Everything
is merely imputed by the mind.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
)
.
L4: [B. Refuting three substantial existent uncompounded phenomena
(i. e. three permanent existent phenomena types: space, analytical cessations, non-analytical cessations)] L5: [1. General refutation]
.
\ ###
\ 205.
\ That space and so forth are permanent
\ Is a conception of common beings.
\ For the wise they are not objects perceived
\ Even by conventional [valid cognition].
.
(i. e. The case of space, and the two types of cessations: Space is not a permanent functional thing, it is not a real thing, it is a negation. There is no such things as permanent functional things as proved above. Cessations are also mere negations, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance, not something existing that would be permanent. - Nirvana is the removal of ignorance, or obstructions, like space; it is not a permanent really existing thing. )
.
(-- Assertion: The treatises of knowledge say space, individual analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are permanent and substantially existent. Any refutation of this is invalidated by your own assertions.
-- Answer: That is not so. Not understanding the significance of applying the term "space" to a mere absence of obstructive contact and so forth, common people think that uncompounded space and so on are permanent [functional phenomena]. Those who are wise concerning the suchness of functional phenomena, far from thinking they exist ultimately, do not regard permanent functional phenomena even as objects perceived by conventional valid cognition. Only that which does not change is termed permanent. What sutra says is not primarily stated to establish [substantial existence, but to refute the existence of permanent functional things]. )
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L5: [2. Specifically refuting permanent omnipresent space (a permanent thing without being a cause or an effect)]
.
\ ###
\ 206.
\ A single direction is not present
\ Wherever there is that which has direction.
\ That with directions therefore clearly
\ Also has other directional parts.
.
(i. e. Space is not absolute, permanent, since in depends on directional parts: Some think that space is a real permanent functional thing, not an effect - inherently existing. But a real permanent thing existing on its own would not be dependent on its parts. Since space obviously can be decomposed into parts and directions, and cannot be defined without talking about objects, movement, directions, . . . it is not an independently existing thing - inherently existing. There is no absolute referential; it is always relative. Space is an effect dependent on the mind conceiving it. Space and objects, like Nirvana and samsara, are co-dependently arisen concepts, forming an apparent duality that needs to be transcended . . . seen through. )
.
(-- Assertion: Space is permanent because it is omnipresent. Whatever is impermanent like a pot is not omnipresent.
-- Answer: The following (the four lines) refutes permanence by refuting omnipresence. It is contradictory to assert that space is omnipresent but partless.
-- The part of space contiguous to an eastern pot is not present wherever there is space which has directions, such as where there is a western pot. It is were, the western pot would be in the east and the eastern pot in the west. If to guard against such a fallacy one asserts that the part of space which is in the east is not in the west, directional space very clearly must have other parts. Therefore one should not accept permanent functional things. Sutra says, "Kasuapa, permanence is one extreme, so-called impermanence is the other extreme. " The belief that ultimate truths are permanent functional phenomena is foreign to this teaching. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting permanent time (a primary cause, without being an effect)]
L5: [1. If permanent time is accepted as a cause, it should also be accepted as an effect]
.
\ ###
\ 207.
\ Since time exists, functional things
\ Are seen to start and stop.
\ It is governed by other factors;
\ Thus it is also an effect.
.
(i. e. The case of time: Some think that time is a real permanent functional thing, a primary cause, not an effect - an inherently existing cause. But, no cause is without its own causes and conditions, and time is a cause -- see next verse. All cause, even time, must be triggered and stopped otherwise its effect would be continuous, thus as a causal factor, time has its own causes and conditions, and is impermanent. Time is not absolute, it is also dependent, an effect, thus impermanent. - Also, like space, time obviously can be decomposed into part, and cannot be defined without talking about phenomenon, beginning, ending, measurements, observations, . . . it is not an independently existing thing - inherently existing. And, as we will see later, a real origination, duration or cessation cannot be observed, so there is no objective basis for time measurement. There is no absolute time referential, in relativity time is dependent on space, speed, gravity . . . Time and things, like Nirvana and samsara, are co-dependently arisen concepts, forming a conceptual system, a theory, that needs to be transcended . . . seen through. They are not absolute, but still not useless obviously. )
.
(-- Assertion of Vaidantokas and others ab: Since permanent time exists the beginning and growth of things like a sprout are seen, while in winter and so forth, although other conditions are present, this is seen to stop. One can thereby infer the existence of time which, moreover, is permanent because of not depending on a cause.
-- Answer: Then it follows that sprouts and so forth are constantly produced and there is never a time when they are not produced, because of being produced by a permanent cause.
-- Assertion: Their production depends on other factors.
-- Answer cd: Then it follows that time, too, is an effect, for the intermittent production of sprouts is governed by other factors, being dependent on conditions like heat and moisture. We do not assert that time is non-existent, for it says:
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~ The actions of the embodied do not
~ Go to waste even in a hundred aeons.
~ When conditions assemble and the time is ripe
~ Their fruit will mature. ) .
L5: [2. Reason for this]
.
\ ###
\ 208.
