
vious. Orders were given to the militia to march upon cer-
tain positions, and the assembled corps were put in motion
--one under General Lincoln, the other under General
Shephard--to check the progress of the insurrection. These
decisive steps were attended with complete success. The
insurgents in most instances fled before the military.
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Where they made a stand, their resistance was feeble and
heartless, and after a few occasional skirmishes, they dis-
persed and took refuge in the adjacent states. With little
hope of success, and without the means of keeping in a
body, they soon dwindled into insignificance, and except a
few predatory incursions by which the frontiers of the
state were harassed, quiet was restored.
In New-Hampshire,* a similar spirit had been also
aroused. In the beginning of eighty-five, the legislature,
yielding to the distresses of the people, had enacted a law
making every species of property a tender at an appraised
value. The creditors consequently withheld their demands,
and the debtors neglected payment. Goods and real pro-
perty being thereby substituted as a medium of exchange,
specie was hoarded, credit suspended, and the distress in-
creased. A convention was held which urged upon the
government the emission of bills of credit, that should be a
legal tender. A plan was formed by the legislature for an
issue, to be loaned on landed security, redeemable at a future
period, which was submitted to the people; but before any
expression of opinion could be obtained, an armed body
assembled at Exeter, the seat of government, where the
legislature was in session, and demanded an immediate
compliance with their terms. The alarmed assembly pro-
posed to consider their complaints; but the senate main-
tained its dignity. General Sullivan, who was the presi-
dent, addressed the people, exposing the absurdity of their
demands, and avowing his determination, even if the whole
state was in favour of the measure, not to yield while they
were surrounded by an armed force; and that no consider-
ation of personal danger should compel him to so flagrant
a violation of the constitutional rights of the people.
The contumacious mob then beat to arms, loaded their
* Collections of the New-Hampshire Historical Society.
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? HAMILTON. 3G9
muskets with ball, and placing sentinels at the doors, held
the legislature prisoners throughout the day. At night-
fall, Sullivan again addressed them. In reply to his firm
harangue, nothing was heard but loud clamours for "pa-
per money"--"an equal distribution of property"--"the an-
nihilation of debts"--and " a release oftaxes. " At this moment
a drum was heard, and a party came in sight, huzzaing for
government. The mob was alarmed, and Sullivan, followed
by the legislature, passed unimpeded through its dense col-
umns. He immediately reassembled the legislature in another
place, issued orders at midnight for the militia, and a body of
two thousand being collected at an early hour, he ad-
vanced and addressed the insurgents, drawn up in order of
battle. A part yielded, the rest fled, and, except to an attempt
to seize the persons of their leaders, no resistance was offered.
The contest was soon after transferred from the field to
the elections, and, without any diminished cause of dis-
content, the people settled down in a general submission to
the laws. The leaders, Parsons, Shays, and French, threw
themselves on the mercy of government, which, with a
prudent mildness, was satisfied with their disfranchisement.
It would be an error to pronounce the issue of these
events merely fortunate, for where can an instance be ad-
duced of so great and long-continued an excitement, pro-
ceeding from such ample causes, among a people just
emerging from a civil war, subdued so soon by a reluctant
exercise of power, and that power the very people, most
of whom were participators in the sufferings which sharp-
ened the edge of discontent?
The ease with which this insurrection was suppressed,
may be in part attributed to the influence of a few of the
leaders in the revolution, who continued to possess the
confidence of the public; but more is to be ascribed to the
character of an enlightened and not dense community,
where an equal condition and equal forms of government
47
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had produced habits of obedience to, and reverence for,
the laws. But it would be not less an error to overlook
the fact, that the issue of this controversy is a rare excep-
tion to the usual course of such events, and to infer from
it, that a civilized society may safely repose upon the un-
controlled virtue and intelligence of its members. The
tendency of civilization is to produce inequalities of condi-
tion, and in the short period which has elapsed since this
rebellion, and notwithstanding the propitious circumstances
in which she has been placed, it would be vain at this time
to expect, even in Massachusetts, a similar result.
A more extraordinary deduction has been drawn from the
tranquil termination of this contest with the laws--that re-
bellions are salutary; "that the tree of liberty must be wa-
tered with blood,"* and that societies which rely for the
preservation of order upon the vigour of government, are
unwisely constituted.
Every violent aggression upon constitutional authority
is an invasion of the first principle of social institutions;
and little permanence or happiness can those institutions
hope to enjoy, or to preserve, which for a moment admit
the dangerous doctrine, except in the extreme cases which
justify a revolution, of a resort to force.
Another inference must be adverted to, because it is known
to be the basis upon which a large superstructure of invidious
censure upon the people of New-England has been raised--
that these scenes prompted in that part of the confederacy
a desire for a monarchical form of government. This is
an error natural to the region of country in which it was
propagated; for where slavery debases all at least below
the rank of master, how short is the interval between re-
volt and ruin; how great the excuse for rigour in the
harsh; how little room for lenity in the gentle; how fear-
* Jefferson's writings.
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? HAMILTON.
371
fill the consequence of awakening the sufferer to a sense
of his injuries; how prone the mind to power! But there
is no analogy in the respective circumstances of the south-
ern and the eastern states. Under less equal forms, rebel-
lion has usually produced some great modification of the
political system, either by larger grants of privilege to the
subject, or greater concentration of strength in the rulers;
but in New-England, weakness made no sacrifices, power
acquired no augmentation, and the insurgents were seen to
lay down their arms, not as trembling vassals, reduced to
the sway of an imperious master, but as an erring part of
the people rejoining the mass, happy to return under the
protection of laws which they had shared in framing, and
knew they could participate in modifying. There is not
an authenticated fact to show, that these events excited a
wish for any other than a more efficient but equally free
government.
