No More Learning

And the structures which are repro- duced in this process and which tie it to what is known and capable of repetition (otherwise information could not be recognized as difference) simultaneously serve its reproduction and are adapted for it in the meanings they hold. Thus time becomes the dominat- ing dimension of meaning, and in this dimension the distinction of future and past becomes that distinction which defines time, start- ing with the before/after distinction. The connection between past and future is now nothing but an artificially arranged chronometry - and nothing more than would be necessary or impossible in terms of its natural essence. The present - the differential of the two tem- poral horizons which itself is neither future nor past - becomes the place where information solidifies and decisions have to be made. But the present is in itself only this point of change or only the position of the observer distinguishing future and past. It does not occur within time. One might suppose that it takes the paradox of a time which is no time from what was thought of before moder- nity as eternity, as the omnipresence of the God who observes all times at the same time. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that this modalization of time has a retroactive effect on communi- cation itself, above all in the dual form of fears and expectations.
We can take it that whatever people know about society and therefore about the world - and especially whatever can be com- municated with some prospect of being understood - comes about in this way. But thematically this does not say very much - apart perhaps from the fact that every statement draws the suspicion upon itself of wanting to say too much. It would not be enough to speak of a universal suspicion of ideology here,17 as even every scientifi- cally supported assertion is subject to the same suspicion as soon as it projects itself as an ontological assertion. But perhaps one can say that the mode of second-order observation has generally set-
? tied into place. Everything that is uttered is deciphered in terms of the one who utters it. News and in-depth reporting is likely to en- courage suspicions of underlying motives (which rarely take on any definite form), while entertainment encourages self-observation in the second-order mode, observation of one's own observing. Both the world and individuality are still perceived even then as a con- crete whole consisting of common characteristics; but always in such a way that one has mentally to include an observer w h o says that this is the way it is.
What is at issue here is no longer the old ontological duality of appearance and reality, which was thought of in principle as being ontologically separable or which as religion made reference to the hidden God. Rather, what is at issue is an understanding of reality which takes reality to be a two-sided form of the 'what' and the 'how' - of the 'what is being observed' and the 'how it is being observed'. And this corresponds precisely to the observation of communication with regard to a difference of information and ut- terance. Only when one takes this difference as a basis can one un- derstand anything - and "understand" is used here in the sense of endless possibilities for further exploration on the side of informa- tion or on the side of schemata (frames) and the utterer's motives.
Of course, all this is not to maintain that every participant in mass media communication reflects that he is experiencing thus. But neither is it a matter of a reserve for the 'educated classes'. Every empirical study will establish that there are different degrees to which this ambiguity of knowledge is processed, and the most easily accessible irritation may assume the form of mistrust. What- ever the psyche makes of this form of irritation is its own business; and an additional part of the picture is that there is no prescribed rule for this which would not immediately invite the same mistrust. Under these circumstances, it is only the conditions of communica- tion that can have a restricting effect. Only a little of what goes on in the consciousness can irritate communication. This will deter- mine the forms of intimacy which are still possible - that feeling of having been left all alone under precisely those conditions which make the opposite a possibility. But this too is reflected a thousand times over in the mass media,18 and thus itself becomes a knowl- edge which we owe to reading and to film.
? The reality of the mass media is the reality of second-order ob- servation. It replaces knowledge prescriptions which have been pro- vided in other social formations by excellent positions of observation: by sages, priests, the nobility, the city, by religion or bv politically and ethically distinguished ways of life. The differ- ence is so stark that one can speak neither of decline nor of progress. Here too the only mode of reflection remains that of second-order observation, that is, the observation that a society which leaves its self-observation to the function system of the mass media enters into precisely this way of observing in the mode of observation of observers.
The result of this analysis can be summed up under the term culture. Since its emergence at the end of the eighteenth century, this term has brought together reflexive and comparative compo- nents. In every last detail, culture knows and says of itself that it is culture. It fashions its own historically or nationally comparative distinctions - first with gestures of superiority for one's own cul- ture in comparison with others, and nowadays with more of an open, casual admission that cultures are many and varied. Even i f - and especially if - this variety exists, one might as well stick with one's own. The fashionable option of cultural diversity legitimates both a conservative basic attitude towards one's own culture and a merely touristic relationship to the others.
Culture in exactly this sense, culture in the sense of the reshaping of everything and anything into a sign of culture, is at once product and alibi of the mass media. Although one usually finds the oppos- ing theory, that the mass media and, in association with it, tourism ruin authentic culture, this is merely an inversion of reality, a mere protective assertion or perhaps a rhetoric which encourages one to search (in vain) for authentic experiences and which complements mass media information by means of tourism, museum visits, for- eign dance groups and suchlike. These kinds of 'supplements' in turn, however, only lead one into culturally aware, that is, staged worlds. 19 The marking of the difference between what one knows from the mass media and what one has really seen (and photo- graphed) right there on the spot, that is, of the difference between tele-tourism and real tourism, is itself a product of the mass media, through which they make themselves invisible as the ground of
? culture. The strange expression 'sightseeing' was introduced at the same time as photography and the rotary press. Without reproduc- tions there would be no originals, without mass media culture would not be recognizable as culture. And the fact that this reflexive cul- ture, this culture which knows itself as culture, produces its coun- ter-conceptuality of 'authenticity', 'actual-ness', 'spontaneity' etc. , just serves to confirm that what is involved here is a universal phe- nomenon which includes self-reference.
