No More Learning

2 Gay, op. cit. p. 471. L. Brehier, Le Schisme Oriental, pp. 92–93.
1


## p. 267 (#309) ############################################

Michael Cerularius and Rome
267
Empire and Leo IX. But at the very time when this alliance was going
to produce its effect Michael Cerularius commenced hostilities against
Rome. It cannot be denied that he had adopted a policy in contra-
diction to that of the Emperor.
In 1053, indeed, he writes to the new Patriarch of Antioch, Peter, ex-
pressing surprise that the name of the Pope is always mentioned in the
liturgy of Antioch. He falsely declares that this name did not appear
in the diptychs of Constantinople after the council of 692 ; but Peter,
who had just submitted his profession of faith to Leo IX, had no diffi-
culty in pointing out the intentional inaccuracy'. In the same letter
Michael Cerularius related his dispute with Argyrus about unleavened
bread.
At the same moment a former cleric of Constantinople, Leo, Arch-
bishop of Ochrida in Bulgaria, addressed to an Apulian Bishop, John of
Trani, a letter which was a veritable indictment of Latin uses. It was no
longer, as in the time of Photius, a question chiefly of the double Pro-
cession of the Holy Ghost, but of ritual and discipline. The use of un-
leavened bread for the Eucharist and the Saturday fast were quoted as
regrettable instances of persistence in the Mosaic law. Through the
agency of the Bishop of Trani, a rival of the Archbishop of Bari who
was devoted to the Holy See, Michael Cerularius tried to draw the other
bishops of Apulia into a dispute with the Pope'. The letter was com-
municated by John to Cardinal Humbert, who had it translated into
Latin and forwarded to Leo IX 4.
Cerularius further took care that a treatise written in Latin by a
monk of the monastery of Studion, Nicetas Stethatus (Pectoratus), was
circulated. The attacks on the Latins were presented in it under a more
violent form than in the letter of Leo of Ochrida. He not only denounced
the use of unleavened bread and the Saturday fast, but, and this point
must have gone home to Leo IX and the Western reformers, he con-
demned the celibacy of priests as contrary to ecclesiastical tradition.
These charges, interspersed with coarse insults, were bound to cause keen
irritation to the Westerners and to embitter the quarrels.
Finally, to cut short any attempt at conciliation, the Patriarch took a
decisive step. On his own initiative he ordered the closing of the churches
of the Latin rite which existed at Constantinople. The abbots and monks
of the Greek monasteries grouped round these churches were commanded
henceforward to follow the Greek ritual, and on their refusal were treated
as “Azymites” and excommunicated. Some of them resisted, and scenes
1 L. Bréhier, Le Schisme Oriental, p. 92. Vide the two letters in Will, Acta et
scripta, quae de controversiis ecclesiae graecae et latinae saeculi xi composita exstant,
pp. 178 and 192.
2 L. Brehier, op. cit. pp. 93–94.
3 Gay, L'Italie méridionale, p. 495.
4 Wibert, Vita Leonis, ix. 11. 11 (Muratori, III. p. 296).
6 L. Bréhier, op. cit. pp. 94-96.
CH, IX.


## p. 268 (#310) ############################################

268 Correspondence between the Pope and the Patriarch
of violence ensued in the course of which Nicephorus, the sacellarius of
the Patriarch, trod under foot the consecrated host? .
While Michael Cerularius was thus entering on the contest, the
liance between the Pope and the Emperor had met with a decisive
check. Argyrus, defeated by the Normans (February 1053), had been
forced to abandon Apulia and to fly northwards. Some months later
Leo IX in his turn was defeated and made prisoner at Civitate, and it
was no other than John, Bishop of Trani, whom Argyrus dispatched to
Constantinople to ask fresh help against the Normans.
These events naturally led to correspondence between the Pope and
the Patriarch; and pontifical legates were sent to Constantinople, but
opinions differ as to the exact order of the facts. According to some
authorities, even before Leo IX had replied to the attacks of the Arch-
bishop of Ochrida, that is to say after the close of 1053, Michael Ceru-
larius wrote the Pope a letter, very conciliatory in tone, in which he pro-
tested his zeal for unity and proposed a new alliance against the Normans.
By so acting he demonstrated his goodwill towards the political alliance
between Pope and Emperor, but he remained obdurate on the matter of
the customs which he condemned as heretical. It was not until after he
had sent this appeal for conciliation that Michael Cerularius received the
two letters addressed to him by the Pope. The first was an indignant
refutation of the attacks of Leo of Ochrida on the Roman uses. In the
second the Pope accepted the proposed alliance, but refused to treat with
the Patriarch as an equal, and reminded him that every Church which
broke with that of Rome was only “an assembly of heretics, a conventicle
of schismatics, a synagogue of Satan”. ?
But this manner of presenting the facts does not at all explain the
express contradiction which exists between the violently aggressive acts
of Michael Cerularius against Rome and the extremely conciliatory letter
which he wrote to the Pope. The text of this letter, it is true, is no
longer extant, but the purport of it can easily be gathered from the
answer of Leo IX and the allusions which Michael Cerularius himself
makes to it in his correspondence with Peter of Antioch. It is hard to
believe that the Patriarch, who had wished to break with. Rome in so
startling a manner, wrote it of his own free will. Further, the position
of the imperial army in Italy at the end of 1053 was so desperate, and
the cementing of the alliance with Leo IX appeared so necessary, that
we are led to believe in some governmental pressure being brought to
bear on the Patriarch. It was almost certainly by order of the Emperor
and at the instigation of Argyrus that he consented to this effort at
conciliation
But no compromise was possible between the obduracy of Leo IX
1 Letter of Leo IX (Will, op. cit. p. 801), L. Bréhier, op. cit. pp. 96-97.
2 Gay, L'Italie méridionale, pp. 492–494.
3 L. Brehier, op. cit. pp. 97-109.