Whether by giving a different direction to the public
mind, and offering a new hope of relief, the proposed con-
vention of the states would have prevented these alarming
occurrences, it is impossible to determine. The despair
of aid from state legislation may have stimulated the peo-
ple to violence; but it is rather to be believed that the
popular feelings were too much excited, the suffering too
great and extensive, to have waited the issue of so slow a
process. The rebellious temper of the populace rendered
a vigorous exertion of the powers of government neces-
sary; and it cannot be doubted, that this necessity had
much influence in inducing the states to consent to the es-
tablishment of the federal constitution.
The prostration of commerce, the poverty and anarchy
of the country, the hopeless prospect before them, com-
pelled the people to feel the want of that which Hamilton
was the first to indicate as the only resource--" a more
perfect union. " New-York had been the earliest to pro-
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pose a convention of the states. After longer experience,
Massachusetts had declared her conviction of its necessity;
to which Virginia, eminently jealous of her state sove-
reignty, was impelled by peculiar circumstances at last to
assent.
Her geographical position rendered it extremely difficult
to establish an efficient, and at the same time an indepen-
dent revenue system. This difficulty had early suggested
the importance of forming a compact with Maryland, as
to the jurisdiction of their confluent waters; and in De-
cember, seventeen hundred and seventy-seven, commis-
sioners were appointed by Virginia for this object. The
subject was resumed in seventeen hundred and eighty-four,
and a similar commission created. Nothing having been
effected by them, new commissioners were chosen in the
succeeding year, who met the deputies of Maryland at
Mount Vernon. There they agreed upon an act regula-
ting the commercial intercourse through the Potomac and
Chesapeake, and defining the jurisdiction of each state.
But at the moment of framing this compact, they deemed
it necessary to extend its provisions so as to authorize the
establishment of a naval force to protect these estuaries,
and the formation of a mutual tariff. This compact, by
the articles of the confederation, required the previous
consent of congress. To obviate that difficulty, these de-
puties recommended to their respective states the appoint-
ment of other commissioners with enlarged powers, to
whose proceedings the permission of congress was to be
solicited.
On the thirteenth of January, seventeen hundred and
eighty-six, resolutions passed the legislature of Virginia for
a uniformity of duties between the two states, and that
commissioners should be chosen to meet annually, if re-
quired, to regulate their mutual commercial interests.
They were instructed particularly to provide, that foreign
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? HAMILTON.
373
gold should pass at the same rate in both states, and that
the same amount of damages should be charged on pro-
tested bills of exchange. A few days after, the house of
delegates passed a resolution, directing the projected ar-
rangement to be communicated to all the other states, who
were invited to send deputies to a general meeting for the
precise purpose " of considering how far a uniform system
of taxation in their commercial intercourse and regula-
tions might be necessary to their common interest and
permanent harmony; and to report an act relative to this
great object, which, when ratified, would enable the United
States, in congress assembled, effectually to provide for the
same. " Thus it will be seen that Virginia merely con-
templated a commercial arrangement, falling far short of
the policy which New-York and Massachusetts had pre-
viously embraced.
Her reluctance in granting, and her repeals of the im-
post ;* her hostility to a federal judiciary; her jealousy as
to the Mississippi;--all leave little room for doubt, that the
project of a continental convention to frame a constitution,
would at an earlier period have been feebly sustained by
her. Washington's circular letter had produced no action
on her part, and her councils were swayed by penmen who
looked upon an invigoration of the union with jealousy,
because the suggestion had emanated from the army, and
who, speculating in their closets on the dangers of con-
ferring power, had not considered how much greater were
the evils of usurpation, even from "necessity," than those
* In a letter from R. H. Lee, he states his apprehensions of alterations m
the articles of the confederation, that he had " ever been opposed to the five
per cent. impost," that he never could agree that congress " shall dictate the
mode of taxation, or that the collection shall in any manner be subject to
congressional control. " He was opposed to the power of regulating trade. --
Life, v. 2, pp. 62, 71.
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of a large constitutional authority. * Yet the precedence
of that state in this important measure- has been claimed
without hesitation, and generally received as a part of
American history. It is time that this error, with many
others, should be corrected.
Soon after this project was first agitated, Hamilton,
whose mind had long laboured with the great design of a
national constitution, determined to bring about the co-
operation of New-York. It was a part of his plan, that
the state legislature should definitively adopt or reject the
revenue system of seventeen hundred and eighty-three, and
in case of its rejection, should appoint commissioners to
attend the commercial convention. "Hamilton," Troup
relates, "had no idea that the legislature could be prevail-
ed on to adopt the system as recommended by congress,
neither had he any partiality for a commercial convention,
otherwise than as a stepping stone to a general conven-
tion, to form a general constitution. In pursuance of
his plan, the late Mr. Duer, the late Colonel Malcom, and
myself, were sent to the state legislature as part of the
* In a letter of Madison to R. II. Lee, he observes, "/ have not yet found
leisure to scan the project of a continental convention with so close an eye
as to have made up any observations worthy of being mentioned to you. In
general, I hold it for a maxim, that the union of the states is essential for their
safety against foreign danger and internal contention, and that the perpetui-
ty and efficacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The question
therefore is, in what mode and at what moment the experiment for supplying
the defects ought to be made. The answer to this question cannot be made
without a knowledge, greater than I possess, of the temper and views of the
different states. Virginia seems, I think, to have excellent dispositions to-
wards the confederacy, but her assent or dissent to such a proposition, would
probably depend much upon the chance of having no opponent capable of
rousing the jealousies and prejudices of the assembly against innovations,
particularly such as will derogate from their own power and importance.