Let it be added at this point that this is not the same as asserting that culture has become a commodity in the form of signs. Such theories confuse system references. It goes without saying that peo- ple have to pay for newspapers and cinema visits, for tourism and sightseeing;20 but in this respect this operational domain remains a market, a part of the economic system. As such it is distinguished from other markets, other services, other products. Particular ex- periences and communications only become culture by being of- fered as signs of culture, and it is this that goes back to the institutionalization of second-order observation in the system of the mass media.
The mass media, with their continuous production of construc- tions of reality, undermine the understanding of freedom that is still prevalent. Freedom is still understood as the absence of coer- cion, as in natural law. Both liberal and socialist ideologies have used this concept of freedom and have quarrelled only over the sources of coercion - the state under the rule of law or capitalist society. The social 'innocence' of the mass media, their harmless- ness, is based on the fact that they coerce no one. This is true of all their programme strands, and especially so of advertising. In fact, however, freedom is based on the cognitive conditions of observa- tion and description of alternatives with an open, decidable, and therefore unknown future. Openness for other possibilities is con- structed into the way of the world which actually is determined (meaning simply: it is the way it is). Psychic and social systems empower themselves to choose. But this presupposes a recursively stabilized network of redundancies, that is, memory. We know that people can only fly in aircraft and not, for example, on magic car- pets. So the constructions of reality offered by the mass media have far-reaching effects on what can be observed as freedom in society,
? and in particular also on the question of how opportunities for personally attributable action are distributed in society. If we still define freedom as the absence of coercion, this function of the mass media to constitute freedom remains latent, or at least it is not discussed. One can only suppose that the mass media lead to an overestimation of others' freedom, whereas each individual is only too aware of the cognitive barriers to the amount of freedom he or she has. And this disbalancing of the attribution of freedom may have far more consequences in a society which at all levels has vastly expanded the scope for making decisions and has generated corre- sponding uncertainties, than the question of who definitively is be- ing forced to engage or not to engage in a particular action.
? The Reality of Construction
Every constructivist theory of cognition will find itself facing the objection that it does not do justice to reality, and this one is no different. In the traditional schema of human capacities, knowl- edge was distinguished from will, and only the will was acknowl- edged to have freedom of self-determination (capriciousness). Knowledge, on the other hand, was held to be subject to the resist- ance of reality and could not simply proceed in an arbitrary way without thereby failing to fulfil its function. However, this division of labour is already flawed inasmuch as from an empirical point of view there is no such thing as arbitrariness, and even self-determi- nation (autonomy) is only possible in a system which distinguishes itself from the environment and, whilst not being determined by its environment, is certainly irritated by it. But then the question as to how we are to understand the resistance with which reality con- fronts both knowledge and wanting only becomes more urgent. And if we wanted to relinquish the concept of resistance as an indi- cator of reality, we would have to do without the concept of reality or, breaking with tradition, develop a totally different concept of reality.
But that is not necessary. Hegel himself dealt with this problem in his Phenomenology of Spirit, in the chapter entitled 'Sense-Cer- tainty',1 but at that point he still thought the problem could be solved by the ultra-potency of the mind. All that has remained of this is the deferability (differance) of every distinction and with it the capacity of every construction to be deconstructed. At the same
? time, however, linguistics for its part offers an adequate adapta- tion of the concept of reality which, mutatis mutandis, we can adopt for a theory of social communication and therefore also for a theory of the mass media. Put briefly, it goes like this: resistance to lan- guage can only be put up by language itself and as a consequence, in so far as language is the point at issue, language itself generates its indicators of reality. 2 This is none other than what we have al- ready formulated using the concept of 'Eigenvalues'. The same would be true for the degree of alertness in conscious thought or tor the brain's neurophysiological mode of operation. All opera- tionally closed systems have to generate their indicators of reality at the level of their own operations; they have no other alternative. Resistance can then crop up internally as a problem of consistency, which is interpreted as memory, for example, even though it al- ways only manifests in the moment and has to be newly actualized time and again.
The more presuppositions upon which the operational closure of a system is based (that is, the more improbable from an evolu- tionary perspective), the more demanding and specific its tests of reality will turn out to be. This applies spectacularly to modern science. And it applies equally to the system of the mass media. We have already identified the mechanism used here. It consists in opin- ions about circumstances and events themselves being treated as events. This is how the system allows new blood to flow in; this it does in a way that is in precise correspondence with the system's code and its mode of operation. In this way the system itself is able to generate resistance to its own habits. It can produce 'changes in values', it can give preference to minority opinions that push them- selves to the fore, perhaps especially because they appear as spec- tacular, full of conflict, deviant, and therefore trigger the 'spiral of silence' identified by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. 3 So there are very many different individual possibilities, but they all basically lead to the media generating resistance to themselves.
A further possibility for testing the mass media's construction of reality lies in empirical social research. In contrast to what is widely assumed, the point of this kind of research lies less in the core do- main of scientific research, that is, in the verification and falsifica- tion of theories,4 and more in obtaining data as documentation for
? decisions in politics and the economy, or perhaps in correcting stereo- types which have developed and become established through the mass media's news and reporting - for instance, about the demotivation and 'drop-out' trend among youth at the end of the 1960s, or about the extent of discontent among the population living in the states of the former East Germany. The intention of making visible long-term changes (or even just fluctuations) which escape the attention of the mass media should also be acknowl- edged in this context. Special credit is due here to the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research; one gathers that no German university wanted to take on the burden of continuing this research. But even if one takes account of the independence of this research with due respect, it can only have an effect if the mass media take up its findings. Ultimately, then, it is the self-correction of an op- erationally closed system that is at issue in this instance as well.
