This
suffices
for the Reply to the First Objection.
Summa Theologica
lxxxiii, qu.
61): "Prudence is the
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid. "
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
event of uncertainties. " Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to
the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself
to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge
of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to
the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2724]FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will
moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the
appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ([2725]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2).
Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in
so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes
on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps
from that which hinders us in tending to God. " Now love is said to
discern because it moves the reason to discern.
Reply to Objection 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so
far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be
done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which
prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to
the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is
counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two,
counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel. " But as
choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be
ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs
the choice by means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought
merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the
practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most
contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in
everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst
of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that
prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art
is, since, as stated above ([2726]FS, Q[57] , A[4]) it includes
application to action, which application is an act of the will.
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Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the
speculative reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov.
10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man. " Now wisdom consists chiefly in
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is
concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of
fuller knowledge. " Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the
same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical
but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
prudence also is both practical and speculative.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel. " Now counsel is about
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence
it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2727]Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom
considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of
the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that
genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common
end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well
for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so
he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said
to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom
about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about
the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is
not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that
"prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take
the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes
under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its
specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true,"
it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application
of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is
no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since
then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms,
propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and
fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to
have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a
thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above
([2728]AA[1],2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys.
i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Objection 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Objection 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence
is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing
to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions
are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to
know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about
which actions are concerned.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with
universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular
cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but
also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends
to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.
Reply to Objection 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars
cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are
uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and
the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence
does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible
objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and
experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle
subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application
it extends to this sense.
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Whether prudence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to
desire and what to avoid. " Now science is condivided with virtue, as
appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art
is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2
Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of
graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be
need of in the work. " Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
to thy prudence. " Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
I answer that, As stated above ([2729]FS, Q[55], A[3]; [2730]FS, Q[56],
A[1]) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that
which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise. " Now good
may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under
the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any
habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the
rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue
since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing
which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On
the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the
appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the
good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they
consider that which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite.
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it,
among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense
for any kind of right reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of
art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore
in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to
do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular
end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of
comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art.
Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means
for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in
the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that
prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed
on other things according to prudence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows
a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man
decides. " Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of
prudence, right action as regards the means. " Now in every virtue
certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence
is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But
prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
prudence is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude. "
I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above ([2731]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2732]FS, Q[18], A[2];
[2733]FS, Q[54], A[2] ), any habit that has a corresponding special
object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and
if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is
called special, not merely according to the consideration of its
matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above
([2734]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the
subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different
powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater
difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a
difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power,
as stated above ([2735]FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any difference in
the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a
fortiori" require a difference of habits.
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated
above [2736](A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and
"prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with
"things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such
as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
"things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer
himself, as stated above ([2737]FS, Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand
prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal
aspect distinctive of powers, i. e. the intellective power, wherein is
prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it
is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general,
but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
intellectual virtue, viz. , prudence, which has the same matter in
common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue
is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of
virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species of
that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in
so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the
object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the
appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as
reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive
power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.
Objection 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason,
but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other
parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
applied to action," as stated above [2738](A[2]). Therefore all actions
are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
end to all moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means. " Therefore it does not
belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
regulate the means.
I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity
pre-exist in the reason.
Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which
is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues,
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in
speculative matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; [2739]FS,
Q[13], A[3]); while certain things are in the practical reason by way
of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends
themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles
to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it
does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but
only to regulate the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis"
appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ([2740]FP, Q[79],
A[12]): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though
they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which
prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows
that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them:
yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of
principles moves science.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find
the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end
of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral
virtues, as shown above [2741](A[6]). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.
Objection 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to
have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said
to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean
in moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But
moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason. " Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5],
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . .
even as a wise man decides. "
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude,
that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear
or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act
according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong
to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations,
and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command is the chief act of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De
Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes. "
Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel. " Now "to take counsel" and "to command"
seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above
([2742]FS, Q[57], A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason.
Therefore command is not an act of prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence
commands. "
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated
above [2743](A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are
three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to
discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ([2744]FS,
Q[14], A[1]). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered,"
and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason,
which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to
command," which act consists in applying to action the things
counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end
of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the
practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more
imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief
act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of
good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act
of prudence that does not continue in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good
things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs
to prudence which takes good counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command
denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act
of the reason, as stated above ([2745]FS, Q[17], A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that
"a solicitous man is a restless man. " Now motion belongs chiefly to the
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not
in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above
[2746](A[1]). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to
solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to
Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not
solicitous, because they are found. " Now the certainty of truth belongs
to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude
is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the
"magnanimous man is slow and leisurely. " Now slowness is contrary to
solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for
"good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it
would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and
watch in prayers. " But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.
Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.
I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far
as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do
whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act
is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in
matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking
counsel. " Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and
for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence
keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived
unawares by evil counsel. "
Reply to Objection 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to
the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction
and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3),
"equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
according to its proper mode. " And since the matter of prudence is the
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and
leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he
is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters
where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them:
for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since
fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ([2747]FS, Q[44], A[2])
when we were treating of the passion of fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good
is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is
not directed to the common good.
