" namely, the land which God had
promised
him.
Summa Theologica
21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries
shall not be able to resist and gainsay. " However, this gift is not
granted to all, or in connection with any particular observance, but
according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, "To
one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the
word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit," and afterwards it is
said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to everyone according as He will. " On the other hand it does
not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the
[3120]FP, Q[109], A[3]. Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is
effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did
anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is
in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions," i. e. the operations "of the
demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,"
such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be
able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the
sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.
Reply to Objection 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it
is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that
the magic art tends.
Reply to Objection 2: The abstinence of these children was not in
accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to
the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the
meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received
knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had understanding
above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments. "
Reply to Objection 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons
is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on
account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to
the case in point.
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Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose
of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration
of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are
lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in
order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things
have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to
assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like
instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7).
Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the
alteration of bodies.
Objection 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly
bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain
occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the
heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e. g. images, also acquire
from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of
certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and
of such like things.
Objection 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many
ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from
God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose
of producing these alterations.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to
superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums
condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or
of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing
worn or fastened on. "
I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily
effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect
naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is
lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper
effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally,
it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those
effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the
head of "compact by tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine,
De Doctr. Christ. ; see above[3121] Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are allured by means of
creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed
by various objects differing according to the various things in which
they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as
are to each one's liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs,
trees, animals, songs and rites. "
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in
employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain
effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of
producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters,
words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by
nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from
their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of
heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire
certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies
result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing
else but composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they
cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to
them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are
artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is
false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11),
that "by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words,
shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed
in the course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth
forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the
stars," as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to
the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ.
Dei x, 11), "all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who
delude the souls that are subject to them. "
Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy
from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite
to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any
effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet
astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the
latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore
they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons:
whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of
tokens in certain shapes or characters.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty,
to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever
purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the
demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary,
it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no
way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts
either tacit or express.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of
fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes
that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms,
which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to
observe such like signs.
Objection 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly
everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain
times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals,
uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come.
Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.
Objection 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by
divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require
that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences:
wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that
happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in
our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds
from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to
observe these presages.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a
thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts
entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a
stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking
the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to go back to
bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home
if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your
clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret
the actual damage. "
I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but
as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as
signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on
divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of
the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with such
like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are
superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry,
which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days
which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day
differentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid
of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.
Reply to Objection 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they
produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully
observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future
events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging
when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one
were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we
have spoken in the [3122]FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 2. But this does not
apply to this kind of observances.
Reply to Objection 2: That men have at first experienced a certain
degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards
when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind,
many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the
demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances,
become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold
snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii,
23).
Reply to Objection 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be
born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states
(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those
deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things,
however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be
signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words
at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than
when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of
producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the sick),
such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way whatever to
call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17,18, "In My name they
shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall
take up serpents. " Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words
at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress.
Objection 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human
body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain
incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing
certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their
madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp
that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers,
nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely. " Therefore it is lawful to wear
sacred words as a remedy for men.
Objection 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the
saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word
is of no less account than the Body of Christ. " Now it is lawful for
one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them
about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it
is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether
uttered or written, for one's protection.
Objection 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth. )
[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works,
and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a passage in
writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard
by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the
Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his
neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the
letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do
well to wear them round your neck; if in the understanding, you will
then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your
neck. "
I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of written words, two
points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written,
because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly
superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should
beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal
something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in
Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely ascribed to him] that
"many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their
fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasten them to
their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand
them. " Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false,
because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who
does not bear witness to a falsehood.
In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it
contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, except
the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or
fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence
for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise,
however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu.
v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In blending together medicinal herbs,
it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than
the divine symbol, or the Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none
but God the Creator of all. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or
to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone,
from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in
connection with any vain observance.
Reply to Objection 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or
any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred
words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like
incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on
the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents,
because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in
order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note
that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its
comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the
widow's request. "
Reply to Objection 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if
they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics
they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this
matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be
three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to
God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.
Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom is speaking the case in which more
attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of
the words.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through
lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that
they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which
pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly
we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for
God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard
to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted,
and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) In what the temptation of God consists;
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) To what virtue it is opposed;
(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the
expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist
in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God
alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and
demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from
his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected
from His power alone.
Objection 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the
divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if
the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work
miracles would tempt God.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he
should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence
Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey," etc.
says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that
announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on
worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he
should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the
less he seeks these things. " And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have never
treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who
restores all things by His mere word. " [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth
Responsory (Dominican Breviary). ] But the temptation of God does not
consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation
of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God
alone is expected.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ who
gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not
allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless
by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare
to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs
to avoid. " From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists
in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and
relying on the assistance of God alone.
I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person
tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By
words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he
can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe
another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two
ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus
Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to
tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by
stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mat. 22:15,
sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends,
by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes
implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person,
yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than
putting him to a test.
Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now
we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God
explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the
intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God
explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment
on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly,
if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks
for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power,
goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in
order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial:
but if he make the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems
to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same
applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or
deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or
useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip
20:12): "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee. "
But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to
tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16, "Thou shalt not
tempt the Lord thy God," says: "A man tempts God, if having the means
at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether
he can be delivered by God. "
Reply to Objection 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds,
to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same
deeds.