\ Any cause without an effect
\ Has no existence as a cause.
\ Therefore it follows that
\ CAUSES MUST BE EFFECTS.
.
(i. e. All functional things are cause, and effect, thus impermanent: Time cannot be a permanent thing that is not a cause and has no effect, because a permanent non-functional thing would be as not existent and there would be no need to talk about it. So time is necessarily a functional thing, both a cause and an effect, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- If proponents of time as a cause accept it as such, they should also accept it as an effect.
-- Without the effect it produced, a cause lacks that which establishes it as a cause, for the establishment of a cause depends on its effects. Thus since it follows that all causes must be effects, one should not accept causes that lack effects. Anything accepted as a cause should be accepted as facilitating an effect. )
.
L5: [3. Contradictoriness of that which undergoes change being permanent]
.
\ ###
\ 209.
\ When a cause undergoes change
\ It becomes the cause of something else.
\ Anything that undergoes change
\ Should not be called permanent.
.
(i. e. All causes are modulated, thus are dependent and impermanent: There is no absolute primary cause, inherently existing cause that are not also dependent, not also an effect. All so called causes are always modulated by various other conditions; the effect is never exactly the same. And even the fact that they need to be triggered (activated) to start producing their effect, and never last eternally (they stop causing), mean that they are themselves subject to other causes and conditions. The simple fact that they are cause means that they are also effect, thus dependent, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- A cause such as a seed acts as the cause of something else such as a sprout, through a change from before in its potency. Any functional thing which changes so that its former and later moments are unalike should not be called permanent. Thus one should not accept permanent time and so forth as causes. )
.
L5: [4. Contradictoriness of that which has come into existence of its own accord depending on causes]
.
\ ###
\ 210.
\ A thing with a permanent cause is produced
\ By that which has not come into being.
\ Whatever happens by itself
\ Cannot have a cause.
.
(i. e. A permanent cause would not produce anything: A so called permanent cause would not change in time, would not be triggered, and thus would not be able to produce an effect at one point and not at another. So the effect would be without a cause. That would be absurd; nothing is without cause and conditions. So, there cannot be a permanent functional thing, a cause that is not an effect itself, that is not itself dependent, and thus impermanent. All causes are effects, and impermanent. )
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.
(-- If one does not accept that time, too, changes, it follows that a functional thing, such as a sprout whose cause is unchanging permanent time, has come about of its own accord because of being produced by a cause that has not come into being. Whatever happens by itself cannot have a producing cause, since its dependence on a cause is inadmissible. ) .
L5: [5. Contradictoriness of that which has arisen from something permanent being impermanent]
.
\ ###
\ 211.
\ How can that which is produced
\ By a permanent thing be impermanent?
\ Never are the two, cause and effect,
\ Seen to have incongruent characteristics.
.
(i. e. An impermanent effect can be produced only by an impermanent cause. All causes must change in time, they must be triggered to start the causing-effect, and stopped otherwise the effect will continue forever. So time, as a supposed cause of the maturation or degradation of things must be itself modulated. Otherwise it is not a cause and that is refuted in verse 208. )
.
(-- How can functional things such as sprouts be impermanent? It follows that they are not, because of being produced by that which is permanent. This entailment follows because cause and effect are never seen to have incongruent characteristics in that one is permanent and the other impermanent. )
.
L4: [D. Refuting permanent particles (primary causes, without being effects, or composed of parts)] L5: [1. Refuting permanent particles]
L6: [a. Unsuitability of that which has parts as a permanent functional thing]
.
\ ###
\ 212.
\ That of which some sides are causes
\ While other sides are not is thereby
\ Multifarious. How can that
\ Which is multifarious be permanent?
.
(i. e. The case of elementary components: even elementary components are dependent on directional & functional parts, on their characteristics, and on the mind conceptualizing them, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- To demonstrate that particles are not truly existent partless phenomena as asserted, it is shown that they have sides and do not therefore interpenetrate completely when they come together to form a composite. Moreover, informing such a composite, particles could not move unless they had parts, such as fore and rear. Since they undergo change during the formation of the composite, how can they be permanent? The causal particles no longer exist once the effect has been produced.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Permanent particles of the four elements activated by the force of karma form the substantial entity of a composite, producing the environmental world and so forth.
-- Answer: That is incorrect, for it follows that when particles coalesce and form a composite, an increase in size is impossible if there is total interpenetration. If some parts coalesce, those that do are causes while those that do not are not causes.
-- It therefore follows that the smallest particle has parts, because some of its sides are causes while others are not. Being multifarious, it follows that it cannot be a permanent functional thing because of having diverse parts. )
.
L6: [b. Unfeasibility of an accretion which is a separate substantial entity forming through the coalescence of homogeneous particles]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 213.
\ The cause which is spherical
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\ Is not present in the effect.
\ Thus complete interpenetration
\ Of particles is not feasible.
.