Objection 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good
for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their
own. Therefore they are not prudent.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to
a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
appointed over his family? "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the
Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is
profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved. " Moreover it
is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better
than the good of the individual.
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident
that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but
also the common good of the multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral
virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common
good is called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich
empire than rich in a poor empire. " Secondly, because, since man is a
part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him
by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition
of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its
whole, is offensive. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to
the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since
these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that which
extends to the common good?
Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same. "
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue
is the same in a good man and in a good ruler. " Now political prudence
is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since
then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and
political prudence are the same habit.
Objection 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence
by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular
good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy"
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are
all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different
kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.
I answer that, As stated above [2748](A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS,
Prolog. ; [2749]FS, Q[102], A[1]), wherefore the species of habits
differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good,
the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher means, not that political
prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but
that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common
good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of
prudence, i. e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is
called "political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler.
Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically,
even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same
authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate
to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance,
habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ
specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In
like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the
good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the
habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is
directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
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Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in
their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence
alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common
to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue
but a true opinion. "
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel. " But prudence makes a man take good counsel
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.
Objection 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above
[2750](A[8]). But command is not in the competency of slaves or
subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but
only in rulers.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs
to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is
about "individual actions. " Now it belongs also to subjects to perform
these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but
also in subjects.
I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave,
nor of a subject as subject.
Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in
the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft. "
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so
far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but
he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but
also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower
powers.
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Whether prudence can be in sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent
[Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light. " Now
the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in
sinners.
Objection 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence.
But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence
also.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of
good counsel is the work of prudent man especially. " Now many sinners
can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good. " Now no inner is a
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.
I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an
evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end,
is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good
robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of
similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This
is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): "The prudence
[Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places
its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when
a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship,
he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly,
because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes
counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning
life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while
imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since
that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is
only in the wicked.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of
the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent
absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation. "
Reply to Objection 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity
with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On
the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First
because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such
ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,
which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there
is no prudence, as shown above ([2751]FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly
because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless
the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object
is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is
more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or
for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel
for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel
into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good
only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
there is "cleverness," [*{deinotike}] i. e. natural diligence which may
be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which
is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false
prudence" or "prudence of the flesh. "
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Whether prudence is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not
all who have grace have prudence.
Objection 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as
stated above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do
not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young
people are not obviously prudent.
knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid. "
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
event of uncertainties. " Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to
the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs
directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by
the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself
to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge
of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to
the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows
therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2724]FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will
moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the
appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ([2725]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2).
Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in
so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes
on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps
from that which hinders us in tending to God. " Now love is said to
discern because it moves the reason to discern.
Reply to Objection 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so
far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be
done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which
prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to
the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is
counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two,
counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel. " But as
choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be
ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs
the choice by means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought
merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the
practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most
contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in
everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst
of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that
prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art
is, since, as stated above ([2726]FS, Q[57] , A[4]) it includes
application to action, which application is an act of the will.
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Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the
speculative reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov.
10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man. " Now wisdom consists chiefly in
contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is
concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of
fuller knowledge. " Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the
same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical
but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
prudence also is both practical and speculative.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent
man is one who is capable of taking good counsel. " Now counsel is about
things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that
deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence
it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2727]Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom
considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of
the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that
genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common
end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well
for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so
he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said
to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom
about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about
the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is
not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that
"prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take
the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes
under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its
specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true,"
it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application
of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is
no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since
then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms,
propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and
fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to
have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a
thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.
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Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above
([2728]AA[1],2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys.
i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Objection 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Objection 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence
is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not
only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing
to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions
are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to
know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about
which actions are concerned.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with
universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular
cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but
also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends
to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.
Reply to Objection 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars
cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are
uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and
the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence
does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible
objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and
experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle
subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application
it extends to this sense.
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Whether prudence is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to
desire and what to avoid. " Now science is condivided with virtue, as
appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art
is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2
Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of
graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be
need of in the work. " Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
to thy prudence. " Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
I answer that, As stated above ([2729]FS, Q[55], A[3]; [2730]FS, Q[56],
A[1]) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that
which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise. " Now good
may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under
the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any
habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the
rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue
since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing
which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On
the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the
appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the
good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they
consider that which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply
right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite.
Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other
intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it,
among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense
for any kind of right reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of
art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore
in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to
do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular
end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of
comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art.
Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means
for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in
the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that
prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed
on other things according to prudence.
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Whether prudence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows
a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man
decides. " Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of
prudence, right action as regards the means. " Now in every virtue
certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence
is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But
prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to
action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
prudence is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude. "
I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above ([2731]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2732]FS, Q[18], A[2];
[2733]FS, Q[54], A[2] ), any habit that has a corresponding special
object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and
if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is
called special, not merely according to the consideration of its
matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above
([2734]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the
subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different
powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater
difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a
difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power,
as stated above ([2735]FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any difference in
the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a
fortiori" require a difference of habits.
