, continues: "When one experiences the
suffering
of the damned, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the suffering of animals .
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
448, 458); bhisakka in the Inde* of the
Anguttara; Milinda, trans. 11,8, note: Siksdsamuccaya, 148. 5,243. 4,295. 2; Bodhicarydvatara, ii. 57, vii. 22. etc. See Taish6 17, no. 793-
10. On abhisamaya, below, vi. 27a. Atthasdlini, 22 (57) distinguishes worldly and transworldly abhisamaya; but the Pali sources most frequently understand abhisamaya in the same sense as does the Abhidharma: comprehension of the Truths through arydprajnd.
11. This theory is not that of all the sources; see p. 908. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26: What is the nature of the Four Truths? The masters of the Abhidharma say: 1. the Truth of Suffering consists of the five updddnaskandhas; 2. the Truth of Origin is the cause of the impure dharmas; 3. the Truth of the Extinction is their pratisamkhydnirodha (ii. 55d); 4. the Truth of the Path is the dharmas which create the Saints (faiksa and aiaiksa dharmas). The Darstantikas say: 1. the Truth of Suffering is ndmarupa; 2. the Truth of Arising is karman and kle? a; 3. the Truth of Extinction is the annihilation (ksaya) of karman and of kiefa; 4.
Footnotes 1041
? 1042 Chapter Six
the Truth of the Path is calm and insight (iamatha andvipaiyand). The Vibhajyavadins (see v. English trans, p. 782, 808,) say: 1. that which has the eight characteristics o(duhkha is duhkha and duhkhasatya; the other impure (sasrava) dharmas are duhkha, but not duhkhasatya [compare the Pali sources quoted below, note 15]; 2. the tfsnd which produces later existence is samudaya and samudayasatya; all other trsnd and the other causes of impure (sdsravahetu) dharmas is samudaya, but not samudayasatya; 3. the extinction of this trsnd is nirodha and nirodhasatya; the extinction of all other trsnd and of the other causes of impure dharmas is nirodha, but not nirodhasatya; 4. the eight-part ? aiksa path is mdrga and mdrgasatya; the other dharmas of the &aiksa and all the dharmas of the Asaiksa are mdrga, but not mdrgasatya. But, in this system, the Arhats only possess the Truths of duhkha and nirodha, and not the Truths of samudaya and mdrga. Samgitiidstra, TD 26, p. 392al6; sdsravahetu is the Truth of Origin; pratisamkhydnirodha is the Truth of Extinction; the dharmas of the Saiksa and the ASaiksa are the path.
12. Visuddhimagga, 495: yasmd pana etdni buddhddayo ariyd pativijjhanti tasmd ariyasaccdnitivuccanti. . . ariydnititathdniavitathdniavisamvddakdnitiattho.
The Aryan is defined, Koia, iii. 44c; same etymology in Anguttara, iv. 145. Majjhima, i. 280. etc. In Atthasdlini, 349: the Aryans are the Buddhas, the Pratyekas, and the SrSvakas; or rather the Buddhas alone are Aryans: compare Samyutta, v. 435 (tathdgata-ariya).
Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 401c27. What is the meaning of the term dryasatya? Are the Truths so cal led because they are good, because they are pure (andsrava), or because the Aryans are endowed with them? What are the defects of these explanations? All three are bad: 1. one can say that the last two Truths are good; but the first two are of three types, good, bad, and neutral; 2. the last two are pure, but not the first two; 3. the non-Aryans are endowed with the Truths, thus it is said: "Who is endowed with the Truths of duhkha and of samudaya? 'AH beings. Who is endowed with the Truth of nirodha? Those who are not bound by all the bonds (sakalabandhana, see Koia, ii. 36c, English trans, p. 207). " Answer: One must say that, because the Aryans are endowed with them, these Truths are the Aryasatyas . . .
13. Samyutta,iv. 127:yamparesukhatodhutadariyddhudukkhato/yam paredukkhatodhu tad ariya sukhato vidu. The Vydkhyd quotes the second pdda: tat pare dukkhato viduh.
It also quotes the last pdda of the Saundarananda, xii. 22: loke'sminn dlaydrdme nwrttau durlabhd ratih / vyathante hy apunarbhdvdt prapdtdd iva baitsah // In fact, what the Aryans call sukha is Nirvana or extinction.
14. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 333c2), the Sautrantikas and the Sthaviras.
15. a. Vydkhyd: mana dpnuvantiti mandpdh / punahsamdhikaranam cdtreti vydkhydtam. b. On the three types of duhkha, Digha, iii. 216 (Buddhaghosa, if the summary in Dialogues, iii. 210, is correct, deviates from Vasubandhu); Samyutta, iv. 259, v. 56; Visuddhimagga, 499; Madhyamakavrtti, chap, xxiv (p. 227, 475), which depends on the
Koia; Bodhicary avatara, 346; Rockhill, Life, 189; Yogas&tra, ii. 15 {parin dma, tdpa and samskdraduhkhatd). Ndmasamgiti, 85: duhkham samsdrinah skandhdh.
c. According to the Yamaka, i. 174, painful sensation (of the body and mind) is duhkha; the rest is duhkhasatya, but not duhkha. Painful sensation is anubhavanaduhkha (the duhkhaduhkha of the Abhidharma); the rest is duhkha because it is dangerous sappatibhayatthena. (According to Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133).