Here too, being awarded the 'reality' seal of quality can only happen in a system which first generates inconsistencies in order then to construct whatever is to be taken as reality. This can be corroborated by biological epistemology, semiotics, linguistics and even sociology - and all these are empirical sciences (not arts! ). However, at the same time, this radical constructivism does not go very far, being limited by the realization that, at the level of first- order observation, illusion and reality and therefore also real real- ity and imaginary reality cannot be distinguished from one another. (Logicians would probably have to say: at this level, the systems do not have sufficient logical values at their disposal. ) Although it is possible to see through this illusion and represent it, it cannot be removed in a way that would mean it no longer occurred. And even second-order observation has to attribute reality to the ob- server whom it is observing. It can select him, but not invent him. This is simply because every observation has to work with the dis- tinction of self-reference and other-reference and must fill the func- tional position that is other-reference with some kind of content. To put it differently: it must use this distinction as its blind spot, for it cannot see (observe, describe) the fact that this distinction owes its existence to the paradox of re-entry.
Whereas subject-based epistemologies had already spoken of an inaccessible outside world but had foundered on the problem of
? the plurality of subjects, operational constructivism is based on the recursivity of its own systemic operations and, linked to this, on the system's memory which constantly applies tests of consistency to all the system's operations as they occur (without relating any of these to a 'subject', an author, an I). If you have guests and you give them wine, you will not suddenly be struck by the notion that the glasses are unrecognizable things in themselves and might only ex- ist as a subjective synthesis. Rather, you will think: if there are guests and if there is wine, then there must also be glasses. Or if vou receive a phone call and the person on the other end of the satellite turns nasty, you're not going to say to him: what do you want, anyway, you're only a construct of this telephone conversa- tion! You will not say this, because it can be assumed that the com- munication itself is carrying out tests of consistency and that it can be predicted how the communication will react to such unusual contributions.
The weak spot along the continuum of perception that is the world is, of course, thought, just as theory is the weak spot along the continuum of communication that is the world. For, at the level of thought and of theory formation, tests of consistency can lead to opposing outcomes. Both neurophysiology and language research force one to accept operationally closed systems, that is, opera- tional constructivism. But then one also has to see that perceptions and communications are dependent upon externalities and do not therefore include information which denies the existence of an out- side world. Individual participants' own autopoietic self-reproduc- tion in terms of life and consciousness is by no means called into doubt. On the contrary, it only becomes conceivable as the envir- onment of the autopoietic social system in its autonomy. The 'I' as the central phantom of recursivity of experience and action still lives from the body as the ground of all perception; but it finds itself additionally enriched and confused by what it knows through the mass media.
All this is also true of the reality of the mass media. Here too it is operationally not possible - and this can be known - to include the selectivity of published information in the recursivity of social com- munication. We react much as did Horatio, whom we have already quoted: 'So have I heard, and do in part believe it. '5 We might well
? doubt one or two details and each might find opportunities to enter into communication with particular opinions. But communication in the social system cannot exclude the framework of tests of con- sistency, recursivity. If it did, it would lose almost all daily neces- sary meaning.
The controversy surrounding constructivist theories of cognition becomes much less clear-cut when the complexity of the issues is elucidated and a plurality of distinctions is attached to it accord- ingly. Sociology and social theory in particular thus gain the ad- vantage of no longer having to rely upon the dogma of classical epistemologies. Instead they are able to seek out the ways and means in which reality is constructed and used as an experience of resist- ance in every place where autopoietic, operationally closed systems come into being. And the same goes for the domain of the mass media.
Perhaps the most important outcome of these considerations is that the mass media may generate reality, but a reality not subject to consensus. They leave the illusion of a cognitively accessible re- ality untouched. 'Radical constructivism' is indeed correct with its theory that no cognitive system, whether it operates as conscious- ness or as a system of communication, can reach its environment operationally. For its own observations it must keep to the distinc- tions it has itself made and thus to the distinction of self-reference and other-reference; and this is not only true for the system of the mass media itself, but also for all psychic and social systems that are irritated by it. But at the same time, it is also true that no cogni- tive system can do without assumptions about reality. For, if all cognition were held to be cognition's own construction and were traced to the way in which the distinction of self-reference and other- reference was handled, this distinction itself would appear para- doxical and would collapse. Other-reference would be merely a variant of self-reference. The idea of reality secures the autopoiesis of cognitive operations by its own ambivalence. It could either be an illusion or the 'reality principle' as psychiatry has it. 6 Either way, what remains important is that in its cognitive operations the sys- tem is forced, not all the time but only in certain instances, to dis- tinguish between the environment as it really is and the environment as it (the system) sees it.