(i. e. Refuting a conceptual proof that makes no sense. -- And it is not possible that there would be no directional & functional parts, that everything would mix without rearrangement depending on directional and functional parts of elementary components. The individuality of parts is not completely annihilated in forming a new result. The result is still dependent on its parts or causes, and those parts have directional and functional parts themselves. - It is in fact more reasonable to think that the whole is merely a name, and that the real dynamic is still operating at the basic level. But there is no such basic level. Everything is both whole and part, and the whole and its parts are not two, not one.
Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Assertion: Although particles interpenetrate completely because they are partless, a separate accretion of coalesced particles forms, which produces the composite.
-- Answer: It follows that it is not feasible for particles to interpenetrate completely when composites form. If they merge completely there will be no gradual increase in size from the first to the second composite and so forth.
-- Also the causative sphere with the characteristic of appearing to the mind as partless and spherical is not present in the resultant substantial entity, the composite. )
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of asserting that particles do not interpenetrate completely]
.
\ ###
\ 214.
\ One particle's position is not
\ Asserted as also that of another.
\ Thus it is not asserted that
\ Cause and effect are the same size.
.
(i. e. So there is no complete assimilation of the individuality of parts into a new whole, and the elementary components still use their directional and functional parts, they are thus not elementary functional things. They are also whole, or effect. Everything is both whole and part, cause and effect. )
.
(-- Where complete interpenetration does not occur, one particle's position will not be asserted as also that of another. Thus since the causal particles and resultant composite are not asserted to be equal in size, the absurd consequence that the composite is not an object of the senses is avoided. Nevertheless since particles have parts, their consequent unfeasibility as permanent functional things remains. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting that particles are partless prior to the formation of a composite] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 215.
\ Whatever has eastern side
\ Also has an eastern part.
\ Those whose particles have sides admit
\ That they are not [partless] particles.
.
(i. e. Even before being involved into a function or composite, they have sides, and thus they have parts. Thus they are not without depending on parts, functional parts or directional parts. )
.
(-- Assertion: The problem of their having parts occurs when the resultant substantial entity is forming, but prior to that the smallest particles do not have parts.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. If a particle has no sides, it cannot be surrounded by particles on its four sides.
-- If it has sides, such as an eastern one, it definitely must have parts, since any particle with an eastern side must also have an eastern part. For that reason any opponent who holds that particles have sides prior to the formation of a composite admits those particles are not partless ones, because of accepting that they are located within the ten boundless directions. )
.
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L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of particles forming composites when movement from one position to another is unfeasible for partless particles]
.
\ ###
\ 216.
\ The front takes up, the back relinquishes --
\ Whatever does not have
\ Both of these [motions]
\ Is not something which moves.
.
(i. e. And if they had no sides (like front, back, . . . ) they would not be move, and would not be able to be part of a composite. There is always a possibility to define a direction relative to something else, even if there is no absolute referential or space. )
.
(-- It follows that such particles would not move from one place to another. When a thing moves from one place to another, its front takes up a position ahead while its rear relinquishes the rearward position, but partless particles neither take up nor relinquish a position. If it is asserted that they do not move, it is contradictory for partless particles to form the substantial entity of a composite. Thus truly existent particles should never be accepted. )
.
L5: [2. Unfeasibility of Yogic awareness perceiving partless particles] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 217.
\ That which does not have a front,
\ Nor any middle,
\ And which does not have a rear,
\ Being invisible, who will see it?
.
(i. e. Refuting the claim that elementary components can be seen in deep meditation. -- Some say that Yogi can perceive elementary components of the external world; that they can see the real origination and cessation of impermanent things by the assembling and dissociation of those elementary components. But if they are elementary, and without sides or parts, how can they be seen. This is absurd. A permanent thing cannot be functional as demonstrated before. Anything perceptible is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. )
.
-- Assertion: permanent particles do exist because adepts perceive them by virtue of the divine eye.
-- Answer: What adept sees such a permanent particle?
-- Seeing is not feasible because such a form -- a particle which firstly has no front, nor any middle, and finally does not
have a .
.
\
\
\
\
\
\
.
(i. e. And it is not because we can see coarse things - wholes (or effects) that there are necessarily elementary permanent parts composing them (or elementary permanent causes) - In the case of elementary components that would be the causes of the whole new effect, the cause cannot continue while the effect is present otherwise there would be endless production of effect, nor can the cause stop before the effect is produce, otherwise the effect would be causeless? So the cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous, nor sequential. So these elementary causing particles cannot really exist as we think they do. There is no real (inherently existing) cause, no real effect. It is more subtle than this. )
.
-- Assertion: Since coarse things would have no cause if particles did not exist, particles do exist and, moreover, are
rear portion -- is not evident to any kind of perception. )
L6: [b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things]
###
218.
The effect destroys the cause; Therefore the cause is not permanent. Alternatively, where the cause
Exists the effect does not.
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permanent because of being causeless functional things.
-- Answer ab: It follows that causal particles are not permanent, for just as the seed changes and disintegrates when the sprout is produced, the causal particles are destroyed by the production of the resultant composite.
-- Objection: This is not established, for they produce a separate effect without giving up their causal identity.