Kathavatthu, xvii. 5: the Hetuvadins maintains that all conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the Path but including the cause of suffering, are suffering.
16. Some agreeable dharmas possess viparinamena duhkhatd, the characteristic of suffering, because they do not last. The Vydkhyd quotes the verse of AsVaghosa, Saundarananda, xi. 50: ha caitraratha ha vdpi ha manddkini hdpriye / ity drtam vilapanto gam patanti dwaukasah II (Compare Divya, 194).
Let us note here that Vasubandhu, iv. 86, quotes the same poem: gfhasthena hi duh/odhd drstir vividhadrspina / dfivo bhiksund caiva paresv dyattavrttind. (Correct the note p. 189. )
? The disagreeable dharmas are suffering by their suffering, painful nature (duhkhasvab- hdvena, upaghdtasvabhdvena). But can they to some extent be happy through transforma- tion, in that they pass away (viparindmasukha)? Without doubt, but these definitions (upadesa) have for their purpose depreciating, disliking these things {vidUsandrtham)'. in the same way we hold agreeable sensation that arises and lasts to be suffering.
All things are suffering through samskdraduhkhatd: samskdrenaiva duhkhateti samskdrenaiva jananenaivety arthah / yad anityarh tad duhkham yan na niyatasthitam tad duhkham yaj jayate vinafyati ca tad duhkham ity arthah / tenoktam / pratyaydbhisamska- randd iti pratyayair abhisamskriyate yasmdt tasmdt tad duhkham iti /
Samyutta, iv. 207: sukham dukkhato . . . dukkham sallato. . . adukkhamasukham aniccato. 17. Quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 476; compare Jacob, Third Handful of Popular Maxims
(Bombay, 1911). p. 103: aksipdtranydya.
18. The point of view of the Theravadins, Kathdvatthu, xvii. 5.
19. Vibhdsd (TD 27, p. 402cl0). The Sutra says: "The Path depends on its preparation (sambhdra), Nirvana depends on the Path; through the pleasure (sukha) of the Path, one obtains the pleasure of Nirvana. How can one say that there is no pleasure in the skandhas? There is found therein a little pleasure . . . nevertheless the skandhas are one mass of suffering, the same if one were to pour a drop of honey into a vase filled with poison. . . ; in this same way are the skandhas: little pleasure and much suffering. They are thus solely called duhkhasatya. There are some who say: In the skandhas, there is absolutely no pleasure: therefore it is called duhkhasatya.
20. This is a stanza by Kumaralabha (a Sautrantika).
21. Saha tu sukhena: tu announces the refutation of the purvapaksa represented by a theory of the Sarvastivadins ("According to one explanation . . . ) and by a theory of the Sautrantikas.
Hsiian-tsang: "The true explanation. . . " TheJapanese editor: "The author presents the correct explanation of the Sarvastivadins. "
22. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402c. According to the Vydkhyd,the Bhadanta Srilabha, etc. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas, the Mahasamghikas, etc. Samghabhadra, Nydydnusdra: "The Sthaviras hold that sensation is only suffering. " Compare Kathdvatthu, ii. 8, where the Theravada condemn the Gokulikas (=Kukkulikas, Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 151).
23. These Sutras are discussed p. 904.
24. Compare Majjhima, i. 507. Refuted p. 908.
25. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 399a23. ParSva says that pidana (affliction, pain) is the characteristic of duhkha; Vasumitra says that pravrtti (or samsdra, samcara, liu-ch'uan jf? $( ) is the characteristic of duhkha; etc.
26. According to Hsiian-tsang: If he answers: "Affliction" (bddh), then, since there is contentment, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which harms," then, since there is usefulness (anugrdhaka) in this, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which displeases (arafifanya)," then, since there is something pleasing, the existence of*pleasure is proved. According to Paramartha: If he answers: "That which afflicts is called suffering," how does pleasure afflict? If he answers: "That which harms," how would it harm since pleasure is useful ? If he answers: "That which displeases," how could it be suffering since pleasure pleases?
27. The Vydkhyd explains: idam atra duhkhasya laksanam ity arthah.
The same Sutra in Samyutta, iv. 216, but the questioner of the Bhagavat is "a certain
Bhiksu": tisso imd bhikkhu vedand vuttd maya. . . / vuttam kho panetam bhikkhu maya yam
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kin ci vedayitam tarn dukkhasmin ti / tarn kho panetam bhikkhu maya samkhdrdnam yeva aniccatarh samdhdya bhasitam . . .
viparindma - anyathdtva.
The commentary of the Ndmasamgiti, viii. 9: yat kith cit kdye vedit am idam atra duhkham.
28. Yathabhutam: conforming to reality, without adding or subtracting (adhydropdpavd- ddbhdvdt).
29. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402cl7 and foil.
, continues: "When one experiences the suffering of the damned, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the suffering of animals . . . When one experiences the suffering of mankind, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the sufferings of the gods.