? And what would be the exceptions? It seems to be the case that here in modern society, which secures its knowledge of the world through mass media, a change has come about. According to the classical model of the rationality of truth with its logical and onto- logical premises, it was only a question of ensuring that errors were avoided. The reasons for error played either no role at all or only a secondary one, namely, only when one wanted to avoid repeating the same error. It was assumed in principle that the error could be corrected at the point where it occurred, and the method recom- mended for this was specifically intended to neutralize the influ- ence of individual characteristics of systems seeking cognition. Provision for correcting errors was built into communication. For the modern world after Descartes and after Freud, this is no longer enough. The cognitive system that we now call 'subject' might infer self-confirmation from every cognition (be it true or untrue), be- cause in the end this is how it confirms its autopoiesis. But it is just this which no longer leads directly to confirmation of the reality value of the knowledge. Self-correcting mechanisms are comple- mented by self-accusing mechanisms. This happens with concepts such as 'projection' or with the highly fragile distinction of normal and pathological. Expanding the suspicion of motives in this way tendentially leads to a self-psychiatrization of communication. As has long been recognized, this includes the communication of psy- chiatrists or other therapists who are at risk of succumbing to their professional deformation. The distinction of normal and patho- logical does not say clearly where the boundaries are to be drawn. The fragility of this distinction, its capacity to be transferred into ever new terrains of suspicion, exactly reflects the functionally nec- essary ambivalence of the understanding of reality. Psychiatry it- self cannot do without a reality somehow guaranteed by the world; otherwise it would have to cease its own activity. In other words, it cannot really accept that it is simply pursuing its own projections with the assumption of pathologies. At the very least it will have to accept that there are more and less painful pathologies. 7
The distinction of a world not subject to consensus, one that can be touched on individually, could be a third solution to this prob- lem, and it seems that this is precisely the solution offered and dis- seminated by the mass media. One must simply be able to accept
? one's own way of looking at reality - and be able to distinguish. One must just beware of believing that it is generally valid, that it is reality per se. One must be in a position to adjust one's own contri- butions to communication according to this difference. One must be able to think or communicate with others on two levels at the same time (and by 'one' here, we mean, as always, both psychic and social systems). 8 Communication individualized in this way is neither obliged to represent itself as error or as pathological, nor compelled to dispense completely with a reference to reality which still hangs in the balance. It can quite harmlessly communicate it- self as well and leave it to further communication whether it will attend more to the motives for the utterance or to the topics.
If this is an accurate diagnosis, it becomes clear why fundamentalisms of every kind develop under these conditions of communication. One can step up and say: this is my world, this is what we think is right. The resistance encountered in the process of doing this is, if anything, a motive for intensification; it can have a radicalizing effect without necessarily leading to doubts about re- ality. 9 And unlike in the older model of 'enthusiasm',10 one does not need to rely on divine inspiration nor to give oneself over to the opposite assertion that this is an illusion. It is sufficient to weld together one's own view of reality with one's own identity and to assert it as a projection. Because reality is no longer subject to con- sensus anyway.
? The Function of the Mass Media
If, from this analysis, one wants to derive something about the so- cial function of the mass media, one must first return to a basic distinction, namely the distinction of operation and observation. Operation is the factual happening of events whose reproduction carries out the autopoiesis of the system, that is, the reproduction of the difference of system and environment. Observations use dis- tinctions to describe something (and nothing else). Observing is, of course, also an operation (otherwise it would not exist), but a highly complex operation which separates off what it is observing from what it is not observing with the aid of a distinction; and what it is not observing is always also the operation of observing itself. The operation of observing is in this sense its own blind spot, which is what enables something in particular to be distinguished and de- scribed in the first place. 1
We need the distinction of operation and observation in order to be able to examine in social theory an insight which is becoming widespread in biological evolutionary theory. This is the realiza- tion that the adaptation of living beings to their environment can- not be traced to cognitive capacities and achievements, but rather that life and adequate adaptation to it must always already be se- cured if a system which can develop cognitive capabilities is to exist. 2 Of course, in the first instance, this is no argument for the same being the case with social systems. But when one gets the problems clear in one's own mind, one soon realizes that if it were to be expected that a system ought to adapt to the environment via
? cognition alone, this would lead to every system demanding more of itself than it could possibly achieve operationally. This is neces- sarily the case if only because given the complexity of the environ- ment, the system does not have the 'requisitive variety' (Ashby). And even the concept of observation is meant to register that the world can never be observed, let alone understood, because every observation generates with an 'unwritten cross' an 'unmarked space' which it does not observe. 3 It is hard to see how systems of con- sciousness or communication-based social systems might break free from this disparity of system and environment. The question can only be what share an environment-related cognition has in the evolutionary opportunities of particular kinds of systems. But what must first be ensured is that the environment tolerates the autopoiesis of the system. In the case of the social system society, then, it must first be ensured that communication connects onto communication and that not every transition from one communication to another would have to keep a check on the entirety of environmental con- ditions necessary for this, that is, would have to communicate, amongst other things, about whether the participants are still alive. Under these conditions, therefore, cognition is primarily deployed in such a way that it is oriented to the inside. The first thing to be sure of is that one communication fits onto another. 4 What is im- portant, then, is adequate behaviour - and not, for example, whether there is enough air to carry a sound from one organism to another. If, unexpectedly, conditions are no longer given, this will be regis- tered as a disturbance and ways out will be sought (again by means of communication).
This leads to the fundamental question of how communication must be, in order that it can not only reproduce itself but also take on cognitive functions and separate reproductive or informational components.
The answer is that communication only comes about at all by being able to distinguish utterance and information in its self-observation (in understanding). Without this distinction, com- munication would collapse, and participants would have to rely on perceiving something which they would only be able to describe as behaviour. 5 The difference of utterance and information corresponds precisely with the requirement of not making the progress of com- munication to communication dependent upon information being
? complete and relevant. And only because this primary, constitutive difference exists can communication code itself in a binary form (for example, with regard to acceptable/not acceptable, relevant/ not relevant) and in this way feel its way around the environment with a distinction for which there is no correlate whatever in the environment itself. Without this distinction, which has been en- tered into its own operation, the system would not be capable of constituting any recognizable identities or developing any memory. Nor could it evolve, or build up its own complexity, or test the possibilities for structuration positively/negatively and thus meet the minimum condition for the continuation of its own autopoiesis. 6 Society as we know it would be impossible.