## p. 269 (#311) ############################################

The Roman legates at Constantinople (1054)
269
and that of Michael Cerularius. Determined to obtain the submission of
the Patriarch, the Pope sent to Constantinople three legates whom he
chose from among his principal counsellors, Cardinal Humbert, Frederick
of Lorraine, Chancellor of the Roman Church, and Peter, Bishop of
Amalfi. Before departing they had an interview with Argyrus, who
posted them up in the political situation at Constantinople; and this
fact was made use of later by the Patriarch, who alleged that these
legates were mere impostors in the pay of Argyrus.
The legates arrived at Constantinople towards the end of April 1054,
and were given a magnificent reception by the Emperor, who lodged
them in the Palace of the Springs outside the Great Wall. They visited
the Patriarch, but this first meeting was the reverse of cordial. Michael
Cerularius was deeply affronted to see that they did not prostrate them-
selves before him according to Byzantine etiquette. At the ceremonies
they claimed to take precedence of the metropolitans, and, contrary to
custom, appeared at the Palace with staff and crozier,
This attitude conformed to the tone of the two letters which they
brought from the Pope. We know already that, in the letter intended
for the Patriarch, Leo IX, while thanking him for the desire for unity
which he expressed, sharply reproved him for his attacks on the Roman
Church. The letter addressed to Constantine IX was, on the contrary,
couched in deferential terms. With consummate skill he contrasted the
project of alliance against the Normans with the attitude of Michael
Cerularius towards him. After enumerating his principal grievances, he
threatened to break with the Patriarch if he persisted too long in his
obstinacy. In conclusion, he adjured the Emperor to help his legates
to restore peace in the Church. It was clear, therefore, that the Pope
looked only to the authority of the Emperor to get the better of the
Patriarch? .
Discussions were opened. The legates Humbert and Frederick wrote
rejoinders to the treatise of Nicetas Stethatus on the question of un-
leavened bread. While defending the Roman Church, they vigorously
attacked certain uses of the Greek Church, but the treatise, especially
addressed to Nicetas, was written in coarse and violent language. The ill-
starred monk was overwhelmed with epithets such as Sarabaita, veritable
Epicurus, forger.
Then, on 24 June 1054, the Emperor and the legates went across to
the monastery of Studion. After the treatise of Nicetas, translated into
Greek, had been read, a discussion followed, as a result of which the
monk declared himself vanquished. He himself anathematised his own
book and all those who denied that the Roman Church was the Head
of all the Churches. The Emperor then ordered the treatise to be
committed to the flames.
The next day Nicetas went to visit the
1 L. Bréhier, Le Schisme Oriental, pp. 105-107.
2 Will, op. cit. pp. 85-88.
сн. Іх. .


## p. 270 (#312) ############################################

270
Excommunication of Michael Cerularius
legates at the Palace of the Springs. They received him cordially, and
removed his remaining doubts by answering all his questions. After he
had renewed his anathema against all the enemies of Rome, the legates
declared that they received him into communion”. The Patriarch
naturally did not take any part in these steps, which constituted an
absolute defeat for him. The monastery of Studion became once more,
as of old, the stronghold of the Roman party.
Michael Cerularius shrank from this open attack and declined to
meet the advances of the legates, protesting that they had not the
requisite authority for treating with him. Pope Leo IX died on 19 April
1054 and the Papal See remained vacant for a year, as Victor II was only
elected in April 1055. The fact of Leo's death was known at Constanti-
nople, as is shewn by the first letter of Michael Cerularius to Peter,
Patriarch of Antioch, in which he represented the legates as forgers in
the employ of Argyrus’.
The tactics of the Patriarch of Constantinople were obvious. By
refusing to recognise the powers of the legates he protracted the negotia-
tions, and was preparing against the Roman Church a manifesto from all
the Eastern Bishops. “Ought those," he wrote to the Patriarch of
Antioch,“ who lead the same life as the Latins, who are brought up in
their customs, and who abandon themselves to illegal, prohibited, and
detestable practices, to remain in the ranks of the just and orthodox ?
I think not”. Nothing demonstrates better than this text the real wish
of the Patriarch for final schism.
The legates then decided to take the decisive action for which Michael
Cerularius was waiting. On Saturday, 15 July 1054, at the third hour,
they repaired to St Sophia at the moment when all the congregation was
assembled for the celebration of the daily service. After haranguing the
crowd and denouncing the obstinacy of Michael Cerularius, they deposited
a bull of excommunication on the altar, and then left the church, shaking
the dust off their feet 4.
In this bull, which the Patriarch caused to be translated into Greek and
inserted in his Synodal Edict, the legates said that they had received
from the Roman Church a mission of peace and unity. They rejoiced
at having found at Constantinople, as well in the Emperor as among the
clergy and people, perfect orthodoxy. On the other hand, they had
detected in the Patriarch ten heretical tendencies. In virtue of their
powers, therefore, they pronounced the anathema against the Patriarch
Michael Cerularius, against Leo, Archbishop of Ochrida, and against the
sacellarius Nicephorus and their followers. Thus the legates, unable to
induce the Patriarch to submit, and not venturing to take steps to depose
1 L. Bréhier, op. cit. pp. 109–113.
2 Will, op. cit. pp. 175 et seq.
3 lb. p. 183.
4 “Commemoratio brevis rerum a legatis apostolicae sedis Constantinopoli ges-
tarum. ” (Will, ib. pp. 151, 152. )