-- Answer cd: Alternatively, since the presence of the causal particles in a place precludes that of the resultant composite, it follows that they are not cause and effect because of being simultaneous and occupying individual positions, like a pot and a woolen cloth in their respective places. )
.
L5: [3. Why Buddhas do not mention the existence of permanent particles]
.
\ ###
\ 219.
\ A permanent thing that is obstructive
\ Is not seen anywhere.
\ Therefore Buddhas never say
\ That particles are permanent.
.
(i. e. Anything obstructive is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. Generalization: Anything that can bee seen, that can interact with anything (ex. any wavelength or field), is necessarily obstructive, thus cause and effect, part and whole, impermanent. Meaning there is no elementary basic components as seeked out by some physicists. )
.
-- For the following reason, too, particles are not permanent: particles are obstructive in that they cannot be penetrated completely by other particles. That which is obstructive cannot be permanent.
-- The reason why Buddhas never say that permanent particles exist is because they do not perceive obstructive permanent things
Cittamatrins, who refute the existence of particles by applying the reasoning of ultimate analysis but assert that consciousness is truly existent, should accept objects and consciousnesses as they are conventionally accepted, since exactly the same reasoning applies. )
.
L4: [E. Refuting substantially established liberation]
L5: [1. Refuting the substantially established liberation of our own sectarians] L6: [a. Unfeasibility of substantially established cessation]
.
\ ###
\ 220.
\ If liberation, which is other than
\ What binds, is bound (i. e. caused) and the means (i. e. causal path) existed,
\ It should not be called liberation(i. e. independent)
\ Since nothing is produced from it.
.
(i. e. The case of the path and Liberation: First, Liberation is not a functional thing because all functional things are both cause and effect, but there should be no observable effect from Liberation; liberation cannot be a cause. - Also, true cessation, like space is not a permanent functional thing; it is not a real thing, it is a negation, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance. The path is not the real cause of Liberation. Liberation is not an effect caused, or produced by the path as if they were absolute cause, and absolute effect. If Liberation was a final effect produced by an absolutely perfect causing path, then it would be dependent and impermanent. It would also be a cause and have further samsaric effect. Thus it would not be called Liberation. -- As demonstrated above, there are no real causes and effects as we usually think they exist. Liberation, like space, is the negation of something else. But this something else, as we will see, is not really inherently existing either - and that is the whole point. Liberation and samsara are co- dependently arisen concepts. Transcendence is going beyond this duality - not taking one side like accepting one and rejecting the other, nor both, nor neither. Transcendence is seeing through illusions created by our own mind, seeing through all opposites / dualities. )
.
(About real cessations: liberation is just another concept. There is no causal path, and no final result. (i. e. Liberation is taught as the final effect, caused but not causing anything else. A permanent functional phenomena. ) If it is a produced functional thing, it would necessarily have an effect, a function. If liberation is caused, and the path exist, then it would be an effect. By there is no effect which are not cause of something else. So it would not be called liberation, because it
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would produce something else -- more karma. So "liberation" is not a functional thing, but a mere concept.
-- Finally the chapter presents a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent. It cannot be a functional phenomenon as claimed, for then it should produce an effect, but none can be identified.
-- Assertion of our own sectarians who do not understand uncompounded phenomena as merely nominal: Although it is true that Buddhas do not mention permanent particles, they say uncompounded phenomena are permanent. Thus there is substantially existent cessation, which is like a dam. If this were not so it would be inappropriate to speak of the third noble truth.
-- Answer: True source bind to cyclic existence, true sufferings are that which is bound and true paths are the means which liberate one from sufferings and their sources. If liberation which is other than these were a functional phenomena, it should facilitate an effect, but it does not produce any effect and not the slightest facilitation occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to call such a substantially existent cessation "liberation. " It contradicts what the Teacher said: "Monks, these five are only names - past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person. " One should therefore accept liberation as a mere term, a mere imputation and not as substantially existent. )
.
L6: [b. It contradicts the explanation that all suffering is abandoned in the sphere of nirvana]
.
\ ###
\ 221.
\ In nirvana there are no aggregates
\ And there cannot be a person.
\ What nirvana is there for one
\ Who is not seen in nirvana?
.
(i. e. The case of what is liberated: the self and the five aggregates are not two, not one: We cannot find a self among the five aggregates individually or together, nor can we find a self separate from them. There cannot be a self liberated. So what is individual Liberation? This is an imperfect concept. )
.
-- This is followed by a discussion of what attains liberation and what exists as a basis when liberation occurs, in the course of which it is demonstrated that the basis cannot be a permanent truly existent self.
-- ab: The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering . . . the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana. " According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist
-- cd: Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ ###
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
(i. e. The real nature of the self is not existence, not non-existence: It is wrong to think that a primordial individual consciousness can be Liberated. There would be no need for consciousness at liberation; and there is no person without consciousness. )
.
(With or without consciousness, there could be no self at liberation: If there is no self in nirvana, then there is no self- consciousness.
.