Should a view of the other states present no objections against the experi-
ment, individually, I would wish none to be presupposed here.
reasons for suspending its delivery are stated in the follow-
ing reply:--
New-York, September 3, 1785.
Reasons assigned for suspending the delivery to con-
gress of the governor's letter for revising and altering the
confederation.
It may be necessary previously to observe, that many
are of opinion the states have not yet had experience suf-
ficient to determine the extent of the powers vested in
congress by the confederation, and therefore that every
measure at this time proposing an alteration is premature;
but admitting the necessity of immediately investing con-
gress with more commercial powers, it may be expedient
to inquire--
First--Whether good policy does not require that those
powers should be temporary?
In determining this question, we are led to consider the
commercial evils to be remedied, the efficacy of tempo-
rary powers for this purpose, and the disposition of the
several states touching the subject.
The evils principally consist in the impositions, restric-
tions, and prohibitions of foreign powers on our commerce,
and in the embarrassment resulting from the commercial
regulations of our own states. How far temporary pow-
ers can remedy these evils, perhaps time and experience
can only determine. Thus much may nevertheless be
suggested; that as several treaties which are now negotia-
ting by our commissioners in Europe are not to exceed
45
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the term of fifteen years, if the commercial powers to be
vested in congress should be of a similar duration, they
may remedy the evils for that term, and at the expiration
thereof a new commercial epoch will commence, when the
states will have a more clear and comprehensive view of
their commercial interests, and of the best means for pro-
moting the same, whether by treaties abroad, or by the
delegation and exercise of greater commercial powers at
home.
Whatever the disposition of the states may be, it can only
be known by their acts; but the different views which they
have had of the subject, give reason to suppose that some
legislatures will think temporary commercial powers eligible
under present circumstances ; and should this be the opinion
of but one, an attempt immediately to delegate perpetual
commercial powers must fail, and may prevent a delega-
tion of temporary powers. For in politics as in private
life, by aiming at too much, one ofttimes accomplishes no-
thing.
Secondly--If the states are unanimously disposed to in-
crease the commercial powers of the confederacy, should
not the additional powers be in the first instance tempo-
rary, and the adoption of them as part of the confederation
depend on their beneficial effects 1 This is a question on
which we propose not to venture a decided opinion; but
experience teaches us, that in the formation of constitu-
tions and laws, the wisest men have not been able to fore-
see the evasions and abuses which in the operation have
resulted from vague terms and expressions, latent incon-
sistencies, artful constructions, and from too full and un-
guarded a delegation of powers.
Whether the subject of commerce, and the danger to
which the states may be exposed by a surrender to the
union of their commercial authority, are so fully under-
stood as to justify the consideration of an immediate altera-
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? HAMILTON.
tion of the confederation, is a matter that the legislatures
alone are competent to determine. Any of them who may
not be clear as to either of these points, will probably (as
in the other case) be in the first instance in favour of tem-
porary commercial powers, and, if approved by experience,
of adopting them as part of the confederation; but should
all the states be in favour of an immediate alteration of
the articles, will it not be expedient for them previously to
consider--that however great the abuse of this trust may
hereafter be, however grievous to a considerable part of
the union, the powers once delegated in the confederation,
cannot be revoked without the unanimous consent of the
states--that this may be earnestly sought for, but never
obtained--that the federal and state constitutions are the
great bulwarks of liberty--that if they are subject on tri-
vial, or even important occasions, to be revised and re-
revised, altered and realtered, they must cease to be con-
sidered as effectual and sacred barriers, and, like landmarks
frequently changed, will afford no certain rule for ascer-
taining the boundaries, no criterion for distinguishing be-
tween the rights of government and those of the people--
and, therefore, that every alteration of the articles should
be so thoroughly understood and digested, as scarcely to
admit the possibility of a disposition for reconsideration.
Thirdly--Shall any alteration, either temporary or per-
petual, be proposed in a way not expressly pointed out
by the confederation? The thirteenth article provides
"that every state shall abide by the determination of the
United States in congress assembled, on all questions
which by this confederation are submitted to them. And
the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably ob-
served by every state, and the union shall be perpetual;
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a con-
gress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed
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THE LIFE OF
by the legislatures of every state. " Here no provision is
made for or against a convention, and therefore it may be
said not to be inconsistent with this article; but as the
proceedings of a convention would not be binding on
congress, should the latter think themselves under the ne-
cessity of rejecting the report of the former, would not
the states, after having thus incurred a considerable ex-
pense, be dissatisfied on the occasion? Would not the mem-
bers of the convention, which it must be supposed would
be men of the first abilities and influence in the several
states, be hurt, and opposed in this instance to congress?
And would not parties in the legislatures and among the
people, be the consequence? If so, may not an apprehen-
sion of these evils have a tendency to influence some mem-
bers of congress to give up their opinions respecting the
repeal, rather than be involved in contentions ; and if such
are the prospects of a convention, will not congress con-
sider it as being contrary to the spirit of the confedera-
tion? Indeed wc are doubtful whether a measure of this
kind would not be viewed as manifesting a want of confi-
dence in congress, and on this ground meet their disappro-
bation.
Fourthly--If an alteration, either temporary or perpet-
ual, of the commercial powers of congress is to be consid-
ered by a convention, shall the latter be authorized to re-
vise the confederation generally, or only for express pur-
poses? The great object of the revolution was the estab-
lishment of good government, and each of the states in
forming their own as well as the federal constitution, have
adopted republican principles. Notwithstanding this,
plans have been artfully laid and vigorously pursued,
which, had they been successful, we think would have inev-
itably changed our republican governments into baleful
aristocracies. These plans are frustrated, but the same
spirit rejnains in their abettors, and the institution of the
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? HAMILTON.