30. Vydkhyd: aduhkhdnantaram sukhdbhimdnam paiyann aha / yadd gandharasaspraspa- vyavihsajam iti / madhyam hi duhkham aduhkhdsukham bhavatdm na mrduprakdram ato vaktavyam tad a k at am ad duhkham mrdubhutam yatrdsya sukhabuddhir bhavatiti visayabaldd eva hi tat sukham utpadyate mrduduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd adhimdtraduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd veti /
Paramartha: "When a person experiences the pleasure arisen from some excellent smell, taste, etc. , then what suffering does he experience? He experiences a weak suffering, and with respect to this weak suffering, he produces the idea of pleasure. If this is the case, when this weak suffering has disappeared . . . "
31. Compare Samyutta, ii-173: If the earth element were absolutely agreeable . . . , absolutely suffering. . .
32. Hsiian-tsang adds: "since suffering diminishes little by little. "
If the displacement of the burden does not provoke a pleasure and is only a diminution
of suffering, this diminution would take place gradually: the impression of pleasure would thus grow from the moment when the burden had been displaced.
33. Utsutra. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 403a4: "All the impure {sasrava) dharmas are cause and as a consequence the Truth of Origin. Why does the Blessed One say that thirst is the Truth of Origin? Therearethirtyexplanations . . . "
The Yamaka, i. 174, ii. 250, demonstrates that thirst is the origin, not ignorance (Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS. , 1914, p. 135).
34. Mahdvagga, i. 6. 20. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 468b27cl9: samudayasatyam katamat / ydsau trsnd nandirdgasahagatd tatra tatrdbhinandini. According to the Sautrantikas, four trsnds are samudayasatya: 1. desire for present existence, the desire for present results: 2. desire for later existences, the desire for future results; 3. desire accompanied by nandi; and 4. desire tatra tatra abhinandini.
35. A non-metrical version in the Tanjur: las dan sredpa dan mi rig pa / phyi ma'i tshe la 'du byed mams kyi rgyu. Three pddas of five syllables in Paramartha: "Action, thirst, ignorance, these three in the future are the cause of all existence. " Hsiian-tsang has four pddas: "Action, thirst and ignorance are the cause which produces the future samskdras which creates the series of existence called pudgala": this is a gatha taken from Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88b9.
The Vydkhyd also attests that this quotation is a stanza: . . . gdthdydm esa nirdesah karma trmdvidyd samskdrdndm caksurddindm hetur abhisampardye.
36. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 224cl6: yatas ca bhiksavah panca bijajdtdny (compare Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 220) akhanddny acchidrdny aputiny avdtdtdpahatdnihavani (? ) sdrdni sukhasayitani prtkividhdtuS ca bhavaty abdhdtus ca / evam tdni bijdni vrddhim virudhim vipulatdm dpadyanta iti hi bhiksava upameyam krtd yavad evasyarthasya vijfiaptaya itimam
? drstantam upanyasyedam uktam /panca bijajdtdniti bhiksavah sopdddnasya vijHdnasyaitad adhivacanam / prthividhdtur iti catasrndm vij&dnasthitindm etad adhivacanam. Compare Samyutta, iiiJ4: seyyathd. . . pathavidhdtu evam catasso vinndnatthitiyo . . . seyyathd pancabijajOtani evam vinndnam sahdram datthabbam.
On the vijfidnasthitiSy see Ko? a, iii. 5.
37. Vyakhyd: dbhiprdyika ity abhiprdye bhavah / abhiprdyena vd divyatity dbhiprdyikah sutre nirdesah / trsnddhikam pudgalam adhikrtya krta ity abhiprdyah / Idksanikas tv abhidharme / laksane bhavo Idksaniko nirdefah /. . . sdsravasya skandhapancakasya samudayasatyatvalaksanayogdt.
38. In the Vyakhyd this Sutra is called the sahetusapratya-saniddnasutra (see the fragment quoted in Koia, iii, Cosmologie); but in the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 452: Pratityasamutpada- sutra.
39. See iii. 30, Madhyamakavrtti, p. 544.
40. Like the limb which has been smeared with a dried paste of masura. In the way that the limb is grasped (dgrhita) by this anointing, in that same way the dtmabhdva is grasped by desire.
41. According to the Japanese editor, Ekottardgama (TD 2. p. 740a-741b).
42. The Vyakhyd quotes the Madhyamaka kdrikd, xxiv. 8: dve satye samupdsritya buddhdndm dharmadesana lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramdrthatah //
Compare the stanzas quoted in the commentary to the Kathdvatthu, p. 22: duve saccdni akkhdsi sambuddho vadatdm varo /
sammutim paramattham ca tatiyam nupalabbhati // tattha samketavacanam saccam lokasammutikdranam /
paramatthavacanam saccam dhammdnam tathalakkhanam //
(The edition has tathd lakkhanam. )
See the translation of the Kathdvatthu, p. 63, 180, 371; Ledi Sayadaw, "Some points in
Buddhist doctrine," JPTS. , 1914. 129.
The problem of the single truth (Suttanipdta, 884), of the two truths and of the four
truths--which implies the question of the real existence of Nirvana (see Anguttara, ii. 161)--is discussed in Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 399bl0 and following, and in the Nydydnusdra of Sarhghabhadra (TD 29, p. 665a27). These document have been translated in the Introduction.