## p. 271 (#313) ############################################

The Synodal Edict of 1054
271
him, appealed to public opinion. In order to render their triumph more
complete, they consecrated, before leaving, some churches of Latin ritual.
Constantine IX continued to give proofs of his goodwill and heaped
splendid presents upon them? .
The triumph of the legates was, however, short-lived. Hardly had
they started on 17 July for their return journey to Rome, when the
Patriarch asked for an interview with them. They had already reached
Selymbria (Silivri) on 19 July, when a letter from the Emperor recalled
them. They turned back and reached the Palace of the Springs, where
they attended the imperial orders. Constantine IX, however, distrusting
the intentions of the Patriarch, did not consent to authorise the inter-
view of Michael Cerularius and the legates in St Sophia except in his
presence. The Patriarch refused this condition and the Emperor ordered
the legates to continue their journey. Subsequently Cardinal Humbert
asserted that Michael Cerularius wanted to draw the legates into a snare
and assassinate them? .
However that may be, the Emperor's answer exasperated the Patri-
arch. Enjoying unbounded popularity at Constantinople, he seems to
have had at this epoch a devoted party. A riot soon broke out in the
streets of the town. Constantine IX in alarm sent to the Patriarch
a veritable embassy of the principal dignitaries of the palace, who were
charged to appease him and to represent to him that the Emperor could
not offer any violence to the legates on account of their ambassadorial
rights. This answer did not satisfy the Patriarch, for soon a second
mission, in which the “consul of the philosophers,” Psellus, figured, arrived
with a new message from the Emperor. Constantine made truly humble
excuses for what had occurred and threw the blame on Argyrus. Two
citizens, Paulus and Smaragdus, guilty of having translated the bull into
Greek and of having circulated it, were handed over to him, after having
been scourged. The Emperor affirmed that he had given the order to
burn the bull and had committed to prison the son and the son-in-law
of Argyrus?
By this volte-face the Emperor surrendered to the will of the Patri-
arch and gave him a free hand for the future. It only remained for
Michael Cerularius to consummate his triumph by a sensational rupture
with Rome. With the authorisation of the Emperor he convened a
council on which were represented all the provinces of the Greek Church.
Twelve metropolitans and two archbishops signed the acts of it. The
opening sections of the Synodal Edict, published in connexion with this
assembly, contained a reproduction of the Encyclical sent by Photius
to the Eastern bishops. Michael Cerularius recapitulated in it all the
grievances of the Greeks against the Roman Church : the double Pro-
cession of the Holy Ghost, use of unleavened bread, the Saturday fast,
1 L. Bréhier, Le Schisme Oriental, pp. 118-119.
2 16. pp. 120, 121.
3 16. pp. 121–124.
יל
сн. Іх


## p. 272 (#314) ############################################

272
Definitive rupture (20 July 1054)
רי
celibacy of priests, shaving the beard, etc. He then complained of the
profanation of the altar of St Sophia by the legates, gave a biased
account of their stay at Constantinople, transcribed their bull of ex-
communication, fulminated an anathema against them, and lastly pro-
duced, as a trophy of victory, the pitiable letter which the Emperor had
addressed to him.
Finally, on 20 July 1054, at the patriarchal tribunal, in the presence
of seven archbishops or bishops and of the imperial delegates, judgment
was pronounced not only “against the impious document but also against
all those who had helped in drawing it up, whether by their advice or
even by their prayers. " Five days afterwards all copies of the bull
were solemnly burned before the eyes of the people; one copy only was
preserved in the archives of the Patriarchate?
By the solemn ceremonial with which he had invested these pro-
ceedings, Michael Cerularius had wished to shew that it was no longer
the question of a temporary schism like that of Photius but of a final
rupture. This schism was indeed his personal achievement and due to
his strong and domineering character, but it also reflects the opinion of
the Greek episcopate, which lent little support to the power
of
supreme
jurisdiction claimed by a bishop foreign to the Empire, and had only
an intolerant contempt for the peculiar uses of the Latins.
This separation was, as we have seen, rendered possible by the
weakening of the prestige of Rome in the East in the course of the
tenth century. Directly after the dispute about image-worship, there
had been in Constantinople an ecclesiastical party which saw no salvation
for the Eastern churches except in communion with Rome. This party
had been strong enough to resist Photius himself, and upon it the
Emperors had relied to re-establish unity. But a century later this
Roman party was non-existent in Constantinople. The scandals of
which Rome had continuously been the theatre during this period, and
the equivocal decisions on the marriage of Leo VI, had discouraged its
supporters.
Michael Cerularius did not meet with the opposition that
had checked Photius.
Notwithstanding wide divergencies, the mass of the faithful followers
of the two Churches shrank from schism, and were satisfied with com-
promises which guaranteed the maintenance of normal relations between
Rome and Constantinople. Nevertheless, after the events of 1054,
although outside Constantinople no act of religious hostility between
Greek and Latins can be shewn, the members of the two Churches soon
regarded each other as enemies, and from this epoch dates the definitive
rupture between the Churches of East and West.
The results of this schism could not but be disastrous to the Byzan-
tine Empire. It took place precisely when the West was beginning to
1 L. Brehier, Le Schisme Oriental, pp. 124–125.


## p. 273 (#315) ############################################

The results of the Schism
273
lay aside barbarism. The highly-organised States, which were being
formed there, lost no time in turning these religious divergencies to
profit against the Byzantine Empire. The first consequence of the
schism was the final loss of Southern Italy. The Papacy, no longer
able to reckon upon the Byzantine Empire, made terms with the Nor-
mans?
But this schism was fated to have far more widely-reaching effects,
and, when the Empire fell on evil days, it was to prove a heavy burden
and a constant check on the goodwill of the West. For the Patriarch
of Constantinople the schism had been unquestionably a great victory.
His authority had been established without dispute over the Slav world
and the Eastern Patriarchates. Liberated from fear of subordination to
Rome, he had finally defended the autocephalia of his own Church. But
this victory of the Byzantine clergy was in reality a check for the states-
men who, like Argyrus, looked solely to the interests of the Empire.
After this epoch there are clear traces of that antinomy, which was
henceforward to dominate all the history of Byzantium, between the
political and the religious interests of the Empire. It was the schism
which, by rendering fruitless all efforts at conciliation between the Em-
perors of Constantinople and the West, paved the way for the fall of
the Empire.
1 At the Council of Melfi. Gay, L'Italie méridionale, pp. 516-519 (1059).
C. MED. H, VOL. IV. CH, IX.
18