Reply to Objection 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they
are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which
is an effect of the divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with
temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God:
wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they
tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any
useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to
believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when
he had the means of flight. " The Blessed Agatha had experience of God's
kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness
as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is a sin to tempt God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God
has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the
same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all the
tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try
Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of
heaven. " Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.
Objection 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his
knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now
it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written
(Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and (Rom. 12:2):
"That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the
perfect will of God. " Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.
Objection 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from
sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when
the Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I
will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to
him: "Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are
grievous to my God also? " (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham (Gn.
15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I shall
possess it?
" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon
asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36,
sqq. ). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin
to tempt God.
On the contrary, It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written (Dt.
6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. "
I answer that, As stated above [3123](A[1]), to tempt a person is to
put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain.
Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either
in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its
qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove
it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it
is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's
perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in
order that the tempter himself may know God's power.
On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the
divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to
others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of
urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite
conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be
wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order,
to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law,
as stated above ([3124]Q[87], A[1]). Hence there was a motive of
urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive
of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted---"that there may be meat
in God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The
words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally, as
though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open the
flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if they
paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would
shower upon them.
Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or
will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to
prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other
knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and
thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and
complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom.
ii) that "he learnt divine thing through experience of them. " It is in
this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His
sweetness.
Reply to Objection 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him
alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was
reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the
common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because
he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it
was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign
through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to
have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be
excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying
to the angel (Lk. 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this? " so that he was
punished for his unbelief.
It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for
a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His word,
and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.
Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in
some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of
temptation of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to
the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man
doubts God, as stated above [3125](A[2]). Now doubt about God comes
under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore
temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer
prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,"
that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what
God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to
do. " Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.
Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in
their hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully,
with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts. " Now deceit
is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is
opposed, not to religion, but to truth.
On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is
to pray to Him inordinately. " Now to pray to God becomingly is an act
of religion as stated above ([3126]Q[83], A[15]). Therefore to tempt
God is a sin opposed to religion.
I answer that, As clearly shown above ([3127]Q[81], A[5]), the end of
religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains
directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is
evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since
no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it
is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3128]Q[81], A[7]), it belongs
to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of
reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that,
through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence
towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of
irreligion.
Reply to Objection 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by
forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way
disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by
God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or
indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and
without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards
Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . under the
mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present
thyself approved unto God. " Therefore also this kind of temptation is a
species of irreligion.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in
relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to
man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and
consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed
to the truth.
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Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin
than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now
the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was
the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of
superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their
number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The
Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand. "], whereas for the sin of
temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and
entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, "Your
fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath that they
should not enter into My rest. " Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin
than superstition.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it
would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a
species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition
which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a
graver sin than superstition.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave
disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe
to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all
(Malach. 1:6). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave
irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.
On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, "When there shall be found among
you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it
is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the
Creator. "
I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is
that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is
less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine
excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just
as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than
if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the
reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to
the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the
superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q[94], A[1], ad
1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of
the divine excellence, as stated above [3129](A[2]). Therefore the sin
of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.
Reply to Objection 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above
manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more
severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is
written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin
also of theirs. "
Reply to Objection 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as
regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as
regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of
God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence
that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine
reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine
excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
which can without sin be given to others.
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OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?
(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?
(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
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Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be
false?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that
the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ([3130]Q[89],
A[3]), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less
than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of
truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to
something unjust.
Objection 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the
thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more
weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is
confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to
consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the
human statement which is confirmed on oath.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are
deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:
"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who
knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were
true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement false,
and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he
says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer
while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for
perjury.
On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].
I answer that, As stated above ([3131]Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take
their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the
confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is
opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be
true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood
directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that
perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species
chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these
three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first
and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated
in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for
in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do
the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since
by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger
of lapsing into falsehood.
Reply to Objection 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight,
since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys.
ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than
the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man
swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that
kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by
swearing what is false.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is
the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it
will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If
something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false,
it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these
cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way,
on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is
formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is
material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much
of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For
Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how
the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty
except the mind be guilty. "
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Whether all perjury is sinful?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does
not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet
sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for
instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore
he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is
perplexed.
Objection 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes
by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not
to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore
not all perjury is sinful.
Objection 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to
be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that
he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter
order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly
not all perjury is sinful.
Objection 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation
of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may
swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on
the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the
statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made.
Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx),
in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast
and exterminate it from all human business. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3132]Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call
God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness
to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores
the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood.
Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it
belongs to show reverence to God.
Reply to Objection 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby
guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep
his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which
he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.
Reply to Objection 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not
to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of
judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of
perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is
doing could not be a matter of an oath.
Reply to Objection 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's
will, there is to be understood this requisite condition---that the
thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or
immoderate.
Reply to Objection 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man
becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil
whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of
fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his
share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.
The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past
and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the
statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as
stated above ([3133]FS, Q[96], A[4]).
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Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is
laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question
whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to
safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that
which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and
who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath.
Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid
occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their
oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to
be punished as for a mortal sin. " Therefore not all perjury is a mortal
sin.
OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on
St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a
greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels. " Now it is not
always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,
if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in
the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always
a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the
Gospels.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed
in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum
dilectus, de Ord. Cognit. ]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a
mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name. "
Therefore it is a mortal sin.
I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i,
2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so. " Now we know
that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or
even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of
God.