357
Cincinnati, honourable and beneficent as the views may
have been of the officers who composed it, we fear, if not
totally abolished, will have the same tendency. What the
effect then may be of calling a convention to revise the
confederation generally, we leave with your excellency
and the honourable legislature to determine.
We are apprehensive, and it is our duty to declare it,
that such a measure would produce throughout the union,
an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send mem-
bers who would promote a change of government; and we
can form some judgment of the p! an which such mem-
bers would report to congress. But should the members
be altogether republican, such have been the declamations
of designing men against the confederation generally,
against the rotation of members, which, perhaps, is the
best check to corruption, and against the mode of altering
the confederation by the unanimous consent of the legisla-
tures, which effectually prevents innovations in the arti-
cles by intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great
danger of a report which would invest congress with pow-
ers that the honourable legislature have not the most dis-
tant intention to delegate. Perhaps it may be said, this
can produce no ill effect, because congress may correct
the report, however exceptionable; or, if passed by them,
any of the states may refuse to ratify it. True it is that
congress and the states have such power, but would not
such a report affect the tranquillity and weaken the gov-
ernment of the union? We have already considered
the operation of the report as it would respect con-
gress; and if animosities and parties would naturally arise
from their rejecting it, how much would these be increased
if the report, approved by congress and some of the states,
should be rejected by other states! Would there not be
danger of a party spirit being thus more generally diffused
and warmly supported? Far distant we know it to be
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THE LIFE OF
from the honourable legislature of Massachusetts to give up
a single principle of republicanism, but when a general
revision shall have proceeded from their motion, and a re-
port, which to them may be highly offensive, shall have
been confirmed by seven states in congress, and ratified by
several legislatures, will not these be ready to charge Mas-
sachusetts with inconsistency in being the first to oppose a
measure which the state will be said to have originated?
Massachusetts has great weight, and is considered as one
of the most republican states in the union, and when it is
known that the legislature have proposed a general re-
vision, there can be no doubt that they will be represented
as being convinced of the necessity of increasing generally
the powers of congress, and the opinion of the state will
be urged with such art as to convince numbers that the
articles of the confederation are altogether exceptionable;
thus, while measures are taken to guard against the evils
arising from the want, in one or two particulars, of power
in congress, we are in great danger of incurring the other
extreme. "More power in congress," has been the cry
from all quarters, but especially of those whose views, not
being confined to a government that will best promote the
happiness of the people, are extended to one that will af-
ford lucrative employments civil and military. Such a
government is an aristocracy, which would require a
standing army and a numerous train of pensioners and
placemen to prop and support its exalted administration.
To recommend one's self to such an administration would be
to secure an establishment for life, and at the same time to
provide for his posterity. These are pleasing prospects
which republican governments do not afford, and it is not
to be wondered at, that many persons of elevated views
and idle habits in these states, are desirous of the change.
We are for increasing the power of congress as far as it
will promote the happiness of the people, but at the same
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? HAMILTON.
359
time are clearly of opinion that every measure should
be avoided which would strengthen the hands of the ene-
mies to free government, and that an administration of
the present confederation, with all its inconveniences, is
preferable to the risk of general dissensions and animosi-
ties, which may approach to anarchy, and prepare the way
to a ruinous system of government.
Having thus from a sense of duty we owe to the Uni-
ted States, as well as to our constituents, communicated to
your excellency our sentiments on this important subject,
we request you to lay them before the honourable legislature
at their next session, and to inform them that their meas-
ures for a general revision of the confederation, if confirm-
ed, shall be immediately communicated to congress. That
no time will be lost by the suspension, since the requisi-
tion to the important matters before congress would have
prevented them from an early attention to the propositions
of Massachusetts, and that if these had been approved by
congress, many of the legislatures being now adjourned,
could not take the same into consideration.
E. Gerry,
S. Holten,
R. King.
The consequence of this reply was a vote of the state
legislature, annulling the resolution recommending a con-
vention. * While Massachusetts had been thus urging a
change in the federal system, she passed a temporary act
of navigation and commerce. f This act prohibited the
exportation of American manufactures or productions in
British bottoms, until the English restrictions were repealed;
limited the entry of all foreign vessels to three designated
ports; and, in order to encourage ship-building, levied an
? November 25th, 1785.
tJune 13th, 1785.
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THE LIFE OF
additional tonnage duty, and a double duty upon all imports
in such vessels. * At the same session she imposed discri-
minating advalorem duties upon certain enumerated arti-
cles, and various specific duties, for the avowed purposes
of encouraging agriculture, improving the raw materials,
promoting manufactures, and inducing economy, and levied
an excise duty on distilled spirits, and on several articles
of luxury.
New-Hampshire followed the example of Massachusetts.
The acts of both of these states, it has been mentioned,
were infractions of the treaty with France. A similar
policy was adopted by Rhode Island.
These laws proved the inefficacy of state legislation.
During their operation almost every foreign ship, destined
for those states, sought other ports. Thus a commerce of
great value was lost, and with it the revenue which had
partly prompted to the discrimination. f These restrictive
enactments were soon repealed, and thus all the injuries
were suffered which are the fruits of precipitate legislation.
But these evils had a wider influence. The laws levy-
ing imposts disregarded all uniformity, both as to the rates
of duties, and as to the articles on which they were charged. J
* The tonnage duty was five shillings per ton. There was a clause in this
act, by which vessels built in Massachusetts, though owned by British sub-
jects, should, on their first outward-bound cargo, pay the same duties as native
vessels. ,
t Representations were made to the Virginia legislature that her commerce
had passed into other states, and that what she lost Maryland gained by her
lower duties.
t The disparity of duties is seen in the fiscal provisions of the southern
states, whose interests at that time approximated. Maryland had one shil-
ling and sixpence per ton on goods of those in treaty--two shillings and eight-
pence on those not in treaty. On British goods, six shillings and eight-pence,
and two shillings per ton extra on other goods. Virginia had three shillings
and sixpence on those in treaty--six shillings and sixpence on those not in
treaty, besides two per cent, extra. South Carolina, two shillings and nine-
pence on British sugars--one shilling and eight pence on those of other nations.