43. Vyakhyd: The two examples indicate the two modes of bheda or breaking: pots, etc. , are broken by a blow (upakrama) whereas water, etc. , is broken by mental analysis (buddhi); for by breaking one cannot take away the taste, etc. from water. Or rather, that which exists conventionally (samvrti) is of two types: 1. conventionally depending on another thing (samvrtyantaravyapds'raya), and 2. depending of a real thing (dravya): of the first, there is at one and the same time breaking (bheda) and analysis (anydpoha) [for example, the pot]; of the second, there is only analysis: one cannot disassociate an atom which is made up of eight things (Ko/a, ii. 22) . . . samvrtisat=samvyavahdrena sat. paramdrthasat-paramdrthena sat svalaksanena sat.
Paramartha, in the Bhdsyam, departs from the original:
"First if the idea of a thing no longer arises when this thing has been broken, then this thing exists conventionally (samvrtisat). When the pot is reduced to baked earth, the idea of pot does not arise with respect to this baked earth. Therefore things like "a pot" exist only as a metaphoric designation (prajnapti) of shape (hsing-hsiang ? f? ffi ~dkrti, samsthdna). Secondly, if the idea of a thing does not arise when, by the mind, one takes away from this thing other given things (dharmas), then this thing exists conventionally; for example, water. If one mentally takes away the color, taste, and the primary elements, etc. ,
Footnotes 1045
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from water, then the idea of water is no longer produced. Thus things such as water exist as
the metaphorical designations of a combination (chil-chi IKHS , samavdya? ).
Thirdly, one expresses Paramartha, the real thing, by words, phrases , and syllables (Kofa,
ii. 47); it is by reason of words that a knowledge relative to Paramartha is producedBut
when one enters absorption, consciousness does not bear on words (Kola, vi. 5c-d) and,
when it has left absorption, the consciousness no longer bears on Paramartha: thus the
words and the consciousness referred to here exist only as metaphorical designations of the
thing expressed (? hsien-chih 8H7F , udbhdvandP). Why are these three types of
dharmas samvrti? What is only made up of words does not have a nature in and of itself,
and is samvrti. To say, in conformity with the usage of the world, that "there is a pot, there
is water, there are words," is true andriotfalse. Therefore this is samvrtisatya. What differs
from these three types of dharmas is called paramdrthasatya. If the idea of a thing arises as
before when this thing is destroyed, or when one has separated it from other dharmas by
the mind, or when one makes an abstraction of it from words, then this thing or dharma
really exists, for example, rUpa. One can cut rupa, one can subtract different dharmas from
it, its taste, etc. : but the idea which bears on rupa remains the same. The same for vedand,
etc. . . According to other masters, the dharmas which are the object of supermundane
(lokottara) knowledge or of the knowledge acquired consecutively to it are also called
tne
paramdrthasatya: the dhdtus (ching-chieh WM- ) > Paramartha. What differs from these three is samvrtisatya.
result, and the Path are
44. According to Hui-hui, the Sautrantikas. The Vydkhyd explains: paramasya jndnasydr- thah paramarthah / paramarthah ca sa satyam ca tad iti paramdrthasatyam. It adds: trividham hiyogdcdrdndm sat paramdrthasat samvrtisat dravyasat /dravyatahsvalaksanatah sad dravyasat. The older masters are thus the Yogacarins (see iv. 4a, note 25).
Compare the doctrine of the Bodhisattvabhumi, I. iv, fol. 18a, Musefon, 1906, p. 220 and following; four types of tattvartha or tattva: 1. the reality recognized in popular usage (laukikaprasiddha); 2. the reality established by reason (yuktiprasiddha); 3. the reality that the Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas cognize through a pure or worldly knowledge, this leading to the pure knowledge consecutive to the pure knowledge (andsravena andsravdvdh- akena anasravaprsthalabdhena ca laukikena jridnena): this reality is the Truths; and 4. the reality which is the sphere of knowledge purified of any hindrance to cognizable ob]ects(jneyavaranavisuddhajHdnagocara): this is tathata. (Compare Sutrdlamkdra,-xi. 3l).
45. This worldly knowledge is samvrtijftana, vii. 2. 21.
46. Paramartha: "The truths have been spoken of in summary. If one asks for a long presentation, one should see how it is spoken of in the Treatise of the Six Higher Knowledges (abhijHd) (liu shen shih lun /\J$Wlffl ) (TD 29, p. 269a3).
47. Paramartha: "One must tell by which cultivation of which means one enters into the Seeing of the Truths. Thus, beginning from the first step, one must tell of its progression. " (TD 29, p. 269a4). Hsiian-tsang: "One must tell by which cultivation of which means one arrives at darianamdrga (TD 29, p. 116b27).
48. a. Here bhdvand is the equivalent of samddhi or absorption (iv. l23c-d).
b. Vrtta or vrtti (vi. 8a) is almost synonymous to ? lla, as we can see in the Saundara- nanda, xiii. 10, xvi. 31; it is the perfect fila of the Bhiksu to be content with the clothing of a
monk, etc. (vi. 7c-d).
49. Udgrhndti, glossed by papthati.
50. Satyadariandnuloma - satyadarSanadhikdrika.
51. On the three patffids, Digha, iii. 219; Vibhanga, 324, Visuddhimagga, 439 (in the order: cintd, suta, bhdvand).
? 52. Vibhdsdy TD 27, p. 940c25. Vasubandhu does not admit this theory; this is why he says: "AccordingtotheVaibhasikas . . . "
53.
