America and Britain rendered invaluable aid to the
Soviet Union; but its efficient handling of that aid, its
4
?
Soviet Union; but its efficient handling of that aid, its
4
?
Soviet Union - 1952 - Soviet Civilization
And we may also be sure that it is
just as important to know the truth now as it was then.
What I am trying to establish here is not that I am
always right about the Soviet Union -- for I have made
my share of mistakes regarding Soviet affairs -- but that
I have made an earnest effort to be objective and that
events have proved me correct on a number of important
points. However, as the climate of opinion changes
towards Soviet Russia, so, too, does the general attitude
towards writers on this subject. Today many Americans
will call you a Soviet apologist if you find any good at all
in the U. S. S. R. and will become quite annoyed if you
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? PREFACE
remind them of indisputable facts such as the Red Army's
victory over the Nazis at Stalingrad. So it is that Mr.
Sokolsky and his confreres are firing away at me once
more as an apologist for everything Soviet.
In the spring of 1951 I made plans to visit Western
Europe and the Soviet Union during the summer, and
actually engaged passage on the S. S. Queen Mary. Then
week after week I waited for the Passport Division of the
United States Department of State to grant an extension
of my passport. The Passport Division finally turned
down my application on the vague grounds that my
"travel abroad at this time would be contrary to the best
interests of the United States. "4 However, my extended
correspondence with the passport authorities made clear
that they were discriminating against me for political
reasons and especially because I had publicly expressed
disagreement with American foreign policy. * In October,
1951, I appealed in an Open Letter to President Truman
to intervene on my behalf. As a consequence the Passport
Division reconsidered my case, but again denied my ap-
plication.
I had hoped during my intended trip to Soviet Russia
to make a first-hand appraisal of current conditions.
While there was no guarantee that the Soviet Govern-
ment would have let me have a visa -- though my chances
were good -- it was in the first instance the arbitrary
action of the U. S. State Department, violating my ordi-
nary privileges as an American citizen, that prevented
the fulfilment of my traveling plans. Faced with the alter-
natives of waiting indefinitely, perhaps several years, for
the re-establishment of my right to go to Europe or of
finishing this book with the abundant factual materials at
? Cf. p. 402.
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? PREFACE
hand, I decided on the latter course. Both in my own case
and in many other recent cases the State Department
must take the responsibility for seriously obstructing
knowledge of foreign affairs by preventing American
writers and teachers from making on-the-spot investiga-
tions into conditions in Soviet Russia and other countries.
While this volume deals with a variety of fundamental
questions concerning the Soviet Union, it does not pre-
sume to attempt the hazardous undertaking of giving an
all-inclusive picture of the U. S. S. R. I have concentrated
on those features of Soviet civilization which have parti-
cularly interested me and to which I have devoted special
study. Much of the material here has appeared previously
in preliminary form in articles or pamphlets. In Chapter
III on "Soviet Ethnic Democracy" I have drawn to some
extent upon an earlier work of mine, The Peoples of the
Soviet Union.
For assistance in the preparation and writing of this
book I wish to thank especially Mr. Bernard L. Koten,
of the Library for Intercultural Studies, who made a care-
ful check of the factual material throughout and cheer-
fully provided the answers to my innumerable questions.
He has no responsibility, however, for the many judg-
ments of interpretation I have made. I am also greatly
indebted to countless other individuals who have helped
me with this volume, but shall not try to list their names.
It has been difficult for me to bring this work to an
end. New facts about the Soviet Union and American-
Soviet relations keep pouring in; and the international
situation changes from day to day. Moreover, I realize
that in attempting to compress into one volume a sum-
mary and an analysis of these very large subjects I have
not done complete justice to the problems involved and
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? PREFACE
. v t>>-" ? '-? >'
have had to omit many details that would throw further
light upon them. Yet I cannot go on indefinitely and
must at last put aside the temptation to include further
material and to keep this book abreast of the current
news.