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? HAMILTON. 361
The consequences of this inequality were soon felt, but in-
stead of looking to the want of uniformity, as the radical
source of the mischief, the wildest remedies were resorted
to. Oppressive penalties, accumulated oaths, multiplied
revenue officers, extravagant and partial exemptions--the
obvious resources of ignorant legislation--followed; and
when these failed, the states were seen competing with
each other in a reduction of duties, in order to secure a
preference to their own ports. Another consequence of
this disordered state of things was the negotiation of com-
mercial leagues, growing out of geographical causes, be-
tween the states of New-Jersey and Pennsylvania, and of
Maryland and Virginia, in direct contravention of the sixth
article of the confederation. The remedy for these evils
had been recommended by congress--the investing them
with a general power for the regulation of commerce.
The delay to embrace it is more decisive than any other
fact of the irrational adherence to state rights. Only four
states had fully complied with this recommendation. Six
had enacted laws clogged with embarrassing conditions.
Two had wholly disregarded it.
How narrow were the views which could not see the
advantages of an unrestrained intercourse between the
states, thus increasing the variety of exports, and enlarging
the field of commercial enterprise! How blind the jeal-
ousy which, in withholding a central power to regulate
commerce, overlooked the obvious facts, that, intersected
as the states are by deeply penetrating rivers, or divided by
artificial boundaries, no efficient guards against illicit trade
could be interposed by means consistent with the maxims
of a mild policy, and with a moderate expense; and that
the necessary expense would compel a resort to harsh and
onerous systems of taxation; that thus the states "would
be obliged," in Hamilton's language, "to strengthen the
executive arm of government, in doing which their consti-
46
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? 362 THE LIFE OF
t
tutions would acquire a progressive direction towards
monarchy. "
At the meeting of the legislature of New-York, in the
year seventeen hundred and eighty-four, Governor Clinton
proposed an enlargement of the powers of congress, if ne-
cessary, to counteract the British proclamations. He also
suggested the establishment of funds to pay the interest
and discharge the principal of the state debt, and indicated
as means, exclusive of direct taxation, the sale of the pub-
lic lands, internal duties and excises, marine passes, and a
tax on sales at auction. The suggestion as to the enlarge-
ment of the powers of congress, was not acted upon.
The state preferred exercising a control over its com-
merce, and having established a customhouse, passed an
act regulating the customs. This act imposed a double
duty on distilled spirits imported in vessels having a Brit-
ish register, but made no other discrimination. A similar
duty was, during the next year, proposed on all imports in
vessels owned in whole or in part by British subjects, un-
less, for the purpose of encouraging navigation, such ves-
sels were built within the state. *
Sensible of the necessity of conferring this power on the
confederacy, General Schuyler opposed this act in the sen-
ate, and Duer in the assembly. It was negatived by the
council of revision, on the ground " that every attempt by
a state to regulate trade without the concurrence of others,
must produce injury to the state, without any general
good; that partial duties would lead to countervailing du-
ties, and that state legislation on this subject, would inter-
fere with and embarrass the commercial treaties. " It nev-
ertheless became a law.
* Congress had, in April, 1784, recommended the grant of a general pow-
er to them for this purpose. This local act was passed in the following No-
vember.
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? HAMILTON. 363
Assured that the conferring on congress the sole power
of commercial regulation, would be an important step to-
wards the institution of a more efficient government,
Hamilton is now seen again exerting his influence. The
chamber of commerce were advised to petition the legisla-
ture. A large meeting was convened in New-York,
which was earnestly addressed by him, and passed resolu-
tions recommending the measure. Circulars were issued
to the other states, and a correspondence opened, which
urged an enlargement of the powers of congress to enable
them to regulate trade and to establish a navy.
The legislature yielded to these combined efforts, and at
the end of the session of seventeen hundred and eighty-five,
passed an act to vest congress for a term of fifteen years
with power to prohibit the importation or exportation of
articles of commerce in the vessels of states " not in treaty,"
and also to prohibit the subjects of any foreign state, not in
treaty, from importing any goods or merchandise, not the
produce or manufacture of the sovereign whose subjects
they were. But an express proviso was annexed, excluding
the United States from collecting any revenue or duties
within the state, without the sanction of its legislature.
The delay of New-York to concur in this measure of
general relief, had created great excitement in the adjoin-
ing states of New-Jersey and Connecticut. The former
declared Perth Amboy and Burlington free ports, and of-
fered special exemptions to merchants removing thither, as
lures to commercial capital. In Connecticut, such was the
discontent, that an entire prohibition of all intercourse
with its southern neighbour was proposed, and would
probably soon have been attempted.
While this conflicting legislation prevailed in the various
states, the patience of the suffering people was nearly ex--
hausted. In several, the debtors were seen striving to obtain
an ascendency in the legislatures, and by suspension acts to
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? 3G4 THE LIFE OF
delay the collection of debts; and a general disposition was
discovered, notwithstanding its evils had so recently been
felt, to seek relief in state emissions of paper money.