L4: [B. Refuting three substantial existent uncompounded phenomena
(i. e. three permanent existent phenomena types: space, analytical cessations, non-analytical cessations)] L5: [1. General refutation]
.
\ ###
\ 205.
\ That space and so forth are permanent
\ Is a conception of common beings.
\ For the wise they are not objects perceived
\ Even by conventional [valid cognition].
.
(i. e. The case of space, and the two types of cessations: Space is not a permanent functional thing, it is not a real thing, it is a negation. There is no such things as permanent functional things as proved above. Cessations are also mere negations, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance, not something existing that would be permanent. - Nirvana is the removal of ignorance, or obstructions, like space; it is not a permanent really existing thing. )
.
(-- Assertion: The treatises of knowledge say space, individual analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are permanent and substantially existent. Any refutation of this is invalidated by your own assertions.
-- Answer: That is not so. Not understanding the significance of applying the term "space" to a mere absence of obstructive contact and so forth, common people think that uncompounded space and so on are permanent [functional phenomena]. Those who are wise concerning the suchness of functional phenomena, far from thinking they exist ultimately, do not regard permanent functional phenomena even as objects perceived by conventional valid cognition. Only that which does not change is termed permanent. What sutra says is not primarily stated to establish [substantial existence, but to refute the existence of permanent functional things]. )
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L5: [2. Specifically refuting permanent omnipresent space (a permanent thing without being a cause or an effect)]
.
\ ###
\ 206.
\ A single direction is not present
\ Wherever there is that which has direction.
\ That with directions therefore clearly
\ Also has other directional parts.
.
(i. e. Space is not absolute, permanent, since in depends on directional parts: Some think that space is a real permanent functional thing, not an effect - inherently existing. But a real permanent thing existing on its own would not be dependent on its parts. Since space obviously can be decomposed into parts and directions, and cannot be defined without talking about objects, movement, directions, . . . it is not an independently existing thing - inherently existing. There is no absolute referential; it is always relative. Space is an effect dependent on the mind conceiving it. Space and objects, like Nirvana and samsara, are co-dependently arisen concepts, forming an apparent duality that needs to be transcended . . . seen through. )
.
(-- Assertion: Space is permanent because it is omnipresent. Whatever is impermanent like a pot is not omnipresent.
-- Answer: The following (the four lines) refutes permanence by refuting omnipresence. It is contradictory to assert that space is omnipresent but partless.
-- The part of space contiguous to an eastern pot is not present wherever there is space which has directions, such as where there is a western pot. It is were, the western pot would be in the east and the eastern pot in the west. If to guard against such a fallacy one asserts that the part of space which is in the east is not in the west, directional space very clearly must have other parts. Therefore one should not accept permanent functional things. Sutra says, "Kasuapa, permanence is one extreme, so-called impermanence is the other extreme. " The belief that ultimate truths are permanent functional phenomena is foreign to this teaching. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting permanent time (a primary cause, without being an effect)]
L5: [1. If permanent time is accepted as a cause, it should also be accepted as an effect]
.
\ ###
\ 207.
\ Since time exists, functional things
\ Are seen to start and stop.
\ It is governed by other factors;
\ Thus it is also an effect.
.
(i. e. The case of time: Some think that time is a real permanent functional thing, a primary cause, not an effect - an inherently existing cause. But, no cause is without its own causes and conditions, and time is a cause -- see next verse. All cause, even time, must be triggered and stopped otherwise its effect would be continuous, thus as a causal factor, time has its own causes and conditions, and is impermanent. Time is not absolute, it is also dependent, an effect, thus impermanent. - Also, like space, time obviously can be decomposed into part, and cannot be defined without talking about phenomenon, beginning, ending, measurements, observations, . . . it is not an independently existing thing - inherently existing. And, as we will see later, a real origination, duration or cessation cannot be observed, so there is no objective basis for time measurement. There is no absolute time referential, in relativity time is dependent on space, speed, gravity . . . Time and things, like Nirvana and samsara, are co-dependently arisen concepts, forming a conceptual system, a theory, that needs to be transcended . . . seen through. They are not absolute, but still not useless obviously. )
.
(-- Assertion of Vaidantokas and others ab: Since permanent time exists the beginning and growth of things like a sprout are seen, while in winter and so forth, although other conditions are present, this is seen to stop. One can thereby infer the existence of time which, moreover, is permanent because of not depending on a cause.
-- Answer: Then it follows that sprouts and so forth are constantly produced and there is never a time when they are not produced, because of being produced by a permanent cause.
-- Assertion: Their production depends on other factors.
-- Answer cd: Then it follows that time, too, is an effect, for the intermittent production of sprouts is governed by other factors, being dependent on conditions like heat and moisture. We do not assert that time is non-existent, for it says:
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~ The actions of the embodied do not
~ Go to waste even in a hundred aeons.
~ When conditions assemble and the time is ripe
~ Their fruit will mature. ) .
L5: [2. Reason for this]
.
\ ###
\ 208.
\ Any cause without an effect
\ Has no existence as a cause.
\ Therefore it follows that
\ CAUSES MUST BE EFFECTS.