C. L.
New York City
August 25, 1952
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? CONTENTS
Pace
Part I. Soviet Domestic Policy and Achievements 1
Chapter I. On Evaluating Soviet Russia 3
1. Introductory 3
2. Much Reliable Information Is Available 6
3. Some Standards of Judgment 24
Chapter II. The Soviet Constitution 50
1. Background of the Constitution 50
2. The Structure of Soviet Society and State 52
3. The New Rights of Man 73
Chapter III. Soviet Ethnic Democracy 90
1. Soviet National and Racial Minorities 90
2. The Soviet Minorities Policy 102
3. Summary and Evaluation 112
Chapter IV. Soviet Russia and Religion 121
1. The Tsarist Background 121
2. Soviet Theory in regard to Religion 125
3. Soviet Practice in regard to Religion 137
Chapter V. Soviet Economic and Cultural
Progress 156
1. What the Second World War Showed 156
2. The Role of Socialist Planning 165
3. Achievements of the Five-Year Plans 182
-4. Post-War Economic Gains 192
5. Cultural Advances 209
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? CONTENTS
Page
Chapter VI. Contrasts between Soviet Socialism
and Fascism 227
1. Ten Fundamental Differences 227
2. Attitudes towards Democracy 229
3. The Other Contrasts 237
Part II. American-Soviet Relations 249
Chapter VII. The Historical Background 251
1. From the American Revolution to the
Russian 251
2. From November, 1917, through World
War II 255
3. American Names on Soviet Maps 273
Chapter VIII. Soviet Foreign Policy 282
1. The Basic Principles 282
2. Does Soviet Russia Wage Aggression? 306
3. Incitements to War against the U. S. S. R. 336
Chapter IX. Co-Existence or Co-Destruction? 355
1. The Madness of a Third World War 355
2. Effects of American Foreign Policy 363
3. Recent Soviet Efforts towards World Peace 387
Chapter X. Final Reflections 412
Notes 417
Index 425
CHARTS
Government Structure of the U. S. S. R. 64
Government Structure of a Union Republic 65
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? PART I
SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICY AND
ACHIEVEMENTS
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? CHAPTER I ON EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
1. Introductory
In March of 1951 the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics was one-third of a century old. In the never-
ending debate that has gone on about Soviet Russia for
more than three decades, the unbending enemies of the
U. S. S. R. , the uncritical sympathizers, and those who like
myself stand somewhere in the middle all agree on at
least one point: that the subject of discussion is of por-
tentous significance for the present and future of all
men, all nations, all peoples. It may well be, as stated by
Father Edmund A. Walsh, an anti-Soviet writer of long
standing, that the establishment of the Soviet Republic
was the most important political event since the fall of
the Roman Empire. Great revolutions and sweeping
changes in any major country have invariably resulted
in widespread, heated controversy in other lands. And
they have aroused such hostility abroad that usually seri-
ous attempts have been made on the part of foreign gov-
ernments to undermine or overthrow the revolutionary
forces and reverse the course of history. It was so at the
time of the American Revolution of 1776 and the French
Revolution of 1789. We need not be surprised that the
Russian Revolution of 1917 has given rise to similar
reactions.
In the case of the Russian Revolution, however, the
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? SOVIET CIYILIZATIOH
reactions have been even more violent and far-reaching.
This has been due to the fact that the program of the
Soviets was itself more far-reaching than that associated
with any other political overturn in history. The Soviet
aim was not merely a redistribution of property in the
interests of this class or that, but the total abolition of
private property in the main means of production and
distribution, and the establishment on that basis of a
planned socialist economy and a classless society.
The possibility of the creation of a socialist society in
a huge and populous country, nearly three times the size
of continental United States and containing a vast wealth
of natural resources, aroused ardent hopes and fanatical
fears from one end of the earth to the other. These hopes
and fears were augmented by the fact that Lenin and his
fellow-Communists held world socialism as their ultimate
ideal; that the Soviet Union, stretching over large por-
tions of both Europe and Asia, was admirably located
for extending its international influence; and that radi-
cal working class movements of one sort or another were
already well under way in a number of nations besides
the U. S. S. R. There can be no doubt that whereas the
American and French Revolutions almost exclusively
affected the Western World, the Russian Revolution has
had just as profound an impact upon the East as upon
the West.
Year after year the argument about Soviet Russia con-
tinued, some claiming that the first socialist state in
history was a disastrous failure, others that it was an
overwhelming success. Then came the Second World
War and the Nazi invasion of the U. S. S. R. in 1941.
America and Britain rendered invaluable aid to the
Soviet Union; but its efficient handling of that aid, its
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? OH EVALUATIHG SOVIET RUSSIA
intrepid resistance to Hitler's attack and its eventual
counter-offensive all the way to Berlin were convincing
proof that here was a nation of remarkable strength,
capacity and morale. The Soviet Republic's defeat of the
Nazis and its contribution to the over-all victory of the
United Nations mightily increased its influence and
power in the world.
Along its western frontier the border states of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania became firm
allies of the Soviet Union and have gone far in develop-
ing socialist systems of their own. In the Far East the
Chinese Communists ousted the Nationalist regime of
Chiang Kai-shek, instituted a People's Republic friendly
to the U. S. S. R. and started China along the path to
socialism. In international affairs, with the defeat and
decline of Germany and Japan, the role of Soviet Russia
has greatly increased. Today as the socialist giant of the
world it stands on a par with the capitalist giant, America,
in power and prestige. Upon the relations between the
Soviet Union, leader of the Communist bloc, and the
United States, leader of the anti-Communist bloc, pri-
marily depend whether we shall see an enduring peace
under the aegis of the United Nations or a new global
war even more devastating than the last.
Because, then, of the acknowledged world importance
of Soviet Russia today, a sound understanding of both
its domestic and foreign policies, is a necessity for all
informed and educated persons in this era. There is an
enormous diversity of opinion concerning what is going
on in the Soviet Union and what its intentions are in the
sphere of international relations. Unfortunately igno-
rance and prejudice play an unusually large part in atti-
tudes toward the U. S. S. R. Yet regarding no subject that
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
confronts the minds of men is objectivity more essential.