Anguttara; Milinda, trans. 11,8, note: Siksdsamuccaya, 148. 5,243. 4,295. 2; Bodhicarydvatara, ii. 57, vii. 22. etc. See Taish6 17, no. 793-
10. On abhisamaya, below, vi. 27a. Atthasdlini, 22 (57) distinguishes worldly and transworldly abhisamaya; but the Pali sources most frequently understand abhisamaya in the same sense as does the Abhidharma: comprehension of the Truths through arydprajnd.
11. This theory is not that of all the sources; see p. 908. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26: What is the nature of the Four Truths? The masters of the Abhidharma say: 1. the Truth of Suffering consists of the five updddnaskandhas; 2. the Truth of Origin is the cause of the impure dharmas; 3. the Truth of the Extinction is their pratisamkhydnirodha (ii. 55d); 4. the Truth of the Path is the dharmas which create the Saints (faiksa and aiaiksa dharmas). The Darstantikas say: 1. the Truth of Suffering is ndmarupa; 2. the Truth of Arising is karman and kle? a; 3. the Truth of Extinction is the annihilation (ksaya) of karman and of kiefa; 4.
Footnotes 1041
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the Truth of the Path is calm and insight (iamatha andvipaiyand). The Vibhajyavadins (see v. English trans, p. 782, 808,) say: 1. that which has the eight characteristics o(duhkha is duhkha and duhkhasatya; the other impure (sasrava) dharmas are duhkha, but not duhkhasatya [compare the Pali sources quoted below, note 15]; 2. the tfsnd which produces later existence is samudaya and samudayasatya; all other trsnd and the other causes of impure (sdsravahetu) dharmas is samudaya, but not samudayasatya; 3. the extinction of this trsnd is nirodha and nirodhasatya; the extinction of all other trsnd and of the other causes of impure dharmas is nirodha, but not nirodhasatya; 4. the eight-part ? aiksa path is mdrga and mdrgasatya; the other dharmas of the &aiksa and all the dharmas of the Asaiksa are mdrga, but not mdrgasatya. But, in this system, the Arhats only possess the Truths of duhkha and nirodha, and not the Truths of samudaya and mdrga. Samgitiidstra, TD 26, p. 392al6; sdsravahetu is the Truth of Origin; pratisamkhydnirodha is the Truth of Extinction; the dharmas of the Saiksa and the ASaiksa are the path.
12. Visuddhimagga, 495: yasmd pana etdni buddhddayo ariyd pativijjhanti tasmd ariyasaccdnitivuccanti. . . ariydnititathdniavitathdniavisamvddakdnitiattho.
The Aryan is defined, Koia, iii. 44c; same etymology in Anguttara, iv. 145. Majjhima, i. 280. etc. In Atthasdlini, 349: the Aryans are the Buddhas, the Pratyekas, and the SrSvakas; or rather the Buddhas alone are Aryans: compare Samyutta, v. 435 (tathdgata-ariya).
Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 401c27. What is the meaning of the term dryasatya? Are the Truths so cal led because they are good, because they are pure (andsrava), or because the Aryans are endowed with them? What are the defects of these explanations? All three are bad: 1. one can say that the last two Truths are good; but the first two are of three types, good, bad, and neutral; 2. the last two are pure, but not the first two; 3. the non-Aryans are endowed with the Truths, thus it is said: "Who is endowed with the Truths of duhkha and of samudaya? 'AH beings. Who is endowed with the Truth of nirodha? Those who are not bound by all the bonds (sakalabandhana, see Koia, ii. 36c, English trans, p. 207). " Answer: One must say that, because the Aryans are endowed with them, these Truths are the Aryasatyas . . .
13. Samyutta,iv. 127:yamparesukhatodhutadariyddhudukkhato/yam paredukkhatodhu tad ariya sukhato vidu. The Vydkhyd quotes the second pdda: tat pare dukkhato viduh.
It also quotes the last pdda of the Saundarananda, xii. 22: loke'sminn dlaydrdme nwrttau durlabhd ratih / vyathante hy apunarbhdvdt prapdtdd iva baitsah // In fact, what the Aryans call sukha is Nirvana or extinction.
14. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 333c2), the Sautrantikas and the Sthaviras.
15. a. Vydkhyd: mana dpnuvantiti mandpdh / punahsamdhikaranam cdtreti vydkhydtam. b. On the three types of duhkha, Digha, iii. 216 (Buddhaghosa, if the summary in Dialogues, iii. 210, is correct, deviates from Vasubandhu); Samyutta, iv. 259, v. 56; Visuddhimagga, 499; Madhyamakavrtti, chap, xxiv (p. 227, 475), which depends on the
Koia; Bodhicary avatara, 346; Rockhill, Life, 189; Yogas&tra, ii. 15 {parin dma, tdpa and samskdraduhkhatd). Ndmasamgiti, 85: duhkham samsdrinah skandhdh.
c. According to the Yamaka, i. 174, painful sensation (of the body and mind) is duhkha; the rest is duhkhasatya, but not duhkha. Painful sensation is anubhavanaduhkha (the duhkhaduhkha of the Abhidharma); the rest is duhkha because it is dangerous sappatibhayatthena. (According to Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133).