A majority was found in New-York, in despite of the
most earnest remonstrances through the press, in favour of
the issue of bills of credit, which were declared a legal
tender, and a discrimination was contemplated among the
different classes of creditors. Two-fifths of the debt due
by congress to the state were to be provided for, and the
claims of the army, of the holders of the loan-office certifi-
cates, and of the board of treasury, were to be turned over
to the exhausted exchequer of the union,--thus by divi-
ding the interests of the creditors, to weaken one of the
principal supports of the continental system. A bill for
the emission of state paper also passed the assembly of
New-Jersey, but was rejected by the council through the
firmness of Governor Livingston. So great was the pop-
ular excitement against him, that this virtuous patriot was
loudly decried and burned in effigy.
South Carolina adopted a similar policy.
Every effort
was made by its citizens to sustain the credit of the paper;
but such were their impoverishment and discord, that it
was thought necessary to pass laws tantamount to closing
the courts of justice. North Carolina and Georgia* fol-
lowed this vicious example. Thus, of the southern states,
Maryland and Virginia only escaped the contagion.
Rhode Island, whose conduct had become a reproach
to its inhabitants, did not merely issue a state paper, but
finding it rapidly sinking, passed laws, rendering a refusal
of it at specie value highly penal in the first instance--
declared that a second offence should be followed by
disfranchisement, and created special tribunals to try the
? The paper of North Carolina is stated to have depreciated 25 per cent;
that of Georgia and Rhode Island, 80 per cent.
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? HAMILTON.
365
offenders, depriving, by a formal enactment, the accused
party of trial by jury. Clauses were added imposing
a test oath to support the paper at par, suspending all
officers who should not subscribe it within twenty days
after its date, rendering a subscription of this oath a quali-
fication of the next legislature, and compelling every male
who had arrived at manhood to take it, or be disfranchised.
It was called the bloody bill. An information was filed
for refusing the paper. The judges of the supreme court
decided against it. They were summoned to appear before
the assembly to explain their decision: four of them were
displaced by the omnipotence of the democracy.
Indignant at these reckless proceedings, Connecticut
enacted a retaliatory law suspending existing suits, and
forbidding the commencement of others.
Indications of a similar temper were evinced in Massa-
chusetts. A proposition was widely circulated, that the
New-England states should virtually abdicate the union by
the withdrawal of their delegates from congress; and in the
disorganizing rage for dismemberment, her western coun-
ties began to look to a severance from her dominion. But
, as a state, Massachusetts firmly adhered to the obligations
of good faith, resisted every effort to emit paper, rejected
with indignation a proposal to purchase her securities at
a depreciated value, granted the impost to congress, and
subsequently passed a law to carry into effect its proposi-
tions for supplementary funds.
The vigour of character which distinguished her in her
support of the public faith, was not less shown by that
part of her population who, from a variety of causes, were
opposed to the requirements of justice.
While in other states much noisy discontent and angry
clamour were heard, among this energetic people dissatis-
faction soon ripened into rebellion.
Peculiar causes had combined to increase the pressure
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? 300
THE LIFE OF
on the states of Massachusetts and New-Hampshire.
Their seaboard population, from being engaged in the
fisheries, and thus following pursuits far removed from
the influence of the laws, were little accustomed to re-
straint. Thrown out of their ordinary occupations at a
time when the price of labour was low, they were com-
pelled to seek subsistence on any terms, and thus diminished
its general value. The demand for supplies created by
their remote expeditions had ceased. The commercial
restrictions prevented the outlet of the surplus produce
of the state; and thus each class, the grower and the con-
sumer, were mutually impoverished; and^ the taxes, which
prior to the revolution had little exceeded one hundred
thousand pounds, had augmented to an enormous amount.
The depreciation of the currency increased the distress.
While it enhanced the nominal amount of the taxes and
public charges, by interrupting private credit, it deterred
from pursuits which alone could provide resources for their
discharge, and led on to speculative measures, all of which
aggravated the evil.
A large number also of the inhabitants had been called out
by military requisitions during the war on temporary expe-'
ditions, and leaving the sober routine of ordinary life, had
acquired all the licentiousness without the discipline of the
camp. The firmness of the legislature put in motion every
active and turbulent spirit. Combinations were formed en-
tertaining desperate designs, and conventions of delegates
from extensive districts of the state were held, which adopt-
ed the most violent resolutions, censuring every measure that
had been taken to fulfil the public engagements; declaring
open hostility to the ministers of justice; calling for an
abolition of all existing contracts; claiming an equal dis-
tribution of property; and at the same time professing
that their proceedings were constitutional!
This ebullition was soon followed by acts of open resist-
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? HAMILTON.
3G7
ance to the laws. The courts were surrounded by insur-
gents; mobs accompanied the judges in their circuits; and
in the three western and largest counties of the state, all
legal process was defied. On intelligence of these pro-
ceedings, the state government attempted to exert its civil
power; but instead of repressing, this confirmed and irri-
tated the insurgents. The contagion spread from town to
town, and it at last became manifest that a military force
could alone overawe their violence.
The legislature having been convened, measures were
adopted, not without opposition from those claiming
the appellation of the friends of the people, conferring
powers on the executive equal to the emergency. These
became the subjects of louder clamours and greater irri-
tation. Offers of pardon were disregarded. Renewed
and more extensive opposition was excited against the
courts of justice, which were in one instance compelled
to stipulate to hold no future sessions, and in another to
give hostages for the protection of. the insurgents. In
Taunton, it was deemed necessary to station a body
of militia to secure the judges and the jury from per-
sonal violence. The discontented, who had previously
shown themselves in detached parties, moved to a com-
mon point; and at last a body of a thousand insurgents
was collected under the command of a late captain in the
continental army, who billeted themselves upon the inhabit-
ants, and apprehended every person obnoxious to their
views. The necessity of abandoning the lenity which had
thus far governed the councils of the state, now became ob-
vious. Orders were given to the militia to march upon cer-
tain positions, and the assembled corps were put in motion
--one under General Lincoln, the other under General
Shephard--to check the progress of the insurrection. These
decisive steps were attended with complete success. The
insurgents in most instances fled before the military.