For the same reasons, no great expectations can be placed on the understanding of communication. Expectations can certainly be raised forcibly, but they then require special differentiated dis- courses. Normally, ambivalences and misunderstandings are borne along as well, as long as they do not block communication; indeed, understanding is practically always a misunderstanding without an understanding of the mis.
It is a big jump from these general systems-theoretical and social- theoretical considerations to the mass media of modern society. The function of the mass media lies after all that in the directing of self-observation of the social system7 - by which we do not mean one specific object amongst others, but a way of splitting the world into system (that is, society) and environment. What is involved is a universal, not an object-specific observation. We have already spoken, in another context,8 of the function of the system's memory which provides a background reality for all further communica- tions, which in turn is constantly reimpregnated by the mass me- dia. What is also involved is an observation which itself generates the conditions of its own possibility and in this sense occurs autopoietically. For the uncertainty as well as the distinctions used for observation are products of the system and are not simply pre- given attributes of the world or ontologically or transcendentally provable decomponates ('categories') of the unity of the world. This means also that the impetus for further communication is repro- duced within the system itself and cannot be explained anthropo- logically, as a drive for knowledge, for example.
? Therefore, one cannot comprehend the 'reality of the mass me- dia' if one sees its task in providing relevant information about the world and measuring its failure, its distortion of reality, its ma- nipulation of opinion against this - as if it could be otherwise. The mass media realize in society precisely that dual structure of repro- duction and information, of continuation of an always already adapted autopoiesis and cognitive willingness to be irritated. Their preference for information, which loses its surprise value through publication, that is, is constantly transformed into non-informa- tion, makes it clear that the function of the mass media consists in the constant generation and processing of irritation - and neither in increasing knowledge nor in socializing or educating people in conformity to norms. The descriptions of the world and of society to which modern society orients itself within and outside the sys- tem of its mass media arise as a factual effect of this circular perma- nent activity of generating and interpreting irritation through information tied to a particular moment (that is, as a difference which makes a difference).
Of course, it should not be implied that irritation happens only in the system of the mass media and not, for example, in marriages, in school lessons or in other interactions; just as power is present not only in the political system, standardizations not only in the law, truth not only in science. Irritability is the most general struc- tural characteristic of autopoietic systems, which in modern de- scription occupies that place once accorded to nature and to the essence of things defined as nature. 9 Irritability arises from the sys- tem having a memory that is actively involved in all operations and therefore being able to experience and balance out inconsistencies - which means nothing other than being able to generate reality. This points to a recursive constitutive context of memory, irritabil- ity, information processing, reality construction and memory. The differentiation of a function system specialized in this serves to improve and simultaneously normalize a means of communication likewise specialized in this. Only from the mass media do we ex- pect this special performance every day, and only thus is it possible to arrange modern society in its execution of communication in an endogenously restless way like a brain and thereby prevent it hav- ing too strong a link to established structures.
? In contrast to the function system of the mass media, science can be specialized in cognitive gains, that is, in social learning proc- esses, whilst the system of law takes on the ordering of expectation which is normative, held onto in spite of the facts and to this extent unwilling to learn. However, the cognitive/normative division be- tween science and law can never divide up among itself and thereby cover the entire orientational requirement of social communica- tion. Under normal circumstances social communication is oriented towards neither science nor the law. But neither can it be left in modern global society to the merely local everyday knowledge that is only found in the nearest vicinity. Accordingly, it seems to be the function of the mass media to remedy this neither cognitively nor normatively specified requirement. The mass media guarantee all function systems a present which is accepted throughout society and is familiar to individuals, and which they can take as given when it is a matter of selecting a system-specific past and establish- ing decisions about future expectations important to the system. Other systems, depending on their own requirements, can then adapt themselves to the past reference of their anticipation; for example, the economy can adapt itself to new circumstances in companies or in the market, and on this basis establish their own connections between their past and their future.
It was Parsons who saw that the particular contribution of the mass media to the 'interchanges' of modern society lies in the in- crease in levels of freedom of communication - analogous to the function of money in the economy. 10 This diagnosis can be broad- ened if one additionally takes into consideration the increase in society's capacity for irritation and the recursive interweaving of mass media communication with everyday communication in the interactions and organizations of society. On the one hand, the mass media draw communication in, on the other, they stimulate ongoing communication. 11 So they continuously apply new com- munication to the results of previous communication. In this sense they are responsible for the production of modern society's 'Eigenvalues' - those relatively stable orientations in the cognitive, the normative and the evaluative domain which cannot be given ab extra but rather arise out of operations being applied recursively to their own results. 12
? It seems that a centuries-old tradition has led us astray, with the result that mass media appear in an unfavourable light. The tradi- tion says that the stability of the social system rests upon consensus - or even on an explicitly/implicitly agreed social contract, and if no longer upon a commonly held religion, then at least on consen- sually accepted background convictions, encapsulated in Jiirgen Habermas's concept of lifeworld. Were this not the case, the mass media would be a destabilizing factor, only out to destroy these presuppositions and to replace them with something the French might call symbolic violence.