To be misinformed about the Soviet Union, to mis-
judge its purposes and achievements, can lead foreign
states and peoples to make crucial mistakes in national
policies. Americans in particular, because relations be-
tween the U. S. Government and that of Soviet Russia
have deteriorated to the danger point since the end of
the Second World War, have a responsibility to acquaint
themselves with the facts about the U. S. S. R. Since
American foreign policy so seriously affects the entire
future of the United States and the world, and since at
present that foreign policy is so largely determined by
what Americans think of Russia, it is imperative for us
to seek out the truth about the Soviet Union.
2. Much Reliable Information Is Available
Despite all reports to the contrary, during the thirty-
five years since the Soviet Republic came into existence
there has been ample opportunity for Americans to learn
about what is going on in the U. S. S. R. and to obtain
reliable information about that country and its people.
True enough, there have been difficulties in the way of
getting all the data we should like about the Soviet Union
-- difficulties caused by both the American and Soviet
Governments. Yet on the whole and over the years a
veritable flood of facts has come through from Soviet
Russia on the basis of which foreigners have been able to
make valid judgments concerning the Soviet experiment
in economic, political and social organization. These
facts have appeared in innumerable newspaper dis-
patches, magazine articles and books published in English
in the United States.
While a knowledge of the Russian language is, of
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? OH EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
course, a valuable asset for the understanding of Soviet
affairs, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient foundation
for such understanding. The White Russian Emigres
and exiles who were born and brought up in Tsarist
Russia, and who speak the language perfectly, are hardly
to be counted on as impartial observers of the Soviet
scene. There are plenty of Britishers who speak English
with the best Oxford accent whom we should not trust
to give an objective account of political and economic
affairs under a Labor Government. More important
than a knowledge of Russian for the understanding of
the Soviet Union is a basic comprehension of social and
economic problems in the contemporary world, an earn-
est attempt to be objective, and a discriminating choice
of authorities on the U. S. S. R.
Whether we are making a study of Russia or England,
Germany or France or ancient Greece, the principle is
the same. In the nature of the case a large part of the
knowledge of every informed man must be vicarious; he
cannot possibly acquire at first-hand all the facts he
needs for comprehending the past and for functioning
properly in our complex society of the present. In the
realm of international relations the twentieth-century
American would be utterly lost if, in lieu of his own
first-hand observation, he could not depend to a consider-
able degree on vicarious knowledge stemming from the
reports and opinions of others whom he has learned from
tested experience to consider dependable.
In any case sufficient material of an authentic nature
about the Soviet Union has been translated into English
or written in English to enable the average literate person
in America and other English-speaking nations to keep
informed about Soviet life. To assert, in the phrase orig-
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
inally coined by Joseph Goebbels and later popularized
by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, that the Russians
have erected an "Iron Curtain" to rule out the exchange
of information with the outside world is extremely mis-
leading. Again and again I have read editorials in
American newspapers lambasting the alleged Iron Cur-
tain, while on a different page in the same edition there
is a detailed story on one aspect or another of Soviet
affairs by some American correspondent in Moscow. And
those who spread the Iron Curtain myth most freely at
the same time dispense all kinds of supposed information
about the Soviet Union, such as that from 15 to 20
million people live in slave labor camps there or that
the Red Army is about to march westward through
Europe to the English Channel. So we see clearly that the
Iron Curtain is an anti-Soviet propaganda slogan, turned
on or off as the situation may require.
It was Mr. Churchill, again, who referred to Soviet
policy as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enig-
ma," a quotation printed repeatedly throughout the non-
Soviet world and called upon whenever some commen-
tator is too ignorant to understand the Soviets or too
indolent to try. While Soviet policy is sometimes difficult
to comprehend, I deny that it constitutes a riddle or that
life as a whole in Soviet Russia must remain a mystery
to foreigners. In this modern age knowledge is the ac-
cepted method of dissolving mysteries. Portraying the
U. S. S. R. as a mystery is, like the Iron Curtain stereo-
type, a substitute for real thinking and an excuse for
laziness in seeking out the facts.
On the same level is the claim that the Russians, and
especially Joseph Stalin, are inscrutable Orientals whose
devious ways it is impossible for Westerners to fathom.
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? ON EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
To consider Russia and the Russians as a mystery, a
riddle or an Oriental enigma gives the anti-Soviet forces
free reign to describe the Soviet Union as they choose
and to make the most exaggerated charges against it. For
if the truth about the U. S. S. R. is really impossible to
obtain, then one statement about that country is as good
as another and the wildest surmises are permissible.
The shallowness and partisanship of those who prop-
agate on every possible occasion Mr. Churchill's quarter-
truth is revealed in their failure to give the context of
the quotation in his speech of October 1, 1939, comment-
ing on the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland after
Hitler's decisive defeat of the Polish army. The Soviet
occupation, said Churchill, is "the assertion of the power
of Russia. Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest.
We could have wished that the Russian armies should
be standing on their present line as the friends and allies
of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian
armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for
the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. . . .
"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is
a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but per-
haps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.
It cannot be in accordance with the interest or the safety
of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the
shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the
Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south-
eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic
life-interests of Russia. "1
So Churchill himself significantly qualified the half-
sentence which is usually quoted all by itself from his
speech. He did not regard the Soviet march into Eastern
Poland as a riddle in the slightest; to him it was a measure
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
of justifiable self-protection against Hitler. And although
Churchill did not claim prophetic powers for the future,
he strongly suggested an interpretation of Soviet policy
that took it entirely out of the category of mystery.