.
(i. e. All functional things are cause, and effect, thus impermanent: Time cannot be a permanent thing that is not a cause and has no effect, because a permanent non-functional thing would be as not existent and there would be no need to talk about it. So time is necessarily a functional thing, both a cause and an effect, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- If proponents of time as a cause accept it as such, they should also accept it as an effect.
-- Without the effect it produced, a cause lacks that which establishes it as a cause, for the establishment of a cause depends on its effects. Thus since it follows that all causes must be effects, one should not accept causes that lack effects. Anything accepted as a cause should be accepted as facilitating an effect. )
.
L5: [3. Contradictoriness of that which undergoes change being permanent]
.
\ ###
\ 209.
\ When a cause undergoes change
\ It becomes the cause of something else.
\ Anything that undergoes change
\ Should not be called permanent.
.
(i. e. All causes are modulated, thus are dependent and impermanent: There is no absolute primary cause, inherently existing cause that are not also dependent, not also an effect. All so called causes are always modulated by various other conditions; the effect is never exactly the same. And even the fact that they need to be triggered (activated) to start producing their effect, and never last eternally (they stop causing), mean that they are themselves subject to other causes and conditions. The simple fact that they are cause means that they are also effect, thus dependent, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- A cause such as a seed acts as the cause of something else such as a sprout, through a change from before in its potency. Any functional thing which changes so that its former and later moments are unalike should not be called permanent. Thus one should not accept permanent time and so forth as causes. )
.
L5: [4. Contradictoriness of that which has come into existence of its own accord depending on causes]
.
\ ###
\ 210.
\ A thing with a permanent cause is produced
\ By that which has not come into being.
\ Whatever happens by itself
\ Cannot have a cause.
.
(i. e. A permanent cause would not produce anything: A so called permanent cause would not change in time, would not be triggered, and thus would not be able to produce an effect at one point and not at another. So the effect would be without a cause. That would be absurd; nothing is without cause and conditions. So, there cannot be a permanent functional thing, a cause that is not an effect itself, that is not itself dependent, and thus impermanent. All causes are effects, and impermanent. )
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.
(-- If one does not accept that time, too, changes, it follows that a functional thing, such as a sprout whose cause is unchanging permanent time, has come about of its own accord because of being produced by a cause that has not come into being. Whatever happens by itself cannot have a producing cause, since its dependence on a cause is inadmissible. ) .
L5: [5. Contradictoriness of that which has arisen from something permanent being impermanent]
.
\ ###
\ 211.
\ How can that which is produced
\ By a permanent thing be impermanent?
\ Never are the two, cause and effect,
\ Seen to have incongruent characteristics.
.
(i. e. An impermanent effect can be produced only by an impermanent cause. All causes must change in time, they must be triggered to start the causing-effect, and stopped otherwise the effect will continue forever. So time, as a supposed cause of the maturation or degradation of things must be itself modulated. Otherwise it is not a cause and that is refuted in verse 208. )
.
(-- How can functional things such as sprouts be impermanent? It follows that they are not, because of being produced by that which is permanent. This entailment follows because cause and effect are never seen to have incongruent characteristics in that one is permanent and the other impermanent. )
.
L4: [D. Refuting permanent particles (primary causes, without being effects, or composed of parts)] L5: [1. Refuting permanent particles]
L6: [a. Unsuitability of that which has parts as a permanent functional thing]
.
\ ###
\ 212.
\ That of which some sides are causes
\ While other sides are not is thereby
\ Multifarious. How can that
\ Which is multifarious be permanent?
.
(i. e. The case of elementary components: even elementary components are dependent on directional & functional parts, on their characteristics, and on the mind conceptualizing them, thus impermanent. )
.
(-- To demonstrate that particles are not truly existent partless phenomena as asserted, it is shown that they have sides and do not therefore interpenetrate completely when they come together to form a composite. Moreover, informing such a composite, particles could not move unless they had parts, such as fore and rear. Since they undergo change during the formation of the composite, how can they be permanent? The causal particles no longer exist once the effect has been produced.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Permanent particles of the four elements activated by the force of karma form the substantial entity of a composite, producing the environmental world and so forth.
-- Answer: That is incorrect, for it follows that when particles coalesce and form a composite, an increase in size is impossible if there is total interpenetration. If some parts coalesce, those that do are causes while those that do not are not causes.
-- It therefore follows that the smallest particle has parts, because some of its sides are causes while others are not. Being multifarious, it follows that it cannot be a permanent functional thing because of having diverse parts. )
.
L6: [b. Unfeasibility of an accretion which is a separate substantial entity forming through the coalescence of homogeneous particles]
L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 213.
\ The cause which is spherical
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\ Is not present in the effect.
\ Thus complete interpenetration
\ Of particles is not feasible.
.