## p. 274 (#316) ############################################

274
CHAPTER X.
(A)
MUSLIM CIVILISATION DURING THE ABBASID PERIOD.
When the Abbasids wrested from the Umayyads in 750 the headship
of the Muslim world, they entered into possession of an empire stretching
from the Indus to the Atlantic and from the southern shore of the
Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. It had absorbed the whole of the Persian
Empire of the Sasanians, and the rich provinces of the Roman Empire
on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean; but though
Constantinople itself had been threatened more than once, and raids into
Asia Minor were so frequent as at certain periods to have become almost
a yearly occurrence, the ranges of the Taurus and the Anti-Taurus still
served as the eastern barrier of Byzantine territory against the spread of
Arab domination. In Africa, however, all opposition to the westward
progress of the Arab arms had been broken down, and the whole of the
peninsula of Spain, with the exception of Asturia, had passed under
Muslim rule. For ninety years Damascus had been the capital of the
Arab Empire, and the mainstay of the Umayyad forces in the time
of their greatest power had been the Arab tribes domiciled in Syria from
the days when that province still formed part of the Roman Empire ;
but the Abbasids had come into power mainly through support from
Persia, and their removal of the capital to Baghdad (founded by Manşūr,
the second Caliph of the new dynasty, in 762) on a site only thirty miles
from Ctesiphon, the capital of the Sasanian Shāhanshāh, marks their
recognition of the shifting of the centre of power.
From this period Persian influence became predominant and the chief
offices of state came to be held by men of Persian origin; the most
noteworthy example is that of the family of the Barmecides (Barmakids),
which for half a century exercised the predominant influence in the
government until Hārūn destroyed them in 803. It was probably due
to the influence of the old Persian ideal of kingship that under the
Abbasids the person of the Caliph came to be surrounded with greater
pomp and ceremony. The court of the Umayyads had retained something
of the patriarchal simplicity of early Arab society, and they had been
readily accessible to their subjects; but as the methods of government
became more centralised and the court of the Caliph more splendid and
awe-striking, the ruler himself tended to be more difficult of access, and


## p. 275 (#317) ############################################

Character of the Abbasid dynasty
275
the
presence of the executioner by the side of the throne became under
the Abbasids a terrible symbol of the autocratic character of their rule.
A further feature of the new dynasty was the emphasis it attached to
the religious character of the dignity of the Caliph. In their revolt
against the Umayyads, the Abbasids had come forward in defence of the
purity of Islām as against those survivals of the old Arab heathenism
which were so striking a feature of the Umayyad court. The converts
and descendants of converts, whose support had been most effective in the
destruction of the Umayyads, were animated with a more zealous religious
spirit than had ever found expression among large sections of the Arabs,
who, in consequence of the superficial character of their conversion to
Islām, and their aristocratic pride and tribal exclusiveness, so contrary
to the spirit of Islāmic brotherhood, had been reluctant to accord to
the converts from other races the privileges of the new faith. The
Abbasids raised the standard of revolt in the name of the family of the
Prophet, and by taking advantage of the widespread sympathy felt for
the descendants of 'Alī, they obtained the support of the various Shi'ah
factions. Though they took all the fruits of victory for themselves, they
continued to lay emphasis on the religious character of their rule, and
theologians and men of learning received a welcome at their court such as
they had never enjoyed under the Umayyads. On ceremonial occasions
the Abbasid Caliph appeared clad in the sacred mantle of the Prophet,
and titles such as that of Khalifah of Allāh (vicegerent of God) and
shadow of God upon earth came to be frequently applied to him. As
the power of the central authority grew weaker, so the etiquette of the
court tended to become more elaborate and servile, and the Caliph made
his subjects kiss the ground before him or would allow the higher
officials either to kiss his hand or foot or the edge of his robe.
The vast empire into the possession of which they had entered was
too enormous and made up of elements too heterogeneous to be long held
together under a system, the sole unifying principle of which was payment
of tribute to the Caliph. A prince of the Umayyad family, "Abd-ar-
Raḥmān, who had succeeded in escaping to Spain when practically all
his relatives had been massacred, took advantage of tribal jealousies
among the Arab chiefs in Spain to seize this country for himself, and to
detach it from the empire, in 756. North Africa, which had been placed
by Hārūn under the government of Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab, became
practically independent under this energetic governor, who established a
dynasty that lasted for more than a century (800-909); though his
successors contented themselves with the title of emir, the Caliph in
Baghdad appears to have been powerless to interfere with their administra-
tion. Hārūn himself seems to have realised that the break-up of the Arab
empire was inevitable, since in 802 he made arrangements for dividing
the administration of it between his sons Amīn and Ma’mūn. But on the
death of their father in 809 civil war broke out between the two brothers.
18-2
CH. X.


## p. 276 (#318) ############################################

276
Decline of the Abbasid Caliphate
The Arabs lent their support to Amīn, and under his leadership made a
last effort to regain for themselves the control of the Caliphate; but in
813 Tāhir, Ma’mūn's brilliant Persian general, defeated him, and as a
reward for his successful siege of Baghdad was appointed by Ma’mūn to
the government of Khurāsān, where he and his descendants for half a
century were practically independent. Egypt broke away from the
empire when a son of one of Ma’mūn's Turkish slaves, Aḥmad ibn Țūlūn,
having been appointed deputy-governor of Egypt in 868, succeeded in
making himself independent not only in Egypt but also in Syria, which
he added to his dominions, and ceased sending money contributions to
Baghdad. This breaking away of the outlying provinces of the empire was
rendered the more possible by the weakness of the central government.
Ma'mūn's brother and successor, Mu'tasim (833-842), made the fatal
mistake of creating an army composed almost entirely of Turkish
mercenaries. Their excesses made life in Baghdad so intolerable that the
Caliph, in order to be safe from the vengeance of the inhabitants of his
own capital, moved to a site three days' journey up the Tigris to the
north of Baghdad, and from 836 to 892 Sāmarrā was the Abbasid capital
where nine successive Caliphs lived, practically as prisoners of their
own Turkish bodyguard. While the Turkish officers made and unmade
Caliphs as they pleased, the country was ruined by constantly recurring
disorders and insurrection. In 865, while rival claimants were fighting for
the crown, Baghdad was besieged for nearly a year, and the slave revolt
for fourteen years (869–883) left the delta of the Euphrates at the
mercy of undisciplined bands of marauders who terrorised the inhabitants
and even sacked great cities, such as Başrah, Ahwāz, and Wāsit, shewing
the weakness of the central power even in territories so close to the
capital. A further disaster was soon to follow in the great Carmathian
revolt, which takes its name from one of the propagandists of the Ismāʻilī
Shi'ah doctrine in 'Irāq during the latter part of the ninth century. His
followers for nearly a century (890-990) spread terror throughout
Mesopotamia, and even threatened Baghdad. They extended their ravages
as far as Syria, murdering and pillaging wherever they went. In 930
they plundered the city of Mecca, put to death 30,000 Muslims there,
and carried off the Black Stone together with immense booty.
These movements represent only a part of the risings and revolts that
brought anarchy into the Caliph's dominions and cut off the sources of
his revenue. In the midst of this period of disorder the Caliph Mu'tamid,
shortly before his death in 892, transferred the capital once more to
Baghdad, but the change did not bring the Caliphs deliverance from the
tutelage of their Turkish troops, and they were as much at their mercy
as before.
Deliverance came from Persia where the Buwaihids, who claimed
descent from one of the Sasanian kings, had been extending their power
from the Caspian Sea southward through Persia, until in 945 they
CH. X.