Soviet "national interest," evaluated always in socialist
terms and with especial reference to self-defense, is indeed
the foundation-stone of Soviet foreign policy, even
though other factors also play a role. Churchill's realistic
analysis in essence contradicts his briefer, more quotable
rhetoric.
Leaving now the question of Winston Churchill's
prose and its misuse to confuse the international situa-
tion, I wish to state that on both the American and
Soviet sides there have all along existed serious barriers
to the exchange of news and cultural materials. I deplore
the present censorship of foreign newspaper correspond-
ents by the Soviet Government and hope that it will be
removed as time goes on. I also deplore the fact that the
Soviet authorities, evidently responding to the fears and
suspicions engendered by the cold war, have extended
the usage of terms like spy and espionage so broadly as to
hamper legitimate reporting and scholarly inquiry.
The cold war has also been responsible, I believe,
for a growing lack of interest on the part of Soviet author-
ities over the past few years in an exchange of students,
teachers, scientists and artists with the United States. A
number of American universities during this period ex-
tended invitations to Soviet scholars to lecture or teach,
but none of them were accepted and in several cases no
acknowledgment was made. American efforts to have the
Red Army Chorus and a Soviet ballet company perform
in the United States came to nothing. At the same time
the Soviet Government, always hesitant to allow within
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? OH EVALUATIHG SOVIET RUSSIA
its borders foreigners who have expressed hostility to-
wards the new regime, has made it increasingly difficult
for Americans to obtain visas for travel in the U. S. S. R.
On the other hand, the United States Government
and Congress, in thrall to a blinding anti-Soviet psychosis,
have created their own special barriers to cultural
interchange. During the past few years the U. S. De-
partment of State has repeatedly denied passports to
Americans who dissent from government policies. Also
it is not generally realized that Congress passed a law as
far back as 1918 which forbids the entry of known Com-
munists into America from the U. S. S. R. or elsewhere,
except in cases where the State Department is willing to
make a special ruling granting alien applicants a visa.
A good example of how this law works is to be seen
in the handicaps and hindrances that the American
Government placed in the way of the Soviet and other
foreign delegates wishing to attend the Cultural and
Scientific Conference for World Peace held in New York
City during March, 1949. A number of foreign delegates
planning to come to the Conference had their American
visas canceled at the last minute. The noted Soviet com-
poser, Dmitri Shostakovich, and other delegates from the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were
scheduled to make a country-wide tour on behalf of Amer-
ican-Soviet understanding and world peace at the close
of the Conference. This tour the U. S. State Department
made impossible by limiting the visas of the delegates to
the New York affair alone and insisting that they return
home without further appearances in America.
Since September, 1950, when Congress passed, over
President Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act
(McCarran Bill), the situation regarding the admission
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
of foreigners, even temporarily, into the United States
has become much worse. This Act excludes from the
United States all persons who are or ever were members
of a Communist or fascist party anywhere, or who ever
belonged to an organization "affiliated" with such a party
or who ever advocated "the economic, international and
governmental doctrines of world communism. " These
inclusive and vague provisions effectively bar out not
only all Communists and ex-Communists from whatever
land, but all citizens of the Soviet Union (except diplo-
mats and other government representatives), as well as
many individuals from non-Communist countries whose
only crime has been to dissent openly from prevailing
orthodoxies or to join an organization whose aim was
world peace.
In a letter printed in The New York Times on Sep-
tember 23, 1951, Dr. Paul Doty, Associate Professor of
Chemistry at Harvard University, described the baneful
effects of the Internal Security Act on the fall meetings
in New York City of the International Congress of Pure
and Applied Chemistry, the International Union of
Chemistry and the American Chemical Society. Wrote
Professor Doty: "The unexpected absence of a consider-
able number of well-known members of the scientific
community cast a shadow over the proceedings. A num-
ber of scheduled papers could not be presented and often
in discussion the expert in a given field was not there
to comment. Those absent were for the most part scien-
tists who had previously visited this country but who on
this occasion were denied visas due to the sweeping and
indiscriminate regulations of the McCarran Act. "2
If the McCarran Act can so cripple conferences in
one of the less controversial natural sciences, one can
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? OH EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
easily see how much more seriously it affects meetings
on economics, political science or race relations. In fact,
strict enforcement of the Act means that no Soviet expert
in any subject can now come to America and present his
viewpoint to his fellow-scientists. I agree fully with what
President Truman said in his letter of July 7, 1951, to
Nikolai M. Shvernik, Chairman of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Supreme Soviet: "We shall never be able
to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war
until communication is permitted to flow, free and open,
across international boundaries. "3 But certainly the
United States, as well as Soviet Russia, is constantly
violating this ideal.
In other words, there are curtains of considerable
thickness originating on both sides. And from 1917 on
a majority of the American people have had a formi-
dable mental block against possible light from the direc-
tion of the Soviet Union. "Never have so many known
so little about so much" was the telling way one observer
a few years ago summed up American understanding of
Soviet Russia.