Kathavatthu, xvii. 5: the Hetuvadins maintains that all conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the Path but including the cause of suffering, are suffering.
16. Some agreeable dharmas possess viparinamena duhkhatd, the characteristic of suffering, because they do not last. The Vydkhyd quotes the verse of AsVaghosa, Saundarananda, xi. 50: ha caitraratha ha vdpi ha manddkini hdpriye / ity drtam vilapanto gam patanti dwaukasah II (Compare Divya, 194).
Let us note here that Vasubandhu, iv. 86, quotes the same poem: gfhasthena hi duh/odhd drstir vividhadrspina / dfivo bhiksund caiva paresv dyattavrttind. (Correct the note p. 189. )
? The disagreeable dharmas are suffering by their suffering, painful nature (duhkhasvab- hdvena, upaghdtasvabhdvena). But can they to some extent be happy through transforma- tion, in that they pass away (viparindmasukha)? Without doubt, but these definitions (upadesa) have for their purpose depreciating, disliking these things {vidUsandrtham)'. in the same way we hold agreeable sensation that arises and lasts to be suffering.
All things are suffering through samskdraduhkhatd: samskdrenaiva duhkhateti samskdrenaiva jananenaivety arthah / yad anityarh tad duhkham yan na niyatasthitam tad duhkham yaj jayate vinafyati ca tad duhkham ity arthah / tenoktam / pratyaydbhisamska- randd iti pratyayair abhisamskriyate yasmdt tasmdt tad duhkham iti /
Samyutta, iv. 207: sukham dukkhato . . . dukkham sallato. . . adukkhamasukham aniccato. 17. Quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 476; compare Jacob, Third Handful of Popular Maxims
(Bombay, 1911). p. 103: aksipdtranydya.
18. The point of view of the Theravadins, Kathdvatthu, xvii. 5.
19. Vibhdsd (TD 27, p. 402cl0). The Sutra says: "The Path depends on its preparation (sambhdra), Nirvana depends on the Path; through the pleasure (sukha) of the Path, one obtains the pleasure of Nirvana. How can one say that there is no pleasure in the skandhas? There is found therein a little pleasure . . . nevertheless the skandhas are one mass of suffering, the same if one were to pour a drop of honey into a vase filled with poison. . . ; in this same way are the skandhas: little pleasure and much suffering. They are thus solely called duhkhasatya. There are some who say: In the skandhas, there is absolutely no pleasure: therefore it is called duhkhasatya.
20. This is a stanza by Kumaralabha (a Sautrantika).
21. Saha tu sukhena: tu announces the refutation of the purvapaksa represented by a theory of the Sarvastivadins ("According to one explanation . . . ) and by a theory of the Sautrantikas.
Hsiian-tsang: "The true explanation. . . " TheJapanese editor: "The author presents the correct explanation of the Sarvastivadins. "
22. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402c. According to the Vydkhyd,the Bhadanta Srilabha, etc. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas, the Mahasamghikas, etc. Samghabhadra, Nydydnusdra: "The Sthaviras hold that sensation is only suffering. " Compare Kathdvatthu, ii. 8, where the Theravada condemn the Gokulikas (=Kukkulikas, Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 151).
23. These Sutras are discussed p. 904.
24. Compare Majjhima, i. 507. Refuted p. 908.
25. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 399a23. ParSva says that pidana (affliction, pain) is the characteristic of duhkha; Vasumitra says that pravrtti (or samsdra, samcara, liu-ch'uan jf? $( ) is the characteristic of duhkha; etc.
26. According to Hsiian-tsang: If he answers: "Affliction" (bddh), then, since there is contentment, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which harms," then, since there is usefulness (anugrdhaka) in this, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which displeases (arafifanya)," then, since there is something pleasing, the existence of*pleasure is proved. According to Paramartha: If he answers: "That which afflicts is called suffering," how does pleasure afflict? If he answers: "That which harms," how would it harm since pleasure is useful ? If he answers: "That which displeases," how could it be suffering since pleasure pleases?
27. The Vydkhyd explains: idam atra duhkhasya laksanam ity arthah.
The same Sutra in Samyutta, iv. 216, but the questioner of the Bhagavat is "a certain
Bhiksu": tisso imd bhikkhu vedand vuttd maya. . . / vuttam kho panetam bhikkhu maya yam
Footnotes 1043
? 1044 Chapter Six
kin ci vedayitam tarn dukkhasmin ti / tarn kho panetam bhikkhu maya samkhdrdnam yeva aniccatarh samdhdya bhasitam . . .
viparindma - anyathdtva.
The commentary of the Ndmasamgiti, viii. 9: yat kith cit kdye vedit am idam atra duhkham.
28. Yathabhutam: conforming to reality, without adding or subtracting (adhydropdpavd- ddbhdvdt).
29. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 402cl7 and foil.
, continues: "When one experiences the suffering of the damned, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the suffering of animals . . . When one experiences the suffering of mankind, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the sufferings of the gods.