In fact, however, the stability (= reproductive capacity) of soci- ety is based in the first instance on the generation of objects, which can be taken as given in further communication. 13 It would be much too risky to rely primarily on contracts or on consensuses that can be called for as a normative requirement. Objects arise out of the recursive functioning of communication without prohibiting the opposing side. And they only leave residual problems for deciding the issue of whether one wants to agree or disagree. Modern soci- ety owes it to the mass media that such objects 'exist', and it would be hard to imagine how a society of communicative operations that extends far beyond individual horizons of experience could func- tion if this indispensable condition were not secured through the communication process itself.
This merely serves to re-confirm the fact that communication has a problem of time to solve in the first instance, and this also applies to the mass media in particular which operate under pres- sures of acceleration. The problem is how one gets from one com- munication to the next, especially if the social system has become highly complex and non-transparent to itself and takes on an enor- mous variety every day which it has to transfer as irritation over to communication. It is impossible to make this dependent upon a previously secured consensus that is to be made sure of operation- ally. On the contrary: every explicit communication poses the ques- tion of acceptance and rejection anew, puts consensus at stake, knowing full well that it is still possible to communicate further even and especially where dissent exists. Under modern conditions, this risking of dissent, this testing of communication by communi- cation, is more or less freed of any inhibitions. This is precisely
? vVhv communication has to be run alongside objects constituted by itself which can be treated as topics. It is therefore incumbent upon the mass media in the first instance to generate familiarity and vary it from moment to moment so that in the following communica- tion one can risk provoking either acceptance or rejection.
This analysis can be summarized in a theory of the memory of society. A system which is able to observe the system/environment difference generated by its operations needs a temporal double ori- entation for its observing operations (or, with Spencer Brown, for bringing about the re-entry of this difference into the system). This double orientation, comprising a memory on the one hand and an open future on the other, maintains the possibility of oscillating between the two sides of any distinction. 14 The problem which is posed for the social system and is essentially solved through the mass media is as follows: how memory function and oscillator func- tion can be combined if only the present, that is, practically no time at all, is available to do so. 15 And that is just another form of the old question as to how a complex system can secure sufficient re- dundancy and sufficient variety at the same time.
If one wants to describe the function of memory with regard to the future right from the start, one must let go of the psychologi- cally plausible idea that memory has the task, only needed occa- sionally, of recalling past events. Rather, memory is performing a constantly co-occurring discrimination of forgetting and remem- bering that accompanies all observations even as they occur. The main part of this activity is the forgetting, whereas only exception- ally is something remembered. For without forgetting, without the freeing up of capacities for new operations, the system would have no future, let alone opportunities for oscillating from one side to the other of the distinctions used in each instance. To put it an- other way: memory functions as a deletion of traces, as repression and as occasional inhibiting of repression. It recalls something, however short- or long-term, when the current operations offer an occasion to repeat, to 'reimpregnate' freed capacities. 16 It does not follow from this that memory operates with reference to the envi- ronment, serving the ongoing adaptation of the system to changing circumstances in its environment. It may indeed look that way to an external observer (with a memory of his or her own). However,
? in the system itself all that is going on is a constantly re-activated internal test of consistency, in which the memory performs recur- sions and organizes the system's resistance to surprising new de- mands placed on meaning. And as we have already said, it is through resistance of the system's operations to the system's operations that the system generates reality.
The feats of memory of communicative systems in general and of the mass media in particular are furnished by topics of communi- cation. For only that which can organize a sequence of contribu- tions and is open for future yes or no options will coagulate around a topic. Topics are extracts of communicative relevances, 'local' modules, as it were, which can be swapped and changed as re- quired. As a result they make possible a highly differentiated memory that can tolerate and indeed facilitate a rapid change of topic with the proviso of return to topics put aside at that moment.
All function systems have a memory specific to them. Thus, for example, the money economy has a memory that is designed to forget the origin of amounts of money paid in each instance, so that turnovers may occur more easily. 17 The memory of the mass media likewise functions internally to the system, but additionally produces functions appropriate for the entire social system. Obvi- ously this social use of the mass media constantly to link past and future is connected to the extremely high expectations of redun- dancy and variety which modern society poses and which it must attribute temporally and take account of via the distinction of past and future. For without this temporal, dimensional stretching, on- going reconstructed reality would collapse due to internal contra- dictions. And it is not least this which explains that this feat requires strong selectors which in turn must be protected by differentiation and operational closure.
? 14
The Public
It may be gathered from the preceding observations what kind of questions need to be asked about the 'function' of the mass media. They make a contribution towards society's construction of real- ity. Part of this includes a constant reactualization of the self-de- scription of society and its cognitive world horizons, be this in a form marked by consensus or dissent (for example, when the real causes of the 'dying of the forests' are at issue). The mass media may not have an exclusive claim on constructing reality. After all, every communication contributes to constructing reality in what it takes up and what it leaves to forgetting. However, the involvement of the mass media is indispensable when the point at issue is widespread dissemination and the possibility of anonymous and thus unpredictable uptake. As paradoxical as it may sound, this means not least, when it is a matter of generating non- transparency in reactions to this uptake. The effect if not the func- tion of the mass media seems to lie, therefore, in the reproduction of non-transparency through transparency, in the reproduction of non-transparency of effects through transparency of knowledge. This means, in other words, in the reproduction of future.