Illustrative of the American attitude is an incident
related by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a speech
about foreign policy in 1944. He told how in 1933 a cer-
tain lady, presumably Mrs.
just as important to know the truth now as it was then.
What I am trying to establish here is not that I am
always right about the Soviet Union -- for I have made
my share of mistakes regarding Soviet affairs -- but that
I have made an earnest effort to be objective and that
events have proved me correct on a number of important
points. However, as the climate of opinion changes
towards Soviet Russia, so, too, does the general attitude
towards writers on this subject. Today many Americans
will call you a Soviet apologist if you find any good at all
in the U. S. S. R. and will become quite annoyed if you
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? PREFACE
remind them of indisputable facts such as the Red Army's
victory over the Nazis at Stalingrad. So it is that Mr.
Sokolsky and his confreres are firing away at me once
more as an apologist for everything Soviet.
In the spring of 1951 I made plans to visit Western
Europe and the Soviet Union during the summer, and
actually engaged passage on the S. S. Queen Mary. Then
week after week I waited for the Passport Division of the
United States Department of State to grant an extension
of my passport. The Passport Division finally turned
down my application on the vague grounds that my
"travel abroad at this time would be contrary to the best
interests of the United States. "4 However, my extended
correspondence with the passport authorities made clear
that they were discriminating against me for political
reasons and especially because I had publicly expressed
disagreement with American foreign policy. * In October,
1951, I appealed in an Open Letter to President Truman
to intervene on my behalf. As a consequence the Passport
Division reconsidered my case, but again denied my ap-
plication.
I had hoped during my intended trip to Soviet Russia
to make a first-hand appraisal of current conditions.
While there was no guarantee that the Soviet Govern-
ment would have let me have a visa -- though my chances
were good -- it was in the first instance the arbitrary
action of the U. S. State Department, violating my ordi-
nary privileges as an American citizen, that prevented
the fulfilment of my traveling plans. Faced with the alter-
natives of waiting indefinitely, perhaps several years, for
the re-establishment of my right to go to Europe or of
finishing this book with the abundant factual materials at
? Cf. p. 402.
xiv
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? PREFACE
hand, I decided on the latter course. Both in my own case
and in many other recent cases the State Department
must take the responsibility for seriously obstructing
knowledge of foreign affairs by preventing American
writers and teachers from making on-the-spot investiga-
tions into conditions in Soviet Russia and other countries.
While this volume deals with a variety of fundamental
questions concerning the Soviet Union, it does not pre-
sume to attempt the hazardous undertaking of giving an
all-inclusive picture of the U. S. S. R. I have concentrated
on those features of Soviet civilization which have parti-
cularly interested me and to which I have devoted special
study. Much of the material here has appeared previously
in preliminary form in articles or pamphlets. In Chapter
III on "Soviet Ethnic Democracy" I have drawn to some
extent upon an earlier work of mine, The Peoples of the
Soviet Union.
For assistance in the preparation and writing of this
book I wish to thank especially Mr. Bernard L. Koten,
of the Library for Intercultural Studies, who made a care-
ful check of the factual material throughout and cheer-
fully provided the answers to my innumerable questions.
He has no responsibility, however, for the many judg-
ments of interpretation I have made. I am also greatly
indebted to countless other individuals who have helped
me with this volume, but shall not try to list their names.
It has been difficult for me to bring this work to an
end. New facts about the Soviet Union and American-
Soviet relations keep pouring in; and the international
situation changes from day to day. Moreover, I realize
that in attempting to compress into one volume a sum-
mary and an analysis of these very large subjects I have
not done complete justice to the problems involved and
xv
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? PREFACE
. v t>>-" ? '-? >'
have had to omit many details that would throw further
light upon them. Yet I cannot go on indefinitely and
must at last put aside the temptation to include further
material and to keep this book abreast of the current
news.