## p. 277 (#319) ############################################

Ascendancy of the Buwaihids
277
entered Baghdad, nominally as deliverers of the Caliph from his rebellious
Turkish troops. For nearly a century from this date the Caliphs were
mere puppets in the hands of successive Buwaihid emirs, who set them
upon the throne and deposed them as they pleased. The Caliph Mustakfī,
whose deliverance from his mutinous Turkish soldiery had been the pre-
text for the Buwaihid occupation of Baghdad, was in the same year dragged
from his throne and cruelly blinded. So low had the office of Caliph
sunk by this period that there were still living two other Abbasid princes
who like Mustakfi had sat upon the Abbasid throne, but blinded and
robbed of all their wealth were now dependent upon charity or such
meagre allowance as the new rulers cared to dole out to them. His
cousin Muțī was set up to succeed him, but though he held the office of
Caliph for twenty-eight years (946–974) he had no voice in the adminis-
tration, and could not even nominate any of the ministers who carried
on the business of the state in his name; helpless in the hands of his
Buwaihid master, he lived upon a scanty allowance. He was compelled
to abdicate in favour of his son ļā'i', after a riotous outburst of religious
intolerance in Baghdad, and Tā'i' for seventeen years (974–991) suffered
similar humiliations. He was deposed at last in favour of his cousin Qādir
(991–1031), of whose reign of forty years hardly any incident is recorded,
because political events pursued their course without any regard to him.
Meanwhile in Upper Mesopotamia an Arab family, the Hamdānids,
at first governors of Mosul, extended their authority over the surrounding
country, and one member of the family, Saif-ad-Daulah, made himself
master of Aleppo and brought the whole of Northern Syria under his
rule in 944. In North Africa a rival Caliphate had arisen under the Shi'ah
Fāțimids, who annexed Egypt in 969, and after more than one attempt
occupied Syria in 988. By the beginning of the eleventh century the
power of the Buwaihids was on the decline and they had to give way before
the Ghaznawids and the Seljūqs, the latter a Turkish tribe which made
its first appearance in history about the middle of the tenth century. In
1055 the Seljūq chief, Țughril Beg, after having conquered the greater
part of Persia, entered Baghdad and delivered the Caliph from subservience
to the Buwaihids. From Baghdad Tughril Beg marched to the conquest
of Mosul and Upper Mesopotamia, and when he died in 1063 he left to
his successor, Alp Arslān, an empire which eight years later stretched
from the Hindu Kush to the shores of the Mediterranean.
Alp Arslān died in 1072 and his son, Malik Shāh, still further
extended the empire by the conquest of Transoxiana. One of the Seljūq
generals, Atsiz, drove the Fāțimids out of Syria and Palestine, and
occupied Jerusalem in 1071 and Damascus in 1075. Under the protection
of the Seljūgs, the Caliph in Baghdad enjoyed at the hand of these
orthodox Sunnīs a certain amount of respect such as he had failed to
receive at the hand of the Shi'ah Buwaihids, but his political authority
hardly extended beyond the walls of the city.
CU, X.


## p. 278 (#320) ############################################

278
The Seljūq empire
The death of Malik Shāh in 1092 was followed by a period of con-
fusion, during which his four sons fought one another for the succession,
but in 1117 the supreme authority passed to his third son, Sanjar, the
last of the Great Seljūqs to exercise a nominal sovereignty over the whole
empire; before his death in 1155 it had split up into a number of separate
principalities, some of them ruled over by Seljūq princes, others by
officers who, acting first as guardians (or Atābegs) to minors, later
assumed the reins of power and founded dynasties of their own.
One permanent result of the rise of the Seljūq empire was that the
way had been opened for Muslim domination in Asia Minor. During
the whole of the Abbasid period the ranges of the Taurus and Anti-
Taurus had formed the frontier line between the Roman and the Arab
Empires, and though incursions had frequently, and during certain
periods annually, been made by the Muslim troops into Anatolia, no
permanent result of these military expeditions into the great plateau of
Asia Minor had been achieved beyond the temporary occupation of some
fortresses. But the Seljūqs made their way into Asia Minor from Northern
Persia through Armenia, and before the end of the eleventh century had
occupied all the centre of Asia Minor, leaving only the kingdom of
Lesser Armenia and the coast-line which was held by Byzantine troops.
This western movement of the Seljüqs and the consequent alarm of the
Emperor of Constantinople who appealed for help to the Christian
powers of Europe, were among the causes of the Crusades.
When the crusaders entered Syria in 1098, the Seljūq empire had
already begun to break up; the greater part of Mesopotamia and Syria
had been parcelled out into military fiefs in which the military officers
of the Seljūgs had made themselves independent. The political situation
of the Muslim world was but little affected by the establishment of the
Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1099, and the most important effect of the
Crusades upon Muslim history was the rise of the Ayyübid dynasty,
established by Saladin in his long conflict with the crusaders culminating
in the battle of Hițțin and the conquest of Jerusalem in 1187.
Farther east, the fratricidal struggle still went on between rival
Muslim houses fighting one another for the possession of the fragments
of the Seljūq empire. For a brief period the Caliph in Baghdad succeeded
in exerting some authority in the neighbourhood of his capital, and Nāşir
(1180-1225), freed from the tutelage of the Seljūqs, restored to the
Caliphate some of its old independence, though the narrow territory
over which he ruled extended only from Takrīt to the head of the Persian
Gulf. His most formidable rival was the Khwārazm Shāh, whose king-
dom, founded by a descendant of one of the Turkish slaves of the Seljūq
Sultan Malik Shāh, had been gradually extended until it included the
greater part of Persia. Under 'Alā-ud-Din (1199-1220) the kingdom of
Khwārazm embraced also Bukhārā and Samarqand, and in 1214 Afghani-
stan; but his career of conquest was short-lived, for on his eastern border