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated
above [2736](A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and
"understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and
"prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with
"things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such
as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
"things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer
himself, as stated above ([2737]FS, Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand
prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal
aspect distinctive of powers, i. e. the intellective power, wherein is
prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it
is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general,
but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
intellectual virtue, viz. , prudence, which has the same matter in
common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue
is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of
virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species of
that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in
so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the
object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
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Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the
appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as
reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive
power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.
Objection 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason,
but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other
parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
applied to action," as stated above [2738](A[2]). Therefore all actions
are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
end to all moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means. " Therefore it does not
belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
regulate the means.
I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of
the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity
pre-exist in the reason.
Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of
which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which
is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as
naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues,
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in
speculative matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; [2739]FS,
Q[13], A[3]); while certain things are in the practical reason by way
of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends
themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles
to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it
does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but
only to regulate the means.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis"
appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ([2740]FP, Q[79],
A[12]): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though
they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which
prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows
that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them:
yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of
principles moves science.
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Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find
the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end
of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral
virtues, as shown above [2741](A[6]). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.
Objection 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to
have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said
to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean
in moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But
moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason. " Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5],
OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . .
even as a wise man decides. "
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should
not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude,
that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear
or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural
reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act
according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong
to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations,
and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
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Whether command is the chief act of prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De
Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes. "
Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel. " Now "to take counsel" and "to command"
seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above
([2742]FS, Q[57], A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason.
Therefore command is not an act of prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence
commands. "
I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated
above [2743](A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are
three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to
discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ([2744]FS,
Q[14], A[1]). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered,"
and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason,
which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to
command," which act consists in applying to action the things
counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end
of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the
practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in
judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more
imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief
act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of
good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act
of prudence that does not continue in heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good
things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs
to prudence which takes good counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command
denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act
of the reason, as stated above ([2745]FS, Q[17], A[1]).
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Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that
"a solicitous man is a restless man. " Now motion belongs chiefly to the
appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not
in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above
[2746](A[1]). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to
solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to
Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not
solicitous, because they are found. " Now the certainty of truth belongs
to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude
is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the
"magnanimous man is slow and leisurely. " Now slowness is contrary to
solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for
"good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it
would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and
watch in prayers. " But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.
Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.
I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far
as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do
whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act
is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in
matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking
counsel. " Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and
for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence
keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived
unawares by evil counsel. "
Reply to Objection 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to
the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction
and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3),
"equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
according to its proper mode. " And since the matter of prudence is the
contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of
prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and
leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he
is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters
where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them:
for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since
fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ([2747]FS, Q[44], A[2])
when we were treating of the passion of fear.
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Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good
is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is
not directed to the common good.
Objection 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good
for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their
own. Therefore they are not prudent.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to
a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a
faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
appointed over his family? "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have
held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the
good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not
bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to
charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the
Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking that which is
profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved. " Moreover it
is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better
than the good of the individual.
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident
that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but
also the common good of the multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral
virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common
good is called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor.
iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich
empire than rich in a poor empire. " Secondly, because, since man is a
part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him
by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition
of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its
whole, is offensive. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to
the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since
these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
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Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that which
extends to the common good?
Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence
are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same. "
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue
is the same in a good man and in a good ruler. " Now political prudence
is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since
then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and
political prudence are the same habit.
Objection 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence
by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular
good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common
good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate
to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy"
which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are
all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different
kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.
I answer that, As stated above [2748](A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS,
Prolog. ; [2749]FS, Q[102], A[1]), wherefore the species of habits
differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good,
the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher means, not that political
prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but
that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common
good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of
prudence, i. e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is
called "political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler.
Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically,
even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same
authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate
to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance,
habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ
specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In
like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the
good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the
habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is
directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
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Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in
their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence
alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common
to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue
but a true opinion. "
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel. " But prudence makes a man take good counsel
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.
Objection 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above
[2750](A[8]). But command is not in the competency of slaves or
subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but
only in rulers.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two
kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs
to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is
about "individual actions. " Now it belongs also to subjects to perform
these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but
also in subjects.
I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave
as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled
and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave,
nor of a subject as subject.
Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in
the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft. "
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so
far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but
he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but
also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower
powers.
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Whether prudence can be in sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent
[Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light. " Now
the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in
sinners.
Objection 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence.
But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence
also.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of
good counsel is the work of prudent man especially. " Now many sinners
can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is
impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good. " Now no inner is a
good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.
I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which
takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent
man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a
good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an
evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end,
is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good
robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of
similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This
is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): "The prudence
[Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places
its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting
ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold
source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the
common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when
a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship,
he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly,
because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes
counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning
life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while
imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since
that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is
only in the wicked.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of
the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent
absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation. "
Reply to Objection 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity
with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On
the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First
because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such
ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,
which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there
is no prudence, as shown above ([2751]FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly
because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless
the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object
is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is
more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or
for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel
for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel
into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good
only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
there is "cleverness," [*{deinotike}] i. e. natural diligence which may
be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which
is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false
prudence" or "prudence of the flesh. "
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Whether prudence is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be
done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not
all who have grace have prudence.
Objection 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as
stated above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do
not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young
people are not obviously prudent.