C. L.
New York City
August 25, 1952
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? CONTENTS
Pace
Part I. Soviet Domestic Policy and Achievements 1
Chapter I. On Evaluating Soviet Russia 3
1. Introductory 3
2. Much Reliable Information Is Available 6
3. Some Standards of Judgment 24
Chapter II. The Soviet Constitution 50
1. Background of the Constitution 50
2. The Structure of Soviet Society and State 52
3. The New Rights of Man 73
Chapter III. Soviet Ethnic Democracy 90
1. Soviet National and Racial Minorities 90
2. The Soviet Minorities Policy 102
3. Summary and Evaluation 112
Chapter IV. Soviet Russia and Religion 121
1. The Tsarist Background 121
2. Soviet Theory in regard to Religion 125
3. Soviet Practice in regard to Religion 137
Chapter V. Soviet Economic and Cultural
Progress 156
1. What the Second World War Showed 156
2. The Role of Socialist Planning 165
3. Achievements of the Five-Year Plans 182
-4. Post-War Economic Gains 192
5. Cultural Advances 209
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? CONTENTS
Page
Chapter VI. Contrasts between Soviet Socialism
and Fascism 227
1. Ten Fundamental Differences 227
2. Attitudes towards Democracy 229
3. The Other Contrasts 237
Part II. American-Soviet Relations 249
Chapter VII. The Historical Background 251
1. From the American Revolution to the
Russian 251
2. From November, 1917, through World
War II 255
3. American Names on Soviet Maps 273
Chapter VIII. Soviet Foreign Policy 282
1. The Basic Principles 282
2. Does Soviet Russia Wage Aggression? 306
3. Incitements to War against the U. S. S. R. 336
Chapter IX. Co-Existence or Co-Destruction? 355
1. The Madness of a Third World War 355
2. Effects of American Foreign Policy 363
3. Recent Soviet Efforts towards World Peace 387
Chapter X. Final Reflections 412
Notes 417
Index 425
CHARTS
Government Structure of the U. S. S. R. 64
Government Structure of a Union Republic 65
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? PART I
SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICY AND
ACHIEVEMENTS
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? CHAPTER I ON EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
1. Introductory
In March of 1951 the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics was one-third of a century old. In the never-
ending debate that has gone on about Soviet Russia for
more than three decades, the unbending enemies of the
U. S. S. R. , the uncritical sympathizers, and those who like
myself stand somewhere in the middle all agree on at
least one point: that the subject of discussion is of por-
tentous significance for the present and future of all
men, all nations, all peoples. It may well be, as stated by
Father Edmund A. Walsh, an anti-Soviet writer of long
standing, that the establishment of the Soviet Republic
was the most important political event since the fall of
the Roman Empire. Great revolutions and sweeping
changes in any major country have invariably resulted
in widespread, heated controversy in other lands. And
they have aroused such hostility abroad that usually seri-
ous attempts have been made on the part of foreign gov-
ernments to undermine or overthrow the revolutionary
forces and reverse the course of history. It was so at the
time of the American Revolution of 1776 and the French
Revolution of 1789. We need not be surprised that the
Russian Revolution of 1917 has given rise to similar
reactions.
In the case of the Russian Revolution, however, the
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? SOVIET CIYILIZATIOH
reactions have been even more violent and far-reaching.
This has been due to the fact that the program of the
Soviets was itself more far-reaching than that associated
with any other political overturn in history. The Soviet
aim was not merely a redistribution of property in the
interests of this class or that, but the total abolition of
private property in the main means of production and
distribution, and the establishment on that basis of a
planned socialist economy and a classless society.
The possibility of the creation of a socialist society in
a huge and populous country, nearly three times the size
of continental United States and containing a vast wealth
of natural resources, aroused ardent hopes and fanatical
fears from one end of the earth to the other. These hopes
and fears were augmented by the fact that Lenin and his
fellow-Communists held world socialism as their ultimate
ideal; that the Soviet Union, stretching over large por-
tions of both Europe and Asia, was admirably located
for extending its international influence; and that radi-
cal working class movements of one sort or another were
already well under way in a number of nations besides
the U. S. S. R. There can be no doubt that whereas the
American and French Revolutions almost exclusively
affected the Western World, the Russian Revolution has
had just as profound an impact upon the East as upon
the West.
Year after year the argument about Soviet Russia con-
tinued, some claiming that the first socialist state in
history was a disastrous failure, others that it was an
overwhelming success. Then came the Second World
War and the Nazi invasion of the U. S. S. R. in 1941.
America and Britain rendered invaluable aid to the
Soviet Union; but its efficient handling of that aid, its
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? OH EVALUATIHG SOVIET RUSSIA
intrepid resistance to Hitler's attack and its eventual
counter-offensive all the way to Berlin were convincing
proof that here was a nation of remarkable strength,
capacity and morale. The Soviet Republic's defeat of the
Nazis and its contribution to the over-all victory of the
United Nations mightily increased its influence and
power in the world.
Along its western frontier the border states of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania became firm
allies of the Soviet Union and have gone far in develop-
ing socialist systems of their own. In the Far East the
Chinese Communists ousted the Nationalist regime of
Chiang Kai-shek, instituted a People's Republic friendly
to the U. S. S. R. and started China along the path to
socialism. In international affairs, with the defeat and
decline of Germany and Japan, the role of Soviet Russia
has greatly increased. Today as the socialist giant of the
world it stands on a par with the capitalist giant, America,
in power and prestige. Upon the relations between the
Soviet Union, leader of the Communist bloc, and the
United States, leader of the anti-Communist bloc, pri-
marily depend whether we shall see an enduring peace
under the aegis of the United Nations or a new global
war even more devastating than the last.
Because, then, of the acknowledged world importance
of Soviet Russia today, a sound understanding of both
its domestic and foreign policies, is a necessity for all
informed and educated persons in this era. There is an
enormous diversity of opinion concerning what is going
on in the Soviet Union and what its intentions are in the
sphere of international relations. Unfortunately igno-
rance and prejudice play an unusually large part in atti-
tudes toward the U. S. S. R. Yet regarding no subject that
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
confronts the minds of men is objectivity more essential.
To be misinformed about the Soviet Union, to mis-
judge its purposes and achievements, can lead foreign
states and peoples to make crucial mistakes in national
policies. Americans in particular, because relations be-
tween the U. S. Government and that of Soviet Russia
have deteriorated to the danger point since the end of
the Second World War, have a responsibility to acquaint
themselves with the facts about the U. S. S. R. Since
American foreign policy so seriously affects the entire
future of the United States and the world, and since at
present that foreign policy is so largely determined by
what Americans think of Russia, it is imperative for us
to seek out the truth about the Soviet Union.