## p. 279 (#321) ############################################

The Mongol conquests
279
appeared the Mongol army of Jenghiz Khān which soon involved in a
common devastation and ruin the greater part of the various Muslim
kingdoms of the East. Muslim civilisation has never recovered from the
destruction which the Mongols inflicted upon it. Great centres of culture,
such as Herāt and Bukhārā, were reduced to ashes and the Muslim
population was ruthlessly massacred. With the Mongol conquest of
southern Russia and of China we are not concerned here, but their armies
after sweeping across Persia appeared in 1256 under the command of
Hūlāgū before the walls of Baghdad, and after a brief siege of one month
the last Caliph of the Abbasid House, Musta şim, had to surrender, and
was put to death together with most of the members of his family;
800,000 of the inhabitants were brought out in batches from the city to
be massacred, and the greater part of the city itself was destroyed by
fire. The Mongol armies then moved on into Syria, where first Aleppo
and then Damascus fell into their hands, but when they advanced to the
conquest of Egypt they met with the first check in their westward move-
ment. Egypt since 1254 had been under the rule of the Mamlūk sultans,
and the Egyptian army in 1260 defeated the Mongols at 'Ain Jālūt in
Palestine, and following up this victory drove them out of Syria altogether.
After the death of Jenghiz Khān in 1227, the vast Mongol empire had
been divided among his four sons; of Muslim territories, Transoxiana
fell to the lot of his second son Jagatai; one of his grandsons, Hūlāgū,
the conqueror of Baghdad, founded the Īl-khān dynasty of Persia and
included in his kingdom the whole of Persia, Mesopotamia, and part of
Asia Minor. The Seljūqs of Asia Minor had managed to maintain a
precarious existence as vassals of the Mongols by making a timely sub-
mission; and, under the rule of the Mamlūk Sultans of Egypt, Syria kept
the Mongols out. Such remained the general condition of the eastern
provinces of what had once been the empire of the Abbasid Caliphs,
during the remainder of the thirteenth century.
The Abbasid epoch has dazzled the imagination of the Muslim world
with the vision of a period of great wealth and splendour, and the de-
gradation of its latter days was blotted out by the remembrance of its
earlier glories, though these lasted barely 83 years. The shadowy Abbasid
Caliphate of Cairo bore witness for two centuries and a half (1261-1517)
to the impressive character of the ideal of a united Muslim Empire, under
the leadership of the Imām-Caliph, regarded as the source of all authority,
in spite of the fact that the disruptive influence of national movements
and the self-assertion of provincial groups had irremediably destroyed
the reality centuries before. As the rule of the Caliph was an absolutism,
tempered only by the divinely-inspired law, to which he with every other
Muslim had to submit, the state perished with him. For Muslim political
theory contained no principle of growth, to provide for the development
of self-governing institutions; no attempt had been made to widen the
сн. х.


## p. 280 (#322) ############################################

280
Muslim political theory
basis of government, or train the subjects to co-operate with the state,
and the continuity of city life-so characteristic a feature of political
life in the West-was unknown in the Muslim East.
By its elaboration of systems of law, however, the Abbasid period
bequeathed to succeeding generations authoritative codes which are still
in operation in various parts of the world, but the theocratic origin of
this law, based as it is on the unalterable, eternal Word of God, has
continuously hampered its adjustment to the changing conditions of
political and social life. In other branches of intellectual activity, not-
ably mathematics and medicine, permanent results were attained, of
which some account is given in the following sections.
The foundation for the political theories that find embodiment in
the organisation of the Abbasid Empire was laid during the period of
the Umayyads. These theories were in the main the outgrowth of two
definite factors. In the first place, the conquering Arabs were faced with
the problem of administering the vast Empire that, in the brief space of
a few decades, had fallen into their hands, while their past history had
given them no experience of organised methods of government and
administration, and their tribal system had ill prepared them for any
large outlook upon material problems. But they found in Palestine,
Syria, and Egypt, a large body of trained officials, accustomed to the
smooth working of the traditional method of administration in the
Roman Empire, and familiar with the departmental routine of bureaux
of government. Similarly, within the Persian empire, in spite of the
anarchy that had prevailed after Chosroes II, the administrative machi-
nery of the Sasanids, with its large body of officials for the collection
of taxes, was still available. There is abundant evidence to shew
that in the provinces of both these Empires the Arabs made very little
change in the methods of administering the country. Accordingly, at a
time when Muslim theory was formless and inchoate, it came under the
powerful influence of one of the greatest attempts to systematize social
and political life that the world has ever seen, and just as Muslim law
bears the imprint of the Roman legal system, and the earliest systematic
treatises of Islām
appear to have been modelled on catechisms of Christian
doctrines, so the fiscal system of the Arabs followed the lines that had
been laid down centuries before by Roman administrators.
On the other hand, during the whole of the Umayyad period, there
had been living in Medina the representatives of the apostolic age of
Islām, engaged in attempts to reduce to order the incoherent materials
for a Muslim theory of life based upon the ordinances of the Koran
(Qur'ān) and the traditionary sayings of the Prophet. As these legists
and theologians viewed with horror the heathenish ideals and manners
of the Umayyad court, and accordingly kept aloof from practical con-
cern with the details of political life, the theories of the state and of
legislation which they worked out very largely ignore the more stable