30. Vydkhyd: aduhkhdnantaram sukhdbhimdnam paiyann aha / yadd gandharasaspraspa- vyavihsajam iti / madhyam hi duhkham aduhkhdsukham bhavatdm na mrduprakdram ato vaktavyam tad a k at am ad duhkham mrdubhutam yatrdsya sukhabuddhir bhavatiti visayabaldd eva hi tat sukham utpadyate mrduduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd adhimdtraduhkhasamanantarapratyayabaldd veti /
Paramartha: "When a person experiences the pleasure arisen from some excellent smell, taste, etc. , then what suffering does he experience? He experiences a weak suffering, and with respect to this weak suffering, he produces the idea of pleasure. If this is the case, when this weak suffering has disappeared . . . "
31. Compare Samyutta, ii-173: If the earth element were absolutely agreeable . . . , absolutely suffering. . .
32. Hsiian-tsang adds: "since suffering diminishes little by little. "
If the displacement of the burden does not provoke a pleasure and is only a diminution
of suffering, this diminution would take place gradually: the impression of pleasure would thus grow from the moment when the burden had been displaced.
33. Utsutra. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 403a4: "All the impure {sasrava) dharmas are cause and as a consequence the Truth of Origin. Why does the Blessed One say that thirst is the Truth of Origin? Therearethirtyexplanations . . . "
The Yamaka, i. 174, ii. 250, demonstrates that thirst is the origin, not ignorance (Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS. , 1914, p. 135).
34. Mahdvagga, i. 6. 20. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 468b27cl9: samudayasatyam katamat / ydsau trsnd nandirdgasahagatd tatra tatrdbhinandini. According to the Sautrantikas, four trsnds are samudayasatya: 1. desire for present existence, the desire for present results: 2. desire for later existences, the desire for future results; 3. desire accompanied by nandi; and 4. desire tatra tatra abhinandini.
35. A non-metrical version in the Tanjur: las dan sredpa dan mi rig pa / phyi ma'i tshe la 'du byed mams kyi rgyu. Three pddas of five syllables in Paramartha: "Action, thirst, ignorance, these three in the future are the cause of all existence. " Hsiian-tsang has four pddas: "Action, thirst and ignorance are the cause which produces the future samskdras which creates the series of existence called pudgala": this is a gatha taken from Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88b9.
The Vydkhyd also attests that this quotation is a stanza: . . . gdthdydm esa nirdesah karma trmdvidyd samskdrdndm caksurddindm hetur abhisampardye.
36. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 224cl6: yatas ca bhiksavah panca bijajdtdny (compare Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 220) akhanddny acchidrdny aputiny avdtdtdpahatdnihavani (? ) sdrdni sukhasayitani prtkividhdtuS ca bhavaty abdhdtus ca / evam tdni bijdni vrddhim virudhim vipulatdm dpadyanta iti hi bhiksava upameyam krtd yavad evasyarthasya vijfiaptaya itimam
? drstantam upanyasyedam uktam /panca bijajdtdniti bhiksavah sopdddnasya vijHdnasyaitad adhivacanam / prthividhdtur iti catasrndm vij&dnasthitindm etad adhivacanam. Compare Samyutta, iiiJ4: seyyathd. . . pathavidhdtu evam catasso vinndnatthitiyo . . . seyyathd pancabijajOtani evam vinndnam sahdram datthabbam.
On the vijfidnasthitiSy see Ko? a, iii. 5.
37. Vyakhyd: dbhiprdyika ity abhiprdye bhavah / abhiprdyena vd divyatity dbhiprdyikah sutre nirdesah / trsnddhikam pudgalam adhikrtya krta ity abhiprdyah / Idksanikas tv abhidharme / laksane bhavo Idksaniko nirdefah /. . . sdsravasya skandhapancakasya samudayasatyatvalaksanayogdt.
38. In the Vyakhyd this Sutra is called the sahetusapratya-saniddnasutra (see the fragment quoted in Koia, iii, Cosmologie); but in the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 452: Pratityasamutpada- sutra.
39. See iii. 30, Madhyamakavrtti, p. 544.
40. Like the limb which has been smeared with a dried paste of masura. In the way that the limb is grasped (dgrhita) by this anointing, in that same way the dtmabhdva is grasped by desire.
41. According to the Japanese editor, Ekottardgama (TD 2. p. 740a-741b).
42. The Vyakhyd quotes the Madhyamaka kdrikd, xxiv. 8: dve satye samupdsritya buddhdndm dharmadesana lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramdrthatah //
Compare the stanzas quoted in the commentary to the Kathdvatthu, p. 22: duve saccdni akkhdsi sambuddho vadatdm varo /
sammutim paramattham ca tatiyam nupalabbhati // tattha samketavacanam saccam lokasammutikdranam /
paramatthavacanam saccam dhammdnam tathalakkhanam //
(The edition has tathd lakkhanam. )
See the translation of the Kathdvatthu, p. 63, 180, 371; Ledi Sayadaw, "Some points in
Buddhist doctrine," JPTS. , 1914. 129.
The problem of the single truth (Suttanipdta, 884), of the two truths and of the four
truths--which implies the question of the real existence of Nirvana (see Anguttara, ii. 161)--is discussed in Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 399bl0 and following, and in the Nydydnusdra of Sarhghabhadra (TD 29, p. 665a27). These document have been translated in the Introduction.