2. Much Reliable Information Is Available
Despite all reports to the contrary, during the thirty-
five years since the Soviet Republic came into existence
there has been ample opportunity for Americans to learn
about what is going on in the U. S. S. R. and to obtain
reliable information about that country and its people.
True enough, there have been difficulties in the way of
getting all the data we should like about the Soviet Union
-- difficulties caused by both the American and Soviet
Governments. Yet on the whole and over the years a
veritable flood of facts has come through from Soviet
Russia on the basis of which foreigners have been able to
make valid judgments concerning the Soviet experiment
in economic, political and social organization. These
facts have appeared in innumerable newspaper dis-
patches, magazine articles and books published in English
in the United States.
While a knowledge of the Russian language is, of
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? OH EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
course, a valuable asset for the understanding of Soviet
affairs, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient foundation
for such understanding. The White Russian Emigres
and exiles who were born and brought up in Tsarist
Russia, and who speak the language perfectly, are hardly
to be counted on as impartial observers of the Soviet
scene. There are plenty of Britishers who speak English
with the best Oxford accent whom we should not trust
to give an objective account of political and economic
affairs under a Labor Government. More important
than a knowledge of Russian for the understanding of
the Soviet Union is a basic comprehension of social and
economic problems in the contemporary world, an earn-
est attempt to be objective, and a discriminating choice
of authorities on the U. S. S. R.
Whether we are making a study of Russia or England,
Germany or France or ancient Greece, the principle is
the same. In the nature of the case a large part of the
knowledge of every informed man must be vicarious; he
cannot possibly acquire at first-hand all the facts he
needs for comprehending the past and for functioning
properly in our complex society of the present. In the
realm of international relations the twentieth-century
American would be utterly lost if, in lieu of his own
first-hand observation, he could not depend to a consider-
able degree on vicarious knowledge stemming from the
reports and opinions of others whom he has learned from
tested experience to consider dependable.
In any case sufficient material of an authentic nature
about the Soviet Union has been translated into English
or written in English to enable the average literate person
in America and other English-speaking nations to keep
informed about Soviet life. To assert, in the phrase orig-
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
inally coined by Joseph Goebbels and later popularized
by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, that the Russians
have erected an "Iron Curtain" to rule out the exchange
of information with the outside world is extremely mis-
leading. Again and again I have read editorials in
American newspapers lambasting the alleged Iron Cur-
tain, while on a different page in the same edition there
is a detailed story on one aspect or another of Soviet
affairs by some American correspondent in Moscow. And
those who spread the Iron Curtain myth most freely at
the same time dispense all kinds of supposed information
about the Soviet Union, such as that from 15 to 20
million people live in slave labor camps there or that
the Red Army is about to march westward through
Europe to the English Channel. So we see clearly that the
Iron Curtain is an anti-Soviet propaganda slogan, turned
on or off as the situation may require.
It was Mr. Churchill, again, who referred to Soviet
policy as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enig-
ma," a quotation printed repeatedly throughout the non-
Soviet world and called upon whenever some commen-
tator is too ignorant to understand the Soviets or too
indolent to try. While Soviet policy is sometimes difficult
to comprehend, I deny that it constitutes a riddle or that
life as a whole in Soviet Russia must remain a mystery
to foreigners. In this modern age knowledge is the ac-
cepted method of dissolving mysteries. Portraying the
U. S. S. R. as a mystery is, like the Iron Curtain stereo-
type, a substitute for real thinking and an excuse for
laziness in seeking out the facts.
On the same level is the claim that the Russians, and
especially Joseph Stalin, are inscrutable Orientals whose
devious ways it is impossible for Westerners to fathom.
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? ON EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
To consider Russia and the Russians as a mystery, a
riddle or an Oriental enigma gives the anti-Soviet forces
free reign to describe the Soviet Union as they choose
and to make the most exaggerated charges against it. For
if the truth about the U. S. S. R. is really impossible to
obtain, then one statement about that country is as good
as another and the wildest surmises are permissible.
The shallowness and partisanship of those who prop-
agate on every possible occasion Mr. Churchill's quarter-
truth is revealed in their failure to give the context of
the quotation in his speech of October 1, 1939, comment-
ing on the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland after
Hitler's decisive defeat of the Polish army. The Soviet
occupation, said Churchill, is "the assertion of the power
of Russia. Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest.
We could have wished that the Russian armies should
be standing on their present line as the friends and allies
of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian
armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for
the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. . . .
"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is
a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but per-
haps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.
It cannot be in accordance with the interest or the safety
of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the
shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the
Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south-
eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic
life-interests of Russia. "1
So Churchill himself significantly qualified the half-
sentence which is usually quoted all by itself from his
speech. He did not regard the Soviet march into Eastern
Poland as a riddle in the slightest; to him it was a measure
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
of justifiable self-protection against Hitler. And although
Churchill did not claim prophetic powers for the future,
he strongly suggested an interpretation of Soviet policy
that took it entirely out of the category of mystery.