## p. 281 (#323) ############################################

Theory of the Caliphate
281
development of the Arab state. Muslim political and legal theories have
consequently never been able wholly to shake themselves free from the
unreality that marked their beginnings in the rarified atmosphere of
speculation in which early Muslim thinkers lived in Medina. When the
Abbasids came into power, largely with the help of an orthodox reaction
against the alleged heathenism of the Umayyad house, and with the
support of Persian converts whose theological zeal was unknown to the
latitudinarian Arabs, they attracted to their new capital, Baghdad, the
legists and theologians of Medina and lavished a generous patronage on
students of theology; at the same time they exercised control over
these thinkers and, while helping orthodoxy to triumph in the state, the
Abbasids took care to make use of it for their own selfish ends.
According to Islāmic theory, religious dogma, maxims of statecraft,
legal ordinances, and the details of the social life of the believer, all have
their source in the revealed text of the Koran and in the traditionary
sayings and practices of the Prophet; where these fail to provide the
required guidance, the consensus of the community is decisive, and most
Muslim thinkers have allowed also an analogical deduction from the first
two sources to particular cases not expressly mentioned in either of them.
During the third century of the Muslim era were compiled the six great
collections of traditions that are held to be authoritative in the Sunni
world. These fix definitely the theories that had grown out of the ex-
perience of preceding generations of Muslims. These traditions gave
final expression to the theory of the Caliphate, according to which the
head of the Muslim community, as successor (Khalifah) of the Prophet,
carried on the same functions that he had performed, with the exception
of the exercise of the prophetic office which was held to have come to an
end with him. Accordingly the Caliph was supreme administrator, judge,
and general. The legists summed up his functions as comprising the
defence and maintenance of the faith; war against those who refused to
accept Islām or submit to Muslim rule; the protection of the country of
Islām and the provision of troops for guarding the frontiers ; the decision
of legal disputes and the punishment of wrongdoers; the collection and
disbursement of taxes; the payment of salaries and the appointing of
competent officials. The holder of the office had to be a member of the
tribe of the Quraish, to which the Prophet himself had belonged, and
had to possess the physical and intellectual qualities necessary for the
performance of the duties above mentioned. In theory the office was
elective, but the first Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty had made it here-
ditary, and generally each Caliph nominated his successor during his life.
It was not necessary that the succession should follow in the direct line.
Of the fourteen Umayyad Caliphs only four were succeeded by a son, and
of the first twenty-four Caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty only six had a
son as his successor; and though, later, direct succession became more
common, out of the total number of thirty-six the office passed from
CH. X.


## p. 282 (#324) ############################################

282
Organisation of administrative machinery
father to son in sixteen cases only. The fiction of election was kept up
by the institution of the oath of allegiance which was taken by the
highest officials and great nobles of the state to the Caliph on his suc-
cession and sometimes also to the heir apparent.
The Caliph was also at the same time Imām or leader of the faithful
in public worship, and, though he often delegated this religious function
to any ordinary Imām, there were even up to the latter days of the Abbasid
dynasty solemn occasions on which the Caliph came forward as leader of
the faithful in this public act of divine worship. The last Abbasid Caliph
who kept up this practice was Rādī (934-940). Though the Sunni doc-
trine never attached such mysterious significance to the office of the Imām
as was characteristic of the Shi'ah sect, yet a certain degree of reverence
became attached to this office even among the Sunnīs, and the theorists
maintained the necessity of an Imām as leader of the whole body of
believers; it was he alone who could declare a general Jihād, calling
upon all the faithful, both men and women, to join in war against the
unbelievers, and he was held to be the source of all legitimate authority,
both in the state and in the administration of justice. In theory every
governor was appointed by the Imām-Khalīfah, and even when the separate
provinces of the empire had become independent and the Caliph was a
helpless puppet, this fiction was still maintained, and a sultan or emir,
though he might have carved out a kingdom for himself by force of
arms, would apply to the Abbasid Caliph for a diploma of investiture.
The organisation of the administrative machinery is traditionally
attributed to Omar (634-644), who established a Dīwān or public register
of income and expenditure, the original purpose of which was the division
of the revenues of the state among the various members of the Muslim
community. But Omar's fiscal system soon broke down, and the
machinery of government gradually became more complicated by the
establishment of separate administrative departments, the number and
designation of which during the Abbasid period varied from time to
time. Among the most important were the Treasury (Dīwān al-Kharāj),
which kept an account of the taxes, and the State Chancery (Dīwān at-
Tauqi'), which issued the decrees of the Caliph and exercised control over
provincial governors. There were also separate departments for official
correspondence, for the administration of the crown lands, for the army,
for the postal service, for accounts, for general expenditure, and for the
freedmen and slaves of the Imperial House.
In the centralisation of government so characteristic of the new
dynasty, the institution of the Wazīr (Vizier) came into prominence.
Whereas the Umayyads, following the traditionary methods of primitive
Arab society, were surrounded by an aristocracy made up of chiefs of
their own race whom they would consult on special occasions, the more
autocratic government of the Abbasids placed the great army of officials
under the control of a minister, the Wazīr, to whom the Caliph delegated


## p. 283 (#325) ############################################

The postal system
283
a large portion of the details of administration. When the Caliph
(as was often the case) did not wish to be disturbed in his pleasures by
the cares of state, the Wazīr acquired almost autocratic powers and
could amass immense wealth ; all officials, even the great provincial
governors, owed their appointment to him, and he controlled the whole
machinery of the state. But his was a perilous position, and the annals
of the Abbasid dynasty are full of stories of the sudden ruin that de-
stroyed great and prosperous ministers.
One of the most important departments was that of the State Post
(Dīwān al-Barīd), an institution that the Arabs took over from the
Romans, as the very designation indicates, barīd being a loan-word from
the Latin veredus; but the story that Hārūn's great Persian minister,
the Barmecide Yaḥyà, reorganised the postal system on a new basis,
probably indicates that the Arabs incorporated also into their system the
old organisation of the Persian Empire. Like the Roman cursus publicus,
this department was designed only to serve the interests of the state, by
keeping the central government in touch with the outlying provinces and
providing secret information of the doings of the various governors.
Relays of swift mounts were kept at post stations on the great highways,
and made possible the rapid communication of information and official
orders. In every large province the postmaster had to keep the Caliph
informed of every event of importance, to report on the state of the
finances and the administration of the crown lands, the behaviour of the
officers of the state, and the condition of agriculture and the peasantry.
The cost of keeping up this large establishment of postal officials, to-
gether with the various stations and the camels and horses required, was
very heavy, but as it constituted the only possible means of controlling
the administration of such a vast Empire, the Caliphs rightly attached
much importance to it, and the Chief Postmaster at the capital had to
communicate despatches to the Caliph immediately on their arrival.
Pigeons also appear to have been used for transmitting news. Further, this
organised control of the great highways, where these postal stations were
established, facilitated the movements of the high officials andof the troops.
In addition to this department there was a large force of detective
police, and an elaborate system of espionage became a characteristic
feature of the administration, whereby a Caliph set spies to watch his
officials and even the members of his own family, while they in return
employed their own spies to report upon his movements and utterances.
For this purpose, in addition to regular members of the postal service,
persons of every social grade, merchants, pedlars, physicians, and slave
girls, were employed.
It was in harmony with this inquisition into the affairs of private
persons that the Muḥtasib, or Prefect of Police, should not only be con-
cerned with preventing breaches of the civil and religious law but also
act as a censor of morals. One of his most important duties was to inspect
сн. х.