43. Vyakhyd: The two examples indicate the two modes of bheda or breaking: pots, etc. , are broken by a blow (upakrama) whereas water, etc. , is broken by mental analysis (buddhi); for by breaking one cannot take away the taste, etc. from water. Or rather, that which exists conventionally (samvrti) is of two types: 1. conventionally depending on another thing (samvrtyantaravyapds'raya), and 2. depending of a real thing (dravya): of the first, there is at one and the same time breaking (bheda) and analysis (anydpoha) [for example, the pot]; of the second, there is only analysis: one cannot disassociate an atom which is made up of eight things (Ko/a, ii. 22) . . . samvrtisat=samvyavahdrena sat. paramdrthasat-paramdrthena sat svalaksanena sat.
Paramartha, in the Bhdsyam, departs from the original:
"First if the idea of a thing no longer arises when this thing has been broken, then this thing exists conventionally (samvrtisat). When the pot is reduced to baked earth, the idea of pot does not arise with respect to this baked earth. Therefore things like "a pot" exist only as a metaphoric designation (prajnapti) of shape (hsing-hsiang ? f? ffi ~dkrti, samsthdna). Secondly, if the idea of a thing does not arise when, by the mind, one takes away from this thing other given things (dharmas), then this thing exists conventionally; for example, water. If one mentally takes away the color, taste, and the primary elements, etc. ,
Footnotes 1045
? 1046 Chapter Six
from water, then the idea of water is no longer produced. Thus things such as water exist as
the metaphorical designations of a combination (chil-chi IKHS , samavdya? ).
Thirdly, one expresses Paramartha, the real thing, by words, phrases , and syllables (Kofa,
ii. 47); it is by reason of words that a knowledge relative to Paramartha is producedBut
when one enters absorption, consciousness does not bear on words (Kola, vi. 5c-d) and,
when it has left absorption, the consciousness no longer bears on Paramartha: thus the
words and the consciousness referred to here exist only as metaphorical designations of the
thing expressed (? hsien-chih 8H7F , udbhdvandP). Why are these three types of
dharmas samvrti? What is only made up of words does not have a nature in and of itself,
and is samvrti. To say, in conformity with the usage of the world, that "there is a pot, there
is water, there are words," is true andriotfalse. Therefore this is samvrtisatya. What differs
from these three types of dharmas is called paramdrthasatya. If the idea of a thing arises as
before when this thing is destroyed, or when one has separated it from other dharmas by
the mind, or when one makes an abstraction of it from words, then this thing or dharma
really exists, for example, rUpa. One can cut rupa, one can subtract different dharmas from
it, its taste, etc. : but the idea which bears on rupa remains the same. The same for vedand,
etc. . . According to other masters, the dharmas which are the object of supermundane
(lokottara) knowledge or of the knowledge acquired consecutively to it are also called
tne
paramdrthasatya: the dhdtus (ching-chieh WM- ) > Paramartha. What differs from these three is samvrtisatya.
result, and the Path are
44. According to Hui-hui, the Sautrantikas. The Vydkhyd explains: paramasya jndnasydr- thah paramarthah / paramarthah ca sa satyam ca tad iti paramdrthasatyam. It adds: trividham hiyogdcdrdndm sat paramdrthasat samvrtisat dravyasat /dravyatahsvalaksanatah sad dravyasat. The older masters are thus the Yogacarins (see iv. 4a, note 25).
Compare the doctrine of the Bodhisattvabhumi, I. iv, fol. 18a, Musefon, 1906, p. 220 and following; four types of tattvartha or tattva: 1. the reality recognized in popular usage (laukikaprasiddha); 2. the reality established by reason (yuktiprasiddha); 3. the reality that the Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas cognize through a pure or worldly knowledge, this leading to the pure knowledge consecutive to the pure knowledge (andsravena andsravdvdh- akena anasravaprsthalabdhena ca laukikena jridnena): this reality is the Truths; and 4. the reality which is the sphere of knowledge purified of any hindrance to cognizable ob]ects(jneyavaranavisuddhajHdnagocara): this is tathata. (Compare Sutrdlamkdra,-xi. 3l).
45. This worldly knowledge is samvrtijftana, vii. 2. 21.
46. Paramartha: "The truths have been spoken of in summary. If one asks for a long presentation, one should see how it is spoken of in the Treatise of the Six Higher Knowledges (abhijHd) (liu shen shih lun /\J$Wlffl ) (TD 29, p. 269a3).
47. Paramartha: "One must tell by which cultivation of which means one enters into the Seeing of the Truths. Thus, beginning from the first step, one must tell of its progression. " (TD 29, p. 269a4). Hsiian-tsang: "One must tell by which cultivation of which means one arrives at darianamdrga (TD 29, p. 116b27).
48. a. Here bhdvand is the equivalent of samddhi or absorption (iv. l23c-d).
b. Vrtta or vrtti (vi. 8a) is almost synonymous to ? lla, as we can see in the Saundara- nanda, xiii. 10, xvi. 31; it is the perfect fila of the Bhiksu to be content with the clothing of a
monk, etc. (vi. 7c-d).
49. Udgrhndti, glossed by papthati.
50. Satyadariandnuloma - satyadarSanadhikdrika.
51. On the three patffids, Digha, iii. 219; Vibhanga, 324, Visuddhimagga, 439 (in the order: cintd, suta, bhdvand).
? 52. Vibhdsdy TD 27, p. 940c25. Vasubandhu does not admit this theory; this is why he says: "AccordingtotheVaibhasikas . . . "
53.