(i. e. Refuting a conceptual proof that makes no sense. -- And it is not possible that there would be no directional & functional parts, that everything would mix without rearrangement depending on directional and functional parts of elementary components. The individuality of parts is not completely annihilated in forming a new result. The result is still dependent on its parts or causes, and those parts have directional and functional parts themselves. - It is in fact more reasonable to think that the whole is merely a name, and that the real dynamic is still operating at the basic level. But there is no such basic level. Everything is both whole and part, and the whole and its parts are not two, not one.
Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Assertion: Although particles interpenetrate completely because they are partless, a separate accretion of coalesced particles forms, which produces the composite.
-- Answer: It follows that it is not feasible for particles to interpenetrate completely when composites form. If they merge completely there will be no gradual increase in size from the first to the second composite and so forth.
-- Also the causative sphere with the characteristic of appearing to the mind as partless and spherical is not present in the resultant substantial entity, the composite. )
.
L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of asserting that particles do not interpenetrate completely]
.
\ ###
\ 214.
\ One particle's position is not
\ Asserted as also that of another.
\ Thus it is not asserted that
\ Cause and effect are the same size.
.
(i. e. So there is no complete assimilation of the individuality of parts into a new whole, and the elementary components still use their directional and functional parts, they are thus not elementary functional things. They are also whole, or effect. Everything is both whole and part, cause and effect. )
.
(-- Where complete interpenetration does not occur, one particle's position will not be asserted as also that of another. Thus since the causal particles and resultant composite are not asserted to be equal in size, the absurd consequence that the composite is not an object of the senses is avoided. Nevertheless since particles have parts, their consequent unfeasibility as permanent functional things remains. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting that particles are partless prior to the formation of a composite] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 215.
\ Whatever has eastern side
\ Also has an eastern part.
\ Those whose particles have sides admit
\ That they are not [partless] particles.
.
(i. e. Even before being involved into a function or composite, they have sides, and thus they have parts. Thus they are not without depending on parts, functional parts or directional parts. )
.
(-- Assertion: The problem of their having parts occurs when the resultant substantial entity is forming, but prior to that the smallest particles do not have parts.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. If a particle has no sides, it cannot be surrounded by particles on its four sides.
-- If it has sides, such as an eastern one, it definitely must have parts, since any particle with an eastern side must also have an eastern part. For that reason any opponent who holds that particles have sides prior to the formation of a composite admits those particles are not partless ones, because of accepting that they are located within the ten boundless directions. )
.
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L7: [(2) Contradictoriness of particles forming composites when movement from one position to another is unfeasible for partless particles]
.
\ ###
\ 216.
\ The front takes up, the back relinquishes --
\ Whatever does not have
\ Both of these [motions]
\ Is not something which moves.
.
(i. e. And if they had no sides (like front, back, . . . ) they would not be move, and would not be able to be part of a composite. There is always a possibility to define a direction relative to something else, even if there is no absolute referential or space. )
.
(-- It follows that such particles would not move from one place to another. When a thing moves from one place to another, its front takes up a position ahead while its rear relinquishes the rearward position, but partless particles neither take up nor relinquish a position. If it is asserted that they do not move, it is contradictory for partless particles to form the substantial entity of a composite. Thus truly existent particles should never be accepted. )
.
L5: [2. Unfeasibility of Yogic awareness perceiving partless particles] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 217.
\ That which does not have a front,
\ Nor any middle,
\ And which does not have a rear,
\ Being invisible, who will see it?
.
(i. e. Refuting the claim that elementary components can be seen in deep meditation. -- Some say that Yogi can perceive elementary components of the external world; that they can see the real origination and cessation of impermanent things by the assembling and dissociation of those elementary components. But if they are elementary, and without sides or parts, how can they be seen. This is absurd. A permanent thing cannot be functional as demonstrated before. Anything perceptible is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. )
.
-- Assertion: permanent particles do exist because adepts perceive them by virtue of the divine eye.
-- Answer: What adept sees such a permanent particle?
-- Seeing is not feasible because such a form -- a particle which firstly has no front, nor any middle, and finally does not
have a .
.
\
\
\
\
\
\
.
(i. e. And it is not because we can see coarse things - wholes (or effects) that there are necessarily elementary permanent parts composing them (or elementary permanent causes) - In the case of elementary components that would be the causes of the whole new effect, the cause cannot continue while the effect is present otherwise there would be endless production of effect, nor can the cause stop before the effect is produce, otherwise the effect would be causeless? So the cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous, nor sequential. So these elementary causing particles cannot really exist as we think they do. There is no real (inherently existing) cause, no real effect. It is more subtle than this. )
.
-- Assertion: Since coarse things would have no cause if particles did not exist, particles do exist and, moreover, are
rear portion -- is not evident to any kind of perception. )
L6: [b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things]
###
218.
The effect destroys the cause; Therefore the cause is not permanent. Alternatively, where the cause
Exists the effect does not.
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permanent because of being causeless functional things.
-- Answer ab: It follows that causal particles are not permanent, for just as the seed changes and disintegrates when the sprout is produced, the causal particles are destroyed by the production of the resultant composite.
-- Objection: This is not established, for they produce a separate effect without giving up their causal identity.