## p. 284 (#326) ############################################

284
Censorship of morals: judiciary: army
weights and measures, and control commercial transactions by preventing
fraud in sales and the counterfeiting of goods or the making of extortion-
ate charges. He forbade the public sale of wine and the playing of
musical instruments in public places. In regard to the practices of
religion it was his duty to see that the correct ritual observances were
followed, for instance, to prevent the utterance of religious formulae not
sanctioned by authority, or the repetition in a loud voice of those
that were to be uttered in low tones; he could stop a man from taking
part in public worship who had not performed the prescribed rites of
ablution, or had not carried them out according to the strict prescriptions
of the ritual law; he could also punish a man who was detected breaking
the fast of Ramadān. He found suitable husbands for widows and took
care that no divorced women married before the expiration of the legal
period. He protected slaves from having tasks imposed upon them that
they were not strong enough to perform, and punished the owners of
beasts of burden if they did not provide their animals with sufficient
provender or overworked them. His authority even extended to the
inspection of dolls, to see whether they bore any resemblance to idols or
served any other purpose than that of accustoming little girls to the
care of infants. Unless he had received express authority, the Prefect of
Police could not interfere with the office of the magistrate, for if an
accused person denied his guilt the matter had to be brought before the
judge.
The judges were appointed either directly by the Caliph or an official,
such as his Wazir, or by a governor to whom authority had been dele-
gated. In the appointment of a judge the locality in which he could
exercise jurisdiction had to be expressly stated, and his authority was
either general or restricted. In the former instance he not only tried cases
but, among other duties, appointed guardians for minors, lunatics, and
others who could not manage their own property, administered religious
endowments, and saw that wills were carried out according to the direc-
tions of the testator. There was a special court of appeal in which were
heard complaints of the miscarriage of justice in the administrative or
judicial department; the earlier Abbasid Caliphs received such complaints
in public audience, but after the reign of Muhtadi (869-870) this office
was put into commission and a special officer appointed as president of
the Board for the investigation of grievances. In the reign of Muqtadir
(908-932), his mother, who controlled the administration, appointed to
this post her Mistress of the Robes.
The organisation of the army varied at different times in Muslim
history. By the Abbasid period the troops were divided into two classes:
the regular Arab army kept on a permanent footing and paid out of the
State Treasury, and the volunteers who were not entered on the register
and received no fixed pay. The latter received grants out of the poor tax,
and took part in the annual raids into Byzantine territory or into the


## p. 285 (#327) ############################################

The Turkish guard
285
neighbouring countries of the unbelievers. As the Abbasids came into
power largely through the assistance of troops from Khurāsān, these
formed a separate division of the army recruited from that part of their
dominions. Later on, Mu'taşim (833-842) added another separate army
corps made up of Turks, and also enrolled a contingent of slaves mainly
from North Africa. The favour which Mu'taşim extended towards these
foreign troops, and the disaffection excited by the excesses they committed
on the citizens of Baghdad, was one of the reasons that determined him
to transfer his capital to Sāmarrā in 836. Here he built enormous
barracks for his Turkish troops and encouraged Turkish chieftains to
come and live under his protection; he assigned separate sections of the
vast city that grew up around his palace to the Turkish troops according
to their tribes and their original habitat, and, in order to keep them
apart from the surrounding population, he purchased numbers of Turkish
slave girls whom he compelled his troops to marry; fixed stipends were
assigned to these slave girls and registers were kept of their names. These
Turkish guards came gradually to outnumber every other section of the
army, and they grew in wealth and influence as the number of posts con-
ferred upon them increased, until gradually the administration passed
from the hands of the Persians into those of the Turks, and the Caliph
became quite at the mercy of his Turkish guard. Things came to such
a pass that more than one Caliph was put to death by his own troops,
and the election of his successor was determined by his Turkish officers.
Still greater confusion arose when rival factions among the Turks them-
selves came to blows with one another: the administration fell into dis-
order, the provinces ceased to remit revenue to the capital, and the
troops mutinied and clamoured for their arrears of pay. It was to
escape from such an intolerable position that the Caliph Mu'tamid
in 892 abandoned Samarrā as a capital.
As the central authority declined and the Empire broke up into a
number of independent states and fiefs, the character of the military
organisation changed, and in place of the great standing army under a
single command a system of military fiefs grew up, according to which
different members of a ruling house or separate chiefs were given charge
over a town or a district, on condition that they paid an annual tribute
and supplied at their own cost a fixed number of troops to their overlord.
But in all these separate bodies of troops the presence of Turkish soldiers
became a common feature, since fresh accessions to their number were con-
tinuously coming from the East as the Turkish troops learned of the
wealth and power that their fellow-tribesmen could gain by service within
the Muslim Empire.
Many of these Turkish soldiers were slaves, and one reason for the
dependence of the Caliphs upon them was the belief that security could
be obtained by the possession of a bodyguard entirely dependent on the
favour of the sovereign without any ties of family or relationship with
CH
X.


## p. 286 (#328) ############################################

286
Slavery: commerce
the rest of the population. When the Caliphs became disillusioned of
the notion that loyalty could be purchased in this manner from the
Turks, they still continued to place reliance upon their slaves, and
Muqtadir (908-932) in his desire to maintain his authority against the
troublesome Turkish troops acquired as many as 11,000 slaves, some of
whom he promoted to high office and placed in command of his army.
Slavery from the outset had been a recognised institution of Muslim
society, but from the reign of this Caliph the tenure by slaves of some
of the highest offices of the state became an increasingly characteristic
feature of the social organisation. Conquests and raids had from the
earliest days of the expansion of the Arab Empire added to the slave
population of the great cities, but a constant supply was kept up later
through the well-organised slave-trade, which brought such enormous
numbers of black slaves from Africa that their armed risings were at
times a source of serious disorder. The white slaves were brought in
thousands from various Turkish tribes in Central Asia, and also from
Mediterranean ports, especially from Spain and Italy. Many of these
slaves were employed by their masters in trade and commercial enterprises
of various kinds.