This at first paradoxical thesis, only resolvable through the distinc- tion of past and present that is present in each instance, can be treated further if one distinguishes between the system of the mass media and the public. In order to do this, we must first introduce a concept of the 'public' which differs clearly enough from the system of the mass media as well as from the concept of 'public opinion'.
? It seems that there has always been an element of unpredictability built into the concept of the 'public'. In classical juridical discourse, 'public' is defined by accessibility for everyone, that is, by the inad- missibility of control over access. In this sense, the printed prod- ucts and programmes of the mass media are public because there is no control over who pays attention to them. But from the point of view of this conceptual scheme, this is only part of the public. Pub- lic toilets are neither opinions nor a product of the mass media. The concept of accessibility refers in a real or metaphorical under- standing to space and to action. This limitation can be corrected if one switches from action to observation. Then, following Dirk Baecker's suggestion, one can define the public as a reflection of every system boundary internal to society,1 or again, as the envir- onment, internal to the system, of social subsystems, that is, of all interactions and organizations, but also of social function systems and social movements. The advantage of this definition is that it can be transferred onto social function systems. The 'market' would then be the environment, internal to the economic system, of eco- nomic organizations and interactions;2 'public opinion' would be the environment, internal to the political system, of political or- ganizations and interactions. 3
It still holds that system boundaries cannot be crossed over op- erationally. But it is also the case that every observing system can reflect this. It sees on the inside of its boundary that there must be an outside, otherwise the boundary would not be a boundary. If specific experiences of irritation repeatedly crop up internally, the system can assume that there are other systems in the environment which are responsible. If, on the other hand, the system reflects that it is being observed from outside, without it being established how and by whom, it conceives itself as observable in the medium of the public. This can, but need not, lead to an orientation to- wards generalizable (publicly defensible) points of view. Function- ally equivalent strategies are those of secrecy and hypocrisy.
Thematic groups around secrecy, simulation, dissimulation, hy- pocrisy come to be worked out especially in the (printed! ) litera- ture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and this occurs by no means merely as political theory going by the name of state reason, but is also exemplified in theatre, with reference to the
? market and for social behaviour per se. 4 In the eighteenth century, the emphatic demand of public life as a means for establishing rea- son came to be directed against this stress upon the necessity of social intercourse. But this is a rather narrow, as it were constitutionalized, concept of public life with demands such as free- dom of opinion, freedom of the press, abolition of censorship. The polemic itself is based on a much more general concept of the pub- lic, which forms the background to precisely such strategies as se- crecy and hypocrisy and later the effort to protect a 'private sphere'. Public life is therefore a general social medium of reflection which registers the non-exceedability of boundaries and, thus inspired, the observing of observations.
Even before an emphatic concept of public opinion arose towards the end of the eighteenth century, the printing press had been used to achieve public resonance for politically ambitious communica- tions and thus to expose decision-making authorities to the dual grasp of writing directed towards them and of its public resonance. In England, petitions directed at the crown and at parliament were printed as early as the seventeenth century, although they retained the form of a letter with address and deferential politeness. In France, the courts began in the eighteenth century to have their remonstra- tions directed at the king printed in order to play the public off against the sole acknowledged 'public person', the monarch. 5 Pub- lic accessibility of communications in the political apparatus of domination is thus expanded with the aid of the printing press, and only afterwards does the idea emerge of public opinion as the ulti- mate authority for the judging of political affairs. Although, in- deed because, the public cannot decide politically, but rather lies to an extent outside the boundaries of the system of politics, it is used politically in politics and copied into the system.
The function of the mass media would therefore be not the pro- duction but the representation of the public. And what is meant here is 'representation' in a 'contrasting', reductive sense. Precisely because the 'public' always describes the other, inaccessible side of the boundaries of all systems, including the mass media, and can- not be specified in the direction of particular partner systems, it is necessary to represent them in the form of constructions of reality in which all subsystems, indeed, all people, can have a part, with-
? out any obligation arising to go about it in a particular way. Thus the representation of the public by the mass media simultaneously guarantees transparency and non-transparency as events continu- ously happen, that is, particular thematic knowledge in the form of objects that are made concrete in each instance, and uncertainty in the issue of who is reacting to them and in what way.
As we have already noted repeatedly, this is an 'autological' con- cept. It applies also to the mass media themselves. By reproducing themselves as a system, they too generate boundaries with an in- side and an outside that is inaccessible to them. They too reflect their outside as public life, so long as specific external relation- ships, such as to politics or to the advertisers, are not in question. This reflection has for them, however, a different status, because their function becomes recognizable here. So there is largely no recourse to the functionally equivalent strategies of secrecy and hy- pocrisy, even if ultimately it is said hypocritically that there is no hypocrisy. A metaphorical redescription6 can attach to this - for example, in the form of professional ethics, which allows journal- ists to understand their efforts as a service to the public, and this as a justification for claims to autonomy and as a reason for neutral- ity of interests, and to institutionalize critical standards and profes- sional consensus for it. There is good reason for the restriction to journalism/profession/ethics if it is the self-regulation of the system of the mass media that is at stake. It also offers a starting point for an independence, however Utopian, from the desires of the audi- ence or of particular interest groups. But these achievements have to be bought with a severely restricted concept of autonomy. Here and here alone, therefore, is there reason to speak, in what is in itself a paradoxical sense, of 'relative autonomy'.