Soviet "national interest," evaluated always in socialist
terms and with especial reference to self-defense, is indeed
the foundation-stone of Soviet foreign policy, even
though other factors also play a role. Churchill's realistic
analysis in essence contradicts his briefer, more quotable
rhetoric.
Leaving now the question of Winston Churchill's
prose and its misuse to confuse the international situa-
tion, I wish to state that on both the American and
Soviet sides there have all along existed serious barriers
to the exchange of news and cultural materials. I deplore
the present censorship of foreign newspaper correspond-
ents by the Soviet Government and hope that it will be
removed as time goes on. I also deplore the fact that the
Soviet authorities, evidently responding to the fears and
suspicions engendered by the cold war, have extended
the usage of terms like spy and espionage so broadly as to
hamper legitimate reporting and scholarly inquiry.
The cold war has also been responsible, I believe,
for a growing lack of interest on the part of Soviet author-
ities over the past few years in an exchange of students,
teachers, scientists and artists with the United States. A
number of American universities during this period ex-
tended invitations to Soviet scholars to lecture or teach,
but none of them were accepted and in several cases no
acknowledgment was made. American efforts to have the
Red Army Chorus and a Soviet ballet company perform
in the United States came to nothing. At the same time
the Soviet Government, always hesitant to allow within
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? OH EVALUATIHG SOVIET RUSSIA
its borders foreigners who have expressed hostility to-
wards the new regime, has made it increasingly difficult
for Americans to obtain visas for travel in the U. S. S. R.
On the other hand, the United States Government
and Congress, in thrall to a blinding anti-Soviet psychosis,
have created their own special barriers to cultural
interchange. During the past few years the U. S. De-
partment of State has repeatedly denied passports to
Americans who dissent from government policies. Also
it is not generally realized that Congress passed a law as
far back as 1918 which forbids the entry of known Com-
munists into America from the U. S. S. R. or elsewhere,
except in cases where the State Department is willing to
make a special ruling granting alien applicants a visa.
A good example of how this law works is to be seen
in the handicaps and hindrances that the American
Government placed in the way of the Soviet and other
foreign delegates wishing to attend the Cultural and
Scientific Conference for World Peace held in New York
City during March, 1949. A number of foreign delegates
planning to come to the Conference had their American
visas canceled at the last minute. The noted Soviet com-
poser, Dmitri Shostakovich, and other delegates from the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were
scheduled to make a country-wide tour on behalf of Amer-
ican-Soviet understanding and world peace at the close
of the Conference. This tour the U. S. State Department
made impossible by limiting the visas of the delegates to
the New York affair alone and insisting that they return
home without further appearances in America.
Since September, 1950, when Congress passed, over
President Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act
(McCarran Bill), the situation regarding the admission
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
of foreigners, even temporarily, into the United States
has become much worse. This Act excludes from the
United States all persons who are or ever were members
of a Communist or fascist party anywhere, or who ever
belonged to an organization "affiliated" with such a party
or who ever advocated "the economic, international and
governmental doctrines of world communism. " These
inclusive and vague provisions effectively bar out not
only all Communists and ex-Communists from whatever
land, but all citizens of the Soviet Union (except diplo-
mats and other government representatives), as well as
many individuals from non-Communist countries whose
only crime has been to dissent openly from prevailing
orthodoxies or to join an organization whose aim was
world peace.
In a letter printed in The New York Times on Sep-
tember 23, 1951, Dr. Paul Doty, Associate Professor of
Chemistry at Harvard University, described the baneful
effects of the Internal Security Act on the fall meetings
in New York City of the International Congress of Pure
and Applied Chemistry, the International Union of
Chemistry and the American Chemical Society. Wrote
Professor Doty: "The unexpected absence of a consider-
able number of well-known members of the scientific
community cast a shadow over the proceedings. A num-
ber of scheduled papers could not be presented and often
in discussion the expert in a given field was not there
to comment. Those absent were for the most part scien-
tists who had previously visited this country but who on
this occasion were denied visas due to the sweeping and
indiscriminate regulations of the McCarran Act. "2
If the McCarran Act can so cripple conferences in
one of the less controversial natural sciences, one can
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? OH EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA
easily see how much more seriously it affects meetings
on economics, political science or race relations. In fact,
strict enforcement of the Act means that no Soviet expert
in any subject can now come to America and present his
viewpoint to his fellow-scientists. I agree fully with what
President Truman said in his letter of July 7, 1951, to
Nikolai M. Shvernik, Chairman of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Supreme Soviet: "We shall never be able
to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war
until communication is permitted to flow, free and open,
across international boundaries. "3 But certainly the
United States, as well as Soviet Russia, is constantly
violating this ideal.
In other words, there are curtains of considerable
thickness originating on both sides. And from 1917 on
a majority of the American people have had a formi-
dable mental block against possible light from the direc-
tion of the Soviet Union. "Never have so many known
so little about so much" was the telling way one observer
a few years ago summed up American understanding of
Soviet Russia.
Illustrative of the American attitude is an incident
related by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a speech
about foreign policy in 1944. He told how in 1933 a cer-
tain lady, presumably Mrs.