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? 368
THE LIFE OF
Where they made a stand, their resistance was feeble and
heartless, and after a few occasional skirmishes, they dis-
persed and took refuge in the adjacent states. With little
hope of success, and without the means of keeping in a
body, they soon dwindled into insignificance, and except a
few predatory incursions by which the frontiers of the
state were harassed, quiet was restored.
In New-Hampshire,* a similar spirit had been also
aroused. In the beginning of eighty-five, the legislature,
yielding to the distresses of the people, had enacted a law
making every species of property a tender at an appraised
value. The creditors consequently withheld their demands,
and the debtors neglected payment. Goods and real pro-
perty being thereby substituted as a medium of exchange,
specie was hoarded, credit suspended, and the distress in-
creased. A convention was held which urged upon the
government the emission of bills of credit, that should be a
legal tender. A plan was formed by the legislature for an
issue, to be loaned on landed security, redeemable at a future
period, which was submitted to the people; but before any
expression of opinion could be obtained, an armed body
assembled at Exeter, the seat of government, where the
legislature was in session, and demanded an immediate
compliance with their terms. The alarmed assembly pro-
posed to consider their complaints; but the senate main-
tained its dignity. General Sullivan, who was the presi-
dent, addressed the people, exposing the absurdity of their
demands, and avowing his determination, even if the whole
state was in favour of the measure, not to yield while they
were surrounded by an armed force; and that no consider-
ation of personal danger should compel him to so flagrant
a violation of the constitutional rights of the people.
The contumacious mob then beat to arms, loaded their
* Collections of the New-Hampshire Historical Society.
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? HAMILTON. 3G9
muskets with ball, and placing sentinels at the doors, held
the legislature prisoners throughout the day. At night-
fall, Sullivan again addressed them. In reply to his firm
harangue, nothing was heard but loud clamours for "pa-
per money"--"an equal distribution of property"--"the an-
nihilation of debts"--and " a release oftaxes. " At this moment
a drum was heard, and a party came in sight, huzzaing for
government. The mob was alarmed, and Sullivan, followed
by the legislature, passed unimpeded through its dense col-
umns. He immediately reassembled the legislature in another
place, issued orders at midnight for the militia, and a body of
two thousand being collected at an early hour, he ad-
vanced and addressed the insurgents, drawn up in order of
battle. A part yielded, the rest fled, and, except to an attempt
to seize the persons of their leaders, no resistance was offered.
The contest was soon after transferred from the field to
the elections, and, without any diminished cause of dis-
content, the people settled down in a general submission to
the laws. The leaders, Parsons, Shays, and French, threw
themselves on the mercy of government, which, with a
prudent mildness, was satisfied with their disfranchisement.
It would be an error to pronounce the issue of these
events merely fortunate, for where can an instance be ad-
duced of so great and long-continued an excitement, pro-
ceeding from such ample causes, among a people just
emerging from a civil war, subdued so soon by a reluctant
exercise of power, and that power the very people, most
of whom were participators in the sufferings which sharp-
ened the edge of discontent?
The ease with which this insurrection was suppressed,
may be in part attributed to the influence of a few of the
leaders in the revolution, who continued to possess the
confidence of the public; but more is to be ascribed to the
character of an enlightened and not dense community,
where an equal condition and equal forms of government
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? 370
THE LIFE OF
had produced habits of obedience to, and reverence for,
the laws. But it would be not less an error to overlook
the fact, that the issue of this controversy is a rare excep-
tion to the usual course of such events, and to infer from
it, that a civilized society may safely repose upon the un-
controlled virtue and intelligence of its members. The
tendency of civilization is to produce inequalities of condi-
tion, and in the short period which has elapsed since this
rebellion, and notwithstanding the propitious circumstances
in which she has been placed, it would be vain at this time
to expect, even in Massachusetts, a similar result.
A more extraordinary deduction has been drawn from the
tranquil termination of this contest with the laws--that re-
bellions are salutary; "that the tree of liberty must be wa-
tered with blood,"* and that societies which rely for the
preservation of order upon the vigour of government, are
unwisely constituted.
Every violent aggression upon constitutional authority
is an invasion of the first principle of social institutions;
and little permanence or happiness can those institutions
hope to enjoy, or to preserve, which for a moment admit
the dangerous doctrine, except in the extreme cases which
justify a revolution, of a resort to force.
Another inference must be adverted to, because it is known
to be the basis upon which a large superstructure of invidious
censure upon the people of New-England has been raised--
that these scenes prompted in that part of the confederacy
a desire for a monarchical form of government. This is
an error natural to the region of country in which it was
propagated; for where slavery debases all at least below
the rank of master, how short is the interval between re-
volt and ruin; how great the excuse for rigour in the
harsh; how little room for lenity in the gentle; how fear-
* Jefferson's writings.
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? HAMILTON.
371
fill the consequence of awakening the sufferer to a sense
of his injuries; how prone the mind to power! But there
is no analogy in the respective circumstances of the south-
ern and the eastern states. Under less equal forms, rebel-
lion has usually produced some great modification of the
political system, either by larger grants of privilege to the
subject, or greater concentration of strength in the rulers;
but in New-England, weakness made no sacrifices, power
acquired no augmentation, and the insurgents were seen to
lay down their arms, not as trembling vassals, reduced to
the sway of an imperious master, but as an erring part of
the people rejoining the mass, happy to return under the
protection of laws which they had shared in framing, and
knew they could participate in modifying. There is not
an authenticated fact to show, that these events excited a
wish for any other than a more efficient but equally free
government.