-- Answer cd: Alternatively, since the presence of the causal particles in a place precludes that of the resultant composite, it follows that they are not cause and effect because of being simultaneous and occupying individual positions, like a pot and a woolen cloth in their respective places. )
.
L5: [3. Why Buddhas do not mention the existence of permanent particles]
.
\ ###
\ 219.
\ A permanent thing that is obstructive
\ Is not seen anywhere.
\ Therefore Buddhas never say
\ That particles are permanent.
.
(i. e. Anything obstructive is necessary functional, thus cause and effect, part and whole, and impermanent. Generalization: Anything that can bee seen, that can interact with anything (ex. any wavelength or field), is necessarily obstructive, thus cause and effect, part and whole, impermanent. Meaning there is no elementary basic components as seeked out by some physicists. )
.
-- For the following reason, too, particles are not permanent: particles are obstructive in that they cannot be penetrated completely by other particles. That which is obstructive cannot be permanent.
-- The reason why Buddhas never say that permanent particles exist is because they do not perceive obstructive permanent things
Cittamatrins, who refute the existence of particles by applying the reasoning of ultimate analysis but assert that consciousness is truly existent, should accept objects and consciousnesses as they are conventionally accepted, since exactly the same reasoning applies. )
.
L4: [E. Refuting substantially established liberation]
L5: [1. Refuting the substantially established liberation of our own sectarians] L6: [a. Unfeasibility of substantially established cessation]
.
\ ###
\ 220.
\ If liberation, which is other than
\ What binds, is bound (i. e. caused) and the means (i. e. causal path) existed,
\ It should not be called liberation(i. e. independent)
\ Since nothing is produced from it.
.
(i. e. The case of the path and Liberation: First, Liberation is not a functional thing because all functional things are both cause and effect, but there should be no observable effect from Liberation; liberation cannot be a cause. - Also, true cessation, like space is not a permanent functional thing; it is not a real thing, it is a negation, the stopping of illusions based on ignorance. The path is not the real cause of Liberation. Liberation is not an effect caused, or produced by the path as if they were absolute cause, and absolute effect. If Liberation was a final effect produced by an absolutely perfect causing path, then it would be dependent and impermanent. It would also be a cause and have further samsaric effect. Thus it would not be called Liberation. -- As demonstrated above, there are no real causes and effects as we usually think they exist. Liberation, like space, is the negation of something else. But this something else, as we will see, is not really inherently existing either - and that is the whole point. Liberation and samsara are co- dependently arisen concepts. Transcendence is going beyond this duality - not taking one side like accepting one and rejecting the other, nor both, nor neither. Transcendence is seeing through illusions created by our own mind, seeing through all opposites / dualities. )
.
(About real cessations: liberation is just another concept. There is no causal path, and no final result. (i. e. Liberation is taught as the final effect, caused but not causing anything else. A permanent functional phenomena. ) If it is a produced functional thing, it would necessarily have an effect, a function. If liberation is caused, and the path exist, then it would be an effect. By there is no effect which are not cause of something else. So it would not be called liberation, because it
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would produce something else -- more karma. So "liberation" is not a functional thing, but a mere concept.
-- Finally the chapter presents a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent. It cannot be a functional phenomenon as claimed, for then it should produce an effect, but none can be identified.
-- Assertion of our own sectarians who do not understand uncompounded phenomena as merely nominal: Although it is true that Buddhas do not mention permanent particles, they say uncompounded phenomena are permanent. Thus there is substantially existent cessation, which is like a dam. If this were not so it would be inappropriate to speak of the third noble truth.
-- Answer: True source bind to cyclic existence, true sufferings are that which is bound and true paths are the means which liberate one from sufferings and their sources. If liberation which is other than these were a functional phenomena, it should facilitate an effect, but it does not produce any effect and not the slightest facilitation occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to call such a substantially existent cessation "liberation. " It contradicts what the Teacher said: "Monks, these five are only names - past time, future time, space, nirvana, and the person. " One should therefore accept liberation as a mere term, a mere imputation and not as substantially existent. )
.
L6: [b. It contradicts the explanation that all suffering is abandoned in the sphere of nirvana]
.
\ ###
\ 221.
\ In nirvana there are no aggregates
\ And there cannot be a person.
\ What nirvana is there for one
\ Who is not seen in nirvana?
.
(i. e. The case of what is liberated: the self and the five aggregates are not two, not one: We cannot find a self among the five aggregates individually or together, nor can we find a self separate from them. There cannot be a self liberated. So what is individual Liberation? This is an imperfect concept. )
.
-- This is followed by a discussion of what attains liberation and what exists as a basis when liberation occurs, in the course of which it is demonstrated that the basis cannot be a permanent truly existent self.
-- ab: The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering . . . the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana. " According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist
-- cd: Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ ###
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
(i. e. The real nature of the self is not existence, not non-existence: It is wrong to think that a primordial individual consciousness can be Liberated. There would be no need for consciousness at liberation; and there is no person without consciousness. )
.
(With or without consciousness, there could be no self at liberation: If there is no self in nirvana, then there is no self- consciousness.