? 15
Schema Formation
The discussion thus far has opted decisively and exclusively for the system references 'society' and 'mass media' and has banished eve- rything else in their 'environment'. This involved disregarding indi- viduals as living bodies and as systems of consciousness. True, we were able to speak of individuals, and in fact no system of the mass media can get by without naming names or conveying images of people. But those are obviously only topics of communication or objects that have been depicted, and in every case it is due to deci- sions in the system of the mass media, that is, to communications, whether or not they are named or shown. It is not the individuals themselves. It is only persons, only 'Eigenvalues', which every com- munication system has to generate in order to be able to repro- duce itself. 1
Obviously, the theory of operational closure of autopoietic sys- tems does not say that these systems could exist without any envi- ronment. The suspicion of 'solipsistic' existences was always an absurd one and says more about whoever formulates it as an objec- tion than about the theory being attacked itself. Certainly, cogni- tive systems are unable to reach their environment operationally, and so they cannot know it independently from their own struc- tural formations. Nonetheless, there are structural couplings be- tween autopoietic systems and systems in their environment which are compatible with autopoiesis. They do not bring about any de- termination of systems' conditions through conditions or events in the environment. Systems can only determine themselves, and this
? they can only do through self-generated structures. But massive and repeated irritations can still arise, each of which is then proc- essed into information within the system. Viewed over the longer term, structural development is thus explained by the constant sup- ply of irritations from certain sources - and by the lack of stimuli on the part of other segments of the environment. Maturana called this evolutionary tendency 'structural drift'.
Of course, this coupling in the relationship of individuals and social systems presupposes that individuals are able to perceive, that is, externalize an environment worked out internally. More- over, it depends upon the perceiving of others' perceiving - other- wise no individual could generate anything that was meant to be perceived by others. Equally without doubt, language must be avail- able, for perception as well as for communication. But these pre- suppositions do not offer us any hypotheses about the direction taken by structural drift when knowledge of the world is generated almost exclusively by the mass media. We still lack a concept, for example, which might explain (or which might lead to hypotheses which might explain) how knowledge of the world arising from life in the family households of traditional society is suppressed or cov- ered over by participation in the output of the mass media. For this issue, a repertoire that has provoked broad discussion with terms such as schema, cognitive map, prototype, script, frame might be useful. 2
These are psychological terms, but ones that are increasingly being used to explain social coordinations or so-called 'collective' behav- iour. 3 Their starting point is memory's need to discriminate con- stantly in the torrent of operations which occupy a system between forgetting and remembering, because without forgetting, the ca- pacities of the system for further operations would very quickly be blocked and, to put it another way, one would only ever be able in future to experience or do the same thing. Forgetting sets you free. But since for its part forgetting cannot be remembered, one needs a schema that regulates what is retained and can be reused. These may be schemata of perception which enable the gaze to be focused and the unfamiliar to be recognized by setting it against what is familiar. But they may also be more abstract categoriza- tions, or both at the same time if, for example, people's qualities or
? behaviour are inferred from racial characteristics. Schemata do not force repetitions to be made, neither do they specify action. In fact, their function is precisely to generate space for freely chosen be- haviour in a system which with its own past has put itself in the state (and in no other) in which it currently finds itself. This is what abstraction (not necessarily conceptual) is for, the disregarding of . . . , the repression of the countless details which mark situations as unique and unrepeatable. But abstraction also means that new situ- ations can modify the schema. The schema allows for supplements and replenishments; it cannot be applied 'schematically'. 4 Devia- tions come as a surprise because of the schema; they become con- spicuous and thus imprint themselves on the memory. Schemata are instruments of forgetting - and of learning; they are limitations to flexibility which make flexibility within prestructured barriers possible in the first place.
As Kant taught us,5 schemata are not images but rather rules for accomplishing operations. The circle schema, for example, is not the depiction of any circle, but the rule for drawing a circle. The diversity given to the inner meaning in the form of time differences can only be reconstructed as procedures (also presupposing time) for purposes of knowledge. For Kant, this copying of time from the empirical over into the transcendental sphere was the reason why a relationship of similarity could be assumed in spite of the radical difference of objects and ideas. This problem does not arise if one takes on board a radically constructivist epistemology. But it re- mains the case that schemata are not images which become con- cretely fixed at the moment of depiction; they are merely rules for the repetition of operations (which then are concrete again). Thus, memory does not consist of a supply of images which one can look at again whenever necessary. Rather, it is a question of forms which, in the ceaseless temporal flow of autopoiesis, enable recursions, retrospective reference to the familiar, and repetition of operations which actualize it.
Schemata can refer to things or to persons. The utility meaning of things is one schema, the hierarchies among people or standard- ized role expectations are another. 'Script' refers to the special case where temporal successions are stereotyped (for example, the fact that we are supposed to buy a ticket before getting on a train). The
? observation of causal relationships typically follows a script be- cause it cuts out other, equally realistic possibilities for causal attri- bution. 6 It is only by way of a script that one comes to attribute effects to actions. A script is therefore an already fairly complex schema which also cuts out many things and presupposes both a stereotyping of events and a standardized coupling of their succes- sion. If thing or person schemata are linked to a script, it also means that the observer is no longer free to choose between object schema and time schema or to let his or her gaze oscillate, but that object schema and time schema enter a relationship of mutual depend- ence where the one cannot be chosen without consideration of the other. We have already considered such a case using the example of the narrative structure of novels: the sequence of actions charac- terizes the people whose motives then make the sequence of actions understandable again - with sufficient scope for surprises.
Now, we assume that the structural coupling of mass media com- munication and psychically reliable simplifications uses, and indeed generates, such schemata.