Whether by giving a different direction to the public
mind, and offering a new hope of relief, the proposed con-
vention of the states would have prevented these alarming
occurrences, it is impossible to determine. The despair
of aid from state legislation may have stimulated the peo-
ple to violence; but it is rather to be believed that the
popular feelings were too much excited, the suffering too
great and extensive, to have waited the issue of so slow a
process. The rebellious temper of the populace rendered
a vigorous exertion of the powers of government neces-
sary; and it cannot be doubted, that this necessity had
much influence in inducing the states to consent to the es-
tablishment of the federal constitution.
The prostration of commerce, the poverty and anarchy
of the country, the hopeless prospect before them, com-
pelled the people to feel the want of that which Hamilton
was the first to indicate as the only resource--" a more
perfect union. " New-York had been the earliest to pro-
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? 372
THE LIFE OF
pose a convention of the states. After longer experience,
Massachusetts had declared her conviction of its necessity;
to which Virginia, eminently jealous of her state sove-
reignty, was impelled by peculiar circumstances at last to
assent.
Her geographical position rendered it extremely difficult
to establish an efficient, and at the same time an indepen-
dent revenue system. This difficulty had early suggested
the importance of forming a compact with Maryland, as
to the jurisdiction of their confluent waters; and in De-
cember, seventeen hundred and seventy-seven, commis-
sioners were appointed by Virginia for this object. The
subject was resumed in seventeen hundred and eighty-four,
and a similar commission created. Nothing having been
effected by them, new commissioners were chosen in the
succeeding year, who met the deputies of Maryland at
Mount Vernon. There they agreed upon an act regula-
ting the commercial intercourse through the Potomac and
Chesapeake, and defining the jurisdiction of each state.
But at the moment of framing this compact, they deemed
it necessary to extend its provisions so as to authorize the
establishment of a naval force to protect these estuaries,
and the formation of a mutual tariff. This compact, by
the articles of the confederation, required the previous
consent of congress. To obviate that difficulty, these de-
puties recommended to their respective states the appoint-
ment of other commissioners with enlarged powers, to
whose proceedings the permission of congress was to be
solicited.
On the thirteenth of January, seventeen hundred and
eighty-six, resolutions passed the legislature of Virginia for
a uniformity of duties between the two states, and that
commissioners should be chosen to meet annually, if re-
quired, to regulate their mutual commercial interests.
They were instructed particularly to provide, that foreign
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? HAMILTON.
373
gold should pass at the same rate in both states, and that
the same amount of damages should be charged on pro-
tested bills of exchange. A few days after, the house of
delegates passed a resolution, directing the projected ar-
rangement to be communicated to all the other states, who
were invited to send deputies to a general meeting for the
precise purpose " of considering how far a uniform system
of taxation in their commercial intercourse and regula-
tions might be necessary to their common interest and
permanent harmony; and to report an act relative to this
great object, which, when ratified, would enable the United
States, in congress assembled, effectually to provide for the
same. " Thus it will be seen that Virginia merely con-
templated a commercial arrangement, falling far short of
the policy which New-York and Massachusetts had pre-
viously embraced.
Her reluctance in granting, and her repeals of the im-
post ;* her hostility to a federal judiciary; her jealousy as
to the Mississippi;--all leave little room for doubt, that the
project of a continental convention to frame a constitution,
would at an earlier period have been feebly sustained by
her. Washington's circular letter had produced no action
on her part, and her councils were swayed by penmen who
looked upon an invigoration of the union with jealousy,
because the suggestion had emanated from the army, and
who, speculating in their closets on the dangers of con-
ferring power, had not considered how much greater were
the evils of usurpation, even from "necessity," than those
* In a letter from R. H. Lee, he states his apprehensions of alterations m
the articles of the confederation, that he had " ever been opposed to the five
per cent. impost," that he never could agree that congress " shall dictate the
mode of taxation, or that the collection shall in any manner be subject to
congressional control. " He was opposed to the power of regulating trade. --
Life, v. 2, pp. 62, 71.
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? 374
THE LIFE OF
of a large constitutional authority. * Yet the precedence
of that state in this important measure- has been claimed
without hesitation, and generally received as a part of
American history. It is time that this error, with many
others, should be corrected.
Soon after this project was first agitated, Hamilton,
whose mind had long laboured with the great design of a
national constitution, determined to bring about the co-
operation of New-York. It was a part of his plan, that
the state legislature should definitively adopt or reject the
revenue system of seventeen hundred and eighty-three, and
in case of its rejection, should appoint commissioners to
attend the commercial convention. "Hamilton," Troup
relates, "had no idea that the legislature could be prevail-
ed on to adopt the system as recommended by congress,
neither had he any partiality for a commercial convention,
otherwise than as a stepping stone to a general conven-
tion, to form a general constitution. In pursuance of
his plan, the late Mr. Duer, the late Colonel Malcom, and
myself, were sent to the state legislature as part of the
* In a letter of Madison to R. II. Lee, he observes, "/ have not yet found
leisure to scan the project of a continental convention with so close an eye
as to have made up any observations worthy of being mentioned to you. In
general, I hold it for a maxim, that the union of the states is essential for their
safety against foreign danger and internal contention, and that the perpetui-
ty and efficacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The question
therefore is, in what mode and at what moment the experiment for supplying
the defects ought to be made. The answer to this question cannot be made
without a knowledge, greater than I possess, of the temper and views of the
different states. Virginia seems, I think, to have excellent dispositions to-
wards the confederacy, but her assent or dissent to such a proposition, would
probably depend much upon the chance of having no opponent capable of
rousing the jealousies and prejudices of the assembly against innovations,
particularly such as will derogate from their own power and importance.
Should a view of the other states present no objections against the experi-
ment, individually, I would wish none to be presupposed here